Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. Rutledge (492 S.W.2d 622, 1973)

PHILLIPS, Chief Justice.

In Cause No. 12009, the trial court held that the term “primary American source of supply”, Article 666-15½, subd. A(9)(b), Vernon’s Ann.Texas Penal Code was unconstitutionally vague and set aside the order of the Commission refusing Rutledge’s application for renewal of a Nonresident Seller’s Permit. The Commission had denied the application for renewal on the basis that Rutledge could not qualify as a primary American source of supply.

This case is reversed and rendered by authority of our decision in a companion case handed down this day: Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. Major Brands of Texas, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 492 S.W.2d 616.

In view of our holding in Cause 12009, the appeal in Cause No. 12022 becomes moot. In Cause No. 12022, Rutledge is appealing from a second denial of a Nonresident Seller’s Permit by the Commission based on the finding of a prohibited “tied house” relationship between applicant and Major Brands of Texas, Inc., the holder of a Texas Wholesaler’s Permit. Article 666-17b(2)(e), Vernon’s Texas Penal Code (Article 1, Section 17b(2)(e) of the Texas Liquor Control Act).

We reverse and render Cause No. 12009. We dismiss Cause No. 12022.

Cause No. 12009 reversed and rendered. Cause No. 12022 dismissed.

SHANNON, J., dissents.