In re Information to discipline certain Attorneys of Sanitary (351 Ill. 206, 1932)

Mr. Justice Stone

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an information filed, on leave granted, by the People, on the relation of the Chicago Bar Association, against fifty-six members of the bar practicing in Cook county. The charges therein arise out of the employment of these various members of the bar by the Sanitary District of Chicago during the period between July 1, 1925, and December 31, 1928. The information charges that these attorneys are guilty of malfeasance in office as members of the bar of this court. It charges that two of the respondents, while acting as attorneys for the district, acquiesced in the placing of an excessive number of lawyers on the payroll of the law department of the district and in payment to them of salaries grossly in excess of the value of their services to the district, thereby permitting fraud to be perpetrated on the public. Eifty-four are charged with having received salaries from the district without rendering ade- . quate or substantial services therefor. During the pendency of the cause four of the respondents died, and as to them the proceeding is abated. Answers having been filed, the cause was referred to Hon. Thomas Taylor, judge of the circuit court of Cook county, as commissioner, to take evidence and report the same together with his conclusions and recommendations. The commissioner took evidence and filed his report. Exceptions were filed thereto by various respondents, and by the relator as to certain recommendations, and briefs and arguments have been filed in-this court.

As to the fifty-four respondents the commissioner’s report recommends the disbarment of eight, the suspension for two years of eight, the suspension for one year of eleven, the censure of seventeen and the discharge of the rule as to.nine. As to respondent Edward H. Luebeck no recommendation was made but the commissioner asks for further instructions. The commissioner recommended that the rule be discharged as to respondents Hector A. Brouillet, Samuel J. Graff and A. Paul Holleb. The relator having filed no exceptions to the commissioner’s report as to them, it is affirmed and the rule as to them is discharged. The remaining six as to whom the commissioner recommends discharge of the rule are John B. King, Eugene L. McGarry, William Scott Stewart, Charles F. Brown, John M. Lowery and John R. McCabe. The relator has filed exceptions concerning the finding and recommendation of the commissioner as to these respondents but to the recommendation concerning the last three no briefs have been filed. Those respondents as to whom the commissioner recommends disbarment are as follows: Frank J. Brewbaker, Kleofas Jurgelonis, Stephen A. Malato, Harry Mantell, Adam • E. Patterson, Joseph E. Paulissen and George IT. Mason. Respondents Mantell and Paulissen filed no answer to the information and were found to be in default. Those as to whom the commissioner recommended suspension for a period of two years are Arthur Donoghue, Daniel V. Gallery, John C. Garriott, Jr., Thomas P. Grant, Maclay Hoyne, Henry E. Jacobs, Nathan A. Lawrence and Medard A. Kunz. The commissioner recommended that the following respondents be suspended for a period of one year: Harry J. Berman, David S. Chesrow, Al F. Gorman, Joseph A. Kolb, Philip A. Lozowick, Carl H. Lundquist, Mark J. McNamara, G. Edwin Mitchell, William S. New-burger and Victor I. Ohrenstein. The last named respondent filed no briefs supporting his exceptions to the commissioner’s recommendation. As to the following respondents the commissioner recommended discipline by censure: John M. Beverly, John J. Dillon, Robert H. Eberle, Roy J. Egan, John F. Higgins, Meyer D. Kaufman, Edward P. Luczalc, Sidney S. Lyon, Arthur F. Manning, James J. McDermott, Abraham L. Missner, Leo V. Roeder, Augustus L. Williams, Eugene M. Hines, John R. Horan, John S. Hall and Ivor L. Smith. The four respondents last named filed no briefs in support of their exceptions to the commissioner’s recommendation.

The charge in the information as to all respondents except Hoyne, Brouillet and Garriott is that they took the funds of the sanitary district in the form of salary as assistant attorneys for the district which they knew they had not earned, when the number of lawyers so placed on the pay-rolls was grossly in excess of the number necessary to carry on the work of the law department of the district. As to certain of the respondents the charge is that they did not render adequate services for the money paid them, and as to others it is charged that they rendered no substantial services for the salary received from the district. The charge against Hoyne and Brouillet is that they acquiesced in the placing on the pay-rolls of the district of many unnecessary attorneys. The charges as to respondent Garriott do not fall strictly in either class, since he is not charged with having received moneys of the district but procuring the payment of salary in the name of his brother-in-law, who, it is charged, rendered no service whatever to the district and did not know his name was on the payroll until the pay check was delivered to him.

A large amount of evidence was taken by the commissioner, which is analyzed in an extended report filed by him. These charges, because of their similarity as to the different respondents, and in order to avoid much repetition in the record, have been joined in one proceeding. They naturally fall into two classes: those attorneys charged with receiving the moneys of the district without rendering any services or grossly inadequate services therefor, and the case of IToyne, whose alleged acquiescence in placing an excessive number of lawyers on the pay-roll of the law department is declared to have made possible the defrauding of the public and the. misuse of public funds.

We shall first consider the charges against those respondents other than Hoyne. In order to avoid injustice which might otherwise result to some of the respondents if treated as members of a class, it is necessary to consider the charges against each separately. In so doing we will first consider those recommended for discharge by the commissioner and as to which recommendations the relator has filed exceptions but no briefs in support thereof. These are Charles F. Brown, John M. Lowery and John R. McCabe.

Respondent Charles F. Brown was at the time of the hearing forty-two years of age. He was admitted to the bar in February, 1913. He was employed by the sanitary district as an assistant attorney from June 15, 1927, to December 31, 1928, at $5000 per year. He received a total of $7708.21. His appointment was made on the recommendation of a political friend. It was understood that he did not want a full-time job. He was assigned a desk. A few days later he was sent to Springfield to lobby on tax matters. He examined some releases, prepared a brief in a damage case, wrote opinions and worked on claims and some compensation cases. It appears that as a result of his service in the World War he was a partial paralytic and that he therefore did not desire full time. He testified that he thought he was rendering services adequate for the compensation paid him. The commissioner found that he was not consciously blameworthy or willingly guilty of any dereliction in his relations to the sanitary district. Relator objects to this finding and recommends that he be censured. From an examination of the evidence we are unable to find that the record contains proof of dereliction on his part, and the recommendation of the commissioner is affirmed.

Respondent John M. Lowery, as to whom the commissioner also recommends discharge of the rule, was fifty years of age at the time of the hearing. He was admitted to the practice of law in 1911 and since that time conducted a practice of general nature. Fie was employed by tire sanitary district as an assistant attorney from February 15, 1928, to November 15, 1928, at $6000 per year, receiving $4500. He was appointed through the recommendation of Timothy J. Crowe, president of the board of trustees of the sanitary district, who asked him if he would like to try some cases for the district. He asked for some time to clean up his work, and went to work for the district in 1928. Crowe gave him a letter of employment, which he took to the chief clerk of that department. He was assigned cases in the service known as the “overflow department,” hereinafter described. He prepared briefs, performed office work and spent most of his time at the district office. The commissioner found that he appeared every workday and remained from nine in the morning until three in the afternoon, during which he performed legal services for the district and was there to do any work that might be assigned to him. The commissioner finds that the evidence fails to make out a case of professional misconduct. The relator recommends that he be censured. We .have examined the evidence as to tire charges of malfeasance against this respondent and are of the opinion that it does not support them, and the report of the commissioner as to him will be affirmed.

Respondent John R. McCabe, as to whom the commissioner also recommended a discharge of the rule, was at the time of the hearing fifty-one years of age. He was admitted to the bar in 1901. He was employed by the sanitary district between October 1, 1927,'and December 31, 1928, at the rate of $6000 per year. He testified that he received information by telephone from the sanitary district, that Crowe, the president, wanted to see him. In response to that information he called at the office of the district and was told by Crowe that he, Crowe, would like to have him on his legal staff. Respondent stated he could not give full time, to which Crowe agreed. It appears that he was told by Crowe that he would be expected to assist in the matter of legislation affecting the sanitary district while the legislature was in session. The chief clerk of the legal department told him that he would hear from him as to assignments. He attended most of the board meetings, as he was told to do. He advised with president Crowe, drafted ordinances, advised as to contracts, examined papers pertaining to easements and bonds and studied the Drainage act. In this and other work he spent about twelve hours a week at the district offices. In this he is corroborated by other witnesses who were among the regular lawyers of the district. The commissioner found that the evidence did not warrant discipline of this respondent, as it did not show unprofessional conduct on his part. Having examined the record as to these charges we are of the opinion that the conclusion of the commissioner is thereby supported, and the report as to this respondent is affirmed.

We come next to the record affecting the respondents as to whom the commissioner recommended disbarment or discipline and the three respondents as to whom the commissioner’s recommendation of discharge of the rule is contested here by the relator. While each case has received the separate consideration of the court, it is necessary that, so far as can be done, the charges and defenses thereto being similar, they be treated as a group, though the application of the defenses herein discussed has been considered as to each separately. The points that have been raised by these respondents are: (1) Insufficiency of proof; (2) no showing of motive; (3) since the respondents were under contract with the district their act in taking the money of the district cannot be made the basis of a charge of unprofessional conduct; (4) the information seeks to establish a new standard of conduct which, if adopted by this court, should not be applied retroactively; and (5) that the several respondents are improperly joined in one proceeding. The last point was considered by this court when the application for leave to file the information was under consideration. This proceeding is not a lawsuit, with the formalities of common law pleading and judgment. It is an investigation of the conduct of certain members of the bar for the purpose of determining whether they shall be disbarred or disciplined. To have filed fifty-six separate cases would have involved a great deal of additional expense and time on the part of the relator and the respondents. As we have indicated, the charges against each individual have been considered separately.

There are certain facts about which there is no dispute and which equally affect all respondents. The Sanitary District of Chicago is a municipal corporation, created by an act of the legislature in 1889. It is managed by a board of nine trustees. It derives its income from taxation. Under the statute the board of trustees has the power to elect an attorney and certain other officers, to hold their respective offices during the pleasure of the board. The board may prescribe the duties and fix the compensation of all officers and employees of the district and adopt rules concerning the conduct of the business of the district. Shortly after its organization it began the construction of a drainage canal, by which it reversed the course of the Chicago river, with the result that it, instead of flowing into Lake Michigan, now flows into the Illinois river basin. Lake Michigan thus became a source of the Illinois river. This reversal of the direction of the waters of the Chicago river was permitted in the interest of the health of the city of Chicago. The quantity of water sent through the sanitary district canal from Lake Michigan and tributaries of the Chicago river into the Illinois river was large and so raised that river that overflows occurred. As a result a very large number of suits and claims for damages were filed against the sanitary district by owners of overflowed land lying near and adjacent to the banks of the Illinois river. These suits were to recover damages to lands, crops, cattle, and other property. ' Many suits were tried throughout the Illinois valley but as late as 1925 many yet remained undisposed of. During that year a commission of three county judges was appointed under an ordinance of the sanitary district to hear such claims and make awards thereon, the same to be paid by the district if it approved them. Many claims were thus disposed of. This commission was later abolished, leaving many suits and claims still pending against the district. Suits were also filed against the district, arising out of proceedings before the commission.

In 1925 claims were actively made by the States bordering on the Great Lakes that the diversion of the water from Lake Michigan through the sanitary district canal was causing damage to the shipping on those lakes by the lower lake levels, and there was filed in the Supreme Court of the United States a proceeding to enjoin this diversion of water. This litigation was in charge of ten special attorneys for the district employed for that purpose. None of the respondents were actually engaged in that suit though some worked on phases of that litigation. The Illinois valley claims, or overflow cases, as they came to be known, were in charge of a staff of lawyers eleven in number, and in addition local attorneys were engaged when cases were tried. A number of these respondents were assigned to overflow cases, but it is charged in the information that they rendered no adequate services in these or other legal matters of the district.

Over eight hundred suits for damages were filed in the different counties along the Illinois river, arising out of floods alleged to have been caused by the flowage through the district canal. Of these suits many were still pending during the period covered by these charges. However, from 1926 to 1929 but two of these suits were tried. The district was represented before, the Illinois Valley Claims Commission by members of the regular legal staff having charge of overflow cases. The two cases tried during this period were the Coal Creek Drainage and Levee District vs. Chicago Sanitary District, and Christie vs. Chicago Sanitary District. Other overflow cases were not tried because of an agreement among counsel that they should await the outcome of the Coal Creek and Christie cases. After verdict in the Coal Creek case against the district in 1926, counsel in charge of that litigation wrote to Brouillet, then attorney for the district, advising that the, legal department “mobilize their trial lawyers” to guard against the possibility of numerous demands for immediate trial in the circuit courts of the counties along the Illinois river. Brouillet thereupon furnished a list, including the names of eight lawyers in different parts of the Illinois river valley, who were available for these cases. Their employment was quite apart from the appointment of the respondents as assistant attorneys. While there had been a call for additional lawyers, the record shows that the trustees and the attorneys knew that there were a comparatively few counties in which suits were filed and therefore but a small number of courts available to try them.

It appears from the record that the district used three methods of payment for the services of members of the law department. One was by voucher, another by the regular pay-roll, and a third by a miscellaneous pay-roll. The regular pay-roll included those holding positions enumerated and provided for in the annual budget. Those holding positions not set out in the budget were carried on the miscellaneous pay-roll, while attorneys rendering special service to the district were paid by voucher. Under the rules of the board the head of the legal department was required to certify twice each month the list or pay-roll of employees in his department. These lists were made up by the chief cleric of the law department from letters of employment. The regular pay-rolls, in consolidated form, were printed monthly. The miscellaneous pay-rolls were not published and did not appear in the records of the proceedings of the board, although at the end of the year the clerk’s annual report showed the names of all employees and totals paid to them. From January i, 1926, until November, 1928, there was a rapid increase in the number of lawyers employed by the district. In 1925 there were 19 lawyers on the regular pay-roll and 25 at different times on the miscellaneous pay-roll. I11 1926 there were 33 lawyers on the regular pay-roll and 30 on the miscellaneous pay-roll. In 1927 there were 44 on the regular pay-roll and 71 on the miscellaneous pay-roll. In 1928 this employment of lawyers reached its peak, there being 41 lawyers on the regular payroll and 99 on the miscellaneous pay-roll, or a total of 140 lawyers employed during that year. Not all were employed throughout the year. As we have stated, the regular pay-roll contained only the names of those lawyers provided for in the regular budget. The amount of money paid out by the district to the assistant attorneys who are respondents herein was in 1925, $7024.07; in 1926, $32,-061.88; in 1927, $85,919.54; in 1928, $196,410.79, making a total for four years of $321,416.28. This was in addition to the regular pay-roll as shown by the budget and in addition to the special appropriations for the services of attorneys in the lake levels and overflow cases. This last mentioned group were paid by vouchers. In 1925 payments to them amounted to $103,333; in 1926, $162,129; in 1927, $219,202; in 1928, $103,827. There is no contention that the number of lawyers was not grossly in excess of the number necessary to carry on the work of the department. Many of these respondents secured their appointment through the political influence of members of one or the other of the major political parties.

While it is not charged that fraud was practiced by any of the respondents in the procurement of employment, it is argued that they became aware that their services were not necessary and that it became their duty to then withdraw from that employment, and that their failure so to do amounted to knowingly taking the moneys of the district without rendering adequate services therefor. Respondents are represented by numerous counsel who have separately presented briefs for their client or clients. These briefs present, in one form or another, the question whether there exists in this State any standard, heretofore recognized, by which the professional conduct of the respondents may be gauged in this proceeding. Counsel for the respondents argue that there has never been a case where this court, or any court, has disbarred or otherwise disciplined an attorney under facts and charges such as are here presented. They cite the rule frequently announced by this court that an attorney will be punished for unprofessional conduct only where the case is clear and free from doubt, not only as to the act charged but also as to the motive, (People v. McCaskrin, 325 Ill. 149; People v. Baker, 311 id. 66; People v. Hickman, 294 id. 471; People v. Plarvey, 41 id. 277;) and urge that as there can be no motive to violate a standard when no standard has been set up, no punishment of the respondents can be had in this case. They say that to now announce a standard of professional ethics which would require disbarment or discipline and apply it to any of the respondents would be to apply such standard retroactively. Counsel for relator reply that the already prevailing standards of conduct for members of the profession do not permit a lawyer for a municipal corporation to accept pay in public funds for many months without rendering adequate services in exchange therefor, and cite Canons 12, 15 and 32 of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association. It may be readily seen that whether such a case as this has previously been presented to a court does not necessarily affect the question whether standards exist by which the conduct of lawyers may be gauged. Counsel agree that no such case has heretofore come to the attention of any court. It is conceded that most of the respondents were appointed through political sponsorship. Each knew the amount of service he was rendering. Each had some judgment as to whether he was giving substantial quid pro quo. It is not, and should not be, necessary that there be laid down specific rules of conduct where a question of professional integrity is involved. A lawyer, by reason of his training, is to be charged with the knowledge that his client, whether an individual or a municipal corporation, relies, and has a right to rely, upon his good faith. Where, as here, the actual client of the attorney is not a board of trustees but the public who pay his fees, the attorney knows that he is charged with responsibility for fair dealing not only with the trustees but likewise the public. Were an information to charge only that respondents had received more compensation than the value of their services warranted, a different case would have been presented. There would then be opened a field of investigation vague and difficult of delimitation. The various elements entering into the value of professional services make it difficult to decide such a question with nicety. In the case of a private contract, where only the party contracting with the lawyer is to pay the fee, it may be said that it is only when the compensation received is, under the circumstances of the employment, so patently and grossly beyond reason as to evidence an overreaching of the client that courts will interfere with the contract or say that the receipt of such fee by an attorney may be considered unprofessional conduct. On the other hand, where his salary is not to be paid by the individual who employs him but paid from the public treasury or a trust fund, and little or no services are rendered, and it appearing to him, upon reasonable reflection, that no substantial services will, under the circumstances, be required of him, the common conscience is sufficient to set up a standard of ethics and to warn the recipient of such salary that he is taking that to which he is not entitled and cannot honestly accept, no matter what may be his contract. An attorney under such circumstances may not plead the shortcomings of the individuals or officials who thus wrongfully contracted with him, for he must be held to realize that if he knowingly continues in such wrongful contract he becomes a party to the wrong. Particularly is this true with the lawyer, since his understanding and training prompt him to an earlier inquiry and aid him in more quickly detecting the wrong. The charge here is that the respondents, with reason to believe that adequate services would not be required or expected of them, continued to thus take public funds knowing that they were violating their obligations, as attorneys, to deal fairly. The thing involved here is not the right of a tax-payer or the sanitary district to recover the salaries paid, but the professional conduct of those who, as members of the legal profession, are particularly charged by the ethics of that profession with a duty to deal fairly with their clients. Neither common law pleadings nor the common law rules governing the entries of judgments are applicable to a proceeding of this character. (Boston Bar Ass’n v. Casey, 211 Mass. 187.) Nor may technical legal defenses be called upon to aid in response to a charge against one’s professional integrity where the accused knows that notwithstanding a technical defense his conduct was ethically and morally without support. Few rules could more directly tend to bring the legal profession and the courts into disrepute than one permitting the lawyer, trained in legal technicalities, to use that training to deal unjustly with others and then urge such defense on an inquiry as to his good faith in such dealing. Fair dealing, whether it be with an individual or the public, demands quid pro quo of the lawyer, and though he should not be penalized for an erroneous exercise of judgment, yet he must, if the standards of the profession be maintained, be held accountable where it is apparent that his act was one of self-interest, directed against the interest of his client. Canons of ethics and rules of professional conduct laid down by courts ought not be necessary to point out as prohibited that which the average intelligent lawyer knows is not fair dealing. If this be not true, then the pronouncements of the courts and the leaders of the profession that the lawyer is held to a high order of integrity become meaningless platitudes. The fact that a lawyer may have considered it ethical to take public funds without giving any substantial service therefor when it is patent to the average mind that it was not, can scarcely be said to constitute an impressive defense of good motive in answer to a charge leveled against his professional conduct. Though these respondents may not have known, when employed, that the pay-rolls of the sanitary district were loaded with useless attorneys, yet if they came to know that such was true, the fact that they had a contract with the district could scarcely have satisfied their own conviction as to the propriety of their remaining on that pay-roll. While it is true, a's urged by counsel for respondents, that an attorney under these charges is entitled to be judged by the circumstances under which he acted and not under what was later disclosed, (United States v. American Bell Telephone Co. 167 U. S. 224; Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 id. 132;) yet where the circumstances were such as to indicate to a reasonable man that his employment was unnecessary and that he was receiving compensation without substantial services rendered, the duty upon him to withdraw became plain, and the fact that the trustees were consenting to the payment, of unearned salaries does not show the lawyer blameless who accepted them. (People v. Gilbert, 263 Ill. 85.) A lawyer who twice each month, for many months, takes a salary from the public knowing that he has rendered no service at all or no substantial service therefor is guilty of a breach of his duty to the public. It is, of course, true that no criticism can attach to a failure to render services because of illness, if there is need for the services and they can be rendered by others without further expense to the client. In what we have here said no new standard is set up, nor is it necessary to set up a new standard of legal ethics in this case. These respondents are to be judged by the standards of common honesty and fair dealing, which are not new but are as old as the profession. The Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association referred to remind the lawyer that the legal profession is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere money-getting trade. (Canon 12.) The lawyer must obey his own conscience and not that of his client. (Canon 15.) “A lawyer will find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty as an honest man and as a patriotic citizen.” (Canon 32.)

It has been the rule in this State for many years that courts are not bound by the opinions of attorneys as to what constitutes reasonable attorneys’ fees but are responsible to litigants for the use of their own knowledge of the value of such services, and ought to, and will, take into consideration such knowledge. (Gentleman v. Sanitary District, 260 Ill. 317; Metheny v. Bohn, 164 id. 495; Goodwillie v. Millimann, 56 id. 523.) The fact that the sanitary district and the respondents were competent to enter into a contract may be admitted, but, obviously, such capacity cannot be urged as a defense against the charge that the attorney so contracting has been guilty of participation in the wrongful use of public funds where it may reasonably be said that he came to know that the contract he had made was one to which he ought not, in good conscience, remain a party. We are of the opinion that there exist, and have existed through the Canons of Ethics and the common conscience, sufficient standards to direct the attorney in all cases of this character not involving honest error in judgment, to which, of course, all are liable.

Counsel argue that to disbar or discipline respondents in this case would, in effect, be making retroactive application of such rule of conduct as may be announced in the case, and that, therefore, no punishment should be imposed. It has been frequently announced by this court that conduct of a lawyer which is dishonest or violative of private rights or public good is punishable in proceedings of this character. (People v. Baker, supra; People v. Hickman, supra.) If, when gauged by these standards, the attorney’s conduct is such as to subject him to discipline, such discipline is not retroactive merely because no similar acts have previously passed under judicial scrutiny. The fact that many others were engaged in similar acts, or that a certain public apathy exists as to such conduct, if it does exist, affords no justification to one shown guilty of such charge. It would, indeed, be most dangerous to approve such an excuse.

• Counsel argue that none of these respondents was under a duty to investigate the reason for failure to assign work to him or the conditions existing in the law department, and since they did not know such conditions they cannot be criticised for waiting for work. All of this was true when the employment began, but certain facts must have presented themselves to each of those respondents who gave little or no services for his salary. He knew that public funds were being paid to him without a just return. He knew that there was little or nothing for him to do. When his request for work brought nothing for him it must have become apparent to him that he was being paid for services he did not render. These were sufficient to provoke inquiry into the conditions existing in the legal department which would have disclosed compelling reasons for his withdrawal from such employment. If such respondents had seriously undertaken to find out what was going on in the law department so far as the prospect of rendering substantial service was concerned, it seems clear from this record that they could have discovered that their services were entirely unnecessary. It may not be said in their defense that they, under such circumstances, waited for work without realizing the injustice of taking the public funds without return therefor. Attorneys are officers of the court and as such are charged with a duty to avoid conduct tending to bring the profession into disrepute. (People v. Moutray, 166 Ill. 630; People v. Czarnecki, 268 id. 278; People v. Gorman, 346 id. 432.) In all cases where it appears that the attorney is an unsafe or unfit person to be trusted as an attorney, this court has the power, and it is its duty, to strike his name from the roll. (People v. Meyerovitz, 278 Ill. 356.) Unprofessional conduct in a lawyer is that which violates the rules or ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession. (People v. Berezniak, 292 Ill. 305.) The standard of professional integrity which has been applied and should be applied to those admitted to the practice of law is not satisfied by such conduct, merely, as enables them to escape the penalties of the criminal law. (People v. Macauley, 230 Ill. 208.) The standards governing attorneys who occupy public office are, after all, but statements of the rule of common conscience and fair dealing.

Respondent Harry J. Berman was forty-eight years of age at the time of the hearing. He was admitted to the bar in 1914 and was on the sanitary district pay-roll as assistant attorney between August 1, 1927, and November 15, 1928, at $5000 per year. His appointment was on a part-time basis and was procured through political friends. He was told there were no cases to assign to him then but that he would be notified. On September 22 of that year two cases were assigned to him which he watched when on call in court. He looked up law. Officials above him in the district told him that these cases would not go to trial. When called upon for a report in detail of the work he had done he stated that he had watched the two cases until April 28, and that this was all the services he performed. He testified that a law clerk could have done what he did but it was not the work that he expected to do and desired to do. Numerous witnesses in connection with the law department testified that they had no knowledge of work that he did, some testifying that he had no valley cases but did other work. The commissioner found that he rendered practically no service for the salary paid him, yet he persisted for fifteen months in drawing a salary at the rate of $5000 per year. The commissioner recommended that he be suspended for a year. Able briefs have been submitted on behalf of this respondent urging that to discipline him would be to make retroactive application of new principles. As we have stated, we cannot agree that the principles involved in this case are new but rather that they are as old as the profession itself. The exercise of good faith in the interest of the client has always been required of lawyers. It is clear that respondent Berman’ must have known that there was no justification for his talcing this salary after it became apparent to him, as it surely did, that he was to render little or no service therefor. He is, however, entitled to consideration for the fact that he took the position originally in good faith. We are of the opinion, however, that his conduct merits discipline.

Respondent John M. Beverly was thirty-nine years of age at the time of the hearing herein. He was admitted to the bar in 1916. He was employed as assistant attorney for the sanitary district from January 16, 1926, to Decernber 31, 1926, and from March 1, 1927, to April 30, 1927, at $4800 per year. He secured employment by aggressive political pressure. No duties were assigned to him at the time of his employment. He states that the service required of him consisted largely in holding himself in readiness to answer any court calls to which he might be assigned. He put in two or three afternoons a week examining files, sometimes working in mornings. He asked for more work and was promised some but received no more. He was assigned to one case of considerable importance. The commissioner found that his work for the district was negligible and that his testimony demonstrated that he realized the services he actually rendered were not adequate, and this is evident. This respondent was frank in his statements. The situation was such, however, as to indicate most strongly to him that he should not continue in the service. His so doing subjects him to discipline.

Respondent Frank J. Brcwbaker was forty-six years of age at the time of the hearing. He was admitted to the bar in 1922. He stated that he had had a general office practice, though not much court work, during the last five years. Fie was employed by the sanitary district from September 16, 1927, to November 15, 1928, at $3600 per year. During that time he was also employed by the American Railway Express Company. He stated that that work did not require much time but that the express company probably paid him $150 to $160 per month. He was appointed by letter of president Crowe. He testified that Hoyne, attorney for the district, told him about the general history of the legal situation of the district and gave him some pamphlets, telling him to familiarize himself with the affairs of the valley, and that there were many cases pending and respondent would be expected to be sufficiently familiar with them to assist in their trial. He stated that nothing was said about putting in his full time for the district. Fie stated that he studied the laws pertaining to the district and made some trips down through the Illinois valley, usually one-day trips on week days. He made no report of his services and none was required. He testified that he was at the district office at various times and would be given cases to study; that he looked at some leases but made no reports. He testified he prepared on fifteen or twenty cases in Brown or Schuyler county but left no memoranda in the office, and that he had read the records in the Coal Creek case and quite a lot of engineering data. He testified that in the first two months he put in one-half his time, doing part of the work at the district office and part at his office. J. S. Smith, claim accountant for the express company employing respondent, testified that respondent’s work for that company consisted in auditing loss and damage claims paid by the company’s claim agents; that his work was done at a desk in the office of the company and occupied respondent’s entire time; that his required time was eight hours per day except Saturday, which was four hours; that he was paid $172.62 per. month, and that during the period from September 16, 1927, to November 15, 1928, respondent was absent from his work thirteen and one-half days, part of which was spent on a vacation in Colorado, and that an additional week was added to this at his request and without pay. This witness testified that during these thirteen and one-half days respondent asked to go to Effingham to visit his father and requested half-fare transportation from Chicago to Effingham and return, which was delivered to him November 3, 1927. Smith testified that he did not know that respondent was practicing law until the sanitary district investigation. Four of the regular attorneys for the district did not recall his service for the district. Respondent testified the amount paid him was fair and reasonable. Smith’s testimony was not contradicted, and shows not only that this respondent did not give any appreciable service to the district but in addition was paid for full time by the express company. The testimony of the respondent as to work he did for the district was not worthy of belief. The commissioner recommended that he be disbarred. To his conduct in accepting pay for services he did not render, it appears that he has added the more serious offense of testifying falsely as to his'relations with the district, thereby showing himself guilty of conduct which tends directly to bring the legal profession into disrepute. His counsel argue that the rule should be discharged, basing their argument principally on the fact that he had a contract with the district, and therefore, in the absence of complaint from the district, he is not to be held to accountability for his action in that connection. This record shows that he was put on the pay-roll as a matter of political patronage. He did no useful work but employed his time entirely in another occupation from which he received compensation. He undoubtedly knew that he was rendering no service of value to the district. In addition to that he testified falsely on the witness stand, and this fact, while not of itself a part of the charge, demonstrates a serious unfitness to practice law and constitutes ground for disbarment, which this court cannot refuse to consider. (People v. Gorman, supra.) The commissioner recommended that he be disbarred, and that report should be affirmed.

Respondent David S. Chesrow was twenty-nine years of age at the time of the hearing. He was admitted to the bar in 1926 and was employed by the sanitary district as assistant attorney from January 22, 1927, to April 30, 1927, from May 10, 1927, to September 15, 1928, and from October 1, 1928, to November 30, 1928, at the rate of $3000 per year. He was employed by letter of president Crowe. When he reported he was told by the chief clerk what work he would be assigned to. He reported five or six times before receiving a letter advising him that he was assigned to lake levels litigation. This was a month after he was put on the pay-roll. In May or June, 1927, he was assigned to valley cases. He had had no work before this assignment. Six cases pending in Pike county were assigned to him. He studied the declarations, made briefs, and did work on other questions of law arising in the district which were assigned to him. He made some trips down into the district pertaining to the work he was assigned to do. Pie presented a schedule showing the hours he put in. He stated that he thought the amount paid him was reasonable. Witnesses were called in his behalf who testified that they thought the fees paid him were reasonable and who testified to his good professional reputation. His counsel argue that the commissioner should have dismissed the charge as to him on his sworn answer and erred in finding that he had rendered inadequate services for the compensation paid him. It is sufficient answer to the first contention to say that the commissioner had no power to dismiss or discharge any of the respondents. He could but make recommendations. Other arguments were presented of the character heretofore considered in this opinion. It is earnestly argued that respondent had no dishonest motives or intention to defraud the sanitary district. This court is not bound by the opinions of attorneys as to the value of their services. (People v. Gilbert, supra.) The record does not show any results of value accruing to the district by reason of the time which he says he devoted to its work. It is evident that his estimate of the hours he put in is not supported by proof as to his services rendered. It is clear that, while taking as salary the sum of $5378.96 during the period of the twenty-two months, he did not discharge his duty to his client and should be disciplined.

Respondent John J. Dillon was thirty-two years of age at the time of the hearing. He was admitted to the bar in 1925 and was employed by the sanitary district as assistant attorney from August' 5, 1927, to October 2, 1928, at $5000 per year. He was told by the president, when appointed, that they expected a lot of lawsuits on the valley claims and that he would have to put in the greater portion of his time in preparation for those suits. He was told valley cases would be assigned to him. He testified that certain cases were assigned to him. He examined titles for the district. He testified that he put in twenty hours per week at the district, and that he had some private business but did not allow it to infringe on the time needed for the district. The record shows that the work he did was largely that of a law clerk, for which he drew a salary of $5000 per year. It is not clear from his testimony that he appreciated during the time of his employment his true situation. The record against him is not sufficient to justify disbarment or suspension but his conduct is subject to discipline.

Respondent Arthur Donoghue was fifty years of age at the time of the hearing. He was admitted to the bar in 1897 and engaged in general practice for the last ten years. He was a member of the State Board of Equalization in 1912, assistant corporation counsel for the city of Chicago from 1924 to 1926, assistant State’s attorney from 1926 to 1927, and was employed by the sanitary district as assistant attorney from March 16, 1928, to November 30, 1928, at $5000 per year. Employment was secured for him by a man by the name of Lyman. He went to the office daily for several months. He testified no work was specifically assigned to him but he was told “to look up some stuff.” He did not state what he was to look up. He testified that he looked up a number of things for himself — had become interested in some things that were going on around there. He stated that Elmer J. Whitty, one of the regular officers of the department, wanted to assign him some cases, but that he replied that he understood there was not anything to be done about them except try them, so there was not much use putting in a lot of time until he knew they were ready for trial. No work was assigned to him after the fourth month. He testified he was told there were a lot of cases to be tried but to keep quiet. He remained on the pay-roll five months thereafter. Five of the regular lawyers of the district testified they had no information as to his work, though Whitty stated on cross-examination that he had some valley cases. He states that he did what he was told to do. The first three or four months he was there from nine until noon, except Saturdays. After that he reported three or four times a week but no work was assigned to him. He states that it was his agreement with his client that he was to do what he was called on to do. It is clear this respondent, who was on the pay-roll for eight and one-half months at $5000 per year, realized that he was rendering no valuable service to the district. It was therefore his duty to the public to withdraw from that employment when he saw that there was, in fact, nothing for him to do. He was a lawyer of experience and knew his obligations to the public. His excuse for his conduct was that he was willing to work. Such conduct, however, will not be allowed to escape discipline.

Respondent Robert H. Eberle was forty-two years of age at the time of the hearing. He was admitted to the bar in 1913 and since engaged in general practice. He was employed as assistant attorney for the sanitary district from June 16, 1928, to November 15, 1928, at $5000 per year. He secured his employment at the suggestion of political friends, who told him that the district had the kind of work he could help them on. President Crowe told him he probably would be given some work to do and would be paid $416 per month, with the understanding that he was to do trial work later in the fall. He testified he was assigned to trade waste cases to help attorney Thomas Marshall, but that Marshall never sent for him. He stated that he examined some leases and did preparatory work on valley cases, and that he worked during his summer vacation on the lake levels cases. He testified that he thought he did not receive enough for the services rendered; that his services were worth $10,000, and that though he put in but an hour or two on each lease he examined, compensation for such services, if rendered to individual clients, would vary from $500 to $2500 for each lease. It appears from the record that at the time he was employed by the district he expected to render services and that he did what was assigned to him, which, however, was negligible. The criticism of his conduct lies in the fact that he must have realized before the expiration of the period for which he was employed that he was doing no work of value for the district. The facts in this case, though requiring discipline, do not justify his disbarment or suspension.

Respondent Roy J. Egan was thirty-three years of age at the time of the hearing. He was admitted to the bar in 1920. He served in the United States district attorney’s office and as assistant corporation counsel, enlisted in the navy in 1918, and served in the officers’ training school, for which he won a commission as an ensign. He was employed by the sanitary district between November 16, 1927, and November 30, 1928, at $3600 per year. Prominent citizens called as witnesses on behalf of respondent, testified to his good service, his industry and his good professional conduct. The evidence discloses that he did what he was told to do; that he put in a substantial amount of time in the study of law, making of briefs in valley cases and advising with officials in the legal department as to other matters arising there. He averaged about three days a week on the affairs of the district. He attended the meetings of the board. Pie kept a tabulation of his services rendered the district, which was offered in evidence. It appears from examination of the record that his motives were good. Pie stated that he thought he had earned his compensation; that if he thought he had not he should be glad to work out part of it and make restitution if he could. While we are of the opinion that this young man should have exercised more discernment and care to see that he rendered full value for the compensation received, yet the record does not disclose delinquency on his part with the required clarity to justify discipline. The rule as to this respondent is therefore discharged.

Respondent Daniel V. Gallery was sixty-six years of age at the time of the hearing. He was admitted to the bar in 1893 and has been in general practice since. He was assistant corporation counsel for four years and was employed as assistant attorney by the sanitary district from March 16, 1928, to November 15, 1928, at $5000 per year. His appointment was secured through political influence. Nothing was said about the time he was to put in. He was put on the pay-roll and two weeks or a month thereafter told attorney Hoyne that he would like some work. He repeated this request at some time later. He made another request for work to one of the special counsel for the district, but no work was ever assigned to him. He stated that the amount paid him was insignificant for the services he expected to perform; that he expected to be retained in lake levels litigation. He does not, however, state the reason for that expectation. His argument is that he wanted to work; that the district had a right to employ him and that he had a right to accept the employment. He also argues that a lawyer employed by a public corporation is entitled to his salary if he is willing to work, regardless of whether any work is assigned to him, and that he had no duty to investigate the conditions in the law department. He states that he did not know that there was nothing for him to do. He was a man of mature years, who understood the duty resting upon a lawyer, and that, notwithstanding failure of the officers of the district to assign work to him, his duty to the public, whose revenues were paying him, was to refuse to continue in that service when it became evident to him, as it surely did, that there was no reason for his employment. It is clear that he is deserving of discipline.

Respondent John C. Garriott, Jr., was forty-one years of age at the time of the hearing. He was admitted to the bar in 1914 and was in the army in the World War about nineteen months. Prominent citizens of Cook county testified to the good reputation of respondent. The charge against him differs from that against other respondents in that he is charged with procuring the appointment of Hugh Miller, his brother-in-law, as an assistant attorney of the district knowing Miller would render no services. Miller testified he was never employed by the district, never visited the office, never did any work for the district and was never asked to do so. He stated he received one check for $150 dated September 15,1927, at respondent’s home, where respondent gave it to him; that he told respondent he did not want it, and respondent told him the check was for him. Miller’s wife stated she would take the check, and after Miller endorsed it she did take it and cashed it. He also testified that respondent told him later that he had given in Miller’s name as a matter of convenience because he did not know whom to recommend for the position and in order to hold it open until he could substitute another name. Respondent states in his answer and testimony that one Michael J. Connelly, a political ward committeeman of the eighth ward, requested him to get a job for a member of the organization, and that respondent asked president Crowe for a job and was told that it would be allotted and asked the name and address of the person to be put on; that respondent, not knowing whom else to suggest, gave the name of Hugh Miller, his brother-in-law, and that later the name of Frank J. Brewbaker, a respondent herein, was substituted, and that while arranging the substitution respondent was told there was a check at the office payable to Miller, and he secured the check and delivered it to him. He further testified that Connelly told him a member of the legislature was entitled to some jobs from the district, and that respondent asked Crowe for five jobs in Springfield in June, 1927, when the legislature was in session. He stated that he did not remember whether he signed the pay-roll to get the check payable to Miller but that Miller’s name looked like his writing. He testified that he received no part of the proceeds of the check. No work was done by either Miller or Garriott. Later Miller delivered to the-clerk of the district a cashier’s check for $150 in re-payment for the one issued to him. It is clearly established that respondent had Miller’s name put on the pay-roll as assistant attorney, received the check for $150 at the district office and took it to Miller, and had him endorse it in the face of Miller’s statement that he knew nothing about the check and did not want it and that he did not need money at the time. It is also clear that at the time respondent made requests for appointments of the sanitary district the legislature was in session and contained bills affecting the interests of the district. There is no controversy as to the facts in this matter. This attorney must be held to have known that to seek favors of the district under such circumstances could not fail to compromise the good faith of his office as a member of the legislature. Respondent argues that the evidence does not show willful or corrupt professional misconduct; that lack of foresight is not ground for disbarment and that his conduct was not so gross as to justify disbarment. It is also argued that the conduct complained of, if it was misconduct, was not in his professional capacity. It is sufficient to say that in People v. Wheeler, 259 Ill. 99, People v. Baker, supra, People v. Hansen, 316 Ill. 502, and People v. Gorman, supra, misconduct outside the professional capacity of the respondent, involving legal ethics, was held to be sufficient ground for disbarment. There being no dispute as to the facts in this case, the question of discipline of this respondent depends entirely upon the effect of those acts which he admits. It is stated in the testimony given on the hearing as to this respondent that it had been the custom for members of the legislature to apply for and receive appointments at the hands of the sanitary district. Quite aside from the question of the approval or disapproval of such custom if it existed, the facts here are that respondent had Miller’s name put on the payroll, called for the check for him and induced him to endorse it and accept it for his wife, notwithstanding Miller’s objection that he did not want to be so employed and did not want the check. Respondent knew that no consideration whatever was being given by Miller for the check and that Miller did not even have knowledge that his name was being put on the pay-roll. The reputation of an attorney for fair dealing is quite as important in his transactions outside his professional duties as it is within them. While this respondent has borne a good reputation and was apparently exercising what he thought was his right, as a meniber of the legislature, to secure positions for members of his party’s organization, the facts remain that he was seeking favors of the district when legislation affecting it was contemplated or was pending before the legislature, and that it was directly through his procurement that $150 of the public funds was paid to the wife of a man who not only rendered no service to the district but who did not desire the appointment and did not desire to accept the check. Such conduct is not in accord with respondent’s professional duty and requires discipline.

Respondent Al F. Gorman was fifty-five years of age at the time of the hearing. He was admitted to the bar in 1916. Previous to his admission to the bar he worked as an architect and had held various town and district offices. He was employed by the sanitary district as an assistant attorney from August 11, 1927, to December 31, 1928, at $6000 per year. He was recommended by friends with political influence. He reported to the office and was told he would be called whenever work was available and that he was to work on valley cases. As a result of this appointment respondent closed his private office and did not practice law for himself during the entire time of his employment. He expected to put in full time for the district. He continued to appear at the office daily for a couple of weeks, but nothing was assigned to him. After six or seven weeks he was assigned six valley cases in Putnam county in which claims had been filed before the claims commission. He did nothing in connection with the handling of the claims, as other counsel took care of them. He states that he checked pleadings, analyzed reports of investigators, looked up evidence, examined records in cases that had been appealed and attended hearings of the claims commission. None of the cases which had been assigned to him were reached for trial and he did not appear in court. Pie had no other law practice but put in some time in real estate work aside from the time he put in at the district office. Various witnesses testified to seeing him at the office but none testified as to any other assignments made to him. The arguments of his counsel are in the main those heretofore discussed in this opinion. It seems clear, however, that the work he is shown by the record to have done required but a small fraction of the time he was on the payroll. His act in closing his private office indicated that he expected to be employed for a considerable period of time. He testified that he had been told his employment should be good for at least six years. It is not doubted that he wished to fulfill the duties of the employment which had been given him, but it is likewise cl