White v. Metropolitan Dade County (563 So. 2d 117, 1990)

GERSTEN, Judge.

Amid the turmoil attendant to living in an urban environment, on an island off an island, called Key Biscayne, there exists a sylvan spot of tranquility — Crandon Park. Key Biscayne, which is actually a barrier island protecting Biscayne Bay from the Atlantic Ocean, was originally owned by a Dade County pioneer family surnamed Matheson. In 1940, the Mathesons gave the people of Dade County, Florida, access to and enjoyment of that portion of Key Biscayne which came to be known as Cran-don Park.

The Mathesons’ deed to Dade County contained the following simple deed restriction: “for public park purposes only.” In spite of the limitation contained in the deed restriction, Dade County took part of the land deeded by the Mathesons and used it for the development of the Lipton International Tennis Center. Two Matheson family heirs, together with residents of Dade County, sought to enjoin the construction of the center for: (1) violating the restriction in the original deed; (2) violating Dade County’s Comprehensive Development Master Plan; and, (3) failing to conform to the requirements of state law with respect to review of developments of regional impact concerning a proposed tennis stadium.

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found that: (1) appellants were not the proper parties to raise the deed restriction issue; (2) the use of the park for a commercial enterprise did not negate the main purpose of the park property under these facts; (3) Dade County had complied with its Comprehensive Development Master Plan (CDMP) in the construction of the tennis complex; and (4) “Development of Regional Impact” (DRI) review, as it pertained to the proposed stadium, was outside the ambit of the action. The court issued a final judgment denying injunctive and declaratory relief from: (1) the development of the Lipton International Tennis Center on Key Biscayne; and (2) the holding of the Lipton International Players Championship Tennis Tournament on Key Biscayne. It is from that final judgment that this appeal follows. We reverse.

I. FACTS

In 1940, several members of the Mathe-son family deeded three tracts of land located on the northern portion of Key Biscayne to Dade County. This land, consisting of 680 acres, came to be known as Crandon Park. In the recorded deeds, the grantors expressly provided:

This conveyance is made upon the express condition that the lands hereby conveyed shall be perpetually used and maintained for public park purposes only; and in case the use of said land for park purposes shall be abandoned, then and in that event the said [grantor], his heirs, grantees or assigns, shall be entitled upon their request to have the said lands reconveyed to them.

Since that time, several amendatory deeds have been issued by the grantors to allow ancillary uses which may have been otherwise violative of the deed restriction. The additional uses permitted were the construction of public roads, public utilities, and “houses, apartments and facilities for the use of employees engaged in [the] care, maintenance’ and operation” of Crandon Park. The last amended deed permitted the building of a firehouse on the property. However, the grantors’ heirs refused to allow the building of a cable satellite dish. The grantors, their heirs, or assigns, have not waived the deed restriction as to any other construction or use. In 1963, a section of the park was utilized as a dump. This use was never approved or sanctioned by the grantors, their heirs, or assigns.

In 1986, the Dade County Board of County Commissioners passed Resolution R-891-86, which authorized the execution of an agreement with Arvida International Championships, Inc., (Arvida), and the International Players Championship, Inc., (IPC), to construct a permanent tennis complex. The construction of the court facilities and infrastructure began in the summer of 1986, and terminated in 1987. Initially, the tennis complex consisted of fifteen tennis courts, service roads, utilities, and landscaping, all located on 28 acres.

The agreement provided that for two weeks each year, subject to a renewal provision, the tennis complex would become the site of the Lipton International Players Championship Tennis Tournament (Lipton tournament). This renowned tournament is only open to world class players who compete for two weeks.

In February 1987, the first Lipton tournament was held before approximately 213,000 people. The county manager considered the Lipton tournament to be such a tremendous success that he recommended, and the County Commission approved in Resolution R-827-87, the construction of “Phase II,” a permanent clubhouse/fitness facility. This 15,000-to-33,000-square-foot facility was to house locker rooms, training and exercise equipment, meeting rooms, food and beverage concessions, and a sporting goods store. As a result of “community input,” the clubhouse was ultimately reduced to 9,800 square feet. This “community input” consisted of informal meetings with residents and one public hearing.

During the four Lipton tournaments held thus far on Key Biscayne, temporary seating has been provided. Appellants contend that a 12,000-seat permanent stadium is part of the future development plans. Although Dade County admits that “[a] stadium is a future possibility,” it asserts that “no unified plan of development for a stadium exists, and no approvals or permits for any stadium have been issued.”

The record reveals only one public hearing has been held regarding the tennis facilities. In July 1987, a public hearing was held pursuant to section 33-303 of the Metropolitan Dade County Code (1987). Section 33-303 requires a hearing be held before the construction of any new government facility. This hearing involved only the approval of the site plan for the proposed clubhouse. No other public hearing has been held either for the previous construction or the projected stadium.

Although the site is classified as “environmentally sensitive parkland” in Dade County’s Comprehensive Development Master Plan (CDMP), no hearings have been held to change that designation in the CDMP. In 1989, the clubhouse was completed.

The facilities are closed to the public for specified periods of time both before and after the two-week Lipton tournament. Dade County’s agreement with the tournament sponsors, Arvida and IPC, gives them control of the tennis complex during what is called the “Tournament Period.” The “Tournament Period” is defined in the agreement as the:

three weeks prior to the beginning of the calendar week in which the qualifying rounds of the Tournaments ... are to be played ... and continuing until the date occurring one (1) week after the completion of such Tournaments concerned.

In addition, the contract gives the tournament sponsors “reasonably necessary” time before the “Tournament Period” for site preparation. Arvida and IPC are also each afforded 45 days and 30 days, respectively, after the “Tournament Period” for site dismantling.

With respect to the 1987 tournament, the agreement specifically provided for Arvida to have “Priority Use” of the “grandstand and stadium court areas from November 1, 1986 through a period ending 45 days after the conclusion of the Tournament.” The agreement defines “Priority Use” as “[t]he unimpaired right of [Arvida and IPC] ... to permit, reasonably restrict and control access to the Site.... ”

Dade County offered testimony at trial that the public was only excluded from using the facilities for some three to four weeks. However, under the clear wording of the agreement, relative to the 1987 tournament, Arvida had the right to exclude the public from the tennis complex for as long as five months.

During the tournament, the sponsors are given most of Crandon Park’s parking spaces to provide parking for the tournament spectators. The agreement provides that the “County will designate adequate parking facilities in the currently existing Crandon Park parking areas ... for Priority Use in connection with the Tournament.”

The contract estimated that the parking needs of the tournament would “not exceed 4,000 spaces per day.” These 4,000 spaces were not sufficient to satisfy the needs of tournament spectators and other park visitors. At trial, Earl Buchholz, Jr., the tournament operator, testified that tournament spectators parked not only at Crandon Park, but at the Marine Stadium, as well. Correspondingly, Dr. Charles Pezoldt, Deputy Director of Dade County Parks and Recreation Department, testified that during the final Saturday and Sunday of the tournament, the parking lots were temporarily closed to the public.

In 1987 and again in 1988, Dade County attempted to obtain the consent of one of the heirs, Hardy Matheson, for the operation of the Lipton tournament. Hardy Matheson refused to give his consent, and informed the County that the tennis complex and the operation of the Lipton tournament was contrary to the deed restriction.

Appellants, joined by the Friends of the Everglades in an amicus brief, raise three issues on appeal: (1) that the trial court erred in refusing to declare that the placement of the tennis complex and the holding of the Lipton tournament in Crandon Park violated the Matheson family deed restriction; (2) that the trial court erred in ruling that the construction of the tennis complex in Crandon Park was consistent with Dade County’s CDMP; and (3) that the trial court erred in ruling it was premature to require the projected stadium to undergo DRI review and that the tennis complex, including the projected stadium, should be required to undergo DRI review.

Dade County responds that: (1) the tennis facility is consistent with the deed restriction limiting use to a public park; (2) the tennis complex is consistent with its CDMP; (3) any question relating to DRI review is premature; and (4) appellants lack standing to raise the issues they have brought on appeal.

We will address each issue separately.

II. THE DEED RESTRICTION

A. STANDING

Dade County contends appellants do not have standing to enforce the deed restriction. In order to enforce a deed restriction, plaintiffs must show that they sustained an injury that was greater in degree than that sustained by the general public, Town of Flagler Beach v. Green, 83 So.2d 598 (Fla.1955); Henry L. Doherty & Co., Inc. v. Joachim, 146 Fla. 50, 200 So. 238 (1941), or that the restriction in the deed was intended for the plaintiffs’ benefit, Bessemer v. Gersten, 381 So.2d 1344 (Fla.1980); Rea v. Brandt, 467 So.2d 368 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 476 So.2d 675 (Fla.1985).

Two of the appellants, Margaret Matheson Randolph and Malcolm Mathe-son, Jr., are heirs of the original grantors. The deed by which the land was transferred to Dade County included the provision that in the event the stated purpose was thwarted, “the said [grantor], his heirs, grantees, or assigns” were entitled to have the lands reconveyed to them. Since this restriction in the deed was intended for the benefit of the heirs of the grantors, we conclude that the appellant/heirs have the requisite standing to enforce the deed restriction.

We rule, however, that there exists a lack of standing as to the other appellants to raise the deed restriction issue. These other appellants have not shown that they sustained an injury greater in degree from that sustained by the general public or that the deed restriction was intended for their benefit. We will therefore determine whether Dade County has violated the deed restriction solely as it pertains to the claims of the appellant/heirs of the grantors.

B. DADE COUNTY’S VIOLATION OF THE DEED RESTRICTION

Appellant/heirs first contend that the construction of the tennis complex violates the deed restriction. As previously stated, the deed provides that the “lands hereby conveyed shall be perpetually used and maintained for public park purposes only.”

“In construing restrictive covenants the question is primarily one of intention and the fundamental rule is that the intention of the parties as shown by the agreement governs, being determined by a fair interpretation of the entire text of the covenant.” Thompson v. Squibb, 183 So.2d 30, 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). Similarly, “the terms of dedications of lands for park purposes where the lands are conveyed by private individuals are to be construed more strictly than is the case where the lands are acquired by the public body by purchase or condemnation.” Hanna v. Sunrise Recreation, Inc., 94 So.2d 597, 600 (Fla.1957).

Appellant/heirs argue that it was the intent of the Matheson family to limit the use of Crandon Park to passive activities such as picnicking, swimming, and the like. We glean no such intention from the language of the deed. Further, the Florida Supreme Court has adopted a very broad definition for what a “park” encompasses. The court has stated:

[A] park is considered not only as ornamental but also as a place for recreation and amusement. Changes in the concepts of parks have continued and the trend is certainly toward expanding and enlarging the facilities for amusement and recreation found therein.

Hanna, 94 So.2d at 601. The court further explained that the permissible uses for a public park include:

[Tjennis courts, playground and dancing facilities, skating, a swimming pool and bathhouse, horseshoe pitching, walking, horseback riding, athletic sports and other outdoor exercises ... golfing and baseball ... parking facilities ... provided always that a substantial portion of the park area remains in grass, trees, shrubs and flowers, with seats and tables for picnicking, for the use by and enjoyment of the public.

Hanna v. Sunrise Recreation, Inc., 94 So.2d at 601 (quoting McLauthlin v. City and County of Denver, 131 Colo. 222, 280 P.2d 1103 (1955), with approval). We conclude, based on the Florida Supreme Court’s broad definition of “park” contained in Hanna, that the construction of the tennis complex did not violate the “pub-lie park purposes only” provision of the deed restriction.

Appellant/heirs next argue that turning the tennis complex over to a commercial operator violates the deed restriction. We do not agree. Florida courts have consistently ruled that commercial benefit does not defeat a park purpose. Hanna v. Sunrise Recreation, Inc., 94 So.2d at 601; State v. Daytona Beach Racing and Recreation Facilities District, 89 So.2d 34 (Fla.1956); Sunny Isles Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Dade County, 79 So.2d 667 (Fla.1955).

Finally, appellant/heirs contend that the operation of the Lipton tournament violates the deed restriction because it deprives the public of the use and enjoyment of Crandon Park, including the use and enjoyment of the tennis facilities. We are persuaded by this argument and rule that the holding of the Lipton tournament violates the deed restriction because it virtually bars the public use of Crandon Park during the tournament, and does bar public use of the tennis complex, for extended periods of time.

Courts have unfailingly guarded against encroachments on public parkland where such parkland is under the protection of a deed restriction or restrictive covenant. Fairhope Single Tax Corporation v. City of Fairhope, 281 Ala. 576, 206 So.2d 588 (1968) (construction of civic center or recreation building was not consistent with the dedication that the property be used for “park purposes”); City of Wilmington v. Lord, 378 A.2d 635 (Del.1977) (construction of water tower in park violated deed restriction, limiting use of property to “public park purposes”); City of Miami Beach v. Kirsner, 178 So.2d 65 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 920, 87 S.Ct. 231, 17 L.Ed.2d 144 (1966) (city’s use of part of park for a dump violated deed restricting use of area for park purposes); Village of Crotonon-Hudson v. County of Westchester, 30 N.Y.2d 959, 335 N.Y.S.2d 825, 287 N.E.2d 617 (1972) (use of public park for solid waste disposal site violated dedication); Borough of Ridgway v. Grant, 56 Pa.Commw. 450, 425 A.2d 1168 (Commw. Ct.1981) (placing of firehouse in a public park violated terms of deed restriction).

In ruling that the holding of the Lipton tournament violates the deed restriction, we note that a distinction must be made between “park purposes” and “public purposes.” Assuming arguendo that the Lipton tournament is an economic success which brings innumerable benefits to Dade County and its citizens, such an undeniable public purpose is not consistent with a deed restriction mandating the narrower “public park purposes only.” See Fairhope Single Tax Corporation v. City of Fairhope, 206 So.2d at 589.

In addition, the word “only” in the deed restriction at issue further buttresses our ruling that the operation of the Lipton tournament, as presently constituted, violates the restriction. As the court in Thompson v. Squibb explained, “the word ‘only’ is synonymous with the word ‘solely’ and is the equivalent of the phrase ‘and nothing else.’ ” Thompson, 183 So.2d at 32.

Dade County contends that the tennis complex is consistent with the “public park purposes” restriction provided for in the deed. In support, Dade County argues that the complex is open to the public when the tournament is not being held, the site of the tennis complex utilizes less than 5 percent of Crandon Park, and that a valid park purpose is served by “spectating.” Dade County also points to the benefits derived by Dade County from having the Lipton tournament in Dade County.

Dade County relies on Hanna v. Sunrise Recreation, Inc., 94 So.2d at 597, as support for its contention that the tennis complex is consistent with the deed restriction. The facts of the present action are different from those in Hanna, in which a lessee was given the right to construct and operate golfing, tennis, refreshment, and other recreational facilities on land deeded to the state for “State park purposes.” Hanna, 94 So.2d at 600-601. The facilities and use at issue in Hanna were to serve public recreational purposes.

Here, the public, in fact, is deprived from using these tennis facilities for a period of three to four weeks during the Tournament Period. Further, under the contract as to the 1987 tournament, Arvida had the right to exclude the public for as long as five months.

In addition, the court in Hanna noted that the recreational use “would not amount to an ouster of the public therefrom.” Hanna, 94 So.2d at 601. Here, the operation of the Lipton tournament, for all practical purposes, does amount to the virtual ouster of the public from the park for periods of time during the two-week tournament.

The contract gives the sponsors “Priority Use” of the parking areas of Crandon Park during the tournament. The contract estimated that the tournament needs “would not exceed 4,000 spaces per day.” The amount of parking spaces was not adequate to meet the needs of tournament spectators and other park visitors as the testimony was uncontroverted that people were turned away from parking lots at the park. There was also uncontroverted testimony that some people found it necessary to park at the Marine Stadium.

We recognize that many legitimate park events, such as softball or golf tournaments, might fill up lots and make it difficult for latecomers to find a parking space at a certain area within the park. This, however, is not simply a case of a filled parking lot within a certain area of the park. The testimony demonstrates that the tournament apparently takes up all the available public parking spaces at Crandon Park for periods of time during the tournament. This is a public park parking nightmare.

We also recognize that the agreement between the tournament sponsors and the County required the County to provide shuttle services, if necessary, to transport tournament spectators. The parties’ agreement, however, provides only for the County’s shuttle transportation of spectators from the parking facilities in “Crandon Park parking areas.”

In none of the cases which Dade County has cited to this court, see e.g., Ocean Beach Realty Co. v. City of Miami Beach, 106 Fla. 392, 143 So. 301 (1932); Kosanke v. City of St. Petersburg Beach, 256 So.2d 395 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972); Florida Little Major League Association, Inc. v. Gulfport Lion’s Little League, Inc., 127 So.2d 707 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961), was the public’s use and enjoyment of the public park infringed upon, as in the present case. In Ocean Beach Realty,' for example, the plaintiff sued to recover possession of city property which had been conveyed to the city to be used exclusively for park purposes. The city had used a portion of the property to widen an abutting street. The court found that the use of a portion of the property to widen a roadway was not an abandonment of the park purpose. The court found:

The result is to make the park accessible to, and usable by, a greater portion of the public than it would have been accessible to, or could have been used by, had not this improvement been made....

Ocean Beach Realty Co. v. City of Miami Beach, 143 So. at 302. Here, the result in effect, is to make the park inaccessible to, and unusable by the public for periods of time.

Dade County argues that the use of the property as a tennis complex is better than its previous use as a dump. While we agree that a tennis complex in a public park, is better than a dump in a public park, we note that the County’s previous use of the site as a dump, was also in violation of the deed restriction. City of Miami Beach v. Kline, 189 So.2d 503 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966); City of Miami Beach v. Kirsner, 178 So.2d at 65-66. Dade County, in fact, conceded before the trial court that the dump was inconsistent with a public park purpose. We do not congratulate Dade County for shifting from one impermissible use to another.

Finally, Dade County argues, and we agree, that it is well settled that “equity abhors a forfeiture,” that “such restrictions are not favored in law if they have the effect of destroying an estate,” and that they “will be construed strictly and will be most strongly construed against the grantor.” Dade County v. City of North Miami Beach, 69 So.2d 780, 782-783 (Fla.1953).

Appellant/heirs, however, clearly represented to this court and the trial court that they were not seeking a reversion. What appellant/heirs want is a declaratory judgment that the present use of the park is in violation of the deed restriction and an injunction to prevent any further erosion of the “public park purposes only” deed restriction.

Florida’s declaratory judgment statute gives courts of this state jurisdiction to declare the rights of parties when there is a dispute over the interpretation of a deed. § 86.021, Fla.Stat. (1989). Further, injunc-tive relief has long been recognized as an appropriate remedy for violation of a deed restriction or restrictive covenant. Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862 (1933); City of Miami Beach v. Kline, 189 So.2d at 505-506; Thompson v. Squibb, 183 So.2d at 33-34.

We therefore declare Dade County to be in violation of the deed restriction. We reverse the trial court order as to the deed restriction, and remand for entry of an order enjoining Dade County from permitting the Lipton tournament to proceed as it is presently held. Our ruling does not prevent Dade County from using the tennis complex for tennis tournaments. It merely seeks to insure that in holding such tournaments, public access to the rest of Crandon Park is not infringed; and use of the tennis complex is not denied to the public for unreasonable periods of time.

III. COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT MASTER PLAN

A. STANDING AND EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

Dade County contends that appellants have no standing to pursue a CDMP challenge and further argues appellants’ CDMP claim is barred for failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. In order to resolve these issues, some background on the laws governing master plans must be provided.

Dade County was required, pursuant to Florida’s "Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act,” to adopt a comprehensive plan for future development applicable to all of Dade County. §§ 163.3161-3215, Fla.Stat. (1989). The purpose of the act is “to protect human, environmental, social, and economic resources; and to maintain, through orderly growth and development, the character and stability of present and future land use and development in this state.” § 163.3161(7), Fla.Stat. (1989). CDMP’s are approved by the state and local governments, and developments undertaken or approved by local governments are required to be consistent with such master plans. §§ 163.3161, .3194, Fla.Stat. (1989).

In 1984, the Florida Supreme Court clarified the standing requirements for plaintiffs to pursue a master plan challenge under Florida’s “Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act.” The court held “only those persons who already have a legally recognizable right which is adversely affected have standing to challenge a land use decision on the ground that it fails to conform with the comprehensive plan.” Citizens Growth Management Coalition of West Palm Beach, Inc. v. City of West Palm Beach, Inc., 450 So.2d 204, 208 (Fla.1984); see also, § 163.3215(1), Fla.Stat. (1989) (“[a]ny aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain an action for injunctive or other relief against any local government to prevent such local government from taking action on a development order ... that is not consistent with the comprehensive plan”). In applying the standing requirements enunciated in Citizens Growth Coalition, the Fourth District Court of Appeal has ruled that property owners whose land adjoined a proposed development and who stood to be directly affected by the development, had standing to pursue a master plan challenge. Southwest Ranches Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Broward County, 502 So.2d 931 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 511 So.2d 999 (Fla.1987).

In the present case, we rule that the two appellant/heirs of the grantors have standing to pursue a master plan challenge under the act because they have a legally protected property interest which was directly affected by the County’s action. By including language in the deed providing for the grantor, his heirs, grantees, or assigns, to have the property recon-veyed to them in the event the stated purpose was thwarted, the grantors created a “reversionary future estate” in land. See R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuek & D. Whitman, The Law of Property § 3.1, at 91 (1984) [hereinafter cited as The Law of Property], This future estate is a “presently existing, legally protected property interest.” See The Law of Property § 3.1, at 91.

We conclude, however, that the other appellants have not established the requisite standing to raise such challenge. No testimony was offered before the trial court that they were directly or adversely affected by the County’s action. Nor did they show that they had a legally recognizable interest in the property. See Citizens Growth Management Coalition of West Palm Beach v. City of West Palm Beach, Inc., 450 So.2d at 208.

We next turn to the administrative remedies issue as it pertains to appellant/heirs. Dade County argues that appellants’ CDMP claim is barred because they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Dade County contends that since it held the public hearing mandated by the CDMP and appellants failed to raise an objection at the hearing, appellants’ CDMP claim is now precluded.

We are not persuaded by Dade County’s argument on this point. The public hearing Dade County refers to was held in July of 1987. By the time of the hearing, Dade County had already ripped out the area necessary to construct the tennis complex. The County had also installed tennis courts and parking lots, all without holding public hearings.

Further, the first of the four planned Lipton tournaments had already been held. Since a significant portion of the damage had already been done by the time of the hearing, the administrative remedy available to appellant/heirs could not have afforded adequate or timely relief. Under these circumstances, we conclude that appellant/heirs’ CDMP claim is not precluded for failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. See Gulf Pines Memorial Park, Inc. v. Oaklawn Memorial Park, Inc., 361 So.2d 695 (Fla.1978); Warner v. City of Miami, 490 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); School Board of Leon County v. Mitchell, 346 So.2d 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert. denied, 358 So.2d 132 (Fla.1978).

Having found that appellant/heirs have standing to pursue their CDMP challenge and that they are not precluded from raising their claim for faihire to exhaust administrative remedies, we next determine whether Dade County has violated its CDMP.

B. DADE COUNTY’S VIOLATION OF ITS COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT MASTER PLAN

Appellant/heirs contend that Dade County failed to comply with the County’s CDMP with respect to the development of the tennis complex at Crandon Park. Dade County asserts that it has complied with every requirement, has obtained every permit required, and is not in violation of its CDMP. Dade County further responds that the trial court’s ruling that the complex is consistent with the CDMP, is supported by competent, substantial evidence.

The tennis complex is located in a zone, which is designated as “environmentally sensitive parkland” under Dade County’s CDMP. The key guidelines for zones designated as environmentally sensitive, provide in part:

Activities which remove organic soils or scarify native rock formations should be minimized to the extent possible and should not disrupt the environmental functions of the zone.

Removal of native vegetation should be minimized, and further removal of bay heads or tree islands particularly avoided.

No rock pits, borrow pits, roadways, building pads, or other development should be permitted to displace primary nesting, roosting, or feeding habitats for endangered, threatened, or rare wildlife, or species of special concern.

Anthony Clemente, former Director of Dade County’s Department of Environmental Resources Management (DERM), testified that he had direct responsibility for applying the County’s environmental criteria and for ensuring that the tennis complex was consistent with the County’s CDMP. He testified that DERM conducted an evaluation of the proposed tennis complex and found that it would have no significant impact on environmentally sensitive areas, and the complex was consistent with the CDMP.

However, Clemente stated that certain requisite evaluations should have been done, such as the impact of the development on bird nesting and related environmental issues, before commencing construction. Clemente admitted that he could not find these evaluations in the file or verify that they had been completed.

This court has recognized that developments challenged as contrary to master plans must be strictly construed and that the burden is on the developer to show by competent and substantial evidence that the development conforms strictly to the master plan, its elements, and objectives. Machado v. Musgrove, 519 So.2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), review denied, 529 So.2d 693, 694 (Fla.1988). We find that Dade County has not met this burden of proof. Dade County did not present sufficient evidence to the trial court to demonstrate that the complex conforms strictly to the CDMP, its elements, and objectives. We rule that the construction of the parking lots, access roads, tennis courts, and clubhouse for the complex cannot be justified under the strict standard of review enunciated by this court in Machado.

We note that the County also argues that the area was improved from an environmental standpoint when Dade County cleaned up the dump site. Assuming this to be true, it still does not establish that the tennis complex is in compliance with the master plan.

Because Dade County has failed to show by competent and substantial evidence that the tennis complex complies with the guidelines for environmentally sensitive zones, as prescribed in the master plan, we find that the tennis complex is in violation of the CDMP. We reverse the trial court order on this point and remand for entry of an order enjoining any further development at the site.

IV. DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL IMPACT REVIEW

A. STANDING

Dade County contends that appellants do not have standing to enforce the statutes governing developments of regional impact review, and that enforcement of these statutes vests exclusively in the Florida Department of Community Affairs (FDCA). We do not agree.

Chapter 380 of the Florida Statutes (1989), mandates developments of regional impact to undergo a review and approval process. § 380.06, Fla.Stat. (1989). Nothing in chapter 380, Florida Statutes, however, has abrogated “the rights of citizens to challenge local zoning decisions in circuit court.” Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Monroe County, 456 So.2d 904, 909 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), review denied, 462 So.2d 1108 (Fla.1985); see Caloosa Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners, 429 So.2d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 438 So.2d 831 (Fla.1983). Persons with a legally recognized interest which will be directly affected by a zoning decision have standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the statutes governing DRI. See Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Monroe County, 456 So.2d at 909; Caloosa Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners, 429 So.2d at 1264-1265.

We recognize that the appellants who are not heirs of the grantors do not have standing under this test. We conclude, however, as we did with respect to the issue of appellants’ standing to raise the violation of the CDMP; that the appellant/heirs do have standing to enforce the statutes governing developments of regional impact. Appellant/heirs are not just citizens who have sustained damages similar to that suffered by the community. Appellant/heirs hold a “reversionary future estate” in the property and they seek to safeguard that estate. See The Law of Property §3.1, at 91. We will therefore consider whether the tennis complex, including the stadium, should be required to undergo DRI review solely as it applies to the claims of the appellant/heirs.

B. DADE COUNTY’S FAILURE TO UNDERGO DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL IMPACT REVIEW

Appellant/heirs contend that the tennis complex, including the proposed stadium, should be required to undergo DRI review. DRI review and approval is mandated for “any development which, because of its character, magnitude, or location, would have a substantial effect upon the health, safety, or welfare of citizens of more than one county.” § 380.06(1), Fla. Stat. (1989). Both appellants and Dade County agree that a 12,000-seat stadium would be subject to DRI review. See §§ 880.0661(3)(b)(l)(b), 380.06(2)(d)(l)(b), Fla.Stat. (1989).

Dade County argues that the tennis complex and proposed stadium is not required to undergo DRI review until, and unless, the County commits to the construction of the stadium. This argument is without merit.

The laws governing DRI review do not allow developers to commence limited construction of a project which ultimately must undergo DRI approval without obtaining a final development order or a preliminary development agreement, in accordance with section 380.06, Florida Statutes, before commencing construction. Section 380.06(8), Florida Statutes, permits a developer to obtain a written preliminary development agreement from the FDCA as a prerequisite to engaging in limited construction of a project which will ultimately trigger DRI review. In order to prevent developers from dividing their project into phases to avoid the DRI review process, certain administrative rules were adopted by the state. These are referred to as “aggregation” rules or provisions.

At the time the project was commenced, the aggregation provisions in force were found in chapter 27F-18, Florida Administrative Code (1986). The purpose of chapter 27F-18, Florida Administrative Code, was to establish the criteria to determine when two or more developments should be aggregated as a single development for DRI review. Chapter 27F-18.003, Florida Administrative Code provided:

(1) Two or more developments shall be presumed to be aggregable if:

(a) The developments evidence common ownership or majority interest; and

(b) The time between completion of one development and acquisition of land for any other development is five (5) years or less; and

(c)l. The developments are rural developments and any boundary of one development is one (1) mile or less from any boundary of all other developments; or

2. The developments are urban developments and any boundary of one development is within one-quarter (½) mile or less from any boundary of all other developments.

The presumption thus raised could be rebutted by a showing that the individual components were not part of a unified plan of development. See Ch. 27F-18.004, F.A.C. The criteria for determining the existence of a unified plan of development was provided as follows:

The Department will consider the following factors to determine if two or more developments are components of a unified plan of development:

(1) The nature and design of each development.

(2) The geographic proximity of the developments to each other.

(3) The temporal proximity between acquisition of land for development and completion of developments thereon.

(4) The ownership interests in the developments and relative activity of individual owners.

(5) Common management of the developments.

(6) Common advertising of the developments.

(7) Sharing of infrastructure between developments.

(8) A master plan or other corroborative documentation of a unified plan of development.

(9) Oral statements made about the developments by the officers or agents of the developer prior to the initiation of aggregation review by the Department.

(10) Separation and interconnection of developments....

(11) Separation of developments by natural or artificial barriers....

Ch. 27F-18.005, F.A.C. The construction of the “tennis complex,” including the projected stadium, even though it is to be accomplished in phases, falls within the definition of a “unified plan of development” under chapter 27F-18, Florida Administrative Code, thus subjecting the project to DRI review.

Chapter 27F-18, Florida Administrative Code (1986), was superseded in 1988 when its provisions were inserted in section 380.-0651(4), Florida Statutes. Ch. 88-164, § 3, Laws of Fla. The aggregation provisions in section 380.0651(4), Florida Statutes, were revised from the previous aggregation provisions contained in chapter 27F-18, Florida Administrative Code.

Nothing in the new provisions, however, exempts the tennis complex and proposed stadium from DRI review as a “unified plan of development.” These new provisions, in fact, strengthen the regulations requiring two or more projects meeting certain criteria to be aggregated and treated as a single DRI, subject to the review provisions of section 380.06, Florida Statutes. § 380.0651(4), Fla.Stat. (1989).

Dade County vehemently denies the proposed tennis stadium is part of a unified plan of development. In support of its contention, Dade County points out that no approvals or permits have been issued, and no hearing has been held with respect to the projected stadium. We are unpersuaded by the County’s argument.

The record is replete and repeatedly resounds with references to the permanent stadium planned for the park: (1) the tournament director, Buchholz, admitted that his company was contractually obligated to place a 12,000-seat permanent stadium on the site; (2) the Coordinator of the Dade County Developmental Impact Committee, Carey Lee Rawlinson, Jr., admitted that the existing contracts commit the tournament director to construct a 12,000-seat permanent stadium; and (3) Interim County Manager, Dewey W. Knight, Jr., had informed the County Commissioners that contractually, construction of the permanent stadium must commence by December 31, 1990.

In addition, the County Commissioners passed resolutions in 1986 and in 1988, which expressly recognize the plans to construct a permanent stadium in Crandon Park. Dade County, Fla. R-891-86 (July 15, 1986); Dade County, Fla. R-712-88 (June 7, 1988). Indeed, the 1986 resolution authorizing the execution of an agreement with the tournament sponsors, attaches as an exhibit, a site plan depicting a permanent stadium to be constructed at the park. (See the appendix attached). The County also, in applications for permits to the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation and the United States Army Corps of Engineers, submitted drawings depicting the location of a permanent stadium to be constructed.

Additionally, in the resolution which the County Commissioners passed in 1988, recognizing the plans to construct a permanent stadium, the County also adopted an amendment to the contract between it and the tournament sponsors. The amendment to the contract specifically requires IPC to “immediately ... pursue approvals and permits necessary to construct and use a 12,000-seat, first class permanent stadium” at the site. Dade County, Fla. R-712-88 (June 7, 1988).

We therefore reject Dade County’s assertion that it is premature to require the tennis complex, including the proposed tennis stadium, to undergo DRI review. The record demonstrates ample proof that such stadium is part of a “unified plan of development” under the criteria set forth in chapter 27F-18, Florida Administrative Code, and as now statutorily prescribed and strengthened in section 380.0651(4), Florida Statutes.

Dade County next argues that a letter from the FDCA, dated May 27, 1988, exempts the development from the aggregation provisions. The letter states in part:

The Department has received your letter dated May 23, 1988, concerning proposed development at the Key Biscayne International Tennis Center in Dade County. Based on your representations, we understand that the developer has received local government approval to construct a 9,800 square foot clubhouse and locker room. It is our understanding that the developer is considering additional development consisting of a 4,800 seat tennis stadium at the Tennis Center, and may eventually develop a facility with a total of more than 12,000 permanent seats. However, according to your letter the developer has not yet requested or received local government approval to develop any permanent stadium seats.

The development currently approved by local government, which consists of a 9,800 square foot clubhouse and locker room, does not, by itself, constitute a Development of Regional Impact (DRI). If the developer seeks approval to develop permanent seating at the tennis center, we request that he obtain a binding letter of interpretation of DRI Status, or that the project undergo DRI review pursuant to Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, if applicable. If any proposed development at the tennis center is determined to be a DRI, the developer may wish to request a preliminary development agreement to allow limited development prior to receiving a DRI development order.

The Department reserves all its rights pursuant to Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, concerning this development and further review of the project may be required if the developer’s plans are materially changed.

Section 380.0651(4)(d), Florida Statutes, provides that the aggregation provisions of section 380.0651(4), Florida Statutes, do not apply to developments in which, prior to July 1, 1988, the FDCA had issued “[written decisions, agreements, and binding letters of interpretation.” We rule that this letter is not a written decision, agreement, or binding letter of interpretation, under this subsection.

Section 380.06(4), Florida Statutes, and section 380.06(8), Florida Statutes, define binding letters and preliminary development agreements. Section 380.06(4)(a), Florida Statutes, states in pertinent part:

If any developer is in doubt whether his proposed development must undergo development-of-regional-impact review under the guidelines and standards, ... he may request a determination from the state land planning agency [FDCA].

l.(d) A request for a binding letter of interpretation shall be in writing and in such form and content as prescribed by the state land planning agency. Within 15 days of receiving an application for a binding letter of interpretation or a supplement to a pending application, the state land planning agency shall determine and notify the applicant whether the information in the application is sufficient to enable the agency to issue a binding letter or shall request any additional information needed....

Section 380.06(8)(a), Florida Statutes, provides in part:

A developer may enter into a written preliminary development agreement with the state land planning agency to allow a developer to proceed with a limited amount of the total proposed development. ...

1. The developer shall comply with the preapplication conference requirements pursuant to subsection (7) within 45 days after the execution of the agreement.

Dade County presented no evidence to the trial court that it complied with either subsection (4) or subsection (8) in its receipt of the May 27, 1988, letter from the FDCA. Further, the May 27 letter makes clear that it is neither a binding letter of interpretation nor a preliminary development agreement. Moreover, the FDCA expressly reserved all its rights under chapter 380, Florida Statutes, concerning the development.

We also reject the contention Dade County made in the trial court that the May 27 letter is a “clearance letter.” Nothing in the statutes or rules governing DRI provide for the issuance of “clearance letters” by the FDCA.

Based on the foregoing, we rule the development should be required to undergo DRI review.

V. CONCLUSION

We rule that the holding of the Lipton tournament in Crándon Park violates the deed restriction. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court order as to the deed restriction and remand for entry of an order enjoining the holding of the Lipton tournament as it is presently held. In addition, we declare that the tennis complex is in violation of the County’s CDMP. We reverse the trial court order on this point and remand for entry of an order enjoining any further development at the site until Dade County is in compliance with its own CDMP.

Further, we declare that the development of the tennis complex was and is subject to DRI review. We therefore reverse the trial court order as to the DRI and remand for entry of an order enjoining Dade County from any further development at the site, unless the development is in accordance with the DRI review and approval process.

It is undisputed that the Lipton tournament and the tennis complex in which it is held serve a public purpose, that it brings tourism to Dade County, and attracts international and national media coverage, thereby enhancing Dade County’s image. Dade County may wish to continue its sponsorship of the Lipton tournament at the tennis complex. It just cannot continue to do so by violating the deed restriction, its own CDMP, or Florida law.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

BASKIN, J., concurs.

NESBITT, Judge

(dissenting):

In 1940, the Matheson family deeded to Dade County some 680 acres on Key Biscayne. The deed contained a restriction which stated that the land was to be used “for public park purposes only.” The site, named Crandon Park, over the years has developed into a recreational area offering numerous and varied activities to the public. These include expansive beaches and picnic areas; a marina with a restaurant and bait and tackle shop; a championship eighteen-hole golf course constructed in 1970 with pro shop, locker room/clubhouse, snack bar and restaurant (the site of an annual professional golf championship tournament); boat ramps; bicycle paths; diving facilities; berths for charter deep sea fishing vessels; sports playing fields; an annual professional athletes’ “Superstars” competition; and tennis courts. The park also contains maintenance facilities and numerous parking lots. Crandon Park was the site of the Metro Zoo until that attraction moved to new facilities off Key Biscayne in 1980.

In 1986, Dade County undertook construction of a tennis center on twenty-eight acres of Crandon Park. Even though most of the site selected was zoned environmentally sensitive park land, the area had previously been the site of a dump (landfill) and park maintenance yard. The center, initially consisting of fifteen tennis courts, service roads, and utilities, was built after the Board of Dade County Commissioners entered into a license agreement with sponsors of the two-week Lipton International Players Championship Tennis Tournament whereby the center would become the site of a yearly tennis tournament. Over 200,-000 spectators have attended each year since the tournament began in 1987.

In 1988, Dade County commissioners proposed that a 33,000 square foot clubhouse, locker room, restaurant, pro shop complex be constructed at the center. After various informal hearings with Key Biscayne residents, as well as a public hearing mandated by section 33-303, Dade County Code, the county decided to reduce the size of the project to a locker room/clubhouse of 9,800 feet. Soon after the county commission authorized this project, several Key Biscayne residents, as well as other Dade County residents and two members of the Matheson family, filed this suit. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment as to whether construction of the tennis center and its use for the Lipton Tournament violated the deed restriction requiring that the park be used for public park purposes only. Moreover, they sought to enjoin the county from further construction at the center based on allegations that the existing center, the approved clubhouse and a proposed 12,000 seat permanent stadium violated the Dade County Comprehensive Development Master Plan and Chapter 380 of the Florida Statutes which governs the grant of permits to build certain developments which will impact the state’s natural environment. Plaintiffs requested that the court order the removal of all existing structures and the immediate review of the tennis center’s compliance with Chapter 380, Development of Regional Impact requirements.

A hearing was held to decide whether or not the facts and allegations entitled plaintiffs to a temporary injunction. At that hearing, the county moved, and the plaintiffs agreed, to take testimony and evidence in order to máke a final disposition of the case. The evidence adduced, viewed in the light most favorable to the county as the prevailing party, will be set out within the discussion of each of the three issues which this case requires us to address.

I. The Alleged Violation of the Deed Restriction

Plaintiffs allege that the tennis center was built strictly for the purpose of accommodating the Lipton Tournament which is a commercial enterprise, and thus the center is a violation of the deed restriction which requires the land deeded be used for public park purposes only. I agree with the reasoning and holding set forth by the majority that according to Florida law, construction of the tennis complex and the yearly tournament’s management by a commercial operator do not defeat the public park purpose. However, I disagree with the majority’s holding that the tournament violates the deed restriction because it a) virtually bars the public’s use of the entire Crandon Park facilities during the tournament period and b) does bar the public’s use of the tennis complex itself for extended periods of time. I base my disagreement on the evidence set forth in the record.

First, the majority bases its conclusion that the public is denied use of the entire 680 acres of Crandon Park during the two-week tournament on its finding that people who want to attend the park in order to enjoy recreational pursuits other than the tournament cannot find a parking place. My colleagues hold that the tournament “does amount to the virtual ouster of the public from the park for periods of time during the two-week tournament.” Majority op. at 125. There is a total lack of competent evidence in the record to support this holding.

Earl Buchholtz, Jr., the tournament organizer, testified that one of the primary reasons the Crandon Park site was selected was because of the parking facilities there. According to the contract between the county and the tournament organizer, the estimated parking needs during the tournament are 4,000 spaces per day to be provided in currently existing Crandon Park lots. The parties agreed that the county is to provide shuttle services to transport spectators from other parking facilities, if necessary, to the site of the event. The contract also provides that the county will provide public transportation to the tournament site from the Vizcaya and Brickell Metrorail stations and other key points in the county.

Dr. Charles Pezoldt, Deputy Director of the Dade County Parks and Recreation Department, testified that essentially four primary parking areas, located to the east side of Crandon Boulevard, are utilized to park the cars of those attending the tennis tournament. Pezoldt said that during non-tournament times, those lots are used for beach-goers’ parking and special activity parking. Pezoldt further testified that park attendance at the time of year the tournament is held (late winter/early spring) is light as compared to the summer time when many people visit the beach. According to his testimony, “Normal use [of the lots designated for tournament parking] is very, very light” during the weeks when the tournament takes place. “That’s why the tournament works so well on the site,” he said. Pezoldt went on to say that increased park attendance during this light season is “an asset because it’s performing a recreational need for the people in the community to enjoy tennis as a spectator and for fulfilling their recreational pursuits.”

Pezoldt stated that the county is currently studying parking uses at the park and that if there is a problem the county will modify the amount of parking at the park. He said that one consideration is to have the 600 to 800 volunteers who work at the tournament park off the island and be brought in by bus. He made clear that “the primary use” for the park will remain “the beach or [] any other recreational use.” He emphasized that these activities “will have priority” over parking.

The record shows that on the Saturday and Sunday afternoons of the tournament’s final matches of 1987 and 1988, the parking areas which normally serve the beach might have been temporarily full for certain periods with the vehicles of both tournament spectators and beach-goers; however, the testimony was that the lots would reopen as people left and parking became available. There was no testimony that the public was prevented from enjoying the myriad activities which Crandon Park has to offer in addition to the tennis tournament for even one day, much less for the full two weeks the tournament runs. The most that can be said is that for a few hours on two days, people arriving after a certain time of day may have found it difficult to find parking at the beach lots across from the tennis center site. Many legitimate park events — softball tournaments, professional golf tournaments, the Superstars competition as well as others— might fill up lots and make it difficult for latecomers to find a parking space at a certain area within the park. Accordingly, I emphatically disagree with the majority’s finding that the testimony shows that “apparently all the available public parking spaces at Crandon Park”, maj. op. at 125, were taken up with the vehicles of tournament goers during certain periods. The record clearly does not prove this. There was absolutely no proof that any Crandon Park facilities were closed due to the tournament or that the public was ousted from any facilities during any time the tournament took place.

In short, the record simply does not support a finding that the deed restriction was violated because the public was ousted from the park; the public can and does use Crandon Park during the tennis tournament. In fact, during the tournament, so many people appear to be using the park that it could be said that a public park “nirvana” is reached. Consequently, I find it incomprehensible that the majority could find that the operation of the tournament amounts to an ouster of the public from Crandon Park.

Second, I disagree with the holding that the record demonstrates that the tournament bars public use of the tennis complex itself for extended periods. The record shows that Dade County controls programming at the tennis center for forty-six weeks of the year and that the commercial operator controls the center program for the other six weeks in order to operate the tournament. Simply because a commercial operator conducts the tennis center program, situated on a mere five per cent of the entire park, for a period of six weeks a year, it cannot be concluded that the tennis center is closed to the public's use during that entire time. Hanna v. Sunrise Recreation, Inc., 94 So.2d 597, 601 (Fla.1957). It was established at the hearing that spectating at sporting events is one of the most popular recreational activities in the country. Throughout the tournament itself, while tennis enthusiasts cannot get on the courts and play tennis, spectators can enjoy watching the professional tennis matches which take place for the public’s benefit. In its opinion, however, the majority chooses to ignore this evidence completely. Instead, the court holds that the tournament “virtually bars the public use of Crandon Park during the tournament, and does bar public use of the tennis complex, for extended periods of time.” Maj. op. at 124. This holding is based on a clearly impermissible reevaluation of the evidence. E.g., Marshall v. Johnson, 392 So.2d 249 (Fla.1980) (appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court by reevaluating the evidence in the cause).

Although the plaintiffs alleged that the tennis complex is totally closed to the public for some eight to nine weeks due to pre-qualifying matches and the set up and take down of commercial booths, bleachers, and other appurtenances, the evidence adduced does not support this statement. According to the terms of the contract between the county and tournament operator, Arvida International Championships, Inc. (AIC), the “Tournament Period,” during which time the AIC has full use of the site and facilities runs from three weeks before the qualifying tennis rounds, through the two weeks of the tournament and until one week after the tournament’s completion. The tournament itself lasts for two of those six weeks. During the tournament, as the majority found, the center is put to public park use. Consequently, from the face of the contract itself, it appears that the park could feasibly be closed for some three to four weeks while the site is under AIC control but the tournament is not taking place. According to the testimony of tournament chairman Buchholtz, the complex can be utilized forty-nine weeks a year.

Appellants presented two witnesses in an attempt to prove their allegation that the tennis center is closed for public use for eight to nine weeks. Both were Key Biscayne residents who frequently passed by the tennis center site. One said that the center “was closed for a few weeks before and a period of t