Oney v. State (170 S.W.2d 738, 1943)

KRUEGER, Judge.

The conviction is for failing to stop and render aid to a person whom he (defendant) had struck with an automobile while driving along and upon a public highway. The punishment assessed is confinement in the county jail for a period of 180 days.

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to justify and sustain his conviction.

The record shows that on the 31st day of August, 1942, while appellant was driving an automobile along and upon Young Street in the city of Longview, he drove it upon and over Willie Pearl Smith, inflicting injuries upon her from the effect of which she died; that after he struck and knocked her down, he hurriedly drove away without stopping and rendering or offering to render any aid. Appellant, who testified in his own behalf, admitted that he struck the deceased with his automobile on Young Street. He also admitted that he did not stop to render aid, but claimed that he was so extremely frightened as a result of the occurrence that he could not stop and render any aid; that he drove home and sent his father to the scene of the accident to see what he could do for the injured person.

We deem the evidence ample to sustain the conviction. It seems that appellant entertains the idea that if the injury to the little girl, which resulted in death, was due to an unavoidable accident, he was entitled to an acquittal. It appears that he based his defense upon such a theory. This prosecution was brought under Art. 1150, P.C., which provides: “Whenever an automobile, motorcycle or other motor vehicle whatsoever, regardless of the power by which the same may be propelled, or drawn, strikes any person or collides with any vehicle containing a person, the driver of, and all persons in control of such automobile, motor vehicle or other vehicle shall stop and shall render to the person struck or to the' occupants of the vehicle collided with all necessary assistance including the carrying of such person or occupants to a physician or surgeon for medical or surgical treatment, if such treatment be required, or if such carrying is requested by the person struck or any occupant of the vehicle collided with”, etc.

It will be noted from the foregoing provision of the statute that it matters not whether the striking of the person was avoidable or unavoidable; the duty rested upon the accused, in any event, to stop and render all necessary assistance. To hold that when the striking of a person, which results in a broken leg or other injuries, is due to an unavoidable accident, that the operator of the motor vehicle may drive away and leave the helpless person lying at the point of collision to suffer unbea