People v. Pelo (404 Ill. App. 3d 839, 2010)

JUSTICE STEIGMANN

delivered the opinion of the court:

In June 2006, the State charged defendant, Jeffrey Pelo, a Bloomington police sergeant, with 37 counts of criminal conduct originating from two separate cases (McLean County case Nos. 06 — CF—581 and 06 — CF—679). Specifically, the State alleged that between December 2002 and June 2006, defendant committed a series of crimes involving the stalking, intimidation, home invasion, residential burglary, unlawful restraint, and aggravated criminal sexual assault of five women from the Bloomington-Normal community.

In June 2008, a jury convicted defendant of all 37 counts. Following an August 2008 sentencing hearing at which the trial court (1) merged several of defendant’s convictions pursuant to the one-act, one-crime rule and (2) imposed several statutorily mandated sentencing enhancements, the court sentenced defendant to a series of consecutive terms of imprisonment, totaling 440 years.

Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court erred by (a) allowing the State to introduce into evidence dozens of exhibits involving, among other things, graphic pornographic images and text, including depictions of rape, found in defendant’s home computer, (b) denying his motion for change of venue, (c) excluding the testimony of his expert witness, and (d) failing to question jurors regarding the presumption that he was innocent until proven guilty; (2) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he sexually assaulted one of the victims, A.M.; and (3) his sentencing enhancements for the aggravated criminal sexual assaults against victims K.H., A.L., and S.K. violate the proportionate-penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (111. Const. 1970, art. I, §11). Because we agree only that defendant’s last argument requires remand, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with directions.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Charges in This Case

1. Case No. 06 — CF—581

In June 2006, the State charged defendant with (1) attempt (residential burglary) (720 ILCS 5/8 — 4, 19 — 3(a) (West 2006)), alleging that defendant attempted to gain entry into J.E’s residence with the intent to commit a felony or theft and (2) stalking (720 ILCS 5/12 — 7.3(a)(2) (West 2006)), alleging that defendant “followed and/or surveilled” J.E on at least two separate occasions, placing her in reasonable apprehension of immediate or future bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement, or restraint. These offenses allegedly occurred in 2005 and 2006.

2. Case No. 06 — CF—679

In August 2006, the State charged defendant with 35 counts involving crimes it alleged that he committed against S.K., A.L., K.H., and A.M., which took place between December 2002 and June 2006.

a. The Counts Involving S.K.

The State charged defendant with home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12— 11(a)(1), (a)(3) (West 2006)), in that he entered S.K’s home with a firearm and knife, threatening S.K. with the imminent use of those weapons (counts I and II); aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 — 14(a)(1), (a)(8) (West 2006)), in that he sexually penetrated S.K’s vagina and anus by the use of force, while armed with a firearm and knife (counts III through XX); (3) residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19 — 3(a) (West 2006)), in that he entered S.K’s home with the intent to commit a felony (count XXI); (4) aggravated unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/10 — 3.1(a) (West 2006)), in that he unlawfully detained S.K. with a firearm or knife (count XXII); and (5) intimidation (720 ILCS 5/12 — 6(a)(1) (West 2006)), in that he threatened to harm S.K’s family if she reported the sexual assault (count XXIII).

b. The Counts Involving A.L.

The State charged defendant with (1) home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12 — 11(a)(1) (West 2006)), in that he entered A.L.’s home and threatened her with a knife (count XXIV); (2) aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 — 14(a)(1) (West 2006)), in that he penetrated A.L.’s vagina, while threatening her with a knife (count XXV) ; (3) residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19 — 3(a) (West 2006)), in that he entered A.L.’s home with the intent to commit a felony (count XXVI) ; and (4) aggravated unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/10 — 3.1(a) (West 2006)), in that he detained A.L. at knifepoint (count XXVII).

c. The Counts Involving K.H.

The State charged defendant with (1) aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 — 14(a)(1), (a)(8) (West 2006)), in that he sexually penetrated KH.’s vagina by the use of force, while armed with a firearm and an object that he led K.H. to believe was a dangerous weapon (counts XXVIII through XXXI).

d. The Counts Involving A.M.

The State charged defendant with (1) aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 — 14(a)(1) (West 2006)), in that he sexually penetrated A.M.’s vagina by the use of force, while armed with a knife and an object he led A.M. to believe was a dangerous weapon (counts XXXII through XXXV).

In October 2006, the State filed an amended motion for joinder and consolidation in both cases (case Nos. 06 — CF—581 and 06 — CF— 679), which the trial court later granted.

B. Pretrial Issues in This Case

Prior to defendant’s jury trial, which began in May 2008, the trial court addressed, in pertinent part, (1) defendant’s request (a) for a change of venue and (b) to limit the State’s evidence and (2) the State’s request to bar defendant’s eyewitness-identification expert.

1. Defendant’s Request for a Change of Venue

In February 2008, defendant filed a motion for change of venue, asserting that the “substantial publicity *** in the local print and electronic media, circulated [and] broadcast [in the] county, *** aro [used] and incite [d] the passions of the community to [his] prejudice.” Following a March 2008 hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion without prejudice, explaining its ruling as follows:

“[T]he [c]ourt has a duty to *** ensure that *** defendant receives a fair trial. That *** includes a trial in front of a fair and impartial jury. ***

[However], the mere fact that there has been potentially harmful publicity in the community in and of itself *** does not establish that there is community prejudice sufficient to warrant a change of [venue], *** [The court] think[s] it is *** clear *** that jurors are not required to be completely ignorant of the case; but rather, *** it must be shown that the jurors may set aside any impressions or opinions that they may have *** and render a verdict based only on the evidence presented at trial.

The other principle *** [that] the [c]ourt is required to be guided by *** is that *** examination of the prospective jurors is the best way, the most valuable [way to] determinfe] whether *** pretrial publicity has rendered a fair trial in a certain location to be impossible.

*** [T]he [c]ourt’s belief [is] that voir dire is intended to do just that, [which] is to ensure that those jurors who are selected and sworn to hear the evidence are not going to be influenced by any pretrial publicity. ***

The [c]ourt does not believe that the subject matter of publicity [that] has been presented in this case *** indicates that it would be impossible to find 12 jurors and several alternatives *** from this county, but of course[,] the [c]ourt can’t hold that because we haven’t begun the selection of the jurors yet. ***

For all those reasons, the [c]ourt does not believe that the granting of a motion for a change of [venue] is appropriate at this time. The motion for change of [venue] is denied. With regard to that motion, of course, *** defendant has the right to renew that motion ***.”

2. Defendant’s Request To Limit the State’s Evidence

In November 2007, the State filed a motion in limine, seeking to use evidence of defendant’s “other misconduct,” which included pornography recovered from defendant’s home computer, to show defendant’s identity; motive; intent; modus operandi; the existence of a common scheme, plan, or design; or continuing narrative. Specifically, the State sought permission to introduce evidence related to case Nos. 06 — CF—581 and 06 — CF—679—that is, evidence of all the charges against defendant and other related misconduct — interchangeably because all of the incidents (1) involved (a) similar victims; (b) restraint of the victim; (c) prior surveillance; (d) the use of similar equipment, tools, and habiliments; (e) a linear progression of time spent at the crime scene; and (f) a suspect who was wearing similar clothing, and (2) occurred at approximately the same time of day.

Defendant broached the other-bad-acts evidence issue at a hearing on several pending motions, as follows:

“[The State] *** filed a motion to let it in. [T]he first thing I was going to address here was that [the State] need[s] to identify what information they are going to try to bring in to show identity, motive, intent, modus operandi, [and] common scheme, plan[, or] design. ***

I don’t know how looking [at] pornography is going to tend to identify [defendant] as the attacker of these women, how it shows motive, intent, modus operandi, or any other existence of a common scheme, plan, or design. I think this motion needs to be addressed before we go to trial ***.”

At a May 2008 hearing, the prosecutor responded as follows:

“[I]t is the State’s intention to show[,] *** through *** images on *** defendant’s computer!,] *** motive, *** intent, *** a design or resolve ***, [and] modus operandi ***.

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[A]s I have presented to the [c]ourt, the bullet points from the four sexual assaults in this case [(case No. 06 — CF—679)], *** from the way those assaults occurred [and] the items that we have found and located on *** defendant’s computer, he was acting in a very [specific] capacity. *** [T]he ones that stands out the most [is K.H.’s], She was assaulted back on April 4[,] 2003. During that time, *** defendant had her remove the duct tape that he had placed on her and instructed her to put her finger in her vagina, [and] told her to put in the vibrator ***[.] [H]e also made the statement [that he wanted] her to do those acts because it gets him off. When you look at the images that were located on *** defendant’s computer, the endless streams of individuals *** having items inserted into them, *** female masturbation, it was certainly something that he was interested in [and] enjoyed watching, not only on the computer, but also during the acts when these sexual assaults were committed. Numerous images on the computer *** are images of foreign objects being placed inside of the women. And in *** [S.K.’s] assault! ], *** [a] vibrator was used. He forced her to use her hand. And, [in the case of A.L.], asked her for sex toys[,] said he enjoyed penetrating masturbation by women, [and] mentioned a beer bottle to be used on her. And [the court] can see images on these exhibits *** where *** beer bottles *** were being used. In each of the four assaults [in case No. 06 — CF—679] *** weapons were being displayed ***. *** [S]pecific graphic images of forced fellatio [show] *** a knife [being] held to the victim’s head and [in] another a gun is held to the victim’s head. And that[ ] specifically happened in these cases. *** I submit to the [c]ourt that *** what the images show on the computer is just as he directed the victim. This is what he enjoyed. This is what gets him off, and what he was [looking at] on the computer [was] the same [thing] he was doing with these victims.

Again, every one of the victims were bound, attempted to be bound, ropes around their necks. *** And when [the court] look[s] at the images on the computer, just about every one of the forced sex categories has the women, not only bound, but [also] ropes and bindings around their neck. In *** one video, it showed two women being bound. [During A.M.’s attack], he was asking constantly about her roommate and asking where she was at[,] *** comment-ting] *** that if the roommate was home, he would do the same thing to her. ***

As for the videos that showed the forced witness, the State believes that those videos are important [because] *** each time *** defendant raped these four victims, he constantly was asking them about boyfriends and asking them specifically about others that they were involved with. And when [S.K.] was trying to speak with him, trying to show that she was a human being and not just an object, she was referring to her upcoming wedding. And when *** defendant heard this ***, *** he seemed to get very happy that a third party was going to be devastated by his actions. And I think that *** the videos that he was watching [show that] he did enjoy devastating, not only his victims, but also the victim [s’] families and those around [them], *** And again, *** covers were put over [the victims’] heads, pillowcases, pillows to blind them. [There were] numerous images *** showing the same type of activity. [A]gain, weapons were used in each [assault], knives or pistols or, on more than one occasion, both of those were used. These images *** show a common design, a common scheme in *** defendant’s activities. And we do feel that they are relevant and more probative than prejudicial on these select images as to the conduct of *** defendant engaged in [the] aggravated criminal sexual assaults against these victims.”

The defense responded as follows:

“The State referred to several reasons for bringing [in] this type of evidence. First of all, [the State] mentioned motive. Motive is a reason why some [one] does something. *** These images do not relate to motive in any way. Intent is used to show lack of mistake or accident. Some[one] obviously contemplates something. *** Again, watching a video does not go to intent.

[There] is not anything really unique about the videos or the assault[s] which is going to be showing modus operandi.

And for identity, *** nothing in these videos helps the State identify [defendant] as being the attacker of any one of these women.

* * *

Not only does the State have a problem [with] not being able to show the images were viewed *** by *** defendant ***, all they can [prove] is that the images were found on a computer located in his home and that he wasn’t at work [at that time], *** [L]ooking at the *** computer images, [even] if [the State] can *** prove [defendant looked at these images], [Hooking at those images does not tend to prove or disprove or make more likely or less likely that he sexually assaulted any of the complaining witnesses and should be excluded.”

After a short recess to consider counsel’s arguments, accompanying motions, and pertinent case law, the trial court made the following ruling:

“With regard to the [State’s] motion regarding computer evidence, the [c]ourt has carefully considered all of the evidence presented today ***.

The issue is similar [to each] of the issue[s from] the [series of] earlier motion[s] and that is whether *** evidence of other bad acts is admissible in this case. *** [T]his is obviously not a situation where the State is seeking admission of this evidence under the propensity statute!.] *** [H]ere[,] we’re talking about what can be termed *** bad acts or other conduct!, which is] the alleged viewing of various types of pornography on a home computer.

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*** [T]here are certainly similarities in each of the charged offenses. There are factors that are common to all of them and primarily those involving the victims being bound in some way. Obviously, force being used, objects being used, and weapons being used, either knives or firearms. Those common elements are present in all four [assaults],

*** The evidence itself, the pornography ***, much of what was presented today has elements that are common with those elements found in the offenses here, specifically[,] *** bondage, use of weapons, use of objects, and *** use of force. In very carefully considering all of those factors, the first question the [c]ourt has to decide is whether the evidence offered is relevant ***. The [c]ourt believes that the evidence presented by the State here today, the pornography evidence, is relevant to those aspects that are shared by some of the items presented in the offensefs] here; that being, specifically, the forced sex or rape websites and photographs, the bondage, the use of foreign objects, and *** the viewing of female masturbation. Those are all common elements between the *** tendered or proffered evidence and the evidence of the offenses. *** There are some items that are being offered, however, that [the court does not] think are relevant. [Specifically,] those websites and the videos that had to do with *** forced witness ***. Those videos called [‘]forced witness[’] as well as the video that ended with a shower scene ***, the [c]ourt just doesn’t see that as relevant. *** So the bottom[-]line ruling is that [the court] *** find[s] that those sites and photographs and images that have to do with forced sex, rape, bondage, the use of foreign objects, and observations of female masturbation are relevant. The others regarding forced witnesses and the shower video are not relevant to the charges.

[T]hat leaves us with the question [of whether] *** the probative value of those items [is] outweighed by its prejudicial [e]ffect[.] Obviously, the introduction of these items would have some prejudicial [e]ffect. *** Otherwise, the State wouldn’t be seeking to introduce it. *** The [c]ourt believe[s] that the probative value is high. The prejudicial [e]ffect is also high. And so the balancing has to be done very carefully.

* * *

[Having] go[ne] through all of the case law *** and [having] weighed the prejudicial effect of the photographs against their probative value. *** After carefully considering it, the [c]ourt believes that the probative value of these websites and photographs does, in fact, outweigh the prejudicial [e]ffect of their admission in this case. With the exception of those that [that court] ha[s] indicated are not relevant, the [c]ourt will allow the [State’s] motion in limine ***. The [c]ourt will deny the motion as it pertains to those items from the forced witness websites and the video involving the shower.”

3. The State’s Request To Bar Defendant’s Expert

In March 2008, the State filed a motion in limine, seeking to bar defendant’s eyewitness identification expert, Dr. Solomon Fulero. Specifically, the State requested, in pertinent part, that the trial court bar Fulero from testifying because Fulero’s testimony would not aid the trier of fact in rendering its verdict. In April 2008, defendant responded, arguing that Fulero would aid the jury because issues with mistaken identification were a general problem in criminal trials, particularly in cases involving sexual assault.

Following an April 7, 2008, hearing on the State’s motion to exclude Fulero, the trial court found as follows:

“With regard to the other argument the State has presented that expert testimony is generally not admissible in the area of eyewitness identification[,] *** the Illinois Supreme Court and the reviewing courts have cautioned trial courts in allowing expert testimony in this area. *** I am not certain that it should be characterized as the State has in that the rule is that it is not generally admissible. [R]ather[,] the recent cases indicate that trial courts need to be very cautious about allowing such evidence because *** it tends to invade the province of the jury in determining credibility of witnesses. *** There has been some evidence presented about certain identification. [The court does not] know if there is other identification that [it] hasn’t heard about.

[F]rankly[, the court is] very frustrated at that. [The court is] at a loss in how to *** rule on this motion without [knowing what] the evidence *** is going to be.

So[, the court’s] ruling on the State’s [m]otion *** [is] this; the motion is allowed unless and until the court is presented with certain evidence that this eyewitness expert has real probative evidence that does not invade the province of the jury in determining credibility of witnesses.”

On April 21, 2008, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s order, barring Fulero’s testimony. At a hearing on that motion held three days later, the court denied defendant’s motion for failure to make a specific offer of proof.

C. Jury Selection in This Case

1. The Trial Court’s Admonishments and Questions Related to the Presumption of Innocence

In May 2008, the trial court addressed the parties as follows:

“We will begin the jury[-] selection process in this case shortly. But before we do that, *** we need to make a bit of a record ***. We had a discussion regarding the jury selection process and to briefly summarize, the [c]ourt is summoning [40] potential jurors to the courtroom here in a few minutes. Upon their arrival, the [c]ourt will be engaging in some opening remarks to the potential jurors regarding the nature of the case, discussing the charges that are pending, indicating the names of potential witnesses, and introducing the parties and the attorneys to the jurors. *** [W]hen the opening remarks are completed, the clerk will call the names of the first four jurors on the list that have been provided to counsel. Those four potential jurors will remain in the courtroom for individual questioning by the [c]ourt and attorneys. The remaining [36] jurors will be excused back to the jury assembly room after the [c]ourt has admonished them ***. Those [36] jurors will remain in the jury assembly room in a separate area from the other potential jurors who are here for trial in the building today until they are needed again in the courtroom.”

Shortly thereafter, the trial court explained to the 40-person pool of potential jurors, among other things, (1) what the court expected of them generally and (2) how the jury-selection process would work. Specifically, the court explained its expectations as follows:

“Ladies and gentlemen, in this case, [defendant], as with any other person who is charged with a crime, is presumed innocent of the charges that bring him before you. This presumption is with him now at the onset of this trial, and it will remain with him throughout the course of the proceedings ***. [This] is not overcome unless and until each of you individually and collectively are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that *** [defendant is guilty. It is absolutely essential as we select this jury that each of you understands and employs these certain fundamental principles; that is, that all persons charged with a crime are presumed to be innocent. And it is the burden of the State *** to prove *** [defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. What this means is that *** [defendant has no obligation to testify in his own behalf or to call any witnesses in his defense. ***

The fact that *** [defendant chooses not to testify must not be considered by you in any way in arriving at your verdict. ***

The bottom line, however, is that there is no burden upon *** [defendant to prove his innocence. It is the State’s burden to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

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The [c]ourt and counsel are going to begin questioning you in panels of four ***.”

The court then seated the first four potential jurors. As part of its questioning, the court asked the group of four, in pertinent part, the following questions, to which the jurors responded as a unit:

“[THE COURT: W]hen [the court] was addressing the entire group, [it] touched on some general principles of the law that apply to all criminal cases. Now, one of those was the presumption of innocence. Do each of you understand and accept that this means that *** [defendant does not need to prove his innocence?

Seeing all positive responses.

[THE COURT:] Do each of you understand that he does not need to testify, and that if he chooses not to testify, that you must not consider that in any way in arriving at a verdict? Each of you understand that?

Seeing all positive responses.”

The court asked the same questions to each successive group of similarly situated potential jurors.

2. Defendant’s Renewal of His Motion for Change of Venue

On the third day of jury selection, defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges and shortly thereafter renewed his motion for change of venue, arguing that the venire had “formed opinions in this case.” The trial court denied defendant’s motion, finding as follows:

“Thus far in the jury[-]selection process, [the court and the parties] have interviewed thirty-eight individuals. Defendant has made a challenge for cause on several of those individuals based on what they said about opinions that they held [in light of local] media coverage. The [c]ourt has granted several of those motions. The [c]ourt has denied several motions for cause on the grounds that the [c]ourt found that the responses of those jurors, while they indicated they had perhaps read or heard things and formed some sort of opinion, they were either not familiar with any facts in the case, and they also indicated that they could set aside their opinions and what they may have read and still judge the case only on the law and the evidence. The [c]ourt believes that the rulings in regard to all of those challenges for cause that were denied [were] appropriate. And, obviously, *** defendant has used some peremptory challenges for a couple of those jurors ***. *** [A]t this point, [the court] think[s] the record is pretty clear that [this case] has not *** even come close to reaching the point of impossibility of selecting a fair and impartial jury in this county.”

D. Defendant’s Trial

1. The State’s Evidence

At defendant’s trial — which began in May 2008 — the State called more than 60 witnesses to testify that between December 2002 and June 2006, defendant — a Bloomington, Illinois, police sergeant — committed a series of signature crimes against women in the BloomingtonNormal community. The State presented evidence that defendant (1) used his resources as a police officer to discover the personal information of a number of individuals, including some of the victims; (2) ran his own license plate number following one of the sexual assaults to determine whether his vehicle had been reported; (3) viewed graphic pornography on his home computer that depicted women (a) being raped, abused, and assaulted with, among other things, beer bottles and (b) pleasuring themselves with their fingers and various sex toys; (4) had access to a hooded sweatshirt labeled “England,” which he may have purchased on a family vacation to London, England, several years before the sexual assaults; (5) owned (a) black gloves with velcro wristbands, (b) rope, (c) black ski masks, (d) a black coat, (e) folding knives, and (f) multiple guns; and (6) had (a) been seen peering into residential windows, (b) been seen driving his personal vehicle early in the morning by fellow Bloomington police officers, who described him as having acted suspiciously, and (c) followed and investigated J.K., as well as removed the screens from her apartment window.

a. Evidence Related to A.M.

A.M. testified that in December 2002, she awoke at 4:30 a.m. to discover an intruder standing in the doorway to the bedroom of her Bloomington apartment. He was shining a flashlight at her. She “freaked out.” He ran over to her and covered her mouth with his hands. He put “twine” around her neck, which she convinced him to remove by promising not to scream. He then put a knife against her head and ordered her to take off her shorts and underwear. She resisted. He told her that if she did not comply, he would cut her throat. She complied, and he inserted his finger into her vagina and then performed oral sex on her. He then ordered her to roll over onto her stomach. He put his fingers into her vagina again. He said, “Tell me why I shouldn’t rape you.” She responded that she did not know. He abruptly stopped, told her to put her face in her pillow, said he would be “right back,” and walked out of her bedroom. When she heard the apartment door shut, she locked the bedroom door and called the police. She added that at some point during the assault, he told her that he had been (1) watching her from across the street and (2) planning to do the same thing to her roommate.

A.M. described the intruder as a white male who was wearing a black ski mask, black “Carhartt” coat, and jeans. She also told the jury that her (1) license plate at the time of the assault read “AMOJO 58” and (2) roommate’s license at the time of the assault read “LACYJO 5.” Those two license plates, “AMOJO 58” and “LACYJO 5,” were run — for no apparent legitimate law enforcement reason— the month before A.M.’s assault by “JPELO,” using the Bloomington police department’s Law Enforcement Agency Data System (LEADS). That same month, someone logged in as “J. Pelo” at the Bloomington police department accessed A.M.’s parents’ personal information through the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database.

b. Evidence Related to K.H.

K.H. testified that in April 2003 she went to sleep in her Bloomington apartment around 12:30 a.m. Sometime after she went to sleep, she awoke to find an intruder standing in her doorway, shining “a small round light” on her. The next thing she knew, the man was on top of her. He put his gloved hand over her mouth and told her not to scream. He said that he did not want to hurt her, but that if she screamed, he would shoot her.

The intruder ripped the sheets from K.H.’s bed. He then tied her hands behind her back with “zip ties” and rolled her over to duct-tape her mouth. She complained that the zip ties were too tight. He cut the zip ties off and bound her wrists with duct tape. He also placed duct tape across her mouth, eyes, and head. He then placed one of her pillowcases over her head. He proceeded to suck on her right nipple. He then licked her vagina and clitoris, placing a gun on her chest and threatening to kill her when she appeared to object. He got off the bed, removed some of his clothes, and ripped open a package. He got back on top of her and rubbed his un-erect penis between her legs and along her vagina. He asked her, “Do you have a boyfriend?” “Do you shave yourself or is that for your boyfriend?” “Do you live here with anybody?” “Where does your boyfriend live?” And, “How old are you?” She could not answer because of the duct tape on her mouth. He stopped and stepped away. When he came back, he was “more erect.” He then penetrated her vagina for “a few thrust[s].”

The intruder got off the bed, told K.H. to stand up, and rubbed his hands over her breasts and between her legs. He then left the room. He came back a short time later, took her cellular telephone off the charger, and ordered her into the bathroom. He told her to get into the bathtub. She complied and he cut the duct tape off of her wrists. He turned on the water and told her to put four fingers into her vagina “as far as [she] could put them and then to move them in and out.” He told her that he liked that and then asked her if she had any dildos or vibrators. She indicated that she did. He left the bathroom and returned with a vibrator.

The intruder then inserted the vibrator into KH.’s vagina. After some time, he took the vibrator out and placed it against her anus, asking her whether she “had ever done it there.” She indicated that she had not and did not want to. He placed the vibrator back into her vagina. He then ordered her to do it to herself, instructing her to “do it hard like you like it.” He added (1) that was the way he liked it and (2) she was “getting [him] off.” After a while, she realized that he had left. She got out of the bathtub, cut the duct tape off of her head, and called the police from her home telephone.

K.H. further testified that the intruder was a white male who was wearing a black ski mask, a black jacket, jeans, and black gloves “like [the] kind *** football players [wear.]” When shown a photographic lineup, K.H. indicated that defendant’s eyes were familiar. In response to voice exemplars, she eliminated five of the eight samples. (Defendant’s voice was not one of the five exemplars she eliminated.)

The State also presented evidence to show that (1) in October 2002 — six months prior to K.H.’s assault — someone logged in as “J. Pelo” at the Bloomington police department accessed K.H.’s and K.H.’s father’s personal information through the NCIC database and (2) in February 2003 — two months before K.H.’s assault — someone logged in as “JPELO” accessed K.H.’s information using the Bloomington police department’s LEADS system.

c. Evidence Related to A.L.

A.L. testified that in July 2004 she was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). Shortly after her DUI arrest, a “tall man in black” walked into her apartment between 11 p.m. and 2 a.m. She yelled, “Help!” and the man ran out the door. In the early winter of that same year, she “woke up to [find] someone on the steps *** to her apartment, which [were] right in front of the window where [she] sle[pt].” She looked out the door and yelled at the person, but she was only able to see the person’s feet.

In January 2005, A.L. went to bed between 11 p.m. and midnight. She awoke to find an intruder in a ski mask standing at the end of her bed. The intruder, who had a flashlight, said he did not want to hurt her. He forced her to roll onto her stomach. She resisted, and he put a “rope cord” with a “slip knot or a double loop” around her neck. After putting the rope around her neck, he turned her onto her back, showed her a knife, and told her that he had a gun. He then bound her wrists together with a zip tie. He ordered her to take off her shorts. She replied that she could not take her shorts off because her hands were tied. He responded, “Yes, you can. I have done this before.” He then assisted her in taking her shorts off and closely “examined” her pelvic area and chest. He threw her blankets and clothes off the bed and continued examining her body. He commented that she was “beautiful” and that he liked female masturbation where “the female would insert something into her vagina to manipulate herself.” He also told her that (1) he had been watching her and (2) she had almost caught him trying to enter her apartment a couple of times.

The intruder asked A.L. whether she had any “sex toys, dildos, [or] vibrators.” She responded that she did not. He then asked her whether she had any beer bottles. She said that she did not. He forced her to manipulate her “pelvic, clitoral area” for two or three minutes, while he watched. He next told her that it was time for “the whole thing,” and she pleaded with him to use a condom. She retrieved a condom from the bathroom. He pulled his pants down and attempted to put the condom on. However, he was unable to do so because he did not have a full erection. Eventually, he was able to get the condom on his penis. He then attempted to penetrate her vagina but was having difficulty because his penis was never fully erect.

The intruder then told A.L. that she had “managed to talk [him] out of the mood.” He told her to get up and “run a bath.” She did, and he told her to get in and wash herself. He then left the bathroom. After a short time, she got out of the bathtub to try to cut the zip ties off of her hands. While she was doing that, the intruder opened the bathroom door, holding a towel and her cellular telephone. He left the bathroom again. He eventually came back and cut the zip ties off her wrists. He told her not to call the police and said that he would be watching her. When she heard him leave, she called the police from her cellular phone. (He had apparently left the cellular telephone in her apartment despite having carried it into the bathroom.)

A.L. testified that the intruder was a white male who was wearing dark clothing, a ski mask, gloves with velcro wrists, and a sweatshirt with (1) a hood and (2) the word “England” on the front of it. She added that the hood of the sweatshirt was pulled over the ski mask. (To show that defendant owned such a sweatshirt, the State introduced photographs of his family wearing similar sweatshirts while on an earlier trip to England.)

A.L. identified defendant as the intruder at trial. She also identified him from both a photographic lineup and voice exemplar. Additionally, she indicated that “the walk and the gait” of the intruder were the same as defendant’s based upon her observations of defendant at his arraignment in this case. The State also presented evidence that A.L.’s personal information had been accessed several times from different central Illinois police agency terminals prior to her assault.

d. Evidence Related to S.K.

S.K. testified that in October 2004, she arrived at her Blooming-ton apartment from work around 2 a.m. As she parked her car, she noticed a man walking “very slowly” away from her apartment building with his hands in his pockets. The man passed within three feet of her car and had a distinctive walk. She added that “it seemed very out of the ordinary.” The next day, her roommate noticed that her bedroom window screens were missing.

On January 25, 2005, S.K. took the day off work to prepare for her wedding. She returned to her apartment from her parents’ home around midnight. She went to bed at approximately 2 a.m. Around 2:45 a.m., she awoke to see someone coming into her room. The intruder told her to “shut the fuck up” and brandished a gun. He then asked her whether her roommate would be coming home. She said that she would not. Following a short struggle, the intruder put the gun to her head and ordered her to remove her clothes.

S.K. explained that the intruder was a white male who was wearing a light-colored University of North Carolina hooded sweatshirt, dark blue jeans, a black “neoprene” coat, black gloves similar to the type that “wide-receivers wear,” and a black belt, adding that he appeared to be using the belt as a utility belt for his weapons. The intruder had the hood of the sweatshirt pulled tight around his face with a black scarf covering half of his nose and all of his mouth. She recalled that the gun was silver and was not a revolver.

S.K. further testified that once the intruder removed her clothing, he began to rub her inner thighs and “look over [her] vaginal area.” He bound her hands with plastic zip ties. He then put a folding knife to her throat and asked her (1) for her name and (2) who lived at 110 Doud Drive. She told him her name and said that her parents lived at that address. He responded as follows: “I know that, you didn’t think I knew that. You make one more noise, you scream, I will put a bullet in your fucking head and go to your parents and finish off every single last one of them.”

Shortly thereafter, the intruder pulled out a vibrator and asked S.K. if she knew where he had gotten it. She responded that she did not, and he told her that it was her roommate’s. At that point, he attempted to place one of her pillowcases over her head. She “lost it,” and he agreed to simply lay the pillowcase over her eyes so that she could not see him. He violently penetrated her vagina with the vibrator for several minutes. He then left the room for a short period of time. When he came back, he attempted to (1) penetrate her anally with the vibrator and (2) put a “black cord” around her neck and “use it as a noose.”

Because the intruder was having difficulty anally penetrating S.K. with the vibrator, he asked her whether she had any lubricant. She said she did not. He persisted. She indicated that she had some lotion in the bathroom. He then made her get off the bed and accompany him to the bathroom. She tried to stop him by telling him that she was pregnant. He did not respond. However, once they were in the bathroom, he asked her how long she had been pregnant. She said, “four days.” He demanded to see the pregnancy test. She retrieved the pregnancy test from the bathroom trash can. After noticing her engagement ring, he asked whether her fiancé was “the person with the red car that visits [her] on the weekend.” She said that he was. He claimed that he knew everything about her, telling her that he knew she worked at “The Loft,” worked out at “Gold’s Gym,” and that her little sister looked very similar to her. He also told her that he (1) knew her schedule and (2) had been watching her come and go from her apartment. He then asked her (1) if her fiancé knew she was pregnant, (2) whether they were excited, (3) how he would feel if he knew that she was pregnant when he raped her, (4) if she would keep the baby in light of the attack, and (5) if her parents would be upset. S.K. testified that he appeared to be “elated like a little kid at Christmas, *** overjoyed that all of these other people [would] be violated.” He then took the lotion and S.K. back to the bedroom.

Once they were back in the bedroom, the intruder put the lotion on S.K’s fingers and, at gunpoint and knifepoint, forced her to place her fingers in her vagina; two fingers, then three and four, and then her thumb. However, she was having trouble inserting her thumb. The intruder became angry and undid the velcro on his gloves in an effort to remove them. At that moment, she could see his face because the pillowcase had “shifted up.” He began to insert his fingers into her vagina; first one, then two, three and four, and then his thumb. After doing so, he asked her (1) whether this was the bed she had gotten pregnant in and (2) what was the craziest thing she had ever done. She did not respond to either question.

The intruder then asked S.K. where she wanted to have sex, pointing first to her mouth, then to her vagina. He unzipped his pants and pulled them down around his knees. He began to rub his penis against her vagina, telling her that if she did not respond, he was going to do both. He then attempted to insert his penis into her vagina. She told him that she “would rather do it the other way.” He grabbed his gun, held it to her head, cocked it by pulling back the slide, and told her that if she bit him, he would “blow her brains out.” He then put his penis in her mouth, but could not become fully erect. (S.K. also noted that his penis did not seem fully erect when he was earlier making contact with her vagina.) He next asked whether she had any condoms. She responded that she did not.

After removing his penis from her mouth, the intruder “got the vibrator out again” and asked S.K. whether she had any sex toys. She responded that she did not. He said, “Well, what about beer bottles?” She said that she did not. He then forced her on to her hands and knees and again violently penetrated her vaginally from behind with the vibrator. After a while, he stopped and began anally penetrating her with the vibrator. All the while, he was repeating the phrases, “You have a pretty pussy,” and “I want to shave it.”

The intruder then ordered S.K. back to the bathroom where he put her right leg up on the counter, directly in front of the mirror. He began rubbing the outside of her vagina, attempting to insert his fingers into her vagina. Simultaneously, he was rubbing her abdomen with his other hand, (1) asking her what her plans were for the pregnancy and (2) talking about killing her family. After several minutes, he forced her to switch legs and then repeated the process.

After assaulting her, the intruder forced S.K. to sit in the bathtub with her feet toward the drain. He turned the water on, spread her legs apart, put soap on her hand, and told her to insert four of her fingers in and out of her vagina rapidly until he told her she could stop. After a while, he knelt down next to the bathtub and told her to hold out her wrists. She complied and he cut the zip ties off with his knife. He then shut the lights off, walked out of the bathroom, and closed the door behind him. After what she thought was a couple of hours, she got out of the bathtub and met a neighbor that she had heard preparing for work in the apartment above hers. When she got out, she noticed that her clothes, her telephones, and the fitted sheet from her bed appeared to be missing. (She later discovered that her cellular telephone was not missing, but had been hidden in her apartment.)

S.K. later identified defendant in court as the intruder, and she also identified him from a photographic lineup and voice exemplar. She also told the jury that the intruder had the same distinctive walk as the man she saw walking away from her apartment in October 2005.

e. Evidence Related to J.E

J.E testified that on April 8, 2005, she received a number of “hangup” calls at work, which gave her a “really bad feeling.” Because of that feeling, she asked a male coworker to walk her to her car. Shortly after driving out of the parking lot, she noticed a man who had pulled his vehicle behind hers acting suspiciously. She described the man as a white male with a straight nose, “rounder” face, a “buzz cut flattop,” and “big sunglasses.” She identified defendant from the witness stand as the person who appeared to be following her that day.

J.E further testified that on April 10, 2005, she and her then-boyfriend, Scott Galuska, returned to her Bloomington home around 10 p.m. Sometime after J.E fell asleep, Galuska woke her up and told her to call the police because he saw someone wearing black gloves standing in her yard. As J.E called the police, Galuska ran outside with a baseball bat. Shortly thereafter, she heard Galuska and the man in the yard yelling at each other. The man eventually ran away.

Galuska testified, reinforcing J.E’s testimony regarding the events of the night of April 10, 2005. Galuska identified defendant from a photographic lineup as the man he confronted in J.E’s yard.

J.E also testified about a third incident. On June 10, 2006, J.E arrived home around midnight. Shortly after arriving home, she noticed that her dog was unusually upset, barking and growling. She then heard what she described as an “urgent” knock at the door. She responded, but no one was at the door. Shortly thereafter, her doorbell rang, and again, no one was there. She then heard a noise by the side of the house, prompting her to call the police. Officer David Ziemer responded to the call.

Ziemer testified that as he approached J.E’s house he saw someone standing with his back against an adjacent house. Ziemer ordered the person to walk toward him but, instead, the person turned to walk away with his hands “in his waist-band area.” Ziemer pulled his service firearm and ordered the man to stop, but the person continued to walk away. However, once the man got to the back of the house, he turned and walked directly toward Ziemer. As the man approached, Ziemer recognized the man as defendant, his former supervisor and member of his softball team. Before he released defendant, Ziemer noticed that defendant had “an item of clothing or something” under his shirt.

2. Defendant’s Evidence

Defendant did not testify in his own defense. However, defendant called several witnesses to show that (1) his brother-in-law and other family members had access to the family computer containing the pornography, (2) the victims had misidentified him as their attacker because they had been tainted in one way or another by the media coverage, (3) he was in bed with his wife or working at the time of the assaults, and (4) other individuals could have committed these crimes.

E. The Jury’s Verdict

In June 2008, the jury convicted defendant of the crimes against J.E, S.K., K.H., A.L., and A.M. as alleged by the State. Specifically, the jury convicted defendant of (1) stalking (720 ILCS 5/12 — 7.3(a)(2) (West 2006)) and attempt (residential burglary) (720 ILCS 5/8 — 4, 19 — 3(a) (West 2006)), in case No. 06 — CF—581 as to J.E; and (2) (a) 1 count of intimidation (720 ILCS 5/12 — 6(a)(1) (West 2006)), (b) 2 counts of residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19 — 3(a) (West 2006)), (c) 2 counts of aggravated unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/10 — 3.1(a) (West 2006)), (d) 3 counts of home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12 — 11(a)(1), (a)(3) (West 2006)), and (e) 25 counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 — 14(a)(1), (a)(8) (West 2006)) in case No. 06 — CF—679 as to S.K., K.H., A.L., and A.M.

F. Defendant’s Sentence

Following defendant’s August 2008 sentencing hearing, the trial court merged several of defendant’s convictions in case No. 06 — CF— 679 pursuant to the one-act, one-crime rule. After doing so, the court entered judgment against defendant on (1) 1 count of (a) stalking (720 ILCS 5/12 — 7.3(a)(2) (West 2006)) and (b) attempt (residential burglary) (720 ILCS 5/8 — 4, 19 — 3(a) (West 2006)) in case No. 06— CF — 581; and (2) (a) 1 count of intimidation (720 ILCS 5/12 — 6(a)(1) (West 2006)), (b) 2 counts of home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12 — 11(a)(1), (a)(3) (West 2006)), and (c) 13 counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 — 14(a)(1), (a)(8) (West 2006)) in case No. 06— CF — 679.

The trial court then imposed a series of consecutive terms of imprisonment, which incorporated a number of enhancements based on defendant’s use of a (1) firearm and (2) dangerous weapon other than a firearm. The court explained its incorporation of those enhancements as follows:

“[T]he aggravated[-]criminal[-]sexual[-]assault charges in [case No.] 06[ — ]CF[—]679 contain certain sentence enhancements^] which mandate the imposition of additional penalties if a weapon is involved in the commission of the offense. The statute defining aggravated criminal sexual assault directs that a violation of [section 12 — 14](a)(8) [(720 ILCS 5/12 — 14(a)(8) (West 2006)),] where the accused was armed with a firearm, is a Class X felony for which fifteen years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the [c]ourt; and a violation of [section 12 — 14] (a)(1) [(720 ILCS 5/12 — 14(a)(1) (West 2006))], where the accused was armed with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm, *** is a Class X felony for which ten years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the [c]ourt. Likewise, home invasion, as charged in [c]ount 1 in this case, pursuant to *** [section] 5/12 — 11(a)(3) [(720 ILCS 5/12 — 11(a)(3) (West 2006))], indicates that where the accused was armed with a firearm during the commission of the offense, the offense shall be a Class X felony for which fifteen years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the [c]ourt.

The jury in this case found beyond a reasonable doubt that *** defendant committed the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault while armed with a firearm in Mounts 3 and 4, 6 through 11, and 28 through 29. The jury also found beyond a reasonable doubt that *** defendant committed the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault while armed with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm, specifically, a knife in Mounts 32 and 33. And, finally, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that *** defendant committed the offense of home invasion while armed with a firearm on Mount 1 ***. The [c]ourt finds that the sentencing enhancements for the use of a firearm and a dangerous weapon, therefore, apply to this case and *** defendant’s sentence on Mounts 1, 3 and 4, 6 through 11, and 28 through 29 will be increased by a term of fifteen years on each count. And *** defendant’s sentence on Mounts 25, 32, and 33 shall be increased by a term of ten years on each count.”

The court thereafter sentenced defendant to a series of consecutive prison terms, totaling 440 years.

This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by (a) allowing the State to introduce dozens of exhibits involving, among other things, graphic pornographic images and text, including depictions of rape, (b) denying his motion for change of venue, (c) excluding the testimony of his expert witness, and (d) failing to question jurors regarding the presumption that he was innocent until proven guilty; (2) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt that he sexually assaulted A.M.; and (3) his sentencing enhancements for the aggravated criminal sexual assaults against K.H., A.L., and S.K. violate the proportionate-penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (111. Const. 1970, art. I, §11). We address defendant’s contentions in turn.

A. Defendant’s Claim That the Trial Court Erred by Allowing the State To Introduce Irrelevant and Prejudicial Pornographic Material

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce dozens of exhibits involving, among other things, graphic pornographic images and text, including depictions of rape (hereinafter the pornography) because this evidence was irrelevant. Defendant further contends that if this court were to conclude that this evidence was relevant, the trial court still erred by admitting it because it was “more prejudicial than probative and admitted without limitation.”

1. The Pornography Presented in This Case

At trial, the State presented the following exhibits recovered from defendant’s home computers: (1) 23 poster boards, containing images, Internet search results, and gallery names; (2) a slide show depicting Internet searches; and (3) two 30-second movie trailers. We discuss each group of exhibits individually to place them in context.

Initially, we note that the State’s computer forensic experts recovered the pornography at issue in this case from defendant’s home computers. Those experts recovered, in relevant part, (1) approximately 175 pornographic images, (2) numerous Internet search terms and the results of those searches, and (3) 2 short movie trailers. The content of the images and movie trailers are self-evident. However, the description of the Internet searches and other written content is more nuanced. That is, a number of the State’s exhibits showed Internet searches that were guided by search terms entered by the computer’s user into what is known as a “search engine,” such as those run by “Google” and “Yahoo!” The result of those searches revealed a list, or menu, of corresponding Web sites containing those terms from which the user could select. Some of the exhibits shown to the jury in this case depicted search terms as well as the results of those searches. The State also presented a number of exhibits depicting the content of Web sites that it claimed defendant had viewed. Those Web sites included what the parties refer to as “gallery names” — that is, they included links to other Web sites with short descriptions of those sites. As we will explain, a few of those images, search results, and gallery names were not relevant to the State’s case and should not have been admitted.

a. The Poster Boards

The State showed the jury 23 separate poster boards, which depicted images, gallery names, and search results that it claimed defendant had viewed. Those poster boards included the following material: (1) 23 images depicting rape, penetration of women with foreign objects, bondage, and forced fellatio (exhibit Cl); (2) 22 images depicting rape, penetration of women with foreign objects, domination, bondage, fellatio, incest, and a gynecological exam (exhibit C2); (3) 22 images depicting rape, bondage, fellatio, caning, and penetration of women with foreign objects, including vaginal and anal shock (exhibit C3); (4) 5 images depicting rape and women penetrating themselves (exhibit C4); (5) 9 images depicting rape, bondage, fellatio, and a woman having her throat slashed with a knife (exhibit C5); (6) 10 written Internet search term results for the search term “bdsm rape,” which included a result for mother-daughter incest and gay rape (exhibit C6); (7) 10 written Internet search results for the search term “real rape,” which included results for father-son-teen incest and gay rape (exhibit C7); (8) a written short story describing a rape, with links at the bottom of that Web site, which described incest (exhibit C8); (9) a Web site that included rape video links and images depicting rape and bondage, including 3 images and stories describing incest (exhibit Cll); (10) approximately 40 images depicting rape, bondage, women penetrating themselves, and penetration of women with foreign objects, including vaginal shock from the Web site www.damseldiary.com (exhibit C12); (11) 11 blacked-out images from the Web site www.maxirape.com (exhibit C13); (12) several images depicting forced fellatio and rape at gunpoint from the Web site www. maxirape.com (exhibit C14); (13) several images depicting rape at knifepoint and gunpoint from the Web site www.maxirape.com (exhibit C15); (14) images depicting rape at gunpoint from the Web site www.maxirape.com (exhibit C16); (15) several images depicting rape at knifepoint and gunpoint from the Web site www.maxirape.com (exhibit C17); (16) a written list of 118 gallery names, such as “Girl tied up at the wall,” “Lesbian slave in bondage,” and “Brutal electric pussy treatment,” from the Web site www.Bdsmsexaffraid.com (exhibit C18); (17) 26 images and 120 gallery names, such as “Girl fucked by brutal device” and “Lesbian torture,” from the Web site www.Bdsmsexaffraid.com (exhibit C19); (18) 6 images depicting rape at gunpoint from the Web site www.forcedfuckers.com (exhibit C20); (19) 28 images depicting domination and forced fellatio, as well as Internet links to 4 videos with short stories describing (a) brides being raped on their wedding night, (b) men overpowering women, (c) men in uniform raping women, and (d) lesbian rape, from the Web site www.forcedfuckers.com (exhibit C21); (20) numerous written gallery names (in very small font) from the Web site www.sodomcity.com, describing links to fetishes such as “Secretaries Drinking Cum and Piss” (exhibit C22); (21) written gallery names (in very small font), such as “High Powered Machines Taking Pussy A Part,” and images, including a woman being caned, from the Web site www.sodomcity.com (exhibit C23); (22) numerous blacked-out images from a “Free Rape Page” taken from the Web site www.screamncream.com (exhibit C24); and (23) 51 images depicting rape, bondage, and forced fellatio from the Web site www.screamncream.com (exhibit C25).

b. The Slide Show

The State also presented to the jury a slide show, which included the following data recovered from defendant’s home computers: (1) an Internet search termed “Real Rape” with results linking to 5 different Web sites, including a father-son incest site (exhibit 9a); (2) an “adults only” warning page (exhibit 9b); (3) a “Rape Gallery” result page (exhibit 9c); (4) results for sex machine and brutal rape videos (exhibit 9d); (5) results and links for father-son incest, straight and homosexual rape, and men with animals (exhibit 9e); (6) results and links to rape and sexual violence Web sites (exhibit 9f); (7) an Internet search termed “bondage” with results linking to bondage and various fetish Web sites (exhibit 9g); (8) a credit-card-decline page (exhibit 9h); (9) an Internet search based on the search term “BONDAGE” with four results Unking to bondage Web sites (exhibit 9i); (10) a page showing only a search termed “porn illegal” (exhibit 9j); (11) text describing fantasy rape, bondage, sexual slavery, and forced submission (exhibit 9k); and (12) a three-line story about the rape and bondage of fitness trainers (exhibit 91).

c. The Movie Trailers

The State also showed the jury two short Internet video trailers, which were approximately 30 seconds long. The first depicted a woman strapped to a board, who was wearing a leather mask, being penetrated by another person’s fist. (That person was otherwise out of view.) The second depicted two women in their underwear who were bound at their hands and feet being thrown onto a bed.

2. The Relevancy of the Pornography

Evidence is relevant when it (1) renders a matter of consequence more or less pr