Gray v. Richmond Bicycle Co. (167 N.Y. 348, 1901)

Vann, J.

A cause of action is merged in a judgment rendered upon it, not only for the reason that a judgment is of a higher nature, but because it would be vexatious to the one party and of no benefit to the other to permit the recovery of two judgments against the same person for one debt. (Davies v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y, 93 N. Y. 250, 254; Nicholl v. Mason & Spaulding, 21 Wend. 339; Wayman v. Cochrane, 35 Ill. 152; Hogg v. Charlton, 25 Penn. St. 200; Marshall v. Stewart, 65 Ind. 243 ; Freeman on Judgments, § 215 ; 15 Amer. & Eng. Encyclo. of Law [1st ed.], 336.) As a judgment of a court in any state is entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of all the states, it is a merger of the cause of action in every part of the Union. (Besley v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 482; Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481; Hampton v. M’Connel, 3 Wheat. 232.)

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Indiana, rendered upon the promissory note in suit, is, therefore, a bar to this action, unless the plaintiff ma