Full opinion text
Opinion BAXTER, J. A jury convicted defendant Gene Estel McCurdy of the first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)), and kidnapping with the purpose to commit a lewd act on a child under 14 years old (§ 207, subd. (b)) of Maria Piceno. The jury found true the special circumstance allegation of kidnapping murder. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(B).) The jury returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied defendant’s automatic motion to modify the penalty verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), sentenced him to death on the murder count, and suspended the imposition of sentencing on the remaining counts. This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We affirm the judgment. I. Facts Eight-year-old Maria Piceno disappeared on March 27, 1995, and her body was discovered approximately two weeks later. At trial, defendant admitted being in the vicinity of Piceno’s last known whereabouts, but denied kidnapping or killing her. A. Guilt Phase 1. Prosecution Evidence Around 3:00 p.m. on March 27, Arcelia Ferrel sent her eight-year-old daughter Maria Piceno to buy some food at Food King, a store two blocks away from their Lemoore apartment. About 20 minutes later, Ferrel went to look for Piceno, but could not find her. A receipt from the store indicated Piceno had bought some food at 3:18 p.m. Eric Douglas saw Piceno in the Food King aisle where ice cream products were displayed. He recalled it being around 3:43 p.m. About 15 minutes later, Douglas saw Piceno in another store in the same shopping center as Food King. Mychael Jackson saw defendant talking to Piceno and holding her hand outside of Food King. Jackson walked to his car, which was approximately 15 feet from defendant’s truck. Jackson saw defendant open the truck’s passenger door and “somebody short” got inside. Defendant then closed the door and walked around the truck to the driver’s side. As Jackson drove off, he could no longer see Piceno in the parking lot. Although his car’s clock indicated this happened around 4:00 p.m., he estimated it was actually 3:50 p.m. because he had set the clock to be 10 minutes fast. Jackson admitted he had suffered a felony fraud conviction while defendant’s case was pending. He denied receiving any benefit for his testimony or knowing that a reward had been offered for information regarding the murder. Jackson denied any involvement in Piceno’s disappearance. A receipt from a video store in the same shopping center as Food King indicated defendant rented three unrated “adult” videos at 3:28 p.m. that day. A receipt from another video store in Lemoore indicated that defendant rented three “X-rated movies” at 3:34 p.m. A third receipt indicated defendant rented three “[p]omographic films” around 4:10 p.m. from another video store in Lemoore. The jury heard the titles of the nine movies. Mary Smith lived next to defendant and had previously been in a brief romantic relationship with him. Smith’s mother, Mary Lazaro, was visiting Smith on the day of Piceno’s disappearance. That evening Lazaro heard through the common wall shared with defendant’s apartment what sounded like a child’s soft whimpering. There were no children in the movie they were watching. Because Lazaro thought the whimpering was coming from defendant’s apartment, Smith told her he did not have any children. The next day, defendant and Smith were watching television together in her apartment when a news bulletin came on about Piceno’s disappearance. Defendant sat up, faced the television, and shifted uncomfortably. A few days after Piceno’s disappearance, Smith told defendant she felt bad that the girl was missing. Defendant, who normally was an attentive listener, interrupted Smith in a hostile manner while not making eye contact with her. Sometime during the last week of March defendant shaved off his mustache. Defendant, who was in the United States Navy, was scheduled for a six-month deployment at sea starting around April 11. In the week preceding the deployment and while at sea, one of defendant’s squadron mates noted he appeared to be unusually agitated, frustrated, and distant. On April 9, Piceno’s fully clothed body was discovered in Poso Creek, which is located in the greater Bakersfield area. Defendant’s parents’ house was in Bakersfield. Defendant’s sister testified defendant was familiar with this creek because it was a well-known local landmark. A shower curtain similar to one that had been given to defendant would later be discovered partially buried approximately 500 yards upstream from Piceno’s body. Carole Cacciaroni, a criminal investigator employed by the Navy and stationed on the same ship as defendant, interviewed him on April 18. When Agent Cacciaroni asked defendant if he knew why she wanted to speak to him, he referred to Piceno’s disappearance. Defendant explained he was renting adult-oriented videotapes at the video store in the shopping center around the time when Piceno was abducted. Defendant offered to be hypnotized to see if it would help him remember anything. Defendant denied knowing what had happened to Piceno. Defendant told Agent Cacciaroni that prior to his deployment he regularly visited his parents’ home. When Agent Cacciaroni informed defendant that Piceno was found dead, he became very upset, started to cry, and asked if Piceno had been molested. Defendant explained he was upset because he had recently quit smoking and had been under some stress. The next day, defendant told Agent Cacciaroni that he was feeling “very disturbed” and “paranoid” because “everybody was pointing fingers at him and that he was sick to his stomach.” Defendant appeared visibly upset, had red and teary eyes, tightly clenched fists, and “shaky” movements. Defendant told Agent Cacciaroni that he did not know if he should “get a lawyer.” When Agent Cacciaroni asked him why he thought he might need an attorney, defendant continued to cry and rock in his chair. Defendant left Agent Cacciaroni’s office, but returned a short while later and appeared to be much more relaxed. Agent Cacciaroni ran into defendant a few days later, and he acted “standoffish” and distant. Police searched defendant’s storage unit in Lemoore and found a box of approximately 30 adult-oriented magazines, several of which had sexually explicit titles and content focusing on teenage women who were staged to appear younger than their actual ages. A list of titles of some of the recovered magazines was admitted into evidence, but the magazines themselves were not. Defendant later told Bruce Ackerman, a federal deputy marshal assigned to the United States Postal Service and an expert on child pornography, that he had purchased the magazines. He also acknowledged the women in them looked younger than 18 years old. At defendant’s trial, Deputy Ackerman testified that, in his experience, in every case in which a person had possessed similar magazines, that person had expressed a sexual interest in minors. Deputy Ackerman conceded he usually investigated only people who had expressed such an interest. Deputy Ackerman also testified at trial that, when asked about the day of Piceno’s disappearance, defendant said he could not remember what he had done after renting the videotapes. Defendant’s younger sister testified that he molested her when they were children. The molestations continued intermittently for over a decade. Several years after the abuse had ended, defendant apologized to his sister for molesting her, and told her that one of the reasons why he never married was “he was really afraid that he might molest his own children.” A forensic pathologist conducted an autopsy, determined Piceno did not die from a heart attack or other natural causes, and concluded she had died from suffocation. Piceno also had non-life-threatening blunt force injuries. The pathologist could not locate Piceno’s hymen, which was consistent with either molestation or decomposition. Based on the creek’s temperature and the state of decomposition, the pathologist estimated Piceno’s body could have been in the water for as long as two weeks. 2. Defense Evidence Claudeen Jackson, who was married to Mychael Jackson but had filed for divorce, believed him to be an “impulsive liar” because he “constantly” lied to her during their marriage. On cross-examination, she admitted she had suffered a felony fraud conviction while defendant’s case was pending. Annie Snowden, Jackson’s ex-wife, testified he was “the biggest liar you will ever run into. He lies about everything.” Two of Jackson’s ex-girlfriends also were of the opinion that he generally was dishonest. A Lemoore police officer testified about discrepancies in Mychael Jackson’s testimony. For example, at trial Jackson testified that he looked at his car’s clock when he entered Lemoore, but he had not mentioned to the interviewing officer the clock was fast. At trial he described the T-shirt defendant wore on the day of Piceno’s abduction, but when initially interviewed by the police Jackson had not provided any details about defendant’s T-shirt. Jackson’s testimony also included other details about defendant’s apparel and vehicle that were not mentioned during his initial interview. A Lemoore police sergeant testified he interviewed Smith, defendant’s ex-girlfriend, after defendant had deployed. Smith told the sergeant that, before his deployment, defendant said he shaved his mustache so he would not have to maintain it while he was at sea. Smith did not tell the sergeant that her mother had heard a child’s whimper. A Tulare County Sheriff’s detective testified about Angelica R., a 10-year-old girl who had been abducted in Visalia approximately a year before Piceno’s death. Angelica R.’s body was discovered in an irrigation ditch approximately 45 miles away from where Piceno’s body was found. Defendant was stationed in the State of Washington when Angelica R. was abducted and he was not the donor of sperm recovered from her body. Unlike Piceno, Angelica R. had been strangled, was discovered nude from the waist down, and had been raped. Defendant testified and denied any involvement with Piceno’s disappearance and death. On the day of Piceno’s abduction, defendant returned 12 adult-oriented videotapes and rented nine more, then went to his apartment and watched all nine videos, which he accomplished by watching portions of them in the fast-forward mode of play. Defendant had been romantically involved with Smith, but denied being in her apartment after Piceno’s disappearance, as Smith had reconciled with her husband by then. Defendant denied having the conversation about Piceno in which Smith claimed he interrupted her. Defendant claimed he shaved off his mustache around a week before his deployment because he was not taking his electric razor with him. Defendant admitted to being “edgy” during his deployment, but claimed his mood was caused by the stress of a new job that had a lot of responsibility. Defendant admitted he lied to Deputy Ackerman about not knowing his whereabouts on the day of Piceno’s disappearance, but claimed he was embarrassed by having rented so many adult-oriented videotapes. Defendant admitted to having twice visited the creek where Piceno’s body was found. He denied owning or possessing a shower curtain resembling the one found near Piceno’s body. Defendant admitted to engaging in sexual activities with his sister while they were growing up, but claimed the encounters were consensual. Defendant and his sister had admitted to each other that they both had been molested by their uncle. Defendant denied having a sexual interest in children. B. Penalty Phase 1. Prosecution Evidence Piceno’s mother Arcelia Ferrel testified that her daughter was a helpful and thoughtful child who wanted to be a doctor when she grew up. Piceno’s abduction and death made Ferrel very afraid, and she also feared for the safety of her other children. Piceno’s death caused Ferrel to have nightmares, and her family was still in counseling. Ferrel brought some of Piceno’s mementos to court. 2. Defense Evidence Defendant’s mother, Anetta McCurdy, testified about his life growing up. Defendant was the oldest of four children and participated in the Boy Scouts. The family was very poor. Defendant was helpful, did not cause problems, and had never been in trouble with the law. After graduating from high school, defendant entered the Navy and had been awarded the Naval Achievement Medal. The stress caused by defendant’s trial had been extremely difficult on his family, worsened his parents’ health, and caused his mother to have nightmares. Anetta wanted defendant to live. II. Discussion A. Pretrial Claims 1. Change of Venue Before jury selection, defendant unsuccessfully moved to change the venue of his trial from Kings County. Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred by denying his motion. We disagree. A defendant’s motion to change venue must be granted “when it appears that there is a reasonable likelihood that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county.” (§ 1033, subd. (a).) “Reasonable likelihood” in this context “ ‘means something less than “more probable than not,” ’ and ‘something more than merely “possible.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 523 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100] (Proctor).) “ ‘ “The trial court typically considers the nature and gravity of the offense, the size of the community, the status of the defendant and the victim, and the nature and extent of the publicity. On appeal, the defendant must show that denial of the venue motion was error (i.e., that it was reasonably likely a fair trial could not be had at the time the motion was made) and that the error was prejudicial (i.e., that it [is] reasonably likely a fair trial was not in fact had). We will sustain the court’s determination of the relevant facts where supported by substantial evidence. We independently review the court’s ultimate determination of the reasonable likelihood of an unfair trial.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1124-1125 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 297, 163 P.3d 4] (Zambrano).) In his motion, defendant contended his case had garnered significant media attention. It had been featured on the national television show, America’s Most Wanted. Three regional newspapers had published about 60 articles on the subject, and four regional television stations had broadcast numerous reports. Notably, one newspaper article quoted an anonymous law enforcement officer who, despite an order barring communication with the media, said that defendant “basically admitted to everything. . . . He’s guilty as sin.” Another article reported on a public memorial that was held for Piceno. In his motion, defendant also contended the order barring communication with the media prevented him from correcting inaccurate media accounts. Without stating its reasons, the trial court denied defendant’s motion without prejudice, allowing him to renew it “at a later date.” He did not do so. The Attorney General preliminarily contends defendant forfeited this issue on appeal because he did not renew his motion. “ “[W]hen a trial court initially denies a change of venue motion without prejudice, a defendant must renew the motion after voir dire of the jury to preserve the issue for appeal.” ’ [Citation.]” (Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1124.) We agree with the Attorney General that the claim is forfeited. Defendant concedes he did not renew his motion after voir dire, but contends it would have been futile for him to renew his motion because the trial court was predisposed to keep his trial in Kings County. (Cf. People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673] [claim of prosecutorial misconduct not forfeited on appeal if a timely objection and request for admonishment would have been futile].) In support, defendant cites the court’s remarks during a hearing regarding the order barring communication with the media, in which the court stated it believed a change of venue could impose an undue burden upon the victim’s family’s “right” to attend the trial. The court’s comments regarding the family’s right to a convenient venue were made nearly a year before defendant moved for a change of venue, when the court was ruling on another issue. Even assuming futility could excuse defendant’s failure to renew his motion, the court’s isolated remark does not establish irreversible hostility to changing venue. In addition, even if the claim had not been forfeited, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling. The first factor of the legal analysis — the nature and gravity of the offense — favored a change of venue, but it did not compel one. The abduction and murder of a young girl from a shopping center is a shocking and serious crime, and the allegations of incestuous molestations were sensational. But the disturbing facts inherent in most capital murder cases standing alone do not require a change of venue. (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 224 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643].) Although prospective jurors would likely sympathize with Piceno’s fate, this sympathy stems from the nature of the crime, and not the locale of the trial. (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 578 [94 Cal.Rptr.3d 322, 208 P.3d 78].) As to the second factor — the nature and extent of the media coverage — it did not heavily favor a change of venue. Of the approximately 60 newspaper articles published about defendant’s case before his motion to change venue, around a third of them were published in the two months following his arrest. Defendant’s trial occurred around 20 months after his arrest. The passage of time ordinarily blunts the prejudicial impact of pretrial publicity. (People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 827 [161 Cal.Rptr.3d 364, 306 P.3d 1195] {Harris).) Moreover, we have affirmed the denial of motions to change venue in cases with more media coverage. (E.g., id. at pp. 823-825 [48 newspaper articles, 294 television reports; media coverage described as “ ‘substantial’ ”]; People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 434 [46 Cal.Rptr.3d 677, 139 P.3d 64] [coverage of serial murder case described as “ ‘saturation’ ”].) The newspapers reported that the trial court excluded most of the questioning conducted by the police, and some articles included facts not admitted at defendant’s trial. In addition, defendant specifically cites a newspaper article’s coverage of his arraignment, at which he “appeared subdued as he arrived at the Kings County government complex . . . , his chin tucked into the collar of a bullet proof vest, [¶] Insults and jeers were hurled as [defendant] passed by a crowd who gathered to watch the spectacle. ‘No rope too short . . . Death penalty, you bet,’ onlookers cried out.” Another article commented, “One could almost feel the deep sigh of relief the entire city of 13,000 breathed when news got out that someone had been caught . . . .” Another article reported that one of defendant’s distant relatives had received a death threat. Defendant further notes that some of the articles reported he was a suspect in the abduction or murder of other juvenile victims in California and Washington. The record, however, discloses the tone of most of the articles was relatively neutral, and none was especially prejudicial or inflammatory. (See, e.g., People v. Famalaro (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1, 22-23 [127 Cal.Rptr.3d 40, 253 P.3d 1185] (Famalaro); People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1218-1219 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543, 156 P.3d 1015] (Prince); People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 448 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790] [recitation of inherently disturbing facts does not demonstrate media bias].) Moreover, a number of the articles focused not on defendant, but the court’s order barring communication with the media. Other articles contradicted the reports that he was a suspect in other child abductions, and presented defendant’s mother’s statement that she believed he was innocent. Particularly in light of the timing of the majority of the reporting mentioned above, the newspaper coverage did not strongly weigh in favor of a change of venue. An episode of the nationally televised show America’s Most Wanted reported on Piceno’s abduction. The record does not contain any details about the episode other than that it aired soon after Piceno’s disappearance, which occurred nearly two years before defendant’s trial. Moreover, as America’s Most Wanted was broadcast nationally, “a change of venue could not be expected to dilute its prejudicial effect.” (Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1127; see People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 279-281 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 648, 187 P.3d 363] (Riggs) [no finding of juror bias when three seated jurors acknowledged seeing an episode of America’s Most Wanted featuring the defendant’s case]; People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 312-314 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374] [affirming denial of motion to change venue where 20 percent of the venire and three seated jurors had seen episodes of America’s Most Wanted featuring the defendant’s case].) With respect to the third factor — the size of the community — its size at the time of defendant’s trial did not weigh heavily in favor of change of venue. “ ‘The size of the community is important because in a small rural community, a major crime is likely to be embedded in the public consciousness more deeply and for a longer time than in a populous urban area.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 280 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990] [affirming denial of change of venue motion in a capital case in Stanislaus County, population approximately 370,000].) The size of the county, however, is not determinative; the critical factor is whether the size of the population was sufficient to dilute adverse publicity. (Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 525.) At the time of defendant’s trial, the population of Kings County was 116,312. We have found reversible error in the denial of change of venue motions in capital cases in comparably sized counties. (E.g., People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1126 [259 Cal.Rptr. 473, 774 P.2d 146] (Williams) [Placer County, population approximately 117,000]; Martinez v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 574, 582 [174 Cal.Rptr. 701, 629 P.2d 502] (Martinez) [Placer County, population 106,500]; Frazier v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 287, 293, fn. 5 [95 Cal.Rptr. 798, 486 P.2d 694] [Santa Cruz County, population 123,790]; Fain v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 46, 52, fn. 1 [84 Cal.Rptr. 135, 465 P.2d 23] [Stanislaus County, population 184,600].) On the other hand, we have also affirmed the denial of change of venue in capital cases tried in comparably sized communities. (E.g., People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1250-1251 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645] [Santa Cruz County, population under 200,000]; Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 525 [Shasta County, population approximately 122,100]; see People v. Coen (1928) 205 Cal. 596, 604-607 [271 P. 1074] [Kings County].) We cannot say the population size of Kings County by itself compelled a change of venue; it may have at most somewhat favored one. (See Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 526.) In Williams, for example, in addition to the size of the county, our reasons for reversing the trial court’s denial of a motion to change venue included the fact that a substantial percentage of the venire knew either the victim, her family, or people in the district attorney’s office. (Williams, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1130.) That was not the case here. The fourth factor — the community status of the defendant, meaning whether defendant had any prominence in the community before the crimes— did not weigh heavily for or against change of venue. Defendant was not well known before his arrest. (See Famalaro, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 23.) Because defendant had lived in Kings County for only six months before the crimes occurred, he may have been perceived as an outsider by the community. (See ibid.) But defendant also had no previous criminal record and was not a member of a racial or ethnic group that could be subject to discrimination. (See People v. Rountree (2013) 56 Cal.4th 823, 839 [157 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 301 P.3d 150]; cf. Williams, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 1126, 1129-1130 [the defendant was an African-American tried in a small county in which only 0.4 percent of the population was African-American].) There is no evidence he belonged to a group to which the community was likely to be hostile; rather, defendant was serving in the Navy when Piceno was abducted. (Cf. Martinez, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 584 [victim’s status of being an employee of the county’s largest employer favored a change of venue].) The fifth factor — the community status of the victim, meaning whether the victim had any prominence in the community before the crimes — did not support a change of venue. Although eight-year-old Piceno was undoubtedly a highly sympathetic victim, she was prominent only due to her being murdered. (Cf. Williams, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 1129-1130 [victim came from a prominent family in the community].) Piceno was not known to the public before her disappearance and there was no evidence she or her family had extensive ties to the community. (See Famalaro, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 23-24.) Moreover, any sympathy garnered by Piceno’s young age and vulnerability would have been apparent regardless of where defendant was tried. (See Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1214.) A newspaper article did report on a public memorial held for Piceno, but nothing in the record suggests this influenced the venire. (See Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 829.) In sum, although some of the factors may have favored a changed venue, the totality of circumstances did not require one. The trial court properly ruled that defendant failed to demonstrate there was a reasonable likelihood he could not receive a fair and impartial trial in Kings County. Defendant also fails to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood he was prejudiced, that is, that he did not in fact receive a fair and impartial trial. (See Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 523.) “With regard to the second part of the showing, in order to determine whether pretrial publicity had a prejudicial effect on the jury, we also examine the voir dire of the jurors.” (Id. at p. 524.) During voir dire, although most prospective jurors expressed some familiarity with defendant’s case, only seven prospective jurors of around 100 were excused for cause based on the trial court’s finding that they had been overly exposed to pretrial publicity. “ ‘The relevant question is not whether the community remembered the case, but whether the jurors . . . had such fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt of the defendant.’ [Citation.]” (Famalaro, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 31.) Nothing in the record suggests that any of the seated jurors could not put aside outside influences and fairly try the case. Nor does the record disclose evidence that any of the seated jurors harbored a bias that was not detected during voir dire. Moreover, defendant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges and did not object to the seated jury’s composition. This suggests defendant at trial believed the jury was fair and impartial. (See People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 922 [55 Cal.Rptr.3d 865, 153 P.3d 955].) 2. Motion to Suppress From April 30 through May 3, law enforcement officials extensively questioned defendant. Before his trial, defendant moved, pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602] (Miranda), to exclude all statements he made during this questioning on the grounds they were unknowingly and involuntarily given. Defendant also moved to exclude Mychael Jackson’s testimony as a “tainted fruit” of these questions. The trial court granted in part his motion, and excluded from trial many of defendant’s statements. Arguing that his statements violated Miranda, and were involuntary, defendant contends the court erred in not excluding all of his statements and Jackson’s testimony. We are not persuaded that reversible error occurred. The trial court divided defendant’s responses to the questioning into five sections: (1) statements he made before receiving the Miranda warning; (2) statements he made after receiving the warning until he first said he wanted a lawyer; (3) statements made after he reinitiated the conversation until he insisted he did not want to answer questions about his childhood; (4) statements made thereafter during a protracted period in which four more times he expressed a desire for an attorney; and (5) all statements made after the last of these requests. The court ruled that all statements he made in sections (1) through (3) were admissible; that statements in the fourth section were admissible only for impeachment purposes; and that statements in the fifth section were not admissible for any purpose. The court also ruled Jackson’s testimony was admissible. As we will explain, the trial court correctly admitted into evidence all of defendant’s statements in sections (1) through (3) described above. Any error as to the admission, for impeachment only, of defendant’s statements made in section four was harmless. The court also correctly admitted Jackson’s testimony. a. Background On April 30, Lieutenant Mark Bingaman of the Kings County Sheriff’s Office, Agent Mike Devine of the Naval Investigative Service, Deputy Marshal Bruce Ackerman, and a Lemoore police officer flew from California to defendant’s ship, which was at sea near Japan. Defendant had worked that day. Around 10:00 p.m., defendant’s commanding officer ordered him to be escorted to an interview room. i. Statements made before receiving Miranda warning Deputy Ackerman and Lieutenant Bingaman started to question defendant. Deputy Ackerman asked, and defendant answered, several questions about his background, such as his upbringing, his decision to join the Navy, and his hobbies. Deputy Ackerman offered defendant some water, which he accepted. ii. Miranda warning and subsequent statements Lieutenant Bingaman then advised defendant of his rights to remain silent and to the presence and assistance of counsel. Defendant acknowledged he understood his rights. Lieutenant Bingaman asked for his help with the investigation, and defendant responded, “They always tell you get a lawyer. ... I don’t know why.” Deputy Ackerman told defendant that they could not advise him, but stressed it was important for him to help with Piceno’s disappearance, and added, “You know what we’re trying to do is we’re trying to help you.” When defendant then expressed difficulty breathing, Deputy Ackerman suggested that he take his time and take deep breaths. Deputy Ackerman continued his questioning, during which defendant told him that he could not relax, requested cigarettes and water, continued to have problems breathing, expressed confusion, and became emotional. At one point, Lieutenant Bingaman left the interview room and a short while later Agent Devine entered. Deputy Ackerman and Agent Devine questioned defendant about the adult-oriented magazines found in his storage unit. Agent Devine explained that “a lot of people that had these kind of magazines [may have] had something happen in their lives,” and asked defendant if anything had happened to him when he was younger. Defendant responded, “I can’t say. I want a lawyer.” Deputy Ackerman started to close his file and leave the room. iii. Statements made after defendant reinitiated the conversation Around 20 seconds later, defendant said, “I don’t know if you guys got any other suspects or what.” Agent Devine explained they were talking to several people. The questioning then resumed. Soon thereafter, defendant said, “I don’t know what to do,” and added, “I [want to] help you guys, I want you guys to find him, but I don’t want to incriminate myself.” Deputy Ackerman continued to question defendant, and asked him several questions about his sister. Defendant then said, “I can’t talk no more.” Deputy Ackerman, however, offered him more water, and continued with the questioning. Agent Devine then questioned defendant. When Agent Devine inquired about defendant’s childhood, defendant replied, “I’d rather not say.” Agent Devine pressed the subject, but defendant stated four times more that he did not want to talk about his childhood. iv. Statements made after defendant stated he did not want to discuss his childhood Deputy Ackerman further questioned defendant. Defendant acknowledged that he was “dealing with” some issues. Defendant offered to give the officers a blood sample. Defendant could not think of anything that might help the officers to understand him or his “situation” better. Defendant said he believed the officers thought he was guilty because of his adult-oriented magazines and because they had come from California to question him. Deputy Ackerman showed defendant a letter that referenced a child and contained the phrase “Lover’s Dreams.” Defendant assumed the letter was written by Piceno’s murderer, and described it as “gibberish.” Deputy Ackerman told him that the letter was recovered from his storage unit, which defendant denied. Defendant offered to provide a handwriting sample to prove he did not write the letter. Defendant then said, “I want a lawyer, enough said.” Defendant assumed the officers were going to show him photographs of Piceno’s body, and said he did not want to see them. The questioning briefly continued and defendant said twice more that he wanted a lawyer. Deputy Ackerman explained that he and Agent Devine were going to talk for a minute, and they left the room. Approximately 20 minutes later, Lieutenant Bingaman reentered the room, woke defendant up, and asked defendant about his request for a lawyer. In the course of doing so, Lieutenant Bingaman resumed questioning defendant. Defendant stated he wanted to talk with a lawyer about the letter Deputy Ackerman had shown him. Defendant told Lieutenant Bingaman two other people also had boxes in his storage unit; he told him their names and suggested the letter came from one of their boxes. Defendant described one of these other people as “not all there.” Defendant admitted to Lieutenant Bingaman that he had rented videotapes from multiple stores on the day of Piceno’s disappearance, contrary to any of his prior statements that may have implied that he had visited only the video store in the shopping center from which Piceno was abducted. Defendant told Lieutenant Bingaman he had no idea who abducted Piceno but he “didn’t do it.” Defendant described his truck to Lieutenant Bingaman. Defendant knew that Piceno was abducted on a Monday, but stated he remembered that detail because it was mentioned in the news reports. Defendant admitted the adult-oriented magazines taken from the storage unit were his. Lieutenant Bingaman questioned defendant about notes he had made about adult-oriented movies, and he replied, “I’d rather not [tell] you.” Defendant told Lieutenant Bingaman, “[0]nce you clear me, people are still going to look at me as a pervert.” Lieutenant Bingaman continued to ask about defendant’s notes. Defendant denied that he ever sold any videotapes for profit, but admitted he had multiple videocassette players, which could be used to copy videotapes. Defendant admitted he had dated several 16-year-old girls, including once when he was 28 years old. Defendant told Lieutenant Bingaman that he covered his apartment’s windows because he used to work nights and doing so helped block out the daylight. Defendant, who lived in a town near Lemoore, stated he went to the video stores in Lemoore because they had a good selection. Defendant told Lieutenant Bingaman that after he rented the videotapes, he picked up his mail from the post office, but he could not remember what he did after that. Defendant offered to submit to a polygraph examination. Lieutenant Bingaman inquired about a motel reservation made under defendant’s name. Defendant responded, “Okay, here we go again. I [want to] see a lawyer.” v. Statements made after defendant’s “here we go again” response Lieutenant Bingaman soon thereafter asked defendant, “[Y]ou want me to talk to you?” and defendant responded that he wanted the lieutenant to explain himself. Lieutenant Bingaman stated he wanted to know why defendant had made a reservation in a motel on the day of Piceno’s disappearance. Defendant denied making any reservations. Lieutenant Bingaman asked defendant who was setting him up if he did not make the reservation. Defendant asked why anyone would do that, and Lieutenant Bingaman responded, “I swear with everything holy to me that, that your name is on reservations at [the motel] on the day that that little girl is taken and [you have got to] give me an answer on that or [I am going to] have to make some hard decisions whether I’m taking you back to the [S]totes.” The questioning continued until around 4:00 a.m., when Lieutenant Bingaman told defendant he was under arrest. Agent Devine, however, then told defendant that Lieutenant Bingaman lacked the authority to arrest him. Defendant’s commanding officer ordered him to be confined, and defendant was transferred to a military base in Japan on May 1. Defendant was questioned on May 2 and May 3 until he was transferred to the custody of civilian authorities. On May 3, the trial court issued a warrant for defendant’s arrest. b. Trial court’s ruling on defendant’s statements Following an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s motion to exclude his statements and to preclude Jackson from testifying, the trial court granted defendant’s motion in part. The court first ruled defendant’s statements before being advised of his Miranda rights were voluntarily made and therefore admissible because of the nonincriminating nature of the questioning. The court ruled defendant’s postadvisement statement that “[t]hey always tell you get a lawyer” was not an invocation of the right to counsel, and his continuing to talk was an implied waiver of his rights. The trial court further ruled that defendant’s statement “I want a lawyer” after being asked if anything had happened to him when he was younger was an invocation of his right to counsel, but in reinitiating the conversation by saying, “I don’t know if you guys got any other suspects or what,” he again waived his rights. The court based its finding on the nonincriminating nature of the preliminary questioning, Deputy Ackerman’s having advised defendant of his rights approximately an hour and 45 minutes earlier, defendant’s initial waiving of his rights, the lack of intimidation tactics or improper inducements, defendant’s understanding that he was a suspect, Deputy Ackerman’s attempt to terminate the interview after defendant’s invocation, and defendant’s reinitiation of the conversation following his invocation. The trial court ruled defendant’s later repeated requests to not discuss his childhood was an invocation of his right to remain silent. The court acknowledged that a suspect’s desire to not discuss a particular subject did not preclude further questioning about other subjects. It found, however, that here Agent Devine’s repeated questions in spite of defendant’s refusals violated his Miranda rights. The court suppressed from the prosecutor’s case-in-chief all statements defendant made after he told Agent Devine that he did not want to talk about his childhood, including the statements he made after he had again requested a lawyer when the officers left him alone for 20 minutes. The trial court also ruled that much of the questioning was involuntary due to the “prolonged repetitive high-pressured questioning interspersed with numerous instances of purposeful disregard of [defendant’s] requests . . . .” The court ruled that all statements made after the questioning about the motel room were involuntary and could not be used at defendant’s trial for any purpose. c. Discussion Defendant contends all of his statements made during the questioning should have been excluded at trial because they were violative of Miranda, and also were involuntary. The applicable law is settled: “ ‘As a prophylactic safeguard to protect a suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the United States Supreme Court, in Miranda, required law enforcement agencies to advise a suspect, before any custodial law enforcement questioning, that “he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Sauceda-Contreras (2012) 55 Cal.4th 203, 215 [145 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 282 P.3d 279] (Sauceda-Contreras).) “ “[I]f the accused indicates in any manner that he wishes to remain silent or to consult an attorney, interrogation must cease, and any statement obtained from him during interrogation thereafter may not be admitted against him at his trial” [citation], at least during the prosecution’s case-in-chief [citations].’ [Citation.] ‘Critically, however, a suspect can waive these rights.’ [Citation.]” (Nelson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 374, italics added.) “The waiver must be ‘voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception’ [citation], and knowing in the sense that it was ‘made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.’ [Citation.]” (Sauceda-Contreras, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 219.) In addition, “[t]he due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes the admission of any involuntary statement obtained from a criminal suspect through state compulsion.” (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 34 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 896, 163 P.3d 896].) “ ‘The prosecution has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant’s confession was voluntarily made. [Citations.] In determining whether a confession was voluntary, “ ‘[t]he question is whether defendant’s choice to confess was not “essentially free” because his [or her] will was overborne.’ ” [Citation.] Whether the confession was voluntary depends upon the totality of the circumstances. [Citations.] “ ‘On appeal, the trial court’s findings as to the circumstances surrounding the confession are upheld if supported by substantial evidence, but the trial court’s finding as to the voluntariness of the confession is subject to independent review.’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘ “[W]hen a reviewing court considers a claim that a confession has been improperly coerced, if the evidence conflicts, the version most favorable to the People must be relied upon if supported by the record. [Citations.]” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 993 [145 Cal.Rptr.3d 146, 282 P.3d 173] (Tully).) i. Statements made before receiving Miranda warning The trial court acknowledged defendant’s statements at the beginning of the questioning were made before the officers advised him of his rights under Miranda, but found the statements were voluntarily given. Defendant contends the court erred by ruling that the statements he made before being advised of his Miranda rights were voluntary and therefore admissible. We disagree. Law enforcement officers may speak freely to a suspect in custody provided “ ‘the speech would not reasonably be construed as calling for an incriminating response.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 388 [106 Cal.Rptr.3d 771, 227 P.3d 342] (Gamache).) Deputy Ackerman’s initial questions were not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. (See People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 26-27 [133 Cal.Rptr.3d 496, 264 P.3d 292] [postinvocation questions about an unrelated homicide were not an impermissible questioning because they could not reasonably be construed as calling for an incriminating response].) The initial questions here appear to have been an attempt by the officers to establish a rapport with defendant. Indeed, defendant fails to explain how any statement he made in this portion of the questioning was used at his trial to implicate him in Piceno’s disappearance or impeach his credibility. ii. Statements made after receiving Miranda warning For the second section of the questioning, the trial court found the officers advised defendant of his rights under Miranda, that he acknowledged those rights and waived them, and his statements were voluntarily given. Defendant contends his statement to Lieutenant Bingaman, after acknowledging his Miranda rights, that “[t]hey always tell you get a lawyer” was an invocation of his right to counsel, and the court erred in ruling otherwise. We disagree. A suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel must be unambiguous. (Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 459 [129 L.Ed.2d 362, 114 S.Ct. 2350].) The reference to an attorney must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer under the circumstances would understand the statement was a request for an attorney. (Ibid.) A reasonable officer in these circumstances could have concluded that defendant was expressing the abstract idea an attorney might be in his best interest, but he did not actually request one. Although officers may seek clarification of an ambiguous request, they are not required to do so. (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 427 [111 Cal.Rptr.3d 589, 233 P.3d 1000].) Moreover, when Deputy Ackerman told defendant the officers could not advise him what to do, defendant continued to speak with them. Accordingly, defendant’s further continuation of the conversation supports the conclusion that he did not intend his comment about getting a lawyer to be an invocation of his right to counsel. Defendant further contends his statement that he did not know why “[t]hey always tell you get a lawyer” indicates he did not understand the rights he was waiving by continuing the conversation with the officers. Lieutenant Bingaman, however, explained to defendant his rights, and defendant acknowledged he understood them. Even assuming defendant’s statement was a true expression of his state of mind, and he did not fully appreciate the possible value in invoking his rights, this does not mean he was not aware of them, or did not understand the consequences of the decision to waive them. Defendant contends his statements from this portion of the questioning were rendered involuntary by the officers’ deceptive and manipulative tactics, promises of leniency, and threats. Defendant notes the officers did not advise him of his Miranda rights at the beginning of the questioning, he repeatedly expressed discomfort during it, and Deputy Ackerman suggested he could discern if defendant was suppressing information. In addition, defendant points out that Deputy Ackerman told him “we’re trying to help you,” and “our motivation is not to give you grief or punishment.” Applying our independent review, we agree with the trial court’s determination that the statements made during this portion of the questioning were voluntary. First, the officers’ introductory questions were likely designed to establish a rapport with defendant, but even if they were successful, this does not establish that defendant’s free will was overborne. (Cf. People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150, 160 [141 Cal.Rptr. 698, 570 P.2d 1050] [conviction reversed due to the questioning officers’ “clever softening-up” of the defendant by ingratiating themselves and disparaging the victim].) The use of deceptive statements during an investigation does not invalidate a confession as involuntary unless the deception is the type likely to procure an untrue statement. (People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 684 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156, 234 P.3d 428] (Tate).) Even assuming defendant’s fragile emotional state made him susceptible to Deputy Ackerman’s suggestion he knew defendant was suppressing information, and that the deputy’s suggestion was actually deceptive, defendant fails to explain how he incriminated himself as a result of this deception. (See People v. Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 444-445.) Indeed, defendant fails to explain which of his statements were untrue, as he denied abducting and killing Piceno. (See ibid.) Next, a statement is involuntary and inadmissible when the motivating cause of the decision to speak was an express or clearly implied promise of leniency or advantage. (Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 985.) Even assuming Deputy Ackerman did implicitly promise leniency, nothing in the record suggests that was defendant’s motivation to speak to the officers. (See id. at p. 986.) Finally, when the officers questioned defendant about a videotape he owned, he expressed concern that he might be prosecuted for “copyright infringements.” But because the officers assured defendant they were not concerned with any possible copyright violations, no threats of prosecution compelled him to continue talking to the officers. iii. Statements made after defendant’s first invocation of his right to counsel For the third section of the questioning, the trial court found defendant had invoked his right to counsel by saying, “I want a lawyer,” but then again waived his rights by continuing the conversation with the officers around 20 seconds later; the court also found his statements were voluntarily given. Defendant contends the court erred in ruling that he voluntarily initiated contact after telling Agent Devine that he wanted a lawyer, thereby negating his invocation of the right to counsel. If a suspect expresses a desire to deal with law enforcement only through counsel, the questioning must cease until counsel has been made available or the suspect initiates further communication with law enforcement. (Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484 — 485 [68 L.Ed.2d 378, 101 S.Ct. 1880].) “ ‘After a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, police officers may nonetheless resume their interrogation if “the suspect ‘(a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked.’ ” [Citations.] The waiver must be “ ‘knowing and intelligent . . . under the totality of the circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused, not the police, reopened the dialogue with the authorities.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 752 [137 Cal.Rptr.3d 117, 269 P.3d 543].) It is undisputed defendant clearly asserted his right to counsel, and, after he did so, the questioning stopped. But about 20 seconds later, as Deputy Ackerman prepared to leave the room, defendant chose to speak. Applying our independent review, we agree with the trial court that defendant invoked his right to counsel, but then again waived that right when he reinitiated communication with Agent Devine, saying, “I don’t know if you guys got any other suspects or what.” (See Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 377-378 [a reinitiation occurs when the suspect’s words or conduct indicate a willingness to engage in a generalized discussion about the investigation].) The record before us indicates defendant’s statement about other suspects could fairly be said to represent a desire to start a generalized discussion about the officers’ investigation. And, defendant’s arguments notwithstanding, for the reasons we have previously explained, the totality of the circumstances before his invocation did not render the implied new waiver of his right to counsel involuntary. Nor do the circumstances after his reinitiation of the conversation undermine the implied waiver. Shortly after defendant reinitiated the conversation, he said, “I don’t know what to do.” Deputy Ackerman told defendant, “It’s up to you.” Defendant responded, “I [want to] help you guys, I want you guys to find him, but I don’t want to incriminate myself.” Deputy Ackerman replied, “I understand your point.” Defendant thereafter continued to respond to the officers’ questions, until he later clearly reinvoked his rights once again. Defendant’s vague initial statements after the reinitiation were not a clear invocation of his rights, or even sufficient to undermine the implied new waiver arising from his continuing the conversation. The deputy’s responses indicated it was defendant’s decision as how to proceed, and he chose to continue talking. Defendant further points to a later moment in the conversation when he said, “I can’t talk no more.” He contends this constituted an invocation of his right to remain silent that was ignored. Deputy Ackerman responded, however, by offering to get him some more water, implying that defendant was not invoking his right to remain silent, but rather was merely indicating voice problems. And, once again, defendant’s followup response, “No, why did I have to rent a video that day?” demonstrated his willingness to continue with the questioning and that he had not intended to invoke his right to remain silent. Notwithstanding defendant’s complaints about his emotional fragility and the officers’ deceptive tactics, our independent review of the record discloses nothing during the questioning immediately following the invocation and subsequent waiver to indicate his continued conversation was involuntary. iv. Statements made after defendant stated he did not want to discuss his childhood During the fourth section of the questioning, the trial court found defendant’s statement he did not want to discuss his childhood to be an invocation of his right to remain silent, which was not honored by the officers. Therefore, the court excluded from the prosecutor’s case-in-chief all statements he made thereafter. The court, however, found the statements made during this section of the questioning were voluntary, so it did not exclude them for all purposes. Defendant does not dispute that statements elicited in violation of Miranda may be used for impeachment purposes if not truly involuntary. However, he contends the statements made during this section of the questioning were actually involuntary, and therefore should not have been used at trial for any purpose. He points out that, unlike in the earlier portions of the questioning, here he repeatedly invoked his rights to counsel and to remain silent, but his requests were ignored. Lieutenant Bingaman also told defendant he wanted to help him and was “not interested [in] putting [him] behind bars,” and that no one was going to “blame a murder on [him],” assertedly implying defendant would receive leniency if he cooperated. Defendant also cites the lateness of the hour and his deteriorating emotional state. We need not decide, however, whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the prosecutor to use for impeachment purposes the statements defendant made after he refused to discuss his childhood, because any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824]; see People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1133 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572].) Very few of his statements from this portion of the questioning were introduced into evidence at trial. For example, at trial defendant admitted that during the questioning he initially withheld from the investigators the fact that he had rented videotapes from two stores other than the one located in the shopping center from which Piceno was abducted. Defendant also admitted at trial that during the questioning he told the officers he was unsure what he had done immediately after renting the videotapes, which he acknowledged was untrue. To the extent this lack of candor indicated defendant’s consciousness of his guilt, it was duplicative of the other, similar evidence that was properly allowed into evidence, such as his statements and demeanor during his interactions with Agent Cacciaroni as well as during other portions of this questioning. In light of the other evidence of defendant’s guilt, we are confident these two statements did not impel him to testify at trial, or to testify as he did, and did not prejudicially influence the jury’s verdict. d. Jackson’s statements Defendant contends that the officers arrested him based on information obtained during the questioning conducted in violation of his rights, and, but for this assertedly unlawful arrest, the media would not have published his image, and Jackson would not have come forward and identified him as Piceno’s abductor. The trial court, defendant contends, therefore erred by not suppressing Jackson’s testimony as the “fruit” of his unlawful statements and arrest. During the hearing on defendant’s motion to exclude his statements and to preclude Jackson from testifying, Lieutenant Bingaman testified about the state of the investigation before the questioning on April 30: Defendant’s sister had told the authorities that she thought he might have abducted Piceno; the police knew defendant had rented videotapes from a store near where Piceno had last been seen; he was familiar with the area where Piceno’s body had been discovered; and the police had searched defendant’s storage unit and found adult-oriented videotapes and magazines. Agent Cacciaroni had informed Lieutenant Bingaman about her interview with defendant, and his demeanor and answers led her to believe that he had “a great deal to hide.” The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress Jackson’s testimony. The court reasoned that, even excising defendant’s statements, there was sufficient probable cause for the police to arrest him; specifically, there was evidence that a crime had been committed, defendant had a motive and the opportunity to have committed the crime, and he had exhibited consciousness of guilt. Even assuming the arrest was unlawful, the court ruled defendant’s “face” was not suppressible. Citing United States v. Ceccolini (1978) 435 U.S. 268 [55 L.Ed.2d 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054] (Ceccolini), the court also ruled that Jackson voluntarily came forward as a witness as a result of the media coverage, and these actions were not sufficiently related to the government’s improper conduct during the questioning as to justify suppression. Defendant contends that without his improperly obtained statements there was no probable cause to arrest him. We need not consider whether probable cause existed to support either defendant’s seizure on the ship or the court’s issuance of an arrest .warrant, however, because Jackson’s identification of defendant was sufficiently attenuated as to purge the taint from any assumed impropriety. “Evidence need not be suppressed as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree,’ though actually procured as the result of a Fourth Amendment violation against the defendant, if it inevitably would have been obtained by lawful means in any event. [Citation.] Moreover, suppression is not necessarily required even if the evidence would not have come to light but for an infringement of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. [Citation.] “Rejecting a strict ‘but for’ test, the United States Supreme Court has admonished that in such cases, ‘the more apt question ... is “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘. . . The question is whether the evidence was obtained by the government’s exploitation of the illegality or whether the illegality has become attenuated so as to dissipate the taint. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] “Relevant factors in [the]