Teal Trading & Development, LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Property Owners Ass'n (534 S.W.3d 558, 2017)

OPINION

Opinion by:

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

This appeal concerns the validity and enforceability of a property restriction— specifically a one-foot reserve strip (“the Non-Access Easement”)—that if valid precludes ingress and egress across the strip. This court has previously reviewed this dispute, holding that neither side was entitled'to summary judgment and remanding to the trial court for further proceedings. See Teal Trading and Dev., LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Prop. Ovmers Ass’n, 432 S.W.3d 381, 384 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied). Upon remand, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor' of appellee Champee Springs Ranches Property Owners Association (“Champee Springs”), and the remaining issues were tried to the court. After trial, the trial court ruled the Non-Access Easement was valid and awarded attorney’s fees and costs to Champee Springs. On appeal, appellant Teal Trading and Development, LP (“Teal Trading”) raises three issues challenging the trial court’s partial summary judgment, its findings, and the award of attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

' Background

As noted above, we previously reviewed this matter. See id. In our prior opinion, we provided a detailed rendition of.the facts. Accordingly, we have taken portions of the factual background from our prior opinion and then revised, updated, and supplemented it as necessary. See id.

Teal Trading owns almost 2,000 contiguous acres of land in the Texas Hill Country. The majority of .its property lies in Kerr County, Texas, although some portion of its land spills into neighboring Kendall County, Texas. Champee Springs represents residents of the Champee Springs Ranches subdivision and The Quarry at Champee Springs Ranches subdivision, which are located in Kendall County. See Tex, Prop, Code Ann, § 204.004 (West 2014) (describing property owners’ association).

.. Six hundred and sixty acres of Teal Trading’s property, and some or all of the land now comprising the subdivisions represented by Champee Springs, were originally owned by E.J. Cop, who purchased 9,245.95 acres of land in Kendall and Kerr Counties on June 3, 1998. Cop platted and developed his property as, Cham-pee Springs Ranches. -On June 4, 1998, Cop signed a “Declaration, of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions,” which was recorded in the deed records of Kendall and Kerr Counties. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 202.001(1)(A) (defining dedicatory instruments, which includes restrictive covenants). The Declaration contains the restriction, i.e., Non-Access Easement, at issue. In pertinent part, .the Declaration states:,

.DECLARATION OP COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS • ⅜ ⅜ ⅜

THAT WHEREAS, E.J. Cop, hereinafter called the Declarant, is the owner of all that certain 9245,95 acres, more or less, tract of land (“PROPERTY”) located in Kendall and Kerr Counties; Texas as more particularly described on Exhibit “A” attached hereto and incorporated herein for all purposes.

WHEREAS, the-Declarant will, convey the PROPERTY, subject to certain protective covenants, conditions, restrictions and easements as hereinafter set forth; NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all of the PROPERTY shall be held, sold, and conveyed subject to the following easements, restrictions, covenant's, and conditions, which are established for the purposes of creating and carrying out a uniform plan for the improvement, development and sale of the PROPERTY and for the further purpose of protecting the value attractiveness and desirability of the PROPERTY for the mutual benefit of the owners of same and accordingly shall run with the title to the PROPERTY or any part thereof and bind the Declarant, his heirs, successors and assigns and all owners and purchasers of the PROPERTY, or any part' thereof, their, [sic] heirs, successors,'executors, administrators and assigns,

* ⅜ *

2, There is hereby reserved unto De-clarant a one (1) foot easement for precluding and prohibiting access to the PROPERTY or Ranger Creek Road or Turkey Knob Road by adjoining property owners other than Declarant and De-clarant’s express assigns,.This easement is inside of and contiguous to the perimeter of the PROPERTY as described in exhibit “A” hereto, provided that no easement is reserved over, across. or upon any public road right-of-way which is dedicated by and shown on that certain Plat of Champee Springs Ranches, a subdivision in Kendall and Kerr Counties, Texas, of record in Volume 3, Page 69, of the Plat Records of Kendall County,' Texas, and further provided Tract 4 of said Champee Springs Ranches subdivision shall be entitled to one access entrance across the restrictive easement along the southwestern boundary line of said Tract 4, but none other access without Declarant’s express written consent thereto.

The restriction in paragraph two is the “Non-Access Easement.” The parties appeared to agree on original submission to this court and still seem to agree the Non-Access Easement prohibits any person— aside from Cop or his assignees—who owns land along the original edge of the Cop tract from permitting anyone else access across the edge of their property.

Ultimately, Cop began to sell lots from his property. The following is a summary of relevant events and conveyances in chronological order:

• June 3, 1998—E.J. Cop purchased 9,245.95 acres of land in Kendall and Kerr Counties.

• June 4,1998—Cop signed the Declaration containing the Non-Access Easement.

• July 9,1998—Cop sold 1,328 acres to C.R. Luigs.

• July 10, 1999—Luigs sold approximately 660 acres in Kerr County to Marrs and Marianne Bowman. The Bowmans platted the 660 acres as Privilege Creek Ranches, but did not sell any lots.

• July 29, 1999—Michael Wall, owner of 2,300 acres in Champee Springs Ranches, filed a replat, which decreased the size of the lots in Champee Springs Ranches and removed the Bowmans’ 660 acres from Champee Springs Ranches.

• July 11, 2006—Mallard Royalty Partners purchased the tract owned by the Bowmans, who executed separate deeds conveying their respective interests.

• July 12, 2006—Mallard Royalty Partners sold the 660 acres, and an additional 1,173 acres that had not been owned by Cop, to BTEX Ranch, LP.

• July 17, 2006—BTEX Ranch, LP executed a deed of trust covering all of its property—the 1,173 acre-tract and the 660 acre tract. BTEX attempted to develop its property as “Boerne Falls Ranch.”

• November 12, 2009—Teal Trading acquired BTEX Ranch, LP’s deed of trust and foreclosed on its interest.

We will refer to the 660-acre tract sold by Luigs and now owned by Teal Trading as the “Privilege Creek Tract.” All of the deeds in the chain of title from Cop to Teal Trading state, in some form or another, that the property conveyed is “subject to” the restrictions in the Declaration filed by Cop.

When Cop acquired 9,245.95 acres, the portion of his property that would later be sold as the Privilege Creek Tract was at the northwestern end of his tract. Thus, the Non-Access Easement runs along the edge of the Privilege Creek Tract to the extent that the edge of the tract was also the edge of the original Cop tract. The additional 1,173 acres owned by Teal Trading adjacent to the Privilege Creek Tract were not part of Cop’s original 9,245.95 acres. Accordingly, Teal Trading’s additional acreage is seemingly “divided” from the Privilege Creek Tract by the Non-Access Easement. In contrast, although the Champee Springs Ranches subdivision is directly adjacent to the Privilege Creek Tract, it was not “divided” from the tract by the Non-Access Easement because the property comprising the subdivision was also part of Cop’s original tract. This is map: demonstrated by the following illustrative

The area depicted in orange—also designated as “section 1”—is the 1,173 acres owned by Teal Trading that was not part of the original Cop Tract. The acreage in yellow—also designated as “section 2”—is the Privilege Creek Tract. The Non-Access Easement, which is depicted by the bolded red line, “divides” the properties owned by Teal Trading. The document shows how the Champee Springs Ranches subdivision is adjacent to the Privilege Creek Tract, but not “divided” from the tract by the Non-Access Easement.-

After BTEX Ranch, LP acquired its property from Mallard Royalty Partners, it began to develop the entire property as a single, contiguous residential subdivision. It then built a construction road that connected Turkey Knob Road to Lane Valley Road. Turkey Knob Road is located within the Privilege Creek Tract and the Cham-pee Springs subdivisions and gives those tracts access to Interstate 10, but it does not otherwise cross the “dividing line” created by the Non-Access Easement. Lane Valley Road is on the other’ side of the “dividing line” created by the Non-Access Easement. To enforce the Non-Access Easement, Champee. Springs intervened in a lawsuit filed by Kendall County against BTEX Ranch, LP relating to BTEX Ranch LP’s development.- The trial court denied the intervention, but severed Champee Springs’s claims into a separate lawsuit. During the BTEX Ranch, LP/Champee Springs litigation, Teal Trading foreclosed on BTEX Ranch LP’s interest and intervened.

Champee Springs sought a declaratory judgment that BTEX , Ranch, LP—and subsequently Teal Trading—-was bound by the Non-Access Easement and estopped to deny its force, validity, and effect, and because Teal Trading was bound, the restriction was enforceable against it. Teal Trading denied it was bound by the restriction and sought a declaratory judgment that the Non-Access Easement was void as an unreasonable restraint against alienation and that Champee Springs waived the right to enforce the Non-Access Easement and was thus estopped from enforcing it. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The sole ground raised in Champee Springs’s motion was the “threshold” issue of whether Teal Trading was estopped by deed from challenging the validity and enforceability of the Non-Access Easement. Teal Trading’s motion and supplemental motion, on the other hand, raised several grounds for summary judgment: (1) the Non-Access Easement was an invalid easement; (2) members of the Champee Springs subdivision had waived, enforcement of the Non-Access Easement; and (3) the Non-Access Easement was void as against public policy. Ultimately, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Champee Springs and denied Teal Trading’s motion. After a hearing, the trial court awarded attorney’s fees and costs to Champee Springs. Teal Trading perfected an appeal to this court.

On appeal, this court held Champee Springs failed to establish as a matter of law,that Teal Trading was estopped by deed from challenging the Non-Access Easement’s validity and enforceability because “none of the deeds within the chain of title from Cop to Teal Trading acknowledge the validity and enforceability of the non-access restriction.” Teal Trading, 432 S.W.3d at 393. As to Teal Trading’s motion, we held Teal Trading failed to prove as a matter of law that: (1) the Non-Access Easement was terminated by merger; (2) the signatories to the 1999 replat intended to waive enforcement of the Non-Access Easement; (3) the Non-Access Easement violates public policy; (4) the Non-Access Easement was an unreasonable restraint on alienation; and (5) the ‘Non-Access .Easement was an unreasonable restraint on use. Id. at 394-97. Finally, we reversed the trial court’s award of attorney’s' fees to Champee Springs, holding that because we reversed the summary judgment in favor of Champee Springs, we were compelled to reverse the award of attorney’s fees and allow reconsideration of the award after resolution on remand. Id. at 398 (citing Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 5.006(a) (stating that “In an action based on breach of a restrictive covenant pertaining to real property, the court shall allow a prevailing party who asserted the action reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to the party’s costs and claim.”)). We remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. Id.

On remand, Champee Springs—as a representative of its members—filed its Fourth Amended Original Petition. Therein, Champee Springs sought a declaration that the Non-Access Easement: (1) “is valid, binding on and enforceable against” BTEX Ranch, LP and Teal Trading, and (2)is enforceable as a'covenant running with real property. Champee Springs also sought recovery of attorney’s fees under section 5.006 of the Texas Property Code and section 37.009 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, i,e., the Declaratory Judgment Act, as well as hosts and interest. Teal Trading filed its Fifth Petition in' Intervention. Teal Trading also sought a declaration, asking the court to declare the Non-Access Easement' “void and unenforceable” because: (1) it violates the public policy of Kerr and Kendall counties; (2) Champee Springs members and other relevant land owners are estopped from contending the Non-Access Easement is valid; (3) Champee Springs members and other relevant land owners are on notice that the Non-Access Easement is not recognized; and (4) Champee Springs members and other relevant land owners waived enforcement of the Non-Access Easement is valid. Teal Trading also alleged several affirmative defenses—estop-pel by deed, estoppel by record, and quasi-estoppel. It further alleged waiver, termination by merger, and void as an unreasonable restraint on alienation and as a prohibition on use.

After filing its amended petition, Cham-pee- Springs -filed a partial no evidence summary judgment motion and a partial traditional summary judgment motion. In its no evidence motion, Champee Springs alleged, as to Teal Trading’s affirmative defenses:

Waiver:

(1) no evidence those who signed the 1999 replat unequivocally intended to waive the Non-Access Easement)

(2) no evidence the property owners affected by the Non-Access Easement signed the 1999 replat or oth- ’ erwise intended to waive the Non-Access Easement;

(3) no evidence Cop signed the 1999 replat.

Estoppel:

(1) no evidence of deception-by those who signed the 1999 replat;

(2) no evidence those who signed the 1999 replat made any false representation or concealed any material fact.

Public Policy:

(1) no evidence any subdivision regulations of Kendall and/or Kerr Counties, in effect at the time the Non-Access Easement'was created, prohibited such a restriction;

(2) no evidence if any state or county public policy, in effect at the time , the Non-Access Easement was created, prohibited such , a restriction relative to access to private, gated subdivisions for purposes of emergency services;

(3) no evidence the Non-Access Easement prevented Kerr County from planning,, specifying, and/or approving the road infrastructure of private roads within the Privilege Creek Ranches Subdivision;

(4) no evidence that on its face the ■ . Non-Access Easement, at the time it was created, violates any state or federal constitutional or statutory-provision.. . u

Unreasonable Restraint on Alienation:

(1) no evidence the Non-Access Easement restrains Alienation of- the Bowman Tracts or any part thereof, which are the only portions of Teal Trading’s property -burdened by the Non-Access Easement. ■"

Prohibition on Use:

(1) no evidence the Non-Access Easement so severely limits Teal Trading’s property use that it rendered the property valueless.

Termination by Merger:

(1) no evidence that all of the burdened and benefitted properties subject to the Non-Access Easement reverted > . back to ownership by a single entity-

In its traditional motion for summary judgment, Champee Springs also challenged each of-Teal Trading’s affirmative defenses and .asserted the Non-Access Easement was a valid, easement. Teal Trading filed a response -and Champee Springs filed a reply to the response. After a hearing, the trial court granted Champee Springs’s motion. In its partial summary judgment, the trial court specifically stated the grounds upon which the motion was granted, ruling as a matter of law that the Non-Access Easement:

• is not an unreasonable restraint on alienation;

• does not amount to a prohibition as to the use of Teal’s property;

• , was not terminated by merger; and

• is a valid easement..

The trial court specifically denied Cham-pee Springs’s motion as to Teal Trading’s affirmative defenses of waiver and violation of public policy. -The trial court did not rule on the affirmative .defenses based on estoppel.

After the trial court • granted partial summary judgment, the parties proceeded to a bench trial on the -remaining issues, he., waiver, estoppel, and violation of public policy. In its judgment, the trial court declared the Non-Access Easement: (1) valid, binding, and enforceable against Teal Trading; and (2). enforceable as. a .covenant running with Teal Trading’s property. The trial. court rejected Teal Trading’s remaining affirmative defenses, i.e., waiver, estoppel by deed, estoppel by record, quasi-estoppel, and-, violation of public policy; It awarded attorney’s fees for the trial phase,.contingent fees through a possible appeal to the supreme court, costs, and interest. Thereafter, Teal Trading perfected this appeal.,

... Analysis

On appeal, Teal Trading challenges the trial' court’s partial summary judgment in favor of Champee Springs, as well as the trial court’s findings and conclusions following the bench trial. In addition, Teal Trading challenges the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs to Champee Springs. We will address each challenge separatély, beginning with the partial summary judgment.

Partial Summary Judgment

As set out above, Champee Springs filed both no evidence and traditional motions for partial summary judgment challenging Teal Trading’s affirmative defenses of waiver, estoppel, violation of public policy, unreasonable restraint on alienation, prohibition on use, and termination by merger. It'also sought to disprove Teal Trading’s allegation that the-Non-Access Easement was not a valid easement. Although Cham-pee Springs sought partial summary judgment as to all of Teal Trading’s affirmative defenses,1 the trial court granted partial summary judgment on only three of the asserted defenses—unreasonable restraint on alienation, prohibition on use, and termination by merger. The trial court also found as a matter of law that the Non-Access Easement is a valid easement.

Teal Trading begins its attack on the partial summary judgment by discussing the trial court’s alleged misinterpretation and misapplication of the law of the case doctrine. Champee Springs counters, arguing the trial court did not misapply the doctrine. These arguments are based on the trial .court’s alleged application of this court’s prior opinion in this- matter. See Teal Trading, 432 S.W.3d at 388-97.

The law of the case'doctrine provides that when a court of last resort makes a decision on a question of law, that decision governs the -case in subsequent stages., Loram Maint., Inc. v. Ianni, 210 S.W.3d 593, 596 (Tex. 2006); City of Houston v. Jackson, 192 S.W.3d 764, 769 (Tex. 2006). The rationale for the doctrine is that it narrows the -issues in successive stages of the litigation to achieve uniformity of decision as well as judicial economy and efficiency. Briscoe v. Goodmark Corp., 102 S.W.3d 714, 716 (Tex. 2003). The law of the case doctrine is based on public policy and is aimed at bringing finality to the litigation process. Id. The doctrine applies only to questions of law and does not apply to questions of fact. Hudson v. Wakefield, 711 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1986).

In Brown & Brown of Tex., Inc. v. Omni Metals, Inc., the First Court of Appeals discussed the application of the doctrine in situations similar to that before us—application of the doctrine in a subsequent appeal following a reversal and remand of a summary- judgment due to the existence of fact issues. 317 S.W.3d 361, 370 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). The court recognized that pursuant to the supreme court’s decision in Briscoe, a court of appeals is ordinarily bound by its initial decisions if there is a subsequent appeal in the original case— but only as to questions of law. Id. at 373 (citing Briscoe, 102 S.W.3d at 716). However, an initial decision does not absolutely bar reconsideration of an issue on a second appeal. Id. Rather, the application of the doctrine is within the court’s discretion and depends on the circumstances of the case. Id. Moreover, the doctrine does not apply if the original decision was clearly erroneous. Id.

We hold that whether the trial court improperly used our prior opinion as a basis for it partial summary judgment is now irrelevant. This court will review the trial court’s partial summary judgment as required pursuant to' the applicable law and pertinent standard of review, applying the law of the case doctrine On appeal only as mandated by the Texas Supreme Court. In other words, if we rendered a decision on question of law in our prior opinion, we should treat such decision as law of the case unless it is clearly erroneous. See Hudson, 711 S.W.2d at 630; Omni Metals, Inc., 317 S.W.3d at 393. However, given that our prior decision to reverse was based on the existence of summary judgment fact issues, and our ultimate resolution of this appeal, we hold the doctrine is inapplicable.

Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s decision to grant no evidence and traditional motions for summary judgment de novo. Sudan v. Sudan, 199 S.W.3d 291, 292 (Tex. 2006); Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). Whether reviewing a traditional or no evidence summary judgment, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to -the nonmovant and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. See Valence Operating, 164 S.W.3d at 661; Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 156 (Tex. 2004). When a trial court’s 'order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground or grounds relied on for its ruling, summary judgment will be affirmed on appeal if any of the theories advanced are meritorious. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001).

Under Rule 166a(i) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a no evidence summary judgment is essentially a pretrial directed verdict. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009); Tatsch v. Chrysler Grp., LLC and Infinity Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 04-13-00757-CV, 2014 WL 6808637, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 3, 2014, no pet. denied) (mem. op.). After an adequate time for discovery passes, a party without the burden of proof at trial may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence to support one or more essential elements of the nonmovant’s claim. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Tatsch, 2014 WL 6808637, at *7; All Am. Tel., Inc. v. TJSLD Commons., 291 S.W.3d 518, 526 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied). The moving party, must specifically state the elements for which no evidence exists. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Timpte Indus., 286 S.W.3d at 310; Tatsch, 2014 "WL 6808637, at *7. To raise a fact issue on the challenged elements, the non-movant must produce more than a scintilla of evidence on the challenged elements.' DTND Sierra Invs., LLC v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., No. 04-12-00817-CV, 2013 WL 4483436, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 21, 2013, pet, denied) (mem. op.); Martinez v. Leeds, 218 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex; App.—El Paso 2007, pet. denied). More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.” Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997). The trial court must grant the no evidence motion if the nonmovant fails to bring forth more than a scintilla of summary judgment evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the challenged elements. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); DTND Sierra Invs., 2013 WL 4483436, at *2; Tatsch, 2014 WL 6808637, at *2.

Under Rule 166a(c) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court properly grants a traditional motion for summary judgment when the movant establishes no genuine issue of material fact exists. Tex. R. Civ. P, 166a(c); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2003); Rentfro v. Cavazos IV, No. 04-10-00617-CV, 2012 WL 566364, at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 15, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.). A movant meets this burden by either conclusively negating a single essential element of the plaintiffs cause of action or establishing an affirmative defense. Frost Nat’l Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 508-09 (Tex. 2010); Rentfro, 2012 WL 566364, at *7.

When a party moves for summary judgment on both no evidence and traditional grounds, as Champee Springs did here, we first address the no evidence motion. See Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013). We address the no evidence motion first because if the nonmovant fails to bring forth more than a scintilla of summary judgment evidence to meet its burden as to the no evidence motion, then there is no need to analyze whether' the movant satisfied its burden as to the traditional motion. See Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248. Accordingly, we will’review Champee Springs’s no evidence motion first. See id.

Application

a. Unreasonable Restraint on Alienation

Teal Trading claimed the Non-Access Easement was an unreasonable restraint on alienation. In its-no evidence motion for summary judgment, Champee Springs asserted there is no evidence the Non-Access -Easement:. (1) is the type of restraint prohibited by the supreme court, or (2) restrains the alienation of the Privilege Creek Tract,- which is the only portion of Teal Trading’s property burdened by the Non-Access Easement. Teal Trading contends summary judgment as to this affirmative defense was improper. In support, Teal Trading argues it provided evidence establishing it- owns property on each side'of the Non-Access Easement and that if it is valid, it will be required to develop the Privilege Creek Tract (the 660 acres) in a manner that only provides access to the development via Turkey Knob Road in Kendall County even though the development is in Kerr County. According to Teal Trading, this limitation on access forces Kerr County service providers, e.g., fire, law enforcement, etc;', to leave Kerr County and traverse a circuitous route to Turkey Knob Road in Kendall County to gain access to any development in the Privilege Creek Tract, a trip taking forty-five mihutes to an hour. Teal Trading contends-this evidence constitutes more than a scintilla' of evidence of an unreasonable restraint on alienation. ' ‘ "

To constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation, it is axiomatic that a restraint must first exist. Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Sav. Ass’n, 638 S.W.2d 811, 813 ((Tex. 1982). Only then must we determine whether' the restraint .is unreasonable. See id. at 814-15; see also Munson v. Milton, 948 S.W.2d 813, 817 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 1997, pet. denied). The Restatement of Property, which Texas has adopted, defines the types of restraints on alienation:

(1) disabling restraint—attempt by an otherwise effective conveyance or contract to cause a later conveyance to be void;

(2) promissory restraint—attempt to cause a later conveyance to impose contractual liability on the one who makes the later conveyance-when such liability results from a breach of an agreement not to convey, and;

(3) forfeiture restraint—attempt to terminate or subject to termination all or part of the property interest conveyed.

Sonny Arnold, Inc., 633 S.W.2d at 813 & n.2 (citing Restatement (First) of Property: § 404 (Am. Law Inst. 1944)); Mattern v. Herzog, 367 S.W.2d 312, 319 (Tex. 1963); Teal Trading, 432 S.W.3d at 396. To date, these are the only restraints on alienation recognized by the Texas courts. See Teal Trading, 432 S.W.3d at 396.

Although in its brief Teal Trading recognizes the three categories, it does -not argue, nor did it present, any evidence, that the Non-Access Easement falls within any of these categories. Teal Trading did not present any evidence the Non-Access. Easement prevents it from transferring or in anyway conveying all or part of the. property, i.e., the Privilege Greek Tract, as a result of the Non-Access Easement. Moreover, we have reviewed the restriction and as we held in our prior opinion, it does not prohibit anyone, including Teal Trading, from selling any part of the Privilege Creek Tract. Id. Thus, on its face, the Non-Access Easement is not as a matter of law a restraint on alienation. Id.

The evidence presented by-Teal Trading shows, at best, an indirect restraint on alienation, i.e., the Non-Access Easement does not prevent Teal Trading from conveying any portion of the Privilege Creek Tract, but its existence may make potential buyers less eager due to inconvenience. See Mattern, 367 S.W.2d at 319-20. Although indirect restraints are recognized, the Texas Supreme Court has held that before such restraints are stricken, they must bear “some relationship to the evil which the rules governing undesirable restraints are designed to prevent.” Id. at 320; see Restatement .(Third) of Property: Servitudes § .3.5 (Am. Law Inst, 1998); see also Teal Trading, 432 S.W.3d at 397. In section 3.5 of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Seryitudes,..the American Law Institute stated indirect restraints are valid unless they lack a rational justification. Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 3.5. In addition, the supreme court has held we should not mechanically apply restraint on alienation rules to indirect restraints because it could inhibit the use of desirable contract provisions and unnecessarily limit the freedom to contract. Mattem, 367 S.W.2d at 320. Moreover, Teal Trading never asserted indirect restraint on alienation as a. defense, nor did it present any evidence the creation of the Non-Access Easement lacked a rational justification. See Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 3.5.

Based on the law applicable to restraints on alienation and the evidence produced by Teal Trading, we hold Teal Trading failed to present even a scintilla of evidence that a recognized restraint on alienation, existed. See Sonny Arnold, Inc., 633 S.W.2d at 813 & n.2 (citing Restatement (First) of Property:.§ 404 (Am. Law Inst. 1944)). In other words, Teal Trading failed to present any evidence it was precluded in any way from conveying all or part of the Privilege Creek Tract because of the Non- ' Access Easement, Accordingly, we hold the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Champee Springs as to the affirmative defense of restraint on alienation.

b. Prohibition on Use

Teal Trading also claims the Non-Access Easement is a prohibition on use of the Privilege Creek Tract so as to render the easement void. In its no evidence motion for summary judgment, Champee Springs asserted there is' no evidence the Non-Access Easement so severely limits Teal Trading’s use of the Privilege Creek Tract that it renders the tract “valueless.” Based on the structure of the argument in its brief, it appears Teal Trading is relying on the same evidence to raise a fact issue on prohibition on use as it did for unreasonable restraint on alienation.

We recognized in our prior opinion in this matter that “[r]estrictions that amount to a prohibition of the use of property are void.” Teal Trading, 432 S.W.3d at 397 (citing Baker v. Henderson, 137 Tex. 266, 153 S.W.2d 465, 471 (1941)). Teal Trading cites to Baker in support of its contention that the Non-Access Easement constitutes a prohibition on use, thereby rendering it void. As we did in our prior opinion, we disagree. As Teal Trading asserts, Baker holds it is contrary to the “business policy^ of the United States “to tie up real estate” where it is conveyed with restrictions and prohibition on use, and therefore, such restrictions should generally be resolved in favor of a free use of property and against such restrictions. 153 S.W.2d at 470. However, Baker is distinguishable from the current situation.

The restriction in Baker precluded the erection of any building on the property in question within seventy-five feet of the property line fronting any street adjoining such property. Id. at 469. Henderson, who purchased a lot subject to the restriction, sought to build a residence on his property. Id. Baker and others brought suit seeking to enjoin Henderson from building his residence, arguing that as the property was a corner lot, it would by necessity violate the seventy-five-foot restriction if any residence was constructed thereon. Id. On review, the supreme court held the restriction was ambiguous—whether the seventy-five-foot setback applied only to the street, which the lot in question fronted, or to any street along the lot-justifying a construction of the restriction in favor of the free use or property and against enforcement of the restriction. Id. After reviewing evidence regarding the grantor’s intent with regard to the restriction, the- court held it was doubtful it was intended to preclude the building of residences on lots such as the one purchased by Henderson. Id. at 470-71. The court then recognized a construction that prohibits the use of property is void, and in this case it was known Henderson purchased the land to build a residence. Id. at 471. The court held enforcing the restriction would be prohibit Henderson from building a residence, i.e., prohibit him from using the property as intended. Id. Thus, the property would be “rendered valueless and worthless” to Henderson. Id.

Here, as noted above, neither party alleged the restriction was ambiguous, nor do we find it so. Thus, we need not construe the Non-Access Easement “in favor of a free use of property” as argued by Teal Trading. See id. at 470; see also Mun-son, 948 S.W.2d at 816. Rather, we should construe the Non-Access Easement in favor of its validity. See Munson, 948 S.W.2d at 816. Teal Trading did not present any competent summary judgment evidence showing the Privilege Creek Tract would be “rendered valueless and worthless” if the Non-Access Easement is enforced. In fact, the summary judgment evidence produced by Champee Springs establishes portions of the Privilege Creek Tract have been sold for substantial sums of money. As we reasoned with regard to the unreasonable restraint on alienation defense, although the Non-Access Easement may make property within the Privilege Creek Tract less attractive to potential buyers, it does not prohibit Teal Trading from using the property as intended. Thus, we hold the portion of the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Champee Springs with regard to the affirmative defense of prohibition of use was proper.

Teal Trading contends it submitted competent summary judgment evidence establishing the property is valueless, but the evidence’ was improperly struck by the trial court based on an objection by Champee Springs. In its 'response to Champee Springs’s assertion that there was no evidence the Non-Access Easement rendered Privilege Creek Tract valueless, Teal Trading submitted the affidavit of Robert W. Floyd, the' Managing Partner for Teal Trading. In his affidavit, Mr. Floyd opined the Non-Access Easement negatively impacts the value of the Privilege Creek Tract due to the “lack of effective emergency services” and that in his opinion, the Non-Access Easement renders the property valueless and unmarketable.

Champee Springs objected to the affidavit arguing, among other things, that: (1) Teal Trading failed to designate or disclose Mr. Floyd as an expert witness, (2) Mr. Floyd is not qualified or competent to express opinions about the market value of the property, and (3) his statements regarding the lack of value and marketability “are unsubstantiated factual conclusions and opinions that are not supported by any underlying facts.” The trial court, by written order, sustained these objections. On appeal, Teal Trading argues only that the trial court erred in granting the objection to the affidavit “based on. a lack of expert designation.” Teal Trading argues that under the Property Owner Rule, the type of testimony provided by Mr. Floyd is “not the type of testimony that must be given by an expert” and that under Texas law, a property owner such as Mr. Floyd in his capacity as managing partner of. Teal Trading, is qualified and permitted to testify about the value of his own property even if he is not an expert. See, e.g., Reid Road Mun. Util. Dist No. 2 v. Speedy Stop Food Stores, Ltd., 337 S.W.3d 846, 852-53 (Tex. 2011); Porras v. Craig, 675 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. 1984).

We agree that a property owner such as Mr. Floyd need not necessarily be designated or disclosed as an expert in order to testify about the value of his property. See Reid Road Mun. Util. Dist., 337 S.W.3d at 852-53. Under the Property Owner Rule, a property owner is generally qualified to testify - about the value of his property even if he is not an expert and would not be qualified to testify about the value of someone else’s property. Id. The rule is based on the presumption that an owner is familiar with his property and its value. Id. The rule applies to testimony from a corporate entity’s agent as well because when an agent testified to the value of the entity’s property, “the legal effect is -that the actual owner of the property is testifying.” Id. However, there are limits on who is permitted to testify on an entity’s behalf under the Property Owner Rule because: (1) it could permit trial by ambush by allowing the circumvention of the means by which witnesses and their opinions are to be timely disclosed, e.g., discovery rules and scheduling orders; and (2) some corporate agents may have limited, or no knowledge about specific company property and its value. Id. at 853-54. Thus, according to the supreme court, testimony regarding value of property is permitted “only from an officer in a management position with duties that at least in some part relate to the property at issue.” Id. at 854. The court instructed that before permitting an agent to testify as to property value, courts should “look both to the position of the witness and to the substance of the witness’s duties instead of looking only at the witness’s title or status. Id:

In Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Justiss, 397 S.W.3d 150, 155 (Tex. 2012), the supreme court reiterated that although a property owner may testify as to the value of his property, such opinion testimony must be' based on market value, not intrinsic or some other speculative value of the' property. This burden is usually met by asking the- property owner if he is familiar with the market value of the property. Id. at 155-56. If, however, the property owner’s testimony is merely concluso-ry or speculative, it is insufficient. See' id. at 158. • There must be a factual basis for the property owner’s valuation. Id. As recognized by the supreme court, numerous Texas courts have rejected testimony from property owners when it was unsupported by a sufficient factual basis. See id. at 158-59 (citations omitted).

Thus, .under the Property Owners Rule, -it is not sufficient to simply aver personal knowledge and provide an opinion on valuation.. See id. at 155-59. Rather, a property owner must provide, the factual basis on which his opinion rests. Id, at 159. As stated by the supreme court:

[Property valuations -may not be based solely on a property owner’s ipse dixit 'An owner may- not simply echo the phrase “market value” and state a number to substantiate his diminished value claim; he must provide the factual basis on which his opinion rests. This burden is not onerous, particularly in light of the resources available today. Evidence of price paid, nearby sales, tax valuations', appraisals, online resources, and any other, relevant factors-may be-offered to support the claim. But the.valuation must be substantiated; a naked assertion of “market value” is not enough.. Of course, the owner’s testimony may be challenged on cross-examination or refuted with independent evidence. But even if unchallenged, the testimony must support a verdict, and conclusory or speculative'statements do not.

Id. at 159.

Here, Mr. Floyd stated only that his affidavit was based on personal knowledge. When he opined that the Non-Acc,ess Easement and the property burdened thereby were valueless, his opinion was nothing .more than a conclusion, unsupported by any . factual basis. Champee Springs specifically asserted Mr. Floyd’s statements were “unsubstantiated factual conclusions and opinions , that are not supported by any underlying facts.” The trial court agreed, as do we. Moreover, as noted above, this contention is belied by the fact that summary judgment evidence produced by Champee Springs shows property within the tract has been sold or offered for sale for substantial sums of money despite the existence of the Non-Access Easement. Accordingly, we reject Teal Trading’s assertion that the trial court erred in sustaining the objection to the affidavit. As a result, Mr. Floyd’s affidavit does not create a fact issue on either unreasonable restraint on alienation or prohibition of use.

c. Termination by Merger

Next, Teal Trading contends the trial court erred in granting Champee Springs’s partial motion' for summary judgment as to'the affirmative defense of termination by merger. With regard to this affirmative defense, Teal Trading argues the Non-Access Easement was extinguished when it became the owner of the land on both sides of the-easement and the easement property. Champee Springs, in its motion for partial summary judgment, asserted there was no evidence “that all of the burdened and - benefited properties subject to the Non-Access Easement came back into the ownership of a single entity,” as required for termination by merger.

The Restatement (Third) of Property defines a “restrictive covenant” as a “negative .covenant” that limits permissible, uses of land. Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 1.3(3); see Tex. Prop. Code Ann., § 202.001(4) (defining “restrictive covenant” as any covenant or restriction in dedicatory instrument whether mandatory, prohibitive, permissive, or administrative); Voice■ of Cornerstone Church Corp. v. Piz za Prop. Partners, 160 S.W.3d 657, (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.). A “negative easement,” such as the one in this case, is a restrictive covenant. See Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 1.3(3). According to the Restatement, an easement is terminated “when all the benefits and burdens come into a. single ownership.” Id. § 7.5. For this reason, easements and other covenants in developments are rarely terminated by merger because each lot or parcel enjoys the benefit of the covenants imposed on every other property in the development. Id. cmt. C. Thus, merger arises so as to terminate an existing restriction or covenant “only when the entire development is acquired by a single owner.” Id.

Teal Trading argues that because it owns the property on each side of the easement and the easement land as well, the estates merged and extinguished, i.e., terminated, the Non-Access Easement on its property. We disagree. In our prior opinion, we specifically held, based on section 7.5 and comment C thereto, merger by termination could only occur if all the burdened and benefitted properties came back into the ownership of a single entity. Teal Trading, 432 S.W.3d at 394 (emphasis added). Although Teal Trading proved it acquired much of the .property originally dedicated by Cop, i.e., the property burdened by the Non-Access Easement, it did not produce any evidence that it acquired all of the property so burdened and bene-fitted. And, the record establishes portions of the original Cop property include properties still owned by members of Champee Springs. Thus, because Teal Trading failed to produce even a scintilla of evidence that “all the benefits and burdens” created in the original Cop dedication have “come into a single ownership,” there can be no termination by merger. See Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 7.5 & cmt. C; see also Teal Trading,. 432 S.W.3d at 394. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in granting the summary judgment in favor of Champee Springs as to the affirmative defense of termination, by merger.

d. Validity of Non-Access Easement

In its petition in intervention, Teal Trading generally sought a declaration that the Non-Access Easement was invalid and unenforceable. Champee Springs, in its traditional motion for summary judgment, alleged and 'argued that as a matter of law, the Non-Access Easement qualifies as a restrictive covenant and as such, is a valid easement. Based on our review of the motion for summary judgment, it appears Champee Springs believed Teal Trading was contending, as it had before, that the Non-Access Easement was invalid because easements must be based on the right to use property as opposed to- a prohibition on use. The trial court granted summary judgment on this ground.

We have reviewed Teal Trad-’ ing’s response to Champee Springs’ motion for summary judgment and find hothing therein in response to this portion of the motion for summary judgment. Thus, it appears that in its summary judgment response, Teal Trading did not respond to this ground in Champee Springs’s motion for summary judgment. “[Ijssues a non-movant contends avoid the movant’s entitlement to summary judgment must be expressly presented by written answer to the motion or by other written response to the motion[.]” Escondido Res. II, LLC v. Justapor Ranch Co., LC, No. 04-14-00905-CV, 2016 WL 2936411, at *2 (Tex. App.— San Antonio May 18, 2016, no pet.) (quoting McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex. 1993)); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). However, a motion for traditional summary judgment must stand or fall on its own merits, and a non-movant’s failure to answer or respond cannot supply by default the summary-judgment proof necessary to establish the mov-ant’s right to judgment; the moyant must still establish its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. McConnell, 858 S.W.2d at 343 (Tex. 1993). The effect of a non-movant’s failure to respond is that the non-movant is limited on appeal to arguing the legal sufficiency of the grounds presented by the movant. Id.

On page 29 of its appellate brief, Teal Trading recognizes the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Champee Springs as to the three affirmative defenses and on the ground that the Non-Access Easement qualifies as a valid, restrictive covenant.-- Teal Trading also states it is appealing “these summary judgment rulings.” However, nowhere in the portion of the brief challenging the trial court’s partial summary judgment does Teal Trading provide any argument regarding the ruling that the Non-Access Easement is a valid easement except by challenging the rulings on the specific affirmative defenses. Thus, with regard to this ground, we hold Teal Trading has not presented anything for our review. See Havre v. Nathan Watson Co., 221 S.W.3d .293, 301-02 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (holding that where defendant asserted in summary judgment motion that it had no duty to plaintiffs, plaintiffs’ failure to challenge the no-duty argument on appeal required appellate court to affirm summary judgment as to negligence claim). However, even if we were to address the validity of theNon-Access Easement given its prohibitive nature, we would hold the trial court properly granted summary judgment.

Assuming Teal Trading’s position is that the Non-Access Easement is invalid because it prohibited use—a negative easement—as opposed to granting a right to use, we hold this position is without merit. See Teal Trading, 432 S.W.3d at 394. As we recognized in our prior opinion in this matter, a claim that an easement is invalid because it purports to prohibit use as opposed to granting use “overlooks the well-established nature of negative reciprocal easements, restrictive covenants, or equitable servitudes restricting the use of property.” Id. (citing Evans v. Pollock, 796 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. 1990); Curlee v. Walker, 112 Tex. 40, 244 S.W. 497 (1922); Restatement (Third) of ‘Property: Servitudes § 1.3(3) (“A ‘restrictive covenant’ is a negative covenant that limits permissible uses of land. A ‘negative easement’ is a restrictive covenant.”)). Texas law recognizes the use and enforcement of restrictive covenants, i.e., negative easements. See, e.g., Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 202.001(4) (defining restrictive covenant as any covenant or restriction whether prohibitive or permissive); Moseley v. Arnold, 486 S.W.3d 656, 662 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, no pet.) (holding that any person entitled to benefit under terms of restrictive covenant may enforce it); Ski Masters of Tex., LLC v. Heinemeyer, 269 S.W.3d 662, 668 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.) (same); Voice of Cornerstone Church, 160 S.W.3d at 665 (holding restrictive covenant is negative covenant that limits use of land and original grantor may enforce it). Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the ground that the Non-Access Easement is a valid, enforceable easement because such negative easements are recognized in Texas.

e. Conclusion^-.Partial Summary Judgment

Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Champee Springs with regard to Teal Trading’s affirmative defenses of unreasonable restraint on alienation, prohibition on use, and termination by merger. We further hold the trial court properly granted summary judgment with regard to the validity of the Non-Access Easement as it relates to the claim of invalidity due to its negative nature. See Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248; Ford Motor Co., 135 S.W.3d at 600; Tatsch, 2014 WL 6808637, at *6. Because Teal Trading has failed to bring forth even a scintilla of summary judgment evidence to counter the no evidence motion filed by Champee Springs with regard to the affirmative defenses of unreasonable restraint on alienation, prohibition on use, and termination by merger, it is not necessary to analyze whether it satisfied its burden in the traditional motion with regard to these defenses. See Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248.

With regard to the validity of the Non-Access Easement, we hold1 the trial court properly granted the traditional motion for summary judgment filed by Champee Springs. Teal Trading did not challenge this contention in its summary judgment response and has not presented any argument on appeal regarding the validity of the easement based on its prohibitory nature. Rather, in its brief with regard to the trial court’s partial summary judgment, Teal Trading presents argument only as to the three affirmative defenses discussed above.

Bench Trial

After granting partial summary judgment in favor of Champee Springs, the trial court proceeded to a bench trial on the remaining issues, i.e., whether the Non-Access Easement is invalid and unenforceable based on the affirmative defenses of estoppel, waiver, and/or violation of public policy. In its petition in intervention, Teal Trading alleged the Non-Access Easement violated Kerr County public policy, Champee Springs waived enforcement of the Non-Access Easement by virtue of the 1999 Replat, and Champee Springs is estopped, by virtue of the 1999 Replat, from contending the Non-Access Easement is valid and enforceable. In its judgment, the trial court found the Non-Access Easement valid and enforceable, rejecting Teal Trading’s affirmative defenses. On appeal, Teal Trading asserts: (1) the 1999 Replat is binding, thereby rendering the Non-Access Easement invalid and unenforceable based the affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel; and (2) the Non-Access Easement is void because it violates Kerr County public policy.

Standard of Review

Teal Trading asserts it is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting certain findings of fact and the conclusions therefrom/ relating to the trial court’s declaration regarding the validity of the Non-Access Easement and its rejection of Teal Trading’s affirmative defenses. Before setting out the standard of review, we note that in its brief, Champee Springs contends we should reject Teal Trading’s sufficiency challenges because it failed to set out the specific fact findings it contends are not supported by the evidence. Champee Springs argues Teal Trading merely argued the evidence as a whole is insufficient to support the trial court’s findings, resulting in waiver.

“A party appealing from a nonju-ry trial in which the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law should direct his attack on the sufficiency of the evidence at specific findings of fact, rather than at the judgment as a whole.” Shaw v. Cnty, of Dallas, 251 S.W.3d 165, 169 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied); Levine v. Maverick Cnty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1, 884 S.W.2d 790, 796 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, writ denied).-Nevertheless, a challenge to an unidentified finding of fact may be sufficient if the reviewing court—after giving consideration to the number of findings, the nature of the case, and the underlying elements of the applicable legal theories—can fairly determine from the argument the specific finding being challenged. Shaw, 251 S.W.3d at 169 (citing Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp., 171 S.W.3d 857, 863 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (holding points of error should be liberally construed to fairly and equitably adjudicate rights of litigants, and reviewing court should consider, parties’ arguments supporting each point of error and not merely wording of points)); In re Estate of Bessire, 399 S.W.3d 642, 649 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, pet. denied).

' Here, the trial court made more .than forty findings of fact. Of those forty, approximately twenty-eight-findings concern the 'validity of the Non-Access Easement and the affirmative- defenses tried to the court. Although we agree Teal. Trading failed to challenge specifically any particular fact finding, we hold that we can .fairly ascertain the factual findings Teal Trading is challenging,- Accordingly-, we will review Teal Trading’s arguments.

In an appeal from a bench trial, the trial court’s findings of fact have the same weight as a jury verdict. Catalina v, Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994); Villarreal v. Guerra, 446 S.W.3d 404, 411 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet, denied), However, when the appellate record includes a reporter’s record, a trial court’s findings of fact are not conclusive and are binding only if supported by the evidence. Sheetz v. Slaughter, 503 S.W.3d 495, 502 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, no pet.). We review a trial court’s findings of fact under the same legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence standards used when determining whether sufficient evidence exists to support an answer to a jury question. Catalina, 881 S.W.2d at 297; Guerra, 446 S.W.3d at 411. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a trial court’s findings, “we do not serve as a fact finder, pass upon the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the-trier of fact, even if there is 'conflicting evidence upon which a different conclusion could be supported.” Guerra, 446 S.W.3d at 411 (quoting Hausman v. Hausman, 199 S.W.3d 38, 41 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.)).

The test for legal sufficiency is “whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review,” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005); see Guerra, 446 S.W.3d at 411. In making this determination, we credit evidence favoring the finding if a reasonable factfih-der could, and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827; Guerra, 446 S.W.3d at 411. If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to-support the finding, the legal sufficiency challenge must fail. BMC Software Belgium, N.V.. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002); Guerra, 446 S.W.3d at 411. In reviewing a factual sufficiency issue, we consider all the evidence supporting and contradicting .the finding. Plas-Tex., Inc, v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex. 1989); Guerra, 446 S.W.3d at 411. We set aside the judgment only if the finding is so contrary to the overwhelming weight' of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust, Cain U Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Guerra, 446 S.W.3d at 411.

A trial court’s conclusions of law present legal questions that we review de novo¿ BMC Software Belg., 83 S.W.3d at 794; In re Estate of Perez-Muzza, 446 S.W.3d 416, 418 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied). On appeal, we will uphold a conclusion of law if the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Sheetz, 503 S.W.3d at 502; Perez-Muzza, 446 S.W.3d at 418.

Application

a. Waiver, Estoppel by Deed, Estoppel by Record

Teal Trading contends that because “[a]ll then owners of land in the Champee Springs subdivision signed and notarized” the 1999 Replat, Champee Springs waived- its right to assert the validity of, and the right to enforce, the Non-Access Easement. On this same basis, Teal Trading argues Champee Springs is es-topped by deed and record from asserting the validity of or enforcing the Non-Access Easement. Thus, as we recognized in our prior opinion in this matter, the defenses of waiver and estoppel are closely , related in this case. See Teal Trading, 432 S.W.3d at 394 (noting issue was whether Champee Springs waived Non-Access Easement based on 1999 Replat and became es-topped from enforcing it). Champee Springs argues Teal Trading is,incorrect because although the 1999 Replat may have been signed by all those who owned land in Champee Springs in 1999, it.was not signed, by all of the property owners affected by the Non-Access Easement— specifically the Bowmans and Cop, which was mandatory to constitute waiver or to estop Champee Springs from asserting the validity and enforceability of the Non-Access Easement.

With regard to the affirmative defenses of waiver, estoppel by deed, and estoppel by record, and after reviewing the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we hold the relevant inquiry is whether it was necessary for all those affected by the Non-Access Easement to sign the 1999 Replat and if so, whether Teal Trading proved all those affected by the Non-Access Easement signed the 1999 Replat. This relates to the trial court’s fact" findings wherein the court found:

20. All of the owners of properties affected by the Non-Access Easement did not sign the 199 Replat or .agree to waive or release the Non-Access Easement;” .

21. (a) Cop, who reserved the right to enforce the Non-Access Easement, did not sign the 1999 Replat ... [.]”

As set out -in the “Background” portion above, in 1998,’ Cop purchased almost' 10,-000 acres of land ■ in Kerf and Kendall Counties. Immediately after the purchase, Cop recorded the Non-Access Easement, which reserved to him a one-foot easement prohibiting access across the easement by anyone other than'Cop or his assigns. Cop then platted his property as Champee Springs Ranches, eventually selling off large portions of it, including more than 1,300 acres to Luigs. In 1999, the Bow-mans acquired 660 acres of the original Cop property from Luigs, i.e., the Privilege Creek Tract. A little over two weeks after the Bowmans acquired their portion of the original Cop tract, Dr. Michael Wall, who owned approximately 2,300 acres in Champee Springs Ranches—part of