State v. Pape (105 Ohio St. 515, 1922)

Matthias, J.

Has the mayor of a village which is located in two or more counties jurisdiction of an offense such as that charged in these cases in any of such counties other than the one wherein the office of the mayor is located? That is the question here presented.

It is conceded that the mayor has jurisdiction and authority to try such cases in either Hamilton or Clermont county, provided the trial is held in the county where the offense is alleged to have been committed, and it is conceded that the mayor has jurisdiction in the trial of illicit intoxicating liquor charges, the same being conferred by Sections 4536, 6212-39 (109 O. L., 10), and 13423, General Code; but it is contended that the mayor cannot try one accused of an offense in any county other than that in which it is charged the offense was committed. Stated more simply, this contention is that the mayor must actually hear such case in the portion of the village which is within the county where the offense is alleged to have been committed, and, hence, that where the charge is that the offense was committed within Hamilton county, and the case is heard and decided at the mayor’s office in the municipal building in Milford, which is on the Clermont county side of the line, the judgment of the mayor is invalid because of want of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a mayor is wholly a matter of statute. Under the provisions of Section 4536, General Code, that jurisdiction, in cases such as these- under review, is coextensive with the county; and it is provided by Section 3539, General Code, that “"When the jurisdiction of municipal officers is co-extensive with the county in which the corporation is situated, their jurisdiction in corporations embracing territory of more than one county shall be co-extensive with each of the counties in which any part of such territory is located.”

It being conceded that by virtue of the provisions of Section 4536, General Code, the mayor of Milford if sitting in the Clermont county portion of the village would have jurisdiction of such offenses as those under consideration committed anywhere in Clermont county, and if sitting in the Hamilton county part of the village would have jurisdiction of such offenses as those under consideration teommitted anywhere in Hamilton county, the question arises, what then is the virtue of Section 3539, General Code, and what was the object and purpose of its enactment? Clearly it was for the purpose of conferring similar jurisdiction throughout the two or more counties in which any portion of such municipality extends. These sections must be construed together, and when so construed there can be no doubt as to their meaning or application. Surely it was not contemplated or intended that a magistrate may determine or alter the jurisdiction of his office by the location of his place of doing business. The court cannot by interpretation add to the latter section the. proviso that the mayor can exercise such jurisdiction only when actually sitting and holding court in the portion of the village located in the county wherein the offense is claimed to have been committed, that provision or condition of the exercise of jurisdiction not having been made by the lawmaking body itself. The offense with which the defendant in each of these cases was charged was alleged to have been committed in Hamilton county. The affidavit so indicated, for the caption was as follows: ‘ ‘ State of Ohio, Hamilton County, ss: In the Mayor’s court in the village of Milford, county of Hamilton, Ohio.” The case was a Hamilton county case, and under the authority conferred by the provisions of the statute above referred to it must necessarily be considered just the same as though the charge had been filed before, and the case tried by, the mayor of a municipality wholly confined within the boundaries of such county. It is quite manifest that the purpose of the legislature in the enactment of Section 3539, General Code, was to treat villages located as is Milford as wholly within each of the counties into which some of it extended. Such statutory enactment was for jurisdictional purposes only, and is in conflict with no provision of the constitution.

The defendants in error rely somewhat upon the provisions of Section 6212-18, General Code, which provides as follows: “Any justice of the peace, mayor * * * within the county with whom the affidavit is filed charging a violation of any of the provisions of this act, when the offense is alleged to have been committed in the county in which such mayor * * * may be sitting, shall have final jurisdiction to try such cases * * It is not necessary to determine whether this language bears the interpretation claimed by defendants in error, that the mayor has jurisdiction only if he actually sits and determines a case in the county where the offense is charged to have been committed, for it has reference only to the act of which it is a part, which does not include Section 13195, General Code, a provision long antedating such act, and upon which the charge in these cases is based.

For the reasons indicated it is our conclusion that the mayor of the village of Milford had jurisdiction to hear and determine these cases. This results in an affirmance of the judgment of the mayor’s court. In our opinion, however, the common pleas court of Clermont county had no jurisdiction of this error proceeding for the reason that in so far as the jurisdiction of a court of common pleas is concerned this should have been and must be considered as a Hamilton county offense and therefore a Hamilton county case, just as it would have been had it been tried by a mayor of a municipality wholly confined ■within the boundary of such county, and any proceeding in error from the judgment of the mayor can be prosecuted in the court of common pleas of 'no other county. In so far, therefore, as the court of appeals reversed the judgment'of the court of common pleas, its judgment is affirmed, but its judgment of reversal of the judgment of the mayor of Milford is reversed.

Judgment reversed.

Marshall, C. J., Johnson, Hough, Wanamaker, Robinson and Jones, JJ., concur.