State v. Trimble (122 Ohio St. 3d 297, 2009)

Moyer, C.J.

{¶ 1} On the evening of January 21, 2005, James E. Trimble, the defendant-appellant, shot and killed his girlfriend, Renee Bauer, and her seven-year-old son, Dakota Bauer, at their home in Brimfield Township, Ohio. Trimble then fled the scene on foot. Later that evening, he broke into a nearby residence and took the occupant, Sarah Positano, hostage. After a police SWAT team surrounded the residence, Trimble shot and killed Positano. Trimble was convicted of the aggravated murder of Renee, Dakota, and Positano and was sentenced to death.

{¶ 2} Trimble now appeals to this court as a matter of right.

State’s case

{¶ 3} During October 2003, Trimble and Renee Bauer started dating. Shortly thereafter, Trimble, Renee, and Dakota began living together in a home at 880 Sandy Lake Road in Brimfield Township.

{¶ 4} Trimble kept numerous guns, including pistols, assault rifles, and military weapons, plus ammunition in his home. Darrell French, a neighbor, often heard Trimble firing his guns in the woods behind his home.

{¶ 5} Trimble and Renee’s relationship started to dissolve as they began to fight and argue. Trimble frequently complained to Darrell and Angela French that Renee was “fuckin’ bitching all the time.”

{¶ 6} In October 2004, Trimble and Renee attended a birthday party at the French home. Trimble and Renee had a quarrel, and Renee left the party. Trimble remained at the party, became drunk, and complained about Renee. Before he finally left, Trimble stated that he was in the mood to go home and “blow something up.” Shortly thereafter, Darrell heard Trimble firing guns in the woods.

{¶ 7} At 7:18 p.m. on January 21, 2005, Elizabeth Trimble Bresley, the defendant’s mother, called Trimble on his cell phone. When she called, Trimble was at home, waiting for a pizza delivery. Bresley heard the doorbell ring and heard Trimble tell Dakota to “give this money to the pizza man.” Trimble then ended the phone call.

{¶ 8} At 8:10 p.m., Bresley made another call to Trimble. She asked how things were going, and Trimble said, “Not too well. I shot Renee and Dakota.” Trimble ended the conversation. Bresley then called her other son, Arthur Trimble, who lives in Florida, and told him that something had happened at his brother’s house. She asked Arthur to find out what had happened.

{¶ 9} Shortly thereafter, Arthur called Trimble and asked what happened. Trimble said, “I killed the fucking bitch.” Arthur said, “You did what?” Trimble replied, “Yep, she’s fucking dead,” and the boy was “dead, too.” Arthur told Trimble to stay where he was because he was going to call the police. Trimble said that he was not going to stay where he was because his life was over. After their conversation ended, Arthur called the Brimfield Township Police Department. Arthur told the police dispatcher to send officers to his brother’s address on Sandy Lake Road because his brother had told him that he had killed two people there that evening.

{¶ 10} Around 9:00 p.m. on January 21, Trimble approached the home of Steven Reichard on Ranfield Road in Brimfield Township. Reichard was working in his garage when he heard a tree branch break. He stepped outside and saw the silhouette of a man standing near a wood pile. Reichard could not see the man’s face, but he was dressed in camouflage clothing.

{¶ 11} Reichard asked the man what he was doing, and Trimble ordered, “Put your fucking hands up.” Reichard asked, “What are you, fucking crazy?” Trimble replied, “That’s right, I’m crazy. I just killed three people.” Reichard raised his hands because Trimble had a rifle. Reichard pleaded for his life as they continued talking. Trimble said, “Only thing I can tell you is that you’re at the wrong place at the wrong time.” Trimble then stepped forward to shoot Reichard.

{¶ 12} At that moment, Lois Scott, Reichard’s mother, came out the back door of the house. Reichard identified his mother, and Trimble told him to “[g]et her over here.” After Scott came over, Trimble said he had to shoot both of them: “You guys can identify me.” Reichard replied that he could not see Trimble’s face. Trimble then said he was going to take Reichard hostage so that his mother would not call the police. Reichard told Trimble that Trimble had another option: to turn around and walk away. Trimble said, “All right. I’m going to turn around and I’m going to walk away slowly. You move and you’re dead. And you call the cops and I’ll kill you.” Trimble then left through the back of the property. After he departed, Reichard called the police.

{¶ 13} Around 9:00 p.m., police officers were dispatched to 880 Sandy Lake Road to check on the report of the killings. Brimfield patrolman Amber Peterson and Portage County Sheriffs officer Trent Springer went to the back of the house after receiving no response to a knock at the front door. They looked through a rear window and saw a body lying on the floor.

{¶ 14} After entering the house, police officers found Renee’s and Dakota’s bodies on the floor in the master bedroom. Renee’s body was face down and lying partly on top of Dakota. Both bodies were fully dressed and wearing jackets. In searching the house, police found Renee’s purse and a duffel bag containing clothing for an adult female and a child on a living room chair. In the dining room, they also found clothing. A piece of paper with a phone number for a battered-women’s shelter was found on the refrigerator.

{¶ 15} About 9:37 p.m. on January 21, Brimfield Chief of Police David Blough requested assistance from the Metro SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) team to help apprehend Trimble. Around 10:20 p.m., Trimble was reported firing shots at police officers on Ranfield Road. At 11:13 p.m., the SWAT team assembled and proceeded towards the area where Trimble had been spotted.

{¶ 16} At 11:18 p.m. on January 21, Sarah Positano, a 22-year-old college student, called 911 and reported that a man had entered her duplex at 3729B Ranfield Road. Positano said the man wanted the police to leave the area, and he would shoot her if the police entered the residence. During the call, Positano could be heard asking Trimble, “Could you not put the gun to my head?”

{¶ 17} During the 911 call, Trimble told the operator that he has a “9-mm pistol with no safety.” Trimble said, “I have got the hammer held back [and] the trigger pulled. So if the cops shoot me or even attempt to break in here, I will let go of the trigger and the innocent girl will die.” He also told the operator that he could see a policeman outside the window “looking in” and added, “I don’t really appreciate that.”

{¶ 18} Following Positano’s call, the SWAT team established a perimeter around the duplex. Meanwhile, Mike Korach, the SWAT team hostage negotiator, twice made phone contact with Trimble. During the first call, Trimble repeated that he had a gun with no safety, that his finger was on the trigger, and that he would kill the girl if the police entered the residence. On the second call, Trimble identified himself as “Camo Jim.” Trimble also warned the police that he had already killed two people that had “fucked” with him.

{¶ 19} As the phone conversation progressed, Trimble said that he did not want to “hurt any innocents” and just wanted the police to go away. Trimble mentioned that he had come into contact with two other people whom he could have killed. However, he did not kill them because they did what he wanted them to do. Trimble said, “Look, if you just give me a couple hours to get my shit together, I’ll let her go.” At Korach’s request, Trimble repeated that promise to Positano. Korach then lost phone contact with Trimble and was unable to reestablish it.

{¶ 20} While Korach talked with Trimble, Lieutenant Richard Baron, an Ohio State Highway Patrol hostage negotiator, maintained phone contact with Positano. Positano told Baron that Trimble was standing right behind her in the upstairs hallway with a gun pointed at her head. During the call, Trimble can be heard telling Positano, “Sarah, in two hours you’re going to go home * * * if the cops don’t come up here.” A few seconds later, Positano can be heard screaming, “I’ve been shot” and starting to gasp for breath. A short time later, the phone connection was lost.

{¶ 21} At 12:05 a.m. on January 22, 2005, Lieutenant Baron notified Chief Blough that he had lost phone contact with Positano after hearing her scream and make gasping noises. However, Baron did not report that Positano had been shot, because he did not hear Positano say so or hear the gunshot. As a result, Chief Blough did not order the SWAT team to enter the residence until more than seven hours later.

{¶ 22} At 12:10 a.m., Trimble fired shots from the residence towards the SWAT team. Chief Blough then issued a “Delta order” authorizing the SWAT team to use deadly force without asking for permission. At 12:35 a.m., after more gunfire came from the residence, SWAT team snipers fired three gunshots in return. Between 12:39 a.m. and 2:32 a.m., Trimble continued to fire shots towards the SWAT team.

{¶ 23} At 7:30 a.m., the SWAT team entered the residence. Positano’s body was found lying in the upstairs hallway. Trimble was arrested, taken into custody, and transported to the Portage County jail.

{¶ 24} On the morning of January 24, 2005, Portage County Sheriff Duane Kaley was informed that Trimble wanted to talk with him. Trimble was brought to Kaley’s office. After waiving his Miranda rights, Trimble provided a taped interview. Trimble stated that he wanted “to get this over with and not make any more people suffer than have already suffered.” He said, “I’m admitting I did everything” and committed “[t]hree murders.”

(¶ 25} Trimble said he did not remember shooting Renee and Dakota. However, he said, “I must have. No one else was there.” Trimble said, “The last thing I remember is me and Dakota were down in the basement, and we were getting ready to shoot his BB gun * * *.” He next remembered running through the woods and talking on his cell phone to his mother and brother. Trimble remembered taking an AR-15 semiautomatic rifle and a 9-mm handgun from his gun safe and six or seven ammunition clips before leaving his home. Trimble also remembered meeting some people in the woods and telling them to leave him alone and not to call the police.

{¶ 26} During the interview, Trimble refused to discuss whether he had had an argument with Renee before the shootings because “why it happened is irrelevant.”

{¶ 27} Trimble said he went to Positano’s residence because he “just kept running through the woods and that’s where [he] ended up.” Trimble claimed that he shot Positano after the police entered the residence. He said, “I had the hammer cocked and the police came in the house and I turned to look at them and [the gun] went off.” According to Trimble, the police entered the residence and then left: “They fired one shot, I fired a couple of shots. They * * * fired a couple of more shots before they went out the door.” Trimble said, “I didn’t pull the trigger,” and “I didn’t mean to shoot her.”

{¶ 28} At trial, Sheriff Kaley testified that Trimble’s explanation for shooting Positano was not consistent with the facts. Kaley stated that the SWAT team entered Positano’s residence only one time, and that was when Trimble was arrested and taken into custody.

{¶ 29} Special Agent John Saraya, a crime-scene agent at the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation (“BCI”), examined the Sandy Lake Road crime scene and collected evidence. Saraya found bone fragments and hair at various locations around the master bedroom and in the adjoining bathroom. Blood spatter was found on the bottom of the dresser near Renee’s head and on the bottom of the shower stall.

{¶ 30} Saraya collected 19 cartridge casings from the floor and top of the dresser in the master bedroom. The cartridges were from .223-caliber high-velocity rounds. Bullet holes were found in the dresser, the wall behind the dresser, the baseboard, and the floor. Saraya determined that the path of the gunshots was from “an upper direction at a slight downward angle.”

{¶ 31} In the basement, Saraya found a long gun case that was open and empty. There were also military belts, magazine pouches, a handgun, and three long guns leaning against the wall. After obtaining a search warrant, Saraya opened a large gun safe that was in the basement. He found 19 guns, including handguns, semiautomatic rifles, an assault rifle, and carbines. He also found 9 mm bullets and .223-caliber rounds of ammunition that matched the casings found in the bedroom.

{¶ 32} Saraya also examined the crime scene at Positano’s residence. Positano suffered a bullet wound in the neck, and a spent 9 mm bullet was found inside her clothing. Trimble’s empty prescription bottle of the anti-anxiety drug Lorazepam and a set of dog tags with Trimble’s name on them were found near Positano’s body in the upstairs hallway.

{¶ 33} Saraya recovered twenty-six .223-caliber casings and nineteen 9 mm casings inside the residence. An AR-15 rifle that fires .223-caliber ammunition was recovered in the north bedroom. Trimble’s empty prescription bottle for Hydrocodone, a pain medication, was found behind the bedroom door. A Sig Sauer 9 mm handgun and Trimble’s wallet were found in the adjoining bathroom. Trimble’s wallet contained $767 in cash, $185.79 in checks made payable to him, and Lorazepam in powdered form.

{¶ 34} Saraya identified two bullet holes in the interior wall that were caused by sniper fire. One bullet had followed a trajectory through the patio door frame into the house, and the other bullet had followed a trajectory through the patio glass door into the house. At trial, Saraya acknowledged that there was a third bullet hole in the wall that had been caused by sniper fire and that he had failed to notice it at the crime scene.

{¶ 35} Jonathan Gardner, a firearms examiner at BCI, examined the 19 cartridge casings collected from Trimble’s home and determined that they had all been fired from the AR-15 rifle recovered from Positano’s residence. Gardner also determined that 18 of the .223-caliber casings collected from Positano’s residence had been fired from the AR-15. He testified that the remaining casings lacked sufficient individual characteristics to make a comparison. Gardner also testified that a shooter would have to pull the trigger of the AR-15 once for each round of ammunition fired.

{¶ 36} Gardner determined that all 9 mm casings recovered from Positano’s residence had been fired from the 9 mm handgun found there. He testified that the handgun has a four-and-one-half-pound trigger pull when the hammer has been cocked, which is “typical for this type of gun.” By examining the gunshot residue around the bullet hole in her jacket, Gardner also determined that the gun had been fired less than 12 inches from Positano.

{¶ 37} Dr. George Sterbenz, the Chief Deputy Medical Examiner for Summit County, conducted the autopsy of Renee. Dr. Sterbenz found that Renee had died from multiple gunshot wounds. She was shot once in the front of the head, 11 times in the back, and in the hand. Dr. Sterbenz also found bruises on Renee’s upper left thigh, her right thigh, and above her elbow that were blunt-force injuries. These were not fresh bruises and could have been caused hours or days before her death. A toxicology screen showed that Renee’s blood-alcohol level at the time of death was .173 percent.

{¶ 38} Dr. Sterbenz also conducted the autopsy of Dakota. Dr. Sterbenz determined that Dakota had also died from multiple gunshot injuries. Dakota received six gunshot wounds in his head, neck, torso, and upper extremities. Dr. Sterbenz testified that two of the entrance wounds are “atypical and characteristic of wounds of re-entry meaning the projectile has traveled through * * * some intermediate target” before striking Dakota.

{¶ 39} Dr. Dorothy Emma Dean, the Deputy Medical Examiner for Summit County, conducted the autopsy on Positano. Dr. Dean determined that Positano had died from a gunshot wound to the neck with perforation of her carotid artery and left lung.

Defense case

{¶ 40} The defense called nine witnesses and introduced photographs and other documentary evidence.

{¶ 41} Captain John Ristity, a Portage County Sheriffs officer, took photographs of Trimble after he had been arrested and taken to the hospital. These photographs show a lump over Trimble’s left eye, a bloody nose with blood streaming across his face, facial bumps and bruises, and a bruise on his upper right arm. Another photograph shows a brownish-red stain on the side of Trimble’s underwear.

{¶ 42} Patricia Wain, a member of the SWAT team, had been the record keeper for the SWAT team’s timeline of events for January 21 and 22. Wain testified that negotiators made contact with Trimble at the Ranfield duplex at 11:41 p.m. At 12:02 a.m., negotiators reported that Trimble had terminated his call and wanted a two-hour time break and would then release Positano and kill himself. At 12:04 a.m., gunshots were heard inside the residence. Between 12:09 p.m. and 2:32 a.m., shots were fired from Positano’s residence on 13 occasions, and snipers returned fire on one occasion.

{¶ 43} Monica Moll, another member of the SWAT negotiation team, testified that she had relayed information to command authorities that Korach had obtained in talking on the phone with Trimble. The information broadcast by Moll could be heard by all SWAT team members.

{¶ 44} Trooper Ronald Schneider, an Ohio State Highway Patrol investigator, prepared a timeline for Positano’s 911 phone calls. He testified that at 11:14:14 p.m. on January 21, Positano initiated the 911 call. At 12:02:23 a.m. on January 22, Positano screamed and twice said, “I’ve been shot.” Thereafter, she could be heard gasping until 12:04:20 a.m. At 12:06:57 a.m., multiple gunshots were heard, and at 12:07:08 a.m., a single gunshot was heard.

{¶ 45} Scott Robertson, the SWAT team commander, testified that at 11:13 p.m. on January 21, the SWAT team began moving out from its staging area. At 11:17 p.m., Robertson was advised that the suspect was located at 3729 Ranfield Road, Apartment B. However, the SWAT team had trouble locating the duplex, according to Robertson. At 11:50 p.m., they identified the duplex. Sniper teams were positioned.

{¶ 46} At 12:10 a.m., Robertson requested a “Delta order” after shots were fired at the SWAT team. The SWAT members began notifying neighborhood residents to stay in the backs of their homes, and Trimble continued to fire at them. At 12:35 a.m., snipers returned fire with three shots. Robertson testified that no additional sniper fire was directed at the residence. During cross-examination, Robertson testified that no one on the SWAT team was either authorized or deployed to enter Positano’s residence between midnight and 12:20 a.m.

{¶ 47} Kenneth Ciesla, an assistant SWAT team commander, was a member of the team that entered Positano’s residence at 7:30 a.m. He testified that after entering the residence, the SWAT team determined that Trimble was partially barricaded in an upstairs bedroom. A tear-gas canister was thrown into the bedroom after Trimble had ignored orders to surrender. Trimble then emerged from the bedroom on his hands and knees. When Trimble collapsed on his hands and refused to show them, Ciesla sprayed Trimble’s face with pepper spray. Ciesla also gave Trimble two knee strikes in the thigh because he refused to be handcuffed. Ciesla did not observe any other blunt force used against Trimble. He testified that no member of the entry team caused Trimble’s injuries, and he does not know how they occurred.

{¶ 48} Jeffrey Film, an assistant SWAT team commander, was in charge of the entry team. Film testified that he dragged Trimble down the hallway after he emerged from the bedroom. He pinned Trimble to the floor by placing pressure on his back and neck area after Trimble refused to release his left arm to be handcuffed. Other officers tried to subdue him with a Taser, but the Taser did not work. Trimble’s arm was forced loose, and he was handcuffed. Film did not see Trimble bleeding or notice abrasions or cuts on his face. Nor did Film see anyone strike Trimble in the face.

{¶ 49} Stephen Miller, a member of the SWAT entry team, and Film took Trimble downstairs after he refused to voluntarily walk down. Miller testified that he did not look at Trimble’s face and did not notice that Trimble had suffered any injuries.

{¶ 50} Larry Dehus, a firearms and ballistics expert, reviewed Saraya’s report and examined the crime scene at Positano’s residence. Dehus criticized the accuracy of Saraya’s findings. Dehus testified that he located three bullet defects on the inner wall rather than the two defects identified in Saraya’s report. He also criticized the accuracy of Saraya’s floor plan because it was not drawn to scale. Further, Dehus stated that Saraya failed to use a string or laser to determine the trajectory of the bullets before concluding that they had been fired from outside the residence.

{¶ 51} Dehus testified that he took detailed measurements inside the residence and completed a scale drawing of the floor plan. He determined the angle of the bullet path using some of the measurements in Saraya’s report. Dehus then projected a straight line for the trajectory of the bullet path, which showed that one of the bullets had been fired from the interior of the living room. Dehus concluded that the bullet had been fired four to six inches from the edge of the patio door frame.

{¶ 52} Dehus also conducted tests on the 9 mm handgun that killed Positano. He testified that the gun has an internal safety that prevents the hammer from falling and firing the weapon unless the trigger is fully depressed. His tests showed that the gun would not discharge by simply letting the hammer fall from a cocked position unless the trigger was fully depressed. Dehus also tested the gun to determine whether it would discharge if he simultaneously released his finger from the trigger and his thumb from the hammer and let the gun fall. Dehus testified that the gun had fired in one of the two times that he conducted this test.

Case history

{¶ 53} Trimble was indicted on three counts of aggravated murder. Count 13 charged Trimble with the aggravated murder of Renee with prior calculation and design. Count 14 charged Trimble with the aggravated murder of Dakota, a child under the age of 13. Count 15 charged him with the aggravated murder of Positano during a kidnapping, aggravated burglary, or burglary.

{¶ 54} Count 13 included a death-penalty specification for a “course of conduct,” R.C. 2929.04(A)(5). Count 14 included death-penalty specifications for a “course of conduct” and the murder of a child under 13 years of age, R.C. 2929.04(A)(9). Count 15 included death-penalty specifications for a “course of conduct,” murder for the purpose of escaping apprehension or detection, R.C. 2929.04(A)(3), murder while committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), and murder while committing or attempting to commit aggravated burglary, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).

{¶ 55} Trimble was also charged with the following additional counts: Count 16 charged Trimble with aggravated burglary, Counts 17, 18, and 19 charged him with kidnapping, and Counts 20 and 21 charged him with felonious assault. Each of these counts included a firearm specification.

{¶ 56} Trimble pleaded not guilty to all charges. The jury found Trimble guilty, and he was sentenced to death.

Pretrial issues

{¶ 57} Change of venue. In proposition of law I, Trimble argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant a motion for change of venue.

{¶ 58} “[T]he right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors.” Irvin v. Dowd (1961), 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751. However, “pretrial publicity!,] even pervasive, adverse publicity[,] does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial.” Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart (1976), 427 U.S. 539, 554, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683.

{¶ 59} A trial court may change venue “when it appears that a fair and impartial trial cannot be held” in that court. Crim.R. 18(B); R.C. 2901.12(K). Any decision on a change of venue rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Lynch, 98 Ohio St.3d 514, 2003-Ohio-2284, 787 N.E.2d 1185, ¶ 34. A defendant claiming that pretrial publicity has denied him a fair trial must show that one or more jurors were actually biased. State v. Treesh (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 464, 739 N.E.2d 749. Moreover, we have held that “a careful and searching voir dire provides the best test of whether prejudicial pretrial publicity has prevented obtaining a fair and impartial jury from the locality.” State v. Bayless (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 73, 98, 2 O.O.3d 249, 357 N.E.2d 1035.

{¶ 60} The defense filed a pretrial motion requesting a change of venue. The trial court deferred ruling on the motion until an attempt had been made to select a jury. A jury was selected following extensive voir dire. The trial court then rejected the motion.

{¶ 61} Trimble used only five of his six allotted peremptory challenges. Thus, Trimble has waived his present claim because of his failure to exhaust his peremptory challenges. See State v. Getsy (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 189, 702 N.E.2d 866. We find that the trial court did not commit plain error in overruling the motion for a change of venue.

{¶ 62} During its pretrial-motion hearing, the defense presented evidence of extensive pretrial publicity reported in local newspapers, the Akron Beacon Journal and the Ravenna Record Courier. Newspaper articles disclosed detailed information about the murders and the victims, discussed Trimble’s lengthy criminal record and his troubled past, and mentioned that Trimble was on probation for a federal firearms conviction at the time of the murders. There was also a good deal of publicity on local radio and television stations about the murders.

{¶ 63} The trial court conducted extensive individual voir dire of prospective jurors. Two of the seated jurors and one of the alternate jurors did not remember any pretrial publicity. Another seated juror had talked to friends about the case, but had read or heard nothing about it in the media. The remaining seated and alternate jurors had heard or read something about the case in the news media. However, all of these jurors assured the court that they could set aside what they heard or read in the news media, remain fair and impartial, and decide the case based solely on the evidence presented in court.

{¶ 64} Though pretrial publicity was extensive, the trial court was in the best position to judge each juror’s demeanor and fairness. The trial court selected a jury after conducting in-depth voir dire that encompasses over 2,450 pages of the record. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not commit plain error in denying the defense motion for a change of venue.

{¶ 65} Based on the foregoing, we reject proposition I.

{¶ 66} Defense jury challenges. In proposition of law II, Trimble argues that the trial court erred by failing to excuse prospective jurors who would automatically vote for the death penalty. He also argues that the trial court erred by failing to excuse prospective jurors who were biased and by failing to excuse a prospective juror who had heard gunshots at the crime scene.

{¶ 67} However, Trimble has waived any objection to these overruled challenges because of his failure to exhaust his peremptory challenges. State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d at 191, 702 N.E.2d 866; see also State v. Hale, 119 Ohio St.3d 118, 2008-Ohio-3426, 892 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 87. We find that no plain error was committed in declining to grant the defense challenges.

{¶ 68} 1. Automatic-death-penalty challenges. A capital defendant may challenge for cause any prospective juror who, regardless of the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and in disregard of the jury instructions, will automatically vote for the death penalty. See Morgan v. Illinois (1992), 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492; State v. Williams (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 679 N.E.2d 646. A trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See State v. Wilson (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 203, 211, 58 O.O.2d 409, 280 N.E.2d 915.

{¶ 69} Trimble alleges that the trial court erred in denying ten challenges for cause against automatic-death-penalty jurors. Of these ten challenges, six prospective jurors were excused for other reasons (Nos. 19, 28, 41, 201, 205, and 213). Thus, the trial court’s denial of Trimble’s automatic-death-penalty challenges of these prospective jurors did not result in plain error.

{¶ 70} Another challenged juror, prospective juror No. 139, was selected as an alternate and later served on Trimble’s jury during the mitigation phase of the trial after replacing a juror who became ill. This juror believed in the death penalty as an “eye for an eye” and would have that mindset if the defendant was found guilty. However, juror No. 139 had assured the court that he could listen to the evidence, follow the court’s instructions, and vote for a life sentence if the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors. Thus, this juror’s responses showed that he would not automatically vote for death. See State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 53, 2005-Ohio-5981, 836 N.E.2d 1173, ¶ 40 (no abuse of discretion in denying a challenge for cause if a juror, even one predisposed in favor of imposing death, states that he or she will follow the law).

{¶ 71} Of the remaining challenged jurors, prospective juror No. 14 and prospective alternate juror No. 133 were excused by defense peremptory challenges. The trial court’s denial of automatic-death-penalty challenges of these peremptorily challenged jurors was also not plain error. Prospective juror No. 14 believed that a case in which one person purposely killed another person would be the kind of case meriting the death penalty. However, prospective juror No. 14 stated that she would not automatically vote for the death penalty and would weigh the evidence and follow the court’s instructions before deciding on a sentence.

{¶ 72} Prospective juror No. 133 believed in the death penalty as “an eye for an eye” and stated that it was appropriate for “[violent, premeditated murders.” However, prospective juror No. 133 also stated that he would listen to the evidence presented during mitigation, give meaningful consideration to life-sentencing options, and would follow the court’s instructions before deciding on a sentence. These statements do not support the notion that juror No. 133 would automatically vote for a death sentence.

{¶ 73} 2. Juror bias. Trimble also claims that the trial court erred in overruling his challenge for bias against jurors Nos. 139 and 28. A trial court has broad discretion in determining a juror’s ability to be impartial. State v. White (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 16, 20, 693 N.E.2d 772. “Thus, where a prospective juror is being challenged for bias, ‘[djeference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.’ ” Id., quoting Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 426, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841.

{¶ 74} Juror No. 139 learned about the murders from the newspapers, television, and conversations with co-workers. The juror stated that what he heard in discussions about the case was “not good for” Trimble and that “he’s already guilty, but he’s just trying to figure out if * * * it’s insanity or not.” Juror No. 139 expressed some uncertainty about whether he could set aside the opinions he heard about the case. Ultimately, juror No. 139 stated that he could set aside what he had previously learned about the murders, listen to the evidence presented in court, and follow the court’s instructions. Based on these assurances, the trial court committed no plain error in overruling the challenge for bias against juror No. 139.

{¶ 75} Prospective juror No. 28 expressed uncertainty about her ability to remain impartial and set aside what she knew from media exposure and talking to others about the case. Despite these misgivings, no plain error occurred in denying this challenge because prospective juror No. 28 was later excused because of her inability to view gruesome photographs.

{¶ 76} 3. Juror who heard the gunshots. Finally, Trimble claims that the trial court erred by denying the defense challenge for cause against seated juror No. 81, who heard the gunshots on the night of the murders.

{¶ 77} During voir dire, juror No. 81 mentioned that she lived less than a mile from Ranfield Road and heard gunshots on the night of the murders. She explained, “I could hear it going on. I thought it was fireworks going on, then I found out he was shooting * * Under further questioning, juror No. 81 stated that she could set aside what she knew about the case and what she had heard that night and remain fair and impartial. Defense counsel challenged juror No. 81 on the grounds that she had personal knowledge of the facts and was a witness to events of this case. The trial court denied this challenge.

{¶ 78} R.C. 2945.25 provides:

{¶ 79} “A person called as a juror in a criminal case may be challenged for the following causes:

{¶ 80} “ * * *

{¶ 81} “(G) That he has been subpoenaed in good faith as a witness in the case;

{¶ 82} “ * * *

{¶ 83} “(0) That he otherwise is unsuitable for any other cause to serve as a juror.

{¶ 84} “ * * *

{¶ 85} “The validity of each challenge listed in this section shall be determined by the court.”

{¶ 86} The defense was not entitled to challenge seated Juror No. 81 under R.C. 2945.25. Seated juror No. 81 was not subpoenaed as a witness. Moreover, hearing the gunshots on the night of the murders did not make her unsuitable as a juror. The fact that gunshots were fired outside Positano’s residence was never in dispute. Thus, this juror’s awareness of the gunshots had no bearing on the outcome of the case. The trial court was also entitled to accept this juror’s assurances that she would be fair and impartial and decide the case based on the evidence. See State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 38. Accordingly, no plain error was committed in the denial of the defense challenge against seated juror No. 81.

{¶ 87} Based on the foregoing, we overrule proposition II.

{¶ 88} Excusal of death-scrupled juror. In proposition of law III, Trimble argues that the trial court erred by excusing for cause a prospective juror who could have set aside his opposition to capital punishment and voted to impose the death penalty.

{¶ 89} A prospective juror may be excused for cause if his views on capital punishment “would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” Adams v. Texas (1980), 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581; State v. Bethel, 110 Ohio St.3d 416, 2006-Ohio-4853, 854 N.E.2d 150, ¶ 118. A trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Wilson, 29 Ohio St.2d at 211, 58 O.O.2d 409, 280 N.E.2d 915.

{¶ 90} Trimble objects to the trial court’s excusal of prospective juror No. 166 because of his opposition to the death penalty. However, Trimble could not have suffered any prejudice by this prospective juror’s excusal, because the jury was seated before prospective juror No. 166 could have been selected as a member of the jury. Accordingly, we reject proposition III.

{¶ 91} Limitations on voir dire. In proposition of law IV, Trimble argues that the trial court erred by limiting voir dire questioning by the defense about mitigating evidence.

{¶ 92} R.C. 2945.27 and Crim.R. 24(B) require that counsel be afforded an opportunity to voir dire prospective jurors or supplement the court’s voir dire examination. Nevertheless, the length and scope of voir dire fall within a trial court’s sound discretion and vary depending on the circumstances of a given case. State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶40.

{¶ 93} Trimble complains that the defense was not permitted to elicit information about mitigating factors from prospective juror No. 201. However, Trimble could not have suffered any prejudice because prospective juror No. 201 was excused for medical reasons before the jury was impaneled.

{¶ 94} Additionally, Trimble claims that the trial court refused to permit defense counsel to address mitigating factors with other prospective jurors. However, Trimble fails to identify any other prospective jurors whose voir dire was curtailed or to provide examples of improper questioning.

{¶ 95} Based on the foregoing, we reject proposition IV.

{¶ 96} Failure to exhaust peremptory challenges. In proposition of law V, Trimble argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to exhaust all of his peremptory challenges.

{¶ 97} The defense did not exercise one of its six peremptory challenges. Trimble claims that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to use this peremptory challenge against seated juror No. 81 or No. 104 after the defense had unsuccessfully challenged them both for cause. He claims that this failure resulted in jurors sitting on his case who were predisposed to find him guilty or who would automatically vote for death.

{¶ 98} Reversal of a conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel requires that the defendant show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant so as to deprive him of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. Accord State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶ 99} Decisions on the exercise of peremptory challenges are a part of trial strategy. State v. Goodwin (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 331, 341, 703 N.E.2d 1251. Trial counsel, who observe the jurors firsthand, are in a much better position to determine whether a prospective juror should be peremptorily challenged. See State v. Keith (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 521, 684 N.E.2d 47. Trimble has failed to establish that his counsel were deficient or that he was prejudiced by the failure to challenge juror No. 81 or No. 104. Both jurors stated that they would be able to base their decisions solely on the evidence presented in court and could fairly and impartially decide the case. Because neither juror indicated any bias or prejudice, Trimble has not shown that having the two jurors hear his case denied him a fair trial. See State v. Lindsey (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 479, 490, 721 N.E.2d 995; State v. Davis (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 326, 350, 581 N.E.2d 1362 (counsel not ineffective by failing to use peremptory challenges when prospective jurors indicate they can set aside their personal views about the death penalty and apply the law to the facts of the case).

{¶ 100} Based on the foregoing, we overrule proposition V.

Trial issues

{¶ 101} Admission of ftrearms not used in murders. In proposition of law VI, Trimble argues that the trial court erred by admitting firearms that were not used in the killings.

{¶ 102} The trial court granted a pretrial defense motion to sever Count 22, the weapons-under-disability charge. The trial court also ruled that “all weapons mentioned in that [charge] may be admissible in the case in chief.” Count 22 specified 21 different firearms, including the two firearms used in the murders, and an additional 19 firearms that were found in Trimble’s basement.

{¶ 103} During the state’s case-in-chief, Agent Saraya testified that he found 19 firearms in a gun safe and at other locations in Trimble’s basement. Trial counsel objected to the admissibility of these firearms as irrelevant evidence, but the trial court overruled this objection and admitted them.

{¶ 104} The admission of the firearms found in the basement rested upon a question of relevancy. Evid.R. 401 provides: “ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. See State v. Sage (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 31 OBR 375, 510 N.E.2d 343, paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶ 105} Trimble argues that the firearms found in the basement were not relevant because none of them were used in the killings. However, the state contends that the firearms in the basement were relevant in proving that Trimble murdered Renee with prior calculation and design as charged in Count 13. The state argues that the evidence demonstrated that Trimble had formed a specific plan to murder her, because Trimble had gone to the basement, opened the gun safe, and selected the AR-15 from his collection of firearms before he killed Renee.

{¶ 106} We reject this argument because the weapon used to kill Renee was unmistakably identified and admitted into evidence. The other firearms were not used in Renee’s murder and thus had no relevance to prove that Trimble murdered her with prior calculation and design.

{¶ 107} The state also argues that the firearms found in the basement were admissible to show his access to and familiarity with the use of firearms. The state cites State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14, 2006-Ohio-5084, 854 N.E.2d 1038, in arguing that the firearms in the basement were admissible in showing his ready access to them. In Drummond, a 9 mm handgun and various ammunition found at the defendant’s residence were admitted into evidence because the handgun and the ammunition were of the type used to commit the murder. Id. at ¶ 84. However, Drummond does not apply to the facts in this case because the two murder weapons were seized when Trimble was arrested, and there was no link between the other weapons found in Trimble’s basement and the murders.

{¶ 108} The state also cites State v. Hartman (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 754 N.E.2d 1150, for the proposition that the firearms in the basement were admissible in showing Trimble’s familiarity with using the weapons. In Hartman, a set of knives belonging to the defendant was admitted into evidence because he owned the knives and, as a chef, was familiar with using them, a fact that made the knives relevant to the surgically precise manner with which he had cut off the victim’s hands. Id. at 281-282, 754 N.E.2d 1150. Unlike the facts in Hartman, the guns found in Trimble’s basement had no relevance in proving any unique type of wounds or manner of death.

{¶ 109} Although not mentioned in the appellee’s brief, the state argued at trial that the firearms were admissible to rebut claims of the defense that Trimble had accidentally killed Positano. During the opening statement for Trimble, trial counsel averred that Trimble had been startled when he saw police officers entering the residence. Trial counsel claimed that Trimble had accidentally shot Positano when he let go of the handgun in order to put both hands on his rifle, and the pistol discharged, killing her. Based upon these claims, the state asserted that the large number of firearms in Trimble’s basement showed his familiarity with firearms and were relevant to rebut the defense theory that Positano had been shot by accident.

{¶ 110} This argument has some merit. Trimble’s possession of a large number of firearms tended to show that he was familiar with using such weapons. Thus, the state was entitled to use such evidence and present such arguments in rebutting defense claims that Trimble had accidentally shot Positano. See State v. Kamel (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 306, 312, 12 OBR 378, 466 N.E.2d 860 (after the defense first raised the subject of defendant’s drug problem, “the topic became open to all relevant inquiry in the discretion of the trial court”). Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the firearms found in the basement.

{¶ 111} Even assuming that the firearms should not have been admitted, any error was harmless. Crim.R. 52(A). Overwhelming evidence established Trimble’s guilt. Such evidence included his admissions of guilt to two family members and Sheriff Kaley, a wealth of forensic evidence tying Trimble to the murders, and eyewitness testimony. Moreover, the jury did not impose the death penalty based upon the fact that Trimble owned many firearms. Indeed, the firearms found in the basement were not readmitted into evidence during the penalty phase.

{¶ 112} Based on the foregoing, we reject proposition VI.

{¶ 113} Display of firearms and the trial court’s warning about graphic photos. In proposition of law VII, Trimble argues that the courtroom display of firearms and ammunition that were not used in the killings was unduly prejudicial. He also argues that the trial court’s warnings to spectators that graphic photographs of the victims were about to be shown denied him a fair trial.

{¶ 114} 1. Display of firearms. During the testimony of Agent Saraya, the defense objected to the display of the firearms found in Trimble’s basement as they were being identified and introduced into evidence. The trial court overruled this objection. After the admission of the firearms into evidence, the defense renewed its objection to the display. Trial counsel noted that the firearms were “lined up sequentially for display” upon two long cafeteria tables and that the jurors were so close to the firearms that they could reach over the jury rail and touch them. The trial court overruled the objection to the display, but said, “We’re going to put them away.” Following a lunch break, the prosecutor stated that the firearms and ammunition had been removed from the courtroom.

{¶ 115} Later, over defense objection, the trial court allowed all of the firearms to be in the jury room during the guilt-phase deliberations. However, during the penalty phase of the trial, the trial court excluded the firearms and ammunition that had been found in Trimble’s basement.

{¶ 116} The firearms and ammunition displayed in court had been introduced into evidence and were displayed only during Saraya’s testimony. Nothing in the record demonstrates that the method of presenting this evidence prejudiced Trimble by inflaming the jury’s passions. However, the firearms were also allowed into the jury room during the guilt-phase deliberations. While it is highly questionable whether the trial court should have allowed this evidence to be displayed before the jury in court or during deliberations, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in doing so.

{¶ 117} Even assuming that these exhibits should not have been displayed, any error was harmless. As previously discussed, overwhelming evidence was presented at trial that established Trimble’s guilt of the three murders. Moreover, during the penalty phase, the trial court excluded the firearms found in the basement, and that exclusion diminishes but does not eliminate the risk of prejudice during this phase of the trial.

{¶ 118} 2. Trial court’s warning about graphic photos. In a pretrial motion, the defense requested that any friends and family members of the victims be excluded from the courtroom during the presentation of autopsy and crime-scene photographs and the playing of Positano’s 911 tapes. The defense argued that such evidence was likely to evoke an emotional outburst that might prejudice the jury. The defense asserted that friends and family members could watch the proceedings on closed-circuit television in another room. The trial court denied this motion.

{¶ 119} During the state’s case-in-chief, a photograph of Renee’s and Dakota’s bodies lying on the bedroom floor was shown on an overhead screen. A spectator exclaimed, “Oh, Dakota” and cried. Following this outburst, trial counsel requested a mistrial, which the trial court denied.

{¶ 120} Immediately after the outburst, the trial court advised the jury:

{¶ 121} “Ladies and gentleman, as we told you in voir dire there will be some graphic photographs and testimony that will be hard for all people to hear. You are instructed that you are to listen to the evidence as it comes from the witness stand, and the exhibits admitted throughout the trial and ignore any reaction that would happen in the spectator’s area. It is important that you not be influenced by this at all. Again, listen and watch the pictures as you see them here in Court.”

{¶ 122} The trial court also advised the spectators in the courtroom:

{¶ 123} “The Court would instruct the spectators from here on out I did not know there were any family members in the background, if there are, we’ll take a break to give you a chance to leave. If you do not wish to look at the pictures we’ll tell you that beforehand. I was unaware that was going to go up that quick.

{¶ 124} “So, again, you’re instructed. I’ll try to give you a break; if you wish to leave the courtroom you can. The jury is instructed to disregard any reaction from the spectators.”

{¶ 125} On several occasions during the remainder of the state’s case, the trial court and the prosecutor advised the spectators that photographs of the victims were about to be shown in court. The spectators were also warned before Positano’s 911 tape was played. The record shows that there were no further outbursts during the trial.

{¶ 126} When an emotional outburst takes place in court, the issue is whether the outburst “deprived the defendant of a fair trial by improperly influencing the jury.” State v. Scott, 101 Ohio St.3d 31, 2004-Ohio-10, 800 N.E.2d 1133, ¶ 44. This “is a factual question to be resolved by the trial court, whose determination will not be overturned absent clear, affirmative evidence of error.” State v. White (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 433, 440, 709 N.E.2d 140, citing State v. Morales (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 252, 255, 513 N.E.2d 267.

{¶ 127} Nothing in the record shows that the outburst had any effect on the jury. Additionally, the trial court’s admonitions focused the jury on the evidence and away from the outburst. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defense motion for a mistrial.

{¶ 128} A trial judge has authority and discretion to exercise control over the proceedings. The trial court’s decision to advise spectators that graphic photos were about to be shown was a proper measure to ensure that there were no further outbursts in court. The trial court’s action constituted a reasonable alternative to requiring spectators who were Mends and family members of the victims to leave the courtroom during the presentation of such evidence. See State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14, 2006-Ohio-5084, 854 N.E.2d 1038, ¶ 52, citing Waller v. Georgia (1984), 467 U.S. 39, 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (a trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing a courtroom).

{¶ 129} Nevertheless, Trimble contends that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s comments about the gruesomeness of the photographs. These claims are speculative. The trial court advised prospective jurors during voir dire that they would see “pictures that are graphic” and that they “may see reactions from the spectators” during the trial. Thus, the trial court diminished the potential for prejudice through its earlier advisement about the graphic nature of the photographs that the jurors would view.

{¶ 130} In summary, we conclude that Trimble was not prejudiced by the display of firearms in court or the trial court’s admonitions about graphic photographs before they were shown in court. Accordingly, we reject proposition VII.

{¶ 131} Gruesome and cumulative photographs and video. In proposition of law VIII, Trimble argues that the trial court erred by admitting gruesome and cumulative photographs and videos of the crime scene and gruesome and cumulative autopsy photographs of the three victims.

{¶ 132} The defense made a motion in limine objecting to gruesome crime-scene and autopsy photographs. However, the motion in limine did not preserve this issue. Gable v. Gates Mills, 103 Ohio St.3d 449, 2004-Ohio-5719, 816 N.E.2d 1049, ¶ 34. At trial, the defense objected to some, but not all, of the crime-scene and autopsy photographs. Trial counsel’s failure to object at trial to photographs that he now claims are gruesome has waived all but plain error with respect to those exhibits. State v. Twyford (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 340, 358, 763 N.E.2d 122.

{¶ 133} In capital cases, nonrepetitive photographs, even if gruesome, are admissible as long as the probative value of each photograph substantially outweighs the danger of material prejudice to the accused. State v. Morales, 32 Ohio St.3d at 257, 513 N.E.2d 267; State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768, paragraph seven of the syllabus. Decisions on the admissibility of photographs are “left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 601, 605 N.E.2d 916.

{¶ 134} 1. Crime-scene photos and videotape. Trimble complains that the trial court erred in admitting 12 crime-scene photographs and a videotape showing the victims’ bodies at Trimble’s home. State’s exhibit 22 is a close-up photograph showing the gunshot wound on the back of Renee’s head. State’s exhibit 59 is a photograph depicting bloody wounds on Dakota’s neck and facial area. Both exhibits, although gruesome, were probative of Trimble’s intent and the manner and circumstances of the victims’ deaths. See State v. Craig, 110 Ohio St.3d 306, 2006-Ohio-4571, 853 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 92; State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 53, 2005-Ohio-5981, 836 N.E.2d 1173. ¶ 85.

{¶ 135} State’s exhibits 13, 19, and 23 present three different views of Renee’s and Dakota’s bodies as they were found lying on the bedroom floor after the murders. These photographs were relevant to show the position of the victims’ bodies at the scene. State’s exhibits 32, 33, and 34 depict the lower portion of Renee’s and Dakota’s bodies. These photographs are not particularly gruesome and were relevant in showing the proximity of empty shell casings to the site at which the victims were shot.

{¶ 136} State’s exhibit 17 is a crime-scene videotape and shows the inside of Trimble’s home, the basement area, and the master bedroom both before and after the bodies were removed. Portions of the videotape are repetitive of the crime-scene photos. However, the photographs and the videotape helped to prove the killer’s intent and illustrated the testimony of the detectives who described the crime scene. See State v. Ahmed, 103 Ohio St.3d 27, 2004-Ohio-4190, 813 N.E.2d 637, ¶ 97. These photographs and videotape also gave the jury an “appreciation of the nature and circumstances of the crimes.” State v. Evans (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 251, 586 N.E.2d 1042.

{¶ 137} Trimble also complains about three gruesome photographs that were not objected to at trial. State’s exhibit 65 shows Renee’s body on the floor after Dakota’s body was removed from the bedroom. No plain error occurred in admitting this photograph because it showed three additional cartridge cases found underneath Dakota’s body. State’s exhibit 21 shows Dakota’s knee sticking up behind the bed in the master bedroom. State’s exhibit 24 shows an empty shell casing and small bone fragments on the floor near Renee’s arm. We also find no plain error in admitting these two photographs because they were not gruesome.

{¶ 138} Additionally, Trimble claims that the trial court erred in admitting state’s exhibit 44, which is an empty cartridge case. However, this exhibit is not gruesome.

{¶ 139} Trimble also contends that the trial court erred in admitting four photographs from Positano’s residence, but fails to explain how they are gruesome or cumulative. State’s exhibits 183 and 186 depict the AR-15 assault rifle found inside her bedroom. State’s exhibit 187 is a close-up of the AR-15, showing that it was jammed. State’s exhibit 209 shows the 9 mm handgun that was found between the commode and the bathtub in the bathroom. However, Trimble failed to object to the admission of any of these photographs at trial. The trial court committed no plain error in admitting these photographs because each of them was relevant in illustrating Saraya’s testimony.

{¶ 140} We conclude that the trial court did not err by admitting any of the crime-scene photographs or videotapes. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that the probative value of each of the photographs and the playing of the videotape outweighed any prejudicial impact on the jury. While some of the photos and videotape were repetitive, Trimble was not materially prejudiced by their admission.

{¶ 141} 2. Dakota’s autopsy photos. Trimble argues that the trial court erred by admitting the autopsy photographs of Dakota, state’s exhibits 279 through 299.

{¶ 142} State’s exhibit 279 depicts Dakota’s fully clothed body before the autopsy. This full body view shows that Dakota suffered wounds to the neck and chest areas. State’s exhibits 282, 283, and 284 present close-ups and different angles of Dakota’s face showing gunshot wounds to his neck, chin, and other facial areas. State’s exhibit 295 is a close-up of the neck wound. These different photographs illustrated that Dakota suffered atypical entrance wounds on his face and neck and demonstrated that gunshots struck Renee before hitting Dakota.

{¶ 143} State’s exhibit 285 is a photograph of Dakota’s torso showing that he suffered two gunshot wounds to the chest. State’s exhibit 287 is a photo of the back of Dakota’s neck showing the location of two exit wounds. These exhibits also supported the medical examiner’s testimony about Dakota’s injuries.

{¶ 144} Other autopsy photographs depict injuries to Dakota’s arms and his right hand. State’s exhibits 288, 289, and 290 are photos of wounds that Dakota suffered to his right hand and arm. State’s exhibits 291 and 292 are entrance wounds near Dakota’s left wrist and are not gruesome. State’s exhibits 293 and 294 are somewhat gruesome and depict exit wounds on his left wrist. The exit wound’s “irregular lacerated appearance” helped show the amount of tissue damage caused by a high-velocity projectile.

{¶ 145} Trimble also complains about other autopsy photos that were not objected to at trial. However, no plain error was committed in admitting these exhibits. State’s exhibit 296 is not gruesome and shows superficial abrasions near Dakota’s temple. State’s exhibits 280 and 281 show a bullet recovered from Dakota’s clothing and are not gruesome photographs. See State v. Moreland (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 58, 64, 552 N.E.2d 894 (photos merely depicting bullets and spent bullet casings are not “gruesome”). Finally, state’s exhibits 297, 298, and 299 are x-rays of Dakota’s head, chest, and forearm and are not gruesome. See State v. Williams (Mar. 20, 2000), Mahoning App. No. 98 CA 74, 2000 WL 309390, *11 (photographs of x-rays showing where the coroner recovered slugs were not gruesome, shocking, or prejudicial).

{¶ 146} 3. Renee’s autopsy photos. Trimble claims that the trial court also erred by admitting the autopsy photographs of Renee Bauer, state’s exhibits 248 through 277.

{¶ 147} State’s exhibit 248 shows Renee’s fully clothed body before the autopsy. This photo showed extensive wounds to her head and chest area. State’s exhibits 250 and 251 are decidedly gruesome photographs showing Renee’s head split open from one of the bullets. State’s exhibit 252 is a photograph showing that the bullet struck Renee in the front of her he