People v. Capistrano (59 Cal. 4th 830, 2014)

Opinion

WERDEGAR, J.

Defendant John Leo Capistrano was convicted at trial of one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187), one count of attempted willful, premeditated murder (§§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a)), six counts of first degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a), 213, subd. (a)(1)(A) & (B)), three counts of carjacking (§ 215), one count of first degree burglary (§ 459), two counts of rape in concert (§§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 264.1) and two counts of forcible oral copulation in concert (§ 288a, subds. (a) & (d)), arising from four separate incidents involving six victims. The first incident, on December 9, 1995, involved the murder and robbery of Koen Witters, who was found in his Rowland Heights apartment strangled and with his arms cut. The second incident, on December 15, 1995, in the City of Whittier, involved the carjacking and home invasion robbery of J.S. and her husband, E.G., and the commission of the rape and forcible oral copulation of J.S. during that robbery. The third incident, on December 23, 1995, in the City of West Covina, involved the carjacking and home invasion robbery of Ruth and Patrick Weir. The fourth incident, on January 19, 1996, involved the home invasion robbery and attempted murder of Michael Martinez, who was found in his apartment in West Covina, having been beaten on the head with a baseball bat and with his throat cut.

As to the murder of Koen Witters, the jury found true the two special-circumstance allegations that the killing was committed in the course of a burglary and a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A), (G)). The jury also found defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and a principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) in the commission of the crimes against J.S. and E.G., and the Weirs. As to the crimes against Michael Martinez, the jury found defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)), and personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). After a penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied the automatic application to modify the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), and sentenced defendant to death. As to the noncapital offenses, the court sentenced defendant to consecutive indeterminate terms of life plus four years’ imprisonment for the Martinez attempted murder and 25 years to life plus 10 years’ imprisonment for the rape of J.S., and to various determinate terms on the remaining counts. This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We will order the trial court to correct the abstract of the judgment in one respect and otherwise affirm the judgment.

I. Facts

A. Guilt Phase

1. Prosecution Evidence

a. Defendant and His Associates

Defendant was 25 years old when the instant offenses occurred, between December 9, 1995, and January 19, 1996. He lived with his cousins Jessica and Joanne Rodriguez at the Lido Garden Apartments in West Covina. Jessica Rodriguez had formerly lived at the Pheasant Ridge apartment complex with her mother. Defendant had helped Rodriguez’s mother move out of the Pheasant Ridge apartments in November 1995. Koen Witters, the murder victim, also lived in the Pheasant Ridge complex.

Defendant was regularly in the company of three youths, Michael Drebert, Eric Pritchard and Anthony Jason Vera. Drebert and Pritchard called defendant “Dad.” Gladys Santos, a key prosecution witness, met defendant in October 1995. Santos also knew Drebert, Pritchard and Vera. Between December 1995 and January 1996, she saw defendant, Drebert and Pritchard regularly, and Vera less so. One reason she saw defendant so frequently during this period was because she was taking care of a 12-year-old girl, Justine, whom defendant treated as his daughter, although he was not her father.

b. The Murder of Koen Witters on December 9, 1995

Koen Witters was in California as part of his work for a Taiwan-based company called Free Free Industrial Corporation. He lived in a company-leased apartment in the Pheasant Ridge apartment complex. Witters was scheduled to return to Taiwan on the night of December 9, 1995. His coworker, Sheree Chen, dropped him off at his apartment at 4:00 p.m. Chen arranged to return later that evening to collect Witters’s apartment key and company-owned cell phone. When she returned about 9:30 p.m., Witters did not respond to her knocking at the door and calling his name. The airport shuttle driver arrived and also tried knocking. When there was no response, he tried the door and found it unlocked. He and Chen entered the apartment. The apartment was “a mess,” according to Chen. The driver looked into the bedroom and got Chen out of the apartment, telling her, “He’s dead, he’s dead.” They called 911 from the complex’s security office.

Police found Witters lying facedown on the bedroom floor, clad only in a pair of swim trunks. His feet were tied at his ankles with a pair of athletic socks. His hands were tied behind his back at his wrists with athletic socks and videotape. His mouth was gagged with another athletic sock secured by a plastic bag. There were large cuts on his forearms and a black luggage strap around his neck. In the living room police found a black flight bag missing its strap. A steak knife was found wedged between the mattress and the box spring in the bedroom. The medical examiner determined that strangulation was the cause of death.

Witters’s apartment had been ransacked. A suitcase on the bed had been forced open and its contents strewn on and around the bed. Missing from the apartment was an Apple computer, a videocassette player (VCR) and the company’s cell phone.

Just before Christmas that year, Michael Drebert told Gladys Santos he, defendant and Pritchard had robbed Witters and that defendant had murdered him. Following this conversation, Santos asked defendant if it was true that he had “kill[ed] someone with a belt.” Defendant laughed and said, “Mike told you, huh?” Santos denied Drebert had told her and again asked him if it was true. Defendant said, “Yeah.” Although at first unwilling to talk about the murder, defendant eventually admitted killing Witters, even demonstrating how he had strangled the victim.

Defendant told Santos that he, Drebert and Pritchard had been “scoping” out Witters’s apartment to rob it. Defendant told her he killed Witters because Witters saw him without a mask. He strangled rather than shot him because a gun would have been too loud and “shanked” Witters because Witters “wouldn’t die.” In a later conversation, he told her he had asked Drebert to help him strangle Witters, and he strangled the victim three times before cutting him. Santos testified further that after the Witters murder, defendant asked her if she knew anyone who might want a large computer. She also testified that after defendant was arrested he told her that if she talked to the police, he would kill her children.

c. Robbery and Sexual Assault Offenses Involving J.S. and E.G. on December 15, 1995

About 9:30 p.m. on December 15, 1995, J.S. and her husband, E.G., returned to their Whittier home after visiting E.G.’s family. E.G. pulled into the garage and got out while J.S. remained in the passenger seat. A man inside the garage wearing a ski mask pointed a gun at E.G.’s face and said, “Give me your money.” J.S. heard her husband yell and saw a man with his hand stretched out toward her husband. A second man was standing behind the first one. One of the men came over to her, pointed a gun at her and motioned to her to get out of the car. One of the men told her husband, “We’re gonna go in the house.”

The men led J.S. and E.G. into the master bedroom and tied their wrists behind their backs. The men also used belts and ties to bind the victims’ ankles and knees, then laid them on the bed. Two other men joined the two men who had brought the victims into the house. All the men wore gloves and their faces were covered; two of them carried guns. Despite their masks, J.S. later identified two of the men from police lineups as Eric Pritchard and Anthony Jason Vera. The man who appeared to be the leader of the group was over six feet tall and had a “good build.” At trial, a police detective testified that defendant is six feet four inches tall and weighs 210 pounds. (The fourth man was not identified at trial.)

One of the men asked J.S. if they had children, were expecting anyone or owned firearms, and what their neighbors were like. Two of the men, including Pritchard, put guns to the victims’ heads and repeatedly asked, “Where’s the money?” The men rummaged through the dresser and the closet in the bedroom, and J.S. heard doors and boxes being opened elsewhere in the house.

One of the men removed a bullet from his gun, put it on the bed between the victims and asked, “Isn’t it big?” Two of the men, one of them Pritchard, asked both J.S. and E.G. if they would “suck dick” to save their lives.

The tall man who appeared to be the leader eventually took J.S. into the bathroom where he twice forced her to orally copulate him and then twice raped her. The second time he ejaculated into her. Afterwards, he took her into a second bedroom where Pritchard also forced her to orally copulate him. After Pritchard left, a man with a gun came in and stood guard. The tall man came in and out of the room. He pulled down J.S.’s pants, fondled her buttocks and made sexual comments about her husband. At one point, after ascertaining that J.S. was of Mexican descent, he told her that he would not kill her because she was Mexican. E.G., meanwhile, remained tied up in the master bedroom. Eventually the men left and the victims were able to free themselves and call 911.

The victims’ home was ransacked. The robbers took stereo equipment, a VCR, two telephone answering machines, jewelry, small appliances and a Scepter brand laptop computer, among other items. They also took the victims’ 1989 Honda Accord.

J.S. was taken to a hospital where a sexual assault examination was conducted; oral and vaginal swabs were taken and later subjected to DNA testing.

Blood samples were obtained from J.S., defendant, Drebert, Pritchard and Vera, and also subjected to DNA testing. Testing performed on the vaginal swab indicated that defendant’s blood sample was consistent with sperm from the vaginal swab. Gladys Santos testified that defendant brought to her house an answering machine and laptop computer matching the description of the computer stolen from J.S. and E.G. Drebert later removed the computer from Santos’s apartment. After defendant’s arrest, Santos gave police an answering machine with the same serial number as one of the machines stolen from J.S. and E.G.

d. The Weir Robbery on December 23, 1995

About 5:30 p.m. on December 23, 1995, Ruth Weir arrived at her Conlon Street home in West Covina after grocery shopping. She pulled into her garage, which was detached from her house, and took groceries from the trunk into her house. When she returned to the garage she was accosted by two men wearing ski masks, one of them armed with a gun. The armed man told her to go into the house. Once inside, the men asked her if she was expecting anyone and asked about her neighbors. She told them she was expecting her husband. She heard her husband’s car pull into the driveway. She glanced out the window and saw a third man standing in the backyard.

One of the men told her to go into the dining room and lie down on the floor. She complied. She heard her husband, Patrick, come in the house and say something like, “What’s going on?” She was taken from the dining room to the family room, where her husband was lying facedown on the floor. There were three intruders in the room; two of them wore ski masks while the third concealed his face by lifting his coat over it. One of them told her to lie down next to her husband. While one of the men sat on the couch with a knife, the others brought wrapped Christmas presents into the room. One of the men asked her if she had money and, when she said, “No,” threatened to kill her if money was discovered. Another one found her senior citizen volunteer badge for the West Covina Police Department and asked her where she kept her gun. She explained she was not a police officer but only a volunteer. One of the men went through her pockets and her husband’s pockets while another asked her where she kept her car keys and then took them. The men also took the Christmas packages. When she protested, one of them put a gun to her head and said, “Would you rather have your Christmas gifts or your life?”

Angela Phillipson, a neighbor of the Weirs, saw an older two-toned beige four-door American-model car and Ruth Weir’s Taurus parked on the nearby cross street. The Taurus drove away quickly while the other car drove away at a normal speed. She later saw the same two-toned car in the vicinity of the Weirs’ home after the police had arrived.

After the robbers left, Ruth Weir called 911. When the police arrived, she inspected her house and found numerous items missing in addition to her Christmas presents. These included jewelry, cash and two sets of three ceramic angels. Her Taurus and a Ziploc bag containing commemorative coins were also missing.

The police found the Taurus the next day in the parking lot of an auto parts store near where Gladys Santos lived. The car’s stereo had been taken.

Santos testified that on the day of the Weir robbery, defendant called her and asked her to pick him up at a location near where he was staying. When she did, and she asked him what he had been doing, he said, “Well, we just robbed somebody.” He had her drive by a house in West Covina and told her a police officer lived there. He said he had stolen Christmas presents, a white car, and groceries. He directed her to another location where he said he had hidden some coins. He got out of the car, but when he returned he told her there was nothing there. Defendant brought some jewelry to Santos’s apartment, which Santos later gave to the police. The jewelry belonged to Ruth Weir.

On January 6, 1996, police stopped a beige-and-brown Buick being driven by defendant’s cousin Jessica Rodriguez. Drebert and Vera were passengers. The car was impounded and searched. In it, police found three ski masks, a pair of cotton gloves, and three knit gloves.

e. The Attempted Murder of Mike Martinez on January 19, 1996

In January 1996, Mike Martinez lived in the Lido Garden Apartments, the same apartment complex as defendant’s cousins, Joanne and Jessica Rodriguez, with whom defendant, Drebert, Pritchard and Vera were staying. Also living with Martinez was Amy Benson, the pregnant daughter of a friend. Defendant and his confederates “hung out” with Benson at Martinez’s apartment almost every day. The owner of the apartment building told Martinez that if defendant and his friends continued to come to his apartment, he would be evicted. In late December or early January, Martinez told Benson and defendant that defendant and his friends could no longer come to Martinez’s apartment. They ignored him. Martinez did not say anything more to defendant, whom he believed to be a gang member, because he was afraid of him.

On January 13, 1996, Eric Pritchard was detained by police investigating a report of a suspicious person loitering at the apartment complex. Martinez saw the detention take place. Pritchard was taken into custody because he had been reported as a runaway and was ultimately released into the custody of his mother.

Six days later, on January 19, Martinez returned home from work around 6:30 p.m. and ate dinner. He left the apartment for a while, returning around 8:00 p.m. to take a shower. When he emerged from the bathroom, defendant, Pritchard, Drebert and Vera were in the apartment. Drebert and Vera were rummaging through Martinez’s closet and desk. Someone had closed the curtains. In an angry and aggressive tone, defendant told Martinez to sit on the couch. Drebert locked the door.

Defendant accused Martinez of calling the police on Pritchard, which Martinez denied. Drebert held up a set of keys and asked Martinez which were the keys to his car. Martinez told him. He also noticed his pager, a watch and some change were missing from the top of the dresser. Defendant struck Martinez in the jaw with such force it tore his lower lip and knocked him backwards. He asked Martinez how much money he had in the apartment and, after Martinez told him a few hundred dollars, said he would kill Martinez if he found more.

Defendant told Drebert to get some belts from the closet. Defendant used them to bind Martinez’s arms behind his back and to bind his legs. Martinez saw Drebert take a baseball bat out of the closet and hand it to defendant. Defendant placed a shirt or a towel over Martinez’s head. He felt a blow to his head. The next thing he remembered was waking up in the hospital.

The officer who responded to a neighbor’s 911 call found Martinez lying faceup on the floor in a pool of blood, unconscious and gasping for air. Martinez’s eyes were swollen shut and some of his teeth lay on the carpet beside him. A bloody bat was leaning against the couch. When the paramedics rolled Martinez onto his stomach, the officer saw puncture wounds on Martinez’s back. A bloody screwdriver was found on the couch.

Martinez had surgical staples placed in his head, he lost some of his teeth, and he was treated for stab wounds to his back. The staples were removed after about a month. Martinez endured 12 root canals, the loss of his sense of smell, and a 60 percent loss of hearing, which lasted for three months. Martinez identified defendant, Drebert, Vera and Pritchard as his assailants from photographs. Martinez’s vehicle was stolen but was recovered a few days later.

Defendant and his confederates went to Gladys Santos’s apartment after the attack on Martinez. Defendant told Santos he had “played baseball” with Martinez’s head. Two patrol officers who received a radio call about the assault on Martinez at the Lido Garden Apartments were told that a red Camaro spotted there three days earlier might have been involved. Their search for the car took them to the apartment complex where Santos lived, about a half-mile from the Lido Garden complex. Eric Pritchard was detained as he attempted to drive out of the complex in a red Camaro. Pritchard ultimately led the police to Santos’s apartment, where defendant, Drebert and Vera were arrested. Santos was also arrested because she lied to the police about knowing Pritchard and about who was in her apartment. No charges, however, were filed against her. A subsequent search of Santos’s apartment yielded several items belonging to Martinez.

2. Defense Evidence

The defense was one of mistaken identity. To that end, defendant introduced evidence to show that on various occasions he had been welcomed in Martinez’s apartment and had socialized with Martinez. He also introduced evidence regarding the physical appearance of Eric Pritchard’s brother, Willie, who was about the same height and build as defendant. Additionally, he offered evidence that a gun was found in the trunk of the car occupied by Joanne Rodriguez, Drebert, and Vera when police stopped them on January 6, 1996, introduced apparently to suggest Drebert and Vera could have committed the charged offenses without defendant’s involvement. Finally, and evidently in response to J.S.’s testimony concerning her sexual assault, he introduced evidence regarding the length of his penis.

B. Penalty Phase

1. Prosecution Evidence

At the penalty phase, the prosecution’s evidence in aggravation consisted of the circumstances of the offenses of which defendant was convicted, defendant’s prior felony convictions, and his violent criminal activity while in custody. (§ 190.3, factors (a)-(c).) The prosecution presented evidence of defendant’s felony convictions for sale of marijuana and vehicle theft. The prosecution also presented evidence of four separate attacks by defendant on other jail inmates, three of which occurred while he was in custody on this case.

On June 4, 1994, defendant attacked Victor Rodela at the Los Angeles County jail apparently because he believed Rodela was homosexual. He kicked and punched Rodela. Rodela sustained a swollen and bloody upper lip and complained of pain in his jaw, back, ribs, and groin.

On October 4, 1996, defendant kicked Ricky Crayton in the mouth with sufficient force to break Crayton’s jaw.

On February 18, 1997, defendant and another inmate stabbed Mauricio Gonzalez as Gonzalez was being transported to his cell with his hands cuffed behind his back and attached to a waist chain. In the opinion of the officer who testified as an expert on Hispanic prison gangs, defendant and the other inmate were carrying out a “hit” on Gonzalez ordered by the Mexican Mafia prison gang. Prior to the instant trial, defendant was convicted of attempted murder for his attack on Gonzalez.

On June 23, 1997, defendant attacked Raymond Gonzalez in the holding cell at the courthouse in Pomona evidently because he believed Gonzalez — a prosecution witness in another case — was a “snitch.” Gonzalez sustained a golf-ball-size knot on his forehead, a bloody nose and blood on his lip and around his teeth.

In addition to this evidence, the prosecution introduced evidence that defendant mouthed the words “Get that fucker,” to another inmate as defendant nodded toward Drebert when they were all in court. As a result, Drebert’s jail status was changed to K-10, meaning that he was kept away from all other inmates.

2. Defense Evidence

Defendant’s girlfriend, Claudia Meza, testified she had known defendant for 11 years and had dated him from October 1995 to January 1996. According to Meza, defendant had never participated in gang activities, nor had he used drugs in Meza’s presence. Defendant told Meza he had had a troubled life, had been in and out of jail, and no one had been there for him. Meza testified that defendant planned to change his life by getting a job as a certified nurse’s assistant and having his tattoos removed.

Defendant’s father, John Catani, also testified. Catani was in prison at the time he testified. He testified he had been in prison when defendant was bom in 1970 and was incarcerated in 1976 and again from 1988 to 1990. He and defendant’s mother were together from 1975 to 1990. They fought constantly and one or the other of them would often leave for extended periods. Catani had a drug problem and defendant’s mother had a drinking problem. When defendant was 14 or 15 years old, Catani noticed his tattoos. Catani believed defendant joined a gang in his late teens. Catani had visited defendant when he was incarcerated in the California Youth Authority when he was 15 or 16, and had scolded him and warned him against becoming a gang member.

II. Discussion

A. Assertedly Improper Joinder of Charges

Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion when (1) it denied his request to sever the Martinez (home invasion robbery, attempted murder), Weir (home invasion robbery, carjacking) and J.S./E.G. (home invasion robbery, sex offenses, carjacking) charges from each other and (2) when it joined those charges to the Witters capital charges, over his objection. We find no abuse of discretion.

1. Denial of Defendant’s Severance Motion

On November 18, 1996, defendant moved to sever the Martinez, Weir and J.S./ E.G. cases, which had previously been joined by the trial court at the prosecution’s request. Defendant also joined codefendant Vera’s motion to sever the J.S./E.G. case from the Martinez case. Defendant argued severance was required in the interests of justice because, contrary to the prosecution’s contention, the various crimes were of different classes. In addition, he argued a joint trial would be unfair because the evidence was much stronger in the Martinez case, where the victim positively identified him as a perpetrator, than it was in the other two cases, where there was little or no evidence identifying him. Vera argued there was an absence of “commonality” with respect to the nature and timing of the offenses and the witnesses to them; the evidence was not cross-admissible; and there was a danger of a “spillover” effect in which the stronger evidence in the Martinez case might bolster the weaker J.S./E.G. case. The court denied the motions. It properly did so.

“ ‘[B]ecause consolidation or joinder of charged offenses ordinarily promotes efficiency, that is the course of action preferred by the law.’ ” (People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 493 [110 Cal.Rptr.3d 673, 232 P.3d 663].) “Section 954 governs the issue of joinder of counts and it provides in pertinent part: ‘An accusatory pleading may charge two or more different offenses connected together in their commission, ... or two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate counts, . . . provided, that the court in which a case is triable, in the interests of justice and for good cause shown, may in its discretion order that the different offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried separately or divided into two or more groups and each of said groups tried separately.’ ” (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 924 [161 Cal.Rptr.3d 295, 306 P.3d 1136].) The crimes involved here — attempted murder, robbery, the sexual offenses, and carjacking — “are . . . deemed to be of the ‘same class,’ insofar as [they] share common characteristics as assaultive crimes against the person.” (People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 276 [247 Cal.Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052].) “Because the charges were properly joined under section 954, ‘defendant must make a clear showing of prejudice to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s severance motion.’ ” (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 119 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296].) That is, defendant must demonstrate the denial of his motion exceeded the bounds of reason. (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 574 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 123 P.3d 614].)

“ ‘ “Refusal to sever [charges] may be an abuse of discretion where: (1) evidence on the crimes to be jointly tried would not be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) certain of the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) a ‘weak’ case has been joined with a ‘strong’ case, or with another ‘weak’ case, so that the ‘spillover’ effect of aggregate evidence on several charges might well alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) any one of the charges carries the death penalty or joinder of them turns the matter into a capital case.” ’ ” (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 575 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580, 161 P.3d 104].) Regarding cross-admissibility, however, “section 954.1 expressly provides that ‘where two or more accusatory pleadings charging offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses have been consolidated, evidence concerning one offense or offenses need not be admissible as to the other offense or offenses before the jointly charged offenses may be tried together before the same trier of fact.’ (Italics added.) Thus, ‘cross-admissibility is not the sine qua non of joint trials.’ ” {Ibid.)

Moreover, “[a]s we explained in People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d 576 [253 Cal.Rptr. 710, 764 P.2d 1087], the issue of cross-admissibility ‘is not cross-admissibility of the charged offenses but rather the admissibility of relevant evidence’ that tends to prove a disputed fact. (Id. at p. 589; see Evid. Code, § 210.)” (People v. Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 576.) Thus, we have said, “ ‘complete (or so-called two-way) cross-admissibility is not required. In other words, it may be sufficient, for example, if evidence underlying charge “B” is admissible in the trial of charge “A” — even though evidence underlying charge “A” may not be similarly admissible in the trial of charge “B.” ’ ” (People v. Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 493.)

Here, all three incidents involved a home invasion robbery, and in all three a victim’s car was taken. The offenses occurred within the same geographical area (the eastern San Gabriel Valley) and within a relatively short period of time (between Dec. 13, 1995, and Jan. 19, 1996). Additionally, the J.S./E.G. and Weir robberies shared common characteristics in their commission. In both cases, the victims were initially approached in their garages as they returned home. The perpetrators covered their faces with ski masks and asked similar questions of the victims. Such evidence would have been cross-admissible to show a common plan or design. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) Defendant maintains that these similarities were not distinctive. But “[t]o establish the existence of a common plan or scheme [under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b)], ‘the common features must indicate the existence of a plan rather than a series of similar spontaneous acts, but the plan thus revealed need not be distinctive or unusual.’ ” (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 586 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076].) The J.S./E.G. and Martinez cases featured another common characteristic: In each case, the perpetrators used items taken from the closets of the victims to tie them up. Finally, stolen items from all three of the noncapital offenses were stored at Gladys Santos’s apartment. Thus, the evidence was potentially cross-admissible in these three connected robberies.

“We emphasize, however, that, even if cross-admissibility did not support consolidation of the cases, the absence of cross-admissibility alone would not be sufficient to establish prejudice where (1) the offenses were properly joinable under section 954, and (2) no other factor relevant to the assessment of prejudice demonstrates an abuse of discretion.” (People v. Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 577.)

Defendant attempts to establish prejudice by pointing to two other factors: (1) the facts of the J.S/E.G. and Martinez cases assertedly would have inflamed the jury against him and prevented a fair assessment of the evidence in the Weir case and, (2) there was a danger of a “spillover” effect by the joinder of the stronger Martinez case, where defendant was identified as the perpetrator, to the J.S./E.G. crimes, where evidence of his participation was weak. We are not persuaded.

Defendant asserts that the sexual offenses perpetrated against J.S. and the attack on Martinez were so brutal as to “evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and make the jury convict on bad character rather than subjecting the prosecution’s evidence to scrutiny.” The issue is not whether evidence of a violent offense evokes repulsion, but whether “ ‘strong evidence of a lesser but inflammatory crime might be used to bolster a weak prosecution case’ on another crime.” (People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 934 [277 Cal.Rptr. 166, 802 P.2d 950].) First, it is not the case that the evidence of his participation in the J.S./E.G. and Weir home invasion robberies was “weak.” Defendant’s connection to those crimes was established by evidence that both J.S. and E.G. had identified defendant as a perpetrator — J.S. in open court during the preliminary examination and E.G. at a live lineup. Additionally, J.S. had repeatedly identified Pritchard and Vera, defendant’s confederates, as perpetrators. While neither Ruth Weir nor her husband was able to identify any of their assailants, the prosecutor represented that defendant had admitted his participation in the Weir robbery to a witness, Gladys Santos. Thus, even to the extent the Martinez incident could be viewed as more inflammatory, joinder was not likely to prejudice him with regard to the jury’s decision on the other charges.

Second, evidence of the Martinez attempted murder was not more inflammatory than the other crimes. Defendant himself equates the potentially inflammatory nature of the sexual assault on J.S. with the attempted murder of Martinez. His contention that evidence adduced regarding these charges would inflame the jury with respect to the “nonviolent robbery” of the Weirs minimizes the terrifying circumstances of the latter offense: Two days before Christmas, an elderly woman was confronted by armed, masked assailants who forced her at gunpoint into her own home; forced her and her husband to lie on the floor while they ransacked her residence; told her they would kill her if she was lying about whether there was money in the house; and when she protested the theft of her Christmas presents, held a gun to her head and asked her to choose between the presents and her life. These circumstances do not support defendant’s characterization of the Weir home invasion robbery as “nonviolent.” Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim that evidence of the J.S. and Martinez offenses was so much more inflammatory it would have rendered the jury incapable of fairly assessing the evidence pertaining to the Weir robbery.

Finally, defendant contends the consolidation of the Martinez case, in which defendant was identified as a perpetrator, with the J.S./E.G. and Weir cases, in which evidence of his identity was more circumstantial, would have had a spillover effect by “improperly bolstering the prosecution’s weak evidence implicating [defendant] in the Weir and [J.S./E.G.] crimes.” As explained above, the evidence connecting defendant to the latter crimes was not weak. Accordingly, the trial court could reasonably find that the jury would be able to fairly assess defendant’s guilt as to all the charges, and did not abuse its discretion by denying the severance motion with respect to the J.S./E.G., Weir and Martinez crimes.

2. Consolidation of Noncapital Charges with Special Circumstance Case

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when, after denying his severance motion, it subsequently consolidated the noncapital charges with the Witters capital murder case. Again, we find no abuse of discretion.

a. Background

The prosecution filed an information charging defendant and Drebert with the special circumstance murder of Witters and moved to consolidate that case with the case charging them, along with Pritchard and Vera, with the J.S/E.G., Weir and Martinez crimes. Defendant and Vera opposed consolidation. Vera, in particular, argued that he would be prejudiced because he was not involved in the murder. The court agreed and denied the consolidation motion. The prosecution responded by asking the court to sever defendant and Drebert from Pritchard and Vera, and then consolidate the capital and noncapital charges against defendant and Drebert. Over defendant’s continued objection, the court granted the request.

b. Discussion

As noted, section 954 represents a legislative preference for the consolidation of charges “connected together in their commission” or “of the same class of crimes or offenses” (ibid.) because such joinder “ ‘ordinarily promotes efficiency.’ ” (People v. Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 493.) Unquestionably, the Witters murder case, like the noncapital charges, involved an “assaultive crime[]” against a person (People v. Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 276) and could be properly joined.

Defendant nonetheless contends consolidation was error because evidence of the noncapital crimes would not have been admissible in the guilt phase of the Witters special-circumstance case had it been tried separately. The prosecutor’s theory of cross-admissibility was that defendant admitted his participation in both the Witters and Weir cases to the same witness, Gladys Santos. The prosecutor also argued Drebert’s participation in the Witters case was admissible to defeat any claim by Drebert that he was unaware that defendant intended to attack Martinez when Drebert agreed to enter Martinez’s apartment and commit a robbery. On appeal, defendant contends Santos’s testimony regarding defendant’s admission that he robbed the Weirs would not have been admissible at a separate trial of the Witters murder, nor would his admission that he killed Witters have been admissible at a separate trial of the Weir case. He argues further that the cross-admissibility of evidence regarding Drebert’s knowledge and intent is, essentially, irrelevant to the question of the cross-admissibility of the evidence as to defendant himself.

Although the prosecutor did not argue this point below, we have already noted that evidence of the geographic and temporal proximity of the four home invasion robberies, along with certain common characteristics of those crimes, would have been admissible to show a common plan for purposes of Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). In any event, even if we assume there was no cross-admissible evidence between the Witters case and the other three cases, the absence of. such evidence is not dispositive. “ ‘Cross-admissibility ... is sufficient but not necessary to deny severance. [Citation.] As the four-part test is stated in the conjunctive, joinder may be appropriate even though the evidence is not cross-admissible ....’” (People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 440 [46 Cal.Rptr.3d 677, 139 P.3d 64].)

The remaining relevant considerations favor consolidation. The murder of Koen Witters was not less inflammatory than the evidence of the sexual assault of J.S., the attempted murder of Martinez or the invasion of the Weirs’ home. Thus, joinder was not “ ‘ “unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant.” ’ ” (People v. Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 439.) Nor was the evidence in the Witters case weaker than such evidence in the other cases so as to create the danger of a spillover effect. {Ibid.) Finally, the fact the Witters case was a capital case did not cut against consolidation where the “evidence of each charge [was] so strong that consolidation is unlikely to [have affected] the verdict.” (People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 423 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78].)

Accordingly, we conclude the trial court properly exercised its discretion in consolidating the capital and noncapital charges.

3. Gross Unfairness

Defendant lastly contends that, even if the trial court’s severance and consolidation rulings were correct when made, reversal of the judgment is required because the joint trial resulted in such gross unfairness as to amount to a due process violation. (People v. Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 494.) The claim is meritless.

Defendant contends joinder allowed the prosecutor to improperly use Martinez’s identification of defendant as his assailant to bolster weaker evidence of defendant’s participation in the remaining offenses. We perceive no such impropriety. Evidence that defendant was the ringleader of a group that included Drebert, Pritchard and Vera, and that J.S. identified Pritchard and Vera as two of the perpetrators, along with DNA evidence connecting defendant to the sexual assault against J.S., could, combined with other evidence, support the inference that defendant was one of the other men involved in the other incidents. As we explained in similar circumstances, a prosecutor may properly argue that defendants probably acted in concert when the evidence established they had a history of doing so. (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 152 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746, 235 P.3d 62].) In short, we reject defendant’s claim that there was anything unfair, much less grossly unfair, in the manner in which the prosecutor connected defendant to the four crimes.

Defendant also argues he was denied due process because consolidation of the cases allowed the prosecutor to present inflammatory evidence suggesting defendant belonged to a gang. The only evidence that defendant was a gang member was Martinez’s testimony that he feared defendant because he believed defendant was a gang member. The prosecutor did not refer to this testimony. The prosecutor made a few references to the ganglike appearance and behavior of defendant and his three cohorts, but these references, fleeting and ambiguous, did not identify defendant as a member of a known street gang. To the extent defendant’s complaint is that there were suggestions defendant, Drebert, Pritchard and Vera acted like a gang in the colloquial sense, the short answer is that they did. Such a colloquial understanding is quite different, however, from a potentially prejudicial suggestion that defendant belonged to one of the well-established criminal street gangs operating in Southern California. Other than Martinez’s brief testimony, no such connection was made by the evidence or suggested by the prosecutor.

B. Asserted Errors During Voir Dire of Prospective Jurors

1. Dismissal of Jurors Who Stated They Would Be Unable to Impose the Death Penalty

Defendant contends the trial court violated his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury by excusing 22 prospective jurors who, in response to the court’s query, stated they would be unable or unwilling to impose the death penalty regardless of the evidence. In support of his claim, he relies on People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271] (Stewart), and People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946 [4 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 75 P.3d 53] (Heard), in which we found error. We reject defendant’s claim the circumstances of this case are analogous to those in the cited cases.

The trial court conducted a preliminary screening of four panels of prospective jurors. The court first considered financial hardship requests. It then described in general terms the nature of the case. It told the first panel; “One of the charges against [defendant] in this case is murder, and it’s alleged that it’s murder in the first degree. [][] It’s further alleged that due to the manner in which the murder was committed, that special circumstances exist. [][] If the jury in this case finds [defendant] guilty of murder in the first degree, and further finds that the special circumstances allegation is true, the jury in this case will be asked to determine the penalty in this case. [][] The jury will have two options, and two options only, and that will be life without the possibility of parole, that will be life in prison, or death. [(][] The reason I’m mentioning that is this: Now, without knowing anything at all about this case, is there any juror sitting in the audience right now that, regardless of what the evidence might be, has such feelings about the death penalty that he or she would be unable to vote to impose the death penalty in this case. [CJ[] If the answer is yes, if you’d rise, please.”

Ten jurors in the first panel responded affirmatively. The court questioned each of them to confirm they would refuse to impose the death penalty regardless of the evidence. For example, the court asked Prospective Juror C.M.: “Miss [M.], that is regardless of what the evidence is; is that correct?” When she answered “yes,” the court excused her. Prospective Juror D.G. was asked, “Miss [G.], your answer is that you would be unable to vote to impose the penalty of death, regardless of the evidence?” The juror answered “yes” and was excused. The court asked essentially the same question of the remaining eight jurors: whether, regardless of the evidence, the prospective juror would be unable to vote to impose the death penalty. It excused the jurors when they answered affirmatively.

The trial court asked a similar question with respect to whether any prospective jurors would vote to impose the death penalty regardless of the evidence. No prospective juror responded affirmatively. Only after this screening was completed were the remaining prospective jurors asked to fill out the juror questionnaire.

Defendant’s objection to the procedure was overruled, as was his renewed objection later in the proceedings, and the trial court used the same procedure when conducting its preliminary screening of the other three panels. The court briefly explained the charges against defendant and the penalty options that would be before the jury should defendant be convicted and the special circumstances found true. The court then asked whether, because of a prospective juror’s feelings about the death penalty, that person would be unable to vote to impose death regardless of the evidence. The court questioned each prospective juror who answered affirmatively to confirm he or she would not vote to impose the death penalty regardless of the evidence. Some of these colloquies were more extensive than others, and on three occasions when there was ambiguity in the prospective juror’s response the trial court did not excuse the individual. In all, the trial court used this procedure to excuse 22 prospective jurors.

“Under decisions of the United States Supreme Court, prospective jurors who express personal opposition to the death penalty are not automatically subject to excusai for cause as long as ‘they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law.’ (Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176 [90 L.Ed.2d 137, 106 S.Ct. 1758]; see Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770] . . . .) To determine if a prospective juror is excusable for cause without compromising a defendant’s constitutional rights, we inquire whether the prospective juror’s views on the death penalty ‘would “prevent or substantially impair the performance” ’ of the juror’s duties in accordance with the court’s instructions and his or her oath. (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844] (Wzri).)” (People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 778 [144 Cal.Rptr.3d 84, 281 P.3d 1].) “Under Witt, a prospective juror is ‘substantially impaired’ and may properly be excused for cause if he or she is unable to follow the trial court’s instruction and ‘conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, including the death penalty where appropriate.’ ” (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 635 [130 Cal.Rptr.3d 590, 259 P.3d 1186].) “In according deference on appeal to trial court rulings on motions to exclude for cause, appellate courts recognize that a trial judge who observes and speaks with a prospective juror and hears that person’s responses (noting, among other things, the person’s tone of voice, apparent level of confidence, and demeanor), gleans valuable information that simply does not appear on the record. [Citation.] As the high court observed in Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 428, ‘the question whether a venireman is biased has traditionally been determined through voir dire culminating in a finding by the trial judge concerning the venireman’s state of mind . . . based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.’ Indeed, as the high court noted in Witt, ‘ “[T]he manner of the juror while testifying is oftentimes more indicative of the real character of his opinion than his words. That is seen below, but cannot always be spread upon the record. Care should, therefore, be taken in the reviewing court not to reverse the ruling below upon such a question of fact, except in a clear case.” ’ ” (Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 451.)

Defendant characterizes the trial court’s questioning of prospective jurors as “perfunctory” and argues it was inadequate to protect his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury because the court failed “to explain[] the applicable law or conduct[] any inquiry into whether the jurors could temporarily put aside [their opposition to the death penalty] and follow the law in this case.” We are not persuaded.

“Recent decisions of this court have emphasized the importance of meaningful death-qualifying voir dire. We have reminded trial courts of their duty to know and follow proper procedure, and to devote sufficient time and effort to the process. [Citations.] At bottom, both the court and counsel ‘must have sufficient information regarding the prospective juror’s state of mind to permit a reliable determination as to whether the juror’s views [on capital punishment] would “ ‘prevent or substantially impair’ ” the performance of his or her duties.’ [Citation.] . . . [][] Nonetheless, the trial court has broad discretion over the number and nature of questions about the death penalty. We have rejected complaints about ‘hasty’ [citation] or ‘perfunctory’ voir dire.” (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 539-540 [26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182].) While the trial court’s preliminary screening of the prospective jurors here was relatively brief, the question it posed to the prospective jurors — whether, regardless of the evidence, they would be unwilling or unable to impose the death penalty — was unequivocal. (See People v. Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 780.)

In Riccardi, question No. 68 of the juror questionnaire asked: “. . . ‘Do you have such an opinion concerning the death penalty that, regardless of the evidence that might be developed during the penalty phase of the trial . . . you would automatically and absolutely refuse to vote for the death penalty in any case?’ ” (People v. Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 780.) The defendant argued that four prospective jurors were improperly excused based solely on their answers to the juror questionnaire because, taken as a whole, their responses were ambiguous and required further examination. Three of those prospective jurors had answered “yes” to question No. 68. In rejecting the defendant’s argument, we observed: “Given that question No. 68 was phrased unequivocally, a prospective juror’s decision to write ‘yes’ as an answer clearly established that the prospective juror held a bias against the death penalty that ‘would “prevent or substantially impair” ’ the performance of his or her duties as a juror even if the evidence leaned in favor of imposing death.” (Ibid:, see People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 531 [“The questionnaire at issue here . . . asked whether a prospective juror held such conscientious objections to the death penalty that, regardless of the evidence or the strength of proof, he or she ‘automatically’ would refuse to return a first degree murder verdict, find a special circumstance true, or impose the death penalty. Any juror who ‘automatically’ would vote in ways that precluded the death penalty would clearly be disqualified under [Wainwright v.] Witt[, supra, 469 U.S. 412].”].)

Here, too, the trial court asked whether any prospective juror’s opposition to the death penalty would preclude her or him from imposing it regardless of the evidence. Those who answered “yes” and whose answer was confirmed by further questioning by the trial court, were disqualified. While brief, the trial court’s questioning was not rote. Some prospective jurors expanded their responses, making it even clearer their opposition to the death penalty would preclude them from imposing it. For example, one prospective juror informed the court, “I am strongly against the death penalty. I’m against it.” When the court asked, “In any case?” the prospective juror replied, “In any case. Life imprisonment, I’m okay; but death, I’m against it.” The court continued the colloquy, asking, “So you would be unable to vote to impose the death penalty in this case or in any case; is that right?” “Yes,” the prospective juror replied. She answered “yes” again when the court asked a final question: “Regardless of the evidence?” Another juror explained that even killing a fish while fishing had been so upsetting to her that “there is no way I could even consider anything like [the death penalty].” The court asked, “You couldn’t conceive of an instance so terrible that you would vote to impose the death penalty?” The prospective juror replied, “No, not at all.” Still, the court probed further, eliciting from the prospective witness repeated statements affirming she would not impose the death penalty in any case (“Everything has a right to live”), under any circumstance (“No circumstance”), and regardless of the evidence (“Regardless”).

On the other hand, the three prospective jurors whose answers were confused or ambiguous were not excused. Moreover, unlike in People v. Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th 758, or People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th 491, the trial court had the opportunity to observe the prospective jurors as they responded to its questions, permitting it to evaluate their credibility and their conviction. The trial court’s ability to “assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose it, [is] a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.” (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 9 [167 L.Ed.2d 1014, 127 S.Ct. 2218].) Thus, “the trial court makes a judgment based in part on the demeanor of the juror, a judgment owed deference by reviewing courts.” (Ibid.) Finally, “[w]hen a juror has clearly expressed an inability to vote for the death penalty regardless of the evidence that may be produced at trial, the court has discretion to limit further voir dire directed toward persuading the juror that there may be some circumstance which he has not considered that could cause him to modify his conscientious or moral attitude toward the death penalty.” (People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 846 [268 Cal.Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983]; accord, People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 714 [137 Cal.Rptr.3d 147, 269 P.3d 568].)

Defendant’s reliance on Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th 425, and Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946, is misplaced because those decisions involve factual circumstances not present here. “[T]he trial court in Stewart excused prospective jurors based solely on their answers to a written question concerning whether their death penalty views would “prevent or make it very difficult” ’ to determine the appropriate penalty, and without engaging in oral voir dire. (Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 444, 446-447, italics omitted.)” (People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1017 [150 Cal.Rptr.3d 299, 290 P.3d 364].) “As we observed, even one who gave a straightforward ‘yes’ answer to such questions would not necessarily demonstrate disqualification under Witt, because mere difficulty in imposing the death penalty does not, per se, prevent or substantially impair the performance of a juror’s duties. The prospective juror might nonetheless be able to put aside his or her personal views and deliberate fairly under the death penalty law. Yet the Stewart questionnaire did not inquire whether the prospective juror could do so.” (People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 530.) In this case, unlike in Stewart, the jurors were personally questioned by the trial court. And unlike the questionnaire in Stewart, the court’s questions here did not use the “make it very difficult” formulation, but asked the jurors unequivocally whether they would be unable to apply the death penalty. Accordingly, Stewart is inapplicable here.

Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946, also involved circumstances quite different from those presented in this case. In Heard, a prospective juror indicated on the juror questionnaire he believed life without possibility of parole was a worse penalty than death. When questioned by the trial court about his response, however, the prospective juror “made it quite clear that he would not vote ‘automatically’ — in other words, ‘no matter what the evidence showed’ — either for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or for death, and also that he would not be reluctant to find the defendant guilty of first degree murder or to find the special circumstances tme ‘so as to avoid having to face the issue of the death penalty.’ ” (Id. at p. 964.) Given the prospective juror’s oral responses, we concluded the trial court had improperly excused him for cause. (Ibid.) In this case, by contrast, the excused jurors clearly stated they would be unable to impose the death penalty regardless of what the evidence showed. We thus reject defendant’s contention that Stewart and Heard require reversal in this case.

The dissent maintains that the trial court’s excusai of 16 prospective jurors from the first two panels was error because the trial court did not conduct a further inquiry after they unequivocally stated they would not impose the death penalty regardless of the evidence. The dissent would have had the trial court explain to the prospective jurors the bifurcated nature of a capital case, the possibility that evidence in aggravation and mitigation might be presented at the penalty phase and the weighing process the jury engages in with respect to such evidence, and have inquired of them whether they could put aside their views and follow the law.

As noted, the trial court exercises its discretion over the number and nature of questions about the death penalty. (People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 539-540.) There is no requirement that a trial court engage in the exposition the dissent would impose upon it. The issue here is not whether the prospective jurors were simply opposed to the death penalty or “did not believe in it,” a circumstance that would require further voir dire, but whether their opposition would disable them from imposing the death penalty regardless of the evidence. Although the trial court did not ask the jurors if they could set aside their feelings and follow the court’s instructions, the court’s inquiry did call on the jurors to assess their ability to vote for death. If a prospective juror states unequivocally that he or she would be unable to impose the death penalty regardless of the evidence, the prospective juror is, by definition, someone whose views “would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ” (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424.) Further inquiry concerning the juror’s ability to follow the law is not required.

In reviewing the trial court’s determination, we apply a “rule of deference” (Uttecht v. Brown, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 7) based on the trial court’s ability to assess the demeanor and credibility of the prospective witness (Darden v. Wainwright (1986) All U.S. 168, 178 [91 L.Ed.2d 144, 106 S.Ct. 2464]). The dissent rejects application of the rule here, asserting the trial court spent insufficient time questioning the individual prospective jurors to have drawn any conclusions regarding their demeanor or credibility. (Cone. & dis. opn., post, at pp. 897-898.) Certainly the trial court could have conducted a fuller inquiry and the better practice is to do so. But the reviewing court applies the rule to the circumstances before it, not the circumstances it might have wished for. (Uttecht v. Brown, supra, at p. 7 [“Deference is owed regardless of whether the trial court engages in explicit analysis regarding substantial impairment . . . .”].) The fact remains the trial court was present at the voir dire and we were not. The dissent cites no authority for the proposition that the trial court must spend a certain amount of time, give certain explanations, ask certain questions, or make findings on the record in support of its determination before a reviewing court applies the rule of deference.

The dissent’s reliance on the Darden decision is misplaced. That opinion does not stand for the proposition that a trial court cannot excuse a prospective juror based on his or her unequivocal answer to a single question unless the record reveals the prospective juror received additional information regarding assessment of the penalty. The claim raised and rejected in Darden was that the trial court had misstated the Witt standard. (Darden v. Wainwright, supra, All U.S. at pp. 175-178.) The court’s examination of the context in which the challenged question was asked was to determine whether the court had “stated the correct standard whe