Full opinion text
Opinion CHIN, J. Defendant Joseph Avila was convicted of the first degree murders of Raul Moneada and Robert Navarro, and the attempted murder, of David Montoya. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189, 664.) The jury also found true the multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation, and allegations that the murders and attempted murder were willful, deliberate, and premeditated, defendant inflicted great bodily injury on Montoya, and defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon, i.e., a knife, in each crime. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3); former § 664, subd. (1), now § 664, subd. (a); § 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), (23); § 12022, subd. (b); former § 12022.7, now § 12022.7, subd. (a).) It returned a death verdict, and the trial court entered a judgment of death. This appeal is automatic. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11; Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment. I. Factual Background A. Guilt Phase 1. Prosecution Evidence In the early morning hours of Saturday, January 12, 1991, a group of friends including Raul Moneada, Robert (“Bobby”) Navarro, David Montoya, Jeffrey Winn, Anthony Padilla, Manuel Moreno, Luis Robledo, Lawrence (“Larry”) Casas, Anthony (“Tony”) Pereira, and Ronald Cordova, were socializing in a parking lot in Riverside after cruising on Magnolia Boulevard. They were unarmed, and had not consumed drugs or alcohol. Pereira and Casas were talking with three young women they had met that evening, Evelyn Quintana, Pauline Mesa, and Joanie Olsen. Testimony from various eyewitnesses to the events at issue, including Montoya, Winn, Padilla, Moreno, Robledo, and Casas, and the testimony and prior statements of Quintana and Mesa, established the following. A dark-colored vehicle, identified by Moreno and Mesa as an Impala, pulled into the parking lot. Defendant and one or two other men got out and walked toward the group of friends. The men told at least two of the women to get in the car. The women refused to leave, and defendant became irate. Padilla heard Pereira say “Carmelos,” which Padilla did not recognize, but assumed was a gang name. Defendant said “Crown Town” or “Corona.” Pereira and Montoya briefly argued with defendant, and someone from defendant’s group suggested they go “one-on-one.” Montoya said defendant was free to take the women, and said “[t]here’s no big problem here.” The confrontation appeared to dissipate, and Montoya and his friends started toward their vehicles. At some point toward the end of the confrontation, defendant broke off from the group and went to Magnolia Boulevard. Moreno testified he saw defendant reach inside the Impala, and “grab something.” Moreno and several other witnesses also observed defendant flag down someone in a different vehicle on the street. That vehicle entered the parking lot, and defendant reached inside it. He then ran behind bushes toward a Honda Prelude in which Montoya was sitting. Defendant was carrying a large knife with an approximately six-inch blade. Montoya started to roll up the passenger window. Defendant grabbed the top of the window, shattering it. Defendant stabbed at Montoya more than 20 times, cutting Montoya’s bicep in half, and cutting his leg. Montoya lay in the driver’s seat, kicking, with his feet out the window. When defendant ran behind the Prelude, Montoya escaped out the passenger window, fearing that defendant would attack him from the driver’s side of the vehicle. Defendant then ran to Moneada’s red Ford Escort. Defendant stabbed Moneada, who was standing outside the vehicle, in the heart, killing him. He tried to open the door to Casas’ vehicle, but it was locked, and the window closed. Defendant proceeded to the next vehicle, a black truck in which Navarro was sitting in the driver’s seat. He stabbed Navarro in the heart through the open truck window, killing him. Defendant was apprehended more than four years later on September 19, 1995, at the Los Angeles International Airport. Two to three hours after the attacks, Mesa, Quintana, and Olsen were separately interviewed by police. The interviews were tape-recorded and at trial played for the jury. Mesa told police she saw “Joey” stab all three victims, Quintana said “Joey” broke “Manuel’s” car window and tried to “stab the guy that got stabbed in the arm,” and Olsen said “Joey” was the only one with a knife. Police showed the women a photograph of defendant; they each identified defendant as “Joey.” At trial, Montoya identified defendant as his assailant, and Padilla testified defendant was the person who went to the passenger side of the Prelude, and who attacked Moneada. Padilla, and Senior Investigator Clark from the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office, testified that Padilla identified defendant in a pretrial photographic lineup. The examining pathologist testified that stab wounds on Moneada and Navarro were consistent with a knife that was approximately five inches in length and one inch wide. Both murder victims had defensive wounds, and toxicology analysis of their blood did not show the presence of either alcohol or drugs. 2. Defense Evidence Defendant presented no evidence. B. Penalty Phase 1. Prosecution Evidence Guillermo Gonzalez Valencia testified that he befriended defendant, whom he knew as “Jose,” in Mexico. Gonzalez drove a tractor-trailer truck. One evening at the end of December 1992, defendant was at Gonzalez’s house, and started to roll a marijuana cigarette. Gonzalez asked him to leave. The next day, at around midnight, Gonzalez heard a noise outside his home. When he investigated, he saw defendant and another man running away. The tires on Gonzalez’s tractor-trailer had been punctured. About six days after this incident, Gonzalez and his friend Guillermo Lopez Reynoza encountered defendant outside a church. Gonzalez asked defendant why he had cut Gonzalez’s tires, and asked him to pay for the damage. Defendant refused. Gonzalez and defendant agreed they did not want to fight. Defendant took out a pencil from his back pocket. As he did so, Gonzalez said, “I didn’t come to fight.” Defendant reassured Gonzalez it was only a pencil. Defendant then discarded the pencil, pulled out a four-to-six-inch knife, and stabbed Gonzalez and Lopez. Gonzalez was hospitalized for about 10 days, required surgery to repair his spleen, and was unable to work for three months. Lopez was hospitalized for nearly two months, and was unable to work for about four months. Navarro’s parents and sister testified regarding his altruism, gregariousness, and mechanical ability. Moneada’s mother, sister, and cousin testified regarding his kindness, maturity, and artistic talent, and his eager anticipation of leaving on a mission for The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints later that year. Montoya testified regarding the effect the murders had on him and the victims’ other friends. 2. Defense Evidence Rosalinda Recendez Corona, defendant’s mother, testified that defendant was bom July 12, 1969, when Rosalinda was about 22. She had four sons, the oldest of whom was murdered after the capital crime. Rosalinda confessed she had not been affectionate with defendant and lacked parenting skills. She beat her children “like animals” in order to discipline them. Rosalinda worked several jobs in order to support the family. Relatives assisted in raising her children. Defendant’s father, Edward Avila, was often incarcerated, and the relationship between defendant’s parents ended after three years. Edward beat Rosalinda, and “probably” did so when she was pregnant with defendant. The family moved frequently until defendant was about four years old. When defendant was about four years old, he was caught in the axle of a vehicle and dragged down the street. He was braised all over his body, but had no serious injuries. Also when defendant was about four years old, Rosalinda began a relationship, and at some point had a son, with Manuel Diaz. For several years, Diaz lived with Rosalinda and her family. Diaz used heroin, beat Rosalinda, and was incarcerated more than once. He had no relationship with defendant. Rosalinda’s relationship with Diaz ended in the late 1970’s or early 1980’s. When defendant was about five or six years old, his father Edward began visiting him and taking him to amusement parks and other locations. When defendant was about seven years old, Rosalinda met and eventually married Michael Corona. This relationship lasted approximately 10 years. Michael used and sold heroin, and was not affectionate to defendant. In 1982, when defendant was in junior high school, Rosalinda had a son with Raymond Salgado. Salgado used heroin and studied the occult, including Satanism. Once after an argument between Rosalinda and Salgado, Salgado told defendant and his brother that if their mother did not come home, he was going to kill himself. Salgado began cutting his arm with a knife. The boys became hysterical, and ran to the location where their mother was staying. Rosalinda called police, who removed Salgado in a straightjacket. The boys helped Rosalinda clean up the pieces of flesh and blood, On another occasion, Salgado slit his stomach open in front of the boys. Rosalinda was not certain, however, whether defendant witnessed this event. Although Rosalinda obtained a restraining order against Salgado, he continued to “torment[]” them, causing Rosalinda to move her children from Madero to Corona. Rosalinda suffered from nervous breakdowns and used prescription sedatives and stimulants before and after defendant was bom. In the 1980’s, when her doctor ceased prescribing these medications, she became addicted to heroin for about five years. She also used cocaine and methadone. She became unable to work, and sold heroin and cocaine to support her habit. In 1983 or 1984, when defendant was about 15, she was incarcerated for 14 months for a dmg-related offense. After she was released, she began using drugs again. Rosalinda did not know with whom defendant lived while she was incarcerated. In 1990, Rosalinda became paralyzed, and was then able to end her dmg addiction. Defendant had no unusual medical conditions or learning disabilities growing up. Rosalinda testified he was a good child. She had no recollection of how he performed in school. It was “[tjotally out of his character to be violent.” Rosalinda loved defendant and wanted him to live. Defendant also presented the testimony of individuals he met in Mexico. Juanito Aguirre and his mother, Emilia Dedios, testified about defendant’s kindness toward him. Juanito had cerebral paralysis, and was confined to a wheelchair. Defendant cooked meals for him, and took him out to eat and for walks in the park or downtown. Juanito testified that defendant was “like a brother to me.” Defendant did not tell Juanito he was in Mexico to avoid apprehension for murder. Jose Gregorio Jimenez Quintero testified that defendant worked for him in Mexico for approximately one month on a remodeling project for the military. Defendant was one of the best workers Jose ever had, and was respected by his coworkers. Defendant also was generous with Jose and others. In 1993, Julian Jimenez Villa was the director of a rehabilitation center in Mazatlan. Defendant participated in a voluntary rehabilitation program in which he committed to “find Christ” and try to change who he was. After three months, Julian saw a change in defendant. He assisted newcomers to the center, studied scripture, and discussed his spiritual experience with people living on the street. Defendant became a counselor at the center, and performed well in this position. Julian did not know defendant was hiding in Mexico because he was wanted for two murders in the United States. Maria Louisa Carajal Moreles knew defendant when he was active in the church connected with the Mazatlan rehabilitation center. Defendant gave Maria’s mother hope that her own son, Maria’s brother, would change and stop using drugs. Maria’s brother did change, and was now an attorney. 3. Rebuttal Evidence Frank Lira testified he was housed in the same area as defendant in the Riverside County jail from 1995 through 1997. Defendant and several others physically assaulted other inmates; on one occasion they beat another inmate and took his commissary card. Once, after defendant and others had beaten an inmate, defendant told Lira he “just had to relieve some stress.” II. Discussion A. Guilt Phase Issues 1. Denial of Keenan Counsel and Removal of Counsel Defendant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to appoint Keenan counsel, refusing to grant a reasonable continuance, and removing his counsel of choice, in violation of various constitutional rights. (Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424, 430 [180 Cal.Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108] [trial court has discretion under statutes governing appointment of counsel to appoint a second defense attorney to assist in defense of a capital case].) We disagree. a. Factual background The capital crimes occurred on January 12, 1991. Defendant was apprehended on September 19, 1995, and initially represented by the Riverside County Public Defender. On June 21, 1996, after receiving numerous continuances of the preliminary hearing, the public defender declared a conflict, and was removed as counsel. The criminal defense panel was appointed, and the case was assigned to John Aquilina. The preliminary hearing was held on October 24, 1996, and defendant was arraigned in superior court on December 19, 1996. In December 1997, the parties agreed on an April 6, 1998 trial date, and trial was set for that date. On March 5, 1998, Aquilina informed the court that he was not ready to proceed to trial. He explained that he was assigned to two other cases, one of which, Hartsch, was ready to proceed to trial, and the other, Lee, nearly ready. Aquilina stated that earlier that week, the criminal defense panel had attempted to reassign the case to a different attorney who was more available, but that “fell through the cracks.” The prosecutor strongly objected to both “protracted delay” of the trial date past May 1998, and reassignment of the case to different counsel. He noted that he had grave concerns about the availability of one of his witnesses, a victim’s parent, who had cancer. He also noted that the case had previously been assigned to different counsel. Aquilina stated that “the reason for the attempt to re-assign this matter was to speed up the case, not to delay matters.” The court responded that its “experience, unfortunately, has been that when that happens, it usually has the opposite effect.” At a subsequent hearing, the trial date was moved to April 13, 1998. On April 7, 1998, defendant filed a motion to continue the trial to a date after May 1, 1999, or more than eight years after the capital crimes occurred. (§ 1050.) In a declaration filed in support of the motion, counsel declared that based on his lack of investigation and preparation, he would not be ready for trial for at least 12 months. His efforts to obtain second counsel, or to have the case reassigned to counsel who would be ready for trial before May 1999, had been unsuccessful. At the April 9, 1998 hearing on the motion to continue, Aquilina stated that the prosecutor only recently had started to object to defense requests for a continuance or insist that the matter proceed to trial. He also said that he organized his capital caseload by working on each case in the order in which it was assigned to him. He received the assignment in Hartsch first, Lee second, and this case third, and had worked on them in that order. He found it “impossible to work on more than one and one-half of these capital cases at any one time.” As a result, he had “devoted [his] full attention to the Hartsch matter, partial attention to the Lee matter, and very little, if any, attention to the Avila matter.” He suggested that if the court wanted to discuss the Avila investigation with him, that discussion should occur in camera. The hearing continued in open court. The court inquired how long a delay would occur if the case was assigned to someone else on the criminal defense panel. Aquilina stated that it was his understanding that each panel attorney was already assigned at least two capital cases set for trial. He further noted that this caseload made it difficult for the attorneys to act as second counsel for each other’s cases. He said that if he were able to devote his full-time attention to defendant’s case, it was “possible that the matter might be able to proceed to trial later this year.” The court acknowledged Aquilina was busy. It also stated that “the People have a point.... [Yjou’re representing to me here . . . [that] you can’t even begin to think about getting ready for this case until you’ve taken care of, in large measure, those other two cases; that you need at least a year, on top of all the time you’ve already had, and on top of the public defender’s rather large amount of time before they were relieved. . . . [T]hese crimes occurred in 1991.” While defendant’s absence from the jurisdiction contributed to the delay, the court stated it nevertheless had to consider the date of the crimes when “evaluating the problems that the People encounter and the victim’s family’s issues.” The court stated that it needed to know if there was anyone on the panel who could work on the case right away, and how soon that person would be ready. The court was concerned that “if we find somebody else to take over for you, it will make it go even longer than if we left it in your hands . . . Aquilina responded, and the court agreed, that the delay “also obviously affects the defendant.” The court then heard from Mr. Finn, who apparently assisted in running the criminal defense panel. Finn described the panel’s staffing and workload challenges, and then stated: “[T]he answer to the Court is simply, no, not within our current people and within our current budget can we reassign this case.” After further colloquy between the court and Finn, the court stated, “From what you’re telling me, I essentially only have two options here. I leave it with Mr. Aquilina and give him something approaching the time he says he wants, or we relieve Mr. Aquilina and appoint private counsel.” The court stated that if private counsel were appointed, it had “no idea whether they can be ready any sooner than Mr. Aquilina can be. If we leave him on the case, at least he has the advantage of familiarity with the case and the defendant. . . .” The court subsequently stated that it needed to find out if anyone was available to take over the case “and be ready any faster than Mr. Aquilina can. And I need to find that out before I can make a decision.” The prosecutor stated that the delay was “working a great injustice” to the victims’ families, and that it was “incumbent upon the Court to . . . find competent counsel.” He noted defendant’s case was not “complicated,” and mentioned other cases in which counsel had been obtained outside the criminal defense panel. After further argument by the prosecutor, and by the apparent prosecutor in the Hartsch case, Aquilina observed that one factor for the court to consider in determining whether to change counsel was “whether the defendant consents to a change of counsel or objects.” The court inquired of defendant whether he would like the court to relieve Aquilina and attempt to find someone who could get to trial faster, or retain Aquilina, “hoping he can get to trial as fast as he can in light of his heavy caseload of complex homicides and death penalty cases.” Defendant answered, “I would like to keep Mr. Aquilina.” The court asked, “Even if it means going for a year or more waiting to get to trial?” Defendant said, “Yes.” The court inquired of Aquilina whether appointment of second counsel would assist him in getting to trial any faster. Aquilina responded, “Obviously second counsel would help.” The court said, “Let’s assume for argument’s sake that you had a second attorney to assist you on this case, not because it’s a complex case, but in order to assist you to get it to trial faster. . . . [Ajssuming the case was prepared and ready with Keenan counsel, what’s the earliest you could be available?” Aquilina responded, “[W]ith one proviso, I believe January [1999], because the Lee matter . . . would probably go some time in November or December. Although yesterday I heard Lee may not go until January.” Aquilina anticipated Hartsch would be tried in July 1998. Aquilina stressed that while he would be physically available to try defendant’s case, he did not know “of any defense counsel that has tried three capital cases in a 12-month period,” and he was disinclined to be the first to do so. The court then inquired whether if Hartsch was tried in July 1998, and Lee tried in January 1999, Aquilina could, with “extra help,” be ready to try defendant’s case between these trials, by October 1998. Aquilina responded, “[I]t’s possible.” The court vacated the April 13, 1998 trial date, and the matter was put over so the court could research what attorneys might be available. On April 13, 1998, the trial court made findings on the record. In particular, it found that Aquilina “has had a reasonable time to prepare the case, and that due to his . . . heavy caseload and matters beyond his control, he’s functionally unavailable to try the case, under Penal Code [s]ection 987.05. So as soon as private counsel can be found, I’m going to ask Mr. Aquilina to turn over all his discovery to new counsel” and return any public funds received for preparation of the case. Aquilina did not object. The court noted that a new attorney had not yet been located and scheduled a hearing in two days. At the April 15, 1998 hearing, the court informed the parties that Bruce Cormicle was available to take the case and give it “top priority.” The court requested Aquilina bring all of his discovery to a hearing on April 17, 1998. Aquilina agreed, and again made no objection to the replacement of counsel. On April 17, 1998, Cormicle appeared, confirmed he was available, and stated he anticipated he would be ready for trial in less than 13 months. Aquilina was relieved and turned over his discovery, again without objection. b. Analysis Defendant contends that Aquilina “was removed over the objection of both Mr. Aquilina and [defendant] on the request of the prosecutor when Mr. Aquilina requested a five-month continuance with the assistance of Keenan counsel or a 12-month continuance if he tried the case alone.” As the above factual recitation demonstrates, while defendant stated he would rather keep Aquilina and delay trial than obtain new counsel and go to trial more quickly, no objection was made either when the court found that Aquilina should be removed, or when he was actually removed. Moreover, contrary to defendant’s assertion, Aquilina never moved for Keenan counsel. Under section 987, subdivision (d), the court may appoint a second attorney in a capital case “upon a written request of the first attorney appointed. The request shall be supported by an affidavit of the first attorney setting forth in detail the reasons why a second attorney should be appointed.” No such written request was made in this case. Nor did Aquilina orally request second counsel. Rather, the possibility of Keenan counsel was simply discussed by Aquilina and the court as one option to accelerate the trial date. Indeed, Aquilina stressed to the court that while he might be physically available sooner with the appointment of Keenan counsel, he knew of no one who had tried three capital cases in a 12-month period, and he was disinclined to be the first. Hence, because Aquilina did not request Keenan counsel, the trial court never ruled on such a request. Nor, contrary to defendant’s assertion, did the trial court err in denying Aquilina’s request for a continuance of at least 12 months, and removing him as defense counsel. “ ‘A court may remove appointed counsel both to “prevent substantial impairment of court proceedings” [citation] and when counsel, without good cause, does not become ready for trial (§ 987.05).’ (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1188 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811] . . . .) A trial court’s removal of appointed counsel for an indigent defendant is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1119 [81 Cal.Rptr.3d 614, 189 P.3d 880].) We find no abuse of discretion. Under section 987.05, “[i]n cases where counsel, after making representations that he or she will be ready for . . . trial, and without good cause is not ready on the date set, the court may relieve counsel from the case . . . .” Here, the parties agreed on an April 6, 1998 trial date, an agreement that implied counsel expected to be ready on that date. Section 987.05 further provides that in establishing a reasonable time to prepare for trial, a trial court “shall not consider counsel’s convenience, counsel’s calendar conflicts, or counsel’s other business.” It seems appropriate to similarly exclude these factors in determining whether counsel has shown good cause for his lack of readiness for trial. Here, the only reason cited by Aquilina for his lack of readiness in April 1998, and need for a minimum 12-month continuance, was his competing capital caseload. The trial court also properly removed counsel to prevent substantial impairment of the court proceedings. (People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1188.) The capital crimes occurred in January 1991, defendant was not apprehended until September 1995 because he fled the jurisdiction, the public defender who first represented defendant sought continuances of the preliminary hearing for nearly a year before being conflicted out, and Aquilina, once appointed, did little work on the case for nearly two years, and then sought to delay trial for at least another year. Indeed, Aquilina sought to continue the trial to a date “after May 1, 1999.” Aquilina thus gave no assurance he would be prepared for trial on May 2, 1999, but rather only represented that he would be ready at some indeterminate point after a year had passed. In addition, a prosecution witness was battling cancer. While defendant expressed a preference for retaining Aquilina, that factor is not dispositive. (People v. Mungia, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1124.) The “ ‘essential aim “is to guarantee ‘an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) Nor, contrary to defendant’s assertion, did the trial court err in failing to hold an in camera hearing on Aquilina’s defense investigation. While Aquilina stated he did not feel comfortable discussing the details of the defense investigation in open court, he never requested a hearing. Nor was one necessary. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, Aquilina never “made an offer of proof that a thorough investigation was underway.” Rather, counsel represented that, following the preliminary hearing, he had done little work on the case and would not be ready for trial for over a year because of competing capital case assignments. These were the pertinent facts the trial court considered in determining whether to remove Aquilina. Defendant asserts he “is aware of no other capital case where defense counsel was removed over the objection of both defense counsel and the defendant on the motion of the prosecutor.” As noted above, there was no objection, and defendant’s stated preference for Aquilina was not dispositive in determining whether defense counsel should be removed. Finally, defendant claims judicial bias in the court’s comments and removal of Aquilina. We have rejected defendant’s claims the trial court erred in failing to appoint Keenan counsel and in removing Aquilina as defense counsel, and our review of the court’s challenged comments reveals no error, riet alone evidence of bias. Moreover, “a trial court’s numerous rulings against a party—even when erroneous—do not establish a charge of judicial bias, especially when they are subject to review.” (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321].) Defendant fails to demonstrate any judicial misconduct or bias, let alone misconduct or bias that was “so prejudicial that it deprived defendant of ‘ “a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.” ’ ” (Ibid.) 2. Denial of Motion to Exclude Identification Evidence Defendant claims that Montoya’s and Padilla’s pretrial and in-court identifications were tainted by unduly suggestive procedures in violation of his right to due process and a fair trial. Not so. a. Factual background On June 14, 1996, Investigator Clark met separately with Padilla and Montoya. In recorded interviews, he discussed at length the events on January 12, 1991. At the end of each interview, he showed them two photographic lineups. Lineup one contained defendant’s photograph in the number two position. Padilla identified defendant, and Montoya selected two photographs from lineup one, one of which was defendant, and two photographs from lineup two. At a hearing on defendant’s motion to exclude Montoya’s and Padilla’s identifications of defendant at trial, Montoya, Padilla, and Investigator Clark testified. As relevant here, Padilla testified that he gave police a description of the assailant the morning after the attacks. He was not sure if he had been shown any photographs at that time, but thought “maybe a series of photographs.” He was not sure, but did not think he had identified possible suspects from the photographs. He did not recall to whom he spoke or whether the person was wearing a uniform, and could not describe the person, except to identify him as “male.” Padilla testified he was also shown photographs at his apartment by Clark about a year or two before his current testimony. Padilla was shown about 12 photographs in two groups of six. He identified one suspect, and was “pretty certain” of his identification. Clark testified that he had only shown photographs to Montoya and Padilla on June 14, 1996. He had never heard “before today” that Padilla had been shown photographs on January 13 or 14, 1991. Clark had both Montoya and Padilla read and sign the admonition form when he gave them the lineups to review. Defense counsel argued without elaboration that the lineup was unduly suggestive because defendant’s photograph was “distinctive as compared to and contrasted to the other individuals.” As an “additional basis,” defense counsel asserted that Padilla was apparently shown photographs of possible suspects soon after the crimes, and these photographs were not preserved “in any fashion.” Counsel therefore argued that Padilla’s trial identification should be excluded on due process grounds. The prosecutor said that the People were unaware of any photographs that were shown to Padilla the night of the capital crimes or on January 14, 1991. He “had no reports reflecting that type of an interview, nor have I been made aware of any photo lineups that were ever shown to Mr. Padilla.” The trial court found the lineups were not unduly suggestive given defendant’s photograph was “very, very similar to [photographs] two through six” on lineup one. It observed that defense counsel had not identified as suggestive any particular characteristic of the lineup, and the court saw none. It therefore denied the motion on that ground. The court also found, based on the transcripts of the interviews and the hearing testimony, that Investigator Clark did nothing to suggest any photograph to either witness. Rather, Clark had the witnesses read the standard admonition, and merely orally confirmed their identifications once made. Finally, the court found that Padilla’s identification in 1996 was not tainted because there was no evidence that Padilla was shown defendant’s photograph soon after the 1991 incident and failed to make an identification. The court left open the possibility defendant could raise the issue again if evidence were found, but stated, “I don’t think the possibility that he was shown a series of photographs that he now can’t recall, and in any event he doesn’t think he made a[n] identification, is sufficient to taint the subsequent photo lineup or any” in-court identification. b. Analysis “Due process requires the exclusion of identification testimony only if the identification procedures used were unnecessarily suggestive and, if so, the resulting identification was also unreliable.” (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 123 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166].) The question is not whether there were differences between the lineup participants, but “whether anything caused defendant to ‘stand out’ from the others in a way that would suggest the witness should select him.” (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 367 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708].) We independently review “a trial court’s ruling that a pretrial identification procedure was not unduly suggestive.” (People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 609 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 160, 115 P.3d 472].) On appeal, defendant once again points to no particular characteristic of the participants in the photo lineups that he contends made the lineups impermissibly suggestive. Nor does our independent review of the lineups reveal any suggestion of “ ‘the identity of the person suspected by the police.’ ” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 413 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442].) Rather, defendant contends Clark asked Montoya and Padilla leading questions. Our review of the transcripts reveals no such suggestiveness in Clark’s inquiries. Both Montoya and Padilla were first admonished in writing that they were “under no obligation to identify anyone from th[e] photographic lineup,” and “the mere fact that the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office is showing these photographs in no way means that a photograph of the person(s) responsible for the crime is/are present.” Clark then told each witness that the person’s appearance on the night of the incident might be different from the photograph, asked Padilla if he “recognized anybody,” and asked Montoya if he saw the perpetrator. He then confirmed which photographs they selected. Defendant further contends the lineups were unduly suggestive because the identifications occurred more than five and one-half years after the capital crimes. While this fact goes to the reliability of the identification, it does not affect a determination whether the lineup was unduly suggestive. (People v. Kennedy, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 608.) Because we have concluded the lineup was not unduly suggestive, we need not consider whether it was reliable under the totality of the circumstances. (Ibid.) Defendant also contends that the identification procedure was unduly suggestive because, while law enforcement may not have told Padilla and Montoya that they had evidence defendant committed the crimes, or that defendant was in custody, “the only reasonable inference is that something about the case had changed after over five years of inaction” on the part of police. Of course, “[a]nyone asked to view a lineup would naturally assume the police had a suspect.” (People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 368.) This circumstance does not render the lineup unduly suggestive. (Ibid.) Defendant contends that Montoya’s preliminary hearing testimony, which occurred several months after the photographic lineup, demonstrates the identification process was unduly suggestive. In particular, defendant claims Montoya testified he was shown photographs of defendant by the district attorney at the time the preliminary hearing was formerly scheduled to be held, and was then postponed, and that Montoya believed he identified defendant in those photographs. This assertion misstates the record. Montoya actually testified that the first time he saw defendant after the capital crimes “was the first preliminary hearing that should have been in June or July.” There was no testimony about viewing photographs at this earlier proceeding. Rather, Montoya testified that in June 1996, Investigator Clark showed him photographs. Montoya recalled that after viewing the photographs, he saw defendant in court. Defendant further contends the trial court improperly required the defense to prove the lineup evidence was tainted. Defendant does bear the burden of demonstrating the identification procedure was unduly suggestive. (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1164 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 117 P.3d 476]; People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 413; People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1222 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210].) In addition, and also contrary to defendant’s claim, Padilla did not testify that he was shown photographs on the night of the crime and could not identify defendant. Rather, Padilla said he was not certain whether he was shown photographs and, while he was unsure, did not think he had identified anyone. Investigator Clark testified he was unaware Padilla had ever been shown photographs in January 1991. Defendant further contends without elaboration that because several prospective jurors and Pauline Mesa were exposed to pretrial publicity, trial counsel was ineffective in failing to “renew his motion to exclude the eye-witness identification once he was clearly aware of the pre-trial publicity without inquiring as to whether a photograph was published in any of these articles.” While his claim is not entirely clear, to the extent he claims Montoya and Padilla might have seen a media photograph of defendant before the photographic lineup, he cites nothing in the record that would support this assertion, nor how this factor would affect our determination that the lineup itself was not unduly suggestive. For these same reasons, he fails to demonstrate any basis on which to conclude trial counsel was ineffective in failing to renew the motion to exclude Montoya’s and Padilla’s identifications of defendant following Mesa’s trial testimony. Defendant contends that the trial court demonstrated judicial bias by (1) asking Clark whether he read the admonition to Montoya and Padilla or asked them to read it to themselves, but not asking questions that assisted defendant, such as why the prosecution waited more than five years to conduct the lineup, why only Montoya and Padilla were asked to participate, and whether the witnesses were exposed to any pretrial publicity; and (2) “trusting] the prosecutor’s unsworn testimony over Padilla’s sworn testimony that he had been previously shown photographs of a suspect and was unable to make an identification.” Not so. The court acted properly in asking for clarification regarding the admonition procedure, which was ambiguous in the transcript of Clark’s interview with Padilla. In addition, the questions defendant now claims the trial court should also have asked were irrelevant to a determination of whether the identification procedure was unduly suggestive. We have rejected above defendant’s claim that there was any definitive testimony that Padilla was shown photographs by law enforcement in January 1991, and failed to identify a suspect. Once again, a “trial court’s numerous rulings against a party—even when erroneous—do not establish a charge of judicial bias, especially when they are subject to review.” (People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1112.) Defendant fails to demonstrate any judicial misconduct or bias, let alone misconduct or bias that “was so prejudicial that it deprived defendant of ‘ “a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.” ’ ” (Ibid.) 3. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Intent to Kill Montoya Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence he intended to kill Montoya, requiring reversal of his attempted murder conviction. Not so. “When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27 [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 323, 190 P.3d 664].) We determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 99 S.Ct. 2781].) In so doing, a reviewing court “presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68].) “This standard applies whether direct or circumstantial evidence is involved.” (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 139 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357].) “[I]t is well settled that intent to kill or express malice, the mental state required to convict a defendant of attempted murder, may ... be inferred from the defendant’s acts and the circumstances of the crime.” (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741 [37 Cal.Rptr.3d 163, 124 P.3d 730].) Here, defendant repeatedly attempted to stab Montoya, an unarmed and trapped victim, and succeeded in stabbing him in the arm and leg. This evidence alone is substantial evidence of defendant’s intent to kill. (People v. Gonzalez (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1552 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 124] [intent to kill demonstrated in part by evidence of unprovoked attack that rendered unarmed victim prone and defenseless as the defendant repeatedly stabbed him].) In addition, defendant then fatally stabbed Moneada and Navarro, who were members of Montoya’s group, inflicting wounds that were, respectively, approximately four and five inches deep and that penetrated their hearts. (See People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 561 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931] [“defendant could have had no other intent than to kill” when he plunged the knife deeply into a “vital area of the body of an apparently unsuspecting and defenseless victim”]; see also People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1253 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543, 156 P.3d 1015] [similarities between murders support the inference that defendant went to the victim’s home “armed with a knife and with the intent to kill”].) The jury convicted defendant of first degree murder for these deaths based on a theory of premeditation, and reasonably could have inferred defendant had the same intent to kill when, immediately prior to the murders, he attacked Montoya in the same manner. Defendant asserts that the evidence of intent to kill is not substantial because the injury to Montoya was not serious. Of course, the degree of the resulting injury is not dispositive of defendant’s intent. Indeed, a defendant may properly be convicted of attempted murder when no injury results. (See People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 135-136 [92 Cal.Rptr.3d 362, 205 P.3d 272].) The jury reasonably could infer that Montoya avoided further injury solely because he assumed a position from which he could kick at defendant and thus protect his vital organs from immediate injury. (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1552 [that the defendant missed the victim’s “heart and lungs was fortuitous rather than indicative of the absence of an intent to kill”]; People v. Lashley (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 945 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 629] [that “the victim may have escaped death” due to “poor marksmanship” does not vitiate intent to kill].) Defendant also contends “there was a reasonable alternative explanation other than the intent to kill,” because he may have merely wanted to “prevent Moreno from driving away with Quintana,” or perhaps simply was “following through with Montoya’s acceptance of a challenge to engage him in a fight.” It is not clear how these motivations would be inconsistent with an intent to kill. (People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 162 [if “jury found defendant’s use of a lethal weapon with lethal force was purposeful, an intent to kill could be inferred, even if the act was done without advance consideration and only to eliminate a momentary obstacle or annoyance”].) Even assuming they are inconsistent with such intent, “if the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 143 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988].) 4. Sufficiency of the Evidence Defendant Stabbed Navarro Defendant contends the record contains insufficient evidence he stabbed Navarro, necessitating that we vacate his murder conviction and the multiple-murder special-circumstance finding. The conviction was supported by substantial evidence. In her January 12, 1991 taped statement to police, which was played for the jury, Pauline Mesa recounted seeing defendant, with whom she was acquainted, stab a man in a truck. The victim in the truck was Navarro. Lawrence Casas testified that “the guy,” identified by other witnesses as defendant, approached Navarro’s truck in which Navarro was sitting in the driver’s seat with his window open. Defendant was carrying a knife with a blade at least six inches long. Casas saw defendant reach into Navarro’s window or doorway and struggle “back and forth.” Luis Robledo testified that he also saw the assailant, who was the same person who attacked Montoya and Moneada, and who was identified by others as defendant, go towards the truck after attacking Moneada. Robledo saw defendant make stabbing motions at Navarro through the open truck window. This testimony constitutes substantial evidence that defendant stabbed Navarro. Absent exceptions not pertinent here, “the testimony of a single witness is sufficient for the proof of any fact.” (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1030 [77 Cal.Rptr.3d 163, 183 P.3d 1146]; see People v. Najera (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1132, 1136-1137 [77 Cal.Rptr.3d 605, 184 P.3d 732].) Contrary to defendant’s implication, lighting conditions on the night of the crimes, inconsistencies within certain testimony or with prior statements, differences between the witnesses’ estimates of defendant’s height and his actual height, and whether defendant could physically complete the crimes in the time and manner described by certain witnesses, were matters for the jury to determine. 5. Instructional Issues a. Requested instructions on voluntary manslaughter, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and the effect of provocation on defendant’s premeditation and deliberation Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses of murder and attempted murder, and failing to instruct that provocation was a circumstance reducing first degree murder to second degree murder. We find no error. The jury was instructed that, in order to find defendant guilty of premeditated first degree murder or premeditated attempted murder, it must find an intent to kill on the part of defendant that “was the result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been formed upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation.” (CALJIC Nos. 8.20, 8.67.) It was also instructed that “cold, calculated judgment and decision may be arrived at in a short period of time, but a mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not deliberation and premeditation.” (CALJIC Nos. 8.20, 8.67.) Second degree murder was defined as “the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought when the perpetrator intended unlawfully to kill a human being but the evidence is insufficient to prove deliberation and premeditation.” (CALJIC No. 8.30.) The jury was also instructed on assault with a deadly weapon as to Montoya. The court refused to instruct on voluntary manslaughter and related principles, including CALJIC Nos. 8.40 (defining voluntary manslaughter), 8.42 (defining a sudden quarrel or heat of passion and provocation), 8.43 (the effect of a cooling period), 8.44 (no particular emotion alone constitutes heat of passion), 8.50 (distinguishing murder and manslaughter), 8.72 (defendant given the benefit of any reasonable doubt on whether the crime was murder or manslaughter), and 8.73 (jury may consider whether evidence of provocation not sufficient to reduce the homicide to manslaughter had any bearing on whether defendant killed with premeditation and deliberation). (§ 192.) “ ‘The trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on all general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence, whether or not the defendant makes a formal request.’ ” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 866 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135].) “Conversely, even on request, the court ‘has no duty to instruct on any lesser offense unless there is substantial evidence to support such instruction.’ ” (People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1215.) This substantial evidence requirement is not satisfied by “ ‘any evidence ... no matter how weak,’ ” but rather by evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable persons could conclude “that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed.” (People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 664 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 126, 187 P.3d 970].) “On appeal, we review independently the question whether the trial court failed to instruct on a lesser included offense.” (People v. Cole, supra, at p. 1215.) 1. Failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter “Manslaughter, an unlawful killing without malice, is a lesser included offense of murder.” (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1086 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335]; see § 192.) “Although section 192, subdivision (a), refers to ‘sudden quarrel or heat of passion,’ the factor which distinguishes the ‘heat of passion’ form of voluntary manslaughter from murder is provocation.” (People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 59 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 971 P.2d 1001]; see People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 461 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 512, 2 P.3d 1066] [certain mitigating circumstances will “reduce an intentional, unlawful killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter ‘by negating the element of malice’ ” (italics omitted)].) “The provocation which incites the defendant to homicidal conduct in the heat of passion must be caused by the victim [citation], or be conduct reasonably believed by the defendant to have been engaged in by the victim.” (People v. Lee, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 59.) “[T]he victim must taunt the defendant or otherwise initiate the provocation.” (People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1306 [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 190 P.3d 616]; see People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 583-584 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 123 P.3d 614] (Manriquez).) The “ ‘heat of passion must be such a passion as would naturally be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person under the given facts and circumstances ....’” (People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1252 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225] (Steele).) “ ‘[I]f sufficient time has elapsed for the passions of an ordinarily reasonable person to cool, the killing is murder, not manslaughter.’ ” (People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 868 [277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906].) Here, there is no substantial evidence of provocation. The record indicates that the victims and their friends, who were not armed, were socializing in a parking lot, and that two of the friends, Pereira and Casas, were talking with three young women, Quintana, Mesa, and Olsen. A dark-colored vehicle pulled into the parking lot. Defendant and one or two other men got out and walked toward the group of friends. The men told at least two of the women to get in the car. The women refused to leave, and defendant became irate. Padilla heard Pereira say “Carmelos,” which Padilla did not recognize, but assumed was a gang name. Defendant said “Crown Town” or “Corona.” Pereira and Montoya briefly argued with defendant, and someone from defendant’s group suggested they go “one-on-one.” Montoya said defendant was free to take the women, and said “[t]here’s no big problem here.” The confrontation appeared to dissipate, and Montoya and his friends started toward their vehicles. None of these events was sufficient “to arouse feelings of homicidal rage or passion in an ordinarily reasonable person.” (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 250 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643].) Defendant asserts, however, that there was sufficient evidence of provocation to warrant instruction on voluntary manslaughter because Pereira was the first one to confront defendant, making the victims and their friends the initial aggressors. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, Padilla did not so testify. Rather, Padilla testified that as defendant and one or two others started walking toward everyone in the group of friends, Pereira “was the first one to confront them or talk to them.” This is not evidence Pereira was initially aggressive. Defendant also relies on Padilla’s testimony that Pereira yelled out “Carmelos.” Padilla had “no idea” what this term meant, but assumed it was “a gang ... or something like that.” Even assuming it was reference to a gang, and that a gang member might have perceived the statement as some sort of a challenge, the requisite provocation must be one that would provoke an ordinarily reasonable person. (Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1252.) Reasonable people do not become homicidally enraged when hearing the term “Carmelos,” even if it is understood as a fleeting gang reference or challenge. Also contrary to defendant’s assertion, there is no evidence that during this verbal confrontation, blows were exchanged. Defendant asserts that victim “Montoya personally agreed to fight the Corona men.” He relies on Casas’ testimony that one person from defendant’s group said “they wanted to fight. . . one-on-one with one of us, . . . which one of ’em was man enough to fight him.” Casas could not “remember for sure,” but thought perhaps Montoya had responded, “[A]ll right, you know, if you want.” Again, even assuming this response was made, it is scarcely a comment that would reasonably incite homicidal rage. Defendant also asserts that Olsen testified “there was a fight which began that could have included a fist fight prior to the stabbing.” Olsen was asked whether, while the conversation between the two groups occurred, anyone got “into a fight where they were punching each other.” She responded, “[I]t could have been ... I can’t actually say that I seen this person do anything, because I did not actually see anybody do anything.” This is not evidence of physical contact. In sum, there was no substantial evidence of provocation to support voluntary manslaughter or attempted voluntary manslaughter instructions, and defendant’s request for such instructions was therefore properly denied. Nor, contrary to defendant’s assertion, was the jury forced into an “all or nothing” choice between murder and acquittal when the court refused to instruct on voluntary manslaughter. (See Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 637 [65 L.Ed.2d 392, 100 S.Ct. 2382]; People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 103 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 507, 105 P.3d 1099].) “[N]o fundamental unfairness or loss of verdict reliability results from the lack of instructions on a lesser included offense that is unsupported by any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could rely.” (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 141 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 212, 91 P.3d 164].) Moreover, the jury was instructed on second degree murder, and accordingly had a choice in evaluating defendant’s culpability. (Schad v. Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. 624, 646-648 [115 L.Ed.2d 555, 111 S.Ct. 2491] [second degree murder instruction sufficient to ensure verdict’s reliability]; People v. Benavides, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 103.) 2. Provocation as reducing the degree of murder instructions In a related claim, defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on CALJIC Nos. 8.73 and 8.44, and that this error, combined with the prosecutor’s misleading argument, was prejudicial. As noted above, CALJIC No. 8.73 would have informed the jury that it could consider whether evidence of provocation not sufficient to reduce the homicide to manslaughter had any bearing on whether defendant killed with premeditation and deliberation. CALJIC No. 8.44 provides that “the heat of passion referred to in the law of manslaughter” is composed of no particular emotion. There was no error in refusing to give these instructions. We have previously held, in a case that like this one lacked substantial evidence of provocation, that the court was not required to sua sponte instruct in the language of CALJIC No. 8.73. (Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1250-1251.) “Although the court did not use the word ‘provocation’ in regard to the degree of murder, it did instruct on ‘heat of passion.’ It told the jury that for the killing to be first degree murder, it must not have been committed ‘under a sudden heat of passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation.’ (CALJIC No. 8.20.) By specifically referring to heat of passion and generally referring to any other condition precluding deliberation, the court fully instructed on the law relevant to the actual evidence. It did not also have to refer to ‘provocation’ regarding the degree of murder, which would not have fit the evidence.” (Id. at p. 1251.) For these reasons, there was no error in failing to instruct in the language of CALJIC No. 8.73 on request or, as defendant suggests, to give this instruction as modified by deleting the reference to manslaughter. (Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1251 [rejecting claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request CALJIC No. 8.73].) Similarly, because there was no substantial evidence defendant committed manslaughter, the trial court properly refused to instruct in the language of CALJIC No. 8.44, which refers to “the law of manslaughter.” While defendant notes here that CALJIC No. 8.44 could have been modified to refer to “the law of premeditation, as defined in CALJIC No. 8.20,” rather than to manslaughter, he did not request this modification below, and the claim is therefore forfeited. (See People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 757 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754].) Moreover, such a modified instruction was not necessary because, as noted above, the language of CALJIC No 8.20 adequately instructed the jury. (Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1251.) Defendant contends the trial court evidenced bias by refusing instructions on voluntary manslaughter and instructions that would have allowed the jury to convict defendant of second degree rather than first degree murder. Because the trial court properly declined to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, and adequately instructed on heat of passion as it related to defendant’s premeditation and deliberation, no error, let alone bias, is demonstrated. b. Instruction on lying in wait Defendant claims the trial court erred and demonstrated its bias when it instructed the jury on lying in wait as a basis for a finding of first degree murder. The prosecutor proceeded on two theories of first degree murder, lying in wait and premeditated murder. The jury was instructed that if it found defendant guilty of first degree murder, and was unanimous on a theory or theories of murder, it was to specify on the verdict forms which theory or theories it chose. As to both victims, the jury expressly found the murders were willf