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Opinion ARABIAN, J. Defendant William Adolf Noguera was convicted by a jury of one count of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189; all statutory references are to this code except as indicated.) The jury also found that in committing the murder, defendant used dangerous and deadly weapons, namely, a martial arts tonfa and a wooden dowel (§ 12022, subd. (b)); it also found true a special circumstance allegation that the murder was committed for financial gain. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1).) Following a penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. We affirm the judgment. Facts I. Guilt Phase Evidence A. The murder of Jovita Navarro: the prosecution’s case. Sometime between 11:30 on the night of April 23, 1983, and 4:30 the following morning, Jovita Navarro was murdered in the bedroom of her La Habra bungalow. La Habra police found Jovita’s body after being summoned by a “911” call from Mindy Jackson, Jovita’s next-door neighbor. After securing the area, investigating officers went to the Jackson residence where they interviewed Dominique Navarro, Jovita’s 16-year-old daughter. Dominique told them she had returned from a date with her then-18-year-old boyfriend around 2:00 that morning; after chatting briefly with her mother, who was reading in bed, and removing her makeup, Dominique had gone to bed and to sleep. She was awakened a few hours later, she said, by muffled noises coming from her mother’s adjacent bedroom. After a few minutes, Dominique heard her mother cry out, “get out, mi hija (“hija” is Spanish for “daughter”), get out, mi hija.” Frightened, and unsure what was afoot in the darkened house, Dominique told Mindy Jackson that she sat at the end of her bed for “about 5 to 15 minutes,” before running blindly down the hall and out the back door. As she ran, she heard a “thumping” sound coming from her mother’s bedroom, followed by what sounded like the footsteps of someone close behind her. Reaching Mindy Jackson’s house, Dominique banged on the door until Jackson answered. In tears and near hysteria, according to Jackson, Dominique said that someone was hurting her mother; she begged Jackson to return to the house with her. Jackson refused. Instead, she managed to telephone 911. Authorities logged in the emergency call at 4:43 a.m. To the casual observer, the murder scene suggested that Jovita had been killed in the course of a combined rape and burglary. Her body was found lying across the bed, her feet touching the floor. Her nightgown had been pulled up around her neck, and a pair of blue women’s underpants was wadded between her thighs. The contents of the bedroom were in disorder— bedding and blankets had been pulled from the bed and thrown haphazardly on the floor; a jewelry box, normally resting on a dresser, was found upended on the hall floor, its contents of costume jewelry scattered along the hallway. Jovita had been badly beaten, mainly on the face and head. She had suffered extensive facial injuries, including dental and eye damage from at least 18 blows to the face and head; her skull had multiple depressed fractures and her scalp had been loosened and tom by the force of the beating; her nose almost touched her left cheek and “defensive wounds” were evident on her arms and hands. On her left thigh, examiners found oval shaped wounds. Blood was spattered on the walls, furniture, and ceiling of the bedroom. The pathologist who examined the body testified that the proximate cause of Jovita Navarro’s death was not the beating but asphyxiation—induced by pressing a rounded object against her throat with such force that her larynx was cmshed, choking off her airway. Extensive cyanosis, or blueing, of her lips and pinpoint hemorrhaging beneath her eyelids confirmed that Jovita had, in effect, been strangled. Had she not died from a lack of oxygen, the pathologist concluded, the severity of the beating would have resulted in her death. In the bedroom, La Habra police investigators found a “tonfa,” a martial arts weapon fashioned from red oak and resembling a police baton; it lay shattered in two pieces, testimony to the savagery of the beating. In a neighboring yard, police recovered a piece of wood shaped like a broom handle, with traces of blood on it. In another yard, they found a bloodstained tan leather glove; bloodstains were also found on a cinder block wall adjoining a nearby lot. The bloodstains on the tonfa, the wooden dowel, and the glove were the same type as Jovita’s. An analysis of fibers removed from the brick wall and the glove were consistent with those found on the bedroom blanket. La Habra and Orange County authorities began an extensive forensic investigation of the crime scene. As a result, investigators concluded that much of the evidence pointing to a burglary and rape/murder of Jovita had been faked. An autopsy failed to reveal the presence of sperm in Jovita’s vagina. An analysis of vaginal swabs was consistent with a finding that the victim might have had intercourse several hours earlier the preceding evening, but there was no external evidence of sexual trauma consistent with a forcible rape. Tests of the blue underwear for semen or other stains indicative of forcible sex were negative. Although the bedroom appeared to have been rifled, nothing of value was missing, including a clear plastic change purse stuffed with small bills that the intruder could not have overlooked. The jewelry box had been knocked from its place and its contents scattered, but none of the jewelry had been taken. An analysis of the blood-spattering pattern on the bed linen suggested that it had been removed from the bed and arranged on the floor after the murder, rather than during a struggle. Moreover, the spatter analysis indicated that Jovita had probably been murdered before the contents of the bedroom had been upended. Finally, investigators could find no evidence that Jovita’s killer had gained entry into the house by force. The on-scene criminalist, examining the body at 6:30 that morning, initially estimated the time of death at between three and six hours prior to his examination, or between 12:30 and 3:30 a.m. Although routine examinations for lividity and rigor mortis—two crude measures used to approximate time of death—confirmed that estimate, it was later revised upward, to 4:45 a.m., based on Dominique’s statement to the police that she had heard her mother cry out around 4:30 that morning. After conducting an autopsy on the morning of April 24, the examining pathologist concluded on the basis of the quantity and state of the contents of her stomach that Jovita died sometime between 12:30 and 2:30 that morning. Another criminalist, who observed the body at the autopsy, testified that the 4:45 a.m. time of death stated in the certificate of death was based on Dominique’s account of the murder. Although that hour was not substantially out of line with the results of the lividity and rigor tests, had it not been for Dominique’s statement the condition of the body suggested that death had occurred between three and seven hours earlier, or between 11:30 the preceding evening and 3:30 that morning. An inquiry into Jovita’s financial circumstances disclosed that she carried $13,000 in life insurance and at the time of her death had approximately $14,000 in accumulated retirement benefits from her job as an Orange County welfare clerk. The house, with a market value of around $90,000, had an existing mortgage balance of $7,000; Jovita carried mortgage insurance in the event of her death. Dominique was her sole heir. As their investigation deepened, police learned from interviews with Margaret Garcia, a coworker, and Mindy Jackson that relations between Jovita and Dominique’s boyfriend, the defendant, were not always pleasant. Jovita had quarrelled with both over Dominique’s repeated violations of curfew hours, over her pregnancy and subsequent abortion, and over what Jovita regarded as a steep decline in Dominique’s schoolwork and attendance beginning with the onset of her relationship with defendant. Garcia and Jackson both testified that Jovita was planning to sell the house and move to the beach, or to enlist Dominique in the Army, in an attempt to separate her from defendant. According to Garcia, Jovita had considered hiring a “hit man” to kill defendant. About two weeks before her death, Garcia said, Jovita told her that she had awakened in the middle of the night to find the front door open and all the outside lights off. Jovita found Dominique wandering the house; Dominique told her that she had opened the front door, but could not explain why. About two or three weeks before Jovita’s murder, Jackson had witnessed her screaming into the telephone and had seen Dominique in the bathroom crying. Jovita had slammed down the handset and said that she “hated” defendant and didn’t want to hear his name again. “If he [defendant] is going to use his karate on me, he has another thing coming,” Jackson reported Jovita as saying. Through interviews with Dominique and defendant, authorities learned that on the night of Jovita’s death the two had gone to a party in West Covina about 7:00. They left around 11:30 that evening, they told police, and went for a hamburger with a friend; after dropping their friend off, they parked for an hour or two, returning to Jovita’s house between 1:30 and 2:00 a.m. Dominique let herself in, locked the front door, opened a sliding glass door at the rear of the house in order to let the family dogs out, and turned off the outside lights. After chatting briefly with her mother, she went to bed. Defendant told police that after leaving Dominique’s house, he went home. Because he had missed the 1:30 curfew set by his mother, he had to knock on the front door to get in. His grandmother, who was watching television with his mother, let him in. After talking with them and being lectured by his mother about being late, he went to bed. La Habra police also interviewed Peter LaCombe, a diesel mechanic employed by the county who had been dating Jovita for about two weeks before her death. LaCombe had spent the evening of April 23 with Jovita at her house. The two ate a substantial dinner around 7:30 and then danced and watched television. Around 11:00 that evening, LaCombe testified, he left for home. From interviews with the adjoining neighbor, Mindy Jackson, police learned that Jackson and her husband had entertained a friend, Tom Brooks, on the night of the murder. All three had heard loud noises coming from the Navarro house around 11:00 p.m. Brooks testified that he had gone outside to investigate but had noticed nothing remarkable; the house was dark and the sliding glass door at the rear was closed. Later that night, they heard what Brooks described as “really radical noises” next door. The three had gone outside about 1:45 a.m. They heard Jovita’s two dogs barking and growling; there were no lights either outside or inside the Navarro house. Despite discrepancies in the accounts given by Dominique and defendant and others interviewed, and suspicions presented by the forensic analyses, police made no arrests in the case until late in the year. In December, the police inspector assigned to the investigation, Sergeant Keltner, received a tip from Steve Arce, an acquaintance of defendant, that Ricky Abram might have information relevant to the homicide investigation. Keltner interviewed Abram on December 14, 1983, at the lone Juvenile Detention Facility near Sacramento, where Abram was an inmate. He tape-recorded most of their conversation. In substance, Abram testified at trial that he decided to disclose his knowledge of the murder scheme after Keltner told him of his possible criminal liability for Jovita’s murder. Abram told the jury that in March 1983, a few weeks after he first met defendant, the two had driven in defendant’s car to pick up Dominique at her house. On the way over, defendant told Abram that he intended to kill Dominique’s mother. He asked for Abram’s help in borrowing a shotgun for that purpose. After picking up Dominique, the three drove to Bob’s Big Boy, a nearby restaurant. There, according to Abram, they discussed in detail defendant’s plan to murder Jovita. The murder, Abram testified, would be staged to look as if Jovita had been killed by a burglar in the middle of the night. Dominique’s role would be to let the two men into the house; Abram would fake the burglary and take any items of value; defendant would kill Jovita with a shotgun blast. Defendant and Dominique would then have intercourse, Abram said, after which Dominique, feigning a rape, would run hysterically next door to report the break-in and murder/rape. For his part in the crime, defendant promised Abram $5,000 from the $25,000 obtained from “the mother’s insurance.” In addition to his share of the insurance, Abram told the jury, defendant promised he could live in Jovita’s house with defendant and Dominique, since “the house would be passed on to the daughter after the mom’s death.” After leaving the restaurant and returning Dominique to her house, defendant dropped Abram off. In early April, Abram was arrested for auto theft, convicted and imprisoned. He testified that he did not see defendant or Dominique again until the trial, regarded the murder scheme as a “joke,” and did not learn of Jovita’s death until Keltner told him. Police interviews with others provided additional evidence of defendant’s involvement in the murder. Steve Arce told the jury of a fight he had with defendant around the Easter preceding Jovita’s death. Defendant had used his feet to quickly knock Arce to the ground. Arce had also seen tonfas in defendant’s car and had seen defendant spinning a tonfa in his hand. He had seen defendant wearing tan leather motorcycle gloves on occasion, and had seen him with Ricky Abram. He also related an incident about a month before Jovita’s death in which defendant kicked two individuals in a street encounter, knocking one of them to the ground in “thirty seconds maybe,” using martial arts techniques. A couple of weeks before the murder, Arce had heard defendant complain about Jovita’s interference in his relationship with Dominique; defendant had said that he wanted “to kill that bitch,” referring to Jovita. In the months following Jovita’s death, investigators learned, Dominique spoke frequently with defendant by telephone from an uncle’s house, where she was now living. Once, the uncle testified, he overheard Dominique complain after completing a call from defendant that she did not want to call the family attorney again; she was upset, her uncle said. The attorney, Dominique’s cousin, confirmed that Dominique made a growing number of telephone calls to him in the months following Jovita’s death; her questions centered on the disposition of the family home and details concerning the amount of Jovita’s insurance, the sums due creditors, and any surplus in the estate; Dominique was “very emphatic,” he testified, that she did not want the house to be sold. That June, the attorney attended a meeting with defendant, Ms mother, Domimque, and another lawyer at wMch the possibility of Domimque’s legal emancipation was discussed. In December 1983, authorities arrested Domimque and defendant. Charged with one count of conspiracy to commit murder and one count of first degree murder, Dominique was tried as a juvemle, convicted and sentenced to the custody of the Youth Authority; her conviction was affirmed on appeal. B. The defense case. Defendant testified in Ms defense. His relations with Jovita were “fair,” he said; sometimes they got along well, sometimes not. He had lived at the Navarro residence for a few months in 1982 with Jovita’s consent. The three regularly had dinner out about once a month. Defendant demed any involvement in Jovita’s death. He had talked to Ricky Abram once about selling Mm an automobile engine; they had gone to Bob’s Big Boy with Domimque. WMle they had lunch, Domimque had complained that her mother had restricted her for coming home late. He never saw Abram again. Defendant had studied martial arts as a young teenager, but had not earned a black belt and had no training in the use of a tonfa; nor had he ever owned one. He had been badly stabbed in the tMgh in a fight in June of 1982, still walked with a limp and had difficulty stretcMng one of Ms legs. He had never had any knowledge of Jovita’s life insurance. On the mght of Jovita’s murder, defendant testified, he had gone with Domimque to a party in West Covina. After a hamburger with a friend, the two had parked for awMle. He dropped Dominique off at her house around 2:00 that morning, went home and, after talking with Ms mother and grandmother, went to bed. About 3:30 a.m., he heard a knock on Ms window. It was Margaret Noone, a friend; he let her in and she stayed in bed with Mm for about an hour before leaving by the window. Around 6:00 a.m., Domimque had telephoned; she was very upset; defendant dressed and left immediately for her house. Defendant’s sister supported Ms testimony regarding the injury to Ms leg and the fact that he had never received traimng in or owned a tonfa. His grandmother confirmed that defendant had arrived home around 2:00 on the mormng of Jovita’s murder. Defendant’s mother testified that he returned home at exactly 2:00 on the mormng of April 24, 1983—she had been watcMng a program on Spanish television and remembered the time. She spoke to defendant briefly as to why he was late. Later that night, defendant’s mother heard the sound of voices in her son’s room. Through the door, she asked defendant who was there; he told her to go to sleep and later refused to tell her the identity of his visitor. Asked about the meeting with Dominique’s attorney in June of 1983, at which Dominique’s legal emancipation was discussed, Mrs. Noguera testified that she had earlier accompanied Dominique to the Social Security office in an effort to help her receive some benefits—she had been without any income in the five months since her mother’s death. A previous attorney had done nothing, and Dominique needed help. Margaret Noone testified that around 3:00 a.m. on April 24, 1983, she had climbed into the window of defendant’s bedroom and stayed for about one and one-half hours. She left when she heard someone knocking on the bedroom door. Two of defendant’s friends testified to prior conversations with Ricky Abram and Steve Arce. Wilbur Boring told the jury that in December of 1983, after he had implicated defendant in Jovita’s murder, Abram had told him that “he [defendant] got what he deserved; he put me in jail so I put him in jail.” Patrick Reese testified that Arce had told him that he cooperated with the police in exchange for immediate release on a felony charge; Arce had observed a pair of nunchuku sticks in defendant’s possession, not tonfas, and had told Reese that he (Arce) should not have told the police some of the things he told them. C. Rebuttal. The prosecution recalled Margaret Noone to the stand. She stated that, in testifying on behalf of defendant, she had “lied . . . [about] basically almost everything” because she “was getting threats if I didn’t say something like that [i.e., her alibi testimony] something would happen to me or my family because [defendant] has such powerful friends, even though he’s in jail.” She had seen nunchuku sticks in defendant’s car, and he liked to “mess around with them.” Noone told the jury that she had been granted immunity from prosecution by the People. In addition, the trial court took judicial notice that Dominique had been called as a witness by the prosecution, had refused to testify, and been adjudged in contempt of court. A deputy marshal testified that shortly after Dominique was held in contempt, he heard defendant say to another inmate that Dominique “did a good job and tell her I love her.” II. Penalty Phase Evidence A. The prosecution’s case. John Antenucci testified that in August 1983, he placed a newspaper advertisement to sell a used Volkswagen. Accompanied by a friend, defendant responded to the advertisement and expressed an interest in buying the automobile. The three went for a test drive, during which defendant stopped the car and told Antenucci to get out because his friend “has a gun.” Defendant’s friend displayed a handgun and threatened to shoot Antenucci, who managed to grab the car keys and escape. B. The defense case. Defendant called 15 witnesses, including a former employer, his high school girlfriend, and several friends of his family. Several witnesses testified that defendant’s family was very close until his parents were divorced in 1980. His mother testified that defendant, who had hunted, fished, and gone on motorcycle trips with his father, appeared to take the divorce hard; he became quieter, more serious, less playful. She asked the jury to spare her son’s life. Defendant’s sister and grandmother also asked the jury not to impose the death penalty. Several witnesses testified to defendant’s participation in the California Blue Jacket Cadette Corps, a youth organization modeled on the Navy. Junior high school authorities testified to his participation in such sports as basketball, track, softball, and football; elementary school employees testified that defendant’s parents had been involved actively in his schooling. Discussion I. Guilt Phase Issues A. Claims of evidentiary error. 1. Admission of victim’s hearsay statements. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence over objection—through the testimony of Mindy Jackson, a neighbor, and Margaret Garcia, a coworker of Jovita—several statements in which Jovita expressed both fear and a dislike amounting to hatred of defendant. If offered to prove that defendant was the killer, the statements obviously were relevant: they tended to prove that he had made threats of physical harm to Jovita in the past and, inferentially, that he carried them out on the night of April 23. For that purpose, however, the statements were hearsay and inadmissible unless authorized by a recognized exception. (Evid. Code, § 1200.) The People argue that, although hearsay, Jovita’s statements were admissible, not to prove their content (that is, that defendant in fact made such threats, thereby supporting the inference that he later carried them out), but for the limited purpose of establishing Jovita’s state of mind at or near the time she was murdered. Such a limited “state of mind” exception is authorized by Evidence Code section 1250, subdivision (a)(1), which provides in substance that, if not otherwise untrustworthy, hearsay statements reflecting an existing state of mind of the speaker are not inadmissible when limited to proof of the declarant’s state of mind. The People’s argument, however, overlooks an essential requirement of Evidence Code section 1250. Apart from a single anomaly, our cases approving the admission of hearsay statements under the exception codified in Evidence Code section 1250, subdivision (a)(1)—the state of mind exception—explicitly recognize the requirement that the declarant’s mental state be factually relevant; that is, that it be, in the words of the statute, “itself an issue in the action.” In People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 607-610 [244 Cal.Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854], for example, we held that the trial court’s admission of the hearsay testimony of three murder victims expressing their fear of the defendant was error because “neither the states of mind of these victims prior to their deaths . . . nor their acts or conduct. . . were an issue in the case which might have been resolved or assisted by the challenged evidence.” (Id. at p. 608.) “As our cases have made clear,” we said, “ ‘a victim’s out-of-court statements of fear of an accused are admissible under [Evidence Code] section 1250 only when the victim’s conduct in conformity with that fear is in dispute. Absent such dispute, the statements are irrelevant.’ ” (Ibid., quoting from People v. Armendariz (1984) 37 Cal.3d 573, 586 [209 Cal.Rptr. 664, 693 P.2d 243]; see also People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 103 [246 Cal.Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37]; People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1204 [249 Cal.Rptr. 71, 756 P.2d 795]; People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 529 [75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580, 40 A.L.R.3d 1323].) We went on to observe in People v. Ruiz, supra, 44 Cal.3d 589, that “a victim’s prior statements of fear are not admissible to prove the defendant’s conduct or motive (state of mind). If the rule were otherwise, such statements of prior fear or friction could be routinely admitted to show that the defendant had a motive to injure or kill.” (Id. at p. 609; italics in original.) The anomaly in our case law, People v. Merkouris (1959) 52 Cal.2d 672 [344 P.2d 1], upheld the admission of hearsay statements by two murder victims concerning threats against them by the defendant, offered to prove that the threats were carried out in the subsequent homicides. That holding, however, as we pointed out in People v. Ruiz, supra, 44 Cal.3d at page 609, was repudiated by the Legislature in 1965 (when it enacted subdivision (b) of Evidence Code section 1250) as one “ ‘based on a rationale that destroys the very foundation of the hearsay rule.’ ” Thus, hearsay statements of victims concerning fears of or threats against them by the accused, when offered to prove the conduct of the accused, are not within the exception to the hearsay rule embodied in Evidence Code section 1250. Here, neither Jovita’s state of mind nor her conduct was relevant to any part of the People’s case; nor did the defense raise any issue concerning her state of mind or behavior at or before the night she was murdered. The entire thrust of the defense case went to the identity of the killer and defendant’s alibi that he was attending a party miles away from the crime scene for much of the evening and spent the remainder of the night at home with his family. Jovita’s state of mind or conduct not being an issue in either the prosecution or defense case, her hearsay statements reflecting dislike and fear of defendant failed to satisfy the requirement that the declarant’s “state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation . . . [be] itself an issue in the action.” (Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (a)(1).) It was thus error for the trial court to admit them into evidence. (People v. Ruiz, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 609.) Although error, we conclude that the admission of Jovita’s hearsay statements does not require reversal. While much of its evidence—apart from the testimony of Ricky Abram and Steve Arce—was circumstantial, the prosecution presented a strong case supporting the conclusion that Jovita Navarro was murdered by defendant. Moreover, much of the testimony admitted as part of what defendant contends was “frustrated mother’s gossip” was heard by the jury through other witnesses—both defendant and Dominique admitted that his relations with Jovita were not always good, that she wanted Dominique to date others and was concerned about the decline in Dominique’s school work. Finally, the trial court gave the jury an instruction limiting the use it could make of the challenged hearsay testimony to Jovita’s state of mind—a limitation repeated by the prosecutor in his closing guilt phase argument to the jury. Despite the error, admission of the hearsay statements added little to a substantial case pointing to defendant’s guilt. For that reason also, we reject defendant’s claim that admission of Jovita’s hearsay statements violated his rights secured under the confrontation clauses of the federal and the California Constitutions. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) In light of the substantial evidence pointing to defendant’s guilt, we conclude that the error in admitting the challenged hearsay statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065].) 2. Admission of character evidence. Defendant next argues that it was error to admit, over a timely objection, Steve Arce’s testimony relating his fight with defendant (in which defendant used martial arts techniques), and a subsequent street fight (in which defendant again used martial arts techniques to quickly knock down one of his opponents). Arce’s testimony should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 1101, defendant argues, because it was nothing more than evidence of “prior bad acts,” in effect used by the prosecution to show that defendant was a “bad character,” who habitually used martial arts to beat up others. As relevant here, Evidence Code section 1101 provides that character evidence (whether shown by opinion, reputation, or conduct) is inadmissible to prove conduct on a specific occasion. Evidence of a crime or other acts is admissible, however, when relevant to prove a fact other than a disposition to commit such acts. Both sides acknowledge that defendant’s familiarity with martial arts was shown by other evidence. Indeed, defendant contends that the challenged testimony was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1101 because it was “merely cumulative” (People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 318 [165 Cal.Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883]). The People argue that Arce’s testimony concerning the martial arts incidents was directed at countering testimony of defendant and his sister, as well as statements by Dominique in the transcript of her police interview, that defendant had only limited use of his left leg since being stabbed in the thigh with a knife a year before Jovita’s murder and thus could not have used martial arts on Jovita. At trial, the prosecutor’s theory supporting the admissibility of Arce’s testimony was that it “puts [defendant’s] familiarity with martial arts very close to the [date of the] victim’s death.” At the prosecution’s request, the trial court gave a limiting instruction, telling the jury that the challenged martial arts testimony “was not offered to prove that the defendant is, in fact, a bad person, but as to the value it may have to you as to his knowledge of martial arts and skills therein.” In addition, at the close of the guilt phase, the trial court gave the jury a more extensive instruction similarly limiting the use of Arce’s martial arts testimony. The rationale offered by the prosecutor adequately identified an exception to the bar on admissibility imposed by Evidence Code section 1101. It is true that, as the defense points out, there was other evidence that defendant had studied and practiced martial arts. That evidence, however, was comparatively remote in time to the murder. The testimony of Arce placed defendant’s use of his martial arts skills—linked to the crime scene by the presence of the broken tonfa—to within one month of Jovita’s murder. In addition, the evidence was relevant to prove defendant’s identity as Jovita’s killer, an additional exception to the bar of section 1101. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) Under the circumstances, we conclude there was no error. 3. Admission of Dominique’s hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception. Next, defendant contends that certain statements of Dominique— made in the course of a police interview on the morning of April 24th, to Mindy Jackson on the same day, and to a private attorney several months later—were erroneously admitted into evidence under Evidence Code section 1223, the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, despite a defense objection. We conclude that, for the most part, the statements of Dominique were offered for a nonhearsay purpose, that is, to establish the existence of a conspiracy between Dominique and defendant by demonstrating that Dominique was lying to the police and to Mindy Jackson in the account she gave them of her role in Jovita’s murder. These statements were thus not subject to the strictures of Evidence Code section 1223. The remaining statements, relating to the existence of an “insurance conspiracy” between Dominique and defendant and made to her lawyer several months after the killing, were offered to prove the truth of the matter stated therein. However, although hearsay, they fell within the coconspirator exception of Evidence Code section 1223. The statements at issue consist of Dominique’s description of the events surrounding Jovita’s murder (e.g., her return home from her date with defendant, retiring only to be awakened by thumping sounds and her mother’s screams) made to Mindy Jackson on the morning of April 24; a tape recording of Dominique’s “hysterical” 911 call made about the same time; and statements made by Dominique to investigating officers the day after the murder, including a tape recording of a two-hour police interview that evening. In addition, questions asked by Dominique of her lawyer concerning the nature and value of the assets of Jovita’s estate and related matters, together with an uncle’s testimony concerning an overheard telephone conversation between Dominique and defendant, were admitted into evidence. It is plain from the record before us that the facially exculpatory statements made by Dominique to Mindy Jackson, the 911 operator, and the investigating officers were not offered by the prosecution to prove the truth of their content. Rather, they were offered to help demonstrate to the trier of fact the existence of a preconceived plan by defendant and Dominique to murder Jovita and plant a false trail of evidence indicating a burglary and rape gone awry. Given that evidentiary role, the nonhearsay statements were not subject to the independent corroboration requirements of Evidence Code section 1223. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) The remaining statements of Dominique challenged by defendant as inadmissible under the coconspirator exception were offered by the prosecution to prove the truth of their content. If credited, they suggest to the trier of fact that the alliance between defendant and Dominique encompassed not only Jovita’s murder, but receipt of the assets of her estate, including her house, life insurance, and pension income. Given the prosecution’s theory of the case, embracing successive but interdependent objectives, the precise evidentiary issue with respect to Dominique’s statements to her lawyer and in the telephone conversation with defendant is whether there was evidence sufficient to support a prima facie finding of a so-called “insurance conspiracy” (People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 436 [124 Cal.Rptr. 752, 541 P.2d 296]) independent of the challenged declarations. We conclude that there was such evidence in the testimony of Ricky Abram. If credited by the trier of fact, Abram’s testimony established the existence of a plan among the three conspirators to murder Jovita, and subsequently to divide the proceeds of her estate and reside together in the Navarro household. Abram’s testimony alone was sufficient to establish the three preliminary facts necessary for the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception, that is, that Dominique was participating in the conspiracy at the time she made the statements, that her declarations were in furtherance of the conspiracy, and that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy at the time the declarations offered against him were made. Although made months after Jovita’s death, Dominique’s statements to her attorney, occurred at a time when the ultimate objective of the conspiracy—securing the life insurance proceeds and the house—had yet to be achieved. (People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 139 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781]; People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195,1231 [283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163]; People v. Leach, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 430-431, fn. 10; People v. Saling (1972) 7 Cal.3d 844 [103 Cal.Rptr. 698, 500 P.2d 610].) Finally, because Dominique’s statements fell within an exception to the hearsay rule that is “firmly . . . rooted in our jurisprudence,” no independent inquiry into their reliability need be undertaken for purposes of satisfying the confrontation clause of the federal Constitution. (Bourjaily v. United States (1987) 483 U.S. 171, 183 [97 L.Ed.2d 144, 157, 107 S.Ct. 2775]; see also People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th 86, 151; People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1231; People v. Brawley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 277, 286-291 [82 Cal.Rptr. 161, 461 P.2d 361].) We therefore reject defendant’s claim to the contrary. 4. Admission of Dominique’s hearsay declarations regarding her use of makeup. Over a defense objection, the trial judge permitted Mindy Jackson to relate to the jury a statement made to her by Dominique “two or three months” before Jovita’s murder to the effect that Dominique maintained a good complexion by removing her makeup every night before going to bed. On the basis of that statement, combined with observations of Jackson and a responding officer that Dominique had makeup running down her tear-stained face when interviewed early on the morning of April 24, the prosecution was able to argue to the jury that Dominique’s account of Jovita’s murder (i.e., that she was awakened by sounds from her mother’s bedroom) was fabricated. Defendant contends that the only possible basis for admitting Dominique’s hearsay declarations concerning her nightly practice of removing her makeup is the coconspirator exception of Evidence Code section 1223. However, defendant argues, the statement fails to satisfy the requirement that it be made “in furtherance of the objective of [the] conspiracy.” (Evid. Code, § 1223, subd. (a).) Moreover, defendant argues, the erroneous admission of Dominique’s hearsay statements was seriously prejudicial. In his closing argument, the prosecutor repeatedly referred to the fact that Dominique was wearing makeup when she appeared at Mindy Jackson’s house the morning after the murder, and the jury asked during the course of its deliberations to review Jackson’s testimony. We agree that the challenged hearsay statement did not qualify for admission under the coconspirator exception of Evidence Code section 1223, the basis specifically relied upon by both the prosecution and by the trial court in admitting it. Lacking any apparent connection with the plan to murder Jovita as alleged by the prosecution, the statement could not have been in furtherance of the conspiracy, as required by subdivision (a) of the statute. Defendant’s claim that admission of the challenged statement regarding Dominique’s makeup habits was “seriously prejudicial” to his defense is substantially undercut, however, by similar evidence in the record which is not challenged, and by the cumulative—indeed, minor—role the contested hearsay statement likely played in the jury’s deliberations. Evidence was admitted in the form of a transcript of a tape recording of Dominique’s interview with the investigating officers on the day following Jovita’s murder in which she stated that, before going to bed on the night of the murder, she had removed her makeup or “most of it.” Moreover, as noted, both Mindy Jackson and Officer Rees testified that Dominique was wearing makeup on the morning of April 24. Jackson testified that Dominique wore “heavy makeup,” a fact she regarded as “unusual”; Rees testified that Dominique’s face was “streaked” with makeup. It was this disparate evidence of Dominique’s use of makeup on the morning of April 24 that the prosecution relied on in its closing argument, including, it is true, the hearsay statement of Dominique’s makeup habits erroneously admitted by the trial court. The latter testimony, however, constituted only a small part of the entire evidence on the makeup point, the bulk of which was unchallenged. Likewise, the jury’s mid-deliberation request for a transcript of Mindy Jackson’s testimony was part of a request for transcripts of the testimony of Peter LaCombe and Tom Brooks. With respect to Jackson’s testimony, the jury asked specifically for extracts concerning “observations of Dominique when she came to the [Jackson’s] front door.” In context, the request suggests that the jury was interested in reviewing much of the testimony surrounding the events of the night of April 23-24, including Dominique’s appearance when she knocked on Mindy Jackson’s door that morning, rather than the erroneously admitted hearsay statement regarding Dominique’s nightly practice of removing her makeup. Given the early hour, and Dominique’s testimony that she had been awakened from sleep by the sounds of a struggle, it is likely that a reasonable juror would be more impressed with the fact that Dominique was wearing makeup at all, rather than by the contested “habit” evidence that she always removed her cosmetics before going to bed. We conclude, therefore, that although not admissible under the coconspirator exception, it is not reasonably probable that defendant would have obtained a more favorable result had Dominique’s hearsay statement not been admitted. B. Accomplice issues. 1. Admission of Ricky Abram’s prior consistent statement. In his cross-examination of Ricky Abram, defense counsel suggested that the witness had a motive to fabricate his testimony because of his prior confinement under California Youth Authority jurisdiction, subsequent arrests following his California Youth Authority discharge, and an expectation of benefits in exchange for his favorable testimony against defendant. On redirect examination, the trial court permitted the prosecution, over objection, to introduce into evidence a tape recording and transcript of the December 1983 interview between Abram and Sergeant Keltner. In all substantial respects, the interview corroborated Abram’s trial testimony regarding the origin and details of the conspiracy to murder Jovita. It thus tended to reinforce in the jurors’ minds the impression that Abram was truthful. Defendant contends that the tape recording and transcript of Abram’s interview with Keltner were inadmissible as a prior consistent statement under Evidence Code section 791 because they failed to meet the requirement that the statement be made “before the bias, motive for fabrication, or other improper motive is alleged to have arisen.” (Evid. Code, § 791, subd. (b).) Here, the defendant’s claim is that any improper motive Abram might have had arose at the time of the interview with Keltner and thus that, in the words of the codifiers of the Evidence Code, “the logical thrust of the [prior consistent statement] is lost.” (See Cal.Law Revision Com. com. to Evid. Code § 791, subd. (b), 29B West’s Ann. Evid. Code (1966 ed.) § 791, p. 373.) Defendant relies on People v. Coleman (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1159 [80 Cal.Rptr. 920, 459 P.2d 248], a capital case in which we held it was error to admit, under the prior consistent statement exception, hearsay declarations made by a crime partner of the accused to his wife and father. The People, seizing on the specific nature of the questions concerning a motive to fabricate his testimony asked Abram on cross-examination, rely on our statements in People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200 [260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285], and People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d 1189, that “ ‘[t]he mere asking of questions [by the defense] may raise an implied charge of improper motive . . .’ ” (49 Cal.3d at p. 210, quoting 45 Cal.3d at p. 1209), thus invoking the exception of Evidence Code section 791, subdivision (b). We addressed this precise question in People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577 [276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376]. There, the defendant argued that it was error to admit into evidence a prior consistent statement by a prosecution witness offered to rehabilitate his testimony because the witness was on probation at the time of the statement and otherwise had motives to fabricate. We framed the issue presented by these circumstances as being “whether, when a witness’s testimony may have been influenced by multiple biases or motives to fabricate, a prior consistent statement is admissible if made before the existence of any one or more of the alleged biases or motives to fabricate or only if made before the existence of all such biases and motives.” (52 Cal.3d at p. 609, italics in original.) In resolving the issue in People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d 577, we cited and relied on People v. Andrews, supra, 49 Cal.3d 200, 210-211, and summarized Andrews as deciding, “in effect, that a prior consistent statement is admissible if it was made before the existence of any one or more of the biases or motives that, according to the opposing party’s express or implied charge, may have influenced the witness’s testimony. [Citations.]” (52 Cal.3d at p. 609.) Our statement of the issue and the controlling legal rule in People v. Hayes, supra, focuses on the governing inquiry in administering Evidence Code section 791, namely, that a prior consistent statement is admissible as long as the statement is made before the existence of any one of the motives that the opposing party expressly or impliedly suggests may have influenced the witness’s testimony. Here, the thrust of defense counsel’s cross-examination of Ricky Abram sought to explore, in light of his cooperation in testifying against defendant, the existence and nature of any agreements with law enforcement authorities to obtain early parole or assistance in the favorable disposition of multiple criminal charges brought against him after the December 1983 interview with Keltner. Although defendant argues that Abram had a motive to minimize his potential penal liability as soon as Keltner told him that he was liable criminally as a coconspirator, as People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d 577, makes clear, the focus under Evidence Code section 791 is the specific agreement or other inducement suggested by cross-examination as supporting the witness’s improper motive. Indeed, that is the distinction the court seems to have had in mind wheri we wrote, in People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d at page 1209, that “[t]he mere asking of questions may raise an implied charge of an improper motive. . . ,” and thus invoke Evidence Code section 791. (See also People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1229 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210] [People v. Andrews, supra, 49 Cal.3d 200, applied where a defendant’s cross-examination of his crime partner concerning possible modification of his sentence in exchange for testimony “yielded a compelling additional Incentive to lie.”]; People v. Coleman, supra, 71 Cal.2d 1159; People v. Duvall (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 417 [68 Cal.Rptr. 708].) 2. Instructions concerning corroboration of accomplice testimony. The trial court gave the jury both CALJIC No. 2.27 (testimony of a single witness is sufficient for the proof of any fact) and CALJIC No. 3.11 (accomplice testimony must be corroborated in order to convict). Defendant contends that the two instructions are contradictory and in combination confused the jury, permitting defendant to be convicted on the basis of Ricky Abram’s uncorroborated testimony alone. We have encountered this claim repeatedly since our initial consideration of it in People v. Chavez (1985) 39 Cal.3d 823, 829-832 [218 Cal.Rptr. 49, 705 P.2d 372], In Chavez, we concluded that “we must look to the entire charge, rather than merely one part, to determine whether error occurred. [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 830.) We have since refined the test formulated in Chavez to encompass determinations whether the jury “is instructed on the kind of evidence necessary to constitute corroboration, on the method of determining whether the accomplice’s testimony was corroborated, on viewing the accomplice’s testimony with distrust, and [whether] the parties proceed[ed] on the premise that corroboration is required.” (People v. Andrews, supra, 49 Cal.3d 200, 217.) Where these criteria are met, there is no error. (People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1313 [248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221]; People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207,241 [253 Cal.Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906].) Applying these criteria to the record in this case leads us to reject defendant’s claim. Although the trial judge read the jury an unmodified version of CALJIC No. 2.27, the “single witness” instruction, together with the accomplice corroboration requirement of CALJIC No. 3.11, he also gave the jurors the full array of accomplice instructions, including the definition of an accomplice (CALJIC No. 3.10), the nature and sufficiency of corroborative evidence (CALJIC No. 3.12), the rule that one accomplice may not be corroborated by another (CALJIC No. 3.13), the necessity of criminal intent (CALJIC No. 3.14), and the requirement that accomplice testimony be viewed with “distrust” (CALJIC No. 3.18). In addition, it is clear from a review of the trial transcript that counsel for both the People and defendant proceeded throughout the trial on the assumption that Abram was an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration. Thus here, as in People v. Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1313, and People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d 207, 241, we conclude that nothing in the combined instructions suggested to the jurors that corroboration of Abram’s testimony was not required: “A reasonable juror would have recognized CALJIC No. 2.27 as setting forth the general rule and the charge on accomplice testimony as an exception to it. [Citations.] Nothing before us indicates that the jurors may have acted otherwise.” (People v. Andrews, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 217.) Given our conclusion that there was no instructional error, defendant’s additional claim under this rubric—that the quality of Abram’s uncorroborated testimony was so unreliable as to offend federal Sixth Amendment jury trial and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights—loses its underpinning. Although Abram’s testimony had its frailties, they were not concealed from exposure and consideration by the jury or from attack by defense counsel. Moreover, because there was no error in giving the jury the combined single witness and accomplice corroboration charges, there is no basis upon which to conclude that the jurors relied solely on the uncorroborated testimony of Abram to convict defendant. In a variant on his federal Sixth Amendment claim, defendant contends that Ricky Abram’s credibility was so slender a reed upon which to base the finding of a financial gain special circumstance that it violates the federal Eighth Amendment. He points to Abram’s defects as a witness—the circumstances under which he agreed to testify for the prosecution, the fallibility of his memory, his reference to testifying from a “script,” the trial judge’s remark, in the presence of the jury, that Abram had “difficulty in remembering,” his serious emotional problems, prior felonies, and admission that he had lied to the police in the past. Drawing an analogy between these testimonial defects and the dangers presented by the forecasts of future violence by a psychopharmacologist which we held inadmissible in the penalty phase in People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 767-774 [175 Cal.Rptr. 738, 631 P.2d 446], defendant concludes that the jury’s finding that the special circumstance was true on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of Abram cannot be allowed to stand. We reject the argument for two reasons. First, its underpinning assumes a predicate that we have just rejected, namely, that the jury was confused by the accomplice and single witness instructions given by the trial court into believing that Abram’s testimony did not require corroboration. Second, although founded in part on the inherent unreliability of psychiatric predictions of future violence, our ruling in People v. Murtishaw, supra, 29 Cal.3d 733, rested as much on the incurably prejudicial impact on a penalty jury of “ ‘affirmative assertion[s] by an apparently well-qualified professional . . . .’” (Id. at p. 773.) “One can imagine few matters more prejudicial at the penalty trial,” we said, “than testimony from an established and credentialed expert that defendant, if sentenced to life without possibility of parole, would be likely to kill again.” (Ibid.) This “ ‘mystic infallibility in the eyes of the jury’ ” (People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 32 [130 Cal.Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240]) that often envelopes quasi-scientific testimony was not, of course, present in this instance, where the jury was, we reiterate, fully capable of judging Abram’s credibility. 3. Instructions concerning withdrawal from conspiracy. Defendant raises the related claim that it was error to instruct the jury on the law governing the termination of penal liability by withdrawing from a conspiracy. Specifically, the trial court read the jury both CALJIC No. 3.02 (conditions for aider and abettor withdrawal) and CALJIC No. 6.20 (coconspirator withdrawal). Defendant reasons that because there was no evidence that Abram communicated a desire to withdraw from the conspiracy and because both instructions require the accessory or coconspirator to communicate the fact of withdrawal to the other parties in order to validly terminate penal liability, giving the jury the challenged instructions somehow confused them, permitting the (improper) conclusion that Abram had ceased to be an accomplice. His testimony, in that event, need not have been evaluated with skepticism or corroborated. We are unpersuaded. Abram’s status as a jail inmate at the time of Jovita’s murder reasonably raised the issue of the effect of his incarceration on his accomplice liability. In effect, the contested instructions informed the jurors that withdrawal required something more than impossibility, that is, required Abram to communicate his withdrawal to his coconspirators. We see nothing erroneous or prejudicial in such a result, especially since the effect of the challenged instructions was to favor a finding that Abram was an accomplice, and thus to require—as the jury was instructed—that his testimony be evaluated skeptically as well as corroborated. In any event, the basic thrust of Abram’s testimony was corroborated by forensic evidence gathered at the crime scene. Jovita appeared to have been killed in the dead of night by an assailant bent on burglary and rape; her daughter fled screaming from the house to report the murder. In gross outline, the manner in which Jovita’s murder was accomplished tracked the plan discussed by the three at Bob’s Big Boy as related by Abram in his testimony. 4. Instructions concerning the reasonable doubt standard. Defendant’s final claim of instructional error is that in giving the jury the standard pattern instructions on reasonable doubt and circumstantial evidence, the trial court committed Cage error (Cage v. Louisiana (1990) 498 U.S. 39 [112 L.Ed.2d 339, 111 S.Ct. 328] (per curiam) [hereafter Cage]). In Cage, the jury was instructed that it must acquit if it had a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. “Reasonable doubt,” however, was defined as a doubt “founded upon a real tangible substantial basis and not upon mere caprice and conjecture.” (Id., at p. 40 [112 L.Ed.2d at p. 342].) Concluding that the challenged instruction “equated a reasonable doubt with a ‘grave uncertainty’ ” and thus might have altered the constitutional standard for penal liability to “ ‘a moral certainty’ that the defendant was guilty” (ibid.), the high court reversed the conviction. By parity of reasoning, defendant argues that a like analysis applies to the pattern reasonable doubt instructions given the jury in this case. He points out that CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.02, 2.21 and 2.27—standard instructions on the relationship between circumstantial evidence and reasonable doubt, all of which were given in this case—direct the jury to make findings using reasonable factual interpretations over those that require unreasonable interpretations. The asserted error was compounded, defendant argues, by the prosecutor’s argument in closing that the jurors should adopt a reasonable interpretation of the evidence. Finally, defendant contends that the directory character of the instructions operated as a mandatory conclusive presumption of guilt. In People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334 [279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009], we rejected a claim analogous in all respects to the one made here. There we pointed out that the vice of the instruction condemned in Cage, supra, 498 U.S. 39, consisted in the “transformation of true reasonable doubt, as it has been traditionally defined, into a higher degree of doubt [required to acquit].” (53 Cal.3d at p. 386.) No such possibility was presented to the jury in this case, however, where the trial court’s use of standardized, pattern instructions included the language of CALJIC No. 2.90. That instruction defines a “reasonable doubt” as one that leaves “the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say that they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge.” Unadorned “moral certainty” of defendant’s guilt was thus the measure given the jury in this case; there was no Cage-like dilution of the standard required to convict. (People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 386; see also People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1235 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1].) Likewise, we reject as we did in Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at page 386, the claim that jurors, charged to choose reasonable interpretations of circumstantial evidence over unreasonable interpretations, would interpret such instructions “to permit a criminal conviction where the evidence shows defendant was ‘apparently’ guilty, yet not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.) The same is true of defendant’s claim that the standard reasonable doubt instructions regarding circumstantial evidence are in effect irrebutable presumptions of guilt. “Read in context, the instructions merely require the jury to reject unreasonable interpretations of the evidence, and to accept the reasonable version of the events which fits the evidence.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 943 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212].) C. Challenge to special circumstance instruction regarding proof of “financial gain.” Defendant’s single claim of error under this rubric has four parts. Fixing on the dual character of the motive alleged by the prosecution for Jovita’s murder—eliminating the chief obstacle to the relationship between defendant and Dominique and acquiring the principal assets of her estate—defendant argues that the failure of the standard CALJIC instruction to require the jury to find that the financial gain motive was (variously) a “dominant," “substantial," or “significant” motive for the murder violated the federal Eighth Amendment requirement that capital offenses be narrowly defined to encompass the limited class of crimes that morally justify imposition of the death penalty. (See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) 481 U.S. 279, 305 [95 L.Ed.2d 262, 286, 107 S.Ct. 1756].) Second, defendant contends that our opinion in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], striking the special circumstance of murder in the commission of a robbery, requires reversal of the conviction here. In Green, the evidence showed that defendant had taken certain items from the murder victim, both immediately before and after killing her, for the purpose of concealing her identity and obstructing his detection. We held that the jury’s finding that the robbery special circumstance was true could not stand under such facts, where “the defendant’s intent [was] not to steal but to kill and the robbery [was] merely incidental to the murder.” (Id. at p. 61.) Third, defendant claims that under People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375 [243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279], the trial court should have instructed the jury