Citations
- 32 N.Y. 703
Full opinion text
Potter, J.
The only question in this case, in my opinion, is: Whether the judge on the trial gave the true construction to the condition of the bond given by Simon Springsteen to the defendants. If, in view of all the circumstances of the case, the true interpretation of that condition was given, the judgment should be affirmed, otherwise it should be reversed.
In the terms used in that condition, it cannot be literally construed. They require the aid of the acts done, and other acts the doing of which are contemplated,.and this condition of the bond, and the due and proper interpretation of its meaning, present a case in which the courts are permitted to call in the aid of extrinsic circumstances to determine its true meaning. (French v. Carhart. 1 Comst., 102, and cases cited.) If the language of an instrument is susceptible of more than one construction, the intent may be inquired into. This is the established rule at common law, and in contracts relating to an interest in lands it is made so by an express provision of the statute. (1 R. S., 748.)
Let us briefly refer to the surrounding circumstances at the time of the execution of this bond, and at the things contemplated between the parties, and in the light of those circumstances read this bond.
John J. Springsteen died in December, 1858, without issue, but leaving Susan M. H. Springsteen, his wife, and Simon Springsteen, his father, entitled in equal shares to his estate.
The widow, Susan H. M., and Henry H. Samson, the defendants, administered on the estate.
On the 28th of January, 1859, the father and the widow of deceased agreed, by the assistance of two friends, called arbitrators, upon a division of the estate between themselves, and stipulating that all legal claims against the estate should be paid equally by the said Susan and the said Simon, thus intending to hasten the division and save legal expenses. The agreement, subscribed by both these equal inheritors of this estate, after the determining the division which should be made, was in the following language: “It shall be, and hereby is, agreed, however, that all legal claims against said estate shall be paid equally by the heirs, Susan Matilda H. and Simon.” This agreement, while it was but the expression of what the legal equities of these parties would have been without it, was made on the division of the estate between them, in which division Simon took the real estate, and Susan her share from the personal. And, as at that early day, the actual extent of claims against the estate could not be determined, it was proper, when releasing each other’s interests in the property thus divided, to have something in writing to secure each from the other against future liabilities. And as the plaintiff alleges in his complaint, which, nót being denied in the answer, is admitted, “ that afterwards, on or about the 2íth day of March, 1859, in consideration of the division of the proceeds and effects of said estate theretofore made as aforesaid, and in order to carry into effect said division, (m3 fuU/y