Eviction in Texas: what the statutes lay out

This guide describes the eviction process — which the Texas Property Code calls a "forcible detainer" suit — as laid out in chapter 24 of the Texas Property Code, and how Texas courts have read its key sections. It explains what the statutes say; it is not legal advice, and procedures change. Every section and case discussed here links to the full text hosted in this library.

Informational only — not legal advice. This page describes statutes and court opinions; it does not apply them to any situation. Verify every section against the official Texas statutes ↗ — chapter 24 was amended effective January 1, 2026, and the cases below construed earlier versions of the text.

The governing law at a glance

Trial-level procedure (filing, service, the answer, the trial setting) is governed by Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 500–510, which this library does not host; the current rules are on the Texas courts' official site ↗.

The process, step by step

1. Written notice to vacate. Under § 24.005, before filing suit a landlord must give the occupant written notice to vacate. For a tenant under a written lease or oral rental agreement who defaults or holds over, the statute sets a minimum of three days' notice "unless the parties have contracted for a shorter or longer notice period in a written lease or agreement"; the same three-day floor applies to tenants at will or by sufferance. Where possession ends because of a foreclosure, § 24.005(b) sets a separate 30-day notice for residential tenants who keep paying rent. The section also prescribes the form of the notice in nonpayment cases (a "notice to pay rent or vacate") and, in subsection (f-3) of the current text, the permitted delivery methods: mail, delivery inside the premises in a conspicuous place, hand delivery to a tenant 16 or older, or — if the parties agreed in writing — electronic delivery.

2. Filing in justice court. § 24.004 places eviction suits in the justice court of the precinct where the property is located, and Government Code § 27.031 lists eviction ("forcible entry and detainer") among the matters within justice-court jurisdiction. A justice court cannot decide title to land — which is why the cases below repeatedly describe forcible detainer as deciding possession only.

3. Citation and trial setting. Service of the citation, the answer, and the trial date are set by Rule 510 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (official site ↗, not hosted here).

4. Trial. The suit is tried in justice court; under § 24.0051 a landlord may join a claim for unpaid rent within the court's jurisdictional limit, and the section directs how notices for the two claims interact.

5. Judgment and writ. Under § 24.0061(a), "a landlord who prevails in an eviction suit is entitled to a judgment for possession of the premises and a writ of possession." The writ — the order directing the constable to restore possession — "may not be issued before the sixth day after the date on which the judgment for possession is rendered" unless a possession bond has been filed and approved (§ 24.0061(b)), and once issued it is to be served within five business days (§ 24.0061(b-1)).

6. Appeal. § 24.007 allows appeal of a county court's eviction judgment on the issue of possession only for residential premises, and provides that the judgment "may not under any circumstances be stayed pending appeal" unless the appellant files a supersedeas bond within ten days. The Supreme Court of Texas applied this bond requirement in Marshall v. Housing Authority of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. 2006), and Briones, below, shows its consequence: without the bond, possession can change hands while the appeal is pending.

7. Other claims survive. § 24.008 states that an eviction suit "does not bar a suit for trespass, damages, waste, rent, or attorney's fees" — the possession question and money questions can travel separately, a point Coinmach, below, turned on.

The key sections, closely read

**§ 24.005 — the notice.* Three things in the text carry the weight. Timing: the default is "at least three days' written notice to vacate … before the landlord files a forcible detainer suit," and the statute twice repeats that parties may contract for a shorter or longer period — the floor is a default, not a mandate. Form: in nonpayment cases the statute distinguishes a "notice to pay rent or vacate" from a bare "notice to vacate," keyed to whether the tenant had previously been late. Delivery:* the current text (subsections (f-3)–(f-4), added by the 2025 amendments) lists the permitted methods and adds that the list "does not apply if the tenant actually receives the notice." A landlord terminating a holdover tenancy must also satisfy the separate termination-notice rule of § 91.001.

**§ 24.0061 — the writ.* The section does three distinct jobs: it entitles a prevailing landlord to judgment and writ (subsection (a)); it delays the writ until the sixth day after judgment (subsection (b)) — the same window § 24.007 gives for a supersedeas bond is running during this period; and it directs execution*, calling issuance "a ministerial act not subject to review or delay" and requiring service within five business days (subsection (b-1)).

How the courts have read it

The opinions below are hosted in this library in full. Each construed the version of the statute in force at the time it was decided; the section text hosted here is current through the 2025 amendments, so the two should be read together with the dates in mind. Texas courts describe forcible detainer as "a statutory cause of action" requiring strict compliance — Kennedy v. Andover Place Apartments, 203 S.W.3d 495 (Tex. App. 2006) — and treat proper notice under § 24.005 as an element of the action — Mendoza v. Bazan, 574 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019).

Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. 2013)

• Issue — What legal status a commercial tenant had after its lease was terminated by

foreclosure and it stayed in possession for years over the new owner's objection — and which claims (breach of lease, trespass, DTPA) could lie against such a holdover.

• Holding — The court held that the occupant was a tenant at sufferance: one who "has been in

lawful possession of property and wrongfully remains as a holdover after the tenant's interest has expired." It held that a tenant at sufferance cannot be liable for breach of the already-terminated lease, but is a trespasser and can be liable in tort; and it rejected the argument that § 24.005(b)'s notice "grace periods" give a holdover any possessory estate.

• Turns on — § 24.002(a)(2) (tenant "at will or by sufferance" as a person who can

commit forcible detainer); § 24.005(b) (notice periods); § 24.008 (an eviction suit does not bar a trespass suit).

• Connects — Supplies the vocabulary the other cases rely on: what "holding over" means and why

the statute reaches tenants at will and at sufferance. Effel applies the same at-will framework to the notice question; Briones picks up after judgment.

• Read it — Full opinion in this library · the case page carries its hand-off link

to the authoritative source.

Effel v. Rosberg, 360 S.W.3d 626 (Tex. App. 2012)

• Issue — Whether a lease "for the rest of [the occupant's] life" created a terminable tenancy,

and whether the landlord's notice letter satisfied § 24.005 so that the forcible detainer judgment could stand.

• Holding — The court held that the lease created only a tenancy at will, terminable at any

time by either party; that the February 24 notice letter "complied with the requirements of section 24.005" (the statute's three-day minimum for tenants at will, absent a contracted period); and it affirmed the judgment awarding possession to the landlord.

• Turns on — § 24.005(b) (three days' written notice to a tenant at will, unless the

parties contracted otherwise).

• Connects — A worked application of the notice element that Kennedy and Mendoza call

strict: the dispute was fought on the adequacy of one letter. Where Effel found the notice sufficient, Briones shows what follows when the notice is missing.

• Read it — Full opinion in this library.

Briones v. Brazos Bend Villa Apartments, 438 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. App. 2014)

• Issue — After a tenant lost possession without filing a supersedeas bond, whether her appeal

was moot, and whether the landlord — which had not given the statutory notice to vacate — could keep its award of attorney's fees and costs.

• Holding — The court held the appeal moot only as to possession (the writ had done its work;

that part was dismissed) but not as to money: because the landlord "failed to provide the statutorily-required notice to vacate," it was not a prevailing landlord, and the court reversed the fee and cost award.

• Turns on — § 24.007 (no stay pending appeal without a supersedeas bond);

§ 24.0061 (execution of the writ); § 24.005 (the missing notice); § 24.006 (fees for a prevailing party).

• Connects — Shows the back half of the flow diagram operating: judgment, no bond, writ,

possession gone — yet the notice element from Effel still decided the money questions, because § 24.008 lets those questions survive the possession fight.

• Read it — Full opinion in this library.

Evidence and elements

The map above pairs each statutory element with the kinds of records the courts in the linked cases discussed — the lease that fixed the tenancy and its end (Coinmach), the notice letter whose adequacy was litigated (Effel, Briones), payment history bearing on default and holdover, and repair or complaint records, which mattered in Hernandez v. Gallardo, 458 S.W.3d 544 (Tex. App. 2014), where tenants pleaded that an eviction violated § 92.331's bar on landlord retaliation for exercising rights in good faith. Section 92.335 addresses how retaliation figures in an eviction suit itself. The map describes what those opinions examined; it is not a checklist for any particular situation.

Where to verify

• Official statute text: statutes.capitol.texas.gov ↗ —

chapter 24 was amended by S.B. 38 (89th Legislature, 2025), effective January 1, 2026.

• Official procedural rules: Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 500–510 ↗.
• In this library: Property Code chapter 24 · chapter 92 ·

chapter 91.

• Every case page above carries its own hand-off link to the authoritative source of the opinion.