Citations
- 476 S.W.3d 671
Full opinion text
OPINION
SUE WALKER, JUSTICE
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellee and Cross-Appellant American Hat Company (AHC) sued Appellant and Cross-Appellee Wise Electric Cooperative, Inc., for negligence following a catastrophic grass fire that consumed roughly. 1,200 acres and was caused by an overhead service wire becoming disconnected at a Wise Electric utility pole. Thick smoke from the fire damaged AHC’s inventory of 490,-092 hats and “hat bodies”; much of this inventory was stored , in twelve forty-foot sea containers parked outside AHC’s western-hat manufacturing plant in Bowie, Texas. Following a five-day bench trial, the trial court issued sixty-four findings of fact and seventeen conclusions of law and signed a judgment awarding AHC $13,385,969.37 in personal property damages and $5,100,379.00 for past lost-profits damages. The judgment also awarded’ Wise Electric a $49,188.31 credit and an offset of $2,578,067.00.. AHC and Wise Electric both perfected appeals..
Wise Electric raises seven issues on appeal; six issues challenge various aspects of the trial court’s damage findings, and one issue challenges the trial court’s finding that Wise Electric was negligent. AHC appeals the $2,578,067.00 offset. We will affirm the trial court’s judgment on negligence and. damages, and we will reverse the judgment’s offset award and remand that claim to the trial court.
II. OvbRview of Factual Background
The fire giving rise to this lawsuit originated at Wise Electric pole meter number 04610 located on Charles Anderson’s property in Wise County. In 1998, Wise Electric had installed an oyerhead service line at the pole utilizing a Burndy Insulink connector. The electrically-charged overhead service line became disconnected from one end of the Insulink connector, and the disconnected line contacted the ground wire on the pole, which caused electrical arcing. The arcing melted the ends of the metal wires in the disconnected line, and molten metal fell to the underly-. ing dry grass. It was a dry, windy day, and the grass ignited, resulting in the fire. In addition to approximately 900 to 1,200 acres of native grass, several structures, vehicles, and campers were consumed. Thirtythree fire trucks, an EMS 'vehicle, twenty other types of vehicles, an4 over one hundred fire-fighting personnel responded to assist in containing and extinguishing the fire.
The fire burned past the back of AHC’s western-hat manufacturing plant, burning barrels of lacquer located behind the factory and generating heat sufficient to cause bricks to pop from the building. Heavy smoke from the fire engulfed the plant, which housed machinery, some hat inventory, and some completed hats awaiting shipping. The smoke was so dense around the plant that visibility in that area was limited to ten feet and surrounding roads were blocked off. The smoke, soot, and ash penetrated AHC’s plant, entering through the ventilation system and from under the doors and sullying the plant’s walls, floors, and machinery. The smoke also penetrated the twelve forty-foot sea containers that were filled ydth additional hat inventory. A strong smoke stench saturated AHC’s entire inventory of 490,-092 western hats that were in various stages of completion and were stored either in the plant or in the sea containers. Photos were introduced into evidence showing the devastation wrought by the fire at and around AHC’s plant, An outside company was hired to clean the plant, and. AHC had to stop its manufacturing processes until the plant and equipment had been cleaned and until it had obtained new hat inventory.
III. Attack on Prior Judgment
In its seventh issue, Wise Electric requests that we reinstate the jury’s damages findings from the first trial.. Wise Electric asserts that this court erred in the reverse-and-remand judgment we issued after the first appeal in this case. But Wise Electric petitioned the Texas Supreme Court to review that judgment, the Texas Supreme Court denied Wise Electric’s petition, our mandate issued, and the case was remanded to the trial court and retried. Thus, our plenary jurisdiction over our judgment in the first appeal has 'expired. See Tex. R. App. 18.1,19.1; Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.225 (West' Supp. 2014).- We lack jurisdiction to reinstate the jury’s damage findings from thé first trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 19.3 (listing limited actions appellate court may take after expiration of plenary power over judgment), 43.2 (listing types of judgment an appellate court can render); see also Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 345-47 (Tex.2005) (recognizing that only void judgments are subject to collateral attack and that a judgment is void only when court had “no jurisdiction of the parties or property, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act”). We overrule Wise Electric’s seventh issue.
IV. Wise Electric’s Evidentiary-Sufficiency Challenges
Wise Electric’s first, second, third,' and fifth issues challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the, evidence to support the trial court’s . findings of fact concerning Wise Electric’s negligence and AHC’s damages.
A. Standards of Review
A trial court’s findings of fact have the same force and dignity as a jury’s answers to jury questions and are reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence1 to support them * by the same standards. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex.1994); Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex.1991); see also MBM Fin. Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., 292 S.W.3d 660, 663 n. 3 (Tex.2009). We defer to unchallenged findings of fact that are supported by some evidence. Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 518, 523 (Tex.2014). We review de novo the conclusions of law drawn by the trial court from the facts to determine their correctness. See BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex.2002). Because a trial court’s conclusions of law are not binding -on us, we will not reverse a trial , court’s judgment based on an incorrect conclusion of law when the controlling findings of fact support the judgnjent on a correct legal theory. See, e.g., Karns v. Jalapeno Tree Holdings, L.L.C., 459 S.W.3d 683, 690 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2015, pet. denied) (citing Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex.1998)).
We may sustain a legal-sufficiency challenge only when (l)the record discloses a complete' absence of evidence of a vital fact, (2) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital’ fact. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 334 (Tex.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1040, 119 S.Ct. 1336, 143 L.Ed.2d 500 (1999); Robert W. Calvert, “No Evidence" and “Insufficient Evidence” Points of Error, 38 Tex. L.Rev. 361, 362-63 (1960). In determining whether there is legally-sufficient evidence to support the finding under review, we must consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfin-der could and disregard evidence contrary to the finding unless a reasonable factfin-der could not. Cent. Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas, 228 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex.2007); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807, 827 (Tex.2005).
Anything more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding. Cont’l Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 450 (Tex.1996); Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 118 (Tex.1996). When the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, the evidence is no more than a scintilla and, in legal effect, is no evidence. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex.2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1030, 124 S.Ct. 2097, 158 L.Ed.2d 711 (2004) (citing Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex.1983)). More than a scintilla of evidence exists if the evidence furnishes some reasonable basis for differing conclusions by reasonable minds about the existence of a vital fact. Rocor Int’l, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 77 S.W.3d 253, 262 (Tex.2002).
When reviewing an assertion that the evidence is factually insufficient to support a finding, we set aside the finding only if, after considering and weighing all of the evidence in the record pertinent to that finding, we determine that the credible evidence supporting the finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that the answer should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986) (op. on reh’g); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965).
B. Negligence
In a portion of its fifth issue, Wise Electric argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove that it was negligent and that its negligence was the proximate cause of the fire. Wise Electric’s fifth issue indicates that it challenges findings of fact 12,13,15(2), 19, 20 through 25, and 39 and conclusions of law 1,2,3, 5, 7, and 8.
1. The Elements of Negligence
To sustain a negligence action, the plaintiff must produce evidence of a legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by that breach. See, e.g., Lee Lewis Constr., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778, 782 (Tex.2001). The components of proximate cause are cause in fact and foreseeability. See, e.g., Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex.1995). The test for cause in fact is whether the negligent “act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about injury,” without which the harm would not have occurred. Id. Foreseeability requires that a person of ordinary intelligence should have anticipated the danger created by a negligent act or omission. Id. (citing Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 549-50 (Tex.1985)). The danger of injury is foreseeable if its “general character ... might reasonably have been anticipated.” Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 551 (quoting Carey v. Pure Distrib. Corp., 133 Tex. 31, 124 S.W.2d 847, 849 (1939)).
2. Evidence of Breach and Causation
The evidence conclusively established that the fire started when an overhead service line at a Wise Electric utility pole located on the Anderson property (pole number 04610) became disconnected from one end of a Burndy Insulink connector. The dispute at trial centered on ivhy the service line became detached from the .connector. AHC asserted that the service line became detached because a Wise Electric lineman had negligently installed the service line into the Burndy Insulink connector by failing to crimp one end of the connector — the end from which the wire became disconnected — and by failing to perform a tug test on the line. Wise Electric, on the other hand, asserted that several possibilities could not be eliminated, including that the service line had become disconnected by high winds or by someone intentionally disconnecting' it or that the service line had failed prior to the fire.
a. Testimony of Doug Page
Doug Page is the Fire Chief for the City of Bowie, Texas. He responded to the November 27, 2005 fire that started around noon that day; he finally cleared the fire scene at approximately 10 p.m. that night. Page investigated the cause and origin of the fire and generated a report that was admitted' into evidence. He testified that the fire started at Wise Electric utility pole number 04610; at the top of that pole, he “could see a connector that'was loose from an electrical line.” TheToose line grounded and started the fire. He had no doubt how the fire started; the proximate cause of the fire was the electrical short at the utility pole. The resultant fire was a wildland fire; wildland fires generate “a lot of ash.” Page said that wind gusts reached sixty miles per hour that day.
b. Testimony of Kelly Myers
Wise Electric’s assistant manager Kelly Myers testified that he had worked at Wise Electric for thirty-one years; he said that he was the person at Wise Electric most knowledgeable about the November 27, 2005 fire that stárted around noon at utility pole number 04610 on the Anderson property in Wise County. Myers explained how a Wise Electric lineman attaches a service line to a utility pole using a Burndy Insulink connector, as was used to connect the overhead service wire-at Wise Electric pole number 04610 when it was installed in 1998. The Insulink is an insulated metal barrel containing a conducting gel, its two ends have caps, and it is used for “end-to-end” connections. Myers explained that Wise Electric’s linemen strip the insulation^ from the ends of the service line and insert the uninsulated ends of the lines through the cap into each end of the Insulink and then “crimp” the Insulink on both sides with a tool to ensure a good connection and to ensure that the service line does not disconnect.
Two crimping tools were' available in 1998 — a ratchet masher and a black-handle Kearney tool. A ratchet masher is a special tool that is designed to mechanically ratchet down to apply a certain amount of compression pressure, and it does not release until the crimp is complete; Myers explained that “[e]ach time you squeeze that handle, it [the ratchet masher] moves a segment to crimp and it holds that.” The ratchet masher makes one large crimp. The black-handle Kearney tool is more like pliers'and has smaller jaws, and a lineman using it must make three individual crimps with it on each side of the •Insulink. Myers explained that a Wise Electric lineman installing a service line on a pole in 1998 would have used the ratchet masher for crimping.
During his testimony, Myers identified various photos of the wires on pole number 04610 after the fire, as well as photos of the actual Insulink from which the overhead service wire had become detached. Myers testified repeatedly that although the photos showed visible crimping on the left-hand side of the Insulink, there was no crimping visible on the right-hand side of the Insulink — the side from which the service wire had become disconnected.
A plastic bag containing the actual service wire, which had been cut from pole number 04610 with the Insulink still attached to one side,- was introduced into evidence. Myers was asked to try to pull the wire out of the Insulink, and although he pulled — and was asked to pull harder— he was unable to pull the wire out of the Insulink. He again agreed that the other side of the Insulink, the side from which the service wire had become disconnected, did not have any markings showing that a ratchet masher or any other type of instrument that would crimp that side had been applied to it. The trial court, acting as the finder of fact in this bench trial, requested that this exhibit be handed to him to look at.
Myers then conducted an in-court demonstration of how a Wise Electric lineman would have connected the service line to the Insulink in 1998 at pole number 04610. First, utilizing a knife, Myers peeled back the plastic coating on two pieces of service wire, exposing about three-quarters of an inch of bare wire On each. He inserted the exposed ends of the service wires through the caps into the ends of the Insulink. After inserting the two wires into the ends of the Insulink, Myers explained that the Insulink then ■ needed to be crimped to make sure the wires did not come out of the Insulink. Before performing the crimping, Myers was asked to pull one of the wires out of the Insulink and was able to easily pull out the wire. Myers then utilized a ratchet masher to crimp both sides of the Insulink. He thereafter performed a “tug test,” tugging on the service wire to he sure it was securely crimped in the connector; he was unable to pull the service wires out of the Insulink. Myers explained that a proper crimp permanently attaches a service line, to the connecter. Once a service line 'has been inserted into an Insulink and properly crimped, it can never be removed; the wire must be cut to separate it from the connector.
Myers agreed that Wise Electric’s policies required linemen to crimp both ends of a crushable connector like the Insulink every time, no exceptions; that a lineman using ordinary care was required to crimp both sides of an Insulink connector; and that the failure to- do so would be the failure to use ordinary care. Myers also agreed that Wise Electric’s linemen were taught to perform a tug test after crimping a line into a connector. Myers agreed that a Wise Electric lineman using ordinary care would perform a tug test on the line on each side of a connector to ensure a proper connection and that the failure to perform the tug test would be a failure to use ordinary care. Finally, Myers agreed that it would be foreseeable to a lineman installing a service line in 1998 that the failure to crimp one side of a Burndy Insulink could result in the service line becoming disconnected from the Insulink.
Upon -questioning by Wise Electric’s counsel, Myers testified that the Burndy Insulink installation instructions do not mention a tug test; the tug test is a safety practice taught to linemen. Myers said that Wise Electric no longer uses the Burndy Insulink connectors because the linemen cannot view the connection inside the barrel of the Insulink, as they can in some other types of crushable connectors. And finally, when asked whether there was “any external evidence on the sleeve of the Insulink that would indicate either an attempted or partial crimp on the end of the Insulink” that the service wire became disconnected from, Myers testified, “I’m not sure what that is, but that could be where a crimp may have been made.” He explained that “it’s possible there could have been a partial crimp” and that the conductive gel inside the Insulink “helped' hold it [the wire] in there.”
On redirect, Myers was impeached with his testimony from the first trial in which he unequivocally testified that Wise Electric has standards concerning the work performed by lineman and that crimping both ends of a connector and performing the tug test were two such standards. He was also- impeached with his prior 'trial testimony that when asked whether he had observed evidence of crimping on the end of the Insulink that the service wire became disconnected from, he answered, “No, sir.”
c. Testimony of Dennis Dale Waugh
Dennis Dale Waugh testified as an expert for AHC. Waugh had worked forty-two years for a utility company; he was a ground man, a first year through fourth year apprentice, .a journeyman lineman, a lead journeyman lineman, and a troubleshooter. Waugh testified that the service wire that had become detached from the Insulink at pole number 04610 became disconnected because there was no crimp on the side of the Insulink that the service wire became disconnected from. He said that the disconnected service wire showed signs of arcing because portions of the wire had melted and that two of the internal strands of the' wire were shorter, indicating that they had burned off.
Waugh said that he had used a Burndy Insulink connector thousands of times, had utilized the ratchet masher thousands of times, and had used the black-handle Kearney tool thousands of times. When asked “what is the proper procedure a lineman must follow to properly install an Insulink connector,” Waugh responded:
Well, first, he measures his wire, skins the insulation of it off, and makes sure that he doesn’t have more insulation off than what the sleeve will accept. And as I.said, I usually put in one end, crimp it, and then install the other end, crimp it. And then do a tug test to make sure that it’s a good connection, and then usually go- to the meter base or some facility that’s handy and check voltage.
Waugh performed an in-court demonstration of the proper procedure for a lineman-to follow to install an Insulink connector, and he utilized the black-handle Kearney tool to perform the crimps. After performing the crimps with the black-handle Kearney tool, Waugh pointed out that three jaw marks of the black-handle Kear-ney tool were visible on the exterior of the Insulink connector. Waugh explained that after crimping both sides of the Insulink, the next step is performance of a tug test and then a voltage check. Waugh testified that a voltage check will not let the lineman know if the connector has been properly crimped because voltage may still pass through a service line connected with an Insulink, even if it is not crimped at all. This is because the conducting gel inside the Insulink is tacky and permits conduction even in the absence of a crimp.
. Waugh explained that a lineman performing crimps with either the black-handle Kearney tool or the ratchet masher knows whether they have performed the crimp in the proper place on the barrel of the Insulink because if a crimp is performed in the wrong place on the Insulink, “you’re crimping air. You’re not crimping any metal. There’s no resistance to the connector tool.” Waugh said that a properly-crimped Insulink should be able to support a man hanging from it; he had seen a service wire connected with an In-sulink “hold up poles that are off the ground, also large tree limbs laying across services.” Waugh further stated that a properly-crimped Insulink is a permanent connection that will not be blown apart by wind, even sixty-mile-per-hour wind.
Waugh testified that the foreseeable consequence of the failure to crimp one side of an Insulink connector is that the electrically-charged service wire will come out of the connector, come into contact with something, and cause a fire. He opined that no tug test had been performed on the service line that became disconnected from the Insulink. And he explained how the service wire had not become disconnected earlier, despite the lack of a crimp:
Well, I think the cap on the end of this sleeve had something to do with it. It’s going to hold the wire. Especially if they get a little bit of insulation in there with it, it’s going to hold that wire. When that cap gets hot or weather-cracked, a piece of it fell off, that allowed the wire to be in the connector free. We don’t know when that happened.
d. Testimony of John Stewart
AHC’s expert John Stewart is an electrical engineer, a licensed professional engineer, and a certified fire and explosion investigator. Stewart’s testimony from the first trial was admitted as an exhibit during the second trial. Stewart investigated the November 27, 2005 fire that started at pole number 04610. ' In addition to offering an opinion on the cause and origin of the fire, Stewart opined that the energized overhead service line became disconnected from the Burndy Insulink connector because the connector had not been crimped on the side from which the wire became disconnected. Stewart reviewed photos of the Insulink in question and pointed out visible crimping on one side, while the other side contained no crimping marks whatsoever. Stewart testified that to properly install an Insulink— using ordinary care in installing the Insu-link, that is the care that a reasonable, prudent electric utility company would use — a lineman for an electric utility company should follow the manufacturer’s instructions for installation, which included properly trimming the insulation on the wires, inserting the wires into the connector to the proper point, crimping both sides with a proper tool, and then pulling on the wires to ensure that a good crimp had ‘occurred and that the wires would not pull out of the connector. Stewart opined that the failure to perform any one of these steps, including crimping both sides of the connector or failing to perform the tug test, would be a failure to exercise ordinary care.
Finally, Stewart testified that he routinely relied on National Weather Service reports in conducting fire investigations and did so here; the report for November 27, 2005 for Decatur, Texas, was introduced into evidence and showed that the average wind speed at approximately 11:45 a.m. was 20.7 miles per hour with gusts to 31.1 miles per hour. Stewart opined that wind, no matter how strong, would not be capable of detaching a service line that had been properly crimped into a connector.
e. Testimony of Freeman Reisner
AHC’s expert Freeman Reisner testified that he worked as a consulting engineer for Haag Engineering where he performed failure analysis. Previously, he had worked for thirteen years for San Angelo Electric Service Company repairing distribution transformers and motors and other types of electric equipment. At Haag Engineering, he had performed at least 1,000 fire investigations. Reisner’s testimony from the first trial was admitted as an exhibit in the second trial. When asked how a Burndy Insulink connector works, Reisner explained,
The connector comes with a plastic cover and little caps on each end. And when two wires need to be connected, the connector, whoever is doing the connecting,. strips the end of the wire so they’re bare and they insert them one in each end — typically, one at a time, and you insert them and then crimp in an area on the connector and check it; and then put another wire in the other end and crimp it and then check it. The ends are puncturable real easily by the wire so you don’t have to poke a hole in it or anything. You just poke the wires in either end.
Reisner testified that to properly join two wires, the connector attaching them must be crimped on both sides. He said that the Burndy Insulink connector at issue here showed no evidence that '‘it was crimped on the side from which the service wire became disconnected. Finally, Reis-ner opined that the service wire became detached from the Burndy Insulink connector because it was not crimped oil the side where it detached. According to Reisner, if an Insulink is properly crimped, it will hold a service line “indefinitely.”
f. Testimony of Forest Smith
Wise Electric’s expert Forest Smith is an electrical engineer who works for “a company that does investigations primarily for insurance companies but sometimes other companies as well” He performed his investigation of the fire four days after it occurred. He testified that the Insulink that is the subject of the lawsuit was installed by Wise Electric but also noted that the utility pole had “Romex” installed on it that was not installed by Wise Electric. He opined that the Romex “possibly could have” played a role in the fire because the person who installed the Ro-mex would have had to stand on a ladder and therefore could have reached the overhead service wire and could have forcibly pulled the service wire from the Insulink in question.
Smith testified that his investigation of the fire followed NFPA 921, which is a set of guidelines by a national consensus committee outlining the way to conduct a forensic investigation. Smith said that the investigations are to follow-scientific method, which he described as follows:-
The scientific method is something that is taken from academia. It’s common in classrooms. It’s been adapted for forensic investigations. It begins by defining a situation, recognizing a need, then col- . lecting data, and then analyzing the data. And then there’s a process called inductive, reasoning in which hypotheses are developed, and then there’s a process called deductive reasoning in which hypotheses are eliminated. And then, finally, there is the stage in which a hypothesis, if it passed the test, becomes a theory, and then the theory becomes the basis for perhaps making a call on the cause of and the origin of a fire.
Applying the scientific method, Smith was unable to make a determination regarding the cause of the fire because he said an origin had not been determined. He did not determine that the area of origin was at pole number 04610; that was not in the scope of his investigation. Smith explained that, using the scientific method, he could not eliminate several hypotheses as possible causes for the service line becoming disconnected from the Insulink; he could not eliminate the possibility that the Insulink had failed prior to the fire, that the wind had caused it to disconnect, or-that someone — “a party perhaps putting up this piece of Romex” — had forcibly pulled the service line out of the Insulink.
Smith testified that the construction of the Wise Electric utility pole complied with required regulations. He determined that Wise Electric used ordinary care in the construction of the pole. Although Smith testified in the first trial that the service line disconnected because a lineman had failed to crimp the Insulink on that side, he asserted in the second trial that, after he had magnified a photo of the approximately two-inch Insulink into an eight-by-ten photo that was admitted as Defendant’s Exhibit IB, he had observed evidence of crimping on both sides of the Insulink. He said that there was one “small indentation” made by a black-handled Kearney tool on the side of the Insu-link where the service wire had disconnected. Smith was impeached with his prior testimony that the right side of the Burn-dy Insulink was not crimped and that it is reasonably foreseeable to a lineman that if he fails to crimp one side of a connector, the wire will come out.
3. The Evidence of Breach and Causation Is Legally and Factually Sufficient
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law,, the trial court found that a service line will not become disconnected from an ‘ Insulink when it is properly crimped, that the Insulink in question at' pole number 04610 was not properly crimped on both sides, and that Wise Electric had failed to use ordinary care when it failed to crimp both sides of the Insulink. The trial court found that if a lineman fails to crimp one side of an Insulink, it is reasonably foreseeable that the electrically-charged line inserted into the non-erimped end of the connector will come loose and that an injury of the kind suffered by AHC will occur. The trial court concluded that Wise Electric was negligent in its installation of the Insulink and that Wise Electric’s negligence had caused the fire and the damages sustained by AHC.
Summarizing the evidence concerning these findings, neither. Myers, Waugh, Reisner, nor Stewart could see any indication that the Insulink had been crimped on the side where the service line disconnected: Although Smith disagreed, not only with these witnesses but also with his testimony in the previous trial, the magnified, enlarged photographs of the Insulink show crimp marks on only the connected side. Moreover, the “slight indentation” that Smith testified in the second trial was observable on the uncrimped side of the Insulink could, according to Smith, only have been made by the black-handled Kearney tool; Myers testified that in 1998 when the Insulink was installed, Wise Electric linemen were using the ratchet masher. The crimped end of the Insulink in question was crimped with the ratchet masher, and no explanation was provided for why one end of the Insulink would be crimped with the ratchet masher while the other end of the same Insulink would not be crimped with the same tool but would instead be crimped with the black-handled Kearney tool. And finally, although the black-handled Kearney tool requires three separate crimps, even Smith purportedly observed only one slight indentation on the uncrimped end of the Insulink.
Although Smith speculated that the service line could have become disconnected from the Insulink by someone climbing up a ladder to the overhead service line and forcibly yanking the service line out of the Insulink, Myers’s incourt demonstration, during which he attempted to do exactly that from the witness stand, showed the impossibility of forcibly disconnecting a service line from a properly-crimped Insu-link; it can be disconnected only by cutting the wire loose from the' Insulink. According to Waugh, a service wire connected with a properly-crimped Insulink will support a man hanging from it, .as well as ungrounded utility poles and tree limbs. Despite Smith’s testimony that possibly the wind caused the service line to become- disconnected, Stewart and Waugh opined that wind, no matter how strong, would not be' capable of detaching a service line that had been properly crimped into a connector. .
Viewing the evidence of the breach and causation elements of negligence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s fact findings and disregarding the contrary evidence that a reasonable factfinder could, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s findings of fact 12, 13, 15(2), 19, 20 through 25, and 39. See Rocor Int’l, 77 S.W.3d at 262; Cont'l Coffee Prods. Co., 937 S.W.2d at 450; Leitch, 935 S.W.2d at 118; see also Cmty. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Dugger, 430 S.W.2d 713, 715-18 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1968, no writ). Considering and weighing all of the evidence in the record pertinent to these findings, the credible evidence supporting the findings is not so weak, nor so contrary to the overwhelming weight of -all the evidence, that the findings should be set aside and a new trial ordered. See Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635; Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176; Garza, 395 S.W.2d at 823. We overrule Wise Electric’s legal and factual sufficiency challenges to the breach and causation elements of negligence challenged in Wise Electric’s fifth issue, and we hold that the trial court’s conclusions pf law 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 8 are legally correct concerning breach and causation .based on the trial court’s fact findings.
We overrule this portion of Wise Electric’s fifth issue.
C. Inventory Damages
Wise Electric’s first, second, and the remainder of its fifth issue challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning AHC’s personal property inventory damages. Wise Electric challenges findings of fact 36 through 41, 53, 55 through 58, 63, and 64 and the legal correctness of conclusions of law 6, 7, and 10. The trial court found that AHC’s entire inventory of 490,-092 hats and hat bodies was smoke damaged, that the hats and hat bodies could not be cleaned, and that that the replacement value of the inventory was $13,385,-969.37 — the amount awarded in the judgment. Wise Electric questions the legal correctness of the trial court’s conclusion of law that the replacement-value measure of damages applies, challenges the testimony of AHC’s owner Keith Maddox and of AHC’s expert Steven Startz concerning the inventory’s fair market value, and contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the amount of the inventory damages award and to establish that the fire was the only cause of damage to the inventory.
1. No Evidence of Preexisting Damage to Inventory
In the final portion of its fifth issue, Wise Electric argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s findings supporting conclusions of law 2 and 3 that the damage to AHC’s inventory was caused solely or only by the fire. Wise Electric argues that because AHC had previously stored its large inventory of hats and hat bodies in a non-air-conditioned facility and because AHC had kept most of its inventory in sea containers outside its plant at the time of the fire, AHC’s inventory of hats and hat bodies was already damaged by heat and moisture before the fire. But Wise Electric points to no evidence, and we have located none in the record, supporting this contention.
Instead, Maddox testified that, prior to the fire, employees at the AHC plant in Bowie used the inventory stored in the sea containers on a daily basis and that although the sea containers had breathe holes, nothing had ever entered the sea containers prior to the smoke and ash from the fire. Maddox testified that air and smoke could enter the holes but not moisture or water.
No witness testified that the inventory contained signs of damage from exposure to heat or moisture — only that after the fire, the inventory had suffered smoke damage. Moreover, actual hats and hat bodies from AHC’s smoke-damaged inventory were introduced into evidence at trial, and the trial- court as the finder of fact had the opportunity to observe the type of damage sustained by the inventory; no questions were asked at trial of any witness concerning any heat or moisture damage suffered by the inventory, and no such damage was pointed out as present on the hats and hat bodies introduced into evidence.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to both the trial court’s implied finding that no prior damage existed to AHC’s inventory and its express findings that smoke particles from the fire penetrated AHC’s plant and its storage containers, as well as the contents of the plant and storage containers, damaging the inventory contained therein, and disregarding the contrary evidence that a reasonable factfinder could, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s implied finding and express findings that AHC’s inventory was not damaged by heat or moisture prior to the fire. See Rocor Int’l, 77 S.W.3d at 262; Cont’l Coffee Prods. Co., 937 S.W.2d at 450; Leitch, 935 S.W.2d at 118. Considering and weighing all of the evidence in the record pertinent to these findings, the credible evidence supporting the findings is not so weak, nor so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that the findings should be set aside and a new trial ordered. See Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635; Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176; Garza, 395 S.W.2d at 823. Consequently, we hold .that the trial court.correctly applied the law to these facts in conclusions of law 2 and 3 by concluding that the fire alone was the proximate cause of damage to AHC’s inventory. See, e.g., BMC Software Belg., N.V., 83 S.W.3d at 794 (“Appellate courts review a trial court’s conclusions of law as a legal question”).
We overrule the remainder of Wise Electric’s fifth issue.
2. Evidence Regarding the Value of AHC’s Inventory
a. Testimony of Keith Maddox
Keith Maddox, the owner of AHC, testified that he had been in the western-wear business for forty years and had been making and selling hats for nineteen years. He sold boots and hats and then owned and operated The Best Hat Store, a hat-manufacturing plant and retail hat store. The Best Hat Store sold cowboy hats manufactured by Stetson, Resistol, Bailey, and American Hat, as well as by The Best Hat Store. About fifty percent of hats sold by The Best Hat Store were manufactured by American Hat. The Best'Hat Store manufactured only felt hats — pure beaver and fifty-percent beaver western and dress hats; these hats sold for between $450 and $800. Maddox purchased the hat bodies for these hats primarily from Winchester Hat Company.
Maddox purchased AHC in March 2003, but he had previously tried to purchase it in 1995 before he opened The Best Hat Store. In 1995', he had called the then-owners of AHC to see if they would consider selling the plant, inventory, and machinery of AHC. He toured the factory and obtained investors to fund the asking-price of $10,000,000, but the owners then raised the asking price to $20,000,000, which Maddox knew he could not raise. In 20Ó3, Maddox learned from a store in Houston that a one-half interest in AHC could be purchased for $2,700,000; he believed that “was a steal” and called an AHC salesman. He learned that Compass Bank owned AHC, so he called Compass Bank. Compass Bank had foreclosed on AHC and told Maddox that AHC would be sold within the week, Maddox immediately traveled to Conroe to tour the AHC facility; he was told at that time that he codld purchase AHC, including all of its equipment and inventory, for $350,000 cash, payable within two days. Maddox borrowed the money, made the purchase, and characterized getting “$13 million worth of equipment for 300 — and inventory for 350,000 [as] an excellent deal.” Maddox testified that the day after he purchased AHC in 2003, the fair market value of the inventory, equipment, and name was $13.5 million dollars. After operating AHC for about a year in Conroe, Maddox moved AHC’s plant to Bowie, Texas. The interior of the Bowie facility was smaller, forcing Maddox to purchase twelve sea containers and place them in the plant’s parking lot for storage of the majority of AHC’s inventory of hats and hat bodies.-
Maddox explained.that AHC makes hats from felt or straw. The process of manufacturing each material is different, but all hats progress from a raw hat body, which is a stage-one hat; to a stage-two hat; and finally to a stage-three hat, which . is a completed hat., Actual straw and felt hats at each stage of manufacturing were admitted into evidence.
Straw.hats are made from rice paper, which is then hand-braided. Stage-one straw hats are dampened, pressed, lacquered with a petroleum-based lacquer, spun, baked, and lacquered ágain before an AHC 'employee trims the hat, sews a wire in it, and then bakes and lacquers the hat again to make it a stagé-twó hat. According to Maddox, the process of making a stage-one straw hat1 into a stage-two straw hat involves “twenty something” steps, about two hours of labor, 'and two days of drying time. To make the stage-two straw hat into a stage-three h'at, workers add “trim” to the outside of the hat and sew a sweatband inside the hat. For straw hats, the transition from stage two to three requires about one hour of labor.
Manufacturing felt hats is more time consuming. On receiving the unshaped felt hat body from a manufacturer, AHC shapes the crown using a manual machine that stretches the crown over a round wooden block. The machine steams the hat and then blasts it with cold air, which “sets it.” AHC dampens and irons the brim and the crown and then lets the hat dry for a day. Next, a trained employee sands the crown with a sander, while the hat is spinning, feeling the hat to ensure a consistent sanding. If necessary, the employee represses the hat and restarts' the sanding. An employee then hand sands both sides of the brim. At this point, the felt hat is a “stage[-]two, open crown.” If a customer prefers a “creased crown,” AHC creases the crown with a, machine. Stage-three felt hats have hand-cut and hand-sewn leather “buckle sets” on them and sweatbands and liners sewed inside the hats. An average of three to four hours of labor is required to transition a stage-two felt hat into a stage-three felt hat. Some felt hats, however, demand much more labor time; as an example, Maddox testified that a mink felt hat requires seventeen steps 'and twenty-four hours of labor.
The price.of a hat and the quality of a hat are partially dependent on the quality of the raw hat body used. Some types of felt hat bodies have more hair than others, giving them a better quality and value. Maddox testified that Belgium and Germany had previously, but no longer, provided felt inventory and that it was the best quality. At the time of the fire, AHC’s inventory included felt hat bodies from Belgium and Germany. Maddox also testified that Taiwan had produced the best straw hat bodies, that AHC had “a big selection” of Taiwanese hat bodies at the time of the fire, but that Taiwan had stopped producing straw hat bodies. Since Taiwan’s cessation of straw-hat production, AHC had acquired straw inventory from China, which Maddox considered inferior in quality to the Taiwanese hat bodies.
Maddox testified that historically, AHC had made the best hats because AHC had utilized the finest raw materials and had the best workmanship; AHC targeted “the more knowledgeable hat wearerfs]” as customers. AHC sold hats to independent hat stores, department and chain retail stores, as well as to individuals. Maddox explained that when one of these department or chain retail stores placed ah order for hats, the hats mdst ship within about forty-eight hours, or the order would be cancelled. Consequently, because of the front-end labor'time required to generate a stage-three, ready-to-ship hat, a hat-manufacturing plant must have a “gigantic inventory” of various types of felt and straw hats completed up to a stage-two- or stage-three level in order to successfully do business with “the majors” and to timely fill incoming orders.
Maddox testified that AHC’s entire inventory was destroyed by the fire; all of the hats and hat bodies that were inside, the plant and that were stored in the twelve sea containers reeked of smoke. He said that “you can never get the smoke smell out of a smoke[-]damaged hat.” Maddox testified that “[n]o one would buy [smoke-damaged hats] and [that] no one with any reputation would sell them.” Maddox explained that when a hat is cleaned, it then has to be reshaped with steam and that when the steam hits the hat, the smoke smell intensifies. He performed an in-court demonstration of how to shape one of AHC’s smoke-damaged hats with steam, and a smoke smell arose in the courtroom.
Maddox testified that approximately five years after the fire, the owner of Outback Traders in Australia was at the AHC factory in Bowie, “and he. wanted to know what was in all of those [sea] containers. We opened one of them up[,] and it was smoky.” When Maddox was asked what he intended to do with all of the smoky hats and hat bodies in the containers, Maddox responded, “[T]hey’re going to the landfill.” The gentleman said that he would take some to Australia to sell because it is smoky in the outback. Maddox said that he did not think the smoky hats would sell, but the. gentleman said that he was going to try.- So Outback Traders purchased 1,830 of the completed, stage-three smoke-damaged hats at a “heavily discounted” price of $49,188.31. AHC generated four invoices to ship the smoky hats to Outback Traders, listing the items being sold as “inventory written off’ followed by the type of hat. The invoices totaled the prices, of the hats, then indicated “minus the total price in. the place for payments or credits,” and stated .a ‘ balance owed as zero.
- Maddox testified that Outback Traders was unable to sell the smoky hats and had not ordered any more smoky hats although it continued to order regular hats, as it had in the past.. Two years after the sale of the smoky hats, an individual in .Montague paid AHC for Outback Traders’s purchase of the 1,330 smoky hats; Maddox testified that the individual made the payment out of friendship because the owner of Outback Traders , felt bad that he had never paid for the hats.. Maddox testified that AHC was not attempting to be awarded damages at trial for the inventory Outback Traders had tried to sell.
b. Testimony of Steven Startz
After the fire, Travelers hired Steven Startz to document, evaluate, and liquidate AHC’s damaged hat inventory. Startz owns Startz Insurance Salvage, and he is a licensed and experienced salvor, which he defined as a documentation, evaluation, and liquidation specialist. Startz had prior salvor experience with , smoke-damaged clothing. In Startz’s experience, smoke odor cannot be removed from clothing.
On behalf of Travelers, Startz commissioned a national inventory crew. He and the inventory crew spent “two or three weeks” counting each and every hat and hat body that was visibly damaged and those that had a smoke odor. Startz reported that all 490,092 hats and hat bodies in AHC’s inventory at the time of the fire had been damaged.
As part of the counting, Startz and his . crew classified the damaged hats into their three stages of production: stage one, stage two, or stage three. They also categorized the damaged hats by their location at the time of the fire: either inside the plant or outside in the sea containers. Startz generated a 114-page spreadsheet itemizing each of the 490,092 hats and hat bodies by stage of manufacture, type, col- or, and location; he provided his report and the spreadsheet to Travelers and to AHC in 2005 after the fire.
Startz testified that while he was at AHC cataloguing AHC’s smoke-damaged inventory, Servpro was also there; Serv-pro had been hired by Travelers to attempt to clean the hats. But Servpro reported to Startz that they were having difficulty getting the smoke smell out of the hats.
In 2008, AHC hired Startz to assess the inventory’s value. Utilizing the spreadsheet he had previously generated for Travelers that individually documented each of the 490,092 hats in AHC’s inventory at the time of the fire, Startz requested invoices for the purchase of the various hat bodies. Purchase invoices did not exist for most of AHC’s hat inventory because Maddox had purchased AHC out of foreclosure more than two and one-half years before the fire and had acquired its inventory without accompanying invoices. To determine a value for the inventory lacking invoices, Startz “utilized like-similar invoicing to come up with the values,” which Startz said was standard practice in the salvor business.
' To compile" like-similar invoices, Startz compared the specific type of hat body catalogued in the spreadsheet (but lacking an invoice) to similar hat bodies offered for sale at the time of the fire by companies from whom AHC had purchased hat bodies for production. Startz’s report explains that “[i]nvoices of purchases and price lists were utilized to accumulate values of the hundreds of types and styles of merchandise affected in your existing inventory.” Startz averaged the invoice values for all felt hat bodies and for all straw hat bodies to arrive at an average cost for felt hat bodies of $40.25 each and for straw hat bodies of $5.43 each.
Then, as reflected in his report, Startz evaluated AHC’s operating expenses, which he testified salvors commonly rely on in assessing value. He totaled AHC’s yearly operating expenses, determined the average number of hats AHC "manufactured per day for the calendar year preceding the fire, and came up with a cost per hat of $29.22 in operating expenses attached to each hat. He added this $29.22 cost-per-hat figure in computing the value of hats that had been manufactured into stage-two and stage-three hats but did not add it in computing the value of stage-one, law hat bodies.
Next, Startz calculated the average labor costs associated with each stage of production. He determined that a stage-one hat, whether felt or straw, would have $0 labor costs added in assessing its value because no labor had yet been exerted on the raw hat body. Stage-two felt hats had an average labor cost of $54.11 per hat, and stage-two straw hats had'an average labor cost of $4.60 per hat. Stage-three felt hats had accrued an average total labor cost'of $67.64, and stage-three straw hats had accrued an average total labor cost of $5.75.
Based on these computations, Startz calculated the average replacement cost for each of the categories of hats in AHC’s inventory — felt and straw hats at manufacturing stages one, two, and three — by totaling the average purchase-price- cost of the hat body, the $29.22 operating expense per hat, and the average labor cost per hat, depending on its stage of completion. Startz arrived at'the following 2005 replacement cost values:
Felt hats stage 1 $40.25
Felt hats stage 2 $123.58
Felt hats stage 3 $137.11
Straw hats stage 1 $5.43
Straw hats stage 2 $39.25
Straw hats stage 3 $40.40
Finally, to arrive at the total replacement value for AHC’s entire inventory, Startz multiplied the number of hats in each of the above categories by the replacement value calculated for that category. AHC’s inventory on the date of the fire included: 38,670 stage-one felt hats; 63,381 stage-two felt hats; 4,574 stage-three felt hats; 345,870 stage-one straw hats; 23,701 stage-two straw hats; and 13,896 stage-three straw hats. Performing the math, the total cost to replace the inventory AHC had on hand at the tinie of the fire is $13,385,969.37. ■ The'trial court admitted Startz’s entire report, which included several invoices and documented his methodology.
Startz said that in 2005, as part of his duties for Travelers, he had attempted to “liquidate” AHC’s inventory of completed hats; he put the completed,' stage-three smoke-damaged hats on the market. But due to the amount of smoke damage sustained by the hats, interest in the finished hats waned quickly. Concerning the hat bodies and stage-two hats, Startz said that “[t]he hats that had not been finished had no market value due to their damage and their state of manufacture.” Consequently, Startz opined at trial that in this case, the replacement cost as well as the pre-fire fair markét value of all 490,092 hats was the same — $13,385,969.37.
c. Testimony of Gary Moore
Gary Moore testified that he had worked in the western-wear business for Hat Co.for over twenty-six years. Hat Co. sold a variety of western hats,- including Resistol and Stetson brand hats; during Moore’s last few years at Hat Co., Hat Co. had about fifty percent of the western-hat market. Moore himself ’generated over $2,000,000 in sales for Hat Co. during each of his last few years of employment by selling new hats to retailers. Moore’s duties with Hat Co. had also included quality control; - he had experience with cus: tomers bringing in smoke-damaged hats to see if anything could be done to restore them.
Travelers had contacted Moore to examine AHC’s inventory of hats that were smoke damaged by th'e fire and to express an opinion as to the condition of the hats, the marketability of the hats, and the refurbishing of the hats. Moore went to AHC’s plant in Bowie. Moore testified, “Boy, you could smell those trailers.... I was standing back from the trailers when they opened them, you know, roughly, ten feet. And when they opened the doors, it was just, you could smell that smoke just reeking out of there.” Moore said the hats “were very smoked.”
Moore explained that from 2005 through trial, there was no process in existence that would remove the smoke smell from a hat. He explained that heat “really brings out” the smoke smell from a smoke-darn-aged hat.. Moore said that “⅛ long as you have that [smoke-damaged] hat, you’re going to have that smell. Some days less; some days more, but you’re always going to have, a smoke smell.” Moore reported his findings to Travelers: all .490,092 hats were smoke damaged and could never be effectively cleaned of the smoke smell. A copy of Moore’s report to Traveler’s was admitted into evidence. .
Moore said that- no market existed for the 490,092 hats he had inspected at AHC. He testified that there is no market for smoke-damaged hats; they are “not re-sellable. I mean, it wouldn’t be reputable to sell them as new hats when they’re damaged hats.” Moore said that no retailer would be willing to stock smoke-damaged hats and further stated, “People will pick it up, smell the smoke, and, you know, that’s it, they’re going to go somewhere else.” Moore.testified: .
Q.. Now, as a result of your observation and investigation when you went to the American Hat Company at -the bequest or behest of .Travelers, did you form an opinion as to what should be done with those hats?
A. Well, yeah, I did. ' ‘
Q. What was that opinion?
A. Dig a hole and put them in it and cover them up.
d. Testimony of John Corn
John Corn is a retired forensic environmental chemist. He w.orked for Armstrong Forensic Laboratory for twenty-three years. Travelers hired Armstrong Laboratories to analyze AHC’s hats to “determine if there was damage to these— to the hats from a grass fire.” Corn testified that Armstrong Laboratories had purchased two new AHC hats to be used as a control group and had received forty-two hats from thee different sources: a set of AHC hats that Blackmon Mooring had attempted to clean by vacuuming and wiping with a clean sponge; a set of AHC hats that Servpro had attempted to' clean by vacuuming, steaming, and brushing; and a set of AHC hats that had not been cleaned and had visible dust, smoke residue, and smoke odor. "Corn selected three to four hats from each source to test.
. Corn explained that the testing for physical particles present on the hats was conducted as follows. A three-by-one-half inch rectangle was cut from the, brim-of the hats. Some of the brim-cut rectangles were analyzed under a microscope, some were subjected to a chemical analysis using a gas chromatograph with a mass spectrometer detector, and some were “de-' sorbed with a solvent” and “injected a portion of that solvent into a gas chroma-tograph mass spectrometer.” Corn explained that “we would analyze the VOC’s [volatilé organic compounds] first -with a set of common chemicals. And then the semi volatiles,,we injected those into the mass spec again for another composite list of chemicals that are common to — in the environment and fire products.” Based on this analysis, two hats “show[ed] evidence of particulates with a morphology of soot,” and one of the new hats showed a “one percent level of carbon particulates.”
Concerning his testing for smoke odor, Corn testified that of the hats tested, only “one hat [] had a smoke odor but no detectable level of soot or carbon particulates,” and “[n]one of the other hats had a detectable odor of smoke.” Corn testified that, to determine whether the hats had a smoke odor, testing' was conducted as follows:
[Y]ou establish the odor you’re looking for, which in this case would be an odor from burned grass. We gave the panel a couple of other soot odors like a match or burning wood, and then you — you get a panel of five people. And from that panel, you — they smell the soot that— your known soot, and then they clean their nose so their olfactory won’t have olfactory fatigue. And then they smell each of the products in a — in a bag. And so we would use an odorless type of bag.
Q. Does the — does the — does the group consist of people selected by you?
A. Yes. We have — we had several employees that were trained in this particular method!,] and we used people that were nonsmokers and who had experience doing this.
Q. Did you find evidence in your review of smoke?
A. Yeah, we found it in one.
Corn’s report to Travelers was admitted into evidence; it indicated that none of the volatile organic compounds found on AHC’s hats were associated with a grass fire and that only one hat had a smoke smell. Corn opined that the hats he analyzed could be “easily cleaned by brushing with an appropriate material and [by] vacuuming with a HEPA filtered or remote vacuum.” Corn’s report stated that “hats with a discernible odor can be treated by placing a hat in a chamber that can be purged with heated filtered air.”
On cross-examination, Corn conceded that he could not offer an opinion concerning any of AHC’s 490,092 hats and hat bodies, other than the few he had analyzed.1 Corn was asked to open Plaintiffs Exhibit 95E — the bag containing AHC stage-three felt hats manufactured before the fire; he did so and testified that he smelled smoke. Corn agreed that he could not testify about the market value of - anything because he was “not that expert.” And when asked about the smoke removal process mentioned in his report, Corn explained- that the hats would need to be unstacked and placed in a container and that
all you’re doing is you’ll have fans with filters oh them at one end. And you’ll either — you can either blow air into it or you can pull air out the other end through filters at this end. And just move air through it, so it’s not a vacuum. It’s just an air movement. And then you heat up the air inside the — inside the container. These containers have been as big as boxcars and as small as a hat box.
Q.' So how long would it take 490,000 hats to go ' through .that process? Hours? Days? Weeks? Months?
A. Us