Full opinion text
CHRISTIAN, J. The offense is aggravated assault; the punishment, a fine of $100 and confinement in jail for ninety days. Mora Munoz testified that appellant attacked him with a breast yoke. It was undisputed that serious bodily injury was inflicted upon Munoz. According to the testimony of appellant, he did not strike Munoz until he (Munoz) attacked him and his brother. Appellant and his brother had been jointly indicted for assault with intent to murder Munoz. It was under this indictment that appellant was tried and convicted of aggravated assault. Appellant made no request for a severance. Upon the trial Munoz testified that appellant’s brother did not participate in the attack upon him. Appellant moved to dismiss the indictment against his brother or else permit him to testify in his behalf. The motion was overruled. The hill of exception (No. 1) fails to show that the brother would have given testimony favorable to appellant. The testimony the witness would have given is not set forth in the bill of exception. Hence, if the court’s action in declining to permit the witness to testify was error — and this is not conceded — we are un-’ able to determine that the error, if any, was harmful. By bill of exception No. 2 it is disclosed ■that the court declined to permit appellant to ask the injured party if he had had any whisky in his house during the last two years. It is recited in the bill of exception that appellant expected to prove by the witness that he “had drunk on the evening of the fight.” In his qualification the court refers to page 6 of the statement of facts, wherein it is shown that the witness testified, in response to questions by appellant, that he was not drunk on the occasion of the assault, and that he had not been drinking on that occasion. The opinion is expressed that the bill of exception fails to manifest error. In response to questions by the county attorney, appellant testified that he had been convicted in Bell county of possession of intoxicating liquor for, the purpose of sale. In his argument the county attorney suggested ■to the jury that appellant was not worthy of belief because of the fact that he had been convicted of the offense mentioned, and had been pardoned in a few days after his conviction. Appellant objected to the argument, and the court overruled the objection. The argument was warranted. In passing upon appellant’s credibility as a witness, it was proper for the jury to consider the’fact that he had theretofore been convicted of a felony. Failing to • find ' error, the judgment is affirmed. PER CURIAM. The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
On Motion for Rehearing. MORROW, P. J. By' separate indictments Bob Frazier and Rube Frazier were charged with an assault upon Munoz. On the, trial no testimony was adduced against Bob Frazier, whereupon Rube Frazier,, the appellant, requested the court to dismiss the prosecution against Bob Frazier so that he might become a witness for the appellant. , Ordinarily, .where persons áre indicted for the same offense either in a joint or. separate indictment, a severance may be had under proper conditions, and, if the one first, tr-ied is, acquitted, his testimony becomes available to his codefendarit. C. C. P. arts. 650 and 651. The statute permits, in the event of a.severance, an agreement as to the order of trial.! It also permits a dismissal -by the prosecution which would restore the com--petency of. the éode,fendant as .a witness. C. O. P. arts. 652 and-653.; Jones v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. R. 538, 214 S. W. 322. ..Article 654, -C. C. P., reads as follows: “When it is apparent-that there is no evidence against a defendant jointly prosecuted with others, the jury shall be directed to find a verdict as-to such"'defendant; and, if they acquit, he may'be introduced as a witness in the case.”- ’ • ■ In-the present instance, it does not appear that there was a joint trial; nor is- the failure -to. apply-.- for a- severance explained. In the books are instances in which a reversal was ordered, though there was neither a sev? erance nor. a joint trial, ¡-but .in which on appeal ■ it was made to appear that one who would have. been otherwise competent and material to the accused- as a witness was in bad faith indicted or charged with the same offense in order to deprive the accused on trial -of his testimony. Such was' the case of Doughty v. State, 18 Tex. App. 179, 51 Am: Rep. 303, to which the appellant refers. See, also, Dodson v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. R. 247, 106 S. W. 378; Cundiff v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. R. 477, 218 S. W. 771; Fagan v. State, 112 Tex. Cr. R. 107, 14 S.W.(2d) 838; Lyles v. State, 41 Tex. 172, 19 Am. Rep. 38. Nothing in the present record brings the appeal within the purview of the principle last mentioned above. If it be assumed that in refusing to annul the prosecution against Bob ’Frazier the trial court was in error, this court would not be in a position to estimate the effect 'of the error, for the reason that the testimony expected from' .Bob Frazier is not made known. That the' refusal of the trial court to receive the testimony of a given witness cannot be intelligently -reviewed on appeal when the complaint is not accompanied by information showing the nature of the testimony expected seems obvious. Moreover, this court has uniformly declared such a bill of exceptions inadequate. Welch v. State, 57 Tex. Cr. R. 111, 122 S. W. 880; Hobbs v. State, 16 Tex. App. 521; Massey v. State, 1 Tex. App. 569; Walker v. State, 9 Tex. App. 200, and numerous other precedents collated by Mr. Branch in his Ann. Tex. P. 0. p. 135, § 212. The motion for rehearing is overruled.