In re Robinson (209 N.Y. 354, 1913)

Chase, J.

By chapter 253 of the Laws of 1912 subdivision 2 of section 88 of the Judiciary Law was amended so as to read as follows: “ The Supreme Court shall have power and control over attorneys and counsellors at law, and the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in each department is authorized to censure, suspend from practice or remove from office any attorney and counsellor at law admitted to practice as such who is guilty of professional misconduct, malpractice, fraud, deceit, crime or misdemeanor, or any conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court is hereby authorized to revoke such admission for any misrepresentation or suppression of any information in connection with the application for admission to practice.” The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court had long exercised such jurisdiction to discipline attorneys and counselors at law who were guilty of professional misconduct. •

By the statute as amended in 1912 the legislature simply gives expression to a more extended power and jurisdiction in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court than was expressed in the statutes as they existed prior to such amendment. (See section 88 of the Judiciary Law as enacted by chapter 35, Laws of 1909, and the Code of Civil Procedure, section 56, as amended by chapter 425, Laws of 1886, and chapter 946, Laws of 1895, and also section 67 of said Code as amended by chapter 99, Laws of 1891, chapter 946, Laws of 1895, and also section 3, chapter 486, Laws of 1871, and the Revised Statutes, part 1, chap. 5, title 4, sec. 24.)

The jurisdiction of this court to hear and determine an appeal from an order made in a proceeding to disbar or otherwise punish an attorney and counselor at law for misconduct as such, had been frequently asserted and exercised prior to said amendment. (Matter of Cooper, 22 N. Y. 67; Matter of Eldridge, 82 N. Y. 161; Matter of an Attorney, 83 N. Y. 164; Matter of Randel, 158 N. Y. 216; Matter of Clark, 184 N. Y. 222; Matter of Kaffenburgh, 188 N. Y. 49; Matter of Droege, 197 N. Y. 44, 50; Matter of Goodman, 199 N. Y. 143; Matter of Spenser, 203 N. Y. 613.)

The statute as amended does not in terms purport to take away the jurisdiction of this court on such appeals, neither can an intention to that effect be inferred therefrom. Jurisdiction to hear and determine such appeals have been so long exercised that it should be continued unless the legislature expressly enacts that such jurisdiction shall no longer exist.

The charges against the appellant are that between November 1, 1899, and January 1, 1902, while he as an attorney and counselor at law was in personal supervision of the law department' of the Metropolitan Street Railway Company, he approved and directed the payment of a large number of bills for money improperly expended by detectives, investigators and other employees of said department in connection with claims presented against said railway company and suits pending or being tried against it for damages arising from the alleged negligence of said company. It is charged that in approving said hills and directing the payment thereof he was guilty of malpractice and gross unprofessional conduct as such attorney and counselor at law.

The appellant was admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law in 1