Burns v. Prudential Securities, Inc. (167 Ohio App. 3d 809, 2006)

Cupp, Judge.

{¶ 1} Defendants-appellants, Prudential Securities, Inc. (“PSI”) and Jeffrey Pickett, appeal the judgment of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas finding appellants liable for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent supervision and awarding compensatory damages of approximately $16 million and punitive damages of $250 million to the class of plaintiffs-appellees.

{¶ 2} This appeal arises from a class action brought by approximately 300 retirees from Marion County, Ohio who maintained nondiscretionary securities accounts or annuities with PSI. Pickett, who worked as a “Senior Vice President Retirement Planning Consultant” in PSI’s Marion, Ohio office, serviced these accounts. The written account and program agreements entered into by each of the class members stated that the plaintiffs would make investment decisions with regard to their accounts and that PSI could not sell, purchase, or otherwise trade account assets without the plaintiffs’ consent.

{¶ 3} On or about October 7 or 8, 1998, Pickett believed that the stock market was going to suffer a severe and prolonged downturn and was fearful that the plaintiffs would lose their retirement assets in the event that downturn occurred. Therefore, Pickett, with the help of other PSI employees, reallocated the plaintiffs’ investments in the Prudential ProChoice and Target programs by selling all of the investments in their existing accounts and purchasing investments for them in the Invesco Total Return Fund and a United States Treasury money market fund. Pickett’s actions resulted in approximately 2,600 trades and the sale of over $40 million in investments over a two-day period. Neither PSI nor Pickett charged a commission on the reallocations, nor did PSI or Pickett earn any compensation based on the reallocations. It is undisputed, however, that the plaintiffs did not authorize the reallocations in advance.

{¶ 4} Within three days of the reallocations, PSI sent each plaintiff a standard confirmation slip, which informed them of the purchases and sales that had occurred in their accounts. Additionally, Pickett and his staff spoke with a number of the plaintiffs on the telephone, advising them of the reallocations and explaining that the reallocations were based on Pickett’s prediction of an impending stock market crash.

{¶ 5} In the first week of November 1998, PSI sent each plaintiff a regular monthly statement that contained information about all of the activity in his or her accounts for that month, including the reallocations made on October 7 and 8. On November 12, 1998, Pickett held a seminar at the Marion Country Club, which many of the plaintiffs attended. At the seminar, Pickett explained his views of the stock market and why he felt it was too risky to be invested in the market at that time. Following Pickett’s presentation, the attendees were given an opportunity to ask questions regarding the reallocations and the reasons for them.

{¶ 6} In February 1999, on the basis of an investigation that had commenced in October 1998, shortly after the reallocations were made without authorization, PSI terminated Pickett’s employment. In March 1999, the PSI agents who assumed service of the accounts that had been assigned to Pickett began to contact the plaintiffs to explain the unauthorized trades and to advise the plaintiffs to reinvest in the stock market.

{¶ 7} On September 10, 1999, the plaintiffs filed a putative class action against PSI and Pickett in the Marion County Court of Common Pleas, alleging breach of contract, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent supervision. The plaintiffs asserted that Pickett’s reallocations to “safe” investments had caused them to miss out on a dramatic rise in the stock market that occurred after October 1998.

{¶ 8} On October 12, 1999, Pickett and PSI removed the case to federal court, claiming that the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by federal law regarding securities fraud and, thus, the state court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. On May 8, 2000, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio dismissed the case and remanded it to the trial court.

{¶ 9} In the two years following remand, the case proceeded unremarkably and with significant motion practice and discovery by each party. During this time, the class of plaintiffs was certified pursuant to Civ.R. 23. An appeal of that certification was taken to this court, wherein we affirmed. Burns v. Prudential Securities, Inc. (2001), 145 Ohio App.3d 424, 763 N.E.2d 234.

{¶ 10} On July 8, 2002, the trial court granted a motion for partial summary judgment previously filed by the plaintiffs. The trial court found that both Pickett and PSI were liable for breach of contract, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty and that PSI was vicariously liable for the tortious actions of Pickett committed within the scope of his employment by virtue of respondeat superior. Trial on the remaining issues, negligent supervision and the calculation of damages, was scheduled to begin September 9, 2002.

{¶ 11} On September 6, 2002, the parties were once again before the trial court. The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs could present an extension of their claim of breach of fiduciary duty at trial by offering evidence that PSI “had and breached a continuing fiduciary duty during a period of months after the unauthorized sales at issue by, among other things, omitting to state material facts or concealing material information relevant to plaintiffs’ determinations or choices of action in response to the subject transactions.” The trial court allowed the claim over the appellants’ objections on the basis that discovery, pretrial motions, negotiations, and even mediation had included assertions of the continuing nature of the duty, sufficient to deem it part of the complaint. The trial court also allowed the plaintiffs to present evidence to substantiate an award of punitive damages from PSI as a result of the alleged breach.

{¶ 12} On September 9, 2002, the morning that trial was set to begin, the appellants once again removed the ease to federal court, alleging that the remaining claims were governed by federal securities fraud law. The following day, the federal district court concluded, for the second time, that there was no federal court jurisdiction for the claims and remanded the matter to state court.

{¶ 13} Trial commenced on September 11, 2002. On October 11, 2002, the jury returned verdicts against Pickett and PSI, finding the appellants liable for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent supervision, and apportioned compensatory damages in the sum of $5,905,598 as a proximate result of these torts. The jury also awarded the class $11,740,994 in compensatory damages with respect to the breach-of-contraet claim that had been previously decided by summary judgment. In addition, the jury awarded punitive damages against PSI in the amount of $250,000,000. The trial court entered final judgment on the verdicts on April 21, 2003. In total, the plaintiffs were awarded $12.3 million in compensatory damages, approximately $4 million in prejudgment interest, $2.8 million in attorney fees and expenses, and $250 million in punitive damages.

{¶ 14} Pickett and PSI filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. The trial court denied these motions in their entirety on July 24, 2003.

{¶ 15} Pickett and PSI subsequently appealed to this court. Pickett set forth six assignments of error, and PSI set forth 12 assignments of error for our review. While this appeal was pending, on March 31, 2006, Picket and PSI removed this action to federal court for a third time. Picket and PSI relied on the United States Supreme Court’s recent pronouncement in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit (2006), — U.S.-, 126 S.Ct. 1503, 164 L.Ed.2d 179, to argue, again, that federal securities fraud law barred the plaintiffs’ action. But, on July 10, 2006, the federal district court determined that federal law did not bar the plaintiffs’ action and remanded the matter to this court.

{¶ 16} On remand, we now consider Pickett’s six assignments of error and PSI’s 12 assignments of error. For clarity of analysis, we have addressed the assignments of error in a different order than they were presented to us. In addition, assignments of error that involve similar issues have been combined for determination.

PICKETT ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I

The Court of Common Pleas committed prejudicial error in refusing to grant a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict to defendants based on their ratification defense.

PRUDENTIAL ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I

The trial court erred by failing to hold that as a matter of law plaintiffs ratified the unauthorized trades.

{¶ 17} In their first assignments of error, Pickett and PSI contend that the trial court erred by failing to conclude, as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs had ratified Pickett’s action of reallocating their investments following the unauthorized trades. All parties agree that Pickett’s conduct breached his clients’ written account agreements. Pickett himself admitted at trial that he should have gotten permission from his clients to reallocate their accounts. However, Pickett and PSI argue that the plaintiffs failed to object within a reasonable time after they were notified of the unauthorized trades and their failure to object constituted ratification. Accordingly, Pickett and PSI assert that the plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty are barred and that the trial court erred in concluding otherwise.

{¶ 18} The standard of review for a ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is the same one applicable to a motion for directed verdict. Posin v. A.B.C. Motor Court Hotel (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 271, 275, 74 O.O.2d 427, 344 N.E.2d 334. A motion for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict is to be granted when, construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party opposing the motion, the trial court finds that reasonable minds could come to only one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party opposing the motion. Civ.R. 50(A)(4); Crawford v. Halkovics (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 184, 185-186, 1 OBR 213, 438 N.E.2d 890. A directed verdict is appropriate when the opposing party has failed to adduce any evidence on the essential elements of the claim. Cooper v. Grace Baptist Church (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 728, 734, 612 N.E.2d 357. The issue to be determined involves a test of the legal sufficiency of the evidence to allow the case to proceed to the jury, and it constitutes a question of law, not one of fact. Hargrove v. Tanner (1990), 66 Ohio App.3d 693, 695, 586 N.E.2d 141. A court of appeals reviews the trial court’s ruling on a motion for directed verdict de novo. McConnell v. Hunt Sports Ents. (1999), 132 Ohio App.3d 657, 686-687, 725 N.E.2d 1193.

{¶ 19} There are stringent criteria that must be met for the application of an affirmative defense such as ratification. LNC Investments, Inc. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A. New Jersey (C.A.2, 1999), 173 F.3d 454, 463. In this case, in order to establish that the plaintiffs acquiesced to Pickett’s reallocation of their investments, Pickett would have to demonstrate, among other things, that the plaintiffs acted “with full knowledge of all material facts relating to the transaction.” Id., citing 57 N.Y.Jur.2d (1986) 108, Estoppel, Ratification and Waiver, Section 76.

{¶ 20} At trial, the plaintiffs introduced the expert testimony of James Francis, a former staff attorney for the Securities and Exchange Commission who had also been previously employed as the compliance director for The Ohio Company, a Columbus, Ohio-based brokerage firm with approximately 50 branch offices, for 16 years. In his testimony, Francis opined that the proper compliance procedure following the unauthorized trades by Pickett would have been to investigate the circumstances of the trades as soon as they were discovered, to reverse the transactions at no cost to the clients, and to send the clients an explanation letter of what had transpired. Francis stated that the letter should have contained the information that the trades were unauthorized, that PSI was not in agreement with the trades made by Pickett, and that the trades had been reversed at no cost. Additionally, he said that the letter should have contained the contact information of the compliance department at PSI so that clients could talk to someone if they had further questions. John Gordon, who, in 1998, was the divisional administrative officer for the Northern division at PSI, also testified on this subject, stating that PSI typically did reverse transactions that were subsequently determined to be unauthorized.

{¶ 21} Following the unauthorized trades of the plaintiffs’ accounts, the record reflects that the following action was taken by Pickett and PSI: within three days of the reallocations made by Pickett, PSI sent all of the plaintiffs “confirmation slips” which informed them of the transactions that had occurred. Each of the confirmation slips stated, “[Ejxecution or orders shall be conclusive if not objected to in writing, addressed to the branch manager of the office serving this account within five days after transmittal to you by mail or otherwise.”

{¶ 22} Within the first week of November 1998, approximately three weeks after the unauthorized trades were effected, the plaintiffs received monthly statements for October, which also informed them of the reallocations. The statements provided, “All account statements sent to you shall be considered binding upon you if not objected to within ten days.” This language corresponded to a provision in the original account agreements that the plaintiffs entered into when they opened their accounts with PSI, which stated:

Confirmation of transactions and statements for my accounts shall be binding upon me if I do not object in writing within ten days after mailing to me. I agree to promptly notify you by a writing addressed to the Branch Manager of the branch in which my account is maintained of any item I believe to be an error or omission in any confirmation or statement.

{¶ 23} Although there is no evidence that any of the plaintiffs objected in writing to the branch manager, as directed by the confirmation slips, monthly statements, and account agreements, Pickett testified that between October 19, 1998 and November 12, 1998, following the trades, he received phone calls from approximately 50 of his clients about the transactions. He testified that during these phone calls, he explained to the clients that he felt there was a tremendous amount of risk in the stock market and that the clients’ investments would be safer out of the market. Pickett also testified that in addition to the 50 clients he spoke to, one of his assistants spoke to approximately 80 people.

{¶ 24} The record further indicates that on November 12, 1998, Pickett invited clients whose accounts had been reallocated to a seminar. The invitation did not mention the reallocation, but Picket testified that because “we all knew their investments were sold out,” he guessed that “every single person who came to the seminar knew what the topic of the seminar was going to be.”

{¶ 25} The seminar was entitled “Market Volatility: The Risk Ahead.” The materials, which were submitted and approved by PSI, included an assessment of the current stock market risks that were classified as (1) high market valuations, (2) world financial crisis, (3) political risk, and (4) hedge funds risk. The seminar also included a chart entitled “Birth of a Bull,” which compared valuations between October 21, 1998 and other “market bottoms” over the past 65 years. Pickett explained to the clients that at that time the market was extremely low and that he would let them know when the time was right to get back into the market. The evidence indicates that from the time of the seminar to the time Pickett was terminated from PSI, on February 22, 1999, Pickett never contacted his clients to advise them to reenter the stock market.

{¶ 26} Despite the confirmation slips, monthly statements, and seminars, the evidence establishes that it was never explained to Pickett’s clients that what Pickett had done was unauthorized or was a breach of the account agreement. At trial, Pickett testified as follows:

Q: When you spoke with your clients after October 8th, isn’t it true that you never used the words “unauthorized transaction,” but you always used the word “reallocation”?

A: Yes.

Q: Did Prudential ever tell you that you should say to those clients that what you did was an unauthorized act or was in breach of the law or was in breach of the contracts?

A: No.

{¶ 27} The plaintiffs introduced an email at trial, sent from one of Pickett’s clients to him on December 3,1998, inquiring about a letter dated October 8,1998 regarding the reallocation of his Target portfolio. The client wrote:

I really have a problem with this since I did not give anyone instructions to do this reallocation and I definitely would not have waited until this date when the stocks that were sold were almost at their low. I do not understand why this was done especially when they were sold to take that money over to government money market [sic] which in no way would regain any money. I thought we were in this for the long term and I realize stock prices go up and down but I see no reason for what was done and in such a large amount of reallocation done at that time.

I would appreciate seeing where I gave the authorization to make this reallocation and their reasoning behind it. I feel it was an undue loss of money out of my account.

{¶ 28} Approximately one month later, on January 5, 1999, the client sent Pickett another email, stating:

I received a call from a Prudential lawyer from New York, which was concerned about the original email that I sent to you requesting some information on my investment. After I talked to him, we agreed that I was not out of line asking these questions and expecting answers to my questions. I did receive you [sic] email saying that you were shipping me a package and I did receive the package. I thought that the package would contain the answers to my questions but it only contained articles giving many analysis [sic] views of the stock market and the trends. The articles did not answer my questions and I am still waiting on the answers to my questions.

{¶ 29} In addition to the lack of a full explanation of the nature of the trades, the evidence indicates that Pickett’s clients were never informed that PSI would reverse the trades at their own expense if the client so desired. In fact, the record does not reveal that Pickett’s clients were even told that they had the option of reversing the trades. According to the record, on October 29, 1998, one of Pickett’s clients came to him and inquired about the reallocations. Pickett testified that he explained the volatility of the stock market to the client but did not suggest reversal of the trades. The evidence indicates that the client, on his own accord, inquired about reversal and asked to be back in the market. Pickett subsequently effected the reversal but because of a rise in the market since the time of the trades, the reversal required an extra investment by the client. The record demonstrates that the reversal was done at the client’s expense. In explaining why PSI did not pay for the reversal, Pickett testified as follows:

Q: Did you know that the clients had the legal right to demand that Prudential reverse these trades, not at the client’s expense, but at Prudential’s expense, did you, as the broker working for my [sic] clients, know that?

A: I’m sure I did know that.

Q: Okay. But you never told them, did you, because you simply weren’t thinking about it, is that true?

A: And that’s the truth, yes.

{¶ 30} In addition to this lack of information, the record indicates that PSI was presenting to other clients a different financial outlook than the one that was approved for Pickett’s November 12, 1998 seminar for the members of the plaintiff class. In October 1998, the Investment Management Services department at PSI, responsible for operating the ProChoice and Target accounts in which the plaintiff class was invested, produced a brochure for those clients entitled “Putting the Investment Environment Into Perspective.” The brochure stated that the Dow Jones had declined by approximately 20 percent from July 1998 to October 1998, smaller companies had declined by substantially more, and stock markets throughout the world were “beginning to reflect fears of a potential global recession,” resembling the concerns that Pickett testified he had had. However, the brochure advised its brokers and clients that “[w]e shouldn’t be spending our time trying to predict what will happen in the stock market. Staying invested and having a long-term plan in place is what is important.”

{¶ 31} Further evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that the stock market reported a marked rise between October 9, 1998 and November 12, 1998. This trend led Ralph Acampora, a renowned market researcher for PSI, to conclude, on October 21, 1998, that “the bear market in U.S. stocks is over” and to predict that the Dow Jones Industrial Average, which on October 7 and 8, 1998 was at approximately 7,700, could reach 9,300 by the end of the year. In an interoffice weekly review memorandum issued on November 6, 1998, another PSI market analyst, Hildegard Zagorski, stated that “[i]t was another great week for the bulls as stocks continued their upward trek. Since the lows reached in early October, the Dow Jones Industrial Average has risen about 1400 points, as of [November 5]’s close, as investors become more optimistic about the outlooks for the U.S. economy and global markets.”

{¶ 32} In support of the argument that the plaintiffs ratified the unauthorized trades by failing to file a written objection, Pickett and PSI cite several cases in which courts have found ratification applicable for an investor’s failure to comply with the written objection language in the confirmation or account statements. However, we find that these cases are distinguishable from the facts in the present case because those cases do not involve the broker failing to fully inform the client about his or her options.

{¶ 33} PSI advances the argument that the plaintiffs had been informed of all the information to which they were entitled as a result of their nondiscretionary accounts. PSI asserts that because its brokers were servicing the plaintiffs’ nondiscretionary accounts, they had limited duties to the plaintiffs. Specifically, PSI contends that its brokers did not have a duty to follow up with the clients after the unauthorized trades and inform them of all of their options. Thus, the clients’ failure to object in light of the information given to them, PSI asserts, constitutes ratification. We cannot agree.

(¶ 34} In general, the duties of a broker associated with a nondiscretionary account, such as these, include the duty to recommend a stock only after studying it sufficiently to become informed as to its nature, price, and financial prognosis; the duty to inform the customer of the risks involved in purchasing or selling a particular security; the duty not to misrepresent any fact material to the transaction; and the duty to transact business only after receiving prior authorization from the customer. Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (E.D.Mich.1978), 461 F.Supp. 951, 953, affirmed (C.A.6, 1981), 647 F.2d 165. On the other hand, brokers who handle discretionary accounts become fiduciaries in the broad sense and have increased duties to keep customers informed regarding the changes in the market that affect the customer’s interest and to explain the practical impact and potential risks of the course of dealing in which the broker is engaged. Id.

{¶ 35} There exist, however, circumstances when an account is neither purely nondiscretionary nor purely discretionary. Some courts have held that if a broker assumes control over an account by acting without the customer’s prior authorization, he owes his customer the same fiduciary duties he would have had if the account had been discretionary from the moment of its creation. Id.; De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. (C.A.2, 2002), 306 F.3d 1293; J.C. Bradford Futures, Inc. v. Dahlonega Mint, Inc. (C.A.6, 1990), 907 F.2d 150.

{¶ 36} Although Ohio courts have not addressed the instant factual scenario, Ohio, in general, has an expansive view of the relationship between a broker and client. “The liabilities of a broker to his [principal] are those of an agent. The relation of principal and agent is always regarded by the court as a fiduciary one, implying trust and confidence.” 10 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1995) 96, Brokers, Section 116.

{¶ 37} After review, we find it contradictory for PSI to assert that its broker was servicing nondiscretionary accounts and, thus, the broker’s duties were merely transactional in nature, while at the same time acknowledging that the broker acted in contravention of the nondiscretionary agreement by taking it upon himself to liquidate his clients’ investments that he deemed too risky. Rather, we hold that if a nondiscretionary broker assumes control of his clients’ accounts and performs transactions at his own discretion without the clients’ approval, the broker must take on the duties of a discretionary broker, including the continuing duty to keep the clients informed of financial information that may affect their investments and the duty to disclose all material information to the clients. See Leib, 461 F.Supp. at 953; Silverberg v. Thomson, McKinnon Securities, Inc. (Feb. 14, 1985), 8th Dist No. 48545, at *4.

{¶ 38} From our review of the record, we find that the plaintiffs presented substantial evidence that the information provided to them concerning the reallocations did not include all the material facts and that they were not made aware of all of the circumstances of the trades. In addition, we hold that Pickett’s unauthorized trading of his clients’ accounts elevated his duties as a fiduciary to the extent that he was required to disclose all material facts of his unauthorized trades, even after the trades had been completed, including his clients’ right to reversal of the trades at PSI’s expense. In the absence of the disclosure of all material facts, we cannot conclude that the plaintiffs ratified the unauthorized trades made by Pickett by failing to object in writing. Ratification occurs only when the customer, with full knowledge of the facts, manifests his intention to adopt the unauthorized transaction. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cheng (C.A.D.C.1990), 901 F.2d 1124, 1129. Without full knowledge, there can be no ratification. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying the appellants’ motion for a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

{¶ 39} Pickett’s first assignment of error and PSI’s first assignment of error are, therefore, overruled.

PICKETT ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II

The Court of Common Pleas committed prejudicial error in failing to properly instruct the jury on the ratification defense.

PRUDENTIAL ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II

The trial court erred in its jury instructions on ratification and fiduciary duty.

{¶ 40} In their second assignments of error, Pickett and PSI allege error in the trial court’s instructions to the jury. Specifically, the appellants object to the instructions given on ratification and the fiduciary duties of brokers of nondiscretionary accounts. On this basis, Pickett and PSI contend that a new trial is warranted.

{¶ 41} A strong presumption exists in favor of the propriety of jury instructions. Ohio Plaza Assoc., Inc. v. Hillsboro Assoc. (June 29, 1998), 4th Dist. No. 96CA898, at *10. In general, the trial court should give requested jury instructions “if they are correct statements of the law applicable to the facts in the case.” Murphy v. Carrollton Mfg. Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 585, 591, 575 N.E.2d 828. However, jury instructions must be viewed in their totality. Margroff v. Cornwell Quality Tools, Inc. (1991), 81 Ohio App.3d 174, 177, 610 N.E.2d 1006. Instructions that, in their totality, are sufficiently clear to permit the jury to understand the relevant law will not be the cause of a reversal upon appeal. Burwell v. Am. Edwards Labs. (1989), 62 Ohio App.3d 73, 79, 574 N.E.2d 1094. Whether the jury instructions correctly state the law is a question of law, which we review de novo. Murphy, 61 Ohio St.3d at 591, 575 N.E.2d 828.

{¶ 42} The jury instructions stated:

The status as a fiduciary imposes upon a stock broker and a broker firm an affirmative duty to inform his investor of all of the relevant facts relating to the subject matter of the managed investments that affect the investor’s interest. Ratification of unauthorized reallocations by an investor cannot occur unless that investor has full knowledge and understanding.

{¶ 43} In addition, PSI alleges error in an instruction on the breach-of-fiduciary duty claim, which stated that it had been Pickett’s and PSI’s duty “to make full, fair, and prompt disclosure of all facts within a broker’s or brokerage firm’s knowledge which a reasonable client would likely consider important in making an investment decision or a decision related to an investment.”

{¶ 44} Pickett and PSI contend, as they did in their first assignments of error, that the appellants’ duties as brokers of nondiscretionary accounts were quite limited and that these jury instructions “vastly overstated” those duties. Pickett and PSI maintain that they had a duty only to inform the plaintiffs that the trades had taken place but the jury instructions misled the jury into believing that the appellants were required to meet the duties of a discretionary broker.

{¶ 45} Although Pickett and PSI correctly set forth the duties of a nondiscretionary broker under ordinary circumstances, those circumstances do not exist in the case before us. As we held in the determination of Pickett’s and PSPs first assignments of error, in those cases in which a broker assumes unauthorized control over a nondiscretionary account, the fiduciary duties imposed upon the broker increase by virtue of the broker’s unauthorized actions. See Leib, 461 F.Supp. at 953. Accordingly, we conclude that the jury instructions set forth a correct statement of the law regarding the appellants’ fiduciary duties to the plaintiffs.

{¶ 46} Moreover, we can find no error in the jury instruction on ratification. It is settled law that full knowledge of the unauthorized act and of all material matters related to it is essential to a valid ratification. See Master Commodities, Inc. v. Texas Cattle Mgt. Co. (C.A.10, 1978), 586 F.2d 1352, 1359-1360.

{¶ 47} We note that the trial court held extensive conferences to determine what jury instructions it would give. We find that the instructions ultimately given reflected a correct statement of the law and were sufficiently clear to permit the jury to understand the relevant law. Therefore, we do not find that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury.

{¶ 48} Pickett’s second assignment of error and PSPs second assignment of error are overruled.

PICKETT ASSIGNMENT OP ERROR NO. Ill

The Court of Common Pleas committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury that the “New York Rule” was the proper measure of damages for breach of contract.

PRUDENTIAL ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. Ill

The trial court’s and jury’s erroneous application of the New York Rule of conversion damages to plaintiffs’ contract claim requires a new trial or judgment in favor of defendants.

{¶ 49} In their third assignments of error, Pickett and PSI assert that the jury instruction regarding the measure of damages for the appellants’ breach of contract was in error. Pickett and PSI contend that although the account agreements included a choice-of-law provision pursuant to which New York law would govern, the trial court erred in applying and subsequently instructing the jury on the calculation of damages relating to the breach of contract because the “New York rule” is only applicable to the measure of damages caused by conversion and not by breach of contract. The appellants assert that the application of this rule caused them prejudice because the jury was allowed to measure damages over an eight-month period, which, the appellants claim, led to an award of an additional $6 million in compensatory damages. If, in the alternative, the New York rule is applicable, then, Pickett and PSI argue, the rule does not allow the time when damages could be calculated to extend to a period of eight months.

{¶ 50} Jury Instructions

{¶ 51} At the outset, we note, once again, that whether the jury instructions correctly state the law is a question of law that we review de novo. Murphy, 61 Ohio St.3d at 591, 575 N.E.2d 828.

{¶ 52} The trial court instructed the jury on the measure of damages as follows:

The measure of damages for breach of contract is the difference between the value of the investments at the time of the unauthorized reallocations on or about October 7, 8, and/or 9, 1998, and the highest intermediate value those investments reached between October 7, 1998 and a reasonable period of time after the plaintiffs received notice of the unauthorized reallocations.

{¶ 53} This language follows the “conversion theory” measure of damages also known as the “New York rule.” In general, New York courts have applied this theory in calculating damages when an item of fluctuating value is wrongfully sold, converted, or not purchased when it should have been. See Schultz v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm. (C.A.2, 1983), 716 F.2d 136, 139. Pursuant to this theory, a plaintiff can receive either the value of the stock at the time of the wrongful act or the highest intermediate stock price between the date of the act and a reasonable time thereafter during which the stock could have been replaced by the plaintiff, whichever is greater. Agostinelli v. DeBartolo Realty Corp. (Dec. 19, 2001), 7th Dist. Nos. 01 CA 9 and 01 CA 10, at *7, 2001 WL 1647218. However, contrary to Pickett’s and PSI’s assertions that the calculation is only for conversion, the New York rule can also be used to measure damages for a breach-of-contract action.

{¶ 54} In In re Dickinson (1916), 171 A.D. 486, 157 N.Y.S. 248, the New York Appellate Division explained that an unauthorized sale, not having been made pursuant to a client’s instructions, may give rise to several causes of action. The court held that whether a client proceeds against a broker for conversion or asserts a right to recover damages for a breach of contract for an unauthorized sale of stock, the measure of damages is the same. Id., 171 A.D. at 251-252. In an action, based on contract, for damages for a broker’s unauthorized sale of stock, the damages would be determined by the highest market price of the stock within a reasonable time after the customer’s discovery of the unauthorized sale. Id. Although the New York rule is often cited in connection with conversion actions, it is not limited to conversion alone. See Katara v. D.E. Jones Commodities, Inc. (C.A.2, 1987), 835 F.2d 966 (Second Circuit Court of Appeals, applying New York law, did not find that the New York rule was inapplicable to the plaintiffs breach-of-contract claim). Rather, the rule is likewise applicable in cases where stock “was not delivered according to contractual or other legal obligation, or [was] otherwise improperly manipulated.” (Emphasis added.) Schultz, 716 F.2d at 141. Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly instructed the jury on the applicability of the New York rule to the plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract action.

{¶ 55} Jury’s Application of Instructions

{¶ 56} Pickett and PSI maintain that even if the New York rule does apply to the plaintiffs’ contract claim, the jury calculated the damages incorrectly. Pickett and PSI allege that the eight-month period used by the jury was unreasonable under the circumstances. Pickett and PSI assert that the plaintiffs’ damages should have been calculated from the date of the unauthorized trades to the date when each plaintiff learned of them, allowing the plaintiffs an award of the increase in value of their shares in the days immediately after the reallocations were effected. Instead, Pickett and PSI contend that calculating the damages from the date of the unauthorized trades to a date eight months later allowed the plaintiffs to, in essence, “wait out a half-year bull market and then leverage Pickett’s transgression into a massive return on an abandoned investment.”

{¶ 57} On appellate review of contractual damages, the factual determinations of a trier of fact will not be overturned as being against the manifest weight of the evidence if there is some competent, credible evidence going to each element of the cause of action. Hofner v. Davis (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d 255, 259, 675 N.E.2d 1339, citing C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 8 O.O.3d 261, 376 N.E.2d 578, syllabus.

{¶ 58} For the purpose of measuring damages, the question of what constitutes a reasonable time after knowledge or notice of the wrongful sale depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Phillips v. Bank of Athens Trust Co. (1952), 202 Misc. 698, 119 N.Y.S.2d 47, 52. No fixed period is prescribed by law, nor is there any rule of thumb by which such period can be ascertained. Id. The time may be more substantially limited, however, if the client definitely takes the position that he will or will not repurchase the investments. Id. If he makes his decision at once or at a definite time, the period during which he may measure his damages will then terminate. Id. If a definite decision is not made, inferences may be drawn from surrounding circumstances as to the period of time that is reasonable for the ascertainment of damages. Id.

{¶ 59} A reasonable time has been interpreted by some New York courts to be: 15, 30, or 60 days; 12 days; nine days; 24 days; and seven days. See, generally, Bache & Co., Inc. v. Internatl. Controls Corp. (S.D.N.Y.1972), 339 F.Supp. 341, 351. However, a “reasonable time” has not been limited to merely days. See, e.g., Hayward v. Edwards (1938), 167 Misc. 694, 4 N.Y.S.2d 699.

{¶ 60} In the case sub judice, the jury awarded the plaintiff class $11,740,994 in damages for the appellants’ breach of contract. The jury determined that damages should be calculated from October 7, 8, and/or 9, 1998, when the unauthorized trades were effected, to June 4, 1999, the date determined by the jury, that would “have been reasonable for the plaintiff class to have reentered the markets after receiving notice of the unauthorized reallocations.”

{¶ 61} The purpose of the reasonable-time rule is to allow the plaintiff “reasonable opportunity to consult counsel, to employ other brokers and to watch the market for the purpose of determining whether it is advisable to purchase on a particular day or when the stock reaches a particular quotation, and to raise funds if he decides to repurchase.” Caballero v. Anselmo (S.D.N.Y.1991), 759 F.Supp. 144, 149, citing Gelb v. Zimet Bros., Inc. (1962), 34 Misc.2d 401, 228 N.Y.S.2d 111, 113.

{¶ 62} When a case involves misrepresentations following the unauthorized transaction, such misrepresentations should also be considered in the totality of the circumstances in determining what is a reasonable time in order to effect the purpose of the rule. In the instant case, the evidence established that Pickett and PSI continually failed to inform the plaintiffs of their option to have the trades reversed at PSI’s expense and failed to ever inform the plaintiffs that Pickett’s actions had been unauthorized.

{¶ 63} The evidence adduced at trial further indicates that it was not until Pickett had been terminated and his former clients began meeting with their new brokers that they were fully informed of the circumstances of Pickett’s actions. According to the testimony of Ken Vincent, one of the three brokers who took over the accounts, PSI did not give the new brokers any information regarding the client base except that Pickett had been terminated and that three brokers were taking over his accounts. Mr. Vincent stated that by the time the new brokers had fully identified the problem and had conducted meetings with the clients, a number of months had elapsed. Another broker who inherited Pickett’s clients, Richard Dixon, stated that he began meeting with clients on March 1, 1999 and met with them into May. Sandy Vincent, the third broker, testified that she also began meeting with the plaintiffs in March 1999. Ms. Vincent testified that she and her staff worked 12-hour days, seven days a week for approximately ten weeks and they were still not able to contact everyone to explain the unauthorized trades.

{¶ 64} Accordingly, we find that this testimony is competent, credible evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that it was not until June 4, 1999 that the plaintiffs had a reasonable opportunity to make an informed decision as to whether they wished to reenter the stock market. While we acknowledge that the majority of cases reviewed provide for a shorter “reasonable time” period than the jury calculated, we believe the longer time frame is justified here by the particular facts of this case. Therefore, we cannot find that the jury erroneously calculated the plaintiffs’ compensatory damages.

{¶ 65} Pickett’s third assignment of error and PSI’s third assignment of error are overruled.

PICKETT ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. IV

The Court of Common Pleas committed prejudicial error in denying the motion to transfer venue.

PRUDENTIAL ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. IX

The trial court erred by denying defendants’ Motion to Change Venue.

{¶ 66} In Pickett’s fourth assignment of error and PSI’s ninth assignment of error, the parties assert that the trial court erred in not granting appellant PSPs motion to change venue in which Pickett joined. Pickett and PSI claim that because of the pretrial publicity that portrayed Pickett and PSI negatively, including no fewer than seven articles in the local paper, and because of the “small town ties” between the jurors and the members of the plaintiff class, an impartial and unbiased jury could not have been assembled in Marion County, and the appellants were deprived of a fair trial.

{¶ 67} The decision whether to change venue is within the trial court’s sound discretion and will not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion. State ex rel. Dunbar v. Ham (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 112, 114, 74 O.O.2d 213, 341 N.E.2d 594.

{¶ 68} Change of venue in a civil action is governed by Civ.R. 3(C). “Upon motion of any party or upon its own motion the court may transfer any action to an adjoining county within the state when it appears that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county in which the suit is pending.” Civ.R. 3(C)(4). On motion by a party, the moving party has the burden of showing that a change of venue is necessary and proper. Hanning v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. (S.D.Ohio 1989), 710 F.Supp. 213, 215.

{¶ 69} The Ohio Supreme Court has long held that the voir dire process provides the best evaluation as to whether such prejudice exists among community members that precludes the defendant from receiving a fair trial. State v. Swiger (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 151, 34 O.O.2d 270, 214 N.E.2d 417, paragraph one of the syllabus. Further, a defendant claiming that “pretrial publicity” has denied him a fair trial must show that one or more of the jurors were actually biased. State v. Treesh (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 464, 739 N.E.2d 749.

{¶ 70} The record, in the case sub judice, reveals that there were several articles published in The Marion Star, the local newspaper, regarding the progress of the case. The record further indicates that five of the seven articles that Pickett and PSI specifically cite as being inflammatory were published in 2001, nearly nine months before a jury was convened and trial began. Of the other two articles, one appeared September 9, 2002, the day trial was scheduled to begin, and provided an overview of the facts in the case, the claims made by the plaintiffs, and an explanation of Pickett’s actions by his defense counsel. The other article appeared September 10, 2002, and explained that the appellants had removed the case to federal court the day before and that the trial was on hold.

{¶ 71} During voir dire, there was extensive discussion among counsel and the prospective jurors about whether the prospective jurors had seen or read articles about the case in the newspaper. Several of the prospective jurors stated that they had read the articles. Many of them noted that they had read articles in the past and had just recently seen, in the two days before trial, additional articles. A few of the jurors stated that based on one of the articles, they believed that they would not be called to serve as a juror because the case was going to be heard in federal court. Many of the jurors also explained that they did not necessarily believe what appeared in the paper.

{¶ 72} After a survey of how many of the prospective jurors had read the newspaper articles, counsel for PSI requested to speak individually to those who responded affirmatively. Counsel’s request was granted by the trial court. Each prospective juror who acknowledged seeing the articles was asked in detail about what articles he or she had read and what effect, if any, the articles had on his or her opinion of the case.

{¶ 73} Of the prospective jurors who had read the articles, all but one was dismissed for cause, either based on their preconceived notions from the articles or for another, separate reason. The one remaining juror who had read the articles was impaneled. The impaneled juror stated specifically during voir dire, however, that she did not form an opinion based on the articles. PSI did not elect to challenge this juror for cause.

{¶ 74} In addition to being questioned about any previous information that the prospective jurors may have had about the case, each venireperson was thoroughly questioned over a period of two days on his or her connections to PSI, Pickett, class members, general knowledge of the stock market and investing, opinions of large corporations, and notions of fairness and justice.

{¶ 75} We have reviewed the record of the voir dire and the trial court’s rulings in regard to the motion for change of venue and can find no error in the trial court’s rulings in these matters. The trial court allowed an extensive voir dire without imposing restrictions or time limits on the opportunity of any party’s counsel to question the prospective jurors. This action underscores the trial court’s efforts to empanel a fair and impartial jury. From the evidence of record, we do not find that the trial court’s action in overruling the motion for change of venue was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and, thus, was not an abuse of discretion.

{¶ 76} Pickett’s fourth assignment of error and PSI’s ninth assignment of error are, therefore, overruled.

PICKETT ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. V

The Court of Common Pleas committed prejudicial error in failing to excuse jurors for cause.

{¶ 77} Under this assignment of error, Pickett specifically asserts error with respect to the trial court’s refusal to excuse certain jurors for cause. Specifically, Pickett alleges that, during voir dire, one of the prospective jurors disclosed that she was a daughter-in-law of one of the class plaintiffs and, during trial, two other jurors disclosed that they had ties to the class plaintiffs. Pickett claims that the trial judge should have excused all of these jurors.

{¶ 78} The determination whether a prospective juror should be disqualified for cause is a discretionary function of the trial court. Berk v. Matthews (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 161, 559 N.E.2d 1301, syllabus. Such a determination will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Id. The erroneous denial of a challenge for cause may be prejudicial because it forces a party to use a peremptory challenge on a prospective juror who should have been excused for cause, giving that party fewer peremptori.es than the law provides. State v. Williams (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 1, 8, 679 N.E.2d 646.

{¶ 79} First, Pickett contends that juror Rebecca Worley should have been dismissed for cause because she was a daughter-in-law of one of the class plaintiffs. However, we can find no support for this contention in the record. The only connection that Worley revealed during voir dire was that her “separated husband’s sister” might be one of the plaintiffs, but she was not certain whether she was involved in the litigation. Worley also stated that it would “absolutely not” be hard to overlook that connection.

{¶ 80} The record indicates that counsel for the appellants then moved to challenge Worley for cause. The trial court determined that on the basis of the inquiry of Worley so far, she would not be excused, but the trial court gave leave to appellants’ counsel to bring Worley back in to question her further. However, Pickett waived any further voir dire of Worley.

{¶ 81} Second, Pickett contends that it was error for the trial court to allow Ronee Berry and Judith Worcester to continue to serve as jurors once Berry and Worcester recognized some of the plaintiffs in the courtroom on the first day of trial. Berry indicated that she was a great-niece of one of the class plaintiffs, and Worcester stated that a class member was a former schoolmate. Upon receiving this information, counsel for both sides agreed to allow the trial court to question the two jurors individually in chambers. In so doing, counsel for both sides submitted questions for the trial court to use in questioning the jurors.

{¶ 82} Upon questioning, both Berry and Worcester stated that any acquaintance with a member of the plaintiff class would not affect their ability to be fair and impartial jurors. Berry stated that although one of the plaintiffs was her grandfather’s sister, she saw her great-aunt only about once a year and did not know her very well. Worcester stated that she had not seen her classmate in a number of years and was only an acquaintance. The trial court was satisfied with this inquiry and allowed both jurors to continue with no objections from counsel.

{¶ 88} The trial court has discretion in determining a juror’s ability to be impartial. State v. Williams (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 281, 288, 6 OBR 345, 452 N.E.2d 1323. “[D]eference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.” Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 426, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841. In the specific instances cited by Pickett, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to dismiss jurors Worley, Berry, and Worcester for cause. Each juror affirmed that they could be fair and impartial despite the circumstances. We are satisfied, as was the trial court, with their affirmations.

{¶ 84} Pickett’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.

PICKETT ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. VI

The Court of Common Pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case.

PRUDENTIAL ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. XII

The trial court did not have jurisdiction over this class action, which is based upon alleged misrepresentations and omissions made in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.

{¶ 85} In Pickett’s sixth assignment of error and PSI’s 12th assignment of error, the appellants argue that the plaintiffs’ lawsuit fell within the exclusive purview of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”) and, accordingly, the state trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. Pickett and PSI contend that because the plaintiffs’ claim of breach of an ongoing fiduciary duty was based on the allegations that Pickett and PSI omitted and concealed information, the plaintiffs’ claim was preempted by SLUSA and should have been removed to federal district court.

{¶ 86} A state court civil action may be removed to federal court under Section 1441(b), Title 28, U.S.Code if the claim arises under federal law. Beneficial Natl. Bank v. Anderson (2003), 539 U.S. 1, 6, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.E.2d 1. However, under the “well-pleaded complaint rule,” a plaintiff who has both state and federal claims may avoid federal court by limiting his or her complaint to the state-law claims. Id. Under this rule, a case will not be removable if the complaint does not affirmatively allege a federal claim unless a federal statute so occupies the field that it completely preempts the state-law cause of action. Id. In that instance, the claim is removable under Section 1441(b). Id.

{¶ 87} In 1998, the United States Congress passed SLUSA to establish the federal courts as the “exclusive venue for most securities fraud class actions[s]” involving nationally traded securities. Burns v. Prudential Secs. (N.D.Ohio 2000), 116 F.Supp.2d 917, 921, citing H.R.Conf.Rep.No. 803, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. at 13 (1998). SLUSA explicitly permits removal of, and therefore completely preempts state court jurisdiction for, “covered class actions” based on state law claims in which plaintiffs allege:

(A) a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security; or

(B) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or other contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.

Section 78bb(f)(2), Title 15, U.S.Code. In the absence of allegations meeting these criteria, Congress has declined to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts, and, accordingly, the doctrine of preemption does not apply.

{¶ 88} The record herein reveals that Pickett and PSI removed this case to federal court following the filing of the complaint. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio found, however, that the allegations made by the plaintiffs did not meet the criteria under SLUSA. See Burns, 116 F.Supp.2d at 926. The federal district court determined that the plaintiffs had not alleged specific facts giving rise to a strong inference that Pickett acted deceitfully in making the unauthorized reallocations. Id. At most, the federal district court held, the plaintiffs alleged unauthorized trading “which, without more, cannot sustain a claim of securities fraud” and did not implicate SLUSA. Id. The federal district court, therefore, remanded the action to the trial court. Id.

{¶ 89} Following the grant of the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary-judgment for breach of contract, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty, Pickett and PSI once again removed the instant action to federal court on September 9, 2002, the day that trial was scheduled to begin. In this removal and request for dismissal, the appellants asserted that the plaintiffs’ remaining claim, that Pickett and PSI violated their continuing fiduciary duties during a period of months after the unauthorized sales by failing to inform them about material facts by making false statements and omissions, now fell squarely within the purview of SLUSA.

{¶ 90} Once again, the federal district court disagreed and found that the crux of the plaintiffs’ complaint was that Pickett acted on his own, without prior approval, in the sale of their investments. Burns v. Prudential Secs., Inc. (N.D.Ohio 2002), 218 F.Supp.2d 911, 915. It was only after the unauthorized sales, plaintiffs alleged, that the appellants failed, in violation of their obligations as fiduciaries, to fully inform the plaintiffs about the situation regarding, among other things, the plaintiffs’ right to have the sales reversed. Id. The federal district court found that any of these omissions or false statements were not fraudulent “in connection with” the unauthorized sales because they occurred after the decision to sell had been made. Id. The federal district court determined that the plaintiffs’ case herein involved two distinct events: (1) the unauthorized sale of investments by Pickett, which was followed by (2) independent acts on the part of PSI. Id. at 916. Further, the federal district court noted that there was no allegation that there was a common scheme or even that Pickett knew or anticipated that PSI would engage in the alleged misrepresentations or omissions following the unauthorized sales. Id. Accordingly, the federal district court determined that any fraudulent action was not “in connection with” the sale of a covered security as required by Section 78bb(f)(2), Title 15, U.S.Code and remanded the case to the trial court. Id. at 917.

{¶ 91} While this appeal was pending, Picket and PSI removed this action to federal court for a third time. Picket and PSI argued, again, that SLUSA barred the plaintiffs’ action. But the federal district court disagreed, and it remanded the matter to this court. Burns v. Prudential Secs., Inc. (N.D.Ohio 2006), 450 F.Supp.2d 808.

{¶ 92} After review, we find that the prior cases set out a correct explanation of federal securities fraud law as well as a concise and accurate analysis of the applicability of that law to the plaintiffs’ breach of continuing fiduciary duty claim. We hold, as did the federal district court, that the plaintiffs’ claims did not meet the criteria set forth in Section 78bb(f)(2).

{¶ 93} Pickett’s sixth assignment of error and PSI’s 12th assignment of error are, therefore, overruled.

PRUDENTIAL ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. IV

The trial court erred by failing to dismiss plaintiffs’ punitive damages claims as a matter of law.

PRUDENTIAL ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. V

The trial court and jury erred by finding malice on the part of Prudential Securities, Inc. (“PSI”).

{¶ 94} PSI’s fourth and fifth assignments of error relate to the availability of punitive damages in the case sub judice. Specifically, PSI argues that in Ohio, punitive damages are limited to tort actions where actual malice is demonstrated. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claims of breach of contract and negligent supervision cannot support the award of punitive damages. Further, PSI asserts that the only basis on which the plaintiffs could recover punitive damages is for the breach of fiduciary duty but, as argued previously, because Pickett was a nondiscretionary broker, he did not have broad fiduciary duties. In the event that the plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim could give rise to the imposition of punitive damages, PSI contends that the plaintiffs did not substantiate, by clear and convincing evidence, malice on the part of PSI, and the jury’s award of punitive damages was in error.

{¶ 95} Before any analysis of PSI’s arguments can be undertaken, however, we must determine which state’s law is applicable to the availability of punitive damages and the burden of proof associated with such damages.

{¶ 96} In 1984, the Ohio Supreme Court formally adopted the Restatement of the Law 2d, Conflicts of Law, which outlines the analysis for determining choice-of-law in a tort action. See Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co., Inc. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 339, 341-342, 474 N.E.2d 286. The court outlined the approach as follows:

When confronted with a choice-of-law issue in a tort action under the Restatement of the Law of Conflicts view, analysis must begin with Section 146. Pursuant to this section, a presumption is created that the law of the place of the injury controls unless another jurisdiction has a more significant relationship to the