Vactor v. State (181 S.W.3d 461, 2005)

OPINION

Opinion by

Justice CARTER.

After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence, Bruce Alan Vactor pled guilty to the offense of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) in an amount greater than one gram but less than four grams, a third-degree felony. See Tex. Health & Safety Code ANN. § 481.102(3)(D) (Vernon Supp.2005) (cocaine is group 1 drug); § 481.115(c) (Vernon 2003) (offense of possessing penalty group 1 drug). There was no negotiated plea agreement, and Vactor’s punishment range was enhanced by virtue of his plea of “true” to having been previously and finally convicted of one other felony offense. See Tex. PeN.Code Ann. § 12.42(c)(1) (Vernon Supp.2005) (enhanced range fifteen to ninety-nine years or life). The trial court sentenced Vactor to fifteen years’ imprisonment. Vactor now appeals, contending the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress in contravention of his state and federal constitutional rights. We affirm.

Vactor argues on appeal that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him. Alternatively, Vactor contends that, if the initial detention was proper, the subsequent invasive search was unlawful. In both arguments, Vactor claims the police searched him in violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and in violation of Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution. Vactor does not, however, provide argument or authority that the Texas Constitution is more comprehensive than the federal counterpart. Accordingly, we limit our analysis to the federal protections. Cf. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 328, 326 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).

A. Standard of Review

A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Carter v. State, 150 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.). If the trial court’s ruling is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case, we must affirm. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543-44 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Shaw v. State, 122 S.W.3d 358, 363 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.). “The general rule is that an appellate court should afford almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of the historical facts supported by the record, especially when the trial court’s fact-findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.” Carter, 150 S.W.3d at 235 (citing State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex.Crim.App.2000)). “At a suppression hearing, the trial court is the exclusive trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses.” Carter, 150 S.W.3d at 235 (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)). We should afford great deference to a trial court’s ruling on “application of law to fact questions,” also known as “mixed questions of law and fact,” if the resolution of those questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Carter, 150 S.W.3d at 235. However, we review de novo those issues and questions that do not turn on credibility or demean- or. Id.