Florida Carry, Inc. v. University of North Florida (133 So. 3d 966, 2013)

ROBERTS, J.

The appellants, Florida Carry, Inc., and Alexandria Lainez, appeal a final order denying their motion for temporary injunction and a final order granting the motion to dismiss of the appellees, University of North Florida (UNF) and John Delaney. At issue in this case is whether a state university may prohibit the carrying of a securely encased firearm within a motor vehicle that is parked in a university campus parking lot. We hold that the legislature has not delegated its authority under the Florida Constitution to regulate the manner of bearing arms to the state universities and reverse the orders on appeal.

Facts and Procedural History

Section 14.0080P of the policies and regulations adopted by UNF bans the storage of any “weapon or destructive device,” as defined by section 790.001, Florida Statutes (2011), in a vehicle located on UNF property. Section 790.001(6), Florida Statutes (2011), includes firearms in the definition of “weapon or destructive device.” As provided in Section 5.0010R(J) of the Student Conduct Code, UNF may impose sanctions, including suspension and expulsion, upon a student who violates the regulation. In addition, section 5.0010R(J) specifically authorizes a referral to law enforcement for criminal prosecution stating that a student, resident, or commuter found in violation of the regulation “will be subject to arrest and/or discipline in accordance with Florida State Statute and the Student Conduct Code.”

The facts of this case are undisputed. Lainez, a student enrolled at UNF, and Florida Carry, Inc., an organization of gun owners of which Lainez is a member, filed a lawsuit to challenge UNF’s regulation. The complaint alleged that Lainez desires to carry a firearm while traveling to and from school as a lawful method of self-defense and that she wishes to store the firearm in her vehicle while on campus. The complaint argued that UNF had no authority to adopt the regulation in question because the Florida legislature had expressly preempted the entire field of firearms regulation in section 790.33(1), Florida Statutes (2011). The complaint sought an award of damages or, in the alternative, a statutory fine, a declaration that UNF’s regulation was invalid, and an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the regulation. The appellants also sought a temporary injunction during the pen-dency of the case to prevent the enforcement of any UNF rules or regulations regarding the otherwise lawful possession of a weapon or firearm in a vehicle and- to prevent the punishment of any student for the same.

The appellees moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that UNF was authorized to regulate firearms possession and storage on school property in accordance with section 790.115, Florida Statutes (2011). UNF maintained that the regulation was authorized under section 790.115(2)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2011), which provides that firearms may not be possessed on school property except when securely encased in a vehicle, but that “school districts” may adopt policies to waive the secure encasement exception. The appellants countered that UNF was not a “school district;” therefore, it was not authorized to waive the exception and prohibit firearms in vehicles on its campus.

After hearings on the motions, the trial court denied the appellants’ motion for temporary injunction and granted the ap-pellees’ motion to dismiss. The trial court reasoned that applying the appellants’ definition of “school district” to section 790.115 would permit only public schools to regulate firearms on their property and frustrate the clearly expressed intent of the legislature to cover all schools as the term “school” was broadly defined in section 790.115(2)(a).

On appeal, the appellants argue: (1) that the legislature clearly intended to preempt regulation of firearms by any other agency or subdivision of the state; (2) that the legislature has determined it is lawful to carry a weapon or firearm securely encased in a vehicle and that right should be liberally construed; and (3) that the legislature has not granted any affirmative authority to UNF to waive the secure encasement provision in section 790.115(2)(a)3. We agree with the appellants’ arguments.

Prior to oral argument, this court, through the three-judge panel, ordered the parties to be prepared to address the following questions:

1. Does a state university have independent authority under Article IX, section 7 of the Florida Constitution as interpreted in [Graham v. Haridopolos, 108 So.3d 597 (Fla.2013),] and NAACP, Inc. v. Florida Board of Regents, 876 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), to adopt a noncriminal policy or regulation concerning the possession of firearms on campus, irrespective of any right it may have under section 790.115(2)(a)3., Florida Statutes, to waive the exception that would allow a student to possess a firearm in a vehicle?

2. Does the University of North Florida qualify as a “local or state government” such that its policies and regulations could be preempted by section 790.33, Florida Statutes?

3. Does the provision of the student handbook at issue in this case qualify as an “ordinance,” “rule,” or “administrative regulation” within the meaning of section 790.33, Florida Statutes?

The panel then requested supplemental briefing from the parties on the questions above.

Analysis

I. Section 790.115, Florida Statutes

We first emphasize that the only legal question presented, argued, and decided by the trial court was whether section 790.115 allowed UNF to prohibit a student, who was otherwise lawfully able to possess a firearm, from keeping said firearm securely encased in her vehicle in a campus parking lot. In its answer brief before this court, UNF advanced only its views regarding the interpretation of section 790.115.

The legislature has provided that a person shall not possess a firearm on school property unless part of a school-sponsored event. See § 790.115(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011). This section defines “school” broadly to encompass preschool and elementary through secondary schools as well as career centers and post-secondary schools, whether public or private. See id. Importantly, the legislature also provided exceptions to this general prohibition. See § 790.115(2)(a)l.-3., Fla. Stat. (2011). Namely, that a person may carry a firearm in a vehicle pursuant to section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (2011), which provides that a firearm may be kept in a private conveyance as long as it is securely encased. The provisions of section 790.25 authorizing the carrying of securely encased firearms in private conveyances as well as other lawful carrying of firearms “shall be liberally construed to carry out the declaration of policy herein and in favor of the constitutional right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes.” § 790.25(4), Fla. Stat. (2011).

While it provides an exception to the general prohibition, section 790.115(2)(a)3. also contains a waiver provision providing that “school districts may adopt written and published policies that waive the exception in this subparagraph for purposes of student and campus parking privileges.” § 790.115(2)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2011). The statute clearly grants school districts the power to waive the exception — not colleges or universities. UNF attempted to exercise this waiver in adopting the operative regulation; however, UNF is not a “school district.” Section 790.115 only uses the term “school district” once; outside of subsection 790.115(2)(a)3., the statute uses the word “school” alone. UNF, as a public post-secondary school, falls within the definition of a “school” in section 790.115(2)(a), but that does not mean that it also falls within the definition of “school district,” a term that is not defined in section 790.115.

Where the legislature has not defined the words used in a statute, the language should be given its “plain and ordinary meaning.” See Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty. v. Survivors Charter Sch., Inc., 3 So.3d 1220, 1233 (Fla.2009) (quoting Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass’n v. Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings, 686 So.2d 1349, 1354 (Fla.1997)). The appellees contend that the legislature intended “school districts” to be interpreted broadly to include a state university board of trustees. Such a construction is contrary to the plain and ordinary meaning of “school district” as it is used in the Florida Constitution and statutes.

Article IX, section 4, of the Florida Constitution provides:

(a) Each county shall constitute a school district.... In each school district there shall be a school board composed of five or more members chosen by vote of the electors in a nonpartisan election for appropriately staggered terms of four years, as provided by law.

(b) The school board shall operate, control and supervise all free public schools within the school district and determine the rate of school district taxes within the limits prescribed herein....

Florida’s K-20 Education Code, Chapters 1000-1013, Florida Statutes (2011), sets forth the governing structure of Florida’s various educational entities. Significantly here, School District Governance (Chapter 1001, Part II, Florida Statutes (2011)) is separate, by statute, from State Universities (Chapter 1001, Part IV, Florida Statutes (2011)). The provisions concerning School District Governance provide that each county constitutes a school district, that the district school system shall include all' public schools in that district under the direction of district school officials, and that the district school board “shall operate, control, and supervise all free public schools in their respective district.” See §§ 1001.31-1001.33, Fla. Stat. (2011). In contrast, the state university system is organized and governed differently than the public district school system. The state university system is operated and regulated by the state board of governors, and each university within the system is operated by a board of trustees under the powers and duties granted by the board of governors. See Art IX, sec. 7(e)-(d), Fla. Const.; Ch. 1001, Part IV, Fla. Stat. (2011). Thus, by law, “school districts” are distinct legal entities that do not operate and control state universities.

Also significant here, the term “school district” is only used in subsection 790.115(2)(a)3. while the rest of section 790.115 simply uses the term “school.” Where the legislature includes wording in one section of a statute and not in another, it is presumed to have been intentionally excluded. See Bd. of Trs. of Fla. State Univ. v. Esposito, 991 So.2d 924, 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (quoting L.K. v. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 917 So.2d 919, 921 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)). The judiciary cannot extend the terms of an unambiguous statute beyond its express terms or reasonable and obvious implications under Florida’s strict separation of powers delineated in article II, section three, of the Florida Constitution. See Davila v. State, 75 So.3d 192, 196 (Fla.2011). Even when the court determines the legislature intended something not expressed in the wording, the judiciary lacks the authority under organic law to depart from the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute. See Johnson v. Gulf Cnty., 26 So.3d 33, 41 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 454 (Fla.1992)). Thus here, it must be presumed that the legislature intended to grant the power to issue waivers solely to “school districts” not individual “schools.”

This court is almost in full agreement that UNF does not qualify as a “school district” under section 790.115; therefore, UNF does not have the authority to waive itself out of the requirements of section 790.25, which gives Lainez the right to carry a securely encased firearm in her vehicle. Where we differ is in our consideration of the constitutional issue raised by the original panel.

II. The Dissent

The dissent implicitly concedes that statutory interpretation of section 790.115 would require reversal. However, the dissent bypasses any error in the trial court’s legal analysis of section 790.115(2)(a)3. and suggests affirmance under the authority granted to the UNF Board of Trustees by the board of governors under article IX, section 7. We respectfully disagree. Whatever the scope of authority granted to the universities under article IX, section 7, it does not encompass a university regulation that prohibits the carrying of a securely encased firearm within a vehicle parked in a university parking lot.

Section 790.33, Florida Statutes

The legislature’s primacy in firearms regulation derives directly from the Florida Constitution. Article I, Section 8(a), of the Florida Constitution provides:

The right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and of the lawful authority of the state shall not be infringed, except that the manner of bearing arms may be regulated by law.

The phrase “by law” indicates that the regulation of the state right to keep and bear arms is assigned to the legislature and must be enacted by statute. Cf. Grapeland Heights Civic Ass’n v. City of Miami, 267 So.2d 321, 324 (Fla.1972) (considering the enactment clause language of article III, section 6, of the Florida Constitution and interpreting the constitutional term “law” in the phrase “authorized by law” to mean an enactment by the legislature not by a city commission or any other political body). Indeed, the legislature has reserved for itself the whole field of firearms regulation in section 790.33(1), which provides:

(1) Preemption. — Except as expressly provided by the State Constitution or general law, the Legislature hereby declares that it is occupying the whole field of regulation of firearms and ammunition, including the purchase, sale, transfer, taxation, manufacture, ownership, possession, storage, and transportation thereof, to the exclusion of all existing and future county, city, town, or municipal ordinances or any administrative regulations or rules adopted by local or state government relating thereto. Any such existing ordinances, rules, or regulations are hereby declared null and void.

Previously, this statute only explicitly preempted the regulation of firearms by local government. See Pelt v. State, Dept. of Transp., 664 So.2d 320, 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), rev. denied, 671 So.2d 788 (Fla.1996). However, in October 2011, the legislature added the phrase “any administrative regulations or rules adopted by local or state government” to emphasize and reiterate that the regulation of firearms was solely within the purview of the legislature and not within the jurisdiction of local governments or agencies of the state government using their rulemaking power. See ch. 2011-109, § 1, Laws of Fla. “It is presumed that in adopting an amendment, the legislature intends to change the meaning of a statute unless a contrary intention is clearly expressed.” Equity Corp. Holdings, Inc. v. Dep’t of Banking & Fin., Div. of Fin., 772 So.2d 588, 590 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). As such, we must interpret the statute to preempt the regulation of the right to bear arms from state governmental entities as well as local government. To rule otherwise and permit a state agency to enact rules or policies restricting the right to bear arms without a specific legislative delegation would render the 2011 amendment superfluous.

Evidence of the legislature’s intent to preempt the entire field of firearm regulation is located in subsection 790.33(4)(e), which provides that section 790.33(1) does not prohibit the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWCC) from regulating the use of firearms as a method of taking wildlife and from regulating shooting ranges. Like state universities, the FWCC derives its authority from the Florida Constitution. See Art. IV, § 9, Fla. Const. If, in implementing the exclusive constitutional authority to regulate firearms in section 790.33 the legislature did not intend to preempt such constitutional agencies in the first place, it would have been completely unnecessary to exempt the FWCC, a constitutional agency. In other words, subsection 790.33(4)(e) would be superfluous if the dissent’s analysis were correct. It follows logically then that section 790.33 must be read to preempt even those state agencies deriving their authority directly from the Florida Constitution. See Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So.2d 993, 996 (Fla.2003) (“It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.”).

Like the FWCC, state universities qualify as state agencies. See § 1001.705(l)(d), Fla. Stat. (2011) (defining a state university as an agency of the state that belongs to and is a part of the executive branch of state government). University boards of trustees are also part of the executive branch of state government. See § 1001.71(3), Fla. Stat. (2011). While universities may be excluded from the definition of an agency in regard to particular statutes, section 790.33 contains no such exclusion. Absent this specific exclusion in the statute at hand, universities must qualify as part of “state government.” The regulation adopted by UNF in this case qualifies as an administrative rule “adopted by local or state government,” which the legislature has expressly preempted. See § 790.33(1), Fla. Stat. (2011).

Article IX, Section 7

The dissent suggests affirmance under the tipsy coachman doctrine and posits that state universities have the independent authority under article IX, section 7, to implement the regulation at issue even in the face of a statutory provision that provides otherwise. The dissent interprets the scope of the university’s authority broadly enough to encompass the regulation at issue, which it characterizes as merely regulating the conduct of students exercising the privilege to enroll in UNF. Interpreting the board of governors’ authority in article IX, section 7, so broadly in this instance conflicts with the right to keep and bear arms in article I, section 8(a). Thus, we must interpret the scope of authority in article IX, section 7, in a manner that gives effect to both provisions. See Askew v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm’n, 336 So.2d 556, 560 (Fla.1976) (recognizing that constitutional provisions should be considered in light of the Constitution as a whole, thus favoring an interpretation that gives effect to every part).

An inquiry into the scope of the board of governors’ authority must first begin with an examination of the actual language of the constitutional provision. See Caribbean Conservation Corp. v. Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 838 So.2d 492, 501 (Fla.2003) (quoting Fla. Soc’y of Ophthalmology v. Fla. Optometric Ass'n, 489 So.2d 1118, 1119 (Fla.1986)). This court endeavors to construe constitutional provisions consistent with the intent of the framers and the voters. Id.

In November 2002, the voters approved Amendment 11, which had been proposed by initiative petition. The amendment created article IX, section 7, and established the board of governors of the state university system as a corporate body that “shall operate, regulate, control, and be fully responsible for the management of the whole university system.” Art. IX, § 7(d), Fla. Const. The board’s responsibilities include, but are not limited to:

[D]efining the distinctive mission of each constituent university and its articulation with free public schools and community colleges, ensuring the well-planned coordination and operation of the system, and avoiding wasteful duplication of facilities or programs.

Id.

Section 7(d) also provides that the board’s “management shall be subject to the powers of the legislature to appropriate for the expenditure of funds, and the board shall account for such expenditures as provided by law.” Id.

The scope of the board’s authority has been interpreted in various decisions from this court and the supreme court. While these decisions have interpreted the board’s scope of authority broadly, it is notable that the areas at issue all concerned matters directly related to education. See Fla. Pub. Employees Council 79, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Pub. Employees Relations Comm’n, 871 So.2d 270 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (personnel); NAACP, Inc. v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 876 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (admission criteria); Decker v. Univ. of W. Fla., 85 So.3d 571 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (student discipline sanctions for cheating). Most recently in Graham v. Haridopolos, 75 So.3d 315 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), this court determined that the board’s authority did not include the power to set and appropriate tuition and fees. That decision was affirmed by the supreme court in Graham v. Haridopolos, 108 So.3d 597, 604 (Fla.2013), which recognized that the language of article IX, section 7, did not plainly transfer to the board the legislature’s control over tuition and fees, but instead granted the board the responsibility to “operate,” “regulate,” “control,” and “be fully responsible for the management of the whole university system.” Employing the canon of construction esjusdem generis to construe the meaning of “operate, regulate, control, and be fully responsible for the management of the whole university system,” the supreme court reasoned that the listed responsibilities in article IX, section 7, included responsibilities that were “executive and administrative in nature.” Id. at 605. The supreme court determined that the ability to set and appropriate for the expenditure of tuition and fees was of a wholly different nature and, therefore, was not included with the meaning of the authority vested in article IX, section 7(d). Id.

While the Haridopolos decisions were based, in part, on the express language in article IX, section 7(d), the discussion of the board’s scope of authority is instructive here. We likewise interpret the board’s authority in article IX, section 7, to encompass responsibilities that are “executive and administrative” in nature. See id. Regulating a citizen’s right to keep and bear arms is of a wholly different nature. Thus, we respectfully disagree with the dissent’s argument that the constitutional language in article IX, section 7, contemplated giving the board (and therefore UNF) plenary authority to enact the regulation at issue, which would deprive students attending UNF of their constitutional right to bear arms as provided by organic law and legislative enactment.

Furthermore, in our view, reading the grant of authority in article IX, section 7, to allow the university to regulate the lawful possession of firearms would have caused this amendment to fail its ballot title and summary review in the supreme court pursuant to section 101.161, Florida Statutes, and article V, section 3(b)(10), of the Florida Constitution. The ballot title and summary to Amendment 11 presented to the voters at the 2002 general election read:

Ballot title: Local trustees and statewide governing board to manage Florida’s university system.

Ballot summary: A local board of trustees shall administer each state university. Each board shall have thirteen members dedicated to excellence in teaching, research, and service to community. A statewide governing board of seventeen members shall be responsible for the coordinated and accountable operation of the whole university system. Wasteful duplication of facilities or programs is to be avoided. Provides procedures for selection and confirmation of board members, including one student and one faculty representative per board.

In re Advisory Op. to the Atty. Gen. ex rel. Local Trs., 819 So.2d 725, 727-28 (Fla.2002).

In its review of this ballot title and summary, the supreme court held that the proposed amendment did “not substantially affect or alter any [other] provision in the state constitution.” Id. at 732. If a constitutional amendment by initiative seeks to “amend multiple sections of the constitution ... [it] should identify the articles or sections of the constitution substantially affected.” Fine v. Firestone, 448 So.2d 984, 989 (Fla.1984). There was nothing in either the text of Amendment 11 or the ballot title or summary to indicate in any way that the amendment to article IX, section 7, would give the board of governors the authority to override the provisions of article I, section 8, providing that the legislature alone has the authority to regulate the manner of bearing arms. Had it done so, the public would have been alerted that Amendment 11 could have diminished the people’s fundamental right to bear arms, a right that has been zealously guarded and protected, as noted by Judge Makar in his concurrence. In essence, to adopt the dissent’s view we would allow Amendment 11 to “fly under false colors.” See Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So.2d 7, 16-18 (Fla.2000).

The dissent maintains that the regulation at issue is a condition on the exercise of a “privilege” rather than a restriction on a fundamental constitutional right. Its analysis thus characterizes the regulation at issue as noncriminal. However, by waiving the secure encasement exception under section 790.115, the regulation here purports to subject a person with a firearm securely encased in his or her vehicle to a potential third-degree felony charge for a violation. See § 790.115(2)(c)l., Fla. Stat. (2011).

The dissent also argues that the university has the power to regulate otherwise lawful activities in the context of student conduct, i.e., consuming alcohol in a classroom or smoking in a dorm room. While true in certain contexts, restricting recreational activities is a far cry from restricting a fundamental, constitutional right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. We recognize that section 1001.706(7)(b), Florida Statutes (2011), gives the board of governors the authority to restrict the use of firearms, food, tobacco, and alcoholic beverages, among other things. However, this provision must be read in pari matea-ría with section 790.115. If the issue in this case involved the right of a student to carry a firearm in the classroom or at a sporting event, our analysis would be different. There are certain places where firearms can be legally prohibited, but the legislature has recognized that a citizen who is going to be in one of these places should be able to keep a firearm securely encased within his or her vehicle.

In regulating the manner of bearing arms, the legislature has attempted to balance this fundamental right with the safety of Florida citizens. This balance can be seen in the “guns-at-work” statute, section 790.251, Florida Statutes (2011), which provides, in part,

(3) Legislative intent; findings. — This act is intended to codify the long-standing legislative policy of the state that individual citizens have a constitutional right to keep and bear arms, that they have a constitutional right to possess and keep legally owned firearms within their motor vehicles for self-defense and other lawful purposes, and that these rights are not abrogated by virtue of a citizen becoming a customer, employee, or. invitee of a business entity. It is the finding of'the Legislature that a citizen’s lawful possession, transportation, and secure keeping of firearms and ammunition within his or her motor vehicle is essential to the exercise of the fundamental constitutional right to keep and bear arms and the constitutional right of self-defense. The Legislature finds that protecting and preserving these rights is essential to the exercise of freedom and individual responsibility. The Legislature further finds that no citizen can or should be required to waive or abrogate his or her right to possess and securely keep firearms and ammunition locked within his or her motor vehicle by virtue of becoming a customer, employee, or invitee of any employer or business establishment within the state, unless specifically required by state or federal law.

Section 790.115 strikes a similar balance when it prohibits firearms from school property except when securely encased within a vehicle pursuant to section 790.25(5).

III. The Concurrences

All of the concurring judges agree with the interpretation of section 790.115 above. Understandably, some of the concurring judges are wary of weighing in on the constitutional issue raised by the dissent. However, a concurrence that does not address the constitutional arguments put forth by the dissent results in an implicit ruling that the authority of the board of governors is not as expansive as the dissent reads it in article IX, section 7.

The procedural posture of this case requires that this court address the constitutional issue. The original panel asked the parties to be prepared to speak on the application of article IX, section 7, in oral argument and then required briefing on the issue. The dissent is entitled to make a “tipsy coachman” argument in order to affirm. If the dissent were correct that article IX, section 7, gives the board of governors independent authority to regulate securely encased firearms within vehicles despite a statute requiring a contrary result, then neither section 1001.706(7)(b), Florida Statutes, nor the provisions of chapter 120 governing how agencies receive their rule-making authority would limit the board of governors and the board of trustees. See In re Advisory Op. of the Governor, 334 So.2d 561 (Fla.1976). The board of governors has, after all, delegated the responsibility for “campus safety” to the various boards of trustees. Such a delegation would be a sufficient grant of power to enact the regulation at issue, which clearly relates to campus safety, regardless of whether one believes disarming students actually makes university campuses more or less safe. Furthermore, any argument that UNF’s regulation fails because it did not have authority delegated by the board of governors constitutes a “tipsy coachman” reversal — a jurisprudential device unknown in the law. See Advanced Chiropractic & Rehab. Ctr. Corp. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 103 So.3d 866, 869 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citing State v. Baez, 894 So.2d 115, 121 (Fla.2004) (Pariente, C.J., dissenting)).

IV. Conclusion

In conclusion, the trial court incorrectly construed the meaning of “school district” in section 790.115. While school districts may adopt a waiver disallowing securely encased firearms in vehicles parked on campuses under their authority, neither UNF nor the UNF Board of Trustees qualifies as a school district under section 790.115(2)(a)3. The legislature has preempted UNF from independently regulating firearms. As such, section 14.0080P of the UNF policies and regulations, to the extent it prohibits possession of securely encased firearms in motor vehicles, is illegal and unenforceable. For these reasons, we reverse and remand for disposition consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

LEWIS, C.J., WOLF, BENTON, THOMAS, ROWE, SWANSON, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.

BENTON, J., concurs in an opinion in which WOLF, J., joins.

"WETHERELL, J., concurs in an opinion in which MARSTILLER, RAY, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., join.

SWANSON, J., concurs with opinion.

MAKAR, J., concurs in an opinion in which OSTERHAUS, J., joins in PART II.

OSTERHAUS, J., concurs in an opinion in which WETHERELL, MARSTILLER, RAY, and MAKAR, JJ., join.

PADOVANO, J., dissents in an opinion in which VAN NORTWICK, and CLARK, JJ., join.

. Whether the legislature has the authority to delegate, in part, the exclusive authority to enact regulations regarding the right to keep and bear arms was not argued in this case, and we need not consider it to decide this case.

. In Florida Retail Federation v. Attorney General of Florida, 576 F.Supp.2d 1301, 1302 (N.D.Fla.2008), the Northern District held section 790.251 unconstitutional in part because the court found it irrationally compelled some businesses, but not others, to allow a customer to secure a gun in a vehicle. However, the opinion recognized that the state may compel a business to allow a gun to be secured in a vehicle in a parking lot and upheld the statute to the extent it compelled a business to allow a worker with a concealed weapons permit to secure a gun in a vehicle in a parking lot. Thus, the legislative intent contained within the statute remains relevant for our purposes here.

. Board of Governors Regulation 1.001(3)(Z) provides that the university boards of trustees are responsible for "campus safety and emergency preparedness, to include safety and security measures for university personnel, students, and campus visitors.”

BENTON, J.,

concurring.

As the majority opinion explains, the University of North Florida is not a “school district” within the meaning of section 790.115(2)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2011). The trial court was in error on this point, and the case has to go back. But section 790.115(2)(a)3. does not control disposition of the entire case, and the court is not saying otherwise today.

Statutory prohibitions against exhibiting a firearm “at a school-sponsored event or on the grounds or facilities of any school” and against possessing a firearm outside a vehicle “on the property of any school” “except as authorized in support of school-sanctioned activities, at a school-sponsored event” also pertain. See § 790.115(1), (2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011). The University is a “postsecondary school” for purposes of these provisions. See § 790.115(2)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2011).

Section 790.06(12)(a)9. and 13., Florida Statutes (2011), make clear, moreover, that licenses to carry concealed weapons do not authorize carrying a handgun openly or carrying a concealed firearm into “[a]ny school, college, or professional athletic event not related to firearms” or into “[a]ny college or university facility unless the licensee is a registered student, employee, or faculty member of such college or university and the weapon is a stun gun or nonlethal electric weapon or device designed solely for defensive purposes and the weapon does not fire a dart or projectile.”

In short, the University successfully advanced its stated purpose to “clarify [its] weapons policy while remaining consistent with Florida law” when it stated in its Policies & Regulations that the University is a school as defined in section 790.115, Florida Statutes; that statutory prohibitions forbid possession of firearms on school property — except as specifically allowed in chapter 790 (e.g., in a vehicle pursuant to section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes, or in the limited circumstances (like ROTC) set forth in sections 790.115 and 790.06) — and that failure to observe the ban may subject offending students to school discipline, not to mention criminal prosecution.

While the Florida Constitution confers on the Legislature the right and responsibility to regulate “the manner of bearing arms,” Art. I, § 8(a), Fla. Const., the Legislature may exercise its constitutional prerogative by delegating article I section 8 authority to the Board of Governors or directly to the university boards of trustees, just as it delegated article I section 8 authority to the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission by enacting section 790.33(4)(e), Florida Statutes (2011), and to the school districts by enacting section 790.115(2)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2011).

As (among other things) a partial, contingent or potential delegation of article I section 8 authority, section 1001.706(7)(b), Florida Statutes (2011), must, however, be construed in pari materia with section 790.115, Florida Statutes (2011). No fair reading of section 1001.706(7)(b) provides authority for the anonymous drafters of a student conduct code to set at naught section 790.115 or any other duly enacted statute. There is, indeed, no true “regulation at issue” in the present case, the dissenting opinion notwithstanding.

On remand, the trial court needs to revisit its ruling with regard to the University’s policy against lawfully storing securely encased weapons “in their vehicle[s] while on any University property or University-controlled property.” But a sweeping declaration that “[a]ll UNF rules and administrative regulations regarding firearms are null and void,” as demanded in the first amended complaint, is plainly unwarranted.

WETHERELL, J.,

specially concurring.

I agree with the analysis in Part I of the majority opinion and the disposition in Part IV of the opinion, but I do not join the remainder of the opinion for the reasons stated in Judge Osterhaus’ opinion with which I fully concur. I write separately to elaborate on why the constitutional issue injected into this ease by the original panel, embraced by the dissent, and rejected on the merits by the majority is not implicated in this case.

The dissent asserts that “universities” have the power pursuant to article IX, section 7 of the Florida Constitution to adopt policies and regulations that trump conflicting state laws. The majority rejects this argument and holds that article IX, section 7 does not give the universities such power, at least in the context of firearm regulation. The problem with the dissent’s argument (and the majority’s decision to address the argument in this case) is that it glosses over the governance hierarchy of the state university system and ascribes the constitutional authority of the Board of Governors (BOG) to an individual state university without any indication that the BOG delegated its purported law-trumping power to the university.

The BOG is a constitutionally-created executive branch agency and is responsible for managing “the whole university system.” Art. IX, § 7(d), Fla. Const.; see also § 1001.705(2), Fla. Stat. Each of the twelve individual state universities is “administered” by a board of trustees (BOT) that is responsible for providing policy-direction, oversight, and strategic planning for the university. See Art. IX, § 7(c), Fla. Const.; BOG Reg. 1.001. The BOG and the BOTs are not responsible for the day-to-day operation of the individual universities; that is the responsibility of the university’s administration under the direction and control of the university president.

Article IX, section 7 does not grant any constitutional authority to the individual universities. Section 7(d) vests the BOG with the authority to “operate, regulate, control, and [manage]” the university system, and section 7(c) authorizes the BOG to “establish the powers and duties” of the BOTs. The BOG, by regulation, has delegated various powers and duties to the BOTs, but the regulation did not delegate any authority directly to the individual universities. See BOG Reg. 1.001(1) (“The intent of this regulation is to delegate powers and duties to the university boards of trustees so that the university boards have all of the powers and duties necessary and appropriate for the direction, operation, management, and accountability of each state university.”) (emphasis added); see also State University System Governance Agreement, at (3)(c) (Mar. 24, 2010) (affirming “the exclusive authority of the BOG for delegating powers and duties to the boards of trustees of the universities”) (emphasis added) (hereafter “Governance Agreement”).

The BOG unquestionably has broad constitutional authority, but it is debatable whether that authority includes the law-trumping powers suggested by the dissent. And, even if the BOG has the power to adopt regulations that supersede state law, nothing in BOG Regulation 1.001 authorizes the BOTs to exercise that power. Indeed, paragraphs (8)(e) and (8)(f) of the regulation require the BOTs to act in conformance with the law. See also Florida Board of Governors, Regulation Development Procedures for State University Boards of Trustees, at § B.l. (July 21, 2005) (“Regulations must be consistent with law ....”). Moreover, even if the BOTs had been delegated the law-trumping authority suggested by the dissent, that has no bearing on this case because the challenged policy was adopted by the university administration, not the university’s board of trustees (hereafter “UNF BOT”), and there is no indication that the UNF BOT delegated any of its purported BOG-delegated law-trumping powers to the administration.

Furthermore, even if we were to assume (1) that the BOG has the constitutional authority to adopt regulations that supersede state laws and (2) that it delegated that authority to the UNF BOT and (3) that the UNF BOT further delegated that authority to the university administration, there is no indication in the record that the administration exercised that authority here. First, as thoroughly discussed in Judge Osterhaus’ opinion, the policy at issue in this case was adopted pursuant to authority the administration mistakenly thought it had under section 790.115(2)(a)3., Florida Statutes. Second, the university policy governing the adoption of policies expressly states that policies should not “conflict with provisions contained in laws” and that conflicting laws “shall take precedence over the policy.” See UNF Policy 1.0010P, at § 2.

It is true, as the majority and the dissent note, that none of these points were argued in the trial court. But that does not matter. This analysis is not presented as an independent basis for reversal; it is simply presented to highlight what I consider to be the main flaw in the “tipsy coachman” basis for affirmance asserted by the dissent. I am not aware of any principle of appellate practice or procedure that would preclude consideration of this analysis (or that in Judge Osterhaus’ opinion) for purposes of evaluating the viability of the “tipsy coachman” argument asserted by the dissent.

Furthermore, principles of judicial restraint counsel against addressing issues— particularly constitutional issues — which are not squarely presented by the facts or which are not necessary to resolve the ease before the court. Here, resolution of the constitutional issue injected by the original panel has no bearing on the outcome of this case because, as discussed above, the policy at issue in this case was not adopted by the BOG or pursuant to a clear delegation of the BOG’s purported power to adopt law-trumping regulations. Accordingly, there was no need for the court to even address the constitutional issue in this case and the majority opinion should have simply left resolution of the issue to another day.

. This statute was enacted in an effort to harmonize and delineate the respective "constitutional duties” of the Legislature and the BOG pertaining to the state university system. See ch. 2005-285, Laws of Fla. Among the constitutional duties of the BOG recognized in this statute is the "responsibility for ... [c]omplying with, and enforcing for institutions under the [BOG]'s jurisdiction, all applicable local, state, and federal laws." § 1001.705(2X0, Fla. Stat.

. This agreement was entered into by the BOG, the Florida Senate, the Florida House of Representatives, and the Governor in the circuit court case that culminated in Graham v. Haridopolos, 108 So.3d 597 (Fla.2013). The agreement is available online at http:// www.acad.usf.edu/News/Budget/docs/ 2010-03-24-SUS-Governance-Agreement.pdf.

. The majority and the dissent each make persuasive arguments on this constitutional issue, but as Judge Osterhaus’ opinion correctly recognizes, it is simply not necessary to reach or resolve the issue in this case. If and when the BOG adopts a regulation such as the policy at issue in this case that conflicts with state law, the merits of the constitutional issue discussed by the majority and the dissent will be ripe for resolution. Cf. Fla. Pub. Empls. Council 79, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Pub. Empls. Rels. Comm’n, 871 So.2d 270, 275 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (concluding that statute designating the "university board of trustees” as the public employer for university employees was "no longer enforceable” after the effective date of article IX, section 7, but affirming lower tribunal’s decision because the BOG had adopted a resolution consistent with the statute designating each BOT as the public employer for its employees). NAACP and Decker do not resolve this issue as the dissent contends. Those cases did not address the scope or extent of the regulatory authority granted by article IX, section 7, nor did they discuss section 1001.705, Florida Statutes. Rather, those cases simply stand for the unremarkable proposition that actions taken by the BOG (NAACP) or a university (Decker) pursuant to authority derived from the constitution are not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act. Cf. § 120.52(1), Fla. Stat. (defining "agency” to exclude governmental entities acting pursuant to powers derived from the constitution); see also Governance Agreement, supra, at (5)(b) (requiring the BOG to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act when adopting rules to implement legislatively delegated authority "for subjects outside the scope of the BOG’s constitutional authority”); § 1001.706(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (same).

. "Each board of trustees is responsible for compliance with all applicable laws, rules, regulations, and requirements." BOG Reg. 1.001(8)(e) (emphasis added).

. "Each board of trustees shall perform such other duties as provided by the Board of Governors, or as each board of trustees may determine are necessary or appropriate for the administration of the university so long as the trustees comply with any applicable laws and Board of Governors’ regulations and policies.” BOG Reg. 1.001(8)(f) (emphasis added).

. Available at http://www.unf.edu/uploaded Files/presidenl/trustees/Regulation DevelopmentProcedureforStateUniversity Boards% 20of% 20Trustees.pdf (hereafter "BOT Regulation Development Procedure”).

. This point is significant because the procedure by which the university administration adopts policies differs markedly from the procedure by which the UNF BOT adopts regulations. Compare Univ. of North Fla. Policy 1.0010P ("Policy Creation and Development Process”) with BOT Regulation Development Procedure, supra; see also Procedures and Policies for Promulgating Policies and Regulations (Univ. of North Fla. Aug. 2006) (available at https://www.unf.edu/presidem/ policies_reguIations/InternaLProcedures_for_ Promulgating_Polices_and_Regulations.aspx).

. No such delegation of authority appears in the UNF BOT's bylaws (available at http:// www.unf.edu/trustees/Bylaws.aspx), the resolution on presidential authority adopted by the UNF BOT (available at http://www.unf. edu/president/ Resolution_on_Presiden-tiaLAuthority.aspx), or the university’s constitution (available at https://www.unf.edu/ president/UNF_Constitution.aspx).

SWANSON, J.,

concurring.

I concur in the opinion of Judge Roberts. I specifically agree the trial court was in error when it relied upon section 790.115(2)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2011), to deny the requested relief below. In reversing the trial court, it is not necessary to disagree with the dissent’s proposition that the firearms policy adopted by the University of North Florida (UNF) could emanate from the power vested in the state university system and the statewide Board of Governors (the Board) by the terms of article IX, section 7 of the Florida Constitution. The Board has broad power to operate, regulate, control and be fully responsible for the management of the whole university system. That power, as vested in the Board and standing alone does not, however, give UNF the authority to restrict a citizen’s right to lawfully possess a firearm in their automobile, as authorized by the Legislature in section 790.251, Florida Statutes (2011).

An argument can be made that the Board could take such action under section 1001.706(7)(b), Florida Statutes (2011). Section 1001.706(7)(b) states in pertinent part:

(7) Powers and Duties relating to property.—

(b) The Board of Governors shall develop guidelines for university boards of trustees relating to the use, maintenance, protection, and control of university-owned or university-controlled buildings and grounds, property and equipment, name, trademarks and other proprietary marks, and the financial and other resources of the university. Such authority may include placing restrictions on activities and on access to facilities, firearms, food, tobacco, alcoholic beverages, distribution of printed materials, commercial solicitation, animals, and sound. The authority provided the board of trustees in this subsection includes the prioritization of the use of space, property, equipment, and resources and the imposition of charges for those items.

(Emphasis added.) While the Board arguably could develop guidelines to restrict on-campus access to firearms legally possessed in one’s automobile, no such guidelines have been promulgated.

The analysis in this case begins with the Legislature’s intent to occupy “the whole field of regulation of firearms” in section 790.33(1), Florida Statutes (2011). One then looks to the Legislative delegation of the power to restrict access to firearms as given the Board by way of section 1001.706(7)(b), and the Board’s authority to develop guidelines regarding the control of firearms. Operative statutory language material to prohibiting secured firearms in conveyances parked on campus is that the Board’s authority “may include placing restrictions on ... access to ... firearms[.]” § 1001.706(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). Pursuant to the above-referenced statutory authority, the Board has implemented a regulation. Board of Governors’ Regulation 1.001(7)(g) states in full:

Each board of trustees shall be responsible for the use, maintenance, protection, and control of, and the imposition of charges for, university-owned or university-controlled buildings and grounds, property and equipment, name trademarks and other proprietary marks, and the financial and other resources of the university.

(Emphasis added.) This regulation only generally addresses a university’s responsibility for the protection of its buildings and grounds. It does not address firearms lawfully possessed in one’s automobile. The Board’s regulatory silence on the lawful possession of a firearm, as authorized by section 790.251, is dispositive. Thus, even if this court concluded the Board could abrogate a citizen’s right to lawfully have a firearm in one’s car while on campus, the Board has not exercised that power.

In contrast, the Legislature has accorded the right to the citizens of this state “for self-defense” to possess a “securely encased” firearm in their private conveyances. See § 790.25(5), Fla. Stat. (2011). While it may be argued the Board is not precluded by the preemptive provisions of section 790.33(1) from limiting or restricting that right, no specific action has been taken pursuant to section 1001.706(7)(b) to effectuate that purported power.

I concur with the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s order of dismissal and order denying injunctive relief.

MAKAR, J.,

concurring with opinion.

I concur in the opinions of Judges Roberts and Osterhaus, and write separately to emphasize that Florida’s legal history on the right to keep and bear arms makes this a straightforward case. I also suggest that when panels ask the parties to address constitutional or other issues of statewide importance not raised in the briefing process, the Attorney General of the State of Florida should be notified so that she can choose to exercise her right to be heard on such matters.

I.

In Florida, the constitutional right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves is older than the State itself. The right dates back 175 years to the 1838 Florida Constitution, adopted by the Territory of Florida (formerly East Florida and West Florida), which was seeking admission into the Union at that time. Florida was admitted as the twenty-seventh State in 1845, and the constitutional right — with only a small gap — has endured ever since.

It is a personal, individual liberty, entitled to protection like other constitutional rights. Like any civil right established in the state or federal constitutions, the legislative branch may choose to pass laws designed to facilítate its exercise or protect against its infringement, which Florida’s legislature has done repeatedly over the past fifty years on the specific topic at issue: safely-secured firearms in motor vehicles.

As far back as 1965, the legislature made clear that the people have the right to travel in their vehicles with firearms that are secured in a way that renders them inaccessible for immediate use. Ch. 65-410, Laws of Fla.; see § 790.25(3)(i), Fla. Stat. Throughout this law’s history, the legislature has demanded that this right be liberally construed in favor of its exercise. § 790.25(4), Fla. Stat. In 1982, the Legislature strengthened and reinforced this right, making clear that people have the right “to possess a concealed firearm or other weapon for self-defense or other lawful purposes within the interi- or of a private conveyance, without a license, if the firearm or other weapon is securely encased or is otherwise not readily accessible for immediate use.” Ch. 82-131, Laws of Fla. Almost thirty years ago, the Florida Supreme Court upheld this right in Alexander v. State, 477 So.2d 557, 558 (Fla.1985), concluding that an employee sitting in his parked car in the employer’s parking lot has a right to possess a zippered pouch containing a firearm.

Handgun safety on school and school district property was a major concern in 1992 when the legislature enacted laws criminalizing conduct involving the possession of firearms and other specified weapons on school property. Ch. 92-130, Laws of Fla. In doing so, however, the legislature explicitly recognized as a lawful right — one under section 790.25, entitled “Lawful ownership, possession, and use of firearms and other weapons” — to have a firearm safely-secured in a vehicle on school property. § 790.115(2)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. The legislature made the judgment that a safely-secured firearm in a vehicle is permissible, even if that vehicle is parked in a lot or garage on school property. Because of greater sensitivities about K-12 district schools, the legislature carved out an exception: any of the sixty-seven “school districts” may adopt a contrary policy “for purposes of student and campus parking privileges” but schools — including universities — lack that authority. Id. The statute’s core provisions are unchanged over the last two decades.

The main purpose underlying these five decades of legislative protection of the right to a safely-secured firearm in a motor vehicle, and two decades of explicit protection of the right on school property, is the legislative judgment that persons desiring to exercise their right to keep and bear arms not be forced to leave their firearms at home when they travel by motor vehicle, sometimes through potentially dangerous neighborhoods or en route to engage in other lawful activities such as target shooting or hunting, as two examples. This purpose is highlighted in a recently enacted related law, section 790.251(4)(a), Florida Statutes, the “Preservation and Protection of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Motor Vehicles Act of 2008,” which strengthened existing legal protections for certain persons such as employees and customers who have secured firearms in their vehicles at private businesses.

However one views the advisability of the constitutional right to keep and bear arms generally, or the statutes facilitating the manner in which the right is exercised, the entire history on the subject demonstrates that the legislature has specifically and repeatedly protected the right of the people to have safely-secured guns in their vehicles for purposes of self-defense and other lawful purposes. This history makes this an easy case.

With the backdrop of 175 years of constitutional protection for the right to keep and bear arms in self-defense, supplemented by fifty years of statutory protection of the specific right to have a secured firearm in one’s vehicle, the university’s policy — as laudable as it may be — directly conflicts with this legal history. As Judge Roberts explains, a university’s general powers to administer its affairs under article IX, section 7 of the Florida Constitution and related statutes, does not trump this legal history. Whatever can be said of the state constitutional and statutory powers of universities, the Florida Constitution specifies without qualification that the “manner of bearing arms may be regulated by law.” Art. I, § 8(a), Fla. Const. The use of the phrase “by law” places this authority exclusively in the legislative branch. Placing limitations on the right to bear arms is a quintessentially legislative function under the Florida Constitution, which does not textually limit the right to bear arms to a particular place, such as in defense of the home only Rather, it speaks only in terms of the “right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves” without limiting where that self-defense might occur. Exercising its exclusive constitutional authority, the legislature has made the policy judgment that having secured weapons in motor vehicles on school property is a protected right. A university — which, unlike the legislature, lacks any specific constitutional authority to regulate on this topic — cannot override that judgment. This lack of constitutional authority empowering the university to regulate the manner of bearing arms is decisive. Even if it were not, to the extent the university believes its statutory authority should prevail, its general authority under section 1001.706(7)(b), Florida Statutes, is subordinate to the more specific statutes allowing safely-secured guns in vehicles. As Judge Osterhaus explains, universities lack the power to sweep aside the longstanding statutory protection of the right to have secured firearms in vehicles under the pretense that they are “school districts” implementing “noncriminal” policies or regulations. In addition, reading the general language of article IX, section 7 of the Florida Constitution broadly would effectively create a fourth branch of government, one with “edu-slative” powers that trump those of the legislative branch; nothing in the language of the amendment or its ballot title or summary suggested such a dramatic alteration to the fundamental three-branch structure of the state constitution.

Finally, merely because this case involves a policy that regulates student conduct does not grant the university immunity from the state and federal constitutions or statutory rights. It is worth noting that if a university, by administrative policy, could override a long-standing right of the people, including adult students, then seemingly little would stand in the way of a university policy that conflicted with, for example, environmental, health, or public safety laws or perhaps other constitution freedoms or statutory rights. If universities can regulate away a Second Amendment right, why not a First Amendment one? Or one protected by the Fourth or Fifth Amendment? This point is rhetorical, but nonetheless meaningful because campus authority unchecked can go astray of constitutional norms in many ways. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981) (exclusionary policy prohibiting student religious group from using university facilities open to other groups violates principle of content neutrality); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975) (temporary suspension from school without notice and chance to rebut charges violates due process); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (196