In re Harrison (557 S.W.3d 99, 2018)

Kevin Jewell, Justice

Appellant's motion for rehearing is denied. We withdraw our February 18, 2018 opinion and substitute the following in its stead. Our judgment remains unchanged.

Clifford Layne Harrison ("Cliff") and Connie Vasquez Harrison ("Connie") are before this court for the second time on direct appeal from proceedings incident to divorce. In a previous appeal on the merits, this court affirmed the divorce decree insofar as it granted the Harrisons' divorce, but we reversed the remainder of the decree and remanded for a new trial.

See Harrison v. Harrison , 367 S.W.3d 822, 835 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (" Harrison I "). This appeal follows the bench trial on remand. Connie challenges the trial court's final order and decree on division of property and determination of conservatorship. In three issues, Connie contends the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) permitting her trial counsel to withdraw, over her objection, approximately four weeks before trial and without granting a trial continuance; (2) naming Cliff sole managing conservator of the Harrisons' two children; and (3) dividing the marital estate. After careful review of the record, we affirm.

Introduction

A trial judge maintains considerable discretion to control disposition of cases "with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." Today's case presents numerous challenges to a trial court's discretionary rulings that, in many respects, balance a litigant's rights against the trial court's broad authority to enforce orders and constrain the litigant's dilatory or obstructive behavior. A litigant's dilatory conduct is especially concerning in a case involving the custody of children. This is so because, in a case such as today's that involves conservatorship, access, and possession decisions, the children's best interest must remain the court's primary concern. See Tex. Fam. Code § 153.002. Conservatorship, access, and possession of the Harrison children have been matters of debate since October 2006, when Cliff initially filed for divorce from Connie. The children, who were six and two years old when this case began, have now reached the ages of seventeen and thirteen, with the upheaval of their parents' divorce and the ongoing custody dispute overshadowing the vast majority of their lives. We are now presented with a new appeal involving challenges to custody decisions and other rulings.

Background

Connie and Cliff Harrison were married in February 2000. Both are licensed attorneys. They have a son who was born in 2000 ("J.H.") and a daughter who was born in 2004 ("V.H."). Connie and Cliff ceased living together in January 2006; Cliff filed for divorce on October 30, 2006. See Harrison I , 367 S.W.3d at 823. From October 2006 to February 2008, Connie was represented in the divorce proceeding by six different attorneys, and she occasionally represented herself. See id. at 823-24. In January 2010, with trial set to begin in March, Connie's trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw based on Connie's inability to pay attorney's fees. Connie opposed her trial counsel's withdrawal and sought interim attorney's fees. After a hearing, the trial court permitted Connie's counsel to withdraw and denied Connie's motion for interim fees. Connie filed a motion for continuance, but the trial court denied the motion. In March 2010, the trial court called the case for trial, and Connie announced that she was "not ready." Nonetheless, the case proceeded to a jury trial with Connie representing herself.

Following trial, the court signed a final decree of divorce on June 21, 2010. Connie appealed the judgment to this court. Holding the trial court erred by denying a continuance when allowing Connie's trial counsel to withdraw, we reversed and remanded for a new trial in April 2012. However, we affirmed the divorce between the parties as of the date of the decree. Since our remand in April 2012, this case has been preferentially set for trial a number of times, and Connie has alternated between periods of self-representation and representation by numerous attorneys, all of whom have withdrawn.

In January 2014, after participating in court-ordered mediation, the parties signed a mediated settlement agreement (the "MSA"). Connie moved to set aside the MSA the following March, asserting that she had been a victim of family violence, which impaired her ability to make decisions, and the MSA was not in the best interest of J.H. and V.H. She also asserted that "there has been a change in circumstances since the signing of the mediated agreement." But on the motion of the children's amicus attorney, the trial court signed an interim order on parent-child issues incorporating the terms of the MSA on April 10 (the "Interim Order"). Consistent with the MSA, the Interim Order named Connie and Cliff joint managing conservators of J.H. and V.H. The Interim Order also provided Connie the exclusive right to designate the children's residence within Harris County, while providing Cliff extended possession of the children.

Connie failed to fully comply with the trial court's Interim Order, as well as other orders. As Connie's violations are relevant to our analysis of the issues she presents, we summarize pertinent examples from the record. In March 2014, Second Baptist School notified Cliff and Connie that the children would not be permitted to enroll again the following school year because the "continued legal dispute concerning possession and other matters ... has required considerable focus by school employees and has on too many occasions distracted school staff from the school's need to focus on the spiritual and educational needs of all students at the school." Thereafter, in May, the trial court signed additional temporary orders authorizing Cliff to enroll the children in private school. Under the terms of that order, if private school was unavailable, then the children were to attend the public schools to which Cliff's home was zoned-Briargrove Elementary and Grady Middle School. Despite these orders, Connie unilaterally enrolled J.H. and V.H. in schools other than those specified by the orders. Further, Connie also violated the orders by withholding J.H. and V.H. from Cliff during his designated visitation times on several occasions. During the summer of 2014, Connie prevented Cliff from seeing or speaking with J.H. and V.H. for numerous weeks. Cliff filed numerous contempt motions against Connie for violating the court's visitation orders.

On August 4, 2014, Cliff filed his first amended petition for division of property and to establish a parenting plan. In this petition, Cliff stated:

The parties and the AMICUS attorney mediated ... on January 29, 2014. A mediated settlement agreement on the parent-child issues was agreed to and signed by the parties and the AMICUS attorney. Since the signing of that mediated settlement agreement, a material and substantial change has occurred with regard to the children and/or the parties, and as such, the agreements pertaining to the children are not in the best interest of the children. Respondent has engaged in a course of conduct that is injurious to the welfare of the children, and this Court should make appropriate orders for the protection of the children.

As to conservatorship of the children, Cliff alleged that the continuation of Connie and he as joint managing conservators was no longer in the children's best interest, and he requested that, on final hearing, the court appoint Cliff sole managing conservator.

Thereafter, on August 19, Cliff filed a motion to set aside the MSA or to modify the Interim Order. Cliff alleged that Connie violated the trial court's orders on several occasions, including withholding J.H. and V.H. during Cliff's designated periods of access, failing to allow communications between Cliff and the children, and engaging in a course of conduct "designed with the specific intent of alienating the children from their father." Cliff sought to be named as the children's temporary sole managing conservator. After a hearing on September 3, the trial court signed an order granting Cliff's motion for temporary orders. Finding the following actions necessary for the safety and welfare of J.H. and V.H. and in their best interests, the trial court: (1) removed Connie as a joint managing conservator, (2) appointed Cliff temporary sole managing conservator, (3) designated Cliff with "the exclusive right to all periods of possession and access of the children," and (4) barred Connie from "any periods of possession and/or access to the children until further order of the Court or by written agreement of the parties and attorneys." At some point before trial, the trial court apparently allowed Connie supervised visitation with J.H. and V.H., although our record does not contain an order so specifying.

Meanwhile, on September 2, Cliff filed a motion for enforcement of possession and access, in which he alleged that Connie had violated the court's orders concerning possession of and access to the children. In this motion, he requested that Connie be held in contempt, jailed, and fined for various alleged violations. Connie appeared at the hearing on Cliff's motion for enforcement on October 16. In an enforcement order signed October 24, the court: (1) found Connie committed eleven violations of its orders; (2) held Connie in criminal contempt for the violations; (3) fined Connie $3,000; and (4) ordered Connie to pay Cliff's reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and costs of $25,554.30. The trial court ordered Connie confined to the Harris County Jail for 120 days, but suspended Connie's confinement and placed her on community supervision contingent on Connie paying the attorney's fees and fines and complying with the court's orders. When Connie failed to pay the fees and fines as ordered, Cliff moved to revoke her probation. Cliff's motion to revoke was set for hearing on December 18.

In early December 2014, Connie retained new counsel. At that time, Connie faced several hearings on Cliff's motions for enforcement and revocation, as well as a January 20, 2015 trial setting. On December 15, however, Connie's counsel filed a motion to withdraw and a motion for continuance. Both motions were set for hearing on December 18 along with Cliff's motion to revoke. Following the December 18 hearing, the court found Connie had violated the terms of her community supervision and ordered Connie jailed for violating the trial court's October 24 order. After hearings on December 18, 22, and 23, the trial court orally denied the motion for continuance and granted Connie's counsel's motion to withdraw. We discuss those proceedings in more detail below.

On January 9, 2015, the trial court conducted a pretrial conference. At that hearing, the trial court ordered Connie and Cliff to exchange with each other a complete set of trial exhibits before 5:00 p.m. that day at Cliff's counsel's office. The trial court further ordered Connie and Cliff to provide copies of their trial exhibits to the amicus attorney by 5:00 p.m. on January 12. At a pretrial hearing on January 16, the trial court learned that Connie failed to exchange exhibits with Cliff on January 9, and failed to serve her exhibits on the amicus attorney by January 12. When questioned by the court, Connie acknowledged she made no attempt to exchange exhibits with either Cliff or the amicus attorney at any time before the January 16 hearing. Both Cliff and the amicus attorney provided their exhibits to Connie. The trial court then ordered Connie to provide her exhibits to Cliff by 1:45 p.m. that day, recessing proceedings to provide Connie time to comply. Proceedings continued at 2:00 p.m. But Connie had only an original copy of her exhibits and was unable to tender copies to opposing counsel or the amicus attorney. Finding that Connie failed to comply with repeated orders to tender exhibits to opposing counsel and the amicus attorney, the trial court excluded Connie's exhibits from evidence at the scheduled jury trial.

The trial court instructed all parties to appear at 8:30 a.m. on January 20 to resolve any outstanding pre-trial matters then begin trial. Connie was not represented by counsel and she failed to appear at 8:30 a.m. Cliff, his counsel, and the amicus attorney appeared timely. At approximately 9:30 a.m., Cliff, the only party who filed a jury demand and paid a jury fee, waived his right to jury trial and requested a bench trial. Connie still was not present. Testimony commenced to the bench. Connie did not arrive in the courtroom until about 10:15 a.m. At that time, Cliff was testifying. Connie notified the trial court that she had filed a motion to recuse the trial judge. The trial court denied the motion to recuse, but recessed proceedings until the administrative judge could rule on the motion. After the administrative judge denied the motion to recuse, proceedings recommenced around 1:30 p.m. At that time, Connie objected to proceeding with trial without a jury. The trial court overruled her objection and proceeded with the bench trial.

Cliff testified to facts bearing on the relevant disputed issues, predominantly custody. Cliff provided examples of Connie's conduct that Cliff considered dishonest and manipulative. For instance, Cliff testified that Connie attempted to buy an expensive home without Cliff's consent or knowledge; Connie forged her name on checks, cashed them, and then lied about it; and Connie deceived Cliff about various home improvements and credit cards. According to Cliff, Connie repeatedly violated court orders regarding J.H. and V.H., by secreting the children from Cliff, attempting to alienate them from Cliff, enrolling them in unapproved schools for the 2015-2016 school year, and communicating with them when she had been ordered to refrain from doing so. Cliff also described several physical altercations with Connie.

Connie cross-examined Cliff extensively regarding whether he called her names or behaved inappropriately toward her in front of J.H. and V.H. after the two separated. Cliff, for the most part, acknowledged he had frequently spoken to Connie in a derogatory manner, but denied that he had ever done so in front of the children. Cliff acknowledged that he had likely sent Connie disparaging text messages. He repeatedly denied that he had ever "beaten up" Connie in front of J.H. or V.H.

Another key issue involved Second Baptist School's decision declining enrollment to the Harrison children for the 2015-2016 school year. The lower school principal, Tamara Gallagher, testified via deposition that J.H. and V.H. were not permitted to re-enroll because of Connie's repeated school policy violations. Gallagher explained that Connie frequently violated school policy. For example, Connie interrupted teachers or pulled the children out of class during school hours, arrived late for pick-up but refused to sign a late form, failed to sign in when she arrived for school visits during school hours, argued with school personnel to alter disciplinary decisions concerning the children, and frequently called to change pick-up instructions very close to dismissal times. Gallagher stated that the school never had a problem with Cliff. She agreed that but for the repeated violations of school policies by Connie, J.H. and V.H. would still be permitted to attend Second Baptist School.

Cliff testified that the children's inability to continue attending Second Baptist School was "very hard" on the children because it was the only school they had ever attended. Cliff enrolled J.H. and V.H. in counseling; he enrolled in counseling himself on the recommendation of the daughter's counselor. V.H.'s counselor testified that she believed Connie's conduct warranted supervised visitation:

I feel that the supervised visits should continue.... [B]ased on what I've experienced or been made aware of throughout this proceeding, there was [sic] a lot of rules that weren't being followed during visitation and around visitation, and a lot of distress around visitation handoffs and things of that nature, and I think the structure of the supervised visits provides a level of comfort and stability for [V.H.]....

I base my recommendation [of continuing supervised visitation] on lots of things; not just what the father says and what the mother says but the clinical presentation of the child, the-my experience during therapy over the weeks. And in my clinical opinion, supervised visits are in the best interest for [V.H.] at this time ....

(Emphasis added). J.H.'s counselor also testified. He stated that J.H. has no fear of either parent, loves them both very much, but would like this case to be over. J.H. also expressed a strong preference to return to Second Baptist School for the next school year.

According to Cliff, Connie has no sense of boundaries or appropriate behavior when it comes to dealing with or confronting people. She inappropriately inserts herself into situations, such as teacher-student relationships. Cliff testified that Connie could be "manipulative" in dealing with the children. Cliff stated that the children seem to be benefiting from their therapy. He indicated that there are "no major" concerns between J.H. and V.H. and the children of Cliff's then-fiancée, Heather Fitzsimmons-they were working on blending the family. Cliff explained that J.H. and V.H. are both aware of the ongoing proceedings, but he does not discuss it with them. He acknowledged that the children probably know more about the proceedings than they should. Cliff stated that he avoids altercations with Connie by simply avoiding being around her alone. He believed that he can control himself around Connie, but he had concerns about whether Connie can control herself around him. Connie, on the other hand, stated that she did not think she and Cliff could operate as joint managing conservators of the children based on Cliff's "rage" towards her.

Connie's sister, Sue Yen Vasquez Davis, testified via deposition. Connie and Davis had not spoken in several years. Davis agreed that Cliff had "always demonstrated good judgment" around J.H. and V.H. She described Cliff as a "good father," "nurturing," and "patient." She had no concerns about Cliff's ability to raise J.H. and V.H. She also agreed that she would have "no hesitancy" in leaving her own children in Cliff's care. When asked similar questions regarding Connie, Davis notably stated she had either "no comment" or "no opinion." For example, Davis had no comment on whether Connie was physically violent, had a propensity to initiate arguments, had a "paranoid tendency," or was psychologically stable. Davis would offer no opinion as to whether Connie was deceptive or combative. She also had no opinion regarding her feelings toward Connie. When asked if she would leave her own children in Connie's care, Davis responded, "No."

During trial, the trial court afforded Cliff and Connie equal, but reasonably limited, time to present their evidence and cross-examine witnesses. During the trial, the trial court repeatedly reminded Connie how much time she had used and how much time remained. Despite the trial court's reminders, when Connie's allotted time expired, Connie argued she lacked sufficient time to present all her desired evidence. The court granted Connie an additional hour to present further evidence.

After hearing evidence and the parties' arguments, the trial court orally rendered judgment on February 12, 2015, and signed the final judgment on March 26, 2015. The trial court appointed Cliff sole managing conservator of J.H. and V.H. and named Connie possessory conservator. The court ordered that Connie have supervised possession of J.H. and V.H. for four hours, twice a month. The court further enjoined both parties from making disparaging remarks about the other, and from discussing this or any future litigation regarding conservatorship issues in the presence of J.H. and V.H. Finally, as is relevant to this appeal, the trial court awarded Cliff the former marital home. Connie timely appealed.

Issues and Standard of Review

Connie challenges (1) the trial court's decision to permit Connie's counsel to withdraw one month before trial without granting a continuance, (2) the trial court's conservatorship determination, and (3) the trial court's division of property. All of these rulings are subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. See Harrison I , 367 S.W.3d at 826 (abuse-of-discretion standard applies to both grant of motion to withdraw and denial of motion for continuance); Baker v. Baker , 469 S.W.3d 269, 273 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) ("The trial court is afforded great discretion when making [conservatorship] determinations, and we review the trial court's decision for an abuse of that discretion."); Stavinoha v. Stavinoha , 126 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (explaining that a party seeking to disturb a trial court's division of property "must show the trial court clearly abused its discretion by a division or an order that is manifestly unjust and unfair").

Under this standard, we cannot "overrule the trial court's decision unless the trial court acted unreasonably or in an arbitrary manner, without reference to guiding rules or principles." Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co. , 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex. 2002). Further, we do not substitute our judgment for the trial court's judgment, even if we would have reached a different conclusion. Id. A trial court does not abuse its discretion when some evidence reasonably supports its decision. Id. Legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds of error under the abuse-of-discretion standard, but are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. Stavinoha , 126 S.W.3d at 608.

Bearing in mind this discretionary standard of review, we turn to Connie's specific issues in this appeal. We first address her complaints concerning the withdrawal of her counsel, then turn to her issues concerning custody of J.H. and V.H., and finally address her challenge to the trial court's division of the marital estate.

Withdrawal of Counsel and Denial of Trial Continuance

In her first issue, Connie asserts that "the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the last minute withdrawal of attorney Sarah Razavi Zand on the eve of trial, while at the same time denying any continuance." We begin our analysis by summarizing the relevant procedural history.

A. Facts Regarding the Withdrawal of Connie's Counsel

Cliff filed for divorce from Connie on October 30, 2006. From that date until the parties' first divorce trial in March 2010, Connie employed at least six different lawyers, each of whom withdrew for various reasons. See Harrison I , 367 S.W.3d at 823-25 (detailing Connie's legal representation history during that time period). When not represented by counsel, Connie represented herself. She also represented herself at the first divorce trial.

Post-remand, Connie retained a number of new attorneys in succession, each of whom withdrew. On September 5, 2014, Connie consented to the withdrawal of her then counsel of record. At that time, trial was preferentially set for mid-January 2015. Connie represented herself from September until early December 2014, when she retained Sara Razavi Zand as counsel. When Connie retained Razavi Zand, upcoming settings included the December 18, 2014 hearing on Cliff's motions to revoke probation and for enforcement, and a January 20, 2015 trial setting. On December 15, 2014, less than two weeks after Connie had retained her, Razavi Zand filed a motion to withdraw as Connie's counsel, as well as a motion for continuance, neither of which are contained in our record.

1. The December 18 hearing

At the December 18 hearing, the trial court first heard Cliff's motion to revoke Connie's probation. Razavi Zand represented Connie on the motion to revoke probation. After hearing testimony from Connie and Cliff, and after considering argument of counsel, including Razavi Zand on Connie's behalf, the trial court ordered her probation revoked and committed her to 120 days in the Harris County jail.

After the court revoked Connie's probation, Razavi Zand requested a continuance of the preferential trial setting so that Connie could obtain new counsel. Cliff objected to further continuances: "[T]his is our fourth preferential trial setting just since the remand. It does not include the prior trial settings. Every time we get close to trial, we get the same motion for continuance. We get the same motion for fees, and then we get a withdrawal. It happens every single time." The children's amicus attorney, while not urging that the continuance be denied, noted, "I do believe that these children deserve finality, just like I said back in 2010; and here we are four years down the road and they still don't have that finality. [J.H.] has been in litigation for more than half his life, and he knows it. He's tired of it; and, so, I think the children deserve to be children and move about." The trial court denied the motion for continuance.

Razavi Zand then presented her motion to withdraw, which Connie (and Cliff) opposed. Razavi Zand articulated her reasons for withdrawing as follows:

At this time, Your Honor, there is a big conflict of interest. There are reasons that I cannot at this point ethically and-I cannot ethically represent [Connie] pursuant to our Disciplinary Rules ... that we follow, Your Honor.

There's a conflict of interest. The conflict of interest arose on Monday, and the conflict of interest-there is now a bigger conflict of interest that has occurred within the past 48 hours that would prevent me from properly representing [Connie] moving forward....

The conflict that I'm referring to is a conflict between my client and I that prevents me from properly representing her.

As far as, like I said, without going into the events that have occurred within the past 48 hours, more so within the past 48 hours, this is not a conflict of interest in the traditional sense that there is another client that it conflicts or anything like that. It's a personal conflict that has arisen between my client and myself where I cannot ethically and morally represent-and maybe I shouldn't use the word "morally." I can't properly represent her in my personal capacity, and my personal interests are-would be put in front of my client's interests at this time....

The basis of my motion to withdraw would be that I cannot ethically and properly represent her with this conflict that has arisen between my client and myself. Nothing outside of my client and myself.

The trial court initially granted Razavi Zand's motion to withdraw, explaining:

I want to be very clear that I don't want to create a policy in this court of letting attorneys withdraw from representing clients that they were recently retained by. However, if this is going to be as you [Razavi Zand], as an officer of the court, have conveyed to this Court that it would subject you to ethical violations with the State Bar, certainly I'm not going to require that you remain on the case.

However, I have denied the continuance in this matter, Ms. Harrison. So, and you have an observer here in court today and I don't know the extent of what you have in the works, but you need to be prepared for trial in January.

Cliff's counsel then asked the trial court to reserve its ruling until Connie had an opportunity to speak to an observer-an attorney-to determine if he would agree to represent Connie. The court agreed to withhold ruling and hear further argument on Razavi Zand's motion to withdraw on December 22, when the court had scheduled a jail review hearing on Connie's contempt sentence.

2. The December 22 hearing

On December 22, Razavi Zand represented Connie during the jail review portion of the hearing, proposing various courses of action by Connie to pay Cliff's attorney's fees and, thus, secure release from jail. The trial court declined to release Connie from jail at this point because Connie had not articulated a specific plan to pay the attorney's fees. The trial court set a second jail review hearing for a date in January 2015.

Razavi Zand then re-urged her motion to withdraw, explaining that her conflict with Connie was "so egregious" as to preclude continued representation: "Because under the disciplinary rule[s], it is a mandatory withdrawal.... I am so conflicted out, due to the egregious conduct that has occurred between my client and myself, that my personal interests have now far exceeded my ability to advocate for Ms. Harrison." However, the trial court was not able to complete this hearing, and it recessed until the following day.

3. The December 23 hearing

On December 23, the trial court resumed argument on Razavi Zand's motion to withdraw. Connie opposed Razavi Zand's withdrawal if it left her without counsel. She also insisted that Razavi Zand did not have cause to withdraw. Connie testified that Razavi Zand's real reason for withdrawal was financial. Also, Connie stated that Razavi Zand told her she was involved in a lawsuit against the trial judge's husband.

When questioned, Razavi Zand stated that she disagreed with Connie's implication that Razavi Zand sought to withdraw "for some other purpose than [Connie's] conduct." Razavi Zand stated unequivocally that she was not withdrawing for the reasons Connie suggested. Instead, Razavi Zand clarified that Connie's actions formed the basis for her request to withdraw. She inquired of Connie: "Would you agree with me that I have informed you that there are certain actions that you have done , prior to my filing, post my filing of my Motion to Withdraw, that I have informed you those were one of many reasons why I was withdrawing?" (Emphasis added.) Connie responded to this question by affirming that, while she did not want to waive her attorney-client privilege, Razavi Zand had stated reasons for withdrawing, though Connie did not "agree[ ] with those reasons."

Razavi Zand verified that she had some of Connie's case files at her office and that she would be able to deliver those files to whomever Connie designated, but Connie stated that she had no one who could accept these files on her behalf. Connie explained that she had not been able to retain other counsel due to her confinement.

At the close of the hearing, the trial court allowed Razavi Zand to withdraw. The court ordered Razavi Zand to deliver Connie's files on January 2, 2015, a date the trial court scheduled for Connie's next jail review hearing. The trial judge explained that she was ruling only on the motion to withdraw at this hearing, and she could address other pending matters at either the January 2 or January 9 hearings. The trial setting was January 20.

B. Withdrawal of Counsel-Applicable Law

An attorney may withdraw from representing a party only upon written motion for good cause shown. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 10. This rule does not define good cause, but courts generally view the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct as articulating guidelines relevant to a "good cause" determination supporting a Rule 10 motion to withdraw. See Harrison I , 367 S.W.3d at 826 ; see also Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof'l Conduct R. 1.15, reprinted in Tex. Gov't Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A.

Under the Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer must withdraw from representing a client if "the representation will result in a violation of ... applicable rules of professional conduct or other law." Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof'l Conduct R. 1.15(a). This rule "requires a lawyer to withdraw from employment when the lawyer knows that the employment will result in a violation of a rule of professional conduct or other law." See Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof'l Conduct R. 1.15 cmt. 2. Further, because attorney-client confidentiality considerations may prevent a lawyer from revealing a detailed factual explanation in support of a motion to withdraw, a "lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient." See Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof'l Conduct R. 1.15 cmt. 3; see also In re Marriage of Glynn , No. 07-13-00095-CV, 2014 WL 7448675, at *2 n.2 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Dec. 31, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.).

C. Permitting Counsel to Withdraw Was Not an Abuse of Discretion

At the hearings on her motion to withdraw, Razavi Zand asserted that she was required to withdraw due to Connie's actions, which had created what Razavi Zand described as an "egregious" conflict. Razavi Zand stated that, due to Connie's actions, Razavi Zand could not place Connie's interests above her own:

[T]he conflict at this point is so egregious that I cannot continue to make these arguments and-have to stay on the case. Because under the disciplinary rule, it is a mandatory withdrawal. And by me staying on the case, your Honor, I am so conflicted out, due to the egregious conduct that has occurred between my client and myself, that my personal interests have now far exceeded my ability to advocate for Ms. Harrison.

Connie, on the other hand, opposed Razavi Zand's withdrawal, telling the court she had "not done anything to cause [Razavi Zand] to withdraw." Connie suggested that Razavi Zand sought to withdraw for financial reasons, but Razavi Zand stated that payment issues were not the basis of her motion. Connie also suggested that Razavi Zand filed her motion to withdraw because Razavi Zand was involved in a lawsuit against the trial judge's purported husband. But Razavi Zand stated that any such lawsuit was not the reason for her withdrawal.

Based on our record, Connie has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in accepting Razavi Zand's statement of the grounds for her motion to withdraw. Razavi Zand explained that her continued representation of Connie would have caused Razavi Zand to violate the disciplinary rules by compromising her fiduciary duties to Connie. Under such circumstances, Razavi Zand was required to withdraw as Connie's counsel. See Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof'l Conduct R. 1.15(a); see also Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline v. Hanna , 513 S.W.3d 175, 178 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (explaining that the disciplinary rules "establish minimum standards of conduct required of lawyers to avoid disciplinary action"; they are "imperatives"); Glynn , 2014 WL 7448675, at *2. The trial court, as the factfinder, was the sole judge of credibility and was free to accept Razavi Zand's assertions that she had cause to withdraw. See, e.g. , Scruggs v. Linn , 443 S.W.3d 373, 382 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005) ). Although it would have been preferable to have obtained a more detailed explanation through an in camera conference or other means that would have preserved attorney-client privilege, Razavi Zand's explanation was sufficient to support good cause to withdraw.

See, e.g. , Goffney v. Rabson , 56 S.W.3d 186, 193 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (explaining the fiduciary relationship between attorney and client; describing that a breach of fiduciary duty occurs when an attorney places personal interests over the client's interest).

Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Razavi Zand to withdraw and overrule this part of Connie's first issue. We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a trial continuance.

D. Motion for Continuance-Applicable Law

In the next portion of her first issue, Connie urges that to the extent Razavi Zand's withdrawal was appropriate, the trial court nonetheless abused its discretion by permitting the withdrawal without also granting a continuance of the January 20 trial setting.

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 251 governs motions for continuance. This rule provides that a motion for continuance shall not be granted without "sufficient cause supported by affidavit, or by consent of the parties, or by operation of law." Tex. R. Civ. P. 251. Accordingly, motions for continuance generally must be in writing, state the specific facts supporting the motion, and be verified or supported by an affidavit. In re G.S. , No. 14-14-00477-CV, 2014 WL 4699480, at *25 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 23, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 251, 252 ; In re E.L.T. , 93 S.W.3d 372, 375 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) ). When a motion for continuance does not comply with the rules, e.g., when the motion is unwritten or unsupported by verified facts, appellate courts generally presume the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. See Villegas v. Carter , 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1986) ; see also In re S.M.H. , 523 S.W.3d 783, 797 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (citing W.W. Webber, L.L.C. v. Harris Cty. Toll Road Auth. , 324 S.W.3d 877, 880 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) ). Oral requests for a continuance do not preserve error. See Phifer v. Nacogdoches Cty. Cent. Appraisal Dist. , 45 S.W.3d 159, 173 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, pet. denied) ; see also D.F. v. State , 525 S.W.2d 933, 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (no abuse of discretion in denying continuance even though counsel withdrew only one day before trial when appellant failed to file written motion for continuance pointing out sufficient cause supported by affidavit; instead, only unsworn oral motion for continuance urged on day of trial).

When, as alleged here, the ground for a continuance is the withdrawal of counsel, the movant must show that the failure to be represented at trial was not due to her own fault or negligence. Villegas , 711 S.W.2d at 626 ; Harrison I , 367 S.W.3d at 827. The "absence of counsel will not be good cause for a continuance or postponement of the cause when called for trial, except it be allowed in the discretion of the court, upon cause shown or upon matters within the knowledge or information of the judge to be stated on the record." Tex. R. Civ. P. 253.

E. Denying Connie's Motion for Continuance Was Not an Abuse of Discretion

It is unclear precisely which motion or motions for continuance form the basis of Connie's appellate complaints.

According to the reporter's record, Razavi Zand filed a written motion for continuance on Connie's behalf, which the trial court denied at the December 18 hearing. Other portions of the reporter's record indicate that Connie attempted to orally request a trial continuance at least twice after the trial court permitted Razavi Zand to withdraw. At the January 16 pretrial hearing, Connie attempted to argue a motion for continuance she asserted she had filed. However, the trial court refused to consider her request because Connie had not set the motion for a hearing or served a copy on Cliff's counsel or the amicus attorney. Also, during the first afternoon of trial, Connie orally asked the court for a continuance.

Our record contains no copies of any written motions for continuance, including the motion filed by Razavi Zand or the motion purportedly filed before January 16. When counsel withdraws but no written motion for continuance is contained in the record, we presume that the trial court has not abused its discretion in denying a continuance. See, e.g. , E.L.T. , 93 S.W.3d at 375 ; D.F. , 525 S.W.2d at 941 ; see also S.M.H. , 523 S.W.3d at 797 (no abuse of discretion shown in denying oral motion for continuance unsupported by affidavit where record did not reveal agreement by the parties or argument that continuance should have been granted by operation of law). Additionally, to the extent Connie seeks to rely on any oral requests for continuance as a basis of her appellate complaint, oral motions for continuance do not preserve error. See Phifer , 45 S.W.3d at 173. A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying an oral motion for continuance. See , e.g. , S.M.H. , 523 S.W.3d at 797 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying oral motion for continuance that was not supported by affidavit); Dempsey v. Dempsey , 227 S.W.3d 771, 776 n.1 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, no pet.) (when request for continuance is oral and unsupported by affidavit, it will be presumed that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying continuance).

Thus, our review of this portion of Connie's first issue is foreclosed because our record does not contain a copy of the written motion for continuance forming the basis of her complaint. See E.L.T. , 93 S.W.3d at 375 ("In this case, the record does not contain a written motion [for continuance] or affidavit. Because appellant did not comply with Rule 251, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion."); cf. Harrison I , 367 S.W.3d at 831-32 (providing details from Connie's written motion for continuance). For example, we cannot determine whether Connie's motion was properly verified, what specific facts formed the basis of the continuance sought, and what, if any, efforts Connie undertook to engage alternate counsel.

Moreover, even presuming Connie properly moved for a continuance, Razavi Zand explained that the reason for her requested withdrawal was that Connie's conduct created an "egregious" conflict. Connie argued that Razavi Zand's reasons were financial or related to a purported lawsuit involving the trial judge's fiancé. Even if we consider these statements to the trial court as sworn evidence in support of a properly filed motion for continuance, the trial court was the factfinder and had discretion to accept Razavi Zand's statements that the basis of her withdrawal was due to Connie's fault. See, e.g. , Scruggs , 443 S.W.3d at 382. This record supports the trial court's implied finding that Connie failed to prove that her counsel's withdrawal was not due to Connie's own fault.

When counsel withdraws due to the fault of the movant, a trial court generally does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for continuance. See Gendebien v. Gendebien , 668 S.W.2d 905, 907-09 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ) (husband failed to show absence of counsel was not due to his own fault or negligence or that he exercised reasonable diligence to obtain new counsel; thus, trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to continue divorce based on absence of counsel); cf. Barbarawi v. Ahmad , No. 14-07-00790-CV, 2008 WL 2261433, at *2-3 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 27, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance when appellants failed to show that lack of representation was not due to their own fault or negligence,); Van Sickle v. Stroud , 467 S.W.2d 509, 510-11 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971, no writ) (in the absence of evidence showing Van Sickle was not at fault for trial counsel's withdrawal and his diligence in finding new counsel, trial court acted within its discretion in denying trial continuance).

Connie cites this court's opinion in her prior appeal, in which we held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance when Connie's counsel withdrew through no fault of Connie's. Harrison I , 367 S.W.3d at 831-35. But the record and circumstances then presented differ from the current appeal. Cf. id. For example, the only reason for her then-counsel's withdrawal was Connie's lack of financial resources to satisfy her contractual payment obligations. Id. at 828. We concluded that there were "significant questions about whether Connie substantially failed to fulfill her obligation to pay" her counsel. Id. at 829. Although we did not hold that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting Connie's counsel to withdraw, we noted that "allowing withdrawal in th[at] instance approach[ed] the outer limits of discretion." Id. at 831. Moreover, in the earlier appeal, the record showed that Connie filed a motion for continuance in which she explained that she was not at fault for her counsel's withdrawal and detailed actions taken to engage new counsel. Id. at 831-32. Ultimately, we concluded that the record did not show that Connie was at fault for causing her counsel's withdrawal. Id. at 832-34.

In our view, the current record, including in particular events transpiring in the trial court since remand, show an altered landscape and do not lead to the same result as our earlier disposition. In exercising its discretion over whether to grant or deny a continuance due to the withdrawal of counsel, a trial court may consider the entire procedural history of a case. Jackson v. LongAgriBusiness, L.L.C. , No. 14-11-01073-CV, 2013 WL 84921, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 8, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). Here, the trial court possessed abundant knowledge of this matter's prolonged history bearing upon whether Connie was entitled to a continuance in December 2014. The record reflects that Connie retained upwards of a dozen different attorneys over the course of this case, hiring at least half of them following our remand. Many of these attorneys withdrew-often with Connie's blessing-before trial settings, resulting in a pattern of trial postponements. Connie consented to the withdrawal of her previous counsel in September 2014, when Connie was aware of the January 2015 trial setting. Connie did not retain Razavi Zand until early December 2014-a little over a month before trial. Less than two weeks into Razavi Zand's representation of Connie, Razavi Zand moved to withdraw based on Connie's actions. On this record, Connie's serial employment of attorneys, continuing unabated following remand, reasonably could be viewed as undertaken for dilatory purposes, which the court could balance against her requested continuance. Cf. Harrison I , 367 S.W.3d at 834-35 ("Serial hiring and firing of attorneys for dilatory purposes would be a legitimate concern to be balanced against a requested continuance in appropriate circumstances.").

In support of her argument, Connie also cites cases in which courts reversed the denial of a continuance when counsel withdrew. Villegas , 711 S.W.2d at 626 ; Harrison I , 367 S.W.3d at 831-34 ; McAleer v. McAleer , 394 S.W.3d 613, 617-20 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.). We find these cases distinguishable because each involved withdrawal of counsel through no fault of the client. Villegas , 711 S.W.2d at 626 (attorney withdrew two days before trial, refused to return the client's files, and trial court denied continuance; supreme court held the trial court abused discretion because evidence showed Villegas was not negligent or at fault in causing his attorney's withdrawal.); Harrison I , 367 S.W.3d at 831-34 ("If fault is to be assigned for the failure to seek interim fees under these circumstances, we do not believe that such fault properly can be assigned to the client."); McAleer , 394 S.W.3d at 617-20 (motion for continuance should have been granted when client, through no fault of his own, found himself in "extremely difficult situation" with counsel who did not participate in discovery and became uncommunicative, and client was forced to hire another attorney shortly before trial). As we have determined, however, Connie has not demonstrated that Razavi Zand's withdrawal was through no fault of Connie.

Under these circumstances and on the present record, Connie has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a trial continuance based on the absence of counsel. Accordingly, we overrule Connie's first issue.

Custody Determination

In issue two, Connie challenges the trial court's custody rulings appointing Cliff sole managing conservator of J.H. and V.H., naming Connie possessory conservator, and limiting Connie's visitation to four hours twice monthly, supervised by a third party. Dividing her arguments into numerous sub-points, Connie claims the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) excluding Connie's trial exhibits concerning custody and the children's best interest; (2) placing time limits on the presentation of evidence; (3) ignoring "compelling and abundant evidence that Cliff had committed domestic violence against Connie in front of the children"; (4) ordering that Connie's visitation with J.H. and V.H. be supervised when no evidence supports such an order; (5) allegedly conditioning Connie's visitation with J.H. and V.H. on Cliff's schedule without any enforceable visitation rights; (6) withdrawing trial of the case from a jury; and (7) refusing to grant Connie the custody rights to which the parties agreed in the MSA.

In addressing each of Connie's arguments, we remain mindful that "[t]he best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the court in determining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to the child." Tex. Fam. Code § 153.002 ; Lenz v. Lenz , 79 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex. 2002). A trial court has broad discretion to decide the best interest of children in matters involving custody, visitation, and possession. E.g. , Allen v. Allen , 475 S.W.3d 453, 458 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) ; In re R.T.K. , 324 S.W.3d 896, 899 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). We review a trial court's custody decision for an abuse of discretion.

R.T.K. , 324 S.W.3d at 899. As discussed above, a trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or without reference to guiding rules or principles. See Butnaru , 84 S.W.3d at 211 ; Baker , 469 S.W.3d at 273. We make our determination based on a review of the entire record. Am. Flood Research, Inc. v. Jones , 192 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Tex. 2006). In evaluating a trial court's exercise of discretion, we generally defer to the court's resolution of underlying facts and credibility determinations that may have affected its decision, and we do not substitute our judgment in its place. See Allen , 475 S.W.3d at 458. The trial court is best able to observe and assess the witnesses' demeanor and credibility and to sense what may not be apparent merely from reading the record on appeal. Id.

Under the abuse of discretion standard, challenges to the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds of error, but are relevant considerations in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. R.T.K. , 324 S.W.3d at 900-01. "A trial court does not abuse its discretion if there is some evidence of a substantive and probative character to support its decision." Id. With these principles in mind, we turn to Connie's arguments in support of her second issue.

A. Exclusion of Evidence and Time Restrictions

In her first attack on the trial court's custody determination, Connie asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) excluding her trial exhibits, which she contends contained evidence of Cliff's alleged history of domestic violence, and (2) placing time restrictions on her presentation of evidence. We address each argument in turn.

1. Connie has not established that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding her exhibits.

Evidentiary decisions are committed to the trial court's sound discretion. U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Waldrip , 380 S.W.3d 118, 132 (Tex. 2012). To show that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence, a complaining party must first establish that evidence affecting the party's substantial rights was excluded, i.e., that the party offered the evidence and obtained an adverse ruling from the trial court, thus preserving error. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a) ; Tex. R. Evid. 103(a) ; see also In re L.D.W. , 14-11-00438-CV, 2013 WL 2247383, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 21, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). If, as here, the evidentiary ruling excludes evidence, preservation of error also entails presenting an offer of proof to the trial court. Tex. R. Evid. 103(a).

On appeal, the party must demonstrate that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence and that the error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. See L.D.W. , 2013 WL 2247383, at *2. In determining harm, the court ordinarily will not reverse a judgment when the evidence in question is cumulative and not controlling on a material issue dispositive to the case. See Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Able , 35 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. 2000) ; L.D.W. , 2013 WL 2247383, at *3. A successful challenge to evidentiary rulings usually requires the complaining party to show that the judgment turns on the particular evidence excluded or admitted. See Able , 35 S.W.3d at 617.

a. Relevant factual background

A brief discussion of events precipitating the trial court's ruling is necessary. The trial court scheduled a pretrial conference for January 9, the date by which the parties were to have exchanged their respective trial exhibits. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166(l). However, Connie did not have her exhibits prepared to exchange at the pretrial conference, so the trial court recessed proceedings and ordered Connie to exchange exhibits with Cliff's counsel by 5:00 p.m. that day. Connie assured the court that she could exchange her exhibits by that time. But Connie failed to appear or contact Cliff's counsel that day. Also, Connie did not make arrangements to exchange exhibits with Cliff's counsel or the amicus attorney at any time between January 9 and the next pretrial conference scheduled for January 16.

When January 16 arrived, the trial court learned that Connie still had not provided her exhibits to opposing counsel and the amicus attorney, despite Connie's representation that she would do so by the close of business on January 9. The trial court again provided Connie with additional time to exchange her exhibits, ordering her to provide copies to all counsel by 1:45 p.m. on January 16. The trial court warned Connie that if she failed to provide her exhibits to opposing counsel and the amicus attorney by that time, the court would exclude them: "So any documents that you intend to tender to [opposing counsel] will occur inside this courtroom at 1:45. If they're not tendered to [opposing counsel] at 1:45, then, they're excluded."

Connie failed to meet this third deadline. When Connie arrived in the courtroom (fifteen minutes late) on the afternoon of January 16, she still did not have her exhibits ready to provide to opposing counsel. The judge stated, "[T]here will not be any exhibits that will be offered at the time of the jury trial by [Connie]-, well, not offered; there will not be any that will be admitted into evidence."

b. Preservation of error

We first address whether Connie preserved error by offering her exhibits into evidence and securing an adverse ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Connie has not identified by citation-nor have we found-a place in the record when she offered the exhibits into evidence during the evidentiary portion of trial. See L.D.W. , 2013 WL 2247383, at *2 (concluding that mother failed to preserve error on exclusion of psychological evaluation report because, even though report was contained in appellate record, mother failed to offer report into evidence and failed to make offer of proof or bill of exception); Est. of Veale v. Teledyne Indus., Inc. , 899 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (to preserve error on exclusion of evidence, party must attempt during evidentiary portion of trial to introduce evidence).

However, the trial court clearly ruled at a January 16 pretrial hearing that none of Connie's exhibits would be admitted into evidence at trial and announced that ruling on the record. The trial court has the authority to make a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of evidence.

Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone , 916 S.W.2d 551, 557 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996), aff'd , 972 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1998). The trial court's pretrial ruling excluding Connie's exhibits is sufficient to preserve Connie's appellate complaint. See Greenberg Traurig of N.Y., P.C. v. Moody , 161 S.W.3d 56, 91-92 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) ; Huckaby v. A.G. Perry & Son, Inc. , 20 S.W.3d 194, 203-04 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. denied) (pretrial ruling on evidence admissibility sufficient to preserve error).

We also conclude that the excluded exhibits affect Connie's substantial rights because they pertain to her rights of possession and custody of her children. See In re Shifflet , 462 S.W.3d 528, 541 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, orig. proceeding). Connie also informed the trial court of the substance of the excluded exhibits by an offer of proof. Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(2) ; see also Katy Int'l, Inc. v. Jinchun Jiang , 451 S.W.3d 74, 96 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (to preserve error in exclusion of evidence, complaining party must show by bill of exception or offer of proof substance of evidence excluded).

Thus, we hold that Connie preserved error on this issue.

c. Did the trial court err in excluding the exhibits?

Connie asserts that the trial court's exclusionary ruling was error because this is "a custody case where the 'best interests' of the child is at stake" and the court's ruling was an extreme penalty akin to striking of pleadings-i.e., a death penalty sanction.

To "assist in the disposition of the case," Rule 166 permits trial courts to hold pretrial conferences and enter orders requiring the parties to, before trial, exchange all exhibits a party may use at trial. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166(l) ; see also Jordan v. Jordan , No. 14-12-00114-CV, 2013 WL 2489577, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] June 11, 2013, no pet) (mem. op.); Taylor v. Taylor , 254 S.W.3d 527, 532 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.). Although this rule does not expressly authorize the imposition of sanctions for violations of pretrial orders, the Supreme Court of Texas has held that the power to sanction a party's violation is implicit in the rule. Koslow's v. Mackie , 796 S.W.2d 700, 703-04 (Tex. 1990). Imposing such sanctions "is left to the sound discretion of the trial court," which we will set aside only on a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 704. Sanctions imposed under Rule 166 must be "just and appropriate." Taylor , 254 S.W.3d at 532.

Trial courts have great discretion "to control the disposition of cases with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." King Fisher Marine Serv. , 443 S.W.3d at 843 (internal quotations omitted); Dow Chem. Co. , 46 S.W.3d at 240. This discretion empowers a trial court to fulfill "a duty to schedule its cases in such a manner as to expeditiously dispose of them." King Fisher Marine Serv. , 443 S.W.3d at 843.

Connie essentially argues that any exclusion of evidence pertaining to domestic violence is an abuse of discretion in a custody dispute when the best interest of children is at stake. Although we agree with Connie that "the best interest of a child can only be attained when a court's decision is as well-informed as the circumstances allow," the present record does not show that the trial court acted outside the zone of its reasonable discretion. Although the trial court excluded Connie's trial exhibits, the court did not strike Connie's pleadings or defenses, did not strike any of Connie's witnesses, and permitted Connie to develop evidence on the domestic violence issue through witness testimony and cross-examination. Further, the court excluded Connie's exhibits only after giving Connie multiple opportunities to exchange exhibits and expressly warning Connie that her exhibits would be excluded if she did not timely provide them to counsel, and afte