Thurman v. State (37 Tex. Crim. 646, 1897)

HENDERSON, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of receiving a stolen horse, knowing it to have been stolen, and appeals. There is no statement of facts in the record. The only objection here urged is as to the charge of the court. The charge complained of is as follows: “The court instructs you that if you believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Jim Thurman, in the County of Hunt, State of Texas, about the time charged in the indictment, fraudulently took from the possession of J. F. Battle the animal named in the indictment, without the consent of said Battle, and with the fraudulent intent to deprive said Battle of the value of said animal, and with the intent to appropriate the same to the use and benefit of him (the said Thurman), and if you further believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant received said horse from said Thurman, knowing the same to have been fraudulently acquired as above explained, by said Jim Thurman, and that, after so receiving said horse (if you find he did so do), the defendant brought said horse into the County of Bosque, State of Texas, about the time charged in the indictment, then you will find the defendant guilty of receiving stolen property,” etc. Appellant insists that the above charge states an erroneous proposition of law, giving jurisdiction of said offense to the County of Bosque on an assumed statement of facts, which does not authorize the prosecution of said offense in Bosque County. He insists that there are only three characters of cases in which a conviction can be legally had in a particular county for said offense of receiving stolen property: First, the receiver can be prosecuted in the county where the theft was commmitted;. second, he can be prosecuted in any councy in which or through which the property was carried by the person stealing the same; and, third, in the county where the stolen property was received. We have examined Art. 23V, Code Crim. Proc., 1895, and, in our opinion, it is subject to the construction placed thereon by appellant. It will be noted that the charge of the court- above quoted proceeds on that part of said count charging appellant with receiving said stolen horse, and is not a charge against him for concealing the same. The receiving and concealing are two distinct offenses; that is, a person may be guilty of receiving the stolen property, though he made no concealment thereof. It would be difficult, however, for him to conceal the stolen property without first having received the same. However, the charge of the court,