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Opinion BAXTER, J. A jury convicted Richard Stitely (defendant) of the first degree murder of Carol Unger. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) A related special circumstance of murder during the commission of unlawful sodomy was found true. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(D).) The jury also convicted defendant of the separate crime of forcible rape against Valery C. (§ 261, subd. (a)(2).) After a penalty trial, the jury returned a death verdict. The trial court declined to modify the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), and sentenced defendant to death for the sodomy murder. The court also imposed and stayed a determinate term on the noncapital rape count. This appeal is automatic. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11, subd. (a); § 1239, subd. (b).) We find no prejudicial error at defendant’s trial. The judgment will be affirmed in its entirety. I. Guilt Phase Evidence A. Murder of Carol Unger and Related Sex Crimes 1. Carol’s Disappearance Carol Unger and her husband, Delbert, frequented the White Oak Inn, a bar located near their home. They went there both together and separately. The couple had one child, Joey, during their marriage. Carol had other children from a prior relationship, including her son Billy. At 8:30 p.m. on January 19, 1990, Billy called Delbert, who was alone at the White Oak Inn. Delbert left the bar and went to a restaurant with Billy. They came home at 11:00 p.m. Joey was there, but Carol was gone. Delbert stayed awake until 1:00 a.m. He heard nothing strange outside the house, which was well lit in front by a streetlight. Meanwhile, beginning at 9:30 the same night, several witnesses saw Carol at the White Oak Inn. Defendant, a semi-regular patron, was there too. Carol sat at the bar, and defendant sat at a table. According to both the bartender, Anthony Russo, and the waitress, Hazel Parrott, Carol and defendant each drank two or three beers. Neither seemed intoxicated. Another regular patron, Shirley Cooper, saw Carol ask two or three men, including defendant, to dance with her. Carol often danced with men who frequented the bar, even when her husband was present. After one dance, defendant returned to his table and Carol sat on a bar stool. Cooper then saw defendant looking or staring at Carol. Carol eventually asked the bartender, Russo, to call a taxi because she wanted “to go home.” Defendant intervened by offering her a ride and asking where she lived. She accepted the offer, and canceled her cab request. At some point, Carol asked Russo whether he knew defendant well. Russo said “no,” but saw no reason to decline the ride. By all accounts, Carol and defendant left the bar together around midnight. This was the last time she was seen alive. When Carol failed to return home, Delbert called and visited the White Oak Inn. He also reported her missing to police. 2. Discovery of Carol’s Body Around 11:00 a.m. on January 20, 1990, the day after Carol left the bar with defendant, Edward Berg found her body in an alley behind his workplace. It was lying partially underneath the comer of Berg’s company van. He called the police. The police found no purse or wallet. They identified Carol through Delbert’s report. Detective John Coffey and a coroner’s investigator, Debrah Kitchings, described the scene, as follows: Carol was lying on her back with her legs spread apart, naked from the waist down. Her jeans and underpants were gathered around one ankle, her shirt was bunched at the breast line, and her jacket was resting underneath the hip area. Carol’s numerous injuries included scrape marks on the back and choke marks on the neck. Pieces of foam rubber were found on her neck and head, in her underwear, and on the ground. It appeared Carol had been sexually assaulted, dragged into the alley, and dumped under the van. 3. Medical Testimony About Carol’s Injuries Dr. Joseph Cogan, who performed the autopsy, testified that Carol was strangled to death, based on the following premortem injuries: Blood congestion and petechial hemorrhages in the jaw and face showed that pressure had been applied to the neck, and that circulation had stopped to the head, for a “long” time. Internal hemorrhaging from blunt force trauma appeared on both sides of the neck and around the eyes and ears. Carol’s thyroid cartilage, or Adam’s apple, was fractured—an injury consistent with manual strangulation. However, the fracturing of the cricoid cartilage, which sits deeper in the neck, required greater pressure from a choke-hold maneuver. Dr. Cogan also linked certain marks on the front of Carol’s neck to a ligature pulled from behind. Regarding nonlethal injuries, Dr. Cogan testified that two cuts on Carol’s left hand were caused by a sharp instrument, and were consistent with defensive knife wounds. He also described abrasions and bmises on the extremities, two round marks or bums on the head, and bmising on the scalp. The skin on Carol’s back had been scraped or dragged on a hard surface both before and after death. Dr. Cogan found multiple signs of sexual activity. There were two tears in the anal opening, as well as tears, contusions, and hemorrhaging inside the anal cavity. The anal injuries were inflicted before death, were caused by blunt force trauma, and were consistent with penile penetration. Dr. Cogan found no vaginal tears. Because the vaginal opening was “marital,” the lack of tearing was not inconsistent with forcible penetration. Some darkening or reddening of the labia could have been a contusion. Investigator Kitchings testified that she saw “trauma” in Carol’s vaginal and anal areas at the crime scene. Kitchings also estimated the time of death by comparing air and liver temperatures at 3:30 p.m. on January 20, 1990, a few hours after Carol was found. She had most likely been dead for 15 hours (i.e., since 12:30 a.m. on January 20, 1990). However, she could have died anywhere from 12 to 20 hours earlier (i.e., between 7:30 p.m. on January 19, 1990 and 3:30 a.m. on January 20, 1990). The evidence included an autopsy report and attached toxicology report. The parties stipulated that Carol’s toxicology tests revealed a .26 percent blood-alcohol content, a result indicating intoxication. 4. Physical Evidence and Forensic Tests As discussed below, the police found tom seat cushions and foam debris during a search of defendant’s car. Criminalist Susan Johnson testified that there was no difference in color, chemical composition, or cellular structure between the foam found on Carol’s body and the foam seized from defendant’s car. The origin could have been the same. Criminalist Lloyd Mahanay made cotton swabs and microscope slides of the fluids in Carol’s vagina and anus. Though he did not personally conduct such tests, he opined that any sperm found on these items would reflect ejaculation into each orifice. Mahanay mled out the possibility that semen from the vagina could have contaminated the anal swab, or that ejaculation on or in the vagina could have leaked into the anus. Serologist Alison Ochiae testified that Carol had type O blood, and that defendant was a type A secretor. A secretor is one whose blood type appears in other bodily fluids. Ochiae found sperm on the vaginal swabs and anal slides that Criminalist Mahanay had prepared. Using the ABO method, Ochiae identified defendant as a possible sperm donor. She also linked him to a stain on Carol’s jacket. The parties stipulated that Criminalist Mark Taylor performed DNA tests that could conclusively match the genetic materials in semen with the genetic materials in blood. The DNA pattern found on Carol’s vaginal and anal swabs matched the DNA pattern obtained from defendant. 5. Defendant’s Statements to Police Based on information obtained at the White Oak Inn and other bars, detectives learned that defendant worked at a radiator repair shop. On February 2, 1990, Detective Coffey and his partner visited defendant at work. He agreed to accompany them to the police station. When Detective Coffey peered inside defendant’s station wagon, he saw tom seats and foam debris similar to the foam found on Carol’s body. Police impounded the car. They later searched it with defendant’s consent. Defendant received and waived his constitutional rights during the ride to the police station. Detective Coffey questioned defendant at the station, assisted by Detective Medina. Coffey recorded the interview without defendant’s knowledge. The jury heard the interview and received the transcript. Defendant first told detectives that he last visited the White Oak Inn on January 26, 1990, and had not been there in the preceding two months. Though he often went to bars on Friday nights, defendant recalled staying home on Friday, January 19, 1990, to save money. He denied knowing Carol. Detective Coffey asked about Valery C., a teenager who stayed with defendant and his daughter. Defendant said that Valery had falsely accused him of rape because he told her to pay rent or move. Detective Coffey said that witnesses saw Carol leave the bar with defendant on January 19, 1990. Defendant then admitted that he drove her home. He recalled seeing both a red van and a shadowy figure outside her house. Supposedly, as Carol left the car, she took a steak knife from her purse. Though defendant was scared, Carol did not threaten him with the knife, and instead mentioned her “old man.” Defendant claimed he sped away, and that nothing sexual or violent happened. He initially lied because he did not want to upset Carol’s husband. Detective Coffey theorized that Carol died during a fight with defendant. Defendant said he might “stop talking,” and Coffey reaffirmed his right to do so. Nevertheless, defendant continued to assert his innocence, saying, “The only thing you can prove is I took her out of that bar, man.” Defendant denied any fight. He repeated that Carol “didn’t threaten” him with the knife or otherwise seem interested in “using” it on him. Detective Coffey remarked that debris in Carol’s hair looked like debris in defendant’s car. Defendant then conceded a struggle, giving the following account: When they got to her house, Carol—who was “drunker than hell”—asked to visit another bar. Defendant refused because he needed to go home. Defendant saw someone exit the house, and watched Carol draw the knife from her purse. She exited and reentered the car. He sped away at her request. Carol again asked to go to another bar. Defendant stopped the car. Scared and unsure of her intent, he squeezed her hand to expel the knife. She tried to bite him, and he grabbed her hair. Carol opened the door. Defendant kicked her in the face, ejecting her from the car. He did not strangle or kill her. Detective Coffey told defendant he intended to test bodily fluids found at the crime scene. Defendant then admitted having vaginal intercourse with Carol in his car. Coffey asked whether the act was “mutual,” and defendant said, “yeah.” He reportedly initiated the sexual encounter, and Carol mentioned the lack of intimacy in her marriage. Defendant said he had previously withheld this information because another “bitch,” Valery C., had falsely accused him of rape. Defendant adamantly denied having anal sex with Carol. Regarding Carol’s injuries, defendant acknowledged that he could have unintentionally “caused her death.” However, he consistently maintained that he kicked her only once—possibly hitting her neck, chest, and shoulder—and that he never strangled or punched her. Finally, at Detective Medina’s request, defendant clarified that the sex act occurred after they left Carol’s house, while the knife was out of sight. They subsequently fought because Carol—though drunk and “out of it”—wanted to go to another bar, and he wanted to go home. In this final account, Carol held the knife down by her side when defendant kicked her from the car. She said she wanted to “hurt somebody.” However, she did not assault, threaten, or injure him with the knife. Defendant claimed Carol was alive and clothed when he left her at a spot different from where her body was found. B. Rape of Valery C. The main witness on the noncapital rape count was the victim, Valery C. Valery testified that in June 1989, she was 16 years old, and five and one-half months pregnant. She had been evicted from her own apartment, and did not live with her mother because they did not get along. Valery therefore accepted an invitation from defendant’s daughter, S., to live with defendant and S. According to Valery, defendant never told her to pay household expenses or to move out. He slept on the couch, and the girls shared the lone bedroom. Valery testified that on June 28, 1989, she returned to the apartment at 11:00 p.m. Defendant was in the front room. S. was gone. Valery entered the bedroom and closed the door. She put on a long button-down shirt and underwear, and got into bed. This was the first time she and defendant were alone together. According to Valery, the following events occurred: Defendant entered the bedroom and shut the door. He climbed on top of Valery, who was underneath the blankets. Scared and confused, she started to scream. Defendant grabbed her throat with one hand and threatened to kill her if she did not keep quiet. Defendant choked her for at least 20 seconds, causing her to cough when he finally released his grip. Valery continued: Defendant pinned Valery’s arm over her shoulder. Saying she could not live there for free, defendant moved the blankets and unbuttoned her shirt. He kissed her breasts, and placed his fingers into her vagina. Defendant then lowered her underpants, unzipped his trousers, and penetrated her vagina. Defendant ignored Valery’s plea to stop because of her unborn baby. Instead, he withdrew his penis, placed Valery on her side, and then resumed intercourse. After ejaculating, defendant left the room. He did not smell like alcohol or seem intoxicated. Valery buttoned her shirt and cleaned herself in the bathroom. When she entered the living room, defendant apologized and said she could call the police. She put on a pair of pants and ran to meet her boyfriend in the park. Crying and shaking, she told him what happened. Almost immediately, at 11:45 p.m., Valery’s boyfriend called the police. As reflected by the 911 recording admitted at trial, both Valery and her boyfriend told the dispatcher about the rape. Valery testified that she also called her mother. Valery continued her account: Valery and her mother promptly went to the police station and reported the rape to a female officer. Later, at the hospital, Valery declined an examination because no female doctor was available. The next day, Valery discarded the button-down shirt because it repulsed her. She retrieved her belongings from defendant’s apartment, and never returned to live there. The investigating officer, Angela Hougen, testified that she saw no bruises on Valery C. However, Valery was distraught at the police station, and became more upset at the hospital while waiting for an exam. C. Defense Defendant presented no evidence at the guilt phase. II. Penalty Phase Evidence A. Prosecution Case 1. Other Violent Crimes The evidence showed that defendant, who was 41 years old at the time of the capital crime, committed prior violent crimes against his ex-wife and their two daughters. Specifically, M., who was 20 years old at the time of trial, testified that defendant adopted her as a child while married to her mother, Deborah. According to ML, defendant sodomized her in the family’s Texas home for three and one-half years, starting when she was five years old. During this period, defendant also sodomized his biological daughter S., who is two years younger than M. The acts usually happened on Saturdays when Deborah ran errands with her and defendant’s youngest child, R. M. described a typical sexual encounter with her father as follows: defendant told M. to undress in the bathroom and to rub Vaseline in her anal area. She complied out of fear. While M. either leaned on the toilet or lay on the floor, defendant placed his penis in her anus. Defendant ignored M.’s pleas to stop even though she bled and expressed pain. Afterwards, defendant told M. to clean herself and to bring her younger sister, S., into the bathroom. M. then saw defendant sodomize S., and heard S. scream. Defendant threatened to kill both the girls and their mother if the sex acts were disclosed. He smelled like liquor, but was not always drunk, when these acts occurred. M. testified that in 1981, at age eight, she disclosed these acts first to the babysitter and then to Deborah (the mother of M. and S.) M. also signed an affidavit in Texas concerning the matter. Deborah testified that she and defendant married in 1973, and divorced 10 years later. According to Deborah, defendant abused alcohol, and the pair often fought. At different times, defendant assaulted Deborah by (1) pointing a gun at her head and threatening to shoot her, (2) wielding a knife and threatening to stab her, (3) grabbing scissors and lunging at her, and (4) striking her with a makeup mirror and cutting her head. Each act occurred in front of the children. Deborah testified that, while awaiting trial, defendant said, “[I]f they find M., she’ll hang me.” Despite some initial doubts, Deborah believed defendant had molested their daughters. She also described him as both smart and a good provider. No one, including defendant, deserved execution in Deborah’s view. 2. Victim Impact Evidence Delbert Unger described Carol as “his whole life.” He identified a photograph of them together, which was admitted into evidence. The pathologist, Dr. Cogan, testified that Carol was probably strangled for several minutes or more before she died, and that she likely experienced both cardiovascular and emotional distress. It took great force to break both neck cartilages—trauma that would cause pain in a five person. Dr. Cogan explained that a lit cigarette could have made the round marks or bums on Carol’s head, and that most of the nonfatal injuries occurred while she was alive and susceptible to pain. B. Defense Case 1. Character Evidence Three associates in the radiator repair business testified on defendant’s behalf: (1) Wyatt Crawford, whose family employed defendant for 15 years in Texas, (2) Richard Donohue, who employed defendant in California before the capital crime, and (3) Eugene Pace, who employed defendant in California at the time of the crime. These witnesses agreed that defendant was competent, courteous, and reliable. His illiteracy did not affect his work. Defendant never came to work impaired by alcohol. The parties stipulated that he quit the first California job because others drank alcohol at work. When defendant was arrested in Texas, his employer, the Crawford family, posted his bail. 2. Lack of Criminal Record The parties stipulated that defendant had no prior felony or misdemeanor convictions. Another stipulation addressed the acts of sodomy reported to police in 1981 and described by M. at trial. A Texas grand jury considered the matter shortly after it was reported and declined to proceed against defendant. The case could have been refiled. 3. Good Conduct in Custody Deputy Sheriff Rust testified that defendant behaved well in jail during the capital trial. The parties stipulated that inmates imprisoned for life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) receive the highest security available outside of death row. If defendant remained discipline-free, he could teach auto repair and earn privileges in prison. IIL Pretrial issues A. Severance Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the special circumstance murder of Carol from the forcible rape of Valery C. He argues here, as below, that the prosecution improperly joined the two counts in order to bolster weak circumstantial evidence that defendant murdered Carol in the course of a sexual assault. A federal due process violation allegedly occurred. We disagree. The trial court properly found that both offenses belonged to “the same [assaultive] class.” (§ 954.) Joinder therefore was statutorily allowed. (Ibid.; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 126 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980].) Defendant has never disputed this threshold point. Thus, defendant must show that a substantial danger of prejudice compelled severance. (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 110 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357].) We ask whether the denial of severance was an abuse of discretion, given the record before the trial court. (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 508 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119].) A pretrial ruling that was correct when made can be reversed on appeal only if joinder was so grossly unfair as to deny due process. (People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th 92, 127; People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d 576, 590 [253 Cal.Rptr. 710, 764 P.2d 1087].) Cross-admissibility is the crucial factor affecting prejudice. (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 120 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296].) If evidence of one crime would be admissible in a separate trial of the other crime, prejudice is usually dispelled. (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1315-1316 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259].) Invoking the law applicable at the time of his trial, defendant argues that prior sex crimes may be used only for a relevant nondispositional purpose, like identity (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b)), and that the two joined counts are not sufficiently “distinctive” to show that the same person who raped Valery C. also attacked Carol. (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 403 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757]; but see Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (a) [new posttrial statute providing that, in'sex crime prosecutions, § 1101 does not bar defendant’s other sex crimes if such evidence is not barred under § 352]; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 911-912 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 986 P.2d 182].) However, the degree of similarity required to prove mental state is far less exacting. The two acts need only be sufficiently similar to suggest that the defendant probably had the same intent each time. (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402.) While the trial court avoided the issue, evidence at both the preliminary hearing and trial that defendant choked and raped Valery C. suggested that he acted with similar criminal intent while having sexual intercourse with Carol—a victim who was also choked. (See People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 379 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708] [not guilty plea disputes all elements of charged crime, including intent].) Indeed, jurors could not convict defendant of first degree murder on a felony-murder-rape theory unless they found “specific intent to commit rape” beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 314 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 877, 96 P.3d 170].) The chance that defendant acted with innocent intent with Carol is sharply reduced by evidence that he committed a forcible, nonconsensual sex act upon Valery C. a few months earlier. (People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 379.) Also, as the prosecutor stated in closing argument, the jury could reasonably infer from Valery C.’s rape accusation that defendant killed Carol to “cover up” the sexual assault, and to prevent her from reporting the crime as Valery had done. This inference of a motive to kill, coupled with evidence that Carol was last seen alive with defendant and that she died soon after they left the bar, constituted circumstantial evidence that he intended, deliberated, and premeditated her death for purposes of proving first degree murder. (People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1284 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1].) However, any lack of cross-admissibility is not, by itself, sufficient to show prejudice and bar joinder. (§ 954.1; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 667 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640] .) Here, the trial court considered other factors commonly used to assess prejudice, including the likelihood of inflaming the jury, the strength of the evidence, and the availability of the death penalty. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 27-28 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262].) The court rejected the notion that the noncapital count was more “passionate” than the capital count, noting that the latter crime involved both sexual violence and murder. The court also determined that circumstantial evidence of defendant’s role in Carol’s murder seemed “pretty strong” compared to Valery C.’s firsthand account of the rape. This reasoning is persuasive. In short, defendant fails to demonstrate that the denial of severance involved an abuse of discretion or caused gross unfairness at his trial. As in other cases, we reject the claim. (E.g., People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1, 27-28 [noncapital sex crime properly joined with subsequent similar capital crime]; People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th 463, 507-509 [same].) B. Miranda Claim. Defendant argues that he invoked his privilege against self-incrimination by suggesting he might “stop talking” to the police on February 2, 1990, and that Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602] (Miranda) barred his subsequent statements during the same interview. The trial court purportedly erred in denying a motion to suppress such evidence. We disagree. Evidence at the suppression hearing consisted primarily of Detective Coffey’s testimony and the transcribed interview. The relevant facts are as follows: Coffey and another officer met defendant at work and said they were investigating a homicide. Defendant was cordial and offered to help. He agreed to talk at the police station and voluntarily entered the police car for this purpose. Defendant was not placed under arrest and was free to decline the ride. Meanwhile, detectives impounded defendant’s car. He sat in the police car and calmly watched the process. The evidence further established that during the ride to the station, no discussion about the criminal investigation occurred. However, in mentioning his marital history in Texas, defendant referred to women as “bitches.” Concerned that defendant might discuss the capital crime, Detective Coffey read defendant his Miranda rights from an official card. Defendant said he understood his rights, and agreed to waive each one. No other conversation occurred in the police car. The record of the suppression hearing also showed that defendant received no new Miranda warnings at the station. Officers placed him in an interview room, activated the tape recorder, and asked questions. After defendant admitted that he gave Carol a ride, Detective Coffey suggested that the pair fought. The following exchange then occurred: DEFENDANT: “Okay. I’ll tell you. I think it’s about time for me to stop talking.” (Italics added.) COFFEY: “You can stop talking. You can stop talking.” DEFENDANT: “Okay.” COFFEY: “It’s up to you. Nobody ever forces you to talk. I told you that. I read you all that (untranslatable).” DEFENDANT: “Well, I mean (untranslatable) God damn accused of something that I didn’t do. I’m telling you the truth. And you’re not believe [sic] me. You’re not believing me. I’m telling you the truth.” COFFEY: “Richard, the only problem is, I can prove otherwise. The only reason I—listen to me.” DEFENDANT: “The only thing you can prove is I took her out of that bar, man. That’s all I did. That’s the only thing I’ve done.” Detective Coffey explained at the suppression hearing that if defendant had decided to stop talking, the interview would have ended. Because defendant’s statements were unclear in this regard, Coffey did not believe that questioning had to stop. Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, Coffey “reinforced” the notion that defendant was free to exercise his right to silence. After hearing argument on both sides, the trial court found no Miranda violation and declined to suppress defendant’s statements. The court determined that defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before the interview. The court also determined that he never stopped speaking freely with the police and that he declined the detective’s offer to do so. To protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, a person undergoing a custodial interrogation must first be advised of his right to remain silent, to the presence of counsel, and to appointed counsel, if indigent. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 467-473, 478-479.) As long as the suspect knowingly and intelligently waives these rights, the police are free to interrogate him. (Id. at pp. 444, 475, 479.) However, if, at any point in the interview, the suspect invokes his rights, questioning must cease. (Id. at pp. 444-445, 473-474; see Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 [68 L.Ed.2d 378, 101 S.Ct. 1880] [questioning cannot resume until request for counsel is granted or suspect restarts interview].) Statements obtained in violation of these rules are inadmissible to prove guilt in a criminal case. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444, 4764-77, 479; see People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 266 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433]; People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 79-80 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 650, 72 P.3d 280].) In order to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege after it has been waived, and in order to halt police questioning after it has begun, the suspect “must unambiguously” assert his right to silence or counsel. (Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 459 [129 L.Ed.2d 362, 114 S.Ct. 2350] (Davis), italics added.) It is not enough for a reasonable police officer to understand that the suspect might be invoking his rights. (Ibid.) Faced with an ambiguous or equivocal statement, law enforcement officers are not required under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, either to ask clarifying questions or to cease questioning altogether. (Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 4594-62.) Of course, such an approach may disadvantage suspects who, for emotional or intellectual reasons, have difficulty expressing themselves. (Id. at p. 460.) However, a rule requiring a clear invocation of rights from someone who has already received and waived them “avoid[s] difficulties of proof” (id. at p. 458), and promotes “effective law enforcement.” (Id. at p. 461.) As in prior cases, we follow Davis here. (People v. Gonzalez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1111, 1125 [23 Cal.Rptr.3d 295, 104 P.3d 98]; People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 510 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032]; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 129-130 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887].) A reasonable officer in Detective Coffey’s position would have concluded that defendant’s first remark (“I think it’s about time for me to stop talking”) expressed apparent frustration, but did not end the interview. Defendant agrees that this statement was ambiguous under Davis, supra, 512 U.S. 452, and that the police were not required to stop asking questions at that point. Nevertheless, Coffey did stop the interrogation, and twice reminded defendant of his right to “stop talking.” This cautious approach gave defendant a chance to clarify whether questioning should proceed—something defendant concedes the officer was not constitutionally required to do. Contrary to what defendant claims, he did not clarify his ambiguous remarks or clearly invoke his constitutional privilege by saying “Okay.” This nonsubstantive response merely implied that defendant understood what he had just heard, and that he could “stop talking” if he so chose. Detective Coffey’s subsequent comments also do not support defendant’s related claim that he was badgered into resuming the interrogation. Consistent with his neutral stance throughout the exchange, Coffey again reminded defendant that talking was optional (“[i]t’s up to you”), and alluded to the prior Miranda warning (“I read you all that”). However, instead of exercising the right to silence that Detective Coffey purposefully “reinforced,” defendant protested his innocence and continuing talking about the crime. Under the circumstances, nothing prevented Coffey from continuing the exchange. We therefore uphold admission of the entire police interview at trial. C. Death Qualification of Jurors 1. Sequestration Issues Defendant insists the trial court erred by failing to conduct the entire death-qualifying voir dire “individually and in sequestration” as set forth in Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80 [168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301] (Hovey). He claims violations of his federal constitutional rights to due process and an impartial jury. Before jury selection, and on its own motion, the trial court determined that Hovey, supra, 28 Cal.3d 1, did not apply. This ruling was correct. Defendant’s trial occurred after voters approved Proposition 115, which added new section 223 to the Code of Civil Procedure. (See Tapia v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.3d 282, 299-300 [applying statute to proceedings held after Prop. 115 took effect on June 6, 1990].) Then, as now, the statute provided that the voir dire of prospective jurors in capital cases “shall, where practicable, occur in the presence of the other jurors.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 223.) This provision had the intent and effect of abrogating the sequestration rule of Hovey, supra, 28 Cal.3d 1, which was not constitutionally compelled. (See id. at p. 80 [invoking court’s “supervisory authority over California criminal procedure”]; see also People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 490 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182]; People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1199 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262]; People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1180 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130]; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46].) We reject defendant’s contrary claim. Defendant alternatively complains that to the extent the court decided that group voir dire was “practicable” (Code Civ. Proc., § 223), it applied statutory law in a manner that denied him due process and an impartial jury. Prospective jurors allegedly gave monosyllabic, unconsidered, and parroted answers that concealed their true views on capital punishment. The record does not support the claim. Initially, the trial court advised counsel of its intent to apply Code of Civil Procedure section 223, and of the procedures that would be used. Thus, the court said it would assume primary responsibility for conducting the oral examination, and that counsel would be allowed to ask appropriate follow-up questions. Prospective jurors, the court said, would be examined as a group in open court. However, the court made clear that many questions, including some involving capital punishment, would be asked at the bench on a select basis. Counsel were told to “expect to approach the bench quite a bit,” because the court planned to ask “sensitive” questions and to probe “exotic” answers in this private manner. Prospective jurors completed a 25-page questionnaire, which they signed under penalty of perjury. One section—six pages and 14 questions— concerned capital punishment. To enhance questioning, the court gave counsel advance copies of the questionnaires in the same order in which each prospective juror would be orally examined. The court said it planned to make preparatory notes on “every single one” of its copies of the questionnaires. As promised, the court began death qualification by asking each prospective juror, in open court, four questions similar to ones appearing on the questionnaire. These questions sought to discover whether prospective jurors would “automatically” vote for a certain penalty (Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770] (Witherspoon), italics omitted), and whether their views on capital punishment would “ ‘prevent or substantially impair’ ” the performance of their duties in keeping with their oath and the court’s instructions. (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844] (Witt) [clarifying the Witherspoon standard].) Depending upon the answers given either orally or in writing, the trial court often asked follow-up questions about the person’s views on capital punishment. In many instances, such clarification occurred at the bench so that other prospective jurors could not hear the exchange. The court permitted counsel to ask additional questions, particularly as to matters discussed at the bench. Based on these facts, and as a threshold matter, it appears the defense had ample opportunity to object to the manner in which the trial court conducted group voir dire under applicable statutory law, and to propose individual sequestered voir dire as a solution to any perceived problems. Thus, as the Attorney General maintains, defendant’s failure to raise any such complaint below forfeits the issue on appeal. (People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 287-288 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337].) The claim lacks merit in any event. Defendant is wrong insofar as he implies that no individual, sequestered examination on capital punishment occurred. We also cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision to ask questions both in open court and at the bench produced meaningless, lockstep answers. Indeed, these procedures enabled counsel on both sides to challenge certain individuals for cause—sometimes successfully—based on their death penalty views. Defendant provides no “specific example of how questioning prospective jurors in the presence of other jurors prevented him from uncovering juror bias.” (People v. Navarette, supra, 30 Cal.4th 458, 490.) Thus, consistent with other post-Proposition 115 cases upholding similar limited sequestration procedures, we find no constitutional or other error. (E.g., People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th 690, 713-714 [same trial judge and procedures as in present case].) 2. General Adequacy of Questioning Defendant asserts that other deficiencies in death qualification prevented him from adequately questioning prospective jurors, and deprived him of federal due process guarantees. For instance, defense counsel objected to the “breakneck speed” of voir dire, and asked the trial court to slow down by “about 15 percent.” Defendant also claims the court made too few inquiries, as evidenced by its use of four standard questions and by its rejection of two proposed defense questions. Defendant did not frame his complaints about the pace and scope of voir dire below in terms of a due process violation. However, assuming without deciding that this federal claim has been preserved (see People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117-118, 133 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166] (Yeoman) [federal constitutional claim not waived when legal standard and relevant facts are essentially the same as state law claim timely raised at trial]), no constitutional or other error occurred. Recent decisions of this court have emphasized the importance of meaningful death-qualifying voir dire. We have reminded trial courts of their duty to know and follow proper procedure, and to devote sufficient time and effort to the process. (See People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th 425, 454-455; People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 966-967 [4 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 75 P.3d 53].) At bottom, both the court and counsel “must have sufficient information regarding the prospective juror’s state of mind to permit a reliable determination as to whether the juror’s views [on capital punishment] would ‘ “prevent or substantially impair” ’ the performance of his or her duties.” (People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 445.) Otherwise, reversible error can occur. (E.g., id. at pp. 446-452 [over defense objection, court erroneously excused five prospective jurors for cause based on inherently ambiguous responses to legally flawed questionnaire]; People v. Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 964—966 [over defense objection, court erroneously excused one prospective juror for cause based on ambiguous answers to imprecise and incomplete oral examination].) Nonetheless, the trial court has broad discretion over the number and nature of questions about the death penalty. We have rejected complaints about “hasty” (People v. Navarette, supra, 30 Cal.4th 458, 487-488) or “perfunctory” voir dire. (People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835, 855 [134 Cal.Rptr.2d 602, 69 P.3d 446].) We also have found no error where the court relied heavily on three, four, or five general questions tracking language from Witherspoon, supra, 391 U.S. 510, and Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 424. (E.g., People v. Hernandez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 855-856; People v. Navarette, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 487; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 973-974 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519]; People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 586 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142].) These cases found voir dire to be adequate because the court and/or counsel asked additional questions to clarify ambiguous responses and to reliably expose disqualifying bias. Such is the case here. Both the court and counsel posed follow-up questions where necessary to glean prospective jurors’ views on penalty. Defendant cites no instance in which the trial court (1) erroneously retained a prospective juror who should have been excused for cause, (2) erroneously excused for cause a prospective juror who should have been retained, (3) decided any challenge for cause absent sufficient information to do so, or (4) allowed a biased juror to serve in the case. Hence, defendant has not shown that the pace or scope of death qualification—including rejection of two defense questions—constituted an abuse of discretion or violated his constitutional rights. IV. Guilt Phase Issues A. Sufficiency of the Evidence Defendant claims insufficient evidence supports both first degree murder theories presented at trial: (1) murder in the commission of forcible rape, and (2) willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. Federal due process guarantees allegedly compel reversal of the murder count. We disagree. 1. Rape Murder Defendant notes that he could be convicted of first degree murder under a felony-murder-rape theory if he accomplished sexual intercourse against Carol’s will by means of force or fear. (See § 261, subd. (a)(2); People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1].) He insists the prosecution did not prove these elements because there was no real injury to Carol’s vagina, and because he told detectives that she consented to vaginal sex. However, viewing all of the evidence most favorably to the judgment, we reject the claim. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578 [162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738]; see Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 99 S.Ct. 2781].) The evidence suggested that defendant formed a sexual interest in Carol inside the bar the night she was killed. After only one dance, defendant looked or stared at her with such intensity that his conduct was noticed by at least one bystander. When Carol told the bartender that she planned to leave by taxi, defendant—who apparently continued to watch her closely— volunteered to drive her home. Defendant made this offer even though he did not know where Carol lived, and even though the pair hardly knew each other. The jury could infer that Carol had no similar interest in defendant. By asking him to dance, Carol treated defendant no differently than other bar patrons with whom she danced the same night or on prior occasions. She did not follow defendant to his table afterwards, but returned to her barstool instead. Moreover, Carol balked at being alone with defendant. Though she eventually accepted a ride from him, she first asked the bartender whether it was safe to go. In a related vein, Carol told the bartender that she was going home to her family. The jury could have accepted this statement at face value, and concluded that Carol did not intend to have sexual relations with defendant after she left the bar. Such evidence was “clearly probative” of both lack of consent and rape, and supported conviction under the prosecution’s first degree felony-murder theory. (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 264 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897] [rape-murder victim’s statement about going home to sleep, which she made after enduring the defendant’s sexual advances in bar, suggested she did not thereafter consent to sex with him].) Against this backdrop, defendant apparently saw Carol consume alcohol in the bar. He also later told the police that she was drunk while riding in his car. To rational jurors, defendant might have believed that Carol’s condition would make her receptive or vulnerable to his sexual advances once they were alone together. However, subsequent events indicate that Carol rejected such advances and that—consistent with evidence in the Valery C. case—defendant forced her to have sex anyway. Carol likely died within 30 minutes of leaving the bar with defendant. During that time, a violent struggle occurred in his car, as evidenced by Carol’s defensive and other injuries, the seat foam stuck to her body, and defendant’s own statements. Jurors also learned that he penetrated and ejaculated into her vaginal and anal cavities. Given the compressed time frame, and the sheer number of violent and sexual acts, the jury could reasonably conclude that they were part of one continuous criminal transaction in which defendant forced Carol to submit to both vaginal and anal intercourse against her will. Defendant highlights his statements to police indicating that Carol consented to vaginal sex, and that they fought afterwards about whether to visit another bar. However, the jury could have discredited this account. (See, e.g., People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1084 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40] [finding substantial evidence that consensual sex did not precede violence, and that violence accompanied sex].) Defendant initially denied knowing Carol or being in the bar the night she was killed. When Detective Coffey disclosed contrary evidence, defendant admitted driving Carol home, but insisted no sex or violence occurred. Only after Coffey implied that defendant’s semen would be found in Carol’s body did he admit vaginal intercourse. He also eventually admitted a struggle in his car. In addition, defendant denied anal intercourse—a stance inconsistent with medical, blood, and DNA evidence indicating that defendant forcibly sodomized Carol. Faced with defendant’s changing stories and with evidence contradicting much of what he said, jurors could infer that none of his exculpatory statements about sex were true, and that he lied to defeat both sodomy and rape charges. Contrary to what defendant further implies, the lack of vaginal injury does not preclude the jury from finding rape or prevent this court from upholding that determination on appeal. (People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1084; see People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1027 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089] [rape involves force sufficient “to overcome the will of the victim,” and does not require evidence that such force “physically facilitated sexual penetration or prevented the victim from physically resisting her attacker”].) Here, of course, the jury was free to accept testimony by Dr. Cogan and investigator Kitchings describing apparent trauma to Carol’s vagina, e.g., bruised labial skin. The inference that such injury occurred during nonconsensual sex was strengthened by evidence that Carol’s body was found naked from the waist down with her legs spread apart. (People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1084.) Such degrading circumstances could have convinced jurors that there was nothing lawful about defendant’s sexual encounter with Carol, including the act of vaginal intercourse. In sum, we find sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction of first degree murder under a felony-murder-rape theory. 2. Premeditated Murder Defendant argues that evidence of premeditation and deliberation was insufficient to support the first degree murder conviction. Under this approach, Carol’s strangulation was impulsive or accidental. Defendant points to the lack of any evidence that he procured a weapon in advance or planned the killing. Suggesting he had no motive to kill, defendant notes that he and Carol were virtual strangers who met on friendly terms in the bar. An intentional killing is premeditated and deliberate if it occurred as the result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse. (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577, 831 P.2d 1159], applying People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 [73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942].) However, the requisite reflection need not span a specific or extended period of time. “ ‘ “Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 332 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374].) Appellate courts typically rely on three kinds of evidence in resolving the question raised here: motive, planning activity, and manner of killing. (People v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125, applying People v. Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27.) These factors need not be present in any particular combination to find substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation. (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 247 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643].) However, “[w]hen the record discloses evidence in all three categories, the verdict generally will be sustained.” (People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 529 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100].) In conducting this analysis, we draw all reasonable inferences necessary to support the judgment. (People v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1124, citing People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) As noted, the murder occurred during a sexually motivated attack. It appears defendant became fixated upon Carol after she asked him to dance. He paid close attention to her words and movements afterwards, and made sure she did not take a taxi home. The evidence further indicated that not long after they drove away from the bar, and while they were alone in his car, defendant forcibly raped and sodomized Carol, and subjected her to lethal violence. The jury could reasonably have believed that defendant killed Carol “to silence her as a possible witness to her own sexual assault.” (People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 247.) It also appears defendant planned the fatal confrontation to some extent. After watching Carol much of the night, he offered her a ride home. Far from being altruistic, this offer could reasonably be seen as a pretext for the pair to be alone. Such circumstances made Carol vulnerable not only to sexual assault, but also to murder. Indeed, as revealed during the police interview, defendant knew when he left the bar with Carol that Valery C. had formally accused him of rape. The jury could have concluded that defendant decided before the murder to ensure that Carol, a subsequent rape victim, did not survive to report the crime. The manner of killing also suggests premeditation. The pathologist, Dr. Cogan, testified that lethal pressure had been applied to Carol’s neck for a “long” time. This evidence suggests defendant had ample opportunity to consider the deadly consequences of his actions. (See, e.g., People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th 463, 510 [strangulation of sexual assault victim for up to five minutes suggested deliberate plan to kill her].) However, instead of easing the pressure on Carol’s neck (as he did during the rape of Valery C.), defendant used multiple means of strangulation, namely, manual choking sufficient to break the thyroid cartilage, use of a choke hold sufficient to break the cricoid cartilage, and application of a ligature sufficient to damage the neck. Such acts seem calculated to ensure death. (See People v. Bonillas (1989) 48 Cal.3d 757, 792 [257 Cal.Rptr. 895, 771 P.2d 844] [describing ligature strangulation as inherently deliberate act].) Accordingly, we find substantial evidence of first degree premeditated murder, and decline to reverse the conviction on this ground. B. Evidentiary Rulings 1. Autopsy Photographs In several hearings held outside the jury’s presence, the court and counsel debated the admissibility of autopsy photographs. The disputed items included three photos of Carol’s dissected neck (exhibit Nos. 46, 47, and 48), and two photos of her dissected anus (exhibit Nos. 61 and 62). As noted further below, the prosecution’s offer of proof included voir dire testimony by the pathologist, Dr. Cogan, that all five photographs played a critical role in explaining his views on sexual trauma and the cause of death. The defense countered by arguing that the pictures were unduly gruesome and prejudicial. Hence, to prevent admission of the neck photographs, defense counsel offered to stipulate to strangulation as the cause of death. Counsel also sought to exclude the anal photographs to prevent jurors from mistakenly blaming defendant for surgical damage caused by the autopsy procedure itself. The trial court ruled that none of the photographs was exceptionally bloody or gruesome, and that all plainly supported the prosecution’s case. Declining to sanitize the crime by excluding this evidence, the court concluded that its probative value substantially outweighed any prejudicial impact. (See Evid. Code, § 352.) Defendant now contends that admission of the photographs constituted an abuse of discretion and violated his rights to due process and a reliable verdict under the federal Constitution. We reject the claims. Defendant did not seek to exclude this evidence on constitutional grounds below. However, assuming without deciding that this federal claim has been preserved (see Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th 93, 117-118, 133), no error occurred. The neck photographs showed that multiple strangulation methods and sustained pressure caused deep injuries in the form of hemorrhaging and cartilage fractures while Carol was alive. Such evidence supported the intent to kill and premeditation elements of the first degree murder charge, and weakened any inference of a rash killing. Similarly, photographs inside the anal cavity revealed tearing and bleeding consistent with forcible penetration before death—information that supported the sodomy-murder special circumstance. We reject defendant’s claim that photographs are irrelevant or inadmissible simply because they duplicate testimony, depict uncontested facts, or trigger an offer to stipulate. (People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 132-133; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 243.) Nor did the trial court err in concluding that relevance outweighed prejudice. The photographs are unpleasant, but not to the point of distracting the jury from its proper function. Contrary to what defendant assumes, jurors could “distinguish between the wounds inflicted from the murder and the disfigurement caused by the autopsy.” (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 751 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754].) Also, any overlap between photographs was insubstantial, particularly since Dr. Cogan relied on each one during his testimony. (See, e.g., People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 29 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224].) We have upheld the use of autopsy photos to prove guilt in other capital trials, including images of dissected tissue and excised organs. (E.g., People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 932-934 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103]; People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 754-755 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2]; People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th 1, 27-29.) We do so again here. 2. Detective Coffey’s Interview Techniques The prosecution called Detective Coffey to describe the murder investigation, including defendant’s statements at the police station. When first examined on the latter topic, Coffey mentioned specific interview techniques used in this case. They included speaking in a stem voice and disclosing incriminating evidence whenever it seemed defendant was “not being truthful.” A bench conference then occurred in which the court and counsel discussed the logistics of presenting the recorded interview to the jury—a recording that was three and one-half hours long. During this conference, the court authorized the prosecution to elicit additional testimony concerning Coffey’s reasons for asking defendant certain questions. The court also overruled defense counsel’s objection that the interview itself provided the “best evidence,” and that the proffered testimony was unnecessary. Hence, when describing defendant’s statements about his conduct on January 19, 1990, Detective Coffey repeatedly testified that defendant changed his story when confronted with conflicting evidence. Coffey twice said that this process exposed apparent “lies” on defendant’s part. Defense counsel objected throughout this exchange solely on grounds the prosecution asked Coffey leading and argumentative questions, and assumed facts not in evidence. Defendant now contends the trial court allowed Detective Coffey to attack defendant’s veracity in violation of state law rales restricting both expert and lay opinion testimony on the issue. (See Evid. Code, §§ 800, 801; People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 744 [244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741]; People v. Sergill (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 34, 38-40 [187 Cal.Rptr. 497]; but see People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 946-947 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388] [suggesting that Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d), known as Prop. 8’s Truth-in-Evidence provision, repealed such rules for crimes committed after its June 1982 effective date].) The ruling supposedly usurped the jury function (thereby violating the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments), and allowed the prosecutor to exploit defendant’s “lies” in closing argument. We reject these claims. First, as noted by the Attorney General, defendant did not seek to exclude the evidence below on any theory raised here. As in prior cases involving a failure to object on similar grounds, the claims have been forfeited on appeal. (People v. Anderson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 453, 478 [276 Cal.Rptr. 356, 801 P.2d 1107].) Second, defendant misreads the record. Detective Coffey highlighted the twists and turns in a long interrogation. Nothing in this testimony or the trial court’s rulings indicated that Coffey was offering an opinion for direct jury consideration on the issue of defendant’s credibility. No reasonable juror would have viewed the evidence this way. Moreover, Coffey’s testimony mirrored the interview heard by the jury, including defendant’s own admissions about lying and changing his account. Just as we find no flaw in the questions the court allowed the prosecutor to ask, we find nothing harmful in the answers Coffey gave. 3. Evidence Carol Left the Bar with Another Man During opening remarks and, later, on cross-examination of bar patron Cooper, the defense tried to inform the jury that Carol left the White Oak Inn with other men before January 19, 1990, the day of the murder. Each time, the trial court sustained the prosecution’s objection, and barred such evidence, absent an in limine offer of proof establishing its relevance. The issue arose again on cross-examination of bartender Russo. Abiding by the court’s ruling, defense counsel moved outside the jury’s presence to ask Russo whether, consistent with his preliminary hearing testimony, he saw Carol leave the bar with a man other than her husband in the weeks before the murder. Defendant argued that Carol’s behavior with other men was admissible under Evidence Code section 1103, subdivision (a)(1) to prove that she acted the same way with defendant the night she died. Defendant insisted that exclusion of the evidence would violate his constitutional right to a fa