Citations
- 215 Ill. 625
Full opinion text
Mr. Justice Boggs
delivered the opinion of the court:
The appellee, while in the employ of the appellant company as a “mule driver” in its mine, in endeavoring to pass through one of the doors of the mine with his mule and a “trip of cars,” was, while attempting to close the door, caught between the door and one of the cars and injured. The door was not so constructed as that it would close automatically, nor was any one in attendance at the door charged with the duty of opening and closing it. He brought this action against the company to recover damages for the injuries sustained, basing his right of action on the alleged willful omission of the appellant company to comply with the requirements of clauses (e) and (f) of section 19 of chapter 93 of our statutes, entitled “Mines and Miners.” (Hurd’s Stat. 1903, p. 1261.) He recovered a judgment in the sum of $1500, which has been affirmed in the Appellate Court for the Fourth District on appeal, and the record is before us on the further appeal of the company.
Clause (e) provides that “all permanent doors in mines used in guiding and directing the ventilating currents shall be so hung and adjusted as to close automatically.” By clause (/) it is required that “at all principal doorways thrdugh which cars are hauled an attendant shall' be employed for the purpose of opening and closing said doors when trips of cars are passing to and from the workings.”
The first count in the declaration alleged it was a principal doorway by which appellee was injured, and averred that the appellant company willfully failed to keep an attendant to open and close the door when the appellee was passing through it with a “trip of cars.” The second count averred that said dporway was a permanent one and used for the purpose of guiding and directing the currents of air; that the appellant willfully neglected and failed to construct said doorway so that it would close automatically, and on this account appellee was injured.
The motion of counsel for the appellant company that a verdict be peremptorily directed in its favor was denied. ‘ This is assigned as for error, and counsel say: “It is our contention that even though the question of whether or not a doorway in a coal mine is a principal one and whether or not a door is a permanent one are ordinarily questions of fact, yet in this case, under this evidence, these questions were questions of law, and the court should have directed a verdict in favor of appellant.”
We cannot assent that clause (