Full opinion text
PER CURIAM. Harrel Franklin Braddy appeals his first-degree murder conviction and sentence of death for the killing of Quatisha Maycock, as well as his convictions and sentences for related offenses. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm Bradd/s convictions and sentences. I. BACKGROUND The evidence presented at Braddy’s trial revealed the following facts. Shandelle Maycock, mother to then five-year-old Quatisha, testified that she first met Brad-dy and his wife Cyteria through a mutual friend from church. Shortly after their initial meeting, Braddy began showing up at Shandelle’s home alone, unannounced, and uninvited, staying for short periods of time with no apparent purpose. Shandelle testified that she initially thought of Brad-dy as a “nice person” and would occasionally ask him for small favors. Braddy once inappropriately placed his hand between Shandelle’s legs, but when Shandelle became angry and threatened Braddy with a knife, Braddy left her apartment and later apologized for his actions. Shandelle testified that Braddy never again made a sexual advance toward her. On Friday, November 6, 1998, Braddy picked Shandelle up from work and drove her home. After Braddy left Shandelle’s apartment at approximately 5:30 p.m., Shandelle began to call around looking for a ride to pick up Quatisha, who was being watched by a family member. Shandelle had not found a ride by approximately 10 p.m., at which time Braddy returned to her apartment in a gold Lincoln Town Car that he had rented earlier in the day. Braddy told Shandelle that they needed to talk but agreed to first drive Shandelle to pick up Quatisha. After picking up Quatisha and returning to Shandelle’s apartment, Brad-dy again stated that he needed to talk to Shandelle. Shandelle agreed, but before Braddy could talk to Shandelle, the phone rang. Shandelle answered the phone, had a brief conversation, and, after hanging up, told Braddy that he needed to leave because she was expecting company. Shan-delle testified that this statement had been a lie — she had not been expecting company but simply wanted Braddy to leave because it was late and she was tired. Upon being told to leave, Braddy immediately attacked Shandelle, threatening to kill her and choking her until she lost consciousness. Shandelle testified that when she regained consciousness, she was still in her apartment but Braddy again choked her until she passed out. Shandelle’s landlord, who occupied the house to which Shandelle’s apartment was attached, testified that he heard shouting coming from Shandelle’s apartment shortly before midnight. When he looked outside a short time later, the landlord saw Brad-dy standing at the driver-side door of the Town Car and Quatisha standing by the passenger-side door. He did not see Shandelle. Shandelle testified that when she awoke for the second time, she was in the back seat of a large car parked in her driveway. Quatisha was in the front passenger seat, and Braddy was in the driver’s seat. As Braddy began to drive, Shandelle told Quatisha that they were going to jump out of the car. Braddy warned Shandelle not to jump, but Shandelle nevertheless pulled Quatisha into the backseat and opened the door. When Braddy saw that they were about to jump, he accelerated and turned a corner, causing Shandelle and Quatisha to fall out of the car. Braddy stopped the car, helped Quatisha back into the car, and put Shandelle in the trunk. Shandelle testified that she remained in the trunk for thirty to forty-five minutes while Braddy continued to drive, after which time the car stopped and Brad-dy opened the trunk. Braddy pulled Shandelle out of the trunk, threw her to the ground, and again choked her until she lost consciousness, all the while threatening to kill her and accusing her of using him. When Shandelle woke up, it was daylight and she was lying in a remote area surrounded by foliage. Shandelle walked to the road and flagged down passing motorists, who called the police. Between 1:30 and 2:30 a.m. on Saturday, November 7, Braddy returned home in the Town Car. Cyteria testified that she was awakened when Braddy came home and, when she went to the door to meet him, saw Braddy wiping down the interior of the Town Car with a cloth. Cyteria also testified that the washing machine was running and that when she looked inside the machine, she saw the clothes Braddy had been wearing earlier that night. On November 7, police spoke to Shan-delle at Glades Hospital, where she had been taken for treatment after being found on the side of the road that morning. Shandelle gave police her statement, along with the names and descriptions of Braddy and Quatisha. Detectives Giancarlo Milito and Juan Murías went to Braddy’s home to determine Quatisha’s whereabouts. Shortly after the detectives arrived at Braddy’s house, they observed him exit the house and drive away in the Town Car. The detectives followed Braddy to a gas station and approached him as he was pumping gas. When the detectives first asked Braddy about Quatisha, Braddy appeared calm and denied any knowledge of the situation. However, when the detectives informed Braddy that Shandelle was alive and had implicated him in Quatisha’s disappearance, Braddy turned pale, began to sweat, shake, and cry, and claimed to feel faint. Detective Milito testified that at this point, although Braddy was not under arrest, he placed Braddy in handcuffs for everyone’s safety because of “the history that I had of him.” The detectives took Braddy to the Miami-Dade County Police Department and sent the Town Car to be processed. Detectives Otis Chambers and Fernando Suco began to question Braddy at approximately 9 p.m. on Saturday, November 7. When the detectives asked Braddy if he would consent to giving DNA samples, Braddy stated that he knew his rights and •wished to be read his rights. Detective Suco, the lead investigator in the case, explained Braddy’s rights to him pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), through the use of a standard Miranda form, which Braddy signed and initialed appropriately. After Braddy indicated that he understood and waived his rights, Detective Suco obtained Braddy’s consent to take specimens for DNA samples and to search Braddy’s home and the Town Car. However, because Braddy hesitated before signing the last consent form, Suco also obtained search warrants for Braddy’s house and the Town Car. Pursuant to both Braddy’s consent to search and the search warrant, police searched the Town Car on Sunday, November 8. After being only partially processed, however, the Town Car was mistakenly released back to the rental agency, where it remained for approximately a day. Police were able to recover the Town Car before it had been cleaned by the rental agency, and pursuant to a second search warrant signed on November 10, investigators removed the trunk liner for DNA testing. Shandelle’s blood was found on the liner. Meanwhile, Braddy’s interview continued early into the morning of November 8. Although Braddy spoke to the detectives— becoming visibly agitated when talking about Shandelle — he divulged no information about Quatisha’s whereabouts. Feeling that they were not making any progress, the detectives took a break from the interview just before midnight on November 7. During the break, Detective Suco prepared Braddy’s arrest form and conferred with other detectives who were gathering information on the case. Having determined that Braddy was lying to them, based on information received from other detectives, the detectives reinitiated the interview at approximately 1:15 a.m. on November 8 and confronted Braddy about lying. Braddy responded by saying, “I can’t tell you. Even if I’m found innocent, my family will not talk to me again.” The detectives continued to question Braddy, but although there was some interaction, Braddy refused to answer questions about Quatisha and mostly “just sat there or ... would put his head down.” At approximately 3 a.m. on November 8, Braddy asked to talk to Detective Chambers alone. The detectives complied, but after fifteen to twenty minutes of useless conversation, Detective Chambers brought Detective Suco back into the room. Shortly thereafter, both detectives escorted Braddy to the bathroom, which he had asked to use. While walking through the homicide office to and from the bathroom, Braddy appeared to be “looking around” and “seeing where he was at.” After returning from the bathroom, the detectives again left Braddy in the interview room while the detectives compared information with other investigators. The detectives resumed the interview at approximately 3:55 a.m. and again confronted Braddy with evidence that contradicted what Braddy had been telling them. For the next two hours, Braddy responded to questions but refused to talk about Quatisha’s whereabouts. At around 6:15 a.m. on November 8, in an attempt to evoke an emotional response and elicit information, the detectives lied and told Braddy that his mother had suffered a heart attack. Although Braddy became visibly upset at this information, he did not divulge any information about Quatisha. Finally, at around 8 a.m. on November 8, Braddy told the detectives that he had left Quatisha in the same area where he had left Shandelle. Braddy then stated that he was tired of talking to the detectives and said that if they did not believe his story, they could take him to jail. At this point, the detectives stopped the interview, relayed Braddy’s confession to their supervisor, and went to breakfast. The detectives returned to the interview room at approximately 11:30 a.m. with breakfast for Braddy. When Detective Suco walked into the interview room, Braddy was standing on a chair in the corner of the room with his shoes off. Braddy immediately jumped to the ground and, before Detective Suco could speak, said “I’ll take you to where I left her.” The detectives drove Braddy north from Miami-Dade County on U.S. Highway 27, through Broward County and into Palm Beach County, to the site where Shandelle had been found, a scene which was already teeming with authorities. At Braddy’s direction, the detectives drove along the dirt roads and through the fields off the highway for approximately three hours, with other detectives following, but found no trace of Quatisha. At approximately 2:30 p.m., after detectives had been led on a vain search by Braddy for several hours, Detective Greg Smith physically pulled Braddy out of the car and pinned Braddy against the side of the car by placing his forearm across Braddy’s throat. Detective Smith held Braddy in this position for approximately fifteen seconds, demanding to know where Braddy had left Quatisha. Braddy gave no response — either verbal or physical — to Detective Smith’s use of force and emotional plea. Having received no information despite his use of force, Detective Smith, along with Braddy and several other detectives, resumed the search for Quatisha on foot. During the foot search, Detective Smith engaged Braddy in a general conversation regarding his family and hobbies. At one point, Braddy asked Detective Smith how long it would take a body in the water to surface, speculating that although he had left Quatisha alive, she might have fallen into the water after he left her. At approximately 4 p.m. on November 8, Braddy admitted to Detective Pat Diaz that Quatisha was in fact at a different location. Braddy then directed several detectives to a section of Interstate 75 in Broward County known as Alligator Alley. Once at Alligator Alley, Braddy told detectives that he had left Quatisha alive on the side of the road at a bridge crossing over a canal. Braddy directed detectives to three such bridges — at highway mile markers 28, 30, and 33 — but could not be sure at which bridge he had left Quatisha. Brad-dy gave different reasons for having left Quatisha on the side of the road in the Everglades in the middle of the night, including that he did so because he was angry with Shandelle and because he was worried that Quatisha would tell people what he had done to Shandelle. Braddy also admitted that when he left Quatisha, he “knew she would probably die” and that when she had not been found by Sunday evening, she was probably dead. After searching until dark on November 8 and finding no trace of Quatisha, detectives escorted Braddy back to the Miami-Dade County Police Department. Detectives took Braddy back to the interview room where he had originally been kept— a room that had not been touched since Braddy occupied it earlier in the day. Upon entering the room, detectives noticed that a metal ceiling grate in the corner of the room — directly above the chair on which Braddy had been standing earlier in the day — had been forcibly bent up on both ends. Braddy was taken to a different interview room and again questioned by detectives, but Braddy never admitted to killing Quatisha. On the morning of Monday, November 9, two fishermen found the body of a child floating in a canal running parallel to Alligator Alley, around highway mile marker 34. The body was recovered, taken to the Broward County Medical Examiner’s office, and identified as that of Quatisha Maycock. Dr. Joshua Perper, the Chief Medical Examiner for Broward County, was called to the scene where Quatisha’s body was found. He examined the body initially when it was brought out of the canal and later performed an autopsy. Dr. Perper testified that Quatisha’s left arm, which was missing when her body was discovered, had been bitten off by an alligator after Quatisha had died. Dr. Perper also testified that Quatisha had suffered “brush burn” injuries while she was alive, consistent with her having grazed against a hard, flat surface, such as falling out of a car and sliding on the road. Additionally, Dr. Perper testified that Quatisha had suffered alligator bites to her torso and head while she was still alive, although he concluded that she was probably not conscious at the time she was bitten. Quatisha had also suffered several injuries after she had died or while she was very close to death, including more “brush burns” and alligator bites, as well as injuries to her lips consistent with fish feeding on her corpse. Dr. Perper concluded that Quatisha’s death was primarily caused by blunt force trauma to the left side of her head, consistent with her either having fallen from a great distance or having been thrown onto a prominent, protruding object, such as the jutting rocks along the canal where her body was discovered. At the conclusion of the guilt phase of Braddy’s trial, the jury found Braddy guilty of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, two counts of kidnapping, burglary of a structure with an assault or battery therein, child neglect causing great bodily harm, and attempted escape. At the penalty phase of trial, the State introduced victim impact evidence through statements from three relatives or close friends of the victim, including Shandelle, who testified that among other things, she had contracted Crohn’s disease as a result of Quatisha’s murder. Additionally, the State presented the following evidence of Braddy’s prior criminal history. The State introduced the judgment and sentence from Braddy’s attempted first-degree murder, robbery, and kidnapping of Corrections Officer Jose Bermudez, as well as of Braddy’s ensuing escape. Ber-mudez testified that on September 14, 1984, he had been escorting Braddy from the courthouse to the jail after Braddy had been denied bond at a bond hearing. Braddy attacked Bermudez in a stairwell, knocking Bermudez to the ground and choking him until Bermudez lost consciousness. When he awoke a short time later, Braddy again choked him to unconsciousness. Bermudez woke up on the floor of a holding cell wearing only his socks and underwear, with Braddy’s handcuffs on the floor nearby. Braddy was nowhere to be found. On September 25, 1984, while a fugitive from police, Braddy broke into the home of Joseph and Lorraine Cole, an elderly couple in Hollywood, Florida. Braddy hid in a closet but was later discovered by the couple and exited the closet with a gun drawn. Braddy ordered both victims into a bedroom and ordered them to lie on the bed. Braddy told Lorraine that she would have to drive him out of the area in the couple’s car in order to help him through blockades. While Braddy walked Lorraine to the garage, Joseph climbed through a window and ran to a neighbor’s house to call the police. When Braddy saw that Joseph had escaped, he apparently changed his mind about taking Lorraine with him. He stole the Coles’ 1984 Ford station wagon and fled alone. Braddy’s fingerprint was found inside the Coles’ house, and both of the Coles positively identified Braddy in a photo lineup. Because the Coles could not be located to testify at Braddy’s penalty phase, the State introduced evidence of the details of Braddy’s crimes against the Coles by having Detective Suco read the arrest affidavit from that case. The State also introduced the arrest affidavit and plea colloquy into evidence. The State further introduced Braddy’s prior criminal history through the testimony of Griffin Davis. Davis testified that on the night of October 5,1984, he had exited a building to retrieve something from his car when Braddy approached him at gunpoint. Braddy forced Davis into Davis’s car, and the two drove onto U.S. Highway 27, with Braddy driving while keeping a gun trained on Davis. When both an oncoming car and a car behind Braddy flashed their lights, Davis capitalized on the distraction and jumped out of the car. Davis hid in a canal beside the road, while Braddy turned around and made three or four passes of the area with his gun hanging out of the window. Eventually, Brad-dy drove off and Davis made his way to police. The State introduced the judgment and sentence from Braddy’s burglary, robbery, and kidnapping of Davis. For mitigation evidence, the defense presented expert testimony regarding Braddy’s ability to adjust to life in prison. Additionally, the defense presented testimony from Braddy’s family and a close friend to establish that Braddy was a good husband and father and that his death would be hard on the family. Braddy’s father testified that out of his six sons, Braddy was the only one who gave him trouble but that he loved Braddy nonetheless. Cyteria testified that despite Brad-dy’s shortcomings, she still considered him a good husband and father. She denied having knowledge of any extramarital affairs in which Braddy might have been involved. All of Braddy’s family members testified that his death would be hard on them individually. On August 31, 2007, the jury recommended, by a vote of eleven to one, that Braddy be sentenced to death for Quati-sha’s murder. After conducting a hearing pursuant to Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688 (Fla.1993), the trial court sentenced Brad-dy to death. State v. Braddy, No. 98-37767 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. order filed Oct. 15, 2007) (Sentencing Order). In sentencing Braddy to death, the trial court found and gave great weight to the following five aggravating factors: (1) the victim of the capital felony was a person less than twelve years of age; (2) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a felony crime, to wit: kidnapping; (3) the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody; (4) the capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP); and (5) the defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to another person. The trial court also considered but gave no weight to the fact that the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC). Braddy waived all mitigating factors, with the exception of the catch-all “[a]ny other factors in the defendant’s background that would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty” (nonstatutory mitigation). § 921.141(6)(h), Fla. Stat. (1997). In his sentencing memorandum, Braddy listed sixty-seven items of nonstat-utory mitigation, which the trial court grouped by topic into nine categories of nonstatutory mitigation. The trial court evaluated and considered each item in each grouping and the grouping itself in determining what weight to accord them, ultimately giving little or moderate weight to eight of the categories: (1) Braddy had adjusted well to prolonged confinement in his previous incarcerations and might possibly be rehabilitated — little weight; (2) the sentence of life imprisonment was available to the court — little weight; (3) Braddy conducted himself in an appropriate manner at trial — moderate weight; (4) the friends in Braddy’s life considered him to be of value — little weight; (5) Braddy’s wife and children supported him unconditionally — moderate weight; (6) Braddy’s execution would presumably have an extreme impact on his family and friends— little weight; (7) Braddy’s parents and siblings considered him to be an important member of the family and believed that his life could be of value to other members of the family — little weight; and (8) Braddy attended church and professed dedication to Christian principles and beliefs — little weight. The trial court also considered but gave no weight to the fact that Braddy did not sexually molest Quatisha. Ultimately, the trial court determined that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and gave great weight to the jury’s recommendation of death. For the other counts of which Braddy was convicted, the trial court sentenced Braddy to three life sentences and fifty years in state prison, with the sentences to run consecutive to each other and to the death sentence. In this appeal, Braddy challenges several aspects of both his guilt and penalty phase trials. Braddy argues that (A) the trial court erred in denying Braddy’s motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney; (B) the trial court erred in failing to timely rule on and ultimately denying Braddy’s motions to disqualify the trial judge; (C) the State failed to establish the venue alleged in the indictment for the charges of murder and attempted murder; (D) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the second search warrant for the Town Car and the accompanying affidavit; (E) the trial court erred in denying Braddy’s motion for mistrial based on Detective Milito’s prejudicial testimony regarding Braddy’s prior criminal history; (F) the trial court erred in allowing the State to engage in improper argument during its guilt phase closing argument; (G) the evidence is legally insufficient to support Braddy’s convictions for burglary, child neglect, and attempted escape; (H) the trial court erred in allowing the State to engage in improper argument during its penalty phase closing argument; (I) the trial court erred in requiring Braddy to argue all nonstatutory mitigation as a single mitigating factor; (J) the trial court erred in allowing the State to present victim impact evidence that Shandelle had contracted Crohn’s disease as a result of the murder; (K) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce impermissible hearsay evidence to prove Braddy’s prior felony convictions; (L) the trial court erred in sentencing Braddy to death because Florida’s capital sentencing proceedings are unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); and (M) the cumulative effect of the above errors deprived Braddy of due process and a reliable sentencing proceeding. In addition to considering Braddy’s arguments on appeal, we review the record to confirm (N) that sufficient evidence supports Braddy’s conviction for first-degree murder and (0) the proportionality of the imposition of the death penalty. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.142(a)(5). II. ANALYSIS A. Motion to Suppress Braddy filed a motion on June 4, 2007, asking the trial court to suppress, inter alia, all statements that Braddy made to police on November 7 and 8, 1998, as well as “all post arrest/custody observations of the Defendant by all police officers participating in the investigation of the case on November 7th and 8th, 1998, the Defendant’s identity, and all tangible evidence unlawfully seized from the Defendant.” At a hearing on June 18, 2007, the trial court denied Braddy’s motion to suppress, determining that the information which Braddy sought to suppress was legally obtained. Braddy now argues that (1) the form used by detectives to advise Braddy of his Miranda rights failed to inform Braddy that he had the right to consult with counsel before his interrogation; (2) the police failed to scrupulously honor Braddy’s right to remain silent; and (3) the police resorted to physical force in order to elicit incriminating statements from Braddy. The trial court’s ruling on Braddy’s motion to suppress comes before us “clothed with the presumption of correctness,” such that we “interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustain the trial court’s ruling.” McNamara v. State, 357 So.2d 410, 412 (Fla.1978). Thus, we “accord a presumption of correctness to the trial court’s rulings on motions to suppress with regard to the trial court’s determination of historical facts” and will only reverse the trial court’s factual findings if such findings are not supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record. Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598, 608 (Fla.2001). However, we “independently review mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately determine constitutional issues arising in the context of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment[s] and, by extension, article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution.” Id. Having determined that the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record, we treat such findings as correct when reviewing Braddy’s claims. We find no merit in Braddy’s claims and therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of Braddy’s motion to suppress. 1. Miranda Form The Metro-Dade Police Department’s Miranda warning form states, in relevant part: 3. If you want a lawyer to be present during questioning, at this time or anytime hereafter, you are entitled to have the lawyer present. Do you understand that right? Braddy initialed that he understood this right and signed the bottom of the form, indicating that he had been neither coerced nor induced to sign the form. We have previously upheld this specific form as sufficient. Chavez v. State, 832 So.2d 730, 750 (Fla.2002) (citing Cooper v. State, 739 So.2d 82, 84 n. 8 (Fla.1999) (approving the warning on the Metro-Dade Miranda form that states, “[i]f you want a lawyer to be present during questioning, at this time or any time thereafter, you are entitled to have a lawyer present”)); see also Johnson v. State, 750 So.2d 22, 25 (Fla.1999). Braddy argues, however, that we should reconsider these opinions in light of our more recent opinion in State v. Powell, 998 So.2d 531 (Fla.2008), rev’d on other grounds, 559 U.S. 50, 130 S.Ct. 1195, 175 L.Ed.2d 1009 (2010) (Powell I). In Powell I, we held that Miranda warnings advising a defendant of both his right to consult counsel “before any questioning” and his right to invoke any of his rights at any time during the interview were insufficient to inform the defendant of his right to have a lawyer present during questioning. 998 So.2d at 540. The Supreme Court disagreed. Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 130 S.Ct. 1195, 1198, 175 L.Ed.2d 1009 (2010) (.Powell II) (holding that the two separate warnings “reasonably conveyed the right to have an attorney present, not only at the outset of interrogation, but at all times”). Thus, not only was our decision in Powell I overruled by the Supreme Court, but the Miranda warnings in that case are distinguishable from those in the Metro-Dade Miranda form which we have expressly upheld in the past and again uphold today. Brad-dy’s claim therefore fails. 2. Invocation of Right to Remain Silent Braddy next claims that police failed to scrupulously honor his right to remain silent. It is well established that where a defendant has received proper Miranda warnings and waived his Miranda rights, he must make an unequivocal or unambiguous request to terminate an interrogation in order to reassert those rights. State v. Owen, 696 So.2d 715, 719 (Fla.1997) (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994)). If a defendant’s attempt to revoke his waiver is ambiguous or equivocal, police are not required to either cease questioning or to clarify whether the defendant’s statement was in fact a reassertion of his Miranda rights. Id. A revocation “is unambiguous if a reasonable police officer under the circumstances would understand that the suspect is invoking the right.” Womack v. State, 42 So.3d 878, 883 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). When determining whether a revocation is unambiguous, we consider “whether the response refers to specific questions about the crime or about the underlying right to cut off all questioning.” Id. (citing Cuervo v. State, 967 So.2d 155, 163 (Fla.2007)). For example, a defendant who, at the outset of his custodial interrogation, stated “[n]o quiero declarar nada” — which was then translated to his interrogator as “[h]e does not wish to talk with us” — had unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent. Cuervo, 967 So.2d at 162. Conversely, a defendant who validly waived his Miranda rights but later responded to a question by saying “[m]an, I don’t really want to talk about that,” did not unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent. Bailey v. State, 31 So.3d 809, 811 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). Likewise, a defendant who, when asked whether he had specifically targeted the victim’s house, responded “I’d rather not talk about it,” and later responded to another question with “I don’t want to talk about it,” did not unequivocally invoke his Miranda rights. Owen, 696 So.2d at 717 n. 4 (Fla.1997). Because it was “unclear whether [the defendant] was referring to the immediate topic of discussion ... or to the underlying right to cut off questioning,” the statements were ambiguous and police were not required to clarify the defendant’s intent. Almeida v. State, 737 So.2d 520, 523 (Fla.1999) (citing Owen, 696 So.2d at 719). Here, the statements which Braddy alleges amount to unequivocal invocations of his Miranda rights are similar to the statements at issue in Bailey and Owen. When confronted by Detective Suco with the fact that Shandelle’s landlord had seen Braddy and Quatisha next to the Town Car on the night Quatisha went missing, Braddy responded “I can’t tell you. Even if I’m found innocent, my family will not talk to me again.” Not only was Braddy’s statement made in direct response to Detective Suco’s specific question regarding the landlord, but Braddy’s statement evinces a hesitancy to talk because of what his family might think of him rather than an invocation of his fundamental right to remain silent. Nor was Braddy’s ensuing silence an unequivocal invocation of his Miranda rights. Braddy cites Pierre v. State, 22 So.3d 759, 766 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), for the proposition that silence can amount to an unequivocal invocation of the right to remain silent. Pierre, however, involved an unequivocal invocation—“I’m not saying anymore”—followed by silence. Id. at 766. Here, no such unambiguous statement was made. Later, when speaking to Detective Chambers alone, Braddy indicated that he did not want to answer Detective Chambers’ questions because he did not want to incriminate himself. It is unclear based on this statement whether Braddy “was referring to the immediate topic of discussion ... or to the underlying right to cut off questioning.” See Almeida, 737 So.2d at 523 (Fla.1999) (citing Owen, 696 So.2d at 717). Because Braddy’s statement was ambiguous, Detective Chambers was not required to clarify whether Braddy was actually invoking his right to remain silent. See Owen, 696 So.2d at 719. Moreover, shortly after Detective Suco reentered the interview room, Braddy again asked to speak to Detective Chambers alone. Braddy’s multiple requests to speak to one detective but not the other belie his claim that he did not wish to speak to detectives at all. Finally, after falsely informing Detectives Suco and Chambers that he had left Quatisha alive in the same area where he had left Shandelle, Braddy told the detectives that he was tired of talking and that if they did not believe him, they could take him to jail. This statement indicates Braddy’s desire to stop the interrogation for a time due to fatigue, as opposed to an unequivocal invocation of his fundamental right to remain silent. Moreover, this statement came directly on the heels of Braddy’s “confession.” Under the circumstances, a reasonable police officer would not have understood Braddy to be unambiguously invoking his right to remain silent immediately after supposedly volunteering the precise information police were seeking. Because Braddy did not unequivocally reinvoke his Miranda rights with this statement, Braddy’s claim that police failed to scrupulously honor his reinvocation is without merit. Therefore, because in none of these instances did Braddy unambiguously revoke his initial waiver of his Miranda rights, the trial court properly denied his claim. 3. Use of Physical Force Braddy next argues that incriminating statements he made to police were the result of physical coercion and therefore involuntary. We have previously stated that “[w]here a defendant alleges that his statement was the product of coercion, the voluntariness of the confession must be determined by an examination of the totality of the circumstances.” Schoenwetter v. State, 931 So.2d 857, 867 (Fla.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Walker v. State, 707 So.2d 300, 311 (Fla.1997)). Here, the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that Braddy’s statements to police were voluntary, not coerced by Detective Smith’s act of physical force. Although Detective Smith’s use of force was highly inappropriate, the circumstances here demonstrate that Brad-dy’s subsequent incriminating statements were not the product of that use of force. The trial court ruled that Detective Smith’s use of force was not “of such force and effect as to overcome [Braddy’s] will[, causing him] to immediately give up incriminatory evidence.” We agree. Shortly before 2:30 p.m. on Sunday November 8, Detective Smith pulled Braddy out of a police car, pushed him up against the side of the car, and held him there by placing his forearm across Braddy’s throat. The record shows that the entire incident lasted for ten to fifteen seconds. Yet it was not until about an hour and a half later, at approximately 4 p.m., that Braddy confessed to Detective Diaz that he had in fact lied to police and that he had left Quatisha in a different area. In the approximately ninety-minute period between when Detective Smith used force against Braddy and when Braddy confessed his lie to Diaz, Braddy had been leading detectives on a deceptive foot search for Quatisha. During this search, detectives were talking to Braddy about general topics such as his family and hunting in an effort to appeal to his humanity. Braddy’s confession, therefore, was insulated from Detective Smith’s use of force by an extended period of amicable conversation and was made to a detective other than the one who physically assaulted him. Moreover, any statements made to detectives during the foot search were not incriminatory because all such statements were made in furtherance of Braddy’s deception. Because the use of force — although highly inappropriate — did not coerce Braddy to make any incriminating statement, we hold that Braddy’s confession to Detective Diaz was voluntary. B. Motions to Disqualify Braddy next challenges the trial court’s ruling on two motions to disqualify. Brad-dy first argues that the trial court’s rulings were untimely and that, as a result, Brad-dy’s motions should have been deemed granted. Second, Braddy disputes the merits of the trial court’s rulings. We disagree on both counts. 1. Timeliness of Ruling A motion to disqualify must be filed “within a reasonable time not to exceed 10 days after discovery of the facts constituting the grounds for the motion and shall be promptly presented to the court for an immediate ruling.” Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(e). Upon the filing of a motion, “[t]he judge shall rule on a motion to disqualify immediately, but no later than 30 days after the service of the motion as set forth in subdivision (c).” Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(j). Subdivision (c) states, in relevant part, that “[i]n addition to filing with the clerk, the movant shall immediately serve a copy of the motion on the subject judge as set forth in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.080.” Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.380(c). If the judge does not rule on a properly served motion “within 30 days of service, the motion shall be deemed granted and the moving party may seek an order from the court directing the clerk to reassign the case.” Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(j). Here, Braddy appeals two of the eight recusal motions that he filed in this case— his October 11, 2006, motion, and his October 19, 2006, motion. These motions were ultimately denied by the trial court on June 18, 2007. In his October 11 motion, Braddy alleges judicial misconduct at an October 3, 2006, pretrial hearing. In his October 19 motion, Braddy alleges judicial misconduct at an October 11, 2006, pretrial hearing. At the end of his October 11 motion, Braddy certifies “that a true and correct copy hereof the foregoing motion has been furnished to [the prosecutor].” Likewise, in his October 19 motion, Brad-dy states, “I certify that a true and correct copy hereof has been furnished to [the prosecutor].” Each motion was filed with and stamped by the court clerk on the date that it was executed by Braddy. However, neither motion certifies that Braddy served a copy of his motions on the judge, as required by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330(c), and there is no evidence in the record suggesting such service occurred. On January 2, 2007, Braddy filed an emergency motion — which he served on both the prosecutor and the trial judge— asking the trial court to rule on the October 11 and October 19 motions to disqualify. At a hearing held on June 18, 2007, Braddy again requested that the trial court rule on the outstanding October 11 and 19 motions to disqualify. The trial court denied Braddy’s October 11 and October 19 motions on that same day. The trial court’s ruling was timely. Although Braddy filed his October 11 and October 19 motions with the court clerk, he did not satisfy the requirement of rule 2.330(c) that a motion to disqualify be served on the judge “[i]n addition to filing with the clerk.” Because Braddy failed to comply with rule 2.330(c), the trial court was not bound by the thirty-day requirement of rule 2.330(j). See Hedrick v. State, 6 So.3d 688, 693 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (holding that because motions to disqualify were never served on judge as required by rule 2.330(c), such motions were not automatically deemed granted by rule 2.330(j) after 30 days). Nor did Braddy’s January 2, 2007, emergency motion asking the trial court to rule on the October 11 and 19 motions subject the trial court to the thirty-day requirement. The thirty-day requirement of rule 2.330(j) applies only to motions that meet the substantive and procedural requirements of Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330(c). See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(j). Because Braddy’s January 2 motion was not a new motion to disqualify pursuant to the requirements of rule 2.330, it was not subject to the time constraints of rule 2.330(j). Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge’s denial of Braddy’s motions on June 18, 2007, was timely. 2. Merits We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to disqualify de novo. Chamberlain v. State, 881 So.2d 1087, 1097 (Fla.2004). “A motion to disqualify will be dismissed as legally insufficient if it fails to establish a well-grounded fear on the part of the movant that he will not receive a fair hearing.” Correll v. State, 698 So.2d 522, 524 (Fla.1997). “A mere ‘subjective fear’ of bias will not be legally sufficient; rather, the fear must be objectively reasonable.” Arbelaez v. State, 898 So.2d 25, 41 (Fla.2005). When determining whether Braddy’s fear was “well-grounded,” we look to see “whether the facts alleged, if true, would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.” Id. (quoting Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So.2d 240, 242 (Fla.1986)); see also Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083, 1087 (Fla.1983). In his October 11 motion, Braddy alleges that during an October 3 pretrial hearing, the trial judge exhibited antipathy towards him, including by angrily telling Braddy to “stop it,” refusing to let Braddy respond to the State’s arguments, and threatening to revoke Braddy’s right to proceed pro se. The record shows, however, that Braddy continually tried to interrupt while either the judge or the State was speaking, despite the trial judge telling Braddy that he could talk “[i]n a minute,” and asking him to “[h]ang on for a second.” After Braddy continued to be disruptive, the judge became more stern, responding to Braddy’s interruptions with statements such as “[ejxcuse me. I’m not talking to you,” “this isn’t a cat fight,” and “[w]e went through this already. Stop it.” These comments, made in the course of the judge’s efforts to control the courtroom, are not legally sufficient to require disqualification. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 556, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (holding that “[a] judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration — even a stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration — remain immune” from motions to disqualify). Nor does the trial court’s threat to suspend Braddy’s right to represent himself require disqualification. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (explaining that “the trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct”). Likewise, the factual allegations contained in Braddy’s October 19 motion are not legally sufficient to require disqualification. Braddy claims that during an October 11 pretrial hearing, the trial court cut Braddy off and refused to allow Braddy to respond to the State’s arguments, establishing a pattern of rudeness and prejudice against Braddy. The record, however, shows that Braddy had the opportunity to argue his position before the court — specifically, whether Braddy could depose certain circuit judges and state attorneys. When Braddy asked the trial court for permission to speak, the trial court allowed Braddy to argue his case. It was only after the trial court denied Braddy’s request and Braddy continued to press the issue that the court cut Braddy off and refused to let him belabor the point. The trial judge’s comments to Braddy, even if exasperated or sharply spoken, do not require disqualification. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56, 114 S.Ct. 1147 (holding that “expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger” do not establish bias or partiality); see also Ragsdale v. State, 720 So.2d 203, 207 (Fla.1998) (holding that trial judge’s statements referring to defendant’s claims as “bogus,” “a sham,” and “abject whining” did not warrant recusal). We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of Braddy’s motions to disqualify. C. Venue Braddy next contends that his convictions for first-degree murder and attempted murder must be reversed because the State failed to establish that the crimes on which those convictions were based occurred in Miami-Dade County, as alleged in the indictment. Braddy first raised this issue in a “Motion for Arrest of Judgment or in the Alternative Motion for Judgment of Acquittal” (motion for acquittal) filed on September 24, 2007 — more than two months after the jury convicted Braddy of these crimes and almost a month after the jury recommended that Braddy be sentenced to death for Quati-sha’s murder. At a hearing held that same day for the purpose of setting a date for Braddy’s Spencer hearing, the trial court orally denied Braddy’s motion for acquittal. The trial court failed to state any legal basis for denying Braddy’s motion. We review the trial court’s denial of Braddy’s motion for acquittal de novo. Reynolds v. State, 934 So.2d 1128, 1145 (Fla.2006). The Florida Constitution provides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused ... shall have the right ... to have a speedy and public trial by impartial jury in the county where the crime was committed.” Art. I, § 16(a), Fla. Const. To help protect this right, the State is required to allege the venue of each crime charged. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.140(d)(3). We have recognized, however, that venue “is merely a privilege which may be waived or changed under certain circumstances.” Lane v. State, 388 So.2d 1022, 1026 (Fla.1980). And we have held that “failure to allege venue in an indictment or information is an error of form, not of substance and such a defect will not render the charging instrument void absent a showing of prejudice to the defendant.” Tucker v. State, 459 So.2d 306, 309 (Fla.1984). Here, the indictment states that each of the crimes of which Braddy was ultimately convicted occurred “within the County of Miami-Dade, State of Florida.” At trial, however, the State introduced evidence establishing that although Braddy’s criminal activity originated at Shandelle’s home in Miami-Dade County, it then progressed to Palm Beach County, where Braddy choked Shandelle and left her in the woods, and finally to Alligator Alley in Broward County, where Quatisha was killed. Section 910.05, Florida Statutes (1997), provides that “[i]f the acts constituting one offense are committed in two or more counties, the offender may be tried in any county in which any of the acts occurred.” For the death of Quatisha, Braddy was charged in the alternative with felony murder. The charge against Braddy for attempted murder with respect to Shandelle was also framed in the alternative as attempted felony murder. The predicate felonies for the felony murder and attempted felony murder charges were based on conduct which commenced in Miami-Dade County. Venue was thus properly laid under section 910.05 with respect to those offenses in Miami-Dade County. In any event, Braddy’s objection to venue was untimely. Although the indictment was filed in November 1998, at no time prior to his July 2007 trial did Braddy object to venue in Miami-Dade County. Braddy did not object to the indictment at his arraignment on November 30, 1998, despite his counsel’s express recognition that “[t]here are three jurisdictions” involved. Nor did Braddy object when, on October 3, 2006, the State filed a statement of particulars alleging that [t]he location of the alleged offense was in or about the vicinity of [the address of Shandelle’s apartment in] Miami-Dade County, Florida, and/or the south side of Alligator Alley at or about Mile Marker 34 in Broward County, Florida and/or three miles north of U.S. 27 in Palm Beach County, Florida. Instead, Braddy objected to this issue for the first time more than two months after his trial had concluded. Braddy has offered no justification for his delay in raising the venue issue. And there is no possibility that the alleged error with respect to venue prejudiced Brad-dy in any manner. We reject Braddy’s argument on this issue. D. Second Search Warrant Braddy next challenges the trial court’s ruling regarding the State’s introduction into evidence of the second search warrant for the Town Car and the accompanying affidavit. Braddy argues that the warrant and affidavit constitute highly prejudicial hearsay evidence and violate Braddy’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. We have “repeatedly held that ‘in order to preserve an issue for appellate review, the specific legal argument or ground upon which it is based must be presented to the trial court.’ ” Kokal v. State, 901 So.2d 766, 778-79 (Fla.2005) (quoting Bertolotti v. Dugger, 514 So.2d 1095, 1096 (Fla.1987)); see also Schoenwetter, 931 So.2d at 871 (holding that in order to preserve a Confrontation Clause challenge for appeal, a defendant must object on Confrontation Clause grounds in the trial court). Because Brad-dy’s counsel failed to state any legal grounds whatsoever when objecting to this evidence, we review the issue for fundamental error. We find no error — fundamental or otherwise — in the trial court’s ruling. The search warrant and affidavit were not introduced for the purpose of establishing the truth of the facts contained therein. Instead, the documents were presented to establish a foundation for later evidence. The State introduced the affidavit to show that the search warrant was properly obtained and introduced the warrant to establish a foundation for any evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant. Braddy’s claim that the documents constitute inadmissible hearsay is therefore without merit. See, e.g., Breedlove v. State, 413 So.2d 1, 6 (Fla.1982) (noting that “[o]ut-of-court statements constitute hearsay only when offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted”) (quoting Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 41 L.Ed.2d 20 (1974)). Nor did the admission of the documents violate Braddy’s Confrontation Clause rights. As we have previously held, “the admission of a hearsay statement made by a declarant who does not testify at trial violates the Sixth Amendment if (1) the statement is testimonial, (2) the declarant is unavailable, and (3) the defendant lacked a prior opportunity for cross-examination of the declarant.” Blanton v. State, 978 So.2d 149, 154 (Fla.2008) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)). Because neither of the documents constituted hearsay evidence, neither crossed the threshold triggering Confrontation Clause analysis. Moreover, Detective Suco — the officer who had sworn the affidavit — was the witness through whom the affidavit was introduced at trial. We therefore determine that the trial court did not err in admitting the search warrant and affidavit into evidence. E. Motion for Mistrial Braddy next challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for mistrial based on Detective Milito’s reference in his testimony to Braddy’s “history.” We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion. Smith v. State, 7 So.3d 473, 502 (2009). “A motion for mistrial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge” and should only be granted “in eases of absolute necessity” “when the error is so prejudicial and fundamental that the expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful if not futile.” Ferguson v. State, 417 So.2d 639, 641 (Fla.1982) (internal citation omitted). Here, Braddy moved for a mistrial based on Detective Milito’s testimony regarding the events leading up to Braddy’s arrest: [W]hen I noticed Mr. Braddy’s demean- or, how it changed, and for our safety, due to the circumstances, I placed handcuffs on him. I advised him I was going to handcuff him, he wasn’t under arrest at the moment, but it was for his safety and my safety dealing with the history that I had of him. (Emphasis added.) Braddy argues that this statement was prejudicial because it informed the jury of his violent criminal past. The trial court disagreed, as do we. Prior to the challenged testimony, Detective Milito had testified that he was dispatched to Braddy’s home after learning that Braddy had been implicated in a violent kidnapping, attempted murder, and possible murder of a child. Given this information and the change in Braddy’s demeanor upon being confronted, Detective Milito’s reference to Braddy’s history could most reasonably be interpreted in context as referring to the facts of the crime that was being investigated. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Braddy’s motion. F. Guilt Phase Closing Argument We review the trial court’s rulings regarding the propriety of comments made during closing argument for an abuse of discretion. Salazar v. State, 991 So.2d 364, 377 (Fla.2008) (holding that “[i]t is within the court’s discretion to control the comments made to a jury, and a court’s ruling will be sustained on review absent an abuse of discretion”) (quoting Ford v. State, 802 So.2d 1121, 1132 (Fla.2001)). If the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to engage in improper argument but there is no reasonable probability that the improper comments affected the verdict, such error is harmless and does not require reversal. Hitchcock v. State, 755 So.2d 638, 643 (Fla.2000). As for those comments to which Braddy did not object at trial but now appeals, we apply fundamental error review. Brooks v. State, 762 So.2d 879, 899 (Fla.2000) (defining fundamental error as that which “reaches down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error”) (quoting McDonald v. State, 743 So.2d 501, 505 (Fla.1999)). Likewise, if Braddy made a contemporaneous objection which the trial court sustained but Braddy failed to move for a mistrial based on the improper statement, we review the unpreserved comment for fundamental error. Rose v. State, 787 So.2d 786, 797 (Fla.2001). We do not review each of the allegedly improper comments in isolation; instead, we examine “the entire closing argument with specific attention to the objected-to ... and the unobjected-to arguments” in order to determine “whether the cumulative effect” of any impropriety deprived Braddy of a fair trial. Card v. State, 803 So.2d 613, 622 (Fla.2001). Braddy challenges a number of comments made during the State’s closing argument. Several of the comments, however, were not preserved for appeal because Braddy either failed to object on the specific legal grounds that he now asserts or because, after having made objections that the trial court sustained, Braddy failed to move for a mistrial. None of the unpre-served comments rises to the level of fundamental eiror, nor does the cumulative effect of those unpreserved comments in which we identify possible error constitute fundamental error. Moreover, the comments that Braddy did preserve for appeal were properly ruled on by the trial court. Accordingly, having considered the State’s guilt phase closing argument as a whole, paying specific attention to the objected-to and unobjected-to comments, we deny Braddy’s claim. 1. Denigration of Defense Braddy argues that throughout its closing argument, the State improperly attacked defense counsel and denigrated his defense. Specifically, Braddy challenges the State’s following comment regarding Braddy’s refusal to give a sworn statement to police: Why would he refuse? I mean their whole thing is manipulation, misrepresentation. Of course he’s going to refuse. Because he thinks if it’s not in writing, he would not consider it, just like if the child’s body had not been found, he could not have been charged with murder. Braddy also challenges the State’s comments that defense counsel must have been “in a different trial” because “[t]heir arguments make absolutely no sense,” as well as the State’s comments responding to the defense theory that Shandelle caused Quatisha’s death by jumping with her out of a moving car: Again and again and again and again, from day one, this defendant has been trying to blame this victim. He’s been pinning in [sic] on all Shandelle May-cock. He’s doing it again. He’s trying to blame Shandelle Maycock for killing her child. If she hadn’t jumped out of the car, she wouldn’t — the child wouldn’t have died. That’s what they are telling you. Braddy, however, failed to preserve an objection to these comments for appeal. Even if the comments are assumed to be improper, given the abundant evidence of Braddy’s guilt at trial, these comments— either individually or cumulatively — do not rise to the level of fundamental error. See, e.g., Chandler v. State, 702 So.2d 186, 191 n. 5 (Fla.1997) (holding that State’s comments at closing referring to defense counsel’s conduct as “cowardly” and “despicable” and calling defendant “malevolent ... a brutal rapist and conscienceless murderer” were “thoughtless and petty” but not fundamental error). Braddy also challenges the State’s assertion that “nobody ever testified they saw [Braddy] with a belly belt.” Despite the State’s assertion, there was some testimony that Braddy was seen wearing a belly belt. Braddy claims that — because defense counsel suggested that Braddy had been restrained with a belly belt — the State’s comment amounted to an allegation that the defense had misrepresented the evidence. Braddy objected to this comment at trial, to which the trial court responded, “[t]he jury will recall the testimony that they heard about all of the issues, including this.” Because Brad-dy failed to obtain a clear ruling on his objection, he failed to preserve the issue for appeal. See Carratelli v. State, 832 So.2d 850, 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (noting that “[a] plethora of Florida cases support the notion that a party must obtain a ruling from the trial court in order to preserve an issue for appellate review”); see also Schreidell v. Shoter, 500 So.2d 228, 233 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (holding that “[fjailure to secure a ruling on an objection waives it, unless the court deliberately and patently refuses to so rule”). Even if the trial court’s comment could be interpreted as a clear ruling sustaining Braddy’s objection, Braddy failed to preserve the issue because he did not move for a mistrial. See Rose, 787 So.2d at 797. We therefore review the comment for fundamental error but find none in light of the totality of evidence of Braddy’s guilt. Braddy also challenges the State’s comment that the defense “had to bring ... up” evidence of a fight that Shandelle had in 1997 with Quatisha’s uncle. Braddy objected but was overruled by the trial court. Braddy’s objection, however, was not made on any specific legal grounds and is thus unpreserved. See Brooks, 762 So.2d at 898. In any event, this statement, which Braddy claims denigrates the manner in which his counsel conducted his defense, was not improper. The challenged comment was made in response to the defense’s theory that persons other that Braddy had a motive for attacking Shandelle by pointing out that no other evidence supported such a theory. The comment was therefore within the wide latitude afforded to the State at closing to advance all legitimate arguments based on the evidence. See Smith, 7 So.3d at 509 (holding that the State has “wide latitude to argue to the jury during closing argument” and is entitled to draw “[[logical inferences” and advance “all legitimate arguments”). 2. Bolstering the State’s Witnesses Braddy next challenges the State’s comments regarding the testimony of several police officers who had testified for the State. Defense counsel had repeatedly suggested during closing arguments th