Full opinion text
Opinion WERDEGAR, J. A jury convicted defendant Richard Cameron Gamache of first degree murder with robbery, burglary, and kidnapping special circumstances, as well as various lesser crimes, for the 1992 abduction and killing of Lee Williams. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189, 190.2, former subd. (a)(i), (ii) & (vii), now subd. (a)(17)(A), (B) & (G).) It thereafter returned a death verdict. On automatic appeal, we affirm the judgment as to Gamache’s death sentence, but reverse in part to allow the trial court to correct error in Gamache’s determinate sentences for his noncapital crimes. Factual and Procedural Background In November 1992, Richard Gamache, then 18 years old, was discharged from the Army. He returned to San Bernardino County, where his estranged wife, Tammy, lived. After he reconciled with his wife, they moved in with a minor friend, Thomas R, in Yermo while planning what to do next. Tammy Gamache had studied animal husbandry and loved horses, so the Gamaches decided to acquire horses and go to Washington to camp in the wilderness. Tammy Gamache had once lived next door to a Yermo couple, Lee and Peggy Williams, who owned horses; she told Richard Gamache about them. Guilt Phase Trial Prosecution Evidence Around December 1, 1992, Tammy Gamache talked with a friend, Melanie Foote, and Foote’s grandparents about the Gamaches’ plans to move to Washington with some horses. She indicated they were planning to buy horses soon and asked whether they could keep them temporarily at Foote’s grandparents’ ranch. Foote’s grandmother agreed. On the afternoon of December 3, Richard Gamache, Andre Ramnanan, and an acquaintance, Donald Gray, went target shooting in the desert outside Yermo. Gray testified he overheard Gamache and Ramnanan discussing plans to steal horses, a horse trailer, and a mobilehome and take them to Washington or Oregon to live off the land. Gamache and Ramnanan would tie the victims up and shoot them if they gave them any trouble. Around 7:30 p.m. on December 3, the Gamaches borrowed the car of Randy Vojkufka, who was also staying at Thomas P.’s residence. They drove to the Foote ranch and confirmed arrangements to drop off horses and a horse trailer there later that evening, and to pick them up again in two days. They left the Foote ranch around 10:30 p.m. After 11:00 p.m., Peggy Williams testified, she was awoken by a knock at the door of her home. She woke her husband, Lee Williams, and he answered the door. She got up a few minutes later and went to the kitchen. Tammy Gamache was using the phone; Thomas P. and Andre Ramnanan were standing with Lee. Richard Gamache came up behind Peggy, put his arm around her neck, and held a gun to her head. Ramnanan held a gun to Lee’s head. Lee and Peggy Williams were made to lie facedown; Richard Gamache ordered Lee to cooperate or he would kill Peggy. Someone tied Peggy’s hands behind her back with a shoelace. Tammy Gamache asked where the horse halters and truck keys were and left. She later returned, reported she had hooked up the horse trailer, and asked Lee Williams about the horses’ care and the location of their blankets and saddles. Meanwhile, Richard Gamache and Ramnanan plundered the house, taking a television, videocassette recorder, camcorder, food dehydrator and vacuum sealer, jewelry, approximately $4,500 in cash, numerous guns, Lee’s wallet, Peggy’s watch, and the couple’s wedding rings. Throughout this process, they were laughing and having a good time. Richard Gamache asked for the pink slips (titles) to the Williamses’ vehicles; Peggy Williams replied they did not yet have them because they were still making payments. Richard Gamache and Ramnanan announced it was time to go. Gamache asked Lee Williams if anyone would miss them and how often people came to the house. Lee and Peggy Williams were taken barefoot, in their bathrobes, out to their motor home. Peggy asked if she could get shoes; Richard Gamache told her she would not need them. Gamache and the others turned out the lights and locked the doors. In the motor home, Richard Gamache and Ramnanan bound and gagged the Williamses. Gamache drove; Ramnanan guarded them with a gun. Tammy Gamache drove the Williamses’ truck and horse trailer. When they arrived at Thomas P.’s house, where Thomas P. was dropped off, they ungagged and untied Peggy Williams. The Gamaches dictated bills of sale for the Williamses’ motor home, truck, trailer, and car; Peggy wrote them out and signed them. Lee Williams was also forced to sign them. Richard Gamache resumed driving the motor home. After some time he stopped, and he and Ramnanan walked the Williamses from the roadside a short distance into the desert. Gamache made them lie facedown on the ground. He said, “Thank you and have a nice day” and shot Lee Williams in the head. He then shot Peggy Williams in the head. Gamache and Ramnanan questioned whether she was dead, shined a light in her eyes, and checked her pulse; Gamache then shot her again. Gamache and Ramnanan walked off and drove away. Peggy waited to confirm they were gone, unsuccessfully tried to get a response from Lee, and then walked toward the lights of a truckstop in the distance and called 911 when she got there. When the police arrived, Peggy Williams described her attackers and provided license plate numbers for the stolen vehicles. Within an hour, the police located the motor home in a café parking lot nearby. They broke in and found it filled with stolen property from the Williamses’ home. They then waited to see if anyone would return. Shortly after 5:00 a.m., now on the morning of December 4, Richard and Tammy Gamache returned to the motor home in the Williamses’ truck, having dropped off the horses and horse gear at the Foote ranch. They were arrested. In the truck, police found the murder weapon (a .32-caliber handgun), other weapons, a bag of cash, and the dictated bills of sale for the Williamses’ vehicles. A search of Thomas P.’s residence the same morning turned up more weapons and jewelry, as well as bloody clothing. Tammy Gamache agreed to help the police find Lee Williams and took them to his body. She then took the police to the Foote ranch where they recovered the horses, horse trailer, horse equipment, and more guns. Ramnanan was arrested late on the evening of December 4. Peggy Williams’s car was found nearby. Defense Evidence Richard Gamache presented no witnesses, relying instead on cross-examination. In closing argument, he conceded he was guilty of murder, attempted murder, robbery, and burglary. He argued, however, that the jury should not convict him of kidnapping for robbery, as the robberies were already completed before the kidnappings, and that the jury should not find any special circumstances true, because the kidnappings, robberies, and burglary were all completed before he decided to shoot the Williamses. Penalty Phase Trial Prosecution Evidence The prosecution elaborated on the circumstances of the crime with further testimony from Peggy Williams, a 40-minute tape of Richard and Tammy Gamache and Andre Ramnanan jointly confessing on December 7 to the details of the crimes, and two police officers testifying to statements Richard Gamache had made about the crimes while in police custody. The prosecution presented victim impact evidence from Peggy Williams. She described Lee Williams and their happy marriage, and how when he was shot and died in her arms she lost her “world.” She described the flashbacks, anxiety, panic, and depression she had experienced since the shootings, and how she eventually left her job and her home. Peggy Williams’s psychotherapist, Dr. Jennifer Reese, testified Williams had made little improvement in the years since the shootings and likely would never recover completely. The prosecution introduced evidence of two other uncharged crimes by Richard Gamache in the month before the murder: an incident in which he had tied up a roommate, accused him of saying Gamache had not paid his rent, and then waterboarded him; and an incident in which he and Ramnanan had taken over a pizzeria at closing, robbed the employees, and emptied the cash register. During the robbery, Gamache held a knife to the throat of one employee and, after taking the wallet of another employee and noting his name and address, threatened to hunt him down and kill him if he went to the police. The prosecution also presented evidence that Gamache had plotted an escape from prison while awaiting trial. Defense Evidence Richard Gamache called his mother, a psychiatrist who had examined his mother, and several psychiatrists who had examined him. Testimony about his childhood showed his mother had left his father when Gamache was in útero because the father’s beatings had threatened a miscarriage. His mother had had Gamache when she was 17 years old. She had been abused by a series of other boyfriends and husbands in addition to Gamache’s father, had been raped, had used drugs and become a prostitute, and had repeatedly tried to kill herself. Gamache and his mother moved frequently. He missed a year of school (fourth grade) to stay home and take care of his mother, who had had ovarian cancer and a hysterectomy. By age 10 or 11, Gamache was left alone at home to fend for himself several days a week. He eventually dropped out of high school, got his GED (general equivalency diploma), and joined the Army, but was discharged in November 1992 for psychological reasons. He experienced feelings of anger and hopelessness as a result. Gamache had a long history of dreams, fantasies, and delusions about engaging in violent behavior. Dr. Michael Kania testified Gamache had a borderline personality disorder, also known as a cycloid personality disorder or unstable personality disorder. He was highly impulsive and subject to rapid mood swings, with a great deal of underlying anger. Dr. Kania likened Gamache to a stick of dynamite and concluded he had a very serious mental disorder. Dr. Loma Forbes testified Gamache was legally insane at the time he shot the Williamses. She also concluded he was schizophrenic. Though he admitted planning to kill the Williamses from the beginning, this was the product of a delusional mind. Gamache was probably untreatable. Procedural History Richard Gamache, Tammy Gamache, and Andre Ramnanan were each charged with first degree murder with three special circumstances, murder during the commission of a robbery, murder during the commission of a burglary, and murder during the commission of a kidnapping. (§§ 187, 189, 190.2, former subd. (a)(i), (ii) & (vii), now subd. (a)(17)(A), (B) & (G).) They were also charged with attempted murder (§§ 187, 664), two counts of residential robbery (§ 211), residential burglary (§ 459), two counts of kidnapping for robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)), and firearm use enhancements (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). They were tried jointly. A jury convicted each defendant of first degree murder and found all the special circumstances true. It also convicted each defendant of all the lesser offenses, found the firearm use enhancements true for Richard Gamache and Andre Ramnanan, and found them not true for Tammy Gamache. At the penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of death for Richard Gamache, a verdict of life for Andre Ramnanan, and could not reach a verdict for Tammy Gamache. The prosecution abandoned further attempts to seek the death penalty against Tammy Gamache, who was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Discussion I. Guilt Phase Claims A. Denial of Prosecutorial Recusal Motion (§ 1424) Before trial, Richard Gamache moved to recuse the entire San Bernardino County District Attorney’s Office. (§ 1424.) He argued the district attorney’s office had a conflict because the surviving victim of the crimes, Peggy Williams, had been employed in the district attorney’s office as a typist for 10 years. The trial court held a series of evidentiary hearings and concluded Gamache had failed to establish a conflict warranting recusal. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. We recently reiterated the principles governing this claim. “Section 1424 sets out the standard governing motions to recuse a prosecutor: such a motion ‘may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.’ (Id., subd. (a)(1).) The statute ‘articulates a two-part test: “(i) is there a conflict of interest?; and (ii) is the conflict so severe as to disqualify the district attorney from acting?” ’ ” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711 [76 Cal.Rptr.3d 250, 182 P.3d 579].) Where, as here, a defendant seeks to recuse not just an individual prosecutor but also an entire prosecuting office, he must make an “especially persuasive” showing. (People v. Hamilton (1988) 46 Cal.3d 123, 139 [249 Cal.Rptr. 320, 756 P.2d 1348].) We review the trial court’s decision to deny a recusal motion, even in a capital case such as this one, only for an abuse of discretion. (Hollywood v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 721, 728-729 [76 Cal.Rptr.3d 264, 182 P.3d 590].) Accordingly, we must determine whether the trial court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether, in turn, those findings support the decision to deny recusal. (People v. Vasquez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 47, 56 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 372, 137 P.3d 199].) As to the first prong of section 1424, we agree with Gamache that the prosecution had a conflict; that is, there was “a reasonable possibility that [the prosecution’s] impartial exercise of discretion might be affected . . . .” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 717-718, fn. 13; see also People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 148 [193 Cal.Rptr. 148, 666 P.2d 5] [A conflict exists “whenever the circumstances of a case evidence a reasonable possibility that the [district attorney’s] office may not exercise its discretionary function in an evenhanded manner.”].) Peggy Williams was employed by the San Bernardino County District Attorney’s Office as a transcriber/typist. She had worked for the district attorney’s office for 10 years at the time of the crimes. She was a victim in the case and its most important witness, and remained deeply emotionally affected by these crimes. Moreover, the murder victim, Lee Williams, was her husband and thus related to a district attorney’s office employee. We have recognized this situation as a paradigmatic conflict. In People v. Superior Court (Greer) (1977) 19 Cal.3d 255 [137 Cal.Rptr. 476, 561 P.2d 1164], we considered a special circumstance murder case in which the victim’s mother was a discovery clerk for the district attorney’s office charged with prosecuting the case. The victim’s mother’s grief was evident to her coworkers; as well, she stood to be a material witness for the prosecution. (Id. at p. 259.) We concluded that where “[t]he victim of the homicide was the son of a member of the district attorney’s staff who worked in the very office in which the prosecution was being prepared” (id. at p. 270), it was not an abuse of discretion to find a conflict (id. at p. 269). Similarly, in People v. Conner, supra, 34 Cal.3d at page 148, we recognized that where a deputy district attorney was a material witness to a shooting and himself potentially a victim, having possibly been shot at, these circumstances could pose a conflict for the district attorney’s office. As well, in People v. Vasquez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pages 57-58, we recognized that the fact a district attorney’s office employed both the defendant’s mother and his stepfather could give rise to a conflict. (See also Lewis v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1283-1284 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 331] [conflict arising from the fact that every district attorney’s office employee was necessarily a victim of the charged crimes].) Peggy Williams’s roles as employee, victim, relative of a second victim, and witness created at least the possibility the San Bernardino County District Attorney’s Office might be influenced in its discretionary decisionmaking. However, the possibility that a prosecutor might be influenced does not alone establish the requisite likelihood or probability that a defendant will be treated unfairly. The trial court here conducted a two-day hearing. Based on all the evidence adduced, it concluded Gamache and his codefendants had not shown a conflict rising to a level that would require recusal. Having reviewed that evidence, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion because substantial evidence fully supports that conclusion. The San Bernardino County District Attorney’s Office is large, with 500 employees and 122 deputy district attorneys. Because of San Bernardino County’s huge geographic spread, the district attorney’s office is divided into three administratively and operationally separate divisions. The murder occurred in the area covered by the Desert Division, where Peggy Williams worked, and was initially handled by prosecutors from that office. On December 7, 1992, Gamache was charged with first degree murder. On December 8, an amended complaint was filed adding special circumstance allegations. After the holidays, by January 7, 1993, the case was reassigned from the Desert Division in Barstow to the Central Division in San Bernardino, 75 miles away, and all further proceedings were handled by the Central Division. We consider first whether the decision to charge Gamache with special circumstances and to seek the death penalty was likely to have been infected by the conflict. The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that it was not, as the decision maker had no personal relationship with Peggy Williams and based his decision on input from others with no connection to Peggy Williams. According to witnesses, District Attorney Dennis Kottmeier made the decision to retain the case as a special circumstances case and to seek the death penalty following a February 23, 1993, meeting with his chief deputies and the assigned prosecutor. Every witness testified that the decision to file special circumstances and seek death was Kottmeier’s, and Kottmeier’s alone. Kottmeier barely knew Peggy Williams. He had not hired her, had never had social contact with her, did not know her by name, and would have recognized her face only in context if he had seen her while visiting the Barstow office where she worked; he would not have recognized her if he had run into her on the street. He did not know Lee Williams at all. Kottmeier testified repeatedly that Peggy Williams’s status as an employee of the district attorney’s office played no role in his decision to seek death for Gamache. The assigned prosecutor, Raymond Haight, prepared the initial recommendation to Kottmeier that the prosecution should seek the death penalty. He did not know Peggy Williams, and her employment status played no role in his recommendation. The other attorneys who played advisory roles and consulted with Kottmeier on the decision to seek the death penalty testified similarly. Chief deputy district attorneys Richard Maxwell, James Hackleman, and Michael Kewin did not know Peggy or Lee Williams at all. Peggy Williams’s status as an employee played no role in their discussions with Kottmeier about the case and in the decision to seek death. Notably, the one chief deputy who did know Peggy Williams, Dennis Christy, immediately recognized his participation in the case could create a recusal problem, concluded he should have no role in any discretionary decisions, and took no part in the discussion during the February 1993 staff meeting at which Kottmeier decided to seek death. The record here thus stands in sharp contrast to People v. Vasquez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pages 56-58, where uncontradicted evidence established that the defendant’s relationship to employees of the district attorney’s office played a role in the handling of the case and where, accordingly, we found recusal mandated. Gamache argues it was error not to disregard this testimony because Kottmeier visited Peggy Williams in the hospital once, on the day she was shot, and later attended Lee Williams’s funeral and offered Peggy Williams a word or two of condolence. Gamache also points out that Kewin, the chief deputy in charge of administrative services, spoke to the office’s victim witness personnel about providing services to Peggy Williams. These actions demonstrate Kottmeier and Kewin were human and humane; they are not of the sort that would demonstrate Kottmeier inevitably must have been subconsciously influenced by Peggy Williams’s employment status in deciding whether to seek the death penalty for Gamache. The trial court heard Kottmeier’s testimony, and that of each of his deputies, and found the disavowals of any influence credible. It was entitled to do so. Further, Gamache argues that Christy, the chief deputy who knew Peggy Williams well, critically affected the decision to seek the death penalty. The record does not support his argument. Gamache and his codefendants were arrested on Friday, December 4, 1992, and Eric Nakata, the deputy district attorney initially responsible for the case, filed a felony complaint on Monday, December 7. Sometime in these first few days, Christy mentioned to Kottmeier a previous possible death case in which S. Donald Ames, Gamache’s counsel, had created procedural difficulties by having his client plead guilty at arraignment, before any special circumstances had been added. Kottmeier directed Christy to avoid this possibility by having special circumstances filed immediately, and an amended complaint charging special circumstances was filed on December 8. Notably, however, Kottmeier and Christy both testified that this early addition of special circumstances was purely procedural, to preserve the status quo and the option of seeking death. Kottmeier reserved judgment until more facts were known and did not decide to pursue the case as a special circumstance murder and to seek the death penalty until February 1993, after the preliminary hearing. Christy and Kottmeier testified, without contradiction, that Christy had played no role in any of the subsequent substantive discussions that led to Kottmeier’s ultimate decision. There is likewise evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Peggy Williams’s employment by the district attorney’s office would not affect the subsequent conduct of the trial. As noted, the San Bernardino County District Attorney’s Office is unusually large and consequently is divided into administratively and operationally separate divisions. There is little to no employee mixing between these divisions. Within approximately one month, the case had been reassigned from the Desert Division in Barstow, where Peggy Williams worked, to the Central Division in San Bernardino, an office 75 miles away. Prosecutor Raymond Haight had never worked in Barstow and had never met Peggy Williams. Indeed, he was part of a career criminal prosecution group that was segregated on its own floor and had its own staff, even apart from the rest of the San Bernardino office. District Attorney Kottmeier established an ethical screen so no Desert Division employees would have any role in the case, and no evidence was advanced that would suggest such screens had not been or could not be effective. The record thus supports the trial court’s conclusion that, because of the prompt steps taken to screen off prosecution of this case from those employees who might have any connection to Peggy Williams, there was no likelihood the conflict would lead to unfair treatment of Gamache at trial. The size of the office and the ability of the San Bernardino County District Attorney’s Office to set up effective ethical screens distinguish this case from those on which Gamache relies. (See People v. Vasquez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 57 [emphasizing the significance of the size of a prosecutor’s office in deciding whether recusal of the entire office is necessary]; In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 163 [84 Cal.Rptr.3d 597, 194 P.3d 330] [noting ethical screens may obviate the need to recuse an entire government law office]; City and County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 839, 853 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 771, 135 P.3d 20] [same].) In People v. Superior Court (Greer), supra, 19 Cal.3d at page 270, we emphasized that the victim’s mother “worked in the very office in which the prosecution was being prepared.” In People v. Conner, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pages 148-149, we found it critical that the felony division of the district attorney’s office consisted of only 25 attorneys; one of the 25 was a victim and a witness, and his experiences had been discussed pervasively throughout the office. And in People v. Choi (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 476, 483 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 922], recusal was appropriate because no effective ethical wall was in place; though the district attorney’s office had in theory set up such a wall, in practice the conflicted district attorney continued to communicate with others in the office about the case. In light of the contrasting facts here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to order recusal. Gamache also argues that the trial court deprived him of his federal due process rights by denying recusal. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.) However, we have explained that section 1424’s recusal standards are prophylactic in nature and “serve[] to prevent potential constitutional [due process] violations from occurring.” (People v. Vasquez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 59.) If recusal was properly denied under section 1424, ipso facto no due process violation occurred. B. Imposition of Security Belt and Shackles Gamache contends the trial court erred by requiring him to wear leg shackles and an electronic security belt during trial, in violation of his rights to a fair and reliable capital trial. (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.) We find no abuse of discretion. “ ‘[A] defendant cannot be subjected to physical restraints of any kind in the courtroom while in the jury’s presence, unless there is a showing of a manifest need for such restraints.’ ” (People v. Wallace, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1050.) The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution bar the use of visible restraints “unless the trial court has found that the restraints are justified by a state interest specific to the particular trial.” (People v. Stevens (2009) 47 Cal.4th 625, 633 [101 Cal.Rptr.3d 14, 218 P.3d 272]; see also Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, 629 [161 L.Ed.2d 953, 125 S.Ct. 2007].) In deciding whether restraints are justified, the trial court may “take into account the factors that courts have traditionally relied on in gauging potential security problems and the risk of escape at trial.” (Deck v. Missouri, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 629.) These factors include evidence establishing that a defendant poses a safety risk, a flight risk, or is likely to disrupt the proceedings or otherwise engage in nonconforming behavior. (Id. at pp. 628-629, 633; People v. Stevens, supra, Al Cal.4th at p. 633; People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 651 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 28 P.3d 175]; People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 291 [127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322].) If the record establishes restraints are necessary, a trial court should select the least obtrusive method that will be effective under the circumstances. (Duran, at p. 291.) These principles apply fully to the decision whether to require a defendant to wear an electronic security belt, also known as a stun belt, notwithstanding that such a belt may not be visible to the jury. (People v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201, 1219 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 161, 52 P.3d 95].) Because a “trial court has broad power to maintain courtroom security and orderly proceedings” (People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1269 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645]), we review decisions regarding the physical restraint of a defendant for abuse of discretion. (Ibid:, People v. Wallace, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1050; People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 253 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3]; People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 293, fn. 12.) “No formal hearing is necessary to fulfill the mandate of Duran-, however, the record must show the court based its determination on facts, not rumor and innuendo.” (People v. Stevens, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 633.) The imposition of restraints without evidence in the record establishing a threat of violence, escape, or nonconforming conduct is an abuse of discretion. (Duran, at p. 291.) Thus, we consider whether the trial court made the findings necessary to impose a particular security measure—that there was a manifest need, and that the measure chosen was the least obtrusive that would still be effective—and further whether those findings were supported by substantial evidence. On June 22, 1995, the trial court held a pretrial hearing to address security measures. The People introduced evidence that in July 1994 Gamache’s cell had been searched and he had been found with a hacksaw, 42 ounces of toothpaste, plans for a homemade silencer, and a written escape plan. The five-step escape plan, which Gamache admitted writing, involved his (1) getting a saw blade, a lighter, and street clothes; (2) cutting his cell bars and making “didimow”; (3) committing a carjacking to get money and a car, and then either (a) going to “Spink’s house,” then Ord Mountain (the area where he and Ramnanan had taken target practice on Dec. 3, 1992) to get a gun, or (b) if there happened to be a gun in the car already, going directly to Laughlin or Las Vegas, Nevada; (4) robbing a casino and changing his identity; and (5) buying equipment to “big hit” Bullhead (an airport outside Laughlin) or “St. Mary’s” (unknown). On May 13, 1995, just a month before the hearing, deputies at the jail where Gamache was being held searched an inmate who was about to be released and found a sealed letter he was attempting to smuggle out and mail on Gamache’s behalf. The letter, to Gamache’s mother, asked her to get a device to trigger the stun belt Gamache expected to wear at trial. Gamache believed this would result in a mistrial. Then Gamache could either escape from the hospital, with the help of outsiders “eddy and gene,” or escape from court using equipment he would buy with money he would receive after successfully suing over being inadvertently shocked. On May 17, just days later, deputies intercepted a second letter from Gamache to his mother, again asking her to get a device to trigger his stun belt, whereby he could obtain a mistrial and sue for “150 thou or so.” Deputies interpreted both letters as asking Gamache’s mother to get a device that might override the stun belt and allow Gamache to escape directly from the courtroom. The People also presented testimony from the marshal in charge of security for the courthouse. He testified that security was hampered by the fact the courthouse had numerous public entrances, but no metal detecting equipment. He further testified that Gamache, alone among the three defendants, had been designated a high-security escape risk. The trial court made an express finding that the evidence established a “manifest need to restrain [Gamache] in some fashion during trial in the presence of the jury.” (See People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at pp. 290-291.) It cited the escape plan and hacksaw found in Gamache’s cell the previous year, as well as the two letters sent a month before the hearing, again plotting an escape. In part because of concerns that Gamache might use the stun belt itself as part of an escape plan, the court concluded ankle shackles, arranged so the jury would not see them, were the preferred means of restraint. On August 7, 1995, at the People’s request, the trial court held a second pretrial hearing to address Gamache’s restraints. The People provided a marshal’s report indicating that Gamache had been found with a homemade handcuff key a few days earlier. The People further indicated Gamache had been found with an elastic file fastener that he allegedly was seeking to shape into a weapon. Gamache admitted possession of the fastener, but argued the handcuff key had been planted in his shoe and, in any event, might not have worked to open his shackles. As a final point, the People represented that Gamache’s mother, to whom his earlier escape letters had been directed, had gone to the Barstow marshal’s office and said that if the trial had been in Barstow, she “ ‘would have blown up the courthouse and everybody else.’ ” Gamache conceded his mother had threatened to blow up a courthouse. Based on this, the People feared Gamache might still have outside help to assist in a potential escape. In light of this additional record, the trial court made an express finding that use of a stun belt in addition to shackles was now appropriate, provided the stun belt was “properly concealed from the jury’s view as much as possible.” Defense counsel assured the court that they would make arrangements to ensure Gamache would be dressed in such a fashion as to conceal the belt. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. It made express findings at both the June 22 and August 7 hearings that restraints were called for. Those findings were fully supported by evidence in the record establishing that Gamache was a genuine escape risk. The court considered in each instance the least obtrusive means that would suffice to address the perceived security problem Gamache posed, initially ordering just shackles that could be concealed from the jury. Only after Gamache and his mother had provided additional evidence that he remained an escape risk and that restraints impervious to picking with a homemade key were necessary, did the trial court order the stun belt. Even then, the court remained cognizant of the possibility for prejudice and took steps to ensure that the stun belt, like the shackles, would not be visible to the jury. Before us, Gamache argues that the trial court should have discounted any possibility of escape as the product of a delusional mind. He further argues that he was never disruptive or violent in court. As to the first point, the record establishes his escape plans were not only in his head. The homemade handcuff key was real, and the trial court was permitted to disbelieve his protestations that the key was not his. So were the letters he wrote to his mother, asking for help in escaping. The trial court could credit testimony that indicated the threat of an escape attempt was genuine and could take into account that Gamache was devising ever-changing methods: a hacksaw, an electronic device to control his stun belt, a homemade handcuff key. His letters suggested he had become desperate in the face of the potential punishment he faced. Given time, Gamache might attempt anything. The trial court was entitled to prepare for that risk. As to the second point, that he was never disruptive or violent in the courtroom, the People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d 282, requirement that the record establish a threat of violence, escape, or disruption is framed in the disjunctive. Where the record establishes a threat of escape, a defendant cannot plead no threat of violence or disruption, and vice versa; the banks he has not robbed do not excuse the banks he has. If any threat in one of these categories is established, a trial court is entitled to take appropriate measures, consistent with the requirement that it choose the least obtrusive restraints necessary. It did so here. C. Prosecutorial Misconduct: Guilt Phase Closing Argument Gamache contends various prosecutorial remarks during the guilt phase closing argument constituted misconduct, thereby violating his rights to due process and a fair trial. (U.S. Const., 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15, 17.) We disagree. Under the federal Constitution, a prosecutor’s behavior deprives a defendant of his rights “when it comprises a pattern of conduct ‘so egregious that it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.’ ” (People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 820 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204]; accord, Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181 [91 L.Ed.2d 144, 106 S.Ct. 2464]; People v. Wallace, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1070.) Conduct that falls short of that standard “may still constitute misconduct under state law if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the trial court or the jury.” (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 462 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790]; accord, Wallace, at p. 1070.) “ ‘ “ ‘[A] prosecutor is given wide latitude during argument. The argument may be vigorous as long as it amounts to fair comment on the evidence, which can include reasonable inferences, or deductions to be drawn therefrom. [Citations] . . .’ [Citation.] ‘A prosecutor may “vigorously argue his case and is not limited to ‘Chesterfieldian politeness’ ” [citation], and he may “use appropriate epithets [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 951-952 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 420, 140 P.3d 736]; see also People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 835 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 126 P.3d 938].) “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on remarks to the jury, the defendant must show a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner.” (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 970 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183].) To preserve a claim for appeal under either state or federal law, a defendant must raise a contemporaneous objection at trial and seek a jury admonition. (People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 336 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 160 P.3d 84].) In the absence of an objection, any claim is forfeited unless an exception applies. (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 710-711 [94 Cal.Rptr.3d 699, 208 P.3d 634].) In those instances where Gamache concedes he failed to object, he argues his failure is excused because an objection would have been futile and an admonition would have failed to cure any harm. However, “[a] defendant claiming that one of these exceptions applies must find support for his or her claim in the record. [Citation.] The ritual incantation that an exception applies is not enough.” (People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 462.) Considering each instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct, we find several of the claims forfeited and all of the claims unfounded. (1) At the beginning of his closing argument, the prosecutor explained he would be spending most of his time on the case against Tammy Gamache and Andre Ramnanan because the evidence against Richard Gamache was largely uncontested, and the jury should not read into this any concession that Richard Gamache was not central to the crimes. He explained; “As you heard from the law, he’s, as the actual shooter—and I think everybody agrees he’s the actual shooter—he’s in a slightly different legal position than Andre and Tammy .... So, as I look at it, looking at the facts, he doesn’t have anywhere to go. So I’m not going to talk too much about him, [be]cause I think everybody here expects you to find him guilty and find the charges true.” (Italics added.) Gamache argues this last remark would have caused the jury to abdicate its responsibilities and substitute the expectations of others for its own judgments. As no objection was made, this argument is forfeited. It is also meritless. The prosecutor’s remark was a fair comment on the state of the evidence, which showed without dispute that Gamache had intentionally robbed, kidnapped, and then shot the Williamses. There is no reasonable likelihood a jury would have understood these remarks as expressing anything other than the prosecutor’s expectation that the jury would find Richard Gamache an easier case than his codefendants. (2) As promised, the prosecutor spent the bulk of his argument highlighting evidence that showed Andre Ramnanan and Tammy Gamache shared Richard Gamache’s intent to shoot and kill the Williamses. He argued they knew Richard would carry out the shootings and they wanted him to: “And I think really what happened was—Richard was the shooter, because I think Andre and Tammy knew he had some propensities along those lines, and they let him do the dirty work. He didn’t mind doing the dirty work. But I submit to you if he hadn’t, they would have done it, but that was his job in this conspiracy, and they expected him to do it.” Gamache argues there was no evidence in the record to show he had “propensities along those lines.” The argument is preserved, as Gamache objected in the trial court. However, the prosecutor’s argument was not misconduct, nor did it prejudice Gamache in any way. It went to whether Gamache’s codefendants had reason to know Gamache would intentionally shoot the Williamses—an issue contested by his codefendants—but it had no bearing on any contested guilt phase issue, as Gamache conceded he intentionally shot the Williamses. (3) At the start of his rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor expressed his disbelief at the arguments of Gamache’s counsel: “As to Richard Gamache, the argument made by [defense counsel], I was flabbergasted that he argued you shouldn’t find the special circumstance[s] true, because, after all, the killing had nothing to do with the robbery, and the burglary and the kidnapping.” He went on to explain in detail why, in his view, the evidence supported the conclusion that Gamache had committed an intentional murder in the course of robbery, burglary, and kidnapping, and why the jury therefore should find the corresponding special circumstances true. Gamache takes umbrage at the use of the word “flabbergasted,” but has forfeited any claim by failing to object at trial. Nor does the prosecutor’s word choice carry him outside the wide latitude afforded counsel at argument; the prosecutor did not ask the jury to decide the case based on his own personal opinions of the merits of Gamache’s arguments, but rather on the evidence in the record that might refute them. (4) Later in his rebuttal, when discussing evidence that for Gamache the murder had been intertwined with—not independent of—the other crimes, the prosecutor read from a transcript of Peggy Williams’s earlier trial testimony about the burglary: “ ‘Q. Tell us what Richard said. [][] A. They asked [Lee] his name—Richard asked him his name, [f] Q. And what did Lee say? [f] A. He said, “Lee Williams.” Asked him where Lee worked, and Lee said, “Southern California Edison.” And the response to that, I don’t know if it was the same person that asked Lee where he worked that came back with the response, but the response was “I should [blow] your fucking head off right now because I had a friend that just broke into Edison and was caught.” ’ [f] Of course the interesting part of that sentence is the words ‘right now’ as opposed to, what, maybe an hour later or so. That takes care of Richard.” Gamache objects that the prosecutor insinuated it was Gamache who said, “I should [blow] your fucking head off right now because I had a friend that just broke into Edison and was caught,” when no evidence in the record supported that conclusion. This claim is preserved, as Gamache’s codefendant objected and the trial court overruled the objection before Gamache had a chance to join; accordingly, it would have been futile to make the same objection that had just been rejected. However, the claim is without merit: the prosecutor read aloud the portion of the transcript where Peggy Williams indicated she did not know who the speaker was, counsel for Gamache’s codefendant pointed out there was no evidence who the speaker was, and the trial court denied the objection with the understanding the jury was necessarily aware Peggy Williams had been uncertain who the speaker was. Nothing in the prosecutor’s remarks was likely to prevent the jury from deciding for itself to whom, if anyone, these remarks should be attributed. (5) Turning to the evidence supporting Tammy Gamache’s intent, the prosecutor conceded: “Tammy did, in fact, lead them to the body. I don’t quite view the interpretation that way—same way [defense counsel] does [that Tammy Gamache did not want Lee Williams to die]. [I] [f]ind it curious that she knew exactly where to take the police, and—well, there are all sorts of other things I could go into, but that, that shows her knowledge of the shooting to be a far greater level than he would have you believe, I think.” (Italics added.) Gamache argues the prosecutor was implying he was privy to evidence outside the record that would further support defendants’ guilt. No objection was made; the argument is forfeited. Moreover, in context, it is clear the prosecutor was alluding to other evidence in the record that would also establish Tammy Gamache was a full participant in the charged crimes; the remark had nothing to do with Richard Gamache. There is no reasonable likelihood the jury would have understood the comment in any other way. Whether they are considered individually or collectively, we conclude Gamache has not shown the prosecutor’s remarks in his guilt phase closing argument constituted misconduct. D. Inference of Guilt from Possession of Stolen Property (CALJIC No. 2.15) The trial court instructed the jury with a version of CALJIC No. 2.15, covering the inferences to be drawn from possession of recently stolen property, which had been modified to include the various crimes with which the three codefendants were charged. Gamache contends this instruction was flawed in two ways: (1) It allowed inferences to be drawn (that Gamache had committed special circumstance murder, kidnapping, robbery, and burglary) that were in no way rationally connected to the provable facts (that Gamache possessed stolen property); and (2) it lessened the prosecution’s burden of proof, incorrectly permitting the jury to find him guilty of murder, robbery, burglary, and kidnapping for robbery based on only slight corroborating evidence above and beyond his possession of stolen property. Accordingly, he contends his federal due process rights were violated. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.) While we agree the trial court partially erred in how it worded its instruction, that error was manifestly harmless. CALJIC No. 2.15 is an instruction generally favorable to defendants; its purpose is to emphasize that possession of stolen property, alone, is insufficient to sustain a conviction for a theft-related crime. (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 131 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166]; People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 176-177 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150]; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 37 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673]; cf. People v. Najera (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1132, 1135-1136 [77 Cal.Rptr.3d 605, 184 P.3d 732] [defendant argued he was prejudiced because the trial court had a duty to give CALJIC No. 2.15 sua sponte in all theft-related cases and failed to do so].) In the presence of at least some corroborating evidence, it permits—but does not require—jurors to infer from possession of stolen property guilt of a related offense such as robbery or burglary. We have held the instruction satisfies the due process requirement for permissive inferences, at least for theft-related offenses: the conclusion it suggests is “ ‘one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the jury.’ ” (Yeoman, at p. 131; see also People v. Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 356 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 269, 187 R3d 1].) Accordingly, we have repeatedly upheld the giving of the instruction in such cases (Parson, at pp. 355-357 [instruction is appropriate for robbery, burglary, and other theft charges]; People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 248-249 [instruction is appropriate for use in theft cases]; Yeoman, at pp. 131-132 [instruction is appropriate in robbery case]), and Gamache offers us no reason to reconsider that conclusion. On the other hand, we have also cautioned that the instruction is inappropriate for non-theft-related crimes, and instructing that possession of stolen property may create an inference that a defendant is guilty of murder, as was done here, is error. (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 101 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30]; People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 248-249.) The People concede as much. As for Gamache’s second argument, that CALJIC No. 2.15 impermissibly alters the burden of proof, we have previously rejected it. The instruction does not establish an unconstitutional mandatory presumption in favor of guilt (People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 131) or otherwise shift or lower the prosecution’s burden of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (People v. Parson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 355-356; People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 248). Gamache offers no persuasive reason to reconsider these conclusions. Though Gamache argues that error in giving CALJIC No. 2.15 is either structural or subject to harmless error analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824], it is well established the People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243], test applies. (People v. Parson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 357-358; People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 101; People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 249.) Under that test—whether it is reasonably probable Gamache would have obtained a more favorable result had the instruction not been given—the error here in extending CALJIC No. 2.15 to the murder charge was clearly harmless. Copious evidence, aside from Gamache’s being caught with the Williamses’ property hours after Lee Williams’s death, established he had intentionally shot and killed Lee Williams. Most prominently, Peggy Williams testified Gamache had done so, and codefendant Andre Ramnanan introduced Gamache’s admission that he had shot Lee Williams. Indeed, counsel during closing argument conceded that Gamache was guilty of murder. II. Sanity Phase Claim: Withdrawal of Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity Plea On July 25, 1995, Gamache entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. On September 25, he withdrew that plea. He now argues (1) the plea withdrawal was not knowing and intelligent, and (2) the trial court breached a sua sponte duty to conduct further inquiry before accepting the withdrawal, thereby violating his due process rights (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.). Accordingly, he argues, the plea should be reinstated and he should receive a new sanity phase trial. The standards for accepting withdrawal of a not guilty by reason of insanity plea are settled. If the trial court has no doubt about a defendant’s present competence, and if the experts who have examined the defendant are unanimous in finding him or her sane at the time of the crime, a trial court may freely accept a defendant’s withdrawal of an insanity plea. (People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1213-1214 [259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698]; People v. Guerra (1985) 40 Cal.3d 377, 384 [220 Cal.Rptr. 374, 708 P.2d 1252]; People v. Redmond (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 931, 939 [94 Cal.Rptr. 543]; cf. People v. Merkouris (1956) 46 Cal.2d 540, 553-555 [297 P.2d 999] [abuse of discretion to accept withdrawal of an insanity plea where experts are split on sanity].) No Boykin-Tahl advisements concerning the rights being relinquished are required. {Bloom, at p. 1214; Guerra, at p. 384.) In the absence of doubt about a defendant’s competence, a trial court has no sua sponte duty to inquire further into the reasoning behind the defendant’s decision. Here, the trial court had received the written reports of three different experts, Drs. James Hawkins, Michael Kania, and Harvey Oshrin. All three examined Gamache and concluded he was sane. The trial court expressed no doubts about Gamache’s competence on the record. Gamache’s lead counsel offered that both he and cocounsel had consulted with Gamache concerning the contents of the psychological and psychiatric evaluations in the case, and in light of the fact all examining experts had concluded he was sane, Gamache intended to withdraw his not guilty by reason of insanity plea. A colloquy followed in which Gamache confirmed on the record that he had consulted with counsel, personally joined with both his counsel in asking the court to withdraw his plea, and understood he was surrendering the possibility of avoiding a penalty phase trial were he to be found insane by a jury. In the absence of any ground for doubt about Gamache’s sanity, the trial court was required to do no more before accepting Gamache’s withdrawal of his plea. Gamache argues there was error in the acceptance of his plea withdrawal because one month later, a fourth expert, Dr. Loma Forbes, issued an opinion concluding Gamache was in fact legally insane. From this, Gamache reasons his trial counsel must have lied to him about every examining expert finding him sane, and rendered incompetent representation in counseling him about withdrawal of his plea. To the extent Gamache frames acceptance of his plea withdrawal as trial court error, nothing in the record up to and including the September 25, 1995, hearing at which Gamache withdrew his plea put Gamache’s sanity in doubt. Presented with expert unanimity, the trial court was under no obligation to inquire whether there were still other defense experts who might at some point in the future reach a different conclusion. To the extent he frames the plea withdrawal as a consequence of defense counsel error—and, notwithstanding accusations of incompetent representation, Gamache apparently disavows a formal ineffective assistance of counsel claim—the record is inadequate for us to resolve such a claim in Gamache’s favor on direct appeal. We do not know what defense counsel did or did not know about Dr. Forbes’s views as of the September 25 hearing, nor what Dr. Forbes’s initial views, if any, may have been, nor what tactical considerations may have played into the decision to advise Gamache to forgo a sanity phase trial. As the burden is on Gamache to affirmatively demonstrate error, in the absence of evidence his claim must fail. (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 746 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 326, 140 P.3d 657]; People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134].) III. Penalty Phase and Sentencing Claims A. Impact of Cumulative Guilt Phase Error on the Penalty Phase Gamache contends that if we do not conclude any individual guilt phase error mandates guilt phase reversal, the cumulative effect of the guilt phase errors nevertheless rendered the penalty phase trial unreliable. We disagree. We have identified only a single guilt phase error, in the wording of CALJIC No. 2.15 as given. As we have explained, that error had no impact on the guilt verdict. Nor has Gamache shown how it possibly could have affected the penalty phase verdict. (See, e.g., People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 959-960 [224 P.3d 877].) B. Denial of Severance Motion/Redaction of Gamache’s Statements During the penalty phase, Gamache’s codefendants, Andre Ramnanan and Tammy Gamache, objected to the introduction of unredacted out-of-court statements Richard Gamache had made to mental health experts on the ground those statements tended to incriminate them. In the alternative, they sought severance. (See Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 [20 L.Ed.2d 476, 88 S.Ct. 1620] (Bruton); People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 [47 Cal.Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265] (Aranda).) “Bruton and its progeny provide that if the prosecutor in a joint trial seeks to admit a nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial statement, either the statement must be redacted to avoid implicating the defendant or the court must sever the trials.” (People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 895 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 162 P.3d 528].) The trial court granted redaction and denied severance. Gamache raises an Aranda-Bruton issue, but with a twist: he argues that by redacting his out-of-court statements to protect his codefendants’ Aranda-Bruton rights, the trial court denied him his right to have his unredacted statements admitted, and the redactions painted Gamache in a much more unfavorable light by creating the impression that he was the ringleader and more culpable than his codefendants. The trial court, Gamache argues, should have granted severance or, at a minimum, refused redaction. We review the trial court’s denial of severance for an abuse of discretion based on the record available to the trial court at the time. (People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 998 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775].) We recently addressed a claim identical to the one Gamache raises here: an assertion that redaction under Bruton and Aranda violated the rights of the speaking defendant by exaggerating his own culpability. (See People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 456-460 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 181 P.3d 947].) Describing the trial court’s duty to ensure the rights of the speaking defendant, we explained: “Severance may be necessary when a defendant’s confession cannot be redacted to protect a codefendant’s rights without prejudicing the defendant. (Aranda, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 530.) A defendant is prejudiced in this context when the editing of his statement distorts his role or makes an exculpatory statement inculpatory. (People v. Douglas (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 273, 285-287 [285 Cal.Rptr. 609].) [f] Ordinarily, in ruling on a severance motion, a trial court should review both the unredacted and the redacted statements to determine whether the redactions so distort the original statement as to result in prejudice to the defendant.” (Id. at p. 457.) Tammy Gamache and Andre Ramnanan objected to statements by Richard Gamache reflected in the psychiatric reports of defense experts Drs. Michael Kania and Loma Forbes. The trial court reviewed these reports and evaluated whether any inculpatory statements (1) reflected matters already known to the jury through other evidence, (2) were prejudicial, and (3) could be redacted without distorting the bases for the experts’ opinions. Gamache now takes issue with five redactions to Dr. Forbes’s report, arguing that they effectively minimized his codefendants’ culpability and exaggerated his own. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the redactions and instructing Dr. Forbes to limit her testimony accordingly, nor in concluding that a joint penalty trial could still proceed. (1) The trial court redacted “and Andre” from the sentence: “Richard went on to discuss how he and Andre planned to kill his wife.” Richard Gamache’s implication of Andre Ramnanan in any plot to kill Tammy Gamache was plainly inadmissible under Aranda-Bruton. Gamache was not prejudiced by the deletion; Dr. Forbes testified about his statements to her solely as the basis for her opinions, not for the truth of the matters asserted therein, so Gamache would not have been able to argue that his out-of-court statement showed Ramnanan shared culpability for an inchoate crime unrelated to the Williams murder. Nor was Gamache prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to simply delete the entire sentence; as counsel and the trial court noted, Forbes’s report contained numerous other references to Gamache’s stated intent to kill Tammy, as well as to an incident where Gamache had rolled his truck at high speed while Tammy was a passenger, breaking her back and causing her to accuse him of trying to kill her. (2) The trial court redacted “and Andre” from a second statement about another unrelated inchoate crime: “He w