Harrison v. Hoyle (24 Ohio St. 254, 1873)

Opinion by

McIivaine, J.,

in which Day, J., concurred:

On the 4th of April, 1832, one William Hamilton conveyed to John Street, Jacob Holloway, Benjamin Hoyle, and Henry Crew, in fee, the real estate in controversy, “ in trust and for the use of the Ohio Yearly Meeting of the Society of Eriends.” The property thus conveyed was intended to be used for the purposes of a boarding-school, and soon after suitable buildings were erected thereon, and a boarding-school has been maintained therein ever since.

At the date of this conveyance, the Ohio Yearly Meeting was an unincorporated religious body, exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction over all members of the Society of Eriends, within certain territorial limits, including the State of Ohio. There was not then, nor is there now, any doubt as to the beneficiary intended by the parties to the conveyance. The Ohio Yearly Meeting was well known to grantor and grantees. Nor did any uncertainty arise as to the identity of the beneficiary, until the 5th day of September,'A. d. 1854.

On the day last named, a separation took place in the Ohio Yearly Meeting, which resulted in the organization of two separate and distinct bodies, each of which assumed the name, and from that time hitherto there have been two associations, each claiming to be the Ohio Yearly Meeting, entitled to the trust property described in said conveyance.

It is admitted by all parties to this action, that there is, and can be, bnt one “ Ohio Yearly Meeting of the Society of Eriendsand, it is further conceded, that one or the other of the bodies, which resulted from the separation referred to, is the true and legitimate Ohio Yearly Meeting, entitled to the usé and benefit of the property and charity above mentioned.

Persons representing each of these bodies, and also the trustees in whom the legal tit] e to the property is no w vested, are before the court. The plaintiffs, who represent the association seeking to recover the possession and use of this property, will be referred to in this opinion as Binns and his associates; and the defendants, who represent the body now in possession of the property, as Ployle and his associates. The former are also known, and sometimes designated, as Guerneyites, and the latter as "Wilburites.

The controlling question involved in the case is, whether Binns and his associates, or Hoyle and his associates, constitute the true and legitimate “Ohio Yearly Meeting of the Society of Eriends.” A finding in favor of one of these parties is necessarily a finding against the other.

Counsel for defendants claim the controlling question in the case to be as follows : “Was Jonathan Binns duly chosen clerk of the Ohio Yearly Meeting of the Society of Eriends, in 1854, according to the rules, discipline, and usages of the meeting and society ?”

A majority of the court are of- opinion that the proposition contained in this claim of defendants is too narrow. Although it may be said to be within the issue, it does not embrace the whole of it. Eor it may be that Binns and his associates are the true beneficiaries of this charity, though it appear that some irregularity intervened in the mode and manner in which Binns was chosen clerk in 1854; or even though the rules, discipline, and usages of the meeting and of the Society of Exiends did not provide at all for the emergency which arose in the xnatter of choosing a clerk for the meeting at its session in that year.

It is quite certain, as it will hereafter appear, that the separation did not take place until Binns assumed to exercise the office of clerk, and it is equally certain that immediately upon the separation Binns became clerk of one of the resultant bodies, and Hoyle of the other. Now, suppose that after the separation neither Binns nor Hoyle was invested with the office-of clerk of the Ohio Yearly Meeting, in conformity to the rules, discipline, or usages of the meeting or the society, it would not follow that neither of the resultant bodies was the true successor of the Ohio Yearly Meeting, or that this trust failed for want of a beneficiary. Or suppose, as the fact is claimed to be, that Hoyle’s term of office had not expired at the time of the separation, and that he continued to act as the clerk of one of the resultant bodies, still, we think it might be made to appear, that he and his associates were the separatists, and ceased not only to be the “ Ohio Yearly Meeting,” but also ceased to be members of the “ Society of Eriendsand, in either event, it could not be said that they are entitled to the benefits of a trust created in favor of the “ Ohio Yearly Meeting of the Society of Eriends,” as against the other resultant body, which, according to the principles of the society, might prove itself to be the only true Ohio Yearly Meeting of the society.

That there is a “ Society of Eriends,” whose existence does not depend vipon the Ohio Yearly Meeting, although the latter is embraced within and forms part of the former, is a fact not only established by the testimony, but it is not denied by any of the parties. This society is composed of all true “ Eriends in Unity ” throughout the world. To be a member of this society requires more than a mere profession of a particular religious faith. It requires a practical fellowship or unity with, and adhesion to, the whole body of Eriends, not only in matters of faith, but also in matters of ecclesiastical and disciplinary jurisdiction. It was well said by Chief Justice Shaw, in Earle v. Wood, 8 Cush. 464: “ Men are not bound to be Quakers, but if they would be Quakers and brethren in unity with each other, and with their common superiors, they must conform to their rules and judgments. . . . The reasons might satisfy their own consciences in separating, but in doing so, they cease to be Quakers, or Friends in Unity.”

The form of government adopted by this society is peculiar, and remarkable for its lack of centralized power; but, nevertheless, such rules aS' it has provided for its own government and the maintenance of its own integrity stand as the law for our guidance in determining which of the contending parties to this suit constitutes the “ Ohio Yearly Meeting,” embraced within, and composing a part of, the “ Society of Friends.”

This view of the issue brings within the scope of our inquiides all the testimony in the case, embracing more than two thousand printed pages, and requires us to state our conclusions of fact in relation to the following subjects:

1. The history and polity of the Society of Friends.

2. The history and polity of the Ohio Yearly Meeting.

3. The causes which produced the separation in the Ohio Yearly Meeting.

4. The immediate circumstances of the separation.

5. The action and judgment of the “ Society of Friends” in relation thereto.

6. The subsequent relations of the -resultant bodies to the society at large.

I. The distinctive doctrines of Quakerism were first taught in England, shortly before the middle of the seventeenth century. The earliest meetings of this sect of Christians were no doubt held for the purpose of worship only, and it was not until the year 1682 that the “ Society of Friends ” was fully organized for the pux-pose of discipline or church government. In that year, a form of ecclesiastical government was matured and adopted. The system then adopted, and which has been continued ever since, embraced four grades of church judicatories, called meetings — namely, the preparative, the monthly, the quarterly, and the yearly. These were connected and subordinated in the order named — the preparative to the monthly, the monthly to the quarterly, the quarterly to the yearly. The London Yearly Meeting, the only yearly meeting at that time established, was invested with paramount and final jurisdiction over all the subordinate meetings of the society. The jurisdiction of the yearly meeting was both appellate and advisory. Appeals from the decisions of the quarterly meetings were entertained by the yearly meeting. Each quarterly meeting was invested with like jurisdiction over all the monthly meetings within its prescribed territorial limits, and each monthly meeting with like jurisdiction over the preparative meetings within its territory.

Under this system, a preparative meeting can not be “ set up ” or “ laid down ” within the bounds of a monthly meeting, without the consent of the monthly; a monthly meeting without the consent of the quarterly meeting to which it is accountable, or a quarterly without the consent of the yearly meeting.

As there is no question of faith or doctrine involved in this case, it is unnecessary to refer to the order of the society in relation to assemblages for worship, further than to say, that all meetings for worship, are promiscuous, being composed of members of the society, without regard to sex, and open to all persons who may desire admission.

Meetings for discipline or business, however, whether convened for the consideration of secular or spiritual matters, are required to be kept “ select,” by which order it is meant that all persons other than members of the society in unity are excluded, not only from participation in the deliberations of the meetings, but also from being present at their sittings.

Another important rule of the society, and one which is fundamental in the organization of every meeting for discipline, is that every such meeting is constituted of two bodies or branches, one of which is denominated, the men’s, and the other the women’s meeting. These bodies are distinguished hy difference of sex, as the names indicate, and although they meet at the same time and place, they deliberate in separate rooms. Each of these bodies chooses its own officers, and keeps its own minutes ; and though they constitute but one church judicatory, yet they are co-ordinate in power, and must concur in the transacting of all business of the meeting — save only in the management of property, it is usual for the women’s meeting to defer to the judgment of the men’s meeting.

The business of each subordinate meeting for discipline is confined to subjects arising within its own territorial jurisdiction ; yet a singular and important feature in the constitution of the society is, that any and all members of the society, without regard to residence, may, as a matter of right, sit and act in any and all deliberations an'd transactions of any meeting. It is usual, however, for members residing within, the bounds of other meetings to refrain from taking an active part in matters of merely local importance.

Another peculiar rule is found in the mode adopted by the society for ascertaining the" sense and determining the action of a meeting. The result of its deliberations is not determined by the will of a majority or other proportion of the members. A vote is never taken. Unanimity is sought to be attained in all its deliberations. If such result, however, can not be secured, the “ solid sense ” of the meeting is collected by the clerk, who makes a minute thereof and reads it to the meeting. In gathering the sense of the meeting, -the clerk takes into consideration the number, age, intelligence, experience, piety, etc., of those uniting with and of those opposing the measure. If the minute so made be acquiesced in by the members, so that substantial unanimity is secured, it is recorded as the action of the meeting ; but if it be not so acquiesced in, the measure is lost or postponed for further consideration.

From this brief outline of the original organization of the society, and some of the fundamental principles of its constitution, we will pass to an examination of certain changes that have been made in the mode of administering its discipline. At the time its organization was completed as above stated, meetings of the society, subordinate to the yearly meeting, existed in different parts of the world, and many of them were located on the western continent. It was very soon found to be inconvenient, if not impracticable, for the yearly meeting at London to bestow that amount of care and supervision over the western meetings which the necessities of the rapidly growing society required. Hence, as early as the year 1683, the Rhode Island Yearly Meeting (which has long since been known as the New England Yearly Meeting) was “set up” by the society, acting through the London Yearly Meeting. This new yearly meeting was invested with exclusive and final jurisdiction, in all matters of local discipline, over the subordinate meetings of the society which had been established in the New "World. Subsequently, and from time to time, as the convenience or necessity of the society required, other yearly meetings were set up, each of which was invested with like jurisdiction and authority over all the subordinate meetings located within the bounds of certain prescribed territory. <

The testimony does not fully show what preliminary steps are necessary in the establishment of a new yearly meeting, but it is quite certain that no new yearly meeting can be set up in the regular order of the society, until it is recognized and acknowledged as such by all pre-existing yearly meetings; and without such recognition and acknowledgment, it is not in unity with, or a part of, the Society of Eriends.

When regularly established, however, all members of the society residing within the bounds of the new yearly meeting are entitled, as a matter of right, to be present at the sittings of every other yearly meeting, and to participate in all its deliberations; and the members of the society residing within the territory of other yearly meetings may sit and act as members of the new yearly meeting — subject, of course, to tbe presentation of such credentials as are required by tbe rules and usages of the society. Thus the integrity of the society has been preserved, notwithstanding the multiplicity of yearly meetings of co-ordinate jurisdiction, whose several judgments, in all matters of local discipline within their respective jurisdictions, are final and conclusive.

Previous to the year 1854, in addition to the New England Yearly Meeting, we find there had been established upon the western continent, the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting, New York Yearly Meeting, Baltimore Yearly Meeting, North Carolina Yearly Meeting, Ohio Yearly Meeting, and the Indiana Yearly Meeting; and upon tbe other side of tbe Atlantic, the Dublin Yearly M-eeting, in addition to the London Yearly Meeting.

Several other considerations also show the continued integrity of the society and its organization, notwithstanding its polity is maintained and its discipline administered in last resort by co-ordinate and quasi independent judicatories.

1. A person admitted to membership by one meeting thereby becomes entitled to all tbe rights of membership in every other meeting of the society, and the disownment of a member by one meeting excludes him from the rights of membership in all others.

2. The polity of the society .requires its members to intermarry within the pale of the church; yet members residing within the bounds of different yearly meetings intermarry, and tbe issue of such marriages are members of tbe society by right of birth.

3. Ministers of one yearly meeting, upon being “ liberated ” for tbe purpose by their own meetings, have tbe right to exercise their gifts within tbe bounds of any other yearly meeting.

4. The regular order of tbe society requires each yearly meeting to communicate with every other yearly meeting by an annual epistle in relation to the general concerns of tbe society.

5. There is constituted within and by each yearly meeting a committee, called the “ Meeting for Sufferings,” composed of men Friends, which exercises the plenary powers of the yearly meeting during its recess. The members of each meeting for sufferings are entitled to sit and act as members of every other meeting for sufferings. Among the services confided to the meeting for sufferings, as enumerated in the book of discipline, is the following, viz: “ To correspond with such other meetings for sufferings as are, or may be, established by any other yearly meeting of our society, on the common concerns of the society.”

Such is the system of government adopted by this peculiar sect of Christians; and we think, in view of the history and nature of its organization,' it would be a gross mistake to hold that each yearly meeting is a distinct and wholly independent body or society. On the other hand, we are forced to the conclusion that there is but one Society of Friends in the world; that the unity of the society, as it existed when the London Yearly Meeting exercised exclusive jurisdiction over all the subordinate meetings, has not been destroyed; that the establishment of other yearly meetings of co-ordinate powers was for the purpose of convenience in the administration of local discipline, without any intent to impair the integrity of the society as it existed before the multiplicity of yearly meetings.

It is true that the judgment of each yearly meeting, touching matters of discipline arising within its limits, is conclusive as to all other yearly meetings and the society at large, because such judgment is, in theory and in fact, the judgment of the society. All members of the society are concluded, because, if not present participating in the action of the meeting, their absence was voluntary, and hence there is no ground for complaint. The true theory of the system seems to be that the several yearly meetings were organized by the society as organs' through which the society, as such, might pronounce its judgments and maintain its order and integrity. It may be conceded that such a system of government would- be of doubtful utility were its rules and judgments to be enforced by coercive measures. But when we consider its operation for nearly two centuries, and view it in tbe light of the faith in which it was founded — a religious faith that obedience to its precepts and acquiescence in its judgments would be secured through the influence of the Spirit which leads to peace, harmony, and unity — we can neither deny nor doubt its sufficiency to preserve the integrity of an organization whose chief aim and purpose is the maintenance of Christian fellowship and a common faith.

H. The Ohio Yearly Meeting was established in the regular order of the Society of Friends in the year 1812. The territory placed under its care had formerly been within the jurisdiction of the Baltimore Yearly Meeting. The Ohio meeting, from the date of its organization to the year 1845, maintained relations of perfect unity with the society and all its meetings and members, and from that time to date of the separation in 1854, its unity with the society was continued under a state of more or less disorder.

A general sketch of the constitution and polity of this meeting has.been portrayed in the foregoing statement of the history and polity of the Society of Friends. In order, however, to understand the full force of the circumstances connected' with the separation in 1854, it is necessary to state a few additional facts in relation to organization and constitution of yearly meetings.

It appears to have been the original design of the society to make the yearly meeting a representative body merely, whose membership should consist of representatives chosen by the several quarterly meetings.' At a very early period, however, in the history of the society, the yearly meeting was in fact changed to a constituent body, although the feature of representation has been retained. All members of the church are members of the yearly meeting, but it is the special duty of the representatives to attend the yearly meeting and report the condition of their respective quarters. As members of the yearly meeting, the only special duty or power of the representatives is declared in the book of discipline as follows: “ The representatives from the quarterly meetings, both men and women, are annually to choose a clerk and assistant at the close of the first sitting for discipline, whose names are to be reported at the opening of the next sitting.” The disposition to be made of the report of the representatives is not prescribed in the book of discipline; but the testimony shows that it is the usage of the meetings to act upon the reports — that is, the men’s and women’s meetings respectively act upon their separate reports. If the choice of the representatives be unanimous and the report be approved by the meeting, the persons so chosen become clerk and assistant for the ensuing year. If, however, the meeting refuse to approve the persons chosen by the representatives, or if no names be reported, the old officers hold over for another year until the meeting otherwise directs. There is no rule or usage of the society for the guidance of a meeting in the matter of selecting its clerk and assistant other than as above stated. There is no doubt, however, that the meeting may, for the preservation of its organization, select a clerk and assistant in any other emergency, though not provided for in the book of discipline, and that its action in such cases, if not in violation of the principles of the society, would be binding upon all its members.

It is claimed, on behalf of the defendants, that the order and usage of the society require the continuance in office of the old clerk and assistant, in all cases where the representatives are unable to agree upon names to be reported to the meeting. "We think the testimony does not support this claim. It is true that it has been usual, in cases where the representatives failed to agree upon names, for them to make a unanimous report of that fact; and it has been usual in such case for the old cleiks to hold over by consent. But in all cases, as we understand the weight of the testimony, the subject is under the control of the meeting. It is within the power of the meeting to approve or disapprove the report of the representatives, whatever that report may be. And in any case where the meeting fails to secure new clerks, through the nomination of the representatives, it may act upon the nomination of any member; and if such nomination be acceptable to the meeting, it has the right to unite therein.

HI. The causes which led to the separation in the Ohio Yearly Meeting may be briefly stated.

Prior to the year 1845, certain dissensions arose among Friends in New England Yearly Meeting, which resulted in a schism in the Swanzy Monthly Meeting in the first place, and afterward in Rhode Island Quarterly, to which the former was accountable, and finally, in 1845, in New England Yearly Meeting. Thus two separate and distinct bodies were formed, each claiming to be the true and legitimate yearly meeting of the Society of Friends within the New England jurisdiction.

As to the merits of the controversy in New England, we are not fully informed by the testimony. It does show, however, that the larger of the two resultant bodies, commonly called the G-uerneyites, has been acknowledged and recognized as the true and only yearly meeting of the society by all Friends, and by all other yearly meetings of the society throughout the world, save only the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting and a part of the members of the society residing within its jurisdiction, and also excepting Hoyle and his associates. The testimony also shows that the smaller New England organization, commonly called ’Wilburites, has been disowned and disavowed by all Friends everywhere, with the exceptions named. The former body has also been adjudged by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in the case of Earle et al. v. Wood et al., 8 Cush. 464, to be the legitimate New England Yearly Meeting. The regular succession of the New England meeting was there found to be with the larger body, according to the principles of its own constitution and its rules in relation to the administration of local discipline. The relation of the New England Yearly Meeting to the society at large did not become, in that case, a subject for judicial inquiry and determination. In fact, there was no pretense that the regular organization was with the smaller body, and the court found that there was no good cause upon which the separation could be justified. “ The only reason assigned, by way of justification or apology,” said the court, “ is, that they and their friends had been oppressed. "Whether this justification could have availed, had such oppression been proved to have been done or sanctioned by the yearly meeting, would present a very different question. But at this time the yearly meeting had done no-act, refused no application for redress, declared no heretical opinion, nor taken any step to be complained of.”

It is to be regretted that the District Court refused, at the-instance of the defendants, to receive all the testimony offered upon this subject; but enough, we think, was received to justify us in finding that the G-uei’neyites of New England are the true members of the Society of Eriends,, and that the Wilburites are separatists from, and not members of the society.

Immediately after the rupture in New England, a lamentable want of harmony was manifested in the Ohio meeting. Hoyle, the then clerk, and his associates were-in sympathy with the smaller New England body, while Binns and his associates adhered to the larger, or regular New England meeting. Such was the intensity of this disorder in the meeting, that the men’s meeting was not only unable to continue its annual correspondence with. New England, but the representatives were unable to agree, upon names for clerk and assistant, to be submitted to the meeting at its annual sittings. This state of disorder continued from year to year, with one or two exceptions, until 1854. In the meantime, the old clerk and assistant held over by unanimous consent. The women’s meeting, however, whose clerk was in sympathy with the larger New' England body,, kept up its regular correspondence with, that body, except perhaps in the years 1845 and 1853.

TV". The immediate circumstances of -the separation.

At the annual session of the Ohio Yearly Meeting for 1854, the men’s meeting for discipline was duly opened by the old clerk, Benj amin Hoyle. The want of harmony, however, was immediately manifested, and was intensified by the presence of Thomas B. Gould, clerk of the "Wilburite New England Meeting, and a companion from the same body. 'The order of the society, that the meeting be kept select, was insisted upon by the Friends in sympathy with the larger and regular New England meeting. But the clerk ;and others in sympathy with Gould proceeded with business, against the protest of the former, and-without making the meeting select, and without even requesting the -objectionable persons to withdraw ; and so the ordinary business of the meeting was continued, amid much confusion, until the adjournment. After the adjournment, the representatives, in pursuance of the -order of the society, met for the purpose of choosing a clerk and assistant for ■the ensuing year, but were unable to unite upon names to be presented to the meeting. A portion of the representatives, about one-third of the whole number, agreed to report to the meeting the name of Jonathan Binns for clerk, .and James B. Bruff for assistant, and the others agreed to report, simply, that the representatives were unable to unite upon names to be reported for clerk and assistant.

At the next sitting, the report of the representatives being in order,, Jabez Coulsen, one of the representatives, reported “ that the representatives had conferred together, :and a large portion of them had united in proposing the name of Jonathan Binns for clerk, and James B. Bruff" for ■assistant.” Many Friends immediately expressed themselves in favor of this report; and thereupon Nathan Hall, another representative, arose and stated, “ that the representatives had met, but were unable to agree upon names to be offered to the meeting for clerk and assistant,” whereupon many -other Friends expressed themselves in favor of continuing the old clerk and assistant for the ensuing year. The clerk then inquired of Nathan Hall whether it had been laid upon him to make that report, and, being answered in the affirmative, he said, “ Then it is in order.” Many voices again united in favor of Binns and Bruff, and others opposed, when the clerk arose and said, “ It is evident from the report Jabez Coulsen has made, that Nathan Hall’s report is true, and it has always been the usage of this meeting, under such circumstances, to continue the old clerks, and that is the course I am now about to take, as the only one, in my opinion, that can be pursued according to. order and thereupon he made and recorded a minute continuing himself and the old assistant for another year.

Thereupon, Jon athan Binns, being urged thereto by those members who opposed Gould and his companion remaining in the meeting (with one or two exceptions), -went to the clerk’s table, and made a minute of his own and Bruff’s appointment as clerk and assistant; which minute was approved by more voices than is usual on such occasions.

The action of the meeting, upon the report from the representatives, is described by Jonathan Binns as follows : “ I think I can give nearly the order in which those events took place. I did not know my name would be reported by the representatives. Jabez Goulsen made the report from the representatives, naming me for clerk; Nathan Hall made the other report. I heard the clerk ask Nathan Hall whether the representatives required him to make that report. Nathan Hall answered in the affirmative. The clerk next spoke; I think he said, £ This is in order.’ There was a large number of the members of the meeting who united in the name brought forward by the representatives, before the other arose to give his report. There was no unity expressed after Benjamin Hoyle said that they were in order and the other was not. Then there were very few voices that united with me. ... If the representatives report the name of a person not acceptable to the meeting, they would have a right to non-concur in the report. I do not recollect that it ever occurred before, that the meeting non-concurred in the report made by the representatives of a person for clerk. The meeting has a right to consider any person, no matter by whom nominated. I consider’ that the concurrence in my appointment was much more general than is usual in the appointment of clerks. I do. not recollect that there was any opposition; there might have been one or two. The concurrence when Hoyle announced his appointment was not near so general as in my appointment.”

The testimony of Benjamin Hoyle, on the same subject, is as follows: “I will go on to state that Jabez Coulsen proposed the name of Jonathan Binns for clerk, and James B. Bruff for assistant; and immediately Nathan Hall arose —he was sitting right before me. I think there were two in the house about rising to approve Jabez Coulsen’s report, but Nathan Hall arose, and said that the representatives were unable to agree, and, on inquiry, he said he was so instructed to report. I then said the latter was in order and the other was not. Upon that the meeting acted, and I made a minute appointing myself clerk, and W. S. Bates assistant, as at other times, to which there Ayasconsiderable unity of expression, and- a good deal of expression was over the name of Binns, too, from those that favored him; and he was invited, after some time, to the-table. He made his minute, and there Avas considerable expression of unity, perhaps more than usual at that time;' but the question was propounded by some one AA^hether we could take any part in that, as it was a separate organization. He was answered that it was a separate organization, and we could not speak to it or recognize it in any shape.”

On the cross-examination of Benjamin Hoyle, the following questions and answers were made: '

“ Question. At the time you made the decision and entered the minute, stating that you were appointed clerk,, and Ur. Bates assistant clerk, state whether there was or had been a general expression of unity in favor of Jonathan Binns for clerk, such as would have authorized your having recorded any other minute than the one you did» record ?

“Answer. There was a very considerable expression, in -quick succession, in favor of Jonathan Binns and James Bruff, before I read the minute, and before he came to the •fable.

“ Ques. Were there any indications as to whether that was a general degree of unity ?

“Ans. I think it proceeded from Jonathan Binns’ asso■ciates.

“ Ques. Was there any evidence of dissent from it?

“Ans. I think our members took very little part with it .alter it assumed the form of, a separate meeting.

“ Ques. But before that ?

“Ans. There was some. I do not think very much.”

Without transacting other business, Hoyle and his adherents adopted a minute of adjournment to the hour of ten o’clock next day; and Binns and his associates adopted .a like minute, to the hour of eight o’clock next morning.

The separation of the men Friends was thus accomplished. Gould and his companion, and William and Charles Evans, from Philadelphia Yearly Meeting, adhered to the Hoyle organization, while all other visiting Friends .remained with the Binns organization.

At the opening of the women’s meeting, on the second day of the session, the representatives reported that they .had conferred together, and were unable to agree upon names to be presented for clerk and assistant; and no names being in fact presented to the meeting, the old clerk .and assistant were, by unanimous consent, continued for .the ensuing year; and afterward this meeting -adjourned, to meet again the next day at the hour to which the men’s meeting might adjourn. The next morning, at eight o’clock, the Binns organization and the women’s meeting respectively met according to adjournments. These organizations united, and have continued to act in unity, claiming to be the true and legitimate Ohio Yearly Meeting of the Society of Friends.

At ten o’clock of the same day, the Hoyle organization convened in separate session; and at the same time anumber of women- Friends, instead of adhering to the regular women’s meeting, organized a new women’s meeting, and united with the Hoyle party. These two latter bodies also-claimed to be the true and legitimate Ohio Yearly'Meeting. Thus the schism in the Ohio Yearly Meeting was. finally and completely effected.

Y. After the separation, but before the end of their respective sessions, each of these resultant bodies prepared and sent an epistle to each of the other yearly meetings of the society, containing a statement of the circumstances-of the separation. The letter of the Hoyle meeting stated the circumstances which occurred on the first and second days of the session, substantially as above given, and claimed that Binns and his associates were seceders from the Ohio-Yearly Meeting, and had assumed the name -without any just claim or right. The letter of the Binns meeting set forth the disorders which had prevailed in the Ohio Yearly-Meeting from the year 1845, and their causes, substantially as above stated, together with the circumstances immediately attending the act of separation.

Upon the receipt of these letters, the several yearly-meetings of the society (except Philadelphia) acknowledged the meeting of which Binns was a clerk as the true- and only Ohio Yearly Meeting, and at the same time disavowed and disowned the organization of which Hoyle was-clerk. The Philadelphia Yearly Meeting, in 1855, united with the Hoyle organization, by receiving and answering-its letter, and by sending letters to other yearly meetings-in vindication of its course. Like correspondence was-continued in .1856; but in the year 1857, on account of dissensions within its own borders, growing out of the same difficulties, it ceased its epistolary correspondence-with the Hoyle meeting, and also with all other meetings-of the society. In the meantime, however, it has accorded full rights of membership to professed Friends in unity with each of the Ohio organizations, without giving credit to the letters or certificates of either body.

YI. The relations which have subsisted, since the separation in the Ohio Yearly Meeting, between the society and each of the resultant bodies, are of importance only as they reflect upon the transactions which resulted in the separation. The true character of those transactions are illustrated in view of their results.

“ The Ohio Yearly Meeting” was the proper name of the association to whose use the property in controversy was conveyed. The reason for annexing thereto in this grant the qualifying words “ of the Society of Friends,” does not clearly appear. It does appear, however, that shortly after the Hicksite defection, in 1827, the orthodox Quakers' were in the habit of distinguishing their meetings from those of the Hicksites by the use of those words or others of similar import. But whether these qualifying words were inserted in this deed in descriptio personce of the beneficiary, or as words of limitation, we need not now- inquire. It may be granted that the use of this property would remain to the “Ohio Yearly Meeting,” notwithstaflding its connection with the society should be disrupted by the unanimous action of Friends residing within its jurisdiction. The solution of that question is not necessary in this case. It is conceded that, previous to 1854, the Ohio Yearly Meéting was composed of persons who were members of the Society of Friends, and that in and by the act of separation, two distinct and independent bodies were organized out of the old membership, each of which claim the succession, and that the persons of whom it is composed continue to be members of the Society of Fri'euds. Hence it is that inquiries into the subsequent ecclesiastical relations of these respective bodies become natural and pertinent.'

The testimony clearly shows that Binns and his associates, ever since the separation, have maintained intact the accustomed relations of a yearly meeting with the society, and its several other yearly meetings, save only in the matter of annual correspondence with 'the Philadelphia meeting. Every rule and order of the society for the preservation of its unity have been kept and observed by and with this meeting. Not a tie has been broken, a duty unperformed, or right unacknowledged, whereby the Christian fellowship, which especially distinguishes this peculiar sect, has been interrupted,

On the other hand, Hoyle and his associates, saving only their imperfect affiliation with Philadelphia Yearly Meeting, have, at all times and everywhere, been excluded from fellowship with the society and all its members. The rights of Quakers have been denied to them by meetings and Friends whose standing in the society is undisputed, and at the same time, the Hoyle meeting has ignored or violated the fundamental law of the society, by invading the. territory of other meetings, and setting up within their jurisdictions its own subordinate meetings. To Hoyle and his associates is denied the right to sit in other yearly meetings, except in Philadelphia; the right of ministers to exercise their gifts; the right of intermarriage ; the right to participate in meetings for suffering, and the duty of annual correspondence, whereby their unity with the society, in the Quaker sense of the term, is wholly de•stroyed.

Upon the above stated facts and circumstances, we must now decide which of these associations is the Ohio Yearly Meeting, for whose use the property in controversy is held in trust.

The usual criteria, by which civil courts are enabled to determine the true succession of a voluntary religious association, whose members have been divided by schism, are not found in the facts above stated. No question of faith or doctrine is involved in the case. The legitimate succession has not been determined by any ordinary form of adjudication, before a superior ecclesiastical tribunal.

In the scheme of Quaker government, no superior judicatory has been organized for the exercise of discipline over its yearly meetings. Neither of the contending parties has shown, that, by conforming strictly with prescribed rules and regulations of the society, it has retained the •regular organization of the Ohio Yearly Meeting. Indeed, the testimony shows that there was no prescribed order, ■or established usage of the society, which provided for the ■emergency that existed at the time of the separation. We •are not left, however, in ignorance of the principles of the •society, by which the question at issue can and should be determined.

If the Ohio Yearly Meeting had been composed of one organized body only, and the women’s meeting alone had ■constituted the yearly meeting, there would be no room for ■doubt as to the legitimate succession. The women’s meeting of the Ohio Yearly Meeting, without interruption in the regularity of its organization, composes a part of the yearly meeting represented by Binns and his • associates; •and though the women’s meeting is part only of the yearly meeting, its organization is as essential to a regularly constituted yearly meeting as is the men’s meeting.

The regular succession in the men’s meeting, however, when considered as a separate organization, is not so apparent. This subject has received much consideration; and after the fullest inquiry into the facts, and the laws of the society, we are of opinion that Hoyle, whose term of -office, as clerk of the meeting for the preceding year, was about to expire at the time of the separation, acted without authority, and without precedent, in deciding, under the circumstances, that he and the old assistant were entitled -to be continued in office for the ensuing year. The matter of choosing a clerk and assistant was properly before the meeting for its action and determination. The representatives had failed to unite upon names to be presented to the meeting ; but, nevertheless, the names of Binns and Bruff had been presented by a report from a portion of the representatives — a minority it is true, but whether by a minority or majority, it was within the power of the meeting, and of the meeting only, as such, to determine whether the report should or should not be adopted. The «ole duty of the clerk in the premises, as we understand it, was to collect and minute the sense of the meeting upon the question. According to the order of the society, the sense of the meeting was determinable only by the expressed will of the members. Those wbo remained silent should have been regarded as indifferent on the subject, or as willing to acquiesce in the result as ascertained from the voices of those who were not indifferent, and with whom the question was a matter of conscience. That a large majority of those members, who spoke to the question at all, united in favor of Binns and Bruff, is not a disputed fact. And, although the clerk, in collecting the-sense of the meeting, should not have been controlled simply by a majority of voices, yet such majority was an important element in determining'the sense of the meeting.

The objection to the action of Hoyle, however, is not simply that he made a mistake in collecting the sense of the meeting — the irregularity in his conduct was, that he-did not attempt to collect it at all, but arbitrarily decided in favor of his own appointment. The honesty of his motives is not impugned — his mistake was in extending a rule or usage to a case where it did not apply. It is probable, but not at all certain, that substantial unity in favor •of Binns and Bruff would not have been attained, if IToyle had made a minute in favor of the minority report; and in that event, the report would have failed of adoption, and, as a matter of necessity, as well as of order, the old clerk and assistant would not have been superseded. But this being conceded, it does not follow that Hoyle can be justified in his assumption of the right to officiate for another year, without having attempted to ascertain the sense of the meeting upon the subject. It may also be conceded that, if no names had been presented to the meeting for clerk and assistant, after the failure of the representatives to agree, the usage of the society and of the yearly meeting, would have continued the old officers for another year. But such is not this case. Nominations ■were in fact made, and the meeting was thus called upon to act; and though there was no prescribed rule or established usage for such a case, the testimony shows, as reason itself would dictate, that the subject was within the power of the meeting, and not within the control of the clerk.

The old clerk having failed to discharge his duty to the-meeting, Jonathan Binns, the nominee for the office, undertook to collect the sense of the meeting as he understood it to have been expressed, and made a minute accordingly of his own appointment. The question now arises, whether the minute so made can be regarded and sustained as the action of the meeting? Two objections-are urged against it: 1. That it was not made by the-clerk; 2. That it did not express the true sense of the-meeting.

As to the first objection, it is true that, by the book of discipline, the duty of collecting and recording the sense-of the meeting is imposed upon the clei’k; and no provision is made therein for the contingencies of his absence, inability, or refusal to act. Yet, if we are right in the-conclusion that Hoyle failed and refused to collect the sense of the meeting upon the nomination of Binns and Bruff, it can not be doubted that Binns was justified in assuming to discharge that duty, if it were the desire of the meeting that he should do so. Although the mode adopted was not prescribed in the book of discipline, or1 sanctioned by a general usage, still the necessity of the-case was a sufficient warrant for the action. The case,, however, was not without a precedent. During the Hick-site troubles, the clerk of a quarterly meeting, within the-jurisdiction of the Ohio Yearly, refused to minute the appointment of his successor, and thereupon the nominee collected the sense of the meeting upon his own nomination and made a minute of his own appointment, though the old clerk at the time was at the table. This action of the quarter, and of the new clerk, was afterward approved by the yearly meeting.

As to the second objection, it may he said, in the first •place, that the expressions of unity in the appointment of Binns and Bruff, actually made by members, would un■questionably have justified a minute in their favor, if it had been made by Hoyle as clerk of the meeting. In the second place, we feel doubly assured that this objection, as well as the first, must fail when considered in the light of .all the circumstances of the case.

The opposition to the appointment of Binns and Bruff •was made by those in sympathy with the separatists in New England, who, by adhering to Gould and other disowned members of the society, were promoting disorder .and schism in the Ohio Yearly Meeting. However sincere in their motives and conscientious in judgment, they were .acting in disregard of the order of the society, and therefore their voices should not have controlled the meeting.

Disorder and dissension had prevailed at the meetings •for discipline for years. At the time of the separation, Hoyle, as clerk, sustained by his associates, was conducting the business of the meeting in open violation of the •order of the society in not making and keeping the meeting select. The friends of order and unity had forborne until all hoj>e of a reconciliation had failed; and, in their judgment, the time had come for choosing between the •.alternatives, of either dissolving their unity with the society and ceasing to maintain its order, or of freeing themselves from the official control of those in sympathy with •the separatists. They chose the latter, and in doing so, -our opinion coincides with that of the great body of Friends arid of their yearly meetings throughout the world, •that they -were fully justified in using the means adopted •for the accomplishment of their ends.

We do not defer to the opinions of Friends, or the decisions of their yearly meetings, as conclusive upon the question before us. Yet the connections and relations between yearly meetings are such that we are not at liberty to wholly disregard their judgments in the premises. If the question related merely to the manner in which local discipline had been administered by the Ohio meeting, all other yearly meetings would have been hound to-acquiesce in its decision. The disorder undoubtedly began in a matter of discipline, hut it ended in separation before-the question of discipline was determined. After the separation, each party enforced the discipline according to its own judgment of right. But by the laws of the society there could exist only one yearly meeting within this jurisdiction ; hence the question arose, which of the bodies constituted the true Ohio Yearly Meeting? This question-involved the unity of the society, and was one in which all the yearly meetings had an interest. It became a question-of identity, or succession, to be determined according to-the laws and usages of the society. Although, as we have-said, one yearly meeting has no control over matters of local discipline arising within the jurisdiction of another,, still, other matters, which affect the general welfare of the-society, are within cognizance of each and all the yearly meetings. As we understand it, such is the theory of Quaker government, and such also has been the practice-under it. Eor instance, in 1827, the followers of Elias - Hicks, embracing a majority of the members present at the Baltimore Yearly Meeting, and including the regular-officers of the meeting, seceded from their unity with the - society upon questions of doctrine; whereupon the minority assembled and organized anew, claiming to be the true - and only Baltimore Yearly Meeting of the society. This claim was submitted to and acted upon by the several other yearly meetings. Thus the orthodox Friends, so • organized, were recognized and acknowledged by all other yearly meetings (including the Ohio Yearly Meeting) as constituting the true and legitimate Baltimore meeting; while the seceders, though possessing the apparent regular ■ organization, were disowned and ceased to be of the society.

The action of each yearly meeting, in relation to matters • of general concern, is certified to the others, in its annual epistle. And though the judgment of a yearly meeting, in relation to such concern, is not regarded as conclusive and . binding upon the society until united in by all the meet- - ings, yet it is regarded by Friends as entitled to great weight in the deliberations of other meetings upon the .same subject.

Sometimes the judgment of the society at large is obtained through a general conference, whose report is submitted to and approved by the several yearly meetings.

It has always been regarded .by Friends as not only a right, but the duty of yearly meetings, to advise and admonish each other in relation to matters affecting the unity and order of the society; and that it is the duty of those receiving such advice or admonition to give it weighty •consideration, to the end that peace and unity may prevail throughout the society.

According to the rules of the society, we think the question of succession in the Ohio Yearly Meeting was a proper •subject for the consideration and judgment of other yearly meetings. And it is quite certain that both parties so understood the polity of the society at the time of the separation, as each submitted to the several other yearly meetings its claim for recognition as the only true and legitimate •Ohio Yearly Meeting.

The several meetings then in existence (save only Phil.adelphia, in which there was a divided sentiment) decided in favor of Binns and his associates, upon full consideration of all the facts involved in the controversy.

Are these decisions entitled to consideration and weight in this case ?

Without undertaking to review the adjudicated cases cited by counsel (none of which is exactly like the present in its facts), I will content myself with stating the principles, which, we think, are deducible from them, namely: 'That civil courts, in determining the question of legitimate succession, in cases where a separation has taken place in .a voluntary religious society, will adopt its rules, and will •enforce its polity in the spirit and to the effect for which •it was designed.

When public policy, or the positive law of the land, is mot contravened, the decisions and orders of the society, ■when made in conformity to its polity, should have the same effect, upon the subject to which they relate, in civil ■courts", which the society intended should be awarded to them when pronounced by its own judicatories.

If such society be composed of separate bodies, whether co-ordinate or subordinated, the rules of the society for the management of its internal affairs, and for the adjustment of the relations between its branches, constitute the law by which they should be governed.

Applying these principles to the facts of the case before us, we are of opinion that the decisions of the several yearly meetings of the society, in relation to the succession in the Ohio Yearly Meeting, are proper and legitimate •evidence in the case, and are entitled to great weight as intelligent opinions and judgments upon the subject. And when considered in connection with the circumstances of the separation, and in view of the principles upon which the Ohio Yearly Meeting was organized, they satisfactorily show that the meeting over which Binns presided, affiliated with the undoubted regular women’s meeting, was and is the true “ Ohio Yearly Meeting of the Society of Friends,” within the terms and meaning of the grant, whereby the trust estate in controversy was created. Decree for plaintiffs.

West, J.

The great importance of the present controversy to a large and very respectable body of Christian people, has commanded for it the-most profound consideration of the court. It involves less a question of value than of legitimacy, the nature and character of which are briefly as follows:

In the year 1832, William Hamilton conveyed certain real estate, which is the subject of controversy, situate at Mount Pleasant, in Jefferson county, to John Street, Jacob Holloway, Benjamin Hoyle, and Henry Crew, trustees, and to the survivor of them, and to the heirs at law of such survivor forever, in trust for the use of “ The Ohio Yearly Meeting of the Society of Friends.” The said premises-were purchased by the yearly meeting, for-the purpose and with the design of erecting and maintaining thereon a boarding-school for the use and benefit of the said yearly-meeting, and was in fact appropriated and applied to such use. In and by the deed of conveyance, it was declared and plainly set forth that said grantees should hold said premises, subject to any disposition which said Ohio Yearly Meeting might, at any time thereafter, make of the same, and upon the request or order of said Ohio Yearly Meeting-convey or transfer the title to said premises to such person or persons, and upon such conditions and terms, as said Ohio Yearly Meeting should at any time direct and require.

On first 8d day, 9th month, 1854, the said Ohio Yearly Meeting separated into two bodies, of which JonathanBinns and Dr. Benjamin Hoyle were the respective heads,, each claiming to be the true and legitimate Ohio Yearly Meeting of the Society of Friends. Henry Crew and Dr. Hoyle were the only surviving trustees holding title to-said premises. In 1855, the meeting of Jonathan Binnsordered and directed the said survivors to convey the said premises to certain designated persons, in trust for the uses> aforesaid, which order and direction Henry Crew complied with, and under which the plaintiffs claim. Dr. Hoyle’s-meeting ordered and directed the said survivors to convey to other designated persons, in trust for the uses aforesaid,, which order and direction the doctor complied with, and under which the defendants claim.

The meeting of Dr. Hoyle having obtained, and ever since the separation, kept possession of the said premises- and boarding-school, to the exclusion of the members and children of the Binns meeting, the plaintiffs, trustees of the latter, biing this action to compel the defendants,, trustees of Dr. Hoyle’s meeting, to convey title, and surrender possession.

The record thus presents the question: Is the meeting of' Jonathan Binns the true and legitimate Ohio Yearly Meetingof the Society of Friends ? If this proposition is affirmed,. the relief asked must be granted; otherwise, it must be denied.

The cause was heard in 1868, in the District Court of Jefferson county, wherein a voluminous mass of testimony was taken and certified to this court with the record, under an order of reservation. While it is a labor almost Herculean to digest this volume, it is no less gratifying than it is remarkable, to observe that in the statements of facts by opposing witnesses no substantial or material differences-intervene. Almost the only differences are of opinion as. to the effect of the facts stated, not as to the facts themselves. The consideration of the case is therefore happily unembarrassd by conflict of evidence.

Preliminary, and essential to the disposition of • the-question presented, is an understanding of the ecclesiastical polity of the Society of Eriends. The society was founded at an interesting period in English history, near the middle of the seventeenth century. The translation of King James had given the Holy Scriptures to the two generations next preceding, which had greatly stimulated religious inquiry. Through them, they were brought face-to face with the Almighty, and beheld the glory of His-brightness shedding a divine radiance directly upon the-hearts of believers. A profound sense of individual accountability threw distrust upon the efficiency of hierarchalmediation. A revolution in religious sentiment and ecclesiastical polity was the consequence. Puritanism supplanted prelacy. But neither puritanism nor prelacy satisfied the divine inspirations of George Eox. To his gentle-spirit it seemed little different whether presbyter or bishop stood between the people and their God; whether the altar was sustained by the sword of Cromwell or the scepter of Charles. They were alike incompatible with the mild virtues, holy precepts, and divine practices of true religion, which was not of the head, but of the heart; not of the lips, but of the life; not of form, but of fraternal love. Recognizing the image of God traced in the constitution of individual man, of whatever condition or clime or race, inequality in the temple and before the shrine was to him incompatible with the doctrine of personal accountability. Every form of ecclesiastical authority was therefore •delusive, even destructive, tending to pride, arrogance, and ■oppression, dimming the heavenly light of direct commu’nieation by reflection through an earthly medium; weakening the sense of homage due to the Creator, by sharing it with the mitre and surplice of the creature. As a consequence of these teachings, “ no lords over God’s heritage” became fundamental in the system of Eox, supplanting presbyter and prelate, priest and bishop, synod and conclave, and every form of ecclesiastical authority, power, or supremacy by which was recognized the unequal dignity of men or their unequal proximity to the ■countenance and glory of the Holy One.