Full opinion text
Opinion BAXTER, J. A Los Angeles County jury convicted defendant Eric Lament Hinton of the first degree murders of Landis Barnes, Albert Brown, and Tenoa Stevenson; selling a substance in lieu of a controlled substance, while personally armed with a firearm; and attempted robbery, with personal use of a firearm. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664, 211, 12022, subd. (a), 12022.5, subd. (a).) The jury also found true the burglary-murder, robbery-murder, and prior-murder-conviction special circumstances as to these three murders as well as a multiple-murder special circumstance. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2), (3), (17)(A) & (G).) After a penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The court denied defendant’s motions for a new trial (§ 1181) and to modify the penalty verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and sentenced defendant to death. This appeal is automatic. We affirm the judgment. I. Background On May 24, 1988, Landis Barnes, Albert Brown, and Brown’s cousin Tenoa Stevenson were shot in a Best Western motel room in Monterey Park during a drug deal. Barnes and Brown' died at the scene. Stevenson managed to stagger outside but was chased by two men in a silver BMW, one of whom exited the vehicle to pursue him on foot and shoot him again, fatally, in a nearby used car lot. Maribelle Santiago, who worked as a “runner” for Stevenson and who testified under a grant of immunity, identified defendant and Steve Hicks as having been with Barnes, Brown, and Stevenson at the motel shortly before the murders. Joel Stephen Cunningham, a convicted felon who also testified under a grant of immunity, confirmed that defendant and Hicks were in the motel room with Barnes, Brown, and Stevenson when the shooting started. Brett Johansen, who had just purchased some groceries at a nearby market, witnessed two men in a BMW chase Stevenson down. Johansen’s description of the BMW’s driver was consistent with Hicks’s appearance; his description of the passenger—and shooter—was consistent with defendant’s appearance. After a series of false statements to police following his arrest, defendant eventually admitted being in the motel room with Hicks during the drug transaction when the shooting started, but claimed Hicks was the shooter. He also admitted pursuing Stevenson in the BMW, but claimed he did so only because Hicks held him at gunpoint. He denied shooting anyone and claimed that Hicks alone shot and killed Barnes, Brown, and Stevenson, using two different guns. After these police interviews, defendant was released. On August 6, 1989, he murdered Dwayne Reed at a gas station in Los Angeles. Defendant was convicted of this murder, which was the basis for the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance, on June 5, 1992. He was convicted of the Barnes, Brown, and Stevenson murders and sentenced to death on February 25, 1993. Murders of Barnes, Brown, and Stevenson In May 1988, Tenoa Stevenson asked his friend Joel Stephen Cunningham for help in finding a supplier of kilo-size quantities of cocaine. Cunningham thought immediately of Landis Barnes, whom he had met a few days earlier. At that time, Barnes had said he “had friends who could produce kilos of cocaine.” Cunningham introduced Barnes to Stevenson and Stevenson’s cousin, Albert Brown. Stevenson said he wanted to buy five kilos. Barnes said he would need to find out the details—such as the price, the supplier, and the time and place of the transaction—from “his people” and then arrange another meeting. The next day, Barnes confessed to Cunningham that he was “having problems connecting with the people that he gets his answers from” and suggested they cruise the neighborhood to try to find “the person that [they] were looking for.” Barnes explained that his suppliers would not allow him to deliver the cocaine and that the cocaine would be delivered “personally” by these suppliers. Barnes and Cunningham drove around Lynwood until Barnes pointed out defendant and said, “That’s him over there.” Barnes stopped the car and got out to talk to defendant while Cunningham stayed in the car. When Barnes returned from talking with defendant, he told Cunningham that “things are going to work out.” Barnes called Stevenson, told him he could supply four kilos (instead of the five requested), and asked where he wanted the transaction to take place. After Barnes hung up, he told Cunningham that Stevenson had asked to meet the next day at a gas station in the Crenshaw area. Cunningham was to receive $8,000 for his role in introducing the parties, and an additional $500 per kilo from Stevenson if it worked out well. Cunningham, Stevenson, Brown, and Barnes waited at the gas station the next day, but no one showed up with the drugs. The principals then arranged to meet at 11:00 p.m. the next night, May 24, 1988, at a 7-Eleven in Monterey Park. When Cunningham arrived at the 7-Eleven, Stevenson and Brown were sitting in Stevenson’s black dually truck. After Barnes drove up in his BMW, defendant and Hicks arrived in defendant’s Volkswagen Beetle. Defendant spoke first to Barnes and then to Stevenson. It appeared to Cunningham that defendant was directing Barnes in the transaction. Stevenson told defendant that it was not “cool” to conduct the transaction in the parking lot and suggested they go instead to the nearby Best Western motel. After Hicks transferred a plastic shopping bag of wrapped packages from defendant’s Beetle to Barnes’s BMW, defendant and Hicks got in Barnes’s car, Cunningham got in his Jeep, and they all followed Stevenson to the motel. Barnes obtained a key from the motel office, opened the room, and entered it. Cunningham, Stevenson, and Brown (who carried a bottle of Clorox bleach to test the purity of the cocaine) followed. Barnes went back outside to see what defendant and Hicks were doing. They said they wanted to see the money, so Stevenson called his “runner,” Maribelle Santiago, and asked her to come to the motel. (Stevenson had previously given Santiago a black nylon tennis bag with $57,000 in cash.) When Santiago drove up, Stevenson and defendant walked up to her car. Defendant said he wanted to see the money. Stevenson said he would show it to him and unzipped the bag. Stevenson tossed one bundle of cash— $5,000—into Maribelle’s car and took the bag, saying, “Go around. I’ll call you to come back.” When Stevenson entered the room, Cunningham asked, “Is our girl here?” Stevenson replied that he had sent her back. A short time later, defendant and Hicks entered the room. Defendant was carrying the shopping bag with yellow wrapped packages inside. He placed the bag on the dresser near the Clorox bottle. Barnes and Brown set to work to test the cocaine, while defendant and Hicks stood near the door. Before the test could be completed, Cunningham heard gunfire. He immediately rolled off the bed onto the floor. Stevenson screamed and landed on top of Cunningham. Cunningham heard two quick shots, then six to eight more shots, followed by the sound of footsteps running out the door. Stevenson got up and exited the room, leaving blood on Cunningham’s shirt. When Cunningham got up, he saw Brown sprawled halfway off the bed and Barnes on the floor. Both had been shot. He went to the door to look for Stevenson and saw Barnes’s BMW leaving the motel driveway instead. Cunningham went back in the room to gather up his ring and his car keys and drove home in his Jeep. Before leaving, in “a kind of panic,” he dropped the yellow wrapped packages into the trash can in the room. Cunningham figured that if the shooters had left the packages in the room, they did not contain cocaine. Cunningham was correct. Police testing revealed that the powder in the wrapped packages did not contain any controlled substance. Meanwhile, Brett Johansen, who had been picking up some groceries at the nearby Hughes Market, heard four “muffled booms” and, shortly thereafter, saw Stevenson run out of the motel parking lot. Stevenson was yelling, “Somebody help me. Please help me,” and trying to flag down a car for help. Johansen also saw two African-American men in a silver BMW, tires screeching, come out of the motel driveway towards Stevenson. Johansen, who was across Emerson Avenue, backed up the hill behind the water machines to watch the events unfold. The intersection was very well lit, and the water machines did not block his view at all. Some cars slowed down as though to help Stevenson, but they sped up and fled when they saw what was going on. The BMW drove into oncoming traffic on Emerson Avenue to chase Stevenson and try to cut him off. Stevenson reversed field and fled, but the BMW executed a 180-degree turn and followed. When a yellow station wagon slowed down, Stevenson ran up to the driver’s window and asked for help. However, the BMW came sliding alongside the station wagon, practically pinning Stevenson in between. The passenger exited the BMW, with his gun in the air. The station wagon then took off, and Stevenson ran away again. The passenger got back in the BMW, which continued the pursuit. When the BMW cut Stevenson off again, he ran into a used car lot, which had a 12-foot fence at the back. The passenger once again exited the BMW and followed Stevenson into the used car lot. Stevenson pleaded, “Please don’t kill me.” His shoulders were slumped, and it appeared to Johansen that he had given up. The passenger reached out with his right hand and picked Stevenson up, as if they were buddies, and straightened him up. The passenger pointed his gun with his left hand at the center of Stevenson’s chest and shot him. Stevenson dropped to the ground. The passenger went back to the BMW, which had been waiting for him, and took off towards the freeway. Stevenson crawled towards the street while Johansen called the police from a nearby gas station. Although Johansen did not see the faces of the BMW’s occupants, he could tell that the passenger was of average height, approximately six feet tall and 150 to 160 pounds. Defendant’s driver’s license indicated that he was six feet one inch tall and 170 pounds. Johansen also described the passenger’s hair as being “about an inch, inch and a half’ long and “nappy”—as defendant’s hair was at the time. Johansen testified that the driver was burlier than the passenger and had shorter hair. This description was consistent with Hicks, who was five feet nine inches tall and 310 pounds and had hair that was shorter than defendant’s. Hicks, moreover, was right-handed. The parties stipulated that defendant was left-handed. Police Investigation Officer Lori Fishbum of the Monterey Park Police Department arrived at the intersection of Atlantic Boulevard and Emerson Avenue around midnight, one to two minutes after receiving the dispatch. She was flagged down by Stevenson, who came out of the used car lot and fell to the ground, bleeding. When Fishbum asked what had happened, frothy blood came out of Stevenson’s mouth and then he died. Johansen directed Fishbum to the Best Western motel, which was next to the used car lot, and she followed the blood drops to room 120. The door was open. Two African-American males, Landis Barnes and Albert Brown, were dead. A Clorox bottle was on the dresser. There were bullet holes in the wall. A white powdery substance packaged like cocaine was in the trash can. There was no money in the room, other than the cash in the victims’ possession, and no black athletic bag. Nor were there any guns. Meanwhile, Maribelle Santiago had become concerned that Stevenson had not called and decided to return to the motel. As she drove back, she saw Stevenson’s body on the comer. She called Stevenson’s girlfriend and brother-in-law while she watched from across the street and saw the police arrive. Police investigators found expended bullets underneath the carpeting and inside the wall of the motel room, a blood trail leading to a bullet near the motel swimming pool, and a bullet in a puddle of blood in the used car lot. A firearms expert examined the expended bullets and fragments and determined that at least two different guns had been used in the motel room shooting. An autopsy revealed that Albert Brown had suffered three gunshot wounds: one in his head and two in his chest. The head wound had been caused by a medium-caliber lead bullet. Stippling around the head wound indicated that the gun had been fired within six to 18 inches of Brown’s face. The chest wounds were caused by copper-jacketed lead bullets and exhibited no stippling. Landis Barnes suffered a bullet wound to the brain, which was fatal, and two chest wounds. Tenoa Stevenson suffered five gunshot wounds, three of them fatal. The front chest wound exhibited markings consistent with a muzzle stamp. During a police interview on June 1, 1988, Cunningham identified “Eric” as having been present at the motel. Further police investigation uncovered defendant’s last name. Cunningham then identified defendant’s photograph in a “six-pack mug book show-up” and subsequently identified Hicks as well. On June 8, 1988, police arrested defendant and interviewed him at the Lynwood Sheriff’s station. Defendant denied being at the motel. He said that Barnes had come by his house with what appeared to be four kilos of cocaine and had offered him $3,000 to provide “protection” during the drug deal, but he had refused to participate and heard later on the news that Barnes had been killed. The next day, defendant was allowed to talk with his girlfriend, Tarsha Smith, at the Monterey Park Police Department, but their conversation was secretly taped. During this conversation, defendant discovered that Smith had undermined his alibi by telling police that he had been at the motel during the shootings. Defendant then requested to meet again with the police. During that police interview, defendant admitted that he had not told the truth during the first interview and offered a new account. He said that Barnes and a man named “Steve” from Nickerson Gardens had asked him to accompany them to a drug transaction and that Barnes had driven him to the motel and had rented a room. Defendant denied ever entering the room and said he instead waited in a phone booth across the courtyard while Barnes and some men who arrived in a black dually truck and a Jeep went into the motel room. He also said he fled after hearing gunshots. Under further questioning, however, defendant admitted entering the motel room to carry the drugs from Barnes’s car to the dresser. Barnes then asked him to act as a lookout. After defendant heard the gunshots, he saw one man run out of the motel room and drive off in Barnes’s BMW. He denied seeing Santiago arrive with the money and denied driving off in the BMW. Later in the interview, defendant admitted that he had stayed in the motel room until the “girl” drove up with the money; that he had left when Stevenson and the others discussed how to test the cocaine’s purity; that one man drove off in the Jeep and one in the BMW after the shots were fired; and that he took the bus home. He denied stopping at the 7-Eleven or accompanying Stevenson to Santiago’s car. He also denied being in Barnes’s BMW. After admitting that he still had not told the police the truth, defendant said that he had seen the four wrapped packages in the trunk of Barnes’s car the night before the murders; that Hicks had started shooting when Barnes cut into one of the packages to test the cocaine; that Hicks had used two guns, a chrome one and a blue steel one; that Hicks had made him drive Barnes’s BMW back to Lynwood; and that Hicks had only then told him the packages contained flour, not cocaine. But, under further questioning, defendant claimed that Barnes had offered him $3,000 to assist in a drug deal, which he had declined because he did not have a gun; that the next night Barnes nonetheless picked him up and brought him to a 7-Eleven, where he saw Cunningham in a Jeep and two other men in a black dually truck; that they all went to the Best Western motel, where Barnes rented a room; and that Hicks told him at that point the packages contained flour. When Barnes was about to cut open the packages, Hicks jerked defendant backwards, pulled out a gun, and started shooting. Brown was the first one hit, then Cunningham fell to the ground, followed by Stevenson. During the volley of shots, Hicks pulled out a second gun, a chrome revolver. Defendant walked towards Barnes’s BMW, since he still had the keys from opening the trunk, but Hicks got in the passenger’s side and told defendant to get in the car and drive. On the way out, they saw Stevenson running on the street. Hicks ordered defendant to follow Stevenson and try to cut him off, and defendant did so. Eventually, Hicks got out of the car and chased Stevenson into a used car lot. Defendant said he knew Hicks from the neighborhood. On June 15, 1988, defendant again waived his Miranda rights and gave yet another statement. In this one, he said that Barnes came to his house the night before the murders and showed him the four wrapped packages in the trunk; that they had a conversation as to whether the packages looked authentic; and that they then rewrapped them with duct tape. He claimed that when he and Hicks were retrieving the kilos from the trunk of Barnes’s car at the motel, Hicks said that he was “fixing to jack those niggers.” Defendant also stated that after the shooting, Hicks pointed the gun at him and said, “Drive the car, and do as I say, and you will not get hurt.” Then, when Hicks saw Stevenson running away from the motel, he said, “Drive and get him.” Defendant told the police that he had previously been untruthful because he was afraid of what Hicks might do to him or his family. But when he was confronted by Cunningham’s statements, he eventually corroborated everything, except “that he did not admit to having a gun in his hand.” On August 8, 1989, Detective Larry Kallestad of the Los Angeles Police Department received a phone call from a woman identifying herself as Eula Roberson, who left her address and phone number. Roberson said she had some information to convey to police detectives. In particular, she said that she had spoken to “E Money,” who had admitted killing three people in Monterey Park. When Kallestad asked whether she knew this person by any other name, she replied, “Eric.” She asked to be picked up in an unmarked car and interviewed somewhere other than her home. At trial, Roberson denied telling police that “E Money” had admitted killing three people in Monterey Park and denied that she had ever had a conversation with defendant about any murders in Monterey Park. On the other hand, Roberson lived in Lynwood, knew defendant from the neighborhood, and admitted that defendant and Barnes often visited her nephews and son. Hicks, too, visited from time to time. She denied knowing defendant by the name “E Money,” but admitted calling the police in August 1989, leaving her name, address, and phone number, and asking to be interviewed away from her house. She also admitted that defendant was the only “Eric” she knew. Defense Case Defendant, who was 18 at the time of the murders, testified at trial. Defendant said that he had known Barnes for 10 years and had known Hicks for five, although he had generally tried to steer clear of Hicks. Defendant said that Barnes came to his house on the evening of May 23, 1988, to ask defendant to transport the goods for a drug deal. Cunningham was also present, but defendant did not know who he was at that time. Defendant, himself a drug dealer, told Barnes to come back when he was ready. Barnes returned around 4:00 p.m. the next day and told defendant the deal was still “on” for that night and said he would pay defendant $3,000 for transporting the drugs. When defendant asked why Barnes wanted him to drive his Beetle, Barnes explained that an African-American male driving a BMW, like Barnes’s car, was more likely to be pulled over than an African-American male driving a Beetle, like defendant’s car. Barnes showed defendant the wrapped packages in the trunk. They looked “funny” to defendant and felt softer than other kilos he had seen. Barnes said they had been opened once and needed to be rewrapped. Barnes returned to defendant’s house around 10:30 p.m. Defendant asked whether Barnes had a gun. Barnes said he did not. Defendant said he was not going to go, but Barnes said “everybody knows one another, and it’s not like that.” When defendant came outside, he saw that Hicks was in Barnes’s car and assumed that Hicks must be the supplier of the drugs. Barnes brought the wrapped packages over to defendant’s Beetle and drove off. Defendant followed. When they arrived at the 7-Eleven, Barnes parked next to Stevenson and Brown, who were next to Cunningham’s Jeep. Barnes got out to talk to Stevenson, while defendant stayed in his car. Hicks and Barnes then came to defendant’s car and told him that Stevenson wanted to conduct the transaction at the motel. Barnes told defendant to leave his car at the 7-Eleven and to ride with Cunningham. Hicks took the wrapped packages out of the car. During the ride with Cunningham to the motel, Cunningham told defendant that if they kept doing business together, defendant would make a lot of money. After Barnes got the room key from the office, he entered room 120, followed by Stevenson, Brown, and Cunningham. Hicks remained inside Barnes’s BMW, while defendant stood in front of it. After Barnes conferred separately with Hicks and Stevenson, Stevenson said he needed to make a phone call. When he came back, he said the money was “on the way.” A car then pulled up, and Stevenson talked to the woman who was driving. Stevenson pulled out a black bag of money, showed it to Barnes, and then put it back in the car. After the car left, Barnes gave defendant his car keys to take the wrapped packages from the trunk to the motel room. Defendant set the bag on the dresser. Brown and Barnes were discussing who was going to test its purity. As the testing was about to begin, Hicks pulled defendant back by his collar and shot Brown. Hicks had a black revolver in his left hand, even though he was right-handed. Defendant turned around and ran away as the gunfire continued. Defendant was heading towards the front of the motel when he realized he had Barnes’s car keys, so he went back to the parking lot. As he was opening the car door, Hicks jumped in the passenger side. He had a different gun in his hand this time, a chrome one. He pointed the gun at defendant and told him to drive. Defendant drove out of the motel lot, against traffic, in pursuit of Stevenson, who was standing near a big yellow car. Hicks made defendant pursue Stevenson in the car until Stevenson ran into the used car lot, at which point Hicks got out of the car and told defendant to stay put. Hicks returned to the car about 45 seconds later and directed defendant to drive to the 7-Eleven, where defendant got into his own car and drove home. Defendant talked on the phone to his girlfriend, Tarsha Smith, about what had happened until 5:00 a.m. He claimed he discovered the drugs were fake only when a friend told him so after the incident. Defendant admitted that he had been untruthful in his police interviews on June 8 and 9, 1988, and that the officers had testified accurately at trial as to his prior statements. He also admitted that he had known all along that “Steve’s” last name was Hicks and that he had not needed to make any phone calls to discover that fact. He further admitted leading police on a wild goose chase and falsely claiming he had sold his Beetle when they asked to inspect it. He lied to the police because he figured the less he told them, “the less they would know, and they would just let me go.” Defendant also was impeached with his prior convictions for murder, attempted murder, and assault with a firearm. Defendant also admitted being untruthful with his girlfriend, Tarsha Smith, in telling her that he did not know who the shooter was and in telling her, after his initial police interview on June 8, that he had told the police everything he knew. When Smith informed defendant that she had already told police that defendant, contrary to his original statement, had been at the motel, defendant asked to meet with police investigators again. Smith testified that defendant and Barnes were friends. The defense sought to impeach Cunningham’s testimony by reference to his denial to police of any knowledge about Stevenson’s death when questioned on May 25, 1988. The defense sought to impeach Santiago’s testimony by reference to her initial statements denying any knowledge of what happened at the motel and her description of herself in a police interview as Stevenson’s lover. And the defense sought to impeach Johansen’s testimony by reference to his earlier estimate that the BMW’s passenger was five feet seven inches tall and by reference to the written report of the investigating officer, Detective David Corrigan, that Johansen had said the passenger grabbed Stevenson with his left hand and held the gun in his right. A defense investigator took photographs of the intersection of Atlantic and Emerson on January 9, 1993, about four and one-half years after the crime. He was three inches shorter than Johansen, and his photographs therefore did not reflect what Johansen saw. The investigator nonetheless believed that Johansen’s view could have been blocked by the water machines, cars in the parking lot, vehicular traffic, and trees. Detective Corrigan, however, testified that the structure surrounding the water machines had not been in existence at the time of the murder, that the water machines themselves were much smaller at that time, that there were no cars in the parking lot a few hours after the murder, that the trees had been much smaller and were more like shrubs at the time of the murder, and that there would have been less traffic around midnight, the time of the murder. Indeed, a videotape Corrigan made the morning after the murder showed that there were very few obstructions. Penalty Phase Around 3:30 p.m. on August 6, 1989, defendant approached Dwayne Reed, who was filling up his car at a gas station at the comer of Imperial and Main in Los Angeles. Defendant, who was carrying a towel in his hand, said he had heard that Reed was going to “smoke” him. Reed replied, “It’s not like that. Everything is cool.” Defendant then said, “I can’t trust you” and pulled a gun out from under the towel. Reed tried to flee but tripped over the hose and fell. Defendant shot Reed fatally in the head at point-blank range. Reed’s aunt, Eula Roberson, had believed defendant and Reed were friends, since defendant used to come over to her house once or twice a week to see Reed and her son. Mitigating Evidence Members of defendant’s family testified about the family’s history and defendant’s childhood. Defendant’s mother, Diane, started running away from home when she was 15. Diane and her mother did not get along well. Some family members testified that Diane was promiscuous from a young age. Jeanette Dozier, defendant’s great-aunt, testified that Diane claimed to have been a prostitute. When Diane became pregnant with defendant at the age of 17, while she was still in high school, her mother beat her with an extension cord. Diane’s aunt, Jeanette Dozier, testified that Diane did not want to have the baby, once tried to abort the pregnancy herself, and did not take care of defendant after he was bom. That responsibility fell to her mother, Jessie Compton, and her sister, Joanne Merritt. Defendant never knew who his father was. Diane was described as “mean” and told defendant that she did not want him. Compton and Merritt, on the other hand, loved defendant “to death.” Defendant’s needs were provided for, he never needed to get a job while in school, and he was even given a Volkswagen Beetle as a high school graduation present. When defendant was four years old, Diane married William Heard, who regularly beat her. Although the beatings did not occur in front of defendant, he saw her braises and welts. Jessie Compton testified that Heard also beat defendant, but defendant’s favorite aunt, Joanne Merritt, denied it. Diane, who soon divorced Heard, also beat defendant when she had been drinking too much. Compton testified that the beatings were so severe that defendant sometimes lost consciousness, but no one ever took him to the hospital. Defendant’s uncle, Donald Dennis, was stabbed to death when defendant was 15 years old. Defendant’s great-aunt, Mae Rossum, thought Donald might have been dealing drugs. Defendant had been very close to his uncle, who had been a role model for him, and some family members testified that defendant changed for the worse after Donald died. Others said that defendant did not change that much. Carlos Hilliard, another uncle, testified he had a sense that defendant was “going the wrong way” after Donald’s death. Defendant was spending time with drug dealers, and Hilliard did talk with defendant about it. Various family members testified that defendant and Barnes were good friends. Diane was raped in early 1988. She stopped working and developed a drinking problem but never told defendant what had happened. Defendant went to church every Sunday when he was in elementary school. When he was in high school and getting beaten up and having his lunch money taken, Jessie Compton’s husband, Charles Compton, showed defendant how to defend himself. Neither Diane nor her mother had ever known defendant to carry a gun or to act in a violent manner. However, Diane said she had been told by police that defendant had a gun on his person when he was arrested. When defendant was 17, he took care of his great-uncle, Jim Rossum, who had suffered a stroke. For about three months, defendant went to the Rossum home and stayed each day for four hours while his great-aunt was at work. Defendant was skilled at drawing and sketched a portrait of his six-year-old daughter, Erica, for his mother’s birthday while he was in jail awaiting trial. Erica testified that she loved defendant and did not want him to die. Defendant had suffered only one disciplinary violation during his incarceration, and that was for being in an unauthorized area. II. Jury-selection Issues On their juror questionnaires, six members of the venire who eventually served on the jury answered something other than an unqualified “yes” to question 93C (“Do you believe that if a person is sentenced to death, he will actually be put to death?”) or question 93D (“Do you believe that if a person is sentenced to life without parole, he will actually spend the rest of his life in prison?”). Following Hovey voir dire—in which each prospective juror stated that, in the event the case proceeded to a penalty phase, he or she could assume that the punishment selected would actually be carried out—these six were allowed to remain in the venire. Defendant, who challenged only one of these prospective jurors for cause below, now alleges the trial court erred in failing to excuse all six of these jurors for cause. He also claims that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove one of these jurors, that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury in the penalty phase to assume that the punishment selected would be carried out, and that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to request such an instruction at the penalty phase. His claims invoke the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. We reject these claims in their entirety. As to defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in failing to excuse the six jurors for cause, we note that, with one exception, defendant failed to challenge these jurors for cause at trial. Accordingly, defendant failed to preserve any appellate challenge to five of these jurors. (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 48 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30]; People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 634 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 28 P.3d 175].) Although defendant did challenge Juror K.B. for cause below, he nonetheless failed to preserve this challenge for appeal. Defendant exercised only eight peremptory challenges, leaving him with 12 remaining when he accepted the jury. (Code Civ. Proc., § 231, subd. (a).) “ ‘To preserve a claim of error in the denial of a challenge for cause, the defense must exhaust its peremptory challenges and object to the jury as finally constituted.’ [Citation.] Defendant did neither.” (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 487 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754].) Even if the claim were cognizable, defendant would not prevail. Each of these six jurors stated that, in choosing between death and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, he or she could properly assume that the punishment selected would actually be carried out. There is no conflict or inconsistency between a juror’s statement of fact that the punishment selected may not necessarily be carried out and the juror’s statement that, for purposes of the trial, he or she would assume the punishment selected would be carried out. (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 378 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169].) The responses provided by each of these jurors during voir dire thus supplied ample evidence of his or her impartiality and capacity to serve. We also reject, on this record, defendant’s claim that his attorney was ineffective in failing to exercise a peremptory challenge against Juror K.B. once the challenge for cause proved unsuccessful. “ ‘Because the use of peremptory challenges is inherently subjective and intuitive, an appellate record will rarely disclose reversible incompetence in this process.’ ” (People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 485 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249].) In this instance, we observe that Juror K.B. had himself been the victim of an illegal police search. He also said that he would not be bothered by viewing unpleasant photographs of the deceased, that he did not believe a police officer’s testimony was necessarily more believable than that of any other witness, and that he believed “mistakes do happen” in charging an individual with a crime. (See People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 839 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 840, 996 P.2d 1152].) Defendant claims next the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jurors at the end of the penalty phase to assume that the penalty selected will be carried out. He acknowledges, as he must, that we have not required such an instruction in every penalty phase because of the concern that such an instruction “may unnecessarily raise questions in the jurors’ minds.” (People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 378-379.) He nonetheless urges that such an instruction should have been given in this case because of the trial court’s awareness of the jurors’ concerns on this topic based on their responses to the jury questionnaire. Although it would not have been improper to have so instructed the jury during the penalty phase instructions (id. at p. 378), as defendant now urges, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ensuring the jurors were instead informed during voir dire to assume that whatever penalty was selected would be carried out. Defendant relies on People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388] (Hines) and People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119] (Davis), but neither case helps him. Indeed, in neither case was a cautionary instruction included among the penalty phase instructions. In Hines, the jury submitted questions once deliberations had already begun as to whether a sentence of death or of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole could be reduced. (Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1071.) The trial court consulted with counsel and then “correctly instructed the jury that the Governor had the power to commute either a death sentence or a sentence of life without possibility of parole, but that it would be ‘improper’ and ‘a violation of your duty as jurors’ to consider the possibility of a pardon or commutation in determining the appropriate penalty.” (Id. at p. 1073.) In Davis, the foreperson submitted a note after the jury had been instructed (but before deliberations had begun) as to whether either punishment, death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, would actually be enforced. We found no error when the court instructed the jury the next morning that it was to assume the punishment selected would be carried out. (Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 546-548.) What is significant in both cases for our purposes is that the trial court dealt promptly with evidence that the jury had concerns whether either punishment, death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, would actually be carried out. Here, unlike in Hines and Davis, the trial court learned of the jurors’ concerns at an early stage, during voir dire. The jurors were then promptly instructed, either by defense counsel or by the court itself, to assume that either punishment would be carried out. (People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 129 [246 Cal.Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37] [“During voir dire virtually all the jurors were informed, either by defense counsel or through general instructions from the court, that they should assume the sentence they voted for, whether death or life without possibility of parole, would be carried out”].) Indeed, several of the jurors also received an explanation why the assumption was so important. Moreover, nothing that occurred subsequently at the trial raised an issue as to whether either punishment would actually be carried out. (People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 76 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118].) Rather, the jury was instructed that it “must now determine which of said penalties shall be imposed on the defendant”; that, in doing so, it shall consider and be guided by the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors; and that it was “not allowed to consider any other facts or circumstances as the basis for deciding that the death penalty would be an appropriate punishment in this case.” Also, both attorneys stressed the gravity of the jury’s decision. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in responding to the jurors’ concerns during voir dire rather than waiting until the jury instructions at the end of the penalty phase. (See People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1009 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171] [trial court “has discretion to determine what additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury’s request for information”]; State v. Anderson (2001) 65 Conn.App. 672 [783 A.2d 517, 521-523]; cf. Penry v. Johnson (2001) 532 U.S. 782, 799-801 [150 L.Ed.2d 9, 121 S.Ct. 1910] [expressing skepticism that “convoluted” statements during voir dire could cure conflicting sets of instructions].) For the same reason, we reject defendant’s claim that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to request the jurors be reinstructed at the end of the penalty phase. Additionally, as stated above, counsel may well have wanted to avoid highlighting the possibility that a death sentence might not be carried out. (People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 378-379.) III. Guilt Phase Issues A. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct Defendant contends that prosecutorial misconduct “permeated the guilt phase trial” in violation of his due process right to a fair trial, privilege against self-incrimination, right to an impartial jury, and right to a reliable determination of guilt under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and article I, sections 1, 7, and 15 of the state Constitution. “A prosecutor’s conduct violates the federal Constitution when it ‘infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.’ (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 18 P.3d 11]; accord, Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181 [91 L.Ed.2d 144, 106 S.Ct. 2464]; Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974) 416 U.S. 637, 643 [40 L.Ed.2d 431, 94 S.Ct. 1868].) ‘Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under [California] law only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the trial court or the jury.’ (Morales, at p. 44.) In general, ‘ “ ‘a defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion—and on the same ground—the defendant [requested] an assignment of misconduct and [also] requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1184-1185 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 112, 105 P.3d 487].) “In the absence of a timely objection the claim is reviewable only if an admonition would not have otherwise cured the harm caused by the misconduct.” (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1146 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572].) 1. Opening Statement Defendant argues first that the prosecutor’s opening statement was improper in that it referred to inadmissible hearsay statements by Barnes and Stevenson, misstated what the evidence would show, and was unduly argumentative. We disagree. As to Barnes’s and Stevenson’s out-of-court statements, the trial court appropriately warned the prosecutor that the admissibility of that evidence was “an issue that we will resolve in this proceeding.” Although we agree with the trial court that “the safer and preferred path is to avoid making those references” until the issue was resolved, we discern no possible prejudice when, as defendant concedes, these out-of-court statements were ultimately admitted under the coconspirator exception at trial. As to whether the prosecutor misstated the legal significance of defendant’s admissions to police, defendant forfeited the claim by failing to object on this ground below. Moreover, the trial court’s instructions before opening statement and again before closing argument that the attorneys’ statements were not evidence would have dispelled any prejudice. (People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1109-1110 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 511, 839 P.2d 1020].) As to the allegation that the prosecutor’s opening statement was unduly argumentative in invoking felony-murder and aiding-and-abetting theories, we note that the trial court sustained the defense objections and admonished the prosecutor. In addition, the prosecutor’s argument essentially tracked what was proved at trial. (United. States v. Panza (2d Cir. 1984) 750 F.2d 1141, 1153.) When combined with the fact that the jury was repeatedly instructed the attorneys’ statements were not evidence and the fact that the objectionable comments and jury deliberations were separated by more than six weeks, defendant could not have been prejudiced. (Frazier v. Cupp (1969) 394 U.S. 731, 736 [22 L.Ed.2d 684, 89 S.Ct. 1420].) 2. Cunningham’s Testimony Defendant quotes several passages from the prosecution’s direct examination of witness Cunningham and complains the prosecution engaged in prejudicial misconduct because the trial court sustained 34 defense objections, admonished the prosecution 10 times, ordered a response stricken on five occasions, and held nine sidebar discussions. But the critical inquiry on appeal is not how many times the prosecutor erred but whether the prosecutor’s errors rendered the trial fundamentally unfair or constituted deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade the jury. Defendant makes no effort to describe the unfairness or deceptiveness of the prosecutor’s conduct, and our own review does not detect any. The trial court sustained the defense objection to Cunningham’s statement that he “figured these people I didn’t know were shooting at us” and ordered it stricken. Inasmuch as Cunningham admitted that he did not see who committed the shooting, the jury would not have interpreted this statement as evidence that defendant (as opposed to Hicks) was the shooter. We also presume the jury obeyed the trial court’s admonition to disregard this response. (People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 528 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032].) Nor do we find it fatal that the prosecutor attempted, unsuccessfully, to inquire into the subject matter of Cunningham’s conversation with Maribelle Santiago two days after the murders. We presume the jury obeyed the trial court’s instruction that questions posed by the attorneys are not evidence. Finally, none of the questions to which the court sustained defense objections of “asked and answered” could have prejudiced defendant. 3. Johansen’s Testimony Over defense objection, the court permitted the prosecution to show defendant’s photograph to witness Johansen for purposes of comparing the hairstyle therein to that of the shooter Johansen observed at the scene. After Johansen established that he never saw the shooter’s face but that his hair was “nappy,” the prosecutor asked, “How would you characterize the defendant’s hair as it is today?” Johansen replied, “It looks a little better kept today, but it’s still kind of nappy.” Defendant did not object to this response, nor did he object when the prosecutor prefaced his next question by saying, “Now, you said that his hair appears to be ‘better kept today.’ ” Defendant did successfully object when Johansen was subsequently asked whether the photographs of defendant “more closely resemble the nappy hair of the shooter.” Ultimately, Johansen testified that the hair in the photographs of defendant was “[n]appy” and “[u]nkempt,” unlike the hair in the photographs of Hicks. Because defendant failed to object to Johansen’s answer or the prosecutor’s followup question, he has forfeited the right to complain on appeal about either one. We also find no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have interpreted either comment as an identification of defendant by Johansen. (See People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2].) Rather, Johansen plainly was comparing defendant’s hair “today” to the hair in the photographs he had been shown. Defendant also complains that the prosecutor’s examination of Johansen began with “a series of leading questions” on foundational matters. He does not assign any prejudice to this sequence, and none can be imagined. (See People v. Hayes (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 459, 470 [96 Cal.Rptr. 879].) 4. Cross-examination of Defendant In a lengthy discussion with extensive quotations from the record, defendant argues that his own cross-examination “was replete with objectionable questions, misstatements of evidence, and attempts to further introduce inadmissible evidence through misrepresentation.” As defendant acknowledges, the trial court in each instance sustained the defense objection and admonished the prosecutor. For example, the trial court corrected the prosecution’s assertion that defendant had been dealing drugs for a few years (it had actually been only 18 months); deemed argumentative the prosecutor’s assertion that defendant had lied when he told Barnes he was willing to be the driver despite not being sure he was even going to participate in the transaction; and deemed speculative the prosecutor’s question whether defendant had told the police that people in the neighborhood were blaming him for Barnes’s murder. We find no reason to doubt the jury followed the court’s instructions distinguishing between evidence and counsel’s questions (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 755 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485]), and (with only two exceptions, discussed below) defendant does not even offer any. Instead, he complains that if such instructions are deemed sufficient, then “as long as the prosecutor did not get away with his misconduct, there can be no prejudicial error.” If by “get away” with misconduct, defendant means that the prosecutor’s actions did not render the trial fundamentally unfair or result in a miscarriage of justice (see People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 844 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673]), then he is correct. Whatever methods a trial or appellate court might otherwise use to bring to heel a recalcitrant or incorrigible prosecutor, the federal Constitution does not require (and the state Constitution does not permit) the reversal of a criminal conviction unless the misconduct deprived defendant of a fair trial or resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (See People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 214 [152 Cal.Rptr. 141, 589 P.2d 396].) Here, as the trial court explained in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial, the prosecutor’s questions were not improper “over and above being in violation of the Evidence Code.” Two portions of the cross-examination merit closer attention, however. In exploring whether defendant could have obtained a gun after Barnes invited him to participate in the drug deal, the prosecutor asked whether defendant could have obtained a gun in his neighborhood. Defendant agreed that he could have done so. The prosecutor then asked whether defendant could have obtained a gun in “the area of [his] car” and, when defendant said, “no,” asked whether defendant kept a gun in his car, had ever kept a gun there, and whether a gun had been found in his car when he was arrested. At this point, the defense objected, and the parties conferred at sidebar. The court observed that “there has to be some evidence of the fact there was a gun in the car when he was arrested ... for you to be asking these questions” and asked for an offer of proof. After reviewing the arrest report, defense counsel pointed out that the gun had actually been recovered from defendant’s person. The court granted the defense motion to strike and informed the jury that “the questions and answers related to a gun being found in the defendant’s car have been stricken. You are instructed to disregard them as though they were never asked or answered.” Although the prosecutor plainly erred in posing the question, defendant was not prejudiced. Not only was the jury promptly instructed to disregard the questions and answers, but defendant himself admitted that a gun had been “available” to him “at a moment’s notice.” Defendant also complains that while inquiring about his interview with police on June 9, 1988, the prosecutor asked, “And you are saying, now, that all those statements you gave were lies?” Defense counsel objected on the ground that it misstated the evidence, in that “a great number of statements made in the course of those interviews were perfectly true.” The .trial court judge agreed that the police witnesses had testified “that some of the statements were truthful” and that characterizing them “in the argumentative way you have been doing with this witness is not appropriate. Stop it, now.” When cross-examination resumed, the prosecutor established without objection that defendant told the police “a whole lot of lies.” The difference between the hyperbolic accusation that “all” of defendant’s statements were lies and defendant’s concession that he told a “whole lot of’ lies could not have been prejudicial. 5. Doyle Error Defendant gave statements to police during an initial interview on the morning of June 8, 1988, a lengthy interview on June 9, and an interview on June 15. The prosecutor elicited this sequence and the fact that, in each instance, defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and waived them. The prosecutor also elicited from Detective Corrigan the fact that police attempted to interview defendant on the afternoon of June 8, but defendant refused to waive his rights. At a sidebar immediately following that exchange, defense counsel asked for a mistrial on the basis of Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610 [49 L.Ed.2d 91, 96 S.Ct. 2240] (Doyle). The prosecutor explained that he did not plan to “comment” on the invocation and had brought it up only because defendant “gave so many statements and he was Mirandized so many times” that defense counsel had earlier indicated “they were confused as to which instance this witness is talking about.” The trial court took the motion under submission and instructed the prosecutor not to ask any further questions in this area. Later that day, the prosecutor asked the jury be admonished concerning the invocation, but defense counsel complained that such an admonition would only exacerbate the problem. Later, in reviewing this sequence of interviews with Lieutenant Maynard Merkt, the prosecutor asked about the interview on the afternoon of June 8 and whether Merkt had obtained any information from defendant at that time. Merkt said, “No, sir.” At sidebar, defense counsel again asked for a mistrial. The prosecutor said the question was merely for purposes of “clarification.” The court observed there was no relevance “to an interview that didn’t happen because the defendant invoked his privilege” and warned it would consider this latest exchange in connection with the original motion for a mistrial. At the hearing on the motion for a mistrial, the People conceded that Doyle applied, but argued that defendant suffered no prejudice. Defendant continued to insist that a jury admonition “would simply aggravate the problem.” The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, expressing doubt that the jurors “are going to do much with it,” and directed counsel not to mention, refer to, or question any witness about defendant’s invocation again. We agree that the error was harmless. Although the jury could in theory have relied on defendant’s unwillingness to speak to the police on the afternoon of June 8 to infer that he was fabricating a defense, there is no reasonable possibility the jury actually did so, inasmuch as defendant gave police concededly false versions of the circumstances surrounding the murders both before and after his invocation. The problem with defendant’s trial testimony was not that the jury heard that he once invoked his Miranda rights, but that he repeatedly provided in the other interviews untrue accounts of his involvement in the murders. Indeed, defendant’s invocation of his Miranda rights was both cumulative of—and inferior to—the other evidence indicating that he had fabricated the account he eventually provided during police interviews and reiterated at trial. For that reason, and because the prosecutor never again mentioned the invocation during trial or closing argument (see U.S. v. Whitehead (9th Cir. 2000) 200 F.3d 634, 639), we conclude that these two fleeting references could not have affected the jury’s verdicts in this case. (People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 857-858 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15]; cf. Gravley v. Mills (6th Cir. 1996) 87 F.3d 779, 788 [“From the beginning of its own case, through the cross examination of the defendant, up until the culmination of its final argument, the state consistently and repeatedly sought to make impermissible references to Gravley’s silence after his arrest”].) For the same reason, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 251 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710].) 6. Opinion Testimony That Defendant Lied During Elis Interrogation Detective Merkt recounted the statements defendant made during the lengthy interview on June 9, 1988. At the outset of that interview, defendant admitted that the version he had provided the previous day was untruthful. In particular, he admitted that he had accompanied Barnes to a motel in Monterey Park, but he claimed that he waited at a phone booth across the courtyard while the other men entered the room. He also said he fled on foot after the shots were fired and went home. When the prosecutor asked Merkt how he would characterize this new account, defendant objected that the question was “vague.” After the trial court overruled the objection, Merkt testified that he believed this statement, too, was untruthful, in that it was inconsistent with the statement of other witnesses and with defendant’s earlier statement. Defendant now claims it was misconduct for the prosecutor to solicit inadmissible opinion testimony from Merkt concerning defendant’s truthfulness. Defendant, who neither objected to the prosecutor’s question on this ground below nor moved to strike Merkt’s response, has forfeited the claim of prosecutorial misconduct. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) Even if we were to assume the claim was cognizable and Merkt’s opinion concerning the truthfulness of defendant’s statement was inadmissible (see People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 546-547 [26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182]), defendant could not possibly have been prejudiced, inasmuch as he himself admitted this version was untruthful. 7. Closing Argument Defendant challenges several statements made by the prosecutor in closing argument, but none of them evidences misconduct warranting a new trial. Indeed, except for one instance (which is identified below), defendant forfeited these claims by failing to object or request an appropriate admonition. a. The prosecutor’s closing argument focused on two questions: whether defendant knew “the dope was bunk” and whether defendant fired a gun. In arguing that the jury must convict defendant of the felonies and the murders if it answered either of these questions in the affirmative, the prosecutor adopted a strategy that was not difficult to follow: If defendant knew the drugs were “bunk,” then he would have anticipated a confrontation with the buyers as soon as their testing discovered that fact, would have understood that he needed to seize their money before they could test the drugs, would have recognized that he and Hicks would be outnumbered by the other parties to the transaction, and therefore would have relied on the use of force (whether his or Hicks’s) to complete the robbery of approximately $50,000. Under this scenario, which depended only on the lone controversial assumption that defendant knew the drugs were “bunk,” defendant was guilty either as a direct perpetrator or as an aider and abettor of all charged crimes. Similarly, if defendant fired his weapon, then—in the absence of any evidence that he fired it in self-defense, that he was provoked to fire it by circumstances completely unrelated to the drug transaction, or that any of the murders were unrelated to the others—he must have been aware the drugs were “bunk” and he was once again guilty as either a direct perpetrator or as an aider and abettor of all the crimes. Thus, in neither instance did the prosecutor contend that either of these facts alone warranted a conviction, and we find no reasonable likelihood the jury understood the prosecutor to make such an argument. (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705].) Rather, the prosecutor argued that either fact, combined mainly with uncontroverted facts in the record and inferences therefrom, would lead to a guilty verdict. This was not error. b. Defendant complains next that the prosecutor impermissibly relied twice on defendant’s prior convictions for murder, attempted murder, and assault with a firearm to argue his bad character and propensity to commit the offenses charged. We disagree with defendant’s characterization of the argument. One of the themes of the prosecutor’s opening summation was that defendant was a liar. To support that allegation, the prosecutor pointed out that defendant had lied to the police several times, that he had lied to his girlfriend, and that he had lied on the stand as to why he had lied to the police. Finally, the prosecutor relied on defendant’s prior convictions, which had been admitted for purposes