Faulkner v. Hart (82 N.Y. 413, 1880)

Miller, J.

The goods, for the value of which the plaintiffs claim to recover in this action, were shipped at New York, to be transported to and were consigned to them at Boston; and they were called for on the day of their arrival, but a delivery was refused until the next day, because it was not convenient for the defendant to deliver them. They were unloaded from the cars the same . afternoon, but too .late for delivery, and were placed during the night of that day in the defendant’s warehouse, and before the plaintiffs 'had an opportunity to make another demand the warehouse, together with the goods, was destroyed by Are. The plaintiffs were doing business, both in New York and Boston, and all resided in Boston except one of them, who lived in New Jersey. The contract for the transportation of the goods was made in New York, with the Norwich and New York Transportation Company, in behalf of itself and the connecting carriers to Boston, and they were to be conveyed to Boston. The last part of the route they were placed in cars upon the road operated by the defendants.

The rule as to the liability of carriers under the facts stated is well established by the law merchant, and the authorities are numerous which sustain the position that the carrier is bound to pay for the loss of the goods destroyed. It is his duty not only to transport the goods, but he has not performed his entire contract as a common carrier until he has delivered the' goods, or offered to deliver them to the consignee, or has done what is equivalent, by giving to the consignee, if he can be found, due notice after their arrival, and by furnishing him a reasonable time thereafter to take charge of, or to remove the same. (Gatliffe v. Bourne, 4 Bing. N. C. 314; S. C., 11 Clarke & Fin. 45; Price v. Powell, 3 Comst. 322; Zinn v. N. J. St. Co., 49 N. Y. 442; Sherman v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 64 id. 254; The “ Sultana” v. Chapman, 5 Wis. 454; Sleade v. Payne, 14 La. Ann. 453; Graves v. H. & N. Y. St. Co., 38 Conn. 143; C. & R. I. R. R. v. Warren, 16 Ill. 502; Moses v. B. & M. R. R., 32 N. H. 523; The Tangier, 1 Clifford, 396.)

In view of the rule laid down in the authorities cited, there would appear to be no serious question as to the plaintiffs’ claim to recover for the value of the goods actually destroyed. The right of the plaintiffs to recover is resisted, and exemption from liability is claimed, by reason of the decisions of the courts of the State of Massachusetts, holding adversely to the role which is established at common law, and which, as we have seen, has been generally adopted and sustained in this country and in England. The decisions of that State establish that the proprietors of a railroad, who transport goods for hire and deposit them in a warehouse until the owner or consignee has a reasonable time to take them away, are not liable as common carriers for their loss by fire, without negligence or default on their part; that the railroad corporation ceases to be á common carrier, and becomes a warehouseman, as a matter of law, when it has completed the duty of transportation, and has assumed the position of a warehouseman, as a matter of fact, and according to the usages and necessities of the business in which it is engaged. (Norway Plains Co. v. B. & M. R. R. Co., 1 Gray, 263; Rice v. Hart, 118 Mass. 201.) These decisions are entitled to the highest respect; but like all other adjudications, are the subject of revisal, limitation, and even to be overruled in the court in which they originated. The same right exists in other courts to consider and pass upon the "same question; and how far they should be allowed to control their decisions in a cause of action where the contract was made in one State, and performed in part in another State where the law has been decided differently, is the question now to be determined. It was long since held in this State that we could not break in upon the settled principles of om commercial law to accommodate them to those of any country. (Aymar v. Sheldon, 12 Wend. 439.) This principle is well established in regard to all contracts of a commercial character; and so far as may be practicable, it is of no little importance that the rule should be harmonious and uniform. Contracts of this description have been the subject of frequent consideration in the Federal courts, and the decisions have been direct and clear that while the decisions of local courts in reference to matters purely local in the States are obligatory throughout the country, they are not conclusive and final as to questions of Commercial law. In Swift v. Tyson (16 Peters, 19), the court say: “ The true interpretation and effect of contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature are to be sought, not in the decisions of local tribunals, but in the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence. Undoubtedly the decisions of the local tribunals upon such subjects are entitled to, and will receive, the most deliberate attention and respect of this court, but they cannot furnish positive rules or conclusive authority by which our own judgments are to be bound up and governed.” In a recent case (Oates v. Nat. Bank, 100 U. S. 239), the State court in Alabama held that by the rules of the commercial law, one who receives a promissory nóte as collateral security for a pre-existing debt does not become a purchaser for value in the course of business, so as to cut off equities which the maker may have against the payee; and on appeal it was held that the courts of the United States are not bound by the decisions of the State courts upon questions of commercial law. This principle has been repeatedly upheld in other cases. (Meade v. Beale, Taney, 339, 360; Austen v. Miller, 5 McLean, 153; The Ship George, Olcott, 89 ; Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666; Robinson v. Com. Ins. Co., 3 Sumn. 220.) In Meade v. Beale (supra) it is said: “ Where the State court does not decide a case upon the particular law of the State or established usage, but upon general principles of commercial law, if it falls into error, that erroneous decision is not regarded as conclusive.”

From the authorities cited it follows that if the higher court in the State of Massachusetts has made an erroneous decision, wrong in principle and contrary to a well-settled rule of commercial law in the English courts, in the Supreme Court of the United States, and many of the State courts, and especially adverse to the decisions of this court, it should not be followed here; and it is not only the right, but the duty of this court to adhere to its own decisions. Any other rule would lead to confusion in regard to a principle of general application; for if the doctrine of the Massachusetts court is to prevail,, the right of the aggrieved party might depend upon the fact whether the action was brought in the Federal or the State court; and if the action in this case had been brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the State of Massachusetts, the plaintiffs would be entitled to recover, while in the State court a different result would prevail. (Richardson v. Goddard, 23 How. [U. S.] 38; The Tangier, 1 Clifford, 396; Moses v. B. & M. R. R., 32 N. H. 523.) This court has the same authority to disregard the Massachusetts decisions, in a case involving a commercial question, as that court had to establish a rule adverse to the decisions of this court, as was done, virtually, in the cases cited. FTor is it important to determine whether, upon a reconsideration, any different rule would have been adopted. It is sufficient to say that in reference to a law notof a single State but affecting the commerce of the world, the decisions of the courts of such State are not obligatory upon the courts of other States or countries.

The learned counsel for the respondents argues that, as the delivery of the goods was to be made in Boston, where they were destroyed, the law of Massachusetts should control in respect to such delivery; and we are referred to several decisions which, it is claimed, sustain this doctrine. (Barter v. Wheeler, 49 N. H. 9; Gray v. Jackson, 51 id. 9; Knowlton v. Erie Railway Co., 19 Ohio St. 260; M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Smith, 7 Chicago Leg. News, 174.) While these cases uphold the general principle that where the contract is to be performed partly in one country and partly in another country, each portion is to be interpreted according to the laws of the country where it is to be performed—a rule which is fully sustained by authority, (see Story on Cont., § 655 ; Pope v. Nickerson, 3 Story, 474, 485; Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank, 1 Otto, 413; Pomeroy v. Ainsworth, 22 Barb. 118), none of them hold that where a great principle of commercial law has been established, which is universally acknowledged and acquiesced in, that the law announced by the courts of a single State can overturn that principle and control the decisions of the courts of another and a distant State. No such question arose' in any of the cases cited; and the answer t