Martin v. State (107 So. 3d 281, 2012)

PER CURIAM.

David James Martin appeals his convictions of first-degree murder and armed robbery and his sentence of death. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons stated below, we affirm his convictions and sentences.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 15, 2008, a grand jury indicted the appellant, David James Martin, on one count of first-degree murder and one count of armed robbery for the homicide of Jacey McWilliams. The charges against Martin resulted from his March 20, 2008, confession to police and the discovery of Jacey’s body shortly thereafter.

The evidence presented at trial revealed that on Thursday, March 13, 2008, Christine McWilliams called police to report that her daughter, Jacey McWilliams, was missing. Mrs. McWilliams was concerned because she had just learned that Jacey had not reported to work for two days, which was out of character for her daughter. Law enforcement began trying to trace Jacey’s movements since the last time she was seen, two days earlier on March 11, while working for the service department at a car dealership. Law enforcement determined that the last time Jacey used her cellular phone was when she placed a phone call to her mother at 9:22 p.m. on March 11. During that conversation, Jacey informed her mother that she was out with a friend named David.

While at work on March 11, Jacey told a coworker that she would be spending the evening with David, who had planned a special night for them. The coworker had met Martin before as she, the coworker’s fiancé, Jacey, and Martin had gone out to play pool together a few weeks prior to March 11. The evidence revealed that after work on March 11, Jacey drove to Martin’s residence in Jacksonville, picked him up, and the pair headed to Black Creek in Middleburg, Florida. At that time, and relevant to this case, Martin did not own a car.

On March 17, four days after Jacey was reported missing, a police officer arrested Martin at a Wal-Mart in Pinellas County for shoplifting. After Martin was transported to the Pinellas County Jail, officers from the Clay County Sheriffs Office who were looking for Jacey coordinated their search efforts with officers from the Pinel-las Park Police Department, who confirmed that they had found Martin with Jacey’s car. Three days later, on March 20, detectives from the Clay County Sheriffs Office and Jacksonville Sheriffs Office convened at the Pinellas County Jail to question Martin about Jacey’s whereabouts. A third officer from the Clay County Sheriffs Office monitored the video that recorded Martin’s interrogation.

Detectives Ken West of the Clay County Sheriffs Office and Brian Wolcott of the Jacksonville Sheriffs Office questioned Martin. At this point in the investigation and interview, the detectives did not know whether Jacey was alive or dead. During trial, Detective West testified that his and Detective Wolcott’s primary objective in questioning Martin was to determine Ja-cey’s whereabouts. At the beginning of the interview, the detectives read Martin his Miranda rights, which he waived.

Martin’s explanation of the last time he had been with Jacey evolved over the course of the interview. Initially, Martin stated that Jacey picked him up from his home in Jacksonville, and then, after spending the evening together, Martin dropped her off at her home, which was also located in Jacksonville. Martin stated that Jacey had given him permission to borrow her car to visit his girlfriend, and that he paid Jacey $50 in return. After taking Jacey home, Martin explained to the detectives that he then drove to St. Petersburg to spend time with his girlfriend. After a visit of two days, March 12-13, in St. Petersburg, Martin returned to Jacksonville. Before returning to see his girlfriend in St. Petersburg a second time, Martin went to his residence and packed all of his belongings into Jacey’s car because Martin and his girlfriend were planning to move to Georgia together soon thereafter.

Later during the interview, Martin’s story changed. Martin told detectives that Jacey had not loaned him her car to visit his girlfriend. Rather, she was unwilling to do so, and, as a result, a verbal altercation ensued. Martin said that he pushed Jacey out of her car and left her behind at Black Creek. He said that when he left in her car, she was alive.

Martin’s story continued to shift, and after approximately three-and-a-half hours of interviewing, Martin confessed to murdering Jacey. He said that on the evening in question he and Jacey were smoking cigarettes near Johns Cemetery Road in Middleburg, Florida, when he told Jacey that he was going to get another cigarette from the car. While at this location, Martin was also communicating with his girlfriend on his cellular phone, who he said was “freaking out ... because [he] wasn’t home.” Martin said that he felt overwhelmed by his girlfriend’s “hurt” and he, in response, attacked Jacey. Rather than obtaining a cigarette from the car as Martin told Jacey he would, Martin retrieved a hammer and then used it to strike Jacey in the head multiple times. He stated that after the first blow, Jacey fell and appeared to be unconscious. He admitted that he continued to strike her, but was unsure of how many blows he inflicted. He described the incident as “a blur” and said that he “blacked out” while he attacked her. Martin then pulled Jacey, now deceased, into the bushes and departed in Jacey’s car. Martin said that he threw the hammer, along with Jacey’s phone, into a river.

Martin told the detectives where he left Jacey’s remains and then drew a map of the area for them. Shortly thereafter her body was located in the area Martin had described just off Johns Cemetery Road. The forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy on Jacey described her as being in an “advanced stage of postmortem decomposition.”

Martin stated that he killed Jacey because the “woman that [he] loved with all [his] heart was hurt so bad” and he had to go to her. Martin and his girlfriend had been exchanging calls and texts throughout the day. His girlfriend stated, and Martin confirmed, that she was concerned that Martin was pursuing a relationship with Jacey.

After Martin killed Jacey, bank records and video surveillance revealed that Martin used Jacey’s ATM card at a Domino’s Pizza and attempted to withdraw cash from her account. After the attack, Martin drove to his girlfriend’s home in St. Petersburg, arriving around 3 a.m, the next morning, March 12. She described Martin’s arrival as unexpected, and said that Martin seemed “very happy” and was “giddy” and “smiling.” During this visit to St. Petersburg, Martin drove his girlfriend to and from her job at a grocery store and slept at rest stops in Jacey’s car. That same day, Martin drove back to Jacksonville, and then returned to his girlfriend’s home two days later, on March 14.

His girlfriend testified that before Martin arrived at her residence in St. Peters-burg, she and Martin had joked about how he could visit her given that he did not own a car. His girlfriend testified that the following exchange took place:

STATE: Did the defendant say anything to you about how not having a car he could possibly get down to see you?

GIRLFRIEND: There was one point in time where we were just joking around with each other and he said, well, you know, I can just steal a car and I said, okay, well, how are you going to do that and he said, well, that’s easy. I’ll just kill them.

STATE: Now that conversation, was that two or three days before he actually showed up at your house?

GIRLFRIEND: It was very shortly before ....

STATE: After he said those words to you, well, that’s easy, I’ll just kill them, did you say anything back to him, joking back towards him?

GIRLFRIEND: Yes.

STATE: What did you say back?

GIRLFRIEND: I made a comment that — I told him a good place to hide a body is — and I told him a cemetery.

Martin confirmed that a similar exchange about stealing a car occurred as well, although he denied that any comments about killing someone were made.

Various experts testified as to what they found at the crime scene and the state of Jacey’s remains. A senior crime laboratory technician for the Florida Department of Law Enforcement testified that he found a cigarette butt, a white blanket, a suspected blood stain on the ground, a pair of eyeglasses, two flip-flops, and loose change strewn about the area where Ja-cey’s body was located. The laboratory technician also testified that Jacey’s shirt and sweatshirt were pulled up over her head, which suggested to him that Jacey’s body had been dragged to the area where police found it. The pockets in Jacey’s pants were also turned inside out.

A forensic pathologist testified that Ja-cey’s skull was cut and exhibited numerous fractures. Although the forensic pathologist was unable to estimate how many blows Jacey had suffered, a forensic anthropologist testified that based on her examination and reconstruction of Jacey’s skull (which comprised more than thirty-three fragments), Jacey was hit at least seven times. The anthropologist likened the blows to those she had seen at mass fatalities or car accidents. The forensic pathologist and anthropologist confirmed that Jacey died from blunt trauma to the head, and that injuries to her brain triggered a hemorrhage that resulted in death. The forensic anthropologist explained that based on the type of trauma Jacey suffered, she was hit by an object with a “curvilinear edge” that was “delivered with great force to the cranium.” The pathologist opined that Jacey was hit with a hammer. Although a hammer was recovered from Jacey’s vehicle, it tested negative for blood. As noted previously, Martin stated during the police interrogation that he threw the hammer used to kill Jacey into a river.

Against the advice of counsel, Martin testified on his own behalf. He denied killing Jacey and claimed that another man, an acquaintance who was Martin’s drug dealer, had killed Jacey in his presence. Martin testified that on the night of Ja-cey’s murder, he and Jacey went to his drug dealer’s residence. The drug dealer instructed that he and Jacey follow him to Johns Cemetery Road. Martin stated that once the three of them arrived at that location, the drug dealer pressured Martin to engage in sexual activity with him, but before this transpired, the trio became involved in a fight. Martin said that his drug dealer had previously forced him to perform sexual acts during prior drug exchanges between the two men. During the ensuing tussle, Martin stated that his dealer struck Jacey with a hammer, killing her, and then told Martin to “drag her body away.” Martin said that he dragged Jacey’s body to the bushes and covered her face with a white blanket. He said that his dealer told him to get rid of the hammer used to kill Jacey, so Martin threw it into a river on his way back to Jacksonville from St. Petersburg after visiting his girlfriend. Martin testified that he falsely confessed to the crime because his dealer, the actual murderer, had threatened to hurt his (Martin’s) mother and girlfriend if he told anyone what had happened. Martin said that at the time police interviewed him, he still feared for his mother’s and girlfriend’s safety. At trial, Martin did not have any other witnesses testify on his behalf. The jury found Martin guilty of one count of first-degree murder and one count of armed robbery.

During the penalty phase, the State argued three aggravators were present and offered victim-impact testimony from Ja-cey’s mother, Christine McWilliams. The parties stipulated as to the first aggravator — that at the time of Jacey’s murder Martin was on felony probation. The second aggravator was that Martin committed the murder while engaged in the commission of a felony — armed robbery. The third aggravator was that Martin committed the murder in a cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) fashion without any moral or legal justification.

Martin presented testimony from eight witnesses. Martin’s mother testified that Martin experienced many physical and emotional problems growing up, that she suspected he had been sexually abused, that he used drugs, and that he would steal from her. She explained that one time Martin stole an air conditioner from her camper, and she reported his actions to law enforcement because she believed that if he went to jail, he would learn his lesson and stop using drugs. Martin’s felony-probation status, to which the parties stipulated, was a result of this incident. Martin’s mother also testified that Martin was on Prozac when he was seven years old, but that she took him off the medication because she did not believe it was necessary. A mental institution had prescribed the medication. Martin’s mother explained that she had been referred to this institution after she contacted the hospital because she was concerned that Martin had been sexually abused. Martin’s mother said that he was released from the mental institution on the medication after six weeks because Martin’s “lifetime maximum mental health insurance” had been exhausted. Martin’s mother also testified that the institution closed shortly thereafter for mistreating children.

Martin’s grandfather, ex-fiancée, friend, ex-girlfriend, stepsister, and stepbrother also testified on Martin’s behalf. Martin’s conditional release counselor, who counseled him after he was released from a juvenile facility at the age of thirteen, also testified. Martin declined to testify at the penalty phase. Martin also decided that he did not want Dr. Harry Krop, a forensic psychologist who had evaluated him, to testify on his behalf.

Following the penalty phase, the jury, by a vote of nine to three, recommended that the court impose a sentence of death for Jacey’s murder.

During the Spenceit hearing, the testimony of several individuals was presented by the State including: Jacey’s mother, brother, and Janeen Dawn McWilliams. Martin presented the testimony of his mother and she read a letter from her other son, Martin’s stepbrother. Defense counsel also submitted the deposition testimony of Dr. Krop to the trial court. '

After independently weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the court sentenced Martin to death for the murder of Jacey. In pronouncing Martin’s sentence, the trial court determined that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of three aggravating circumstances: (1) the capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and under a sentence of felony probation, § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008) (great weight); (2) the capital felony was committed while Martin was engaged in the commission of a robbery, § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2008) (great weight); and (8) the crime for which Martin was found guilty was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification, § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (2008) (great weight).

The trial court addressed two statutory mitigators: Martin’s age, and additional factors in Martin’s background that would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty. The trial court found that the first mitigator was not proven by the defense. Martin was twenty-one years old at the time of the crime and demonstrated, during his police interview and trial, a level of “sophistication, intelligence, and understanding [to] directly rebut [this] claim.” See § 921.141(6)(g), Fla. Stat. (2008).

With regard to other factors in Martin’s background that would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty, see § 921.141(6)(h), Fla. Stat. (2008), the trial court found the following mitigating circumstances: (1) “drug abuse — suffered from substance abuse during his adolescent and adult life” (slight weight); (2) lack of positive role models and the lack of the benefit of stable and nurturing parents during Martin’s formative years (slight weight); (8) lack of a violent history (slight weight); (4) incident was situational and his aberrant behavior was an isolated incident (slight weight); and (5) has family members who are concerned about him and love him (slight weight). The trial judge found the following mitigating factors not proven and gave them no weight: (1) emotional abuse; (2) sexual abuse; (3) led law enforcement to the crime scene and location of Jacey’s body; (4) failure of the system; (5) lack of impulse control; (6) has a reason to do well in prison; (7) exhibited a lack of sophistication in the way the crime was committed; and (8) showed remorse.

The trial court found that Martin proved six nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: (1) performed kind deeds for others (slight weight); (2) shares love and support with his family who continues to love him (slight weight); (3) attempted to have a positive influence on family members despite his incarceration (slight weight); (4) has artistic skills (slight weight); (5) cares about animals (slight weight); and (6) is amenable to rehabilitation and a productive life in prison (slight weight).

Recognizing that weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not a mathematic comparison, but a qualitative assessment, the trial court concluded that the aggravating circumstances “far out-weighted]” the mitigating circumstances. The court found the jury’s recommendation of death was fully justified, and, therefore, imposed the death penalty for Jacey’s murder and thirty years of incarceration for Martin’s robbery conviction, to run concurrently.

This direct appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Right to Remain Silent

In his first challenge, Martin contends that the trial court should have suppressed his statement to police. Martin asserts that his statement was inadmissible because the police violated the Fifth Amendment when they failed to terminate the interview after Martin invoked his right to remain silent. He also contends that his confession is inadmissible because it was obtained through police coercion. We disagree.

Standard, of Review

According to this Court,

[ AJppellate courts should ... accord a presumption of correctness to the trial court’s rulings on motions to suppress with regard to the trial court’s determination of historical facts, but appellate courts must independently review mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately determine constitutional issues arising in the context of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment and, by extension, article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution.

Miller v. State, 42 So.3d 204, 220 (Fla.2010) (quoting Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598, 608 (Fla.2001)). “In addition, the State bears the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was freely and voluntarily given.” Id.

Merits

The Fifth Amendment to' the United States Constitution states that “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” As part of preserving this right, in Miranda v. Arizona the United States Supreme Court explained that

if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them aware of it — the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise.

384 U.S. 436, 467-68, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The right to remain silent is one of four procedural warnings that must be provided to a suspect who is taken into custody to protect his privilege against self-incrimination. These four warnings are that a suspect

must be warned prior to any questioning [1] that he has the right to remain silent, [2] that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, [3] that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and [4] that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (emphasis supplied); see also Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 966 (Fla.1992). “Once warnings have been given ... [i]f the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602.

Since Miranda, the U.S. Supreme Court and Florida courts have addressed the many ways in which suspects may invoke their right to terminate questioning. Protection of this right requires only that a suspect “indicate[ ] in any manner” that he no longer wants to be interrogated, and then the interrogation must cease regardless of whether it has yet to begin or already has begun. See 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Although the language “in any manner” may sound broad, this Court has clarified that this standard simply means that no “magic words” are necessary to invoke the right. See State v. Owen, 696 So.2d 715, 719 (Fla.1997).

In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court addressed how law enforcement officers should respond when a suspect is in custody and makes an “insufficiently clear” request for counsel. Id. at 454, 114 S.Ct. 2350. The Davis Court explained that the right to counsel established in Miranda was one of a “series of recommended ‘procedural safeguards’ ” that ensured the right against self-incrimination was protected. Id. at 457, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-44, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974)). Because of this right’s “sufficient[ ] importf ] ... [it] ‘requires] the special protection of the knowing and intelligent waiver standard.’ ” Id. at 458, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 483, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)). The Court noted that although it would be “good police practice” for interviewing officers to clarify a suspect’s request for counsel, officers are under no obligation to stop questioning a suspect because to do so “would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity.” Id. at 460, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975)); see also Owen, 696 So.2d at 719 (noting that to require officers to ask clarifying questions placed “too great an impediment upon society’s interest in thwarting crime”).

In Owen, this Court held that the Davis analysis “applies as much to requests to terminate interrogation as it does to requests for counsel.” 696 So.2d at 718; see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2260, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (“There is no principled reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel....”). This Court has held that if police provide proper Miranda warnings, they are not then required to clarify a suspect’s statement regarding his right to remain silent during an interrogation when the assertion made is ambiguous. See Cuervo v. State, 967 So.2d 155, 162 (Fla.2007) (affirming its holding in Owen that police need not ask clarifying questions following an ambiguous request to terminate an interrogation); Owen, 696 So.2d at 718.

In Owen, this Court noted that “requests for counsel have been accorded greater judicial deference than requests to terminate interrogation,” 696 So.2d at 718 n. 6, and it followed, therefore, “by even greater logic that the Constitution does not require such a clarifying approach when an accused ambiguously or equivocally attempts to invoke his [or her] right to remain silent.” Id. (quoting State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277, 285 (Minn.1995)). The Owen Court concluded that the defendant did not invoke his right to terminate questioning when he responded to a question about whether he had targeted the house at issue with the statement “I’d rather not talk about it” and, in response to a question about where he had placed a bicycle, stated “I don’t want to talk about it.” Id. at 717 n. 2. Both statements failed to indicate, unambiguously, whether the defendant was referring to the immediate topic of discussion or, instead, was invoking his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Id. at 720; see also Almeida v. State, 737 So.2d 520, 523 (Fla.1999) (addressing Owen’s “equivocal request” standard).

Both federal and Florida courts have repeatedly held that if a suspect in custody has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights, an attempt to revoke that waiver thereafter must be unambiguous. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 460-61, 114 S.Ct. 2350; United States v. Mikell, 102 F.3d 470, 476 (11th Cir.1996); Cuervo, 967 So.2d at 163; Miles v. State, 60 So.3d 447, 451 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Alvarez v. State, 15 So.3d 738, 743 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). The standard under this rule is whether “a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be an assertion of the right to remain silent.” Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir.1994); see also Owen, 696 So.2d at 718.

In this case, the trial court did not err in denying Martin’s motion to suppress because police detectives informed Martin of his Miranda rights in “clear and unequivocal terms” and Martin, in response, did not indicate that he wished to invoke his right to remain silent. A detective read Martin his Miranda rights at the beginning of the interview. The same detective then asked Martin to sign the card from which he had just read Martin his rights. The card stated that by signing the card Martin indicated that he understood these rights.

Martin does not dispute that he waived his right to remain silent at the beginning of the interrogation. Instead, Martin contends that he asserted his right when he stated “I have nothing really to talk about” almost two hours after the interview began. Martin uttered the disputed statement during the following exchange with Detectives Wolcott and West:

WOLCOTT: Tell me where I can go get her. Do the right thing. It is very simple. I think what happened here was an accident David....

MARTIN: Let me tell you what, even if I could tell you where she’s at. The whole point about it’s an accident, people don’t give a fuck about that. It’s an accident, it’s whether or not ... I mean I don’t know what I am trying to say.

WOLCOTT: David, people do care. There is many a times that I have had cases where it was justified, excusable, there was not intent. Stuff like that, okay and it just disappeared. But you know what happened in all those cases. Everybody stepped up and told the truth. None of that can happen.

WEST: No one, you have zero shot, okay, by not telling the truth. That’s it. Okay. It’s not about that. My life is not any better if you go to prison. My life is not any better if you walk out of here. Okay, I don’t dislike you. Okay, we are not, you have never done, this is the first time we have ever met isn’t it?

MARTIN: Right.

WEST: W[e] got no beef. Okay the only beef I have is I have a job. I signed up for this job. It pays like crap but I do it. Okay, it can be rewarding. I can help families. Okay, I can do that kind of stuff. But what prohibits me from doing that is when I got the evidence and I got the people talking and they are not going like this. Okay, then is when you start having problems. Do we need to have problems? Have I treated you bad?

MARTIN: Nope.

WEST: Have I disrespected you?

MARTIN: Not at all.

WEST: Do you feel like I am judging you wrong or anything?

MARTIN: No.

WOLCOTT: Then.

MARTIN: As a matter of fact you have something set in your head that you are trying to get to and I can’t help you get there.

WOLCOTT: But David, you can.

MARTIN: No, I can’t.

WOLCOTT: I think you have it in your head, okay, that you can’t help us. Okay, and maybe that is preventing you from wanting to help us, but at some point in your time son, you have got to let someone trust in you. You’ve got to sho[w] that there is a reason to trust in you. Okay? You cannot put the weight of this world on your shoulders. None of us can. Okay. Communication is big bro. Talking to people. Okay, spiritually, mentally, I mean it’s a relief. Okay, it’s a weight off man. It’s a weight off okay. It’s a relief for you to be able to lay down tonight in your bunk, okay. Knowing that you know what, that shit’s behind me.

MARTIN: You know what? I already feel that relief. You know why? Because I told you what I already told you.

WOLCOTT: David.

MARTIN: I have nothing really to talk about.

WOLCOTT: David you are not, okay, you may be saying that you are having it, okay, but your body is not saying that.

MARTIN: Because yall are putting me under a lot of pressure right now.

WOLCOTT: Okay, well it’s a pressure situation.

MARTIN: I know it is.

WOLCOTT: I don’t know how many times you have sat across from a homicide detective being questioned.

MARTIN: I never have.

WOLCOTT: And that is why I said today is the biggest day of your life. Okay, today can be a turning point for you. It can’t be a turning point by lying to us. Okay, I have been doing this job 11 years. Okay, the two of us have been doing this job longer than you have been alive. Okay, we have seen other young people make this same mistake. They think that there isn’t a way out that there is no light at the end of the tunnel and they can’t help themselves and they can. I am telling you they can, but you, David, cannot help yourself by not being truthful. You’ve got to. It’s that simple because.

(Emphasis supplied.)

As previously discussed, both this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have held that an invocation of one’s right to remain silent must be made in clear and unequivocal terms if it follows a previous, knowing and voluntary waiver of one’s Miranda rights. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 460-61, 114 S.Ct. 2350; Cuervo, 967 So.2d at 163 (emphasizing that this Court’s holding in Owen regarding equivocal invocations “applies only where the suspect has waived the right to remain silent earlier during the session”) (quoting Almeida v. State, 737 So.2d 520, 523 n. 7 (Fla.1999)).

The transcript from Martin’s interview reveals that Martin did not make an unequivocal invocation. Rather, Martin uttered an ambiguous statement akin to that spoken by the defendant in Owen who, in response to an officer’s question regarding why he had entered a particular home, answered “I’d rather not talk about it.” Owen, 696 So.2d at 717 n. 4. Martin, like the Owen defendant, did not unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent.

Before the exchange excerpted in this opinion transpired, Martin had been telling the detectives a fabricated story of what he and Jacey had been doing the last time he saw her. Martin disputed that he had hurt Jacey, telling the detectives that he dropped her off at home, and denied any knowledge of her whereabouts. The detectives, however, began to accuse Martin of being evasive and not telling them the whole story. Detective West informed Martin that Jacey’s cellular phone records did not comport with Martin’s story. Detective Wolcott noted it did not make sense that if Martin had left Jacey in a populated location as Martin claimed, she would not have sought the help of a nearby resident. In light of these statements, Martin’s story began to change.

Before Martin uttered the statement at issue, he told the detectives that he and Jacey had gotten into an altercation because she had refused to lend Martin her ear. Now, rather than taking Jacey home, Martin told law enforcement that he had pushed her out of the car and sped off, leaving Jacey, who was crying and yelling, behind. It was shortly after Martin provided this revised version of events that he made the statement “I have nothing really to talk about.” Given the responsive nature of the disputed statement, and the context in which it was made, it is reasonable that the interviewing detectives understood Martin’s statement to mean that he did not have more information as to Jacey’s whereabouts and her disappearance in general — not that he was ending the interview and invoking his right to remain silent.

This Court’s conclusion that Martin did not assert his right to remain silent is further supported by the fact that Martin’s statement came mid-interview, rather than at the beginning of it or following the colloquy regarding his Miranda rights. In contrast to this case, in Cuervo we held that the defendant had asserted his right to remain silent in part because his invocation “came solely in response to the inquiry concerning his Miranda rights, before any questions specific to the crime were asked.” 967 So.2d at 163. In light of the Cuervo defendant’s statement, we concluded that the interrogation should have ceased at that moment. Id. at 164. Martin’s statement, however, was in response to requests from the detectives to tell them where they could find Jacey, and his statement — “I have nothing really to talk about” — did not clearly indicate that he was invoking his right to remain silent. We cannot determine what in fact Martin meant by this statement, and it is equivocal at best.

In addition, and as previously discussed, the police interviewing Martin did not have an obligation to clarify this ambiguous assertion. As stated in Cuervo, “police in Florida need not ask clarifying questions if a defendant who has received proper Miranda warnings makes only an equivocal or ambiguous request to terminate an interrogation after having validly waived his Miranda rights.” 967 So.2d at 162 (quoting Owen, 696 So.2d at 719). We reaffirm that statement here.

Martin’s equivocal statement resulted in a non-assertion of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent — his statement was not legally sufficient to invoke his right after he previously 'waived it, nor did it place the detectives on notice that they must cease questioning. We conclude, therefore, that Martin’s right to remain silent was not violated and affirm the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress.

A Voluntary and Admissible Confession

Standard of Review

A confession is inadmissible if it is involuntary. See Brewer v. State, 386 So.2d 232, 235 (Fla.1980); Coffee v. State, 25 Fla. 501, 510, 6 So. 493 (1889). The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution “prohibits the states from using the coerced confession of an accused against him.” Brewer, 386 So.2d at 235 (citing Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286-87, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936)). The standard to determine voluntariness in state prosecutions is the same as that which “applies to federal prosecutions under the [F]ifth [A]mendment privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964)).

The test to determine whether a confession is voluntary — in other words, not coerced — is whether it was the product of free will and rational choice. See Blake v. State, 972 So.2d 839, 844 (Fla.2007) (noting that “the salient consideration” is whether the defendant’s free will was overcome). This is determined based on “an examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession.” Traylor, 596 So.2d at 964; see also Blake, 972 So.2d at 844; Brewer, 386 So.2d at 237. In assessing the totality of the circumstances, a court must consider any promises or misrepresentations made by the interrogating officers. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (noting that misrepresentation by law enforcement is a relevant consideration in the totality-of-the-eircum-stances assessment).

In the instant case, Martin contends that his confession was involuntary and should have been suppressed by the trial court because it was coerced by the interviewing detectives. Martin alleges that the detectives relied upon the following six coercive tactics to induce his confession: The police (1) threatened him with the spectre of death row; (2) deluded him as to what he could expect for himself and from a jury if he confessed; (3) deceived him as to the amount of time he had to cooperate with law enforcement; (4) promised their favorable testimony and use of their influence during his trial if he cooperated; (5) promised to arrange a visit for him with his girlfriend if he cooperated; and (6) exploited his religious beliefs by relying on a version of the “Christian burial” interrogation technique.

When considering the facts, relevant standard of review, and totality of the circumstances, we do not agree with Martin that the detectives coerced his confession. Nevertheless, some of the techniques the detectives employed walked the line that separates permissible from impermissible interview tactics, and we, as a result, note that this case presents the very outer limit as to what tactics law enforcement may employ when performing a custodial interrogation.

In our analysis, we address each of Martin’s six claims and then assess them given the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interview. “As has often been stated, a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress comes to the appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness, and the reviewing court must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.” Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 806 (Fla.2002). Applying this standard of review, we conclude that the detectives did not violate Martin’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent because they did not induce a coerced confession, and we uphold the denial of his motion to suppress.

Merits

Death Row, Fair Trials, and Testimonial Damnation

Martin first asserts that his confession was coerced because the interviewing detectives threatened him with the spectre of death row, implied that he would not receive a fair trial .unless he confessed, and threatened him with their testimonial damnation if he did not confess.

Martin relies on our opinion in Brewer, in which this Court upheld the trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress when the interrogating officers “raised the spectre of the electric chair,” in addition to employing a number of other coercive tactics, to elicit the defendant’s confession. See 386 So.2d at 235-36. That case, however, is factually dissimilar from the situation Martin confronted.

In Brewer, the interrogating officers told the defendant that they knew he had committed second-degree murder and, therefore, he should confess to the crime to avoid a first-degree murder charge. Id. at 233. Evidence at the crime scene linking the defendant to the homicide had already been found. This evidence included the defendant’s cap, shoe-track impressions matching the defendant’s shoes, and blood matching the victim’s found on the defendant’s boots. Id. Aware of this evidence, police officers arrested the defendant, advised him of his Miranda rights, and interrogated him. Id. The defendant thereafter made incriminating statements during the interrogation. Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress his incriminating statements. Id. After reviewing the recorded interrogation, the trial court concluded that the defendant’s statements were coerced and excluded them. Id. at 236.

This Court concluded that the trial court properly excluded the incriminating statements made by the defendant during his interrogation because the interrogating officers pressured the defendant by stating that, given the already available and incriminating evidence, the defendant had only two options — either the electric chair or time in prison. Id. at 234-35. During the Brewer interrogation, the detectives said, in relevant part:

FIRST VOICE: If you get convicted of first degree murder, now it’s the damn electric chair or life. Now that’s the way — that’s what it amounts to. But, if you [] know, if you committed second degree murder, it’s what? Five? What? Twenty? Twenty years to life and you’re eligible for parole at five or seven, see? That’s second degree. That’s what you did. I know that’s what you did. That’s what you did. Second degree murder. But, if we put all this evidence we got before a jury, you are liable to get convicted, of first degree murder. Look, we know you were ... in the area. We know you went to the restaurant. Your knife was found under that woman. Your knife, that’s been identified as your knife, it’s even got your name on it....

SECOND VOICE: Engraved on it.

FIRST VOICE: ... And I guarantee you when we go to court, if we go to a trial on this thing, buddy, they are going to find you guilty. I’ll swear they are. They will find you guilty and they will send you away for the rest of your life if they don’t put you in the electric chair. Where you go ahead and cooperate and tell us you’ve done this thing and tell us how you done it, tell us where that billfold is, tell us where the billfold is, we’ll help you out on this thing. We’ll get — you’ll get out of this thing on second degree murder. But we got you. We got you locked up in this thing. And that’s the truth ....

Id. at 233-35 (emphasis supplied).

Although Martin’s interview at times addressed the death penalty as a possible punishment, both the purpose of the interview and the context in which this topic was addressed contrast significantly from that which we held induced a coerced, and therefore inadmissible, confession in Brewer. The stated objective of the detectives interviewing Martin was to gain his trust to locate Jacey. At the time of the interview, all that law enforcement knew was that Martin likely had information regarding Jacey’s whereabouts because he was the last person known to have had contact with her. Although law enforcement may have been concerned that foul play was involved — the detectives who interviewed Martin were from the Sheriffs departments’ homicide division and Jacey’s whereabouts had been unknown for nine days when Martin’s interview occurred— nothing else indicates that the detectives suspected Martin was the culprit behind her disappearance, at least when the interview session began. The dialogue between Martin and the detectives, combined with their lack of knowledge regarding Jacey’s welfare, do not transform otherwise unobjectionable statements regarding possible punishments into a constitutionally impermissible interrogation.

In Walker v. State, this Court upheld the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress. 707 So.2d 300 (Fla.1997). In Walker, detectives had questioned the defendant for six hours, provided drinks “upon request,” and allowed him to use the restroom. Id. at 311. The detectives had also reminded the defendant that the death penalty was a potential punishment for murder, but did not threaten the defendant with the electric chair or promise him anything other than informing the prosecutor that the defendant had cooperated. Id. The trial court described the tactics used by interrogating detectives as techniques that “everyone knows about” and “have not been disapproved by the law in any way.” Id. On direct appeal, this Court held that the interrogation “simply [could not] be characterized as so coercive as to render [the] confession involuntary.” Id.

Martin directs attention to the following exchange as an example of the detectives’ reliance on the death penalty as a possible punishment to coerce his confession:

WOLCOTT: ... Okay, we need your help. Okay. This is a very serious situation that we are all right here. Okay, probably one of the biggest days of your life right now. Okay, you are not a bad person. Okay, you have had some minor shit. Man we have all had minor shit. I ain’t in here to judge you brother. But you are tired, I can tell you are tired. It’s been tough. Okay, I know I can see it in your eyes man. You are not a monster are you? Are you cold blooded?

MARTIN: No not at all.

WOLCOTT: You are a decent guy aren’t you?

MARTIN: I try.

WOLCOTT: You have just had some bad breaks. Right? Is that safe to say?

MARTIN: Yes sir.

WOLCOTT: You have had some bad breaks, okay. We need you to be honest with us and we need your help okay? Because I am telling you right now, [your girlfriend], as much as she loves you sitting over there, she ain’t, she is not going to back you up on something this big.

MARTIN: Oh, I know.

WOLCOTT: You know that right?

MARTIN: Unhuh.

WOLCOTT: And getting up in front of that jury of 12 people, we are going to parade a pretty little blond haired girl that ain’t never been in no trouble up there and s[i]t down and tell the story. Okay and then they are going to parade us and everyone we have talked to about everything else and then they are going to parade you up there. And like I said, I am not here to judge you. Okay, but let’s face it. Common sense tells you who are they probably going to believe? [Your girlfriend]?

MARTIN: Yea.

WOLCOTT: The girl that hasn’t ever been in trouble. Don’t do this. She is not going to protect you. You have you, okay. There is an out. I mean there is a light at the end of this tunnel. Things happen for a reason. Okay, he and I go out and if he and I go out to a bar one night and a fight happens, okay, I am going to defend myself man. I am not going to let someone hit me, but in the meantime while I am hitting him back, my intent might not be to hurt him bad.

MARTIN: Unhuh.

WOLCOTT: Or potentially even kill him. That might not be my intent. Things might have just went wrong.

MARTIN: Unhuh.

WOLCOTT: People can understand that. People can all relate to that. People have all been in that situation. The situation people can’t relate with is why something is done for no reason. Okay. You need to help yourself. You need to help her family. We need to get some answers, okay. It’s that simple. Okay there is a lot of stuff that’s mounting against you. You said so yourself, the picture doesn’t look that good.

MARTIN: Oh, I know.

WOLCOTT: Okay. The best thing that David can do for David is to help us find [Jaeey]. Okay.

MARTIN: Uhhuh.

WOLCOTT: Because you look like a monster if you don’t. You really do. And you know where monsters go. Monsters go to prison, monsters go to death row. Monsters never see the light of day again ....

MARTIN: Right.

WOLCOTT: You have had some bad breaks. Where do we need to go find her?

MARTIN: I have no idea. I mean I don’t know.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Similar to the Walker interview, the interview here did not occur in an unduly oppressive environment. The interview lasted approximately three-and-a-half hours. It included a bathroom break and inquiries regarding Martin’s welfare. The detectives’ comments regarding the death penalty, and the realities of trial, were not made to incite fear in Martin, but were part of a larger conversation regarding possible penalties Martin could face in the absence of further explanation from him with regard to what happened the last time he and Jacey were together. See United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467, 1475 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that a government officer “who informs the defendant of realistically expected penalties for cooperation and/or non-cooperation does not offer an illegal inducement”).

The detectives’ statements are best interpreted as representations to Martin that Jacey’s disappearance may have been the consequence of an accident rather than some preconceived, evil plan. Given that Martin’s account of the night he spent with Jacey evolved over the course of the interview, it is not surprising that the detectives continued to press Martin for an explanation while simultaneously addressing the implications of Martin providing false or deceptive testimony. Doing so, however, does not automatically transform into a conclusion that the detectives coerced Martin into confessing.

Martin also alleges that the detectives implied he would not receive a fair trial if he did not provide them with the information they sought and threatened him with their testimonial damnation. Martin cites the following exchange in support of his allegation that he would not receive a fair trial:

WOLCOTT: And getting up in front of that jury of 12 people, we are going to parade a pretty little blond haired girl that ain’t never been in no trouble up there and s[i]t down and tell the story. Okay and then they are going to parade us and everyone we have talked to about everything else and then they are going to parade you up there. And like I said, I am not here to judge you. Okay, but let's face it. Common sense tells you who are they probably going to believe? [Your girlfriend]?

(Emphasis supplied.)

Shortly thereafter, the following colloquy took place between Detective Wolcott and Martin. Martin alleges that this exchange also supports his allegation that the detectives threatened him with their testimonial damnation:

MARTIN: I didn’t do nothing to her. I did not lay a hair on her.

WOLCOTT: David.

MARTIN: Yes.

WOLCOTT: Why are you putting yourself in this position? Why?

MARTIN: In what position?

WOLCOTT: The one you are sitting in right now. You can’t tell me some of the truth, okay and then lead us to believe everything that’s being said. You just can’t.

MARTIN: You are right. I already tried that and it didn’t work.

WOLCOTT: You see.

MARTIN: You got stuff out of me. Huh?

WOLCOTT: Who do you think Ifsic] going to believe? You know whose those people are right?

MARTIN: Right.

WOLCOTT: That’s the jury.

MARTIN: Unhuh.

WOLCOTT: You go in there and tell them what you are telling me right now and they aren’t going to believe you.

MARTIN: I know. I already know. And. That’s why it is so, that’s why I am so worried about it.

WOLCOTT: I know you are worried about it. It’s bothering you and we can see that.... We understand that you are scared okay.... Give me the opportunity to go do what’s right. You need to do what’s right David. Let me go do what’s right. I need to leave here now and go do what’s right.... Let me go tell those people that David did what was right. That David got into a situation that he couldn’t control. That David didn’t mean to do what happened. David told me where she was at. David told me he was sorry for what happened. He didn’t mean for this to happen. It wasn’t planned. It just happened. Let me go get her and take her home. Do what is right David.

MARTIN: You don’t understand.... David doesn’t know where she’s at.

WOLCOTT: David, you are the last one that was with her.

MARTIN: [TJhat’s the last place I seen the girl. Right there.

WOLCOTT: [T]hat girl would have walked up to that house, knocked on the front door and said call the police. She did not do that. She would have done that. It has been 9 days David. She didn’t do that. Okay. What are these people going to believe now when I walk in and say this is what we have[?]

MARTIN: Right.

WOLCOTT: I mean we already know what happened, but he is not remorseful for it. He doesn’t care because he won’t tell us anything. What do you think they are going to look at you as? They are going to look at you as the monster that you are not.

Later, Detective Wolcott made the following statements:

WOLCOTT: And it’s going to be dark soon. And we still want to call this mother back. You don’t know how bad both of us want to call this mother right now, back on the phone and tell her it’s over.... She’s not dumb. [Jacey] doesn’t miss work. Mom knows. She has told us she knows. She just wants her back so that she can do the right thing by her, which makes you the better person because you allowed her to do that. You are not going to be viewed upon as the monster. But once I leave you are the monster. And that’s what everybody is going to look at and I am not going to be able to say, yes, you know he helped me. I am going to say, no he didn’t. And you are going to be sitting there and you are going to hear me say it and I am not going to lie. And those other people are going to listen to it and you are going to be the monster, but I don’t think that’s really what happened. I mean I think she got hurt, I can understand. You didn’t go there to do that. All you wanted was a car. You wanted a car to get to your fiancé[e]. And unfortunately in the process of getting that car, it went bad. Something that at that point you couldn’t control. Which doesn’t put you at the top of the tree. It puts you at the bottom like he was explaining to you. So you are going to have to make a decision. Are you going to be the monster or are you going to tell me how I can take her home?

So whether or not you want to trust me and I hope that you would.... I understand because of the job that I have. Whether or not you want to trust me, that’s fine. Okay, I am not the one that makes the decision about what happens with the rest of your life. The guy in the robe up there is the one that’s going to make the decision about what happens the rest of your life. Okay, the attorney isn’t going to be the one. It’s going to be these people right here.... Okay, they are just folks. They have hearts. They make mistakes. Okay, forgiveness. Repenting. What they are not going to accept is being lied to. Just like you and me.

You’ve got everyday people, everyday people that are going to decide what happens from here on out and my partner and I are going to have to get up there and tell them. Okay, what are we going to have to tell them? We are going to have to say, you know what David, you did the right thing, you did the right thing folks. It’s a shame it happened, it was a mistake. But he did the right thing. And her mom is going to get up there and have an opportunity to speak to them ... I know her being a woman of religion, she’s going to have forgiveness.... Do you want these folks back here to hear out of us that David is cold-blooded and he meant this to happen? That this is how he wanted it to be, that he said you know what. I know her mom is upset but screw her. Give me what I get. You are definitely going to be in a bad position. There is no doubt about it.

(Emphasis supplied.)

In evaluating whether the techniques employed by law enforcement crossed the line into coercive conduct, we again turn to the interrogation in Brewer, in which this Court held that the defendant’s confession was inadmissible because the detectives engaged in “actual threats, promises of leniency, and [made] statements calculated to delude the appellant as to his true position.” 386 So.2d at 237.

FIRST VOICE: ... [H]ow is a jury going [to see this situation], you think of 12 people that don’t know a damn thing about the law sitting back there listening to this, see? They don’t know as much about the law as me or Aired or maybe not as much as you; but, they are sitting there listening. All right. Here — here he was. His knife was under the woman. We’ve got your boots that’s got blood all over them. All over them. Even where they were polished. We are going to present that to the jury. We are going to let them look at it.... SECOND VOICE: Yes, sir.

FIRST VOICE: You were wearing them that night, weren’t you?

SECOND VOICE: Yes, sir.

FIRST VOICE: And why did you lie to us and tell us that you had them others on? It ain’t going to do you any good to lie, Pat. If you done it, tell us, and tell us right now, and we’ll help you out on this thing. They are going to come to us and they are going to say, “Did you cooperate?” We are going to say, “yes, he did. He’s sorry for what he done. We believe he can be rehabilitated.” That’s what we will tell the parole people when the (sic) come to us. If you hang back and try to lie to us, we are going to say, “yes, he lied to us. He hasn’t admitted it. We had to go to a jury trial. The jury found him guilty. They sent him away for life.” And that’s the way it will be. You will be there the rest of your damn life. Hell, tell us about it. We put a guy in jail, just like you, just about the same age, for the same thing not one month ago. Now, he was on drugs too. Hell, you’re sorry for what you’ve done. I know you are. Tell us about it. Get it off your conscience. We’ll help you out. I’m serious. Won’t we, Aired? I tell you, a damn jury is going to convict you, Pat. We got all kinds of evidence on you. Even if what you told us is true, a jury will still convict you of first degree murder. You’ve got 12 people sitting back there and they’ve read about all this stuff in the papers and, man, these people will just string you by the nape of your neck right now if they get their hands on you. Hell, we know you done it. You know you done it. We can prove it in court. Admit it. Say you’re sorry. Try and get off light. That’s your only recourse.

Brewer, 386 So.2d at 234-35 (emphasis supplied).

To advise a suspect of potential penalties and consequences does not amount to a threat. See Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d at 1475. In a similar manner, encouraging a suspect to cooperate with law enforcement is not coercive conduct. See Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So.2d 495, 512 (Fla.2005) (holding that parole officer’s advisement to defendant to cooperate did not vitiate the voluntariness of his statements). It is recognized that advising a suspect that he should expect a conviction of murder because a jury will not believe him despite the evidence presented is a threatening and coercive tactic that is totally improper under our Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. This is the kind of dialogue the defendant in Brewer confronted and is unlike that which Martin faced during his interview. We conclude that the statements the detectives made during Martin’s interview did not place the type of pressure upon Martin that would be deemed coercive and render his confession inadmissible.

In Martin’s case, when the detectives’ statements are evaluated in context, they reveal that the detectives thought that the jury would not believe Martin’s story about what had occurred the last time he was with Jacey. Detective Wolcott’s statements indicate that he believed Martin could be charged with premeditated murder if he did not provide a reasonable explanation as to what had transpired between Martin and Jacey on the day he stole her ear. The Brewer officers, in contrast, told the suspect that if he did not confess to the crime, he would not receive a fair trial because a jury would find him guilty no matter the evidence presented, or what he claimed had occurred. 386 So.2d at 235.

Moreover, to conclude that the statements the interviewing detectives made induced a coerced confession would seriously undercut law enforcement’s ability to elicit admissions in the pursuit of the public welfare, to assist victims of crimes, and to investigate disappearances. Certainly, to some extent, “any custodial interrogation involves some informal compulsion,” but that is why Miranda warnings, which undeniably were given in this case, are a nonnegotiable element of a voluntary confession during custodial interrogation. See Bowen v. State, 565 So.2d 384, 387 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Given the totality of the circumstances — the detectives’ lack of knowledge regarding Martin’s role in Ja-cey’s disappearance, the nature of the statements made regarding the death penalty, and the physical environment in which the interview was conducted — we conclude that the detectives’ comments at issue did not incite fear in Martin to the extent that his resulting confession was a product of improper police coercion.

Delusion

Martin next alleges that the detectives coerced his confession by making him believe that the situation he faced was not very serious while also implying that he would not receive a fair trial unless he confessed to the crime. Martin contends that the detectives’ statements to this effect deluded him as to his true position, and thus procured his involuntary, and therefore invalid, confession. Martin points to his first exchange with the detectives that we addressed when we discussed the detectives’ comments regardin