Full opinion text
OPINION MALONEY, Judge. Appellant was indicted and convicted in Dallas County on a charge of Capital Murder. TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. 19.03(a)(2). The indictment alleged that appellant caused the death of the deceased by shooting him with a firearm in the course of appellant’s attempt to commit robbery of Mark DeCardenas. The jury answered the issues submitted to it in the affirmative and the trial court assessed the death penalty. Article 37.071 V.A.C.C.P. Direct appeal was had to this Court. Article 37.071 § 2(h) V.A.C.C.P. Appellant has raised fifty-four points of error in this appeal. A discussion of the facts is necessary to fully address appellant’s fifty-first point of error, alleging insufficiency of the evidence. The week of the robbery, appellant and two longtime friends, Tony Ray Harvey and Tracy Stallworth met in Dallas. Appellant and Harvey at that time were residents of Houston and Stallworth resided in Dallas. Harvey testified at trial that he, Stallworth and appellant stole an Oldsmobile Cutless and parked it in a hotel parking lot until the morning of the robbery. On February 26,1988, the morning of the robbery, appellant, Harvey and Stallworth rented a blue Plymouth, retrieved the stolen Oldsmobile and drove it and the Plymouth to an area near Brancatos Grocery, where they parked the Oldsmobile in the parking lot across from Brancatos Grocery and all three then drove the Plymouth to a parking lot down the street. While appellant and his cohorts were parking in this lot, two passing police officers stopped and briefly questioned them as to what they were doing. Stallworth responded that they were waiting for a bus. Having no reason to inquire further, the officers went on their way. Mark DeCardenas, the owner of Brancatos Grocery, testified that he had noticed a blue Plymouth driving or parked near the store several times earlier on the day of the robbery. About 4:30 p.m., Mark DeCardenas and the deceased, an off-duty police officer who worked part-time as a security guard at the store, drove to the bank to obtain cash in the amount of $30,000.00, necessary for the store’s check cashing service. This additional money was needed in order to cash the number of paychecks customary for a Friday afternoon. Harvey testified at trial that when appellant, Harvey and Stall-worth saw DeCardenas and the deceased returning from the bank, appellant and Harvey got out of the Plymouth, into the Oldsmobile and drove to the parking lot across from Brancatos Grocery. Testimony at trial showed that DeCardenas and the deceased were approached by appellant as they walked across the parking lot and that appellant attempted to grab the paper bag containing the money from DeCardenas. The deceased instructed DeCardenas to run into the store and pushed him toward the door. The bag containing the money was dropped in the scuffle. According to testimony at trial, appellant backed away from the scene, shooting at the deceased, got into the Oldsmobile with Harvey and drove away. The deceased shot at the retreating Oldsmobile, shattering the back window. The deceased sustained fatal gunshot wounds in the encounter. As the Oldsmobile left the scene, two police officers driving in the opposite direction noticed the broken rear window and, suspecting a stolen vehicle, followed it. When they caught up with the Oldsmobile, it was stopped in the middle of the street, the doors were open and the occupants were gone. A revolver, recovered from the floorboard, was established as the murder weapon. The license plate number of the rented blue Plymouth, obtained by the police officers who observed and questioned the trio before the robbery, was traced to Stall-worth’s girlfriend and led to Stallworth’s arrest. Based upon information from Stall-worth, the arrests of Harvey and appellant followed. Fingerprints obtained from the Plymouth and witnesses who identified appellant as the gunman corroborated Harvey’s testimony that appellant was the gunman. In his fifty-first point of error, appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s conviction for capital murder. Appellant points out that De-Cardenas was unable to identify appellant as the gunman. DeCardenas testified that he momentarily “blacked out” and did not see the perpetrator’s face. Appellant also argues that out of ten witnesses who viewed live lineups, only one positively identified appellant as the assailant and a number of witnesses identified persons other than appellant. Appellant further directs us to inconsistent descriptions of the gunman’s height, weight and clothing given to the police following the robbery. Appellant also argues that his fingerprints were not found on the gun, the grocery sack or anywhere in the stolen Oldsmobile. The State points to the testimony of witnesses who identified appellant as the gunman. In addition to Harvey, appellant’s longtime friend and accomplice to the offense, two other witnesses testified at trial that appellant was the triggerman. Frank Green, the manager of the grocery, testified that he viewed the attempted robbery from the store window and subsequently made a positive identification during a live lineup. Another witness, Oliver Powell, testified that he was crossing the parking lot when the Oldsmobile cut in front of him and appellant got out and approached De-Cardenas and the deceased. Powell further testified that appellant attempted to grab the paper bag containing the money from DeCardenas, that appellant then backed away from DeCardenas and the deceased, pulled out a gun and fired at the deceased. Powell testified that the day after the robbery, he identified appellant in a photo lineup. The State contends that despite some inconsistencies between descriptions given at the scene of the crime and appellant’s actual appearance, Powell’s and Green’s testimony is sufficient to satisfy the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence. With respect to the lack of fingerprints, the State points out that a glove was recovered from the stolen vehicle and appellant’s fingerprints were found in the blue Plymouth. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict”, Bowden v. State, 628 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), and ask whether “any rational finder of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 n. 12, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). Here, eye witnesses to the crime positively identified appellant as the gunman in photo and live lineups and at trial. Appellant’s fingerprints were found in the blue Plymouth which was observed by two police officers and DeCardenas as being near the scene of the crime close to the time of the offense. Appellant’s friend and cohort, Tony Ray Harvey, testified that the robbery was planned and committed by appellant, Harvey and Stallworth and that appellant was the gunman. However, the weight to be given to the testimony of Harvey, an accomplice in the subject crime, is governed by article 38.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which states that “[a] conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense.” The evidence at trial, apart from Harvey’s testimony, must “tend to connect” appellant with the robbery. The testimony of the other eye witnesses, the sightings of the blue Plymouth near the scene of the crime and the fingerprints of appellant found in the Plymouth all “tend to connect” appellant with the subject offense. The fact that the record contains some inconsistencies in the descriptions given of appellant does not render the evidence insufficient to support a conviction. Bowden, 628 S.W.2d at 784-85. Similarly, the fact that only one out of ten witnesses to the crime who were shown live lineups identified appellant as the gunman does not render the evidence insufficient. These facts and inconsistencies were presented to the jurors for their review and evaluation in light of all the evidence. Reconciliation of conflicts and inconsistent evidence are matters for consideration by the members of the jury. Id. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s conviction of appellant. Appellant’s fifty-first point of error is overruled. We now address the remainder of appellant’s points of error. In appellant’s first, second and third points of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his challenges for cause with respect to three venirepersons, Madie Harvey, Samuel Weldon Jackson and Johnny Lutt-rull, alleging that their testimony reflected that they would each be unable to assess the minimum five year sentence for murder in the event of a guilty verdict. Venireper-son Jackson was further challenged for cause because Jackson allegedly would require appellant to present mitigating evidence before he would answer “no” to submitted issue number two and also because Jackson allegedly was biased due to his exposure to pretrial publicity. Quoting from this Court’s decision in Pierce v. State, 604 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), appellant argues that the subject venirepersons should have been excused for cause because appellant is “entitled to have jurors who believe in the full range of punishment.” Appellant claims that because of the trial court’s ruling he was forced to use peremptory strikes to exclude these venirepersons and was accordingly deprived of the use of those peremptory challenges to exclude subsequent venirepersons which he found objectionable. Since a number of appellant’s points of error complain that the trial court improperly overruled certain of appellant’s challenges for cause, we shall discuss here the proper standard in reviewing such rulings and will not fully repeat this discussion when addressing each such point of error. “[T]he proper standard to be used in disqualifying prospective jurors in death penalty cases is to determine whether their views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors in accordance with the instructions given and the oaths taken.” Jacobs v. State, 787 S.W.2d 897, 402 (Tex.Cr.App.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 882, 111 S.Ct. 231, 112 L.Ed.2d 185 (1990) (citations omitted). In reviewing the decisions of a trial court in this regard, we have repeatedly recognized that considerable deference must be given to the trial judge who is in the best position to observe the prospective jurors and evaluate their responses. Id.; Fuller v. State, 827 S.W.2d 919, 924 (Tex.Cr.App.1992). A trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause will be reversed only when the record shows a clear abuse of discretion. Jacobs, 787 S.W.2d at 402; see also Farris v. State, 819 S.W.2d 490, 501 (Tex.Cr.App.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1278, 117 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992). In examining the record we review the testimony of the questioned venireper-son “as a whole.” Farris, 819 S.W.2d at 501. With respect to appellant’s points of error one, two and three, in assessing a potential juror’s capacity to consider the full range of punishment available, we examine the juror's testimony as a whole and determine whether the questioned juror’s view of the range of punishment amounts to bias or prejudice against the law. See, e.g., Pyles v. State, 755 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Tex.Cr.App.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 986, 109 S.Ct. 543, 102 L.Ed.2d 573 (1988); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Crane v. State, 786 S.W.2d 338, 343 (Tex.Cr.App.1990). Generally, where it is clear from the responses given by a prospective juror that he is unable to consider the full range of punishment available for the crime committed, he is deemed biased as a matter of law and a challenge for cause should be granted. Nethery v. State, 692 S.W.2d 686, 691 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1110, 106 S.Ct. 897, 88 L.Ed.2d 931 (1986). However, “where the juror states he believes that he can set aside any influences he may have, and the trial court overrules a challenge for cause, its decision will be reviewed in light of all the answers the prospective juror gives.” Anderson v. State, 633 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). Here, the record reflects that even though the questioned venirepersons initially expressed certain reservations about assessing the minimum sentence of five years in a murder case, each of them nevertheless ultimately testified that they could follow the law and keep an open mind when assessing the range of punishment in light of the evidence presented. Because their testimony reflected that they would follow the law and be willing to assess the minimum sentence under the appropriate facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant’s challenges for cause on the issue of whether venireper-sons Harvey, Jackson, and Lutrull could consider the full range of punishment and would not be biased in answering the submitted issues. Faulder v. State, 745 S.W.2d 327, 339-40 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). We also find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding no merit in appellant’s other allegations with respect to venireman Jackson. Appellant contends that Jackson would place an unacceptable burden on the defense by requiring the defense to present mitigating evidence with respect to submitted issue number two. However, the record on voir dire does not indicate that Jackson would require the defense to present such evidence in order to answer “no” to submitted issue number two. Jackson testified that he would like to be presented with evidence of appellant’s character, prior offenses and “anything that would help me make a decision” prior to responding to submitted issue number two. This testimony merely evidences Jackson’s desire to review the relevant facts before making a decision. Moreover, Jackson testified that if the only evidence presented were the facts of the subject crime, he would answer “no” to submitted issue number two. Appellant also claims that Jackson was biased because of his exposure to pretrial publicity. In response to questions concerning pretrial publicity, Jackson informed the court that the deceased’s wife had been his daughter’s school teacher at the time of the offense and also testified that he had heard radio news reports and had read newspaper articles about the shooting. However, Jackson testified that he had not formed an opinion regarding appellant’s guilt or innocence that would influence his decisions in reaching a verdict. Specifically, with respect to the deceased’s wife, Jackson stated that he had met her on only one occasion and unequivocally testified that he would be able to keep an open mind with respect to her testimony- Article 35.16(a)(10) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that if, from exposure to pretrial publicity such as newspaper articles or other media, a prospective juror forms a conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant that would influence his verdict, he must be discharged. Article 35.16(a)(10) V.A.C.C.P.; see also Faulder, 745 S.W.2d at 340-41. However, where, a prospective juror testifies that he is able to set aside any outside influences and render a fair and impartial verdict based upon the evidence presented, the denial of a challenge for cause will not be error. Id; see also Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780, 797 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046, 107 S.Ct. 910, 93 L.Ed.2d 860 (1987); Anderson, 633 S.W.2d at 854 (denial of challenge for cause not error even when juror knew rape victim and witnesses); Esterline v. State, 707 S.W.2d 171, 175 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1986, pet. ref’d) (where juror stated that he could be fair and had not formed an opinion about guilt or innocence, the court did not err in overruling challenge for cause even though juror was a police officer and knew police officers who would be testifying at trial). Here, Jackson agreed during voir dire that he had not reached any conclusion regarding appellant’s guilt or innocence. In light of Jackson’s testimony that his verdict would not be influenced by any of the pretrial elements to which he had been exposed, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing appellant’s challenge for cause against Jackson. Appellant’s points of error one, two and three are overruled. In his fourth and fifth points of error, appellant alleges that the trial court erred in overruling his challenges for cause with respect to venirepersons Harvey and Lutt-rull on the ground that they would always answer “yes” to submitted issue number one in the event of a finding of guilt. Although venireperson Harvey testified that she found it “difficult” to make a distinction between the terms intentional and deliberate, she agreed that there is enough difference between the two terms so as to amount to a barrier. Further, Harvey stated unequivocally that she would follow her oath and answer the issues based upon the evidence. In view of Harvey’s testimony that she recognized a distinction between the terms “intentional” and “deliberate” and agreed to follow her instructions and consider the evidence presented in answering the submitted issues, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant’s challenge for cause against prospective juror Harvey. Appellant’s point of error number four is overruled. We also hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant’s challenge for cause with respect to venireperson Luttrull. Appellant argues that because Luttrull testified that he did not consider a deliberate act to require more than an intentional act, he was essentially applying a legally unacceptable standard. Appellant bases this argument upon Luttrull’s voir dire testimony that he believed a person could deliberately, but not necessarily intentionally, shoot and kill another person. However, when subsequently questioned by defense counsel as to whether one could conclude, then, that “if a person intentionally kills a person that would then always be deliberate”, Luttrull disagreed. In response to further questions of defense counsel as to whether he could answer submitted issue one in the negative and find that the accused did not act deliberately, even after a finding that he had acted intentionally, Luttrull responded that he could. Following completion of questioning by the defense, the State further instructed Luttrull on the distinction between intentional and deliberate and Luttrull agreed that “deliberate should mean more than intentional.” An isolated statement will not require that a juror be struck for cause when his testimony taken as a whole indicates that he is not biased. Fearance v. State, 771 S.W.2d 486, 500 (Tex.Cr.App.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 927, 109 S.Ct. 3266, 106 L.Ed.2d 611 (1989). Even if Luttrull did have some initial confusion as to the distinction between the terms, his later testimony reflected otherwise. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Luttrull’s initial testimony did not reflect that he maintained a view that would prevent or impair his performance as a juror. See McCoy v. State, 713 S.W.2d 940, 951 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940, 107 S.Ct. 1590, 94 L.Ed.2d 779 (1987). Appellant’s fifth point of error is overruled. In his sixth point of error, appellant claims the trial court erred in overruling his challenge for cause with respect to veniremember Russell Cowan on the ground that Cowan would automatically answer all three submitted issues in the affirmative upon a finding of guilt. Appellant further alleges that venireperson Co-wan’s views on sentencing issues are such that they would substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror and that he would impose the death penalty “in an arbitrary and capricious manner.” In addressing the issue of responding “automatically” to the submitted issues upon a finding of guilt, this Court has stated: More to the point is the question whether finding of guilt would ‘automatically’ dictate a result in the mind of the venireman as to special issues, without consideration of the guilt evidence as it relates particularly to resolution of those issues. For only upon manifesting an inability, once the issue of guilt has been resolved against the accused, to reconsider guilt evidence in the particular context of special issues, has a venireman demonstrated himself unable objectively to follow the law. Gardner v. State, 730 S.W.2d 675, 680 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 905, 108 S.Ct. 248, 98 L.Ed.2d 206 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the crucial consideration is whether the veniremember is able to re-examine the evidence of guilt in the context of the submitted issues. Appellant alleges that Cowan’s failure to distinguish between “intentional” and “deliberate” in the context of the first submitted issue, would lead Cowan to automatically respond in the affirmative upon a finding of guilt. Contrary to appellant’s contentions, Cowan repeatedly agreed that he could distinguish between “intentionally” and “deliberately” and that deliberately means something more than intentionally. He stated that if the State only proved intent, then “Question No. 1 hasn’t been fulfilled.” With respect to the second submitted issue, appellant claims that Cowan’s testimony that he believed there to be a greater likelihood a guilty party would commit a future crime than a person who had never committed a crime demonstrated that Co-wan would automatically answer submitted issue number two in the affirmative upon a finding of guilt. However, Cowan only testified that there was a "possibility” that he “could” answer in the affirmative based only upon a guilty finding. He did not state that he would automatically respond in that manner. In addition, as the State correctly points out, the facts and circumstances of a capital offense alone, if particularly heinous in nature, can be sufficient to support an affirmative response to the second submitted issue. Harris v. State, 738 S.W.2d 207, 225 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 207, 98 L.Ed.2d 158 (1987); but see Smith v. State, 779 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (nature of offense alone was here insufficient to prove future dangerousness). In discussing the third submitted issue, Cowan was asked to give an example of circumstances in which provocation would exist. The only example Cowan could think of was one involving self defense. Appellant contends that this testimony reflects that Cowan would automatically answer the third issue in the affirmative is unfounded. The fact that Cowan could only think of one situation in which there would be provocation within the scope of submitted issue three does not demonstrate unacceptable bias. See Harris v. State, 784 S.W.2d 5, 23-24 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1090, 110 S.Ct. 1837, 108 L.Ed.2d 966 (1990); McCoy, 713 S.W.2d at 951 (venireman’s inability to conceive of a situation where they would respond yes or no to a submitted issue is not grounds for reversal); There is ample evidence in the record to support the trial court’s decision to overrule appellant’s challenge against Co-wan based upon his views concerning the submitted issues. Cowan testified that he would have to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt on all three submitted issues, that he would keep an open mind to full range of punishment and that he would follow the “guidelines for me as a juror.” We hold the trial court did not err in finding that Cowan’s testimony as a whole showed that he would be able to “reconsider guilt evidence in the particular context of special issues”. We also find no basis in the record supporting appellant’s allegations that Cowan would impose the death penalty in an “arbitrary and capricious manner”. Appellant does not point to any specific testimony in support of his contention, except to assert Cowan maintained an opinion that the submitted issues do not serve as barriers to the death penalty. We do not find support for appellant’s contentions in the record. Appellant’s sixth point of error is overruled. In points of error seven and eight, appellant alleges that the trial court erred in overruling his challenges for cause with respect to venirepersons Samuel Carl Joiner and Judy Lee Smith Woods on the ground that they would each answer submitted issue number two “yes” in the event of a finding of guilt. Because appellant failed to preserve any error for review with respect to venireperson Smith, we will only address appellant’s claims with respect to Joiner. Although the record reflects that Joiner expressed initial reservations with respect to the second submitted issue, he ultimately testified that he would consider all of the evidence presented and require the State to meet its burden on each submitted issue. In addition, although Joiner agreed it would be hard not to assume that a guilty party would be capable of committing another crime he nevertheless testified that he could remain open minded in considering the facts and circumstances. We hold, in light of his testimony taken as a whole, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant’s challenge against Joiner. Appellant’s seventh and eighth points of error are overruled. In his ninth point of error, appellant claims the trial court erred in overruling his challenge for cause against venire-person Roni Allen, alleging that her answers regarding submitted issues one and two indicated that she maintained a bias that would impair the performance of her duties as a juror. Specifically, appellant points to Allen’s testimony that upon a finding of guilt, she would automatically answer submitted issues one and two in the affirmative. Appellant also claims that Allen’s testimony that she would presume a defendant had intent to kill if it were proven that he had a firearm in the course of committing a robbery, demonstrates that she would effectively dispense with the State’s burden to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt. The State argues that Allen was sufficiently rehabilitated by the trial court which questioned Allen further on submitted issue number one. Review of the record shows that venire-person Allen agreed with the defense counsel that if the State proved “that when the defendant killed the deceased, he acted with specific intent to kill, then, that would be enough for [her] to answer question No. 1 yes, that he did it deliberately and with a reasonable expectation that death would result.” However, the trial court specifically questioned her on this issue and solicited contrary responses, as did the State. In response to questions from the court, Allen agreed that upon a finding of guilt, she would re-examine the evidence “to determine whether or not it was, in addition to the specific intent, it was also a deliberate act.” Allen also testified she would presume all three submitted issues to be “no” until proven otherwise and also that she would “go strictly with the evidence” in answering the submitted issues. Great deference is given to the rulings of the trial judge who was present to observe the demeanor of the prospective juror. Fuller, 827 S.W.2d at 924; Mooney v. State, 817 S.W.2d 693, 701 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). Particularly when a venireperson’s views are unclear or conflicting is the “trial judge in a unique position to determine whether those [views] would prevent or substantially impair the venireperson’s performance as a juror.” Farris, 819 S.W.2d at 501; see also Fuller, 827 S.W.2d at 924; Mooney, 817 S.W.2d at 701. Here, the trial court focused its attention on Allen’s responses pertaining to submitted issue number one, choosing to specifically question her in this regard. Although some of Allen’s testimony indicated that she would answer submitted issue one “automatically” in the affirmative, the record contains sufficient testimony to the contrary to hold that the trial court could reasonably have found that her testimony as a whole did not reflect a bias against the law. See Farris, 819 S.W.2d at 501. Appellant also claims that Allen would automatically answer submitted issue number two in the affirmative upon a finding of guilt. When questioned by defense counsel on the second issue, Allen agreed that if the State proved that the defendant was guilty as alleged in the indictment, she would answer question number two in the affirmative. Conversely, in response to subsequent questioning by the State, Allen agreed that she would consider each submitted issue as “serious barriers to the death penalty” and would answer no unless the State met its burden of proof. Allen also agreed that she would not automatically answer the submitted issues in the affirmative upon a finding of guilt and that her answers would depend on “[t]he whole picture.” Given Allen’s testimony as a whole, we cannot say that she indicated an “inability ... to reconsider guilt evidence in the particular context of special issues”, and accordingly, we will defer to the ruling of the trial court. Gardner, 730 S.W.2d at 680. With regard to Allen’s testimony, complained of by appellant, that she would presume a defendant acted with intent to kill based upon the fact that he committed a robbery with a firearm, review of the record shows that Allen was obviously confused about the defense counsel’s line of questioning in this regard. Regardless, this court has recognized that “the fact that a person is armed when entering the area of a crime or while committing a crime is itself of probative value in proving deliberate conduct.” Livingston v. State, 739 S.W.2d 311, 339 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210, 108 S.Ct. 2858, 101 L,Ed.2d 895 (1988). We have held that procuring and carrying a gun to a preplanned robbery can constitute evidence of deliberateness. Livingston, 739 S.W.2d at 339; Smith v. State, 676 S.W.2d 379, 393 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1061, 105 S.Ct. 2173, 85 L.Ed.2d 490 (1985). We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant’s challenge for cause on these grounds. Appellant’s ninth point of error is overruled. In his tenth point of error appellant claims that the trial court erred in overruling his challenge for cause with respect to venireperson Margaret Gumma, based upon her answers regarding submitted issues one and two. Appellant also contends that the totality of Gumma’s testimony indicates that she would be disqualified to serve under Wainwright. The record reflects that Gumma had an understanding of the concepts underlying the submitted issues and would require the State to prove each one before responding affirmatively. Where any of Gumma’s testimony reflected a bias against the law, when properly instructed on the law, she responded appropriately. In overruling appellant’s challenge against Gumma, the trial judge stated that it was his observation that “her responses to the concepts as presented by both sides were careful and reasoned responses” and that she was a “conscientious citizen” who would “diligently, conscientiously and faithfully, not only listen to the evidence, but with fidelity to her oath, follow the law to the nth degree.” Appellant’s tenth point of error is overruled. Appellant alleges in his eleventh and twelfth points of error that the trial court erred in overruling his challenges for cause against veniremembers Terry Farrar and Jo Ann Brooks, based upon their testimony pertaining to submitted issue number one. Appellant claims Farrar and Brooks should have been excused because they were unable to distinguish between the terms “intentional” and “deliberate” and consequently would automatically answer the first submitted issue in the affirmative upon a finding of guilt. Appellant specifically argues that Farrar would automatically respond affirmatively to the first submitted issue based upon his testimony that carrying a loaded gun in the commission of a robbery would evidence deliberate conduct. Farrar actually testified that taking a loaded gun to a robbery evidences that the defendant is “going prepared” and that there is “some thought process there that I would tie into deliberately.” As we stated previously in this opinion, evidence that a defendant carried a loaded gun with him in the commission of a robbery is probative of whether the defendant acted deliberately. See Livingston, 739 S.W.2d at 339. Furthermore, review of the record shows that Farrar clearly recognized a difference between the terms “intentionally” and “deliberately”, testifying that “intentional shows less thought process before doing it. Deliberate shows more.” Appellant’s eleventh point of error is overruled. With respect to venireperson Brooks, the record reflects the existence of some confusion regarding her understanding of the two terms. When responding to questions from defense counsel, Brooks stated that she would automatically answer the first submitted issue in the affirmative upon a finding of guilt. When questioned by the State, Brooks testified that she would not automatically answer the submitted issue, and agreed that she would require the State to prove it. Because of Brooks’ apparent confusion and vacillation, the trial judge further instructed and questioned her on the distinction between the terms. In response to the court’s inquiries, Brooks consistently indicated that she grasped the distinction between the terms and agreed that she would hold the State to its burden of proving deliberate conduct in order to answer the first issue in the affirmative. As previously stated, when presented with a prospective juror whose testimony is “vacillating” or “equivocating,” we will defer to the trial judge who had the opportunity to observe and evaluate components that are insightful to the juror’s views but which are not reflected on the face of the record, such as demeanor, inflection and expression. E.g., Fuller, 827 S.W.2d at 924; Farris, 819 S.W.2d at 501. While it is true that Brooks’ testimony evidenced some confusion in distinguishing between “intentional” and “deliberate” conduct, she ultimately agreed that there was a difference between the terms and that she would require the State to prove that the defendant acted “deliberately” before responding affirmatively to submitted issue number one. Based upon Brooks’ testimony as a whole, we hold the trial court could reasonably have concluded that her views, although somewhat vacillating, would not “prevent or substantially impair” her role as a juror. Appellant’s point of error number twelve is overruled. Appellant alleges in point of error thirteen that the trial court erred in overruling his challenge for cause against venireper-son Theresa Moore based upon her testimony pertaining to submitted issue number two. Appellant claims that Moore’s testimony indicated that she was so confused about submitted issue number two that she would only be able to respond affirmatively- Moore initially agreed with defense counsel that upon a finding of guilt she would answer issue two in the affirmative. However, upon further instruction and questioning by the State, Moore agreed that she would presume submitted issue number two to be no until the State presented enough evidence to prove otherwise. She agreed that there may be fact situations where a defendant found guilty of capital murder would not be a continuing threat to society. When asked by defense counsel why she had changed her views about the second submitted issue, Moore stated that initially she had not been considering the “broad spectrum of how murders can take place.” For the remainder of her testimony Moore was unequivocal in stating that she would not answer the second submitted issue “yes” automatically upon a finding of guilt. Any further confusion expressed by Moore was not about the submitted issue itself or the law, but was in response to the confusing line of questioning by the attorneys. Although Moore’s initial testimony indicated that she would respond automatically in the affirmative to submitted issue two upon a finding of guilt, the record shows that she was rehabilitated by the State, and thereafter consistently testified that she would hold the State to its burden of proving the submitted issue. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s challenge for cause. See, e.g., McCoy, 718 S.W.2d at 951. Appellant’s thirteenth point of error is overruled. In points of error fourteen, twenty and twenty-one appellant argues that the trial court erred in overruling his challenge for cause against venireperson Joan Smyth because of her alleged inability to consider the full range of punishment and distinguish between the terms “intentional” and “deliberate” in the context of the submitted issues. Appellant claims that the totality of Smyth’s testimony reflected that she was so biased in her views that she would be prevented or impaired in performing her duties as a juror. As we stated previously in this opinion, when assessing a potential juror’s capacity to consider the full range of punishment, we review the testimony as a whole and determine whether the questioned juror’s view of the range of punishment amounts to bias or prejudice against the law. E.g., Pyles, 755 S.W.2d at 103. When questioned by defense counsel as to whether she would be willing to assess the minimum five year sentence in “a murder case ... regardless of the facts and circumstances,” Smyth replied that she did not believe that she would. Later, when reminded by the State of the many possible fact scenarios that might be presented in a murder case, Smyth agreed that she would keep an open mind to the entire range of punishment, even to a five year sentence, if warranted by the facts. Based upon all of Smyth’s testimony concerning the range of punishment, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant’s challenge for cause on the grounds that Smyth was unable to consider the full range of punishment. Appellant claims that Smyth should have been excused because she was unable to “articulate any real difference between ‘intentional’ and ‘deliberately’ in special issue no. 1.” When asked to describe the difference between the terms, Smyth testified: A. Well, deliberately and intentional kind of seem the same until you think about it a little bit. My definition of deliberate would be, you know, planned in a purpose, that would be my ultimate goal, deliberate. Intentional means that may or may not, you know, may or may not depending on the circumstances. I intend to go to town, but I may not get there. My intentions may be different than what actually happens. I intend to pay my bills on time, but for some reason or another, I don’t get — you know. Q. What if you intend to pay your bills on time, and do, in fact, pay them on time? Would that mean to you that it was not only intentional but that it was deliberate? A. Well, that’s true. I mean in that concept, that’s the way I am. I intend to and I deliberately do that. But— Q. You see— A. Yes, I see what you’re saying. Q. In the context of a capital murder case if the intent is not carried out, we’re not here to begin with? A. Yes, right. Q. But, still with that, do you believe you see a difference in the two concepts? A. Yes, I believe I do, but I’m not that articulate to come up with a— Although Smyth clearly had trouble articulating the distinction between the terms, she stated repeatedly and consistently that she did recognize a difference between the terms and agreed that she could conceive of a situation where she might find that a defendant acted intentionally but not deliberately. Based upon Smyth’s testimony as a whole, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion overruling appellant’s challenge for cause with respect to Smyth’s answers on the first submitted issue. Appellant’s points of error fourteen, twenty and twenty-one are overruled. In his twenty-second point of error, appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his request for an additional peremptory strike to exclude venireperson Smyth. Appellant did not cite a single authority or point to any facts in support of this bare assertion and the State did not address this point of error. We will address this point of error although not properly briefed. It is clearly within the discretion of the trial court to grant additional peremptory challenges upon exhaustion of the statutory number of strikes. No abuse of discretion will be found for overruling a defendant’s request for additional strikes in the absence of “wrongdoing” on the part of the trial court. Thomas v. State, 701 S.W.2d 653, 658 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). Such wrongdoing may exist if the trial court has improperly overruled a defendant’s challenge for cause and the defendant has accordingly used a strike on a juror who is subject to a challenge for cause. Id. We do not in this appeal hold that any of appellant’s challenges for cause were improperly overruled. In the absence of any showing of wrongdoing on the part of the trial court, it was not error for the court to refuse appellant’s request for additional challenges. Appellant’s point of error twenty-two is overruled. In points of error fifteen and sixteen, appellant claims that the trial court erred in excusing venirepersons Waldo Cecil and Melissa Kelly without a challenge for cause or submission by either party. Appellant claims that such action constituted fundamental error and therefore no objection was needed. The State contends that appellant’s challenges for cause were presumed. The State further asserts that even if the trial court did improperly dismiss the prospective jurors, it was not fundamental error and appellant’s failure to object waived any error. The record is clear that counsel for the defense did not expressly challenge either prospective juror for cause. Although it appears that they were both excused under the assumption that the defense intended to submit them for cause, we will assume, as appellant claims, that appellant did not intend to submit them for cause and the trial court excused them sua sponte. We need not, however, reach the issue of whether the trial court’s dismissal was improper, because even in the event of improper sua sponte dismissal of a prospective juror, the error is waived in the absence of an objection. Warren v. State, 768 S.W.2d 300, 303 n. 2 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 923, 109 S.Ct. 3253, 106 L.Ed.2d 599; Mays v. State, 726 S.W.2d 937, 950 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1079, 108 S.Ct. 1059, 98 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1988). Here, counsel for appellant was present at the time Cecil and Kelly were excused, but did not object to their excusáis. Accordingly, we hold that appellant waived the error, if any, and overrule points of error fifteen and sixteen. In his seventeenth point of error, appellant claims the trial court erred in excusing venireperson Roberta Wade because the State did not set forth the reasons for its challenge. Appellant also claims Wade was improperly excluded under Witherspoon because she did not exhibit any bias or prejudice. Article 35.16 provides that “[a] challenge for cause is an objection made to a particular juror, alleging some fact which renders him incapable or unfit to serve on the jury.” Article 35.16 V.A.C.C.P. (emphasis added). Clearly, under article 35.16, a challenge for cause, by definition, should allege facts explaining the basis of the challenge. Garcia v. State, 626 S.W.2d 46, 56 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). However, where the reason that the juror is incapable or unfit to serve is obvious to the court and opposing counsel and there is no indication that the parties were unaware of the grounds for the challenge, we hold that facts need not be alleged in making the challenge. See Miller v. State, 741 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061, 108 S.Ct. 2835, 100 L.Ed.2d 935 (1988). The reasons for the State’s challenge are apparent from Wade’s testimony. Immediately prior to each of the two times the State submitted Wade, Wade testified that she might feel compelled to abstain from answering the special issues in order to avoid imposition of the death penalty or that she would be unable to take the juror’s oath in order to avoid imposition of the death penalty. It is clear from the nature of the questions asked by defense counsel after the State’s submission that the defense was aware of the grounds for the State’s challenge. Defense counsel’s awareness of the grounds for the challenge was also evidenced by its objections to the court’s sustaining of the State’s challenge, which specifically addressed the issue of Wade’s ability to take the juror’s oath. We hold that the grounds supporting the State’s challenge for cause were obvious to the court and to opposing counsel and therefore the State’s challenge was sufficient even in the absence of factual allegations. We now address whether the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s challenge. Review of Wade’s voir dire testimony reflects that she was so uncomfortable with the notion of serving on a jury in a capital case that she stated she would feel compelled, if on such jury, to abstain from responding to the submitted issues. Although Wade agreed with defense counsel that, if on the jury, she would answer the issues truthfully as shown by the evidence and would not violate her oath, she later testified repeatedly that she would be unable to take the juror’s oath since it would compel her to vote and would not allow abstention. Following is a portion of Wade’s voir dire testimony: Q. [the State] ... And therefore, I gather, from what you have told us, that you could not take that oath because you cannot give us that assurance that your conscience would not insist that you abstain if that’s what it came down to? A. [Wade] Well, these three questions, I can answer because if someone proves to me these answers ought to be yes, I can say yes. But what I’m saying is, I don’t know that I want to be put in this position of having to say yes to these things and having the outcome be the death of someone. So, you’re probably right in that I can’t take that oath, because I’m still thinking of the bottom line. * * * * * * Q. ... only you can tell us if you can stand before this judge and take that oath to render a verdict strictly according to the evidence or if you’re saying, judge, I cannot take the oath, because I can foresee the possibility of being put in the position of having to abstain to be true to my conscience? A. Okay. I can foresee that possibility. Q. Okay. All right. Therefore you cannot take the oath? A. I think not. Q. ... If the honest answer is, you know, not only do I not want to be on the jury but I cannot take that oath because I realize that you may well have an intellectually — intellectual proof might be there right down the line, and yet I may have to literally tell the other 11 jurors, I abstain. If that possibility exists, then I submit that you are really not in a position to take the oath? A. I’m not. Q. Fine. You’re telling us firm and fixed, I cannot take the oath? A. I can’t when I know what the bottom line is. A juror who states that they are unable to take the juror’s oath because to do so would potentially place them in the position of having to impose the death penalty is subject to a challenge for cause. Goodwin v. State, 799 S.W.2d 719, 731-32 (Tex.Cr.App.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2913, 115 L.Ed.2d 1076 (1991). In Goodwin, as here, we were presented with a venireperson who stated that she would be unable to take the oath, but would follow it if compelled to take it. There, we said that: When a venireperson states that her convictions are so strong that she cannot take an oath, knowing that a death sentence is a possible result at trial, the venireperson is subject to challenge for cause. If the venireperson specifically states that she would be unable to take the oath required of a juror, then that venireperson has made it “unmistakably clear” that she could not be trusted to “abide by existing law” and “to follow conscientiously the instructions” of the trial judge. Id. (citations omitted). We further stated that “when faced with the ambiguous voir dire record of a venireperson who indicates both an inability to follow the law because of her views on the death penalty, and an ability to follow her oath and the law as instructed by the court, great deference should be given to the decision of the trial judge.” Id. Veniremember Wade’s testimony indicated that she would attempt to avoid her duties by either refusing to take the oath or abstaining from voting. Viewing her testimony as a whole and given Wade’s pronounced resistance to accept juror responsibility to the point of abstention from voting if selected to serve, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s challenge. Goodwin. Point of error seventeen is overruled. In point of error eighteen, appellant challenges the trial court’s excusal of prospective juror Steven DeJohn Hart on the grounds that he was a vacillating juror. Appellant contends that nothing under article 35.16 V.A.C.C.P. allows a juror to be challenged for cause solely because he is vacillating or equivocating in his answers. Appellant also claims Hart did not vacillate in his responses. During voir dire, Hart testified at least five times that he would automatically respond in the affirmative to the first submitted issue upon a finding of guilt. Hart also testified at least five times that he would not automatically respond in the affirmative to the first submitted issue upon a finding of guilt. Hart further testified approximately five times that he would automatically answer the second and/or third submitted issues in the affirmative upon a finding of guilt. However, he testified at least twice that he could envision a scenario where he would not answer all of the submitted issues in the affirmative. Despite his agreement at least five times that he would automatically answer the first submitted issue in the affirmative, Hart testified twice that in his opinion the State would never be able to offer enough evidence to prove deliberate conduct. Hart indicated on his questionnaire that he was opposed to the death penalty and testified in response to questioning by the State that he would never answer the submitted issues in the affirmative because of his opposition to the death penalty. However, he apparently abandoned those beliefs in responding to voir dire questions by defense counsel, testifying that he could answer the issues in the affirmative, if proven, even though the death penalty would be imposed. In granting the State’s challenge for cause, the trial judge concluded that “[wjhile a number of Mr. Hart’s responses were totally consistent with the lawful requisites of a juror in a death penalty case, the court found itself, as I’m sure counsel did, troubled extensively by the vacillation that Mr. Hart demonstrated with regard to counsel’s questions.” A prospective juror is subject to a challenge for cause where he is so vacillating in his responses as to create the impression that he would be “unable to faithfully and impartially” answer the submitted issues. Foster v. State, 779 S.W.2d 845, 851 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1039, 110 S.Ct. 1505, 108 L.Ed.2d 639 (1990); see Clark v. State, 717 S.W.2d 910, 914-15 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059, 107 S.Ct. 2202, 95 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987). In addressing the issue of the vacillating venireperson, we have stated that “[w]hen the record of voir dire is unclear, ‘there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.’ ” Foster, 779 S.W.2d at 851 (quoting Wainwright). Review of prospective juror Hart’s testimony demonstrates substantial vacillation in his responses regarding the submitted issues and his views on the death penalty and how they would impact his responses. We will defer to the trial court’s .finding that venireman Hart would be “unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law” and hold that there was no abuse of discretion in such determination. Foster, 779 S.W.2d at 851. Appellant’s point of error eighteen is overruled. In his nineteenth point of error appellant claims the trial court erred in overruling his challenge for cause against venireman Charles Bridges on the grounds that Bridges would give more credibility to the testimony of a police officer than the testimony of another person. The State contends that because Bridges was under consideration as an alternate juror only and since the alternate juror selected was dismissed from his duties prior to the deliberation of the panel, no harm resulted from the trial court’s ruling, even if it was in error. We agree with the State. Each of the parties was given one peremptory strike during examination for selection of an alternate juror. Bridges was the first venireperson examined for the position of alternate juror. Following the court’s overruling of appellant’s challenge, appellant exercised a peremptory challenge and Bridges was excused. The next veni-reperson examined, Mary Austin, was selected to serve as the alternate juror. Appellant did not attempt to challenge Austin for cause or object to her selection in any way. Immediately prior to dismissal of the jury for deliberation on the guilt/innocence portion of the trial, the court excused Austin from service. Selection of alternate jurors is treated as distinct and separate from selection of the primary panel. Following selection of the required number of jurors for the panel, the parties’ unused peremptory strikes are essentially wiped out and each party is given the designated number of strikes for use in selecting one or more alternate jurors. Article 35.15(d) Y.A.C.C.P. We see no reason why the rules for preserving error on challenges for cause during selection of an alternate juror should differ from those applicable during the primary panel selection. In order to preserve error on a challenge for cause, an appellant must show 1. The voir dire of the individual venire-person was recorded and transcribed. 2. The appellant at trial asserted a clear and specific challenge for cause clearly articulating the grounds therefore. 3. After the challenge for cause is denied by the trial court, appellant uses a peremptory challenge on that juror. 4. All peremptory challenges are exhausted. 5. When all peremptory challenges have been exhausted, appellant makes a request for additional peremptory challenges. 6. Finally, the defendant must assert that an objectionable juror sat on the case. The appellant should point out to the trial court that he is being forced to try the case with a juror seated whom he would have exercised a peremptory challenge had he had one. Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Cr.App.1989); see also Cumbo v. State, 760 S.W.2d 251, 254 (Tex.Cr.App.1988); Bell, 724 S.W.2d at 796; East v. State, 702 S.W.2d 606, 612 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1000, 106 S.Ct. 418, 88 L.Ed.2d 368; White v. State, 629 S.W.2d 701, 707 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 938, 102 S.Ct. 1995, 72 L.Ed.2d 457 (1982). In the absence of such a showing, the appellant fails to demonstrate harm. Clearly, the first three requirements necessary to preserve a challenge for cause were met. In addition, appellant exhausted his single peremptory challenge by striking venireman Bridges. However, at no time during or following Austin’s examination did appellant request an additional peremptory strike. Appellant also fails to point to an objectionable alternate juror since he made no objection to the only alternate seated, Austin. Moreover, although Austin was seated as a juror with the panel during the presentation of evidence at the guilt/innocence portion of the trial, she did not participate in the deliberations and therefore, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, she could not be said to have contributed to appellant’s conviction. Appellant’s point of error nineteen is overruled. In his twenty-third point of error appellant claims that the trial court erred in permitting the shackling of appellant during the voir dire, guilt/innocence and punishment portions of the trial, in the absence of evidence that appellant was a security threat. Appellant relies on several decisions of this court which held that reversible error exists where a shackled defendant is brought into the presence , of the jury unless the record demonstrates a good and sufficient reason for taking such measures. Appellant points out that the only explanation given by the court for the shackling was that it was done “at the suggestion and request of Dallas County deputy sheriffs.” The State argues that the threshold issue in determining whether the court abused its discretion in allowing the shackling of appellant is whether the jury observed the physical restraint of appellant. The State directs us to statements made by the prosecutor for the record that the restraints were not visible from the area where the jury would be seated, that appellant’s long pants would conceal the shackles and that a brief case or box could be placed in front of appellant’s legs to further assure that the jury would not see the leg restraints. Since there is no evidence that the jury actually saw the restraints, the State argues, there is no reversible error. When a defendant is viewed by the jury in handcuffs or shackles, his presumption of innocence is seriously infringed. Long v. State, 823 S.W.2d 259, 282 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). Only in rare circumstances is shackling called for, and in such event, the record must detail the grounds for such action. E.g., Long, 823 S.W.2d at 282; Marquez v. State, 725 S.W.2d 217, 228 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 201, 98 L.Ed.2d 152. The trial judge must set forth with specificity the reasons supporting his decision to restrain the defendant. See, e.g., Long, 823 S.W.2d at 282; Marquez, 725 S.W.2d at 228. On appeal the role of this court is to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in authorizing the restraint. Long, 823 S.W.2d at 282; Marquez, 725 S.W.2d at 227. Even if an abuse of discretion exists, reversal may not be called for if such abuse was harmless. Long, 823 S.W.2d at 283. In Long v. State, this court decided that in the absence of evidence that the jury actually saw the shackles, no reversible error exists. Id. There, the record was devoid of any evidence supporting the trial judge’s decision to shackle the defendant. Although this court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in shackling the defendant during his trial, we nonetheless held that, in the absence of evidence that the jury actually saw the shackles, the defendant was not harmed or prejudiced. Id. In the instant case, the record reflects that appellant was restrained by a two foot chain cuffing his feet and attached to an ankle bracelet. Defense counsel objected to the restraints and pointed to the lack of evidence that appellant had acted in such a way as to justify the use of the shackles. In response, the prosecutor noted for the record that the leg restraints could not be seen from the gallery where the jury would be seated. The judge then stated: Let the rec