Grossman v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, C.A. (534 So. 2d 773, 1988)

SCWARTZ, Chief Judge.

We affirm the judgment below upon the holding that, as a matter of law, the maker of a note is precluded by the parol evidence rule from successfully contending that he may be relieved of his unconditional promise to pay by a directly contrary oral representation of the payee that he need not. Schwartz v. Zaconick, 68 So.2d 173 (Fla.1954); E.J. Sparks Enters., Inc. v. Christman, 95 Fla. 928, 117 So. 388 (1928); Forbes v. Ft. Lauderdale Mercantile Co., 83 Fla. 66, 90 So. 821 (1922); Bodne v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, C.A., 523 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Can-Am Invs., Inc. v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, C.A., 521 So.2d 184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Linear Corp. v. Standard Hardware Co., 423 So.2d 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); see General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Marlar, 761 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir.1985), vacated per stipulation, 774 F.2d 1042 (11th Cir.1985); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Rood, 698 F.2d 435 (11th Cir.1983). But cf. Nagelbush v. United Postal Sav. Ass’n, 504 So.2d 782 (Fla.3d DCA 1987) (fraudulent promise to co-makers that other co-makers will pay joint obligation may be relied upon). Compare Payne v. Nicholson, 100 Fla. 1459, 131 So. 324 (1930) (collateral fraudulent promise may be relied upon).

AFFIRMED.