Rufo v. Simpson (86 Cal. App. 4th 573, 2001)

Opinion

VOGEL (C. S.), P. J.

Introduction

These consolidated civil actions arise from the murders of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Lyle Goldman. A jury found that defendant Orenthal James (O.J.) Simpson committed these homicides willfully and wrongfully, with oppression and malice. Sharon Rufo and Fredric Goldman, the parents and heirs of Ronald Goldman, were awarded $8.5 million compensatory damages on their cause of action for wrongful death. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 377.60, 377.61.) Fredric Goldman as personal representative of the estate of Ronald Goldman was awarded minor compensatory damages and $12.5 million punitive damages on the survival action, the cause of action Ronald Goldman would have had if he survived. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 377.30, 377.34.) Louis H. Brown as personal representative of the estate of Nicole Brown Simpson was awarded minor compensatory damages and $12.5 million punitive damages on the survival action, the cause of action Nicole Brown Simpson would have had if she survived. Defendant Simpson appeals from the judgments.

Defendant does not contend that the evidence is legally insufficient to show that he is the person who committed the murders. He seeks reversal for a new trial on the grounds that the trial court committed reversible error in numerous rulings on admission and exclusion of evidence and in denying a mistrial based on juror misconduct. He also contends the compensatory and punitive damages awards are excessive as a matter of law. We conclude the trial court did not err, and the compensatory and punitive damages are not excessive. We affirm the judgments.

Decedent Ronald Goldman has the same last name as one of the present parties, plaintiff Fredric Goldman. Decedent Nicole Brown Simpson shares the names of two of the present parties, plaintiff Louis H. Brown and defendant Orenthal James Simpson. For clarity in the narrative and discussion that follow, we refer to the present parties by their last names (i.e., Goldman is plaintiff Fredric Goldman, and Simpson is defendant Orenthal James Simpson), and to the decedents by their first names, Ronald and Nicole.

Facts

In a prior criminal trial, Simpson was acquitted of the murders of Nicole and Ronald. In the present civil trial, the jury concluded that Simpson killed Nicole and Ronald. Simpson does not contend on appeal that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. He contends, however, that the judgments should be reversed for a new trial on the grounds that evidence was erroneously admitted or excluded and the award of damages is excessive.

No exhaustive summary of the underlying facts is necessary. Factual details relating to admission or exclusion of the disputed items of evidence are addressed in the discussion of those issues. The following summary is sufficient to give context to the legal discussion that follows.

Nicole and Ronald were stabbed to death on the night of June 12, 1994, in front of Nicole’s home on Bundy Drive in Los Angeles.

Plaintiffs contended that Simpson, Nicole’s ex-husband, had the motive to kill Nicole in a rage. On several prior occasions during their marriage Simpson had physically abused Nicole. In 1992 they separated. In May 1993 they agreed to try for a year to see if they might reconcile. In April 1994 Simpson was encouraged they would reconcile. But on May 22, 1994, Nicole terminated the relationship. Simpson retaliated by threatening to cause serious income tax problems for Nicole concerning their arrangement regarding his residence on Rockingham Avenue in Los Angeles. On June 7, 1994, Nicole telephoned a battered women’s shelter hotline and stated she was frightened because her ex-husband was stalking her, and she sought advice whether it might be safer to move back in with him. By the end of that conversation she decided not to move back with him. On June 12, 1994, Simpson’s and Nicole’s young daughter performed in a dance recital. Simpson flew from New York to Los Angeles to attend it. Simpson was in a foul mood that day. At the dance recital, Simpson and Nicole sat apart and did not interact. When the recital ended, Nicole excluded Simpson from a post-recital family dinner.

Ronald was a waiter at the restaurant where the dinner occurred. After-wards, Nicole telephoned the restaurant about a pair of eyeglasses left at the dinner. Ronald may have been killed because he encountered the murder of Nicole while delivering the eyeglasses to her home.

Shortly after the killings, Nicole’s and Ronald’s bodies were found in front of her residence. Police responded to the scene and collected physical evidence. Numerous drops of blood at the scene were proved by DNA evidence to be Simpson’s. There was a left-hand leather glove, of a rare make that Nicole had previously purchased for Simpson, that matched the right-hand glove later found at Simpson’s residence. Bloody footprints at the scene were made by distinctive luxury shoes similar to those worn by Simpson in the past. A knit cap at the scene contained hair fibers matching Simpson’s hair. Ronald’s shirt contained hair fibers matching Simpson’s hair, and cloth fibers matching bloodstained socks found at Simpson’s residence.

Other physical evidence from Simpson’s Ford Bronco and Simpson’s home on Rockingham pointed to Simpson as the murderer. The Bronco contained blood from Simpson, Nicole, and Ronald. Simpson’s freshly dripped blood was found on his driveway. Simpson had recent cuts and abrasions on his hands. The right-hand glove matching the left-hand glove from the crime scene was found on a path next to Simpson’s house. This glove contained Simpson’s blood, Nicole’s blood, Ronald’s blood, Nicole’s hair, and Ronald’s hair. A pair of socks found in Simpson’s bedroom contained Simpson’s and Nicole’s blood.

Faced with overwhelming physical evidence, the defense suggested that some evidence was planted by police officers or ineptly contaminated during collection, storage, or testing.

Simpson testified and claimed that he was at home on Rockingham during the time of the killings, prior to being picked up by a limousine driver for a ride to the airport to fly to a previously scheduled event in Chicago. Plaintiffs presented evidence that Simpson had time to commit the murders, go home, catch his ride to the airport, and dispose of evidence in a small bag that he would not allow the limousine driver to handle and which was never seen again. On the flight back to Los Angeles after being notified of Nicole’s death, Simpson told a passenger that there were two victims killed in the garden area of Nicole’s house, although those details had not been provided to him in the notification. After being informed that police were going to arrest him, Simpson and a friend fled in Simpson’s Bronco. Simpson had his passport, a fake goatee and mustache, $8,000 to $9,000 in cash, and a loaded gun. Simpson talked about committing suicide.

Contentions

Simpson contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence that Simpson previously abused Nicole.

Simpson contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of statements made by Nicole, which he contends were inadmissible hearsay or irrelevant. Simpson contends the trial court erred in excluding defense evidence of prior testimony of Mark Fuhrman, and of validation studies performed at the Los Angeles police crime laboratory.

Simpson contends the trial court erred in denying a mistrial after plaintiffs’ counsel referred to Simpson’s alleged failure to pass a polygraph test, or after a juror’s misconduct was discovered.

Simpson contends the compensatory damages awarded to the parents of Ronald on their action for wrongful death are excessive.

Simpson contends the trial court erroneously admitted expert opinion on the value of Simpson’s name and likeness as an element of his present net worth, and that the punitive damages awarded are excessive.

We find no merit to any of these contentions and therefore we affirm the judgments.

Admissibility of Simpson’s Prior Abuse of Nicole

Simpson contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of five instances of Simpson’s prior abuse of Nicole. This evidence showed: (1) • outside a veterinary clinic around the spring of 1983, Simpson approached Nicole’s car, tried to pull off Nicole’s fur coat, and hit Nicole in the face, saying he “didn’t buy this fur coat for you to go fuck somebody else”; (2) in 1984, Simpson lost his temper and struck Nicole’s Mercedes with a baseball bat; (3) at a public beach in July 1986, Simpson slapped Nicole and she fell to the sand; (4) on New Year’s Day 1989, Simpson and Nicole had a violent argument during which he pulled her hair and struck her on the face or head, for which Simpson pleaded nolo contendere to spousal abuse; and (5) during a rage in October 1993, Simpson broke a door of Nicole’s residence.

Simpson contends this evidence showed nothing more than bad character or a propensity for violence, which is inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a). But that section further provides, “Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation; plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident. . .) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b); People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 393 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757].) The trial court denied Simpson’s motion in limine to exclude this evidence. The court ruled the evidence was admissible to show motive, intent, and identity.

Simpson contends that since he denied being the perpetrator, the intent with which the killings were committed was not genuinely in issue. He contends the prior instances of abuse did not tend to establish a motive for these killings and were not similar to these killings. He misplaces reliance on cases stating that in order to be admissible to prove identity, prior acts and charged acts must bear striking and distinctive similarities so as to support a reasonable inference that the same person committed both. (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 403; People v. Haston (1968) 69 Cal.2d 233, 246 [70 Cal.Rptr. 419, 444 P.2d 91].)

The requirement for a distinctive modus operandi does not apply when the prior and charged acts involve the same perpetrator and the same victim. The courts have concluded that evidence of prior quarrels between the same parties is obviously relevant on the issue whether the accused committed the charged acts. (People v. Cartier (1960) 54 Cal.2d 300, 311 [5 Cal.Rptr. 573, 353 P.2d 53]; People v. Daniels (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 36, 46 [93 Cal.Rptr. 628]; People v. Haylock (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 146, 150 [169 Cal.Rptr. 658]; People v. Zack (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 409, 413-415 [229 Cal.Rptr. 317]; People v. Linkenauger (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1603, 1609-1614 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 868]; see People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 633 [105 Cal.Rptr. 681, 504 P.2d 905]; People v. Benton (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 92, 98 [161 Cal.Rptr. 12]; People v. McCray (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 159, 171-173 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 872]; People v. Hoover (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1026 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 208].)

People v. Zack, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d 409, discusses this principle. The defendant was convicted of murdering his wife, and the evidence included the defendant’s prior assaults on her. After reviewing the precedents, the court concluded, “From these precedents, as well as common sense, experience, and logic, we distill the following rule: Where a defendant is charged with a violent crime and has or had a previous relationship with a victim, prior assaults upon the same victim, when offered on disputed issues, e.g., identity, intent, motive, etcetera, are admissible based solely upon the consideration of identical perpetrator and victim without resort to a ‘distinctive modus operandi’ analysis of other factors.” (Id. at p. 415.) Similarly in People v. Linkenauger, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th 1603, the defendant was convicted of murdering his wife, and the evidence included prior marital discord and assaults on her. The court stated, “Appellant contends that evidence of marital discord and prior assaults does not support the inference that he intended to commit a premeditated murder. We disagree. The evidence had a tendency in reason to show appellant’s intent to beat, torture, and ultimately murder Jo Ann. It was properly admitted to show ill will and motive. . . . [¶] Evidence concerning marital discord and appellant’s prior assaults also supports the inference that appellant committed the offense. . . . As we have indicated, by reason of the marital discord and his prior assaults upon JoAnn, the jury could logically draw the inference that appellant had again assaulted her.” (Id. at pp. 1613-1614, citations omitted.) In People v. Daniels, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d 36, the defendant was convicted of attempted murder of his wife, and the evidence included prior assaults upon her. The court stated, “Evidence showing jealousy, quarrels, antagonism or enmity between an accused and the victim of a violent offense is proof of motive to commit the offense. . . . Likewise, evidence of threats of violence by an accused against the victim of an offense of violence is proof of the identity of the offender.” (Id. at p. 46, citations omitted.)

Here the trial court correctly concluded the evidence of Simpson’s prior abuse of Nicole was relevant to motive, intent, and identity. (People v. Linkenauger, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1613-1614.) The court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in concluding that the probative value of this evidence outweighed the potential prejudicial effect. (People v. Linkenauger, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th 1603, 1614; People v. McCray, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th 159, 173.) The fact that the prior instances occurred several years before the killings did not preclude their admission into evidence. (People v. McCray, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 173.) This fact merely affected the weight that the jury would accord to this evidence.

Hearsay Issues Regarding Various Statements by Nicole

Simpson contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of statements made by Nicole, which Simpson contends were inadmissible hearsay or irrelevant. These may be divided into three categories: (1) statements made to police or security officers at the times of the 1984 and 1989 incidents discussed in the previous section, (2) statements made by telephone to a battered women’s shelter on June 7, 1994, and (3) statements made in writing in Nicole’s diary and a letter to Simpson.

Factual Background

Statements at the Times of the Prior Incidents

Concerning the 1984 incident in which Simpson struck Nicole’s automobile with a baseball bat, Mark Day testified that he was a security patrol officer who was called to the Simpson residence on Rockingham in response to a disturbance. As he approached the front door Nicole came running across the front yard. She was very upset. She stated that “he” (Simpson) had lost his temper and that she was afraid. Day then observed the damage to the Mercedes and spoke to Simpson who admitted he had lost his temper.

Concerning the 1989 incident, Los Angeles Police Detective John Edwards went to the Rockingham residence in response to a 911 call. When Edwards buzzed at the gate of the residence, he observed Nicole, wearing only a bra and sweat pants, run from the bushes across the driveway to a control box and collapse onto it. She appeared to push on a button repeatedly while yelling to Edwards, “he’s going to kill me, he’s going to kill me.” She then ran to the gate and when it opened she “came flying through that open area of the gate, ran directly to [Edwards] and collapsed onto [Edwards].” She was cold, wet, and shivering. “She was crying, she was hysterical, and appeared to be very frightened and exhausted.” She repeated “he’s going to kill me, he’s going to kill me,” and when Edwards inquired, who, she said OJ. Simpson. Edwards observed multiple injuries on her forehead, eye, cheek, lips, and neck and asked what happened. Nicole answered “OJ. had hit her, kicked her, slapped her, and pulled her hair.”

Telephone Call to Battered Women’s Shelter

After considering Simpson’s motion to exclude the following evidence entirely, the court admitted it for the limited purpose of showing Nicole’s state of mind.

Nancy Ney was a director of Sojourn House, a battered women’s shelter. She had training regarding domestic abuse. She was on duty receiving calls on the shelter’s telephone hot line on June 7, 1994, five days before the murders. She received a call from a woman who stated that her name was Nicole, she was Caucasian, she was in her 30’s, she had been married eight years but was divorced, she had two children under age 10, she was living in West Los Angeles, and her ex-husband was famous. Nicole stated that she was frightened. Her ex-husband had been calling her begging her to come back to him and he had been stalking her. She related that she found him staring at her in a restaurant and a market and following her when she drove. This unnerved her and she was frightened by it. Upon questioning by Ney whether her ex-husband had ever beaten her or threatened her, Nicole replied he had beaten her throughout the marriage and told her a few different times that if he ever caught her with another man he would kill her. Nicole asked for Ney’s opinion whether it might be safer for her and the children to move back in with him. Ney and Nicole discussed this, and by the end of the conversation Nicole came to the conclusion that in the long run it would not be best for her to move back in with him. Nicole indicated she did not wish to come to the shelter. She thanked Ney for helping her and letting her express her feelings. Ney invited her to call back in a week but did not hear from her again.

Written Statements

Diary Entries

After considering Simpson’s objection to the following evidence in its entirety, the court admitted it for the limited purpose of showing Nicole’s state of mind.

Edited pages from Nicole’s diary were admitted into evidence as exhibit No. 735. The entry for May 22, 1994, states “we[’]ve officially split,” and then describes the intended arrangements for child visitations. The entry for June 3, 1994, states that when Simpson came over to her residence at 8:30 p.m. to pick up the children for visitation, he commented to her, “You hung up on me last nite, you’re gonna pay for this bitch, you’re holding money from the IRS, you’re going to jail you fucking cunt. You think you can do any fucking thing you want, you’ve got it coming—I’ve already talked to my lawyers about this bitch—they’ll get you for tax evasion bitch I’ll see to it. You’re not gonna have a fucking dime left bitch.” Nicole’s entry adds, “I just turned around and walked away.”

Letter

Portions of an undated letter in Nicole’s handwriting addressing Simpson were introduced into evidence for the limited purpose of showing Nicole’s state of mind. The redacted version, exhibit No. 732, includes the following: “O.J.[:j I think I have to put this all in a letter. A lot of years ago I used to do much better in a letter. I’m gonna try it again now. I’d like you to keep this letter if we split, so that you’ll always know why we split. I’d also like you to keep it if we stay together, as a reminder. . . . There was also that time before Justin [was bom and a few months] after Sydney [was bom] I felt really good about how I got back in shape [and] we were out[,] you beat the holy hell out of me [and] we lied at the x-ray lab [and] said I fell off a bike. Remember!?? And since Justin[’s] birth is the mad New Years Eve beat up. ... I just don’t see how that compares to infidelity, wife beating, verbal abuse. . . . And if I wanted to hurt you or had it in me to be anything like the person you are I would have done so after the New Year incident. But I didn’t even do it then. I called the cops to save my life whether you believe it or not. But I didn’t pursue anything after that. I didn’t prosecute, I didn’t call the press [and] didn’t make a big charade out of it. I waited for it to die down and asked for it to. But I’ve never loved you since or been the same.”

The trial court expressly limited the scope of this evidence to Nicole’s state of mind and not the truth of what occurred in the underlying incidents. In addition to instructing the jury generally that evidence admitted for a limited purpose may not be considered for any other purpose, the court at least twice instructed the jury specifically regarding the letter that it was admitted into evidence only “for the limited purpose of demonstrating Nicole Brown Simpson’s state of mind regarding her relationship with defendant Simpson. You are not to consider any of the statements contained in that letter as evidence that the events described in the letter occurred.”

Discussion

Spontaneous Statements to Police

As discussed in the previous section, the prior incidents of abuse were relevant and admissible to show motive, intent, and identity. Nicole’s statements describing those incidents were therefore relevant, and they were admissible if they came within an exception to the hearsay rule. Nicole’s statements to responding officers on the dates of the 1984 and 1989 incidents were properly admitted under the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule. Evidence Code section 1240 provides, “Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [f] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception.” This codifies a common law exception to hearsay. The requirements for this exception are: (1) there must be an occurrence startling enough to produce nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must be made before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, while the nervous excitement still dominates and the reflective powers are still in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it. (People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318 [246 Cal.Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082].) A statement that satisfies these elements is deemed sufficiently trustworthy to be received as evidence for the truth of the matter asserted despite its hearsay nature. (Ibid.; People v. Hughey (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1383, 1392-1393 [240 Cal.Rptr. 269].)

Simpson contends “a period of time had transpired between the event and the statements,” and Nicole “had an opportunity to ‘contrive and misrepresent’ and to regain her ‘reflective powers.’ ” The record supports the trial court’s contrary conclusion. Whether the requirements of the spontaneous statement exception are satisfied in any given case is largely a question of fact. The determination of this question is vested in the trial court. The trial court necessarily exercises discretion in deciding it. The discretion of the trial court is at its broadest when it determines whether the nervous excitement still dominated and the reflective powers were still in abeyance. (People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 318-319; People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 904 [254 Cal.Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940].) The trial court here did not abuse its discretion in concluding Nicole’s statements to the officers satisfied the spontaneous statement exception. (People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 319-320; People v. Hughey, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d 1383, 1388; People v. Forgason (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 356, 365 [160 Cal.Rptr. 263].)

State of Mind Evidence

Hearsay is a statement made other than while testifying as a witness, which statement is offered in the trial to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a) [fn. 3, ante].) Unlike the two statements to officers concerning prior incidents which were admitted to prove the truth of the matters asserted, the statements made in the telephone call to the battered women’s shelter, the diary entries, and the letter were expressly limited to the purpose of showing Nicole’s state of mind. Most of the statements were not hearsay at all, because they were not admitted to prove the truth of the matters asserted.

Thus, under plaintiffs’ offers of evidence and the trial court’s rulings and instructions limiting the purpose of the evidence, the statements made in the telephone call to the battered women’s shelter were not admitted to prove: (a) that her ex-husband had been calling her, begging her to come back to him; (b) that he was stalking her; (c) that she found him staring at her in a restaurant and a market and following her vehicle; (d) that he had beaten her throughout the marriage; and (e) that he had told her different times that if he ever caught her with another man he would kill her. The statements in the diary were not admitted to prove that Nicole evaded taxes. The statements in the letter were not admitted to prove: (a) that Simpson beat Nicole and they lied to the X-ray lab that she fell off her bike; (b) that the “mad New Years Eve beat up” occurred; and (c) that Simpson committed “infidelity, wife beating, verbal abuse.”

Rather, these statements were offered or admitted only as circumstantial evidence from which inferences could be drawn concerning how Nicole felt about the nature of the relationship between her and Simpson. They were offered to explain her conduct in finally terminating the relationship, which in turn was alleged to have provoked Simpson to murder. As such, they were not hearsay. (People v. Ortiz (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 377, 389-390 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 914]; 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Hearsay, §§ 37-39, 198, pp. 719-721, 915.)

A few of the statements directly expressed Nicole’s then state of mind: in the telephone call: (a) she was frightened; (b) she was unnerved and frightened by the perceived incidents of stalking; (c) she wanted advice because of uncertainty whether it was safer to move back in with her ex-husband; and (d) she concluded by the end of the conversation that she should not move back in with him; (2) in the diary: she and Simpson “officially split” as of May 22, 1994; (3) in the letter: (a) she called the police on New Years 1989 “to save her life”; and (b) since that incident she had never loved Simpson or been the same. These were hearsay to the extent they were offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, Nicole’s then feelings or state of mind. (People v. Ortiz, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 389-390; 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, supra, Hearsay, § 198, p. 915.) But they were admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. Evidence Code section 1250 provides, “(a) Subject to Section 1252,[] evidence of a statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation (including a statement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health) is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when: [¶] (1) The evidence is offered to prove the declarant’s state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation at that time or at any other time when it is itself an issue in the action; or [¶] (2) The evidence is offered to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant. [¶] (b) This section does not make admissible evidence of a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed.”

To avoid the force of plaintiffs’ argument that all this evidence had a limited admissible purpose to show Nicole’s state of mind, Simpson contends Nicole’s state of mind was irrelevant. He is wrong.

This argument was raised early by Simpson’s pretrial motion in limine to exclude all of the out-of-court statements by Nicole. Goldman’s opposition to the motion in limine answered it as follows: “Here, Goldman contends that particular ‘acts or conduct’ of Nicole motivated Simpson to murder her: breaking off their relationship for good in May 1994, ignoring Simpson at their daughter’s June 12 recital, and refusing to include Simpson in a family dinner and celebration immediately following the recital, after he had flown thousands of miles to be at the recital. Of course, Simpson’s motive is a highly relevant issue because it is probative of the identity of the killer. See People v. Zack, 184 Cal.App.3d 409, 413-14[, supra]. Moreover, at his deposition, Simpson denied all of this conduct, contending that he (not Nicole) broke off the relationship, that he was not rejected by Nicole, that he interacted pleasantly with Nicole at the recital, and that he chose not to go out to dinner with the family. Thus, Nicole’s state of mind—her fear of Simpson and intense hostility toward him for threatening to turn her [in to] the Internal Revenue Service and forcing her and their children to move out of their house—not only proves and explains why she engaged in the conduct that plaintiffs contend motivated Simpson to kill her, but also serves to rebut Simpson’s claims to the contrary.” In its pretrial ruling denying Simpson’s motion in limine, the court indicated that although it would not make final determinations until specific evidence was offered at trial, it was reasonable to assume that the nature of the relationship between Simpson and Nicole would be a relevant issue.

Consistent with the pretrial memo, Goldman’s counsel told the jury in his opening statement that the evidence would show Simpson and Nicole were engaged in a deeply emotional, tense, angry conflict in the weeks leading up to the killings, and that Simpson felt rejection and rage when Nicole attempted to end their relationship and excluded Simpson from the family circle and celebration at the recital and post-recital dinner. Counsel for Nicole’s estate stated the evidence would show that in the weeks leading up to the killings Simpson’s ego was bruised to its core by Nicole’s finally ending the relationship, and on the night of the killings by his exclusion from the family circle, and he committed the killings in a rage. Counsel for Simpson told the jury the evidence would show the relationship between Simpson and Nicole was not acrimonious, Simpson was not out of control when they mutually decided to terminate the relationship and move on with their lives, and Simpson was not in a foul mood at the recital.

During trial, in his memorandum to the court about admissibility of the telephone call to the battered women’s shelter, Simpson again claimed it should be excluded on the ground Nicole’s state of mind was irrelevant. Goldman’s memorandum replied the statements in the telephone call “explain Nicole’s conduct in ending the relationship with defendant and in rejecting him again on June 12, the night of the murders,” or were “admissible as circumstantial evidence of Nicole’s state of mind. Each statement provides highly probative evidence of Nicole’s fear, and helps explain her conduct in rejecting defendant and not wanting anything to do with him.” In arguing the motion Goldman’s counsel contended, “Our theory of the case, Your Honor, as you probably know, is that the . . . primary motivation for the crime was retaliation . . . from Ms. Brown’s rejection of Mr. Simpson, the termination of the relationship and the rejection, specifically on June 12, as well, after the recital. And her state of mind about the relationship, the state of the relationship, her extreme fear of the defendant, as demonstrated by the phone call [to] Ms. Ney. It is probative of the fact that. . . she would not want to be with him and would want to stay as far away from him as possible. [It very much] goes to her rejection of him.” He argued the evidence impeached Simpson’s position that Simpson had put the relationship behind him. He contended the evidence “really goes to the heart of the motive of the case, as to what’s going on in the relationship in these few days before the murders. As the court in Zack said, antagonism, hostility, enmity in the relationship is highly probative and always relevant.” The court agreed with plaintiffs’ argument that the evidence was admissible for the limited purpose offered. Earlier the court had similarly admitted the diary entries. The court agreed with plaintiffs’ contention the diary entries showed Nicole’s state of mind as relevant to the motive issue.

Later when Goldman’s counsel sought to cross-examine Simpson about the letter, Goldman’s counsel asserted the letter came within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule; Simpson’s counsel again argued Nicole’s state of mind was not in issue. The court concluded, “I’m satisfied that the decedent’s state of mind has been put into issue insofar as it is the defendant’s contention that the relationship was a loving relationship and that the defendant had no basis in that relationship which would cause him to commit the acts resulting in the deaths of the decedents. So I think that’s clearly an issue.”

Based on the particular circumstances and plaintiffs’ theory of the case, the trial court reasonably concluded that Nicole’s state of mind was in issue, and that evidence offered for the limited purpose of showing her state of mind was relevant and admissible. According to plaintiffs’ theory of the case, Nicole, after a long stormy sometimes violent relationship with Simpson and efforts to reconcile, decided in May of 1994 finally to end the relationship; the final few weeks were tense; Simpson reacted negatively; finally, on the night of the killings, when Simpson was excluded from the family gathering he flew into a rage and killed Nicole, along with Ronald, an unanticipated bystander. The proffered evidence explained how Nicole was feeling about Simpson, tended to explain her conduct in rebuffing Simpson, and this in turn logically tended to show Simpson’s motive to murder her. It was not irrelevant that: Nicole had cited prior beatings as a reason “why we split”; Nicole “never loved [Simpson] since” the New Year’s 1989 beating; Nicole felt they had “officially split” on May 22, 1994; and Nicole on June 7, 1994, felt frightened and confused about whether to go back with Simpson, but decided not to. These feelings tended to explain her conduct on the days leading up to the killings, including the last day, when Simpson’s motive was claimed to have arisen.

Simpson contends that because he denied being the perpetrator, the defense did nothing to put into issue Nicole’s state of mind or conduct immediately before the killings. This does not show the evidence was irrelevant. Even without an opening statement by Simpson’s counsel or testimony by Simpson, plaintiffs were entitled to present evidence tending to establish motive. Without persuasive evidence from plaintiffs regarding motive, the jurors might believe there was nothing in the relationship between Simpson and Nicole which would precipitate a murder. (See People v. Zack, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d 409, 415 [prior assaults on wife admissible, husband “was not entitled to have the jury determine his guilt or innocence on a false presentation that his and the victim’s relationship and their parting were peaceful and friendly”]; People v. Linkenauger, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th 1603, 1615 [same].)

This case, therefore, is not like the cases cited by Simpson where the court found there was no legitimate disputed issue concerning the hearsay declarant’s state of mind. (Simpson cites People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 529-532 [75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580, 40 A.L.R.3d 1323] [victim’s statement “T know he’s going to kill me’” was not admissible to show victim’s state of mind or conduct preceding death where it was undisputed at trial that defendant killed her while she was lying on a couch and his defense went to his mental state]; People v. Arcega (1982) 32 Cal.3d 504, 526-529 [186 Cal.Rptr. 94, 651 P.2d 338] [victim’s statement that defendant “ ‘was going to hit her, to beat her up’ ” was not admissible to show victim’s state of mind or conduct preceding death where defendant admitted killing the victim while she was asleep and argued only lack of premeditation; defense raised no issue that the victim’s conduct immediately preceding death in any way provoked or mitigated the homicide]; People v. Armendariz (1984) 37 Cal.3d 573, 584-587 [209 Cal.Rptr. 664, 693 P.2d 243] [victim’s statement, 17 months before the killing, indicating fear of the defendant was not admissible to show victim’s state of mind on the night of the murder, where the defense identified a third person as the killer and raised no issue about the victim’s attitude toward defendant or any issue that the killing was accidental or justifiable]; People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 607-610 [244 Cal.Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854] [victims’ statements of fear of defendant were not admissible to show their states of mind; victims 1 and 2 were murdered in their sleep and there was no issue as to their conduct prior to the killings; victim 3’s statement did not support prosecution theory of faltering marriage as motive for killing; but error harmless in light of limiting instruction]; and People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 621-622 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160] [victim’s statement of fear and hatred of defendant was not admissible to show victim’s state of mind, where her conduct and state of mind were not relevant to any part of the People’s case nor did the defense raise any issue of her state of mind or behavior before she was murdered, the entire defense being alibi; but error harmless in light of limiting instruction].)

Here, plaintiffs presented specific theories why Nicole’s state of mind about her relationship to Simpson was relevant to Simpson’s reasons for killing her.

Other Points

Simpson raises several other points about the admission of this evidence, all without merit.

Simpson points out that the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule “does not make admissible evidence of a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed.” (Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (b).) This point is irrelevant because the evidence was admitted solely for the limited purpose of showing Nicole’s state of mind, not “to prove the fact remembered or believed.”

Simpson contends the statements in the call to the battered women’s shelter which tended to identify the caller as Nicole (the caller stated her name was Nicole, she was Caucasian, she was in her 30’s, she had been married eight years but was divorced, she had two children under 10, she was living in West Los Angeles, and her ex-husband was famous) were themselves inadmissible hearsay. They were not. They were not admitted “to prove the truth of the matter stated,” because there was no material disputed issue in the case concerning Nicole’s biographical history. These statements were introduced only as circumstantial evidence tending to identify the caller. They were properly admissible for this nonhearsay circumstantial evidence purpose. (People v. Herman (1920) 49 Cal.App. 592, 595-596 [193 P. 868]; People v. McGaughran (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 6, 16 [17 Cal.Rptr. 121]; People v. Hess (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1078-1079 [90 Cal.Rptr. 268, 43 A.L.R.3d 643]; Dege v. United States (9th Cir. 1962) 308 F.2d 534, 535-536.)

Simpson contends that even if his hearsay and relevance objections lacked merit, the trial court nevertheless should have excluded this relevant evidence as unduly prejudicial, pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. (Fn. 2, ante.) It is for the trial court, in its discretion, to determine whether the probative value of relevant evidence is outweighed by a substantial danger of undue prejudice. The appellate court may not interfere with the trial court’s determination to admit the evidence, unless the trial court’s determination was beyond the bounds of reason and resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46]; People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 73 [246 Cal.Rptr. 209, 753 P.2d 1]; People v. Yovanov (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 392, 406 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 586].) “Prejudic[ial]” in Evidence Code section 352 does not mean “damaging” to a party’s case, it means evoking an emotional response that has very little to do with the issue on which the evidence is offered. (People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638 [250 Cal.Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189].) Evidence which has probative value must be excluded under section 352 only if it is “undu[ly]” prejudicial despite its legitimate probative value. (People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 724 [if it “poses an intolerable ‘risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome’ ”].)

The trial court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in the circumstances here. As we have noted, the nature of the relationship and Nicole’s feelings about Simpson, especially in the final weeks, were highly relevant to plaintiffs’ theory of the case that Simpson killed Nicole in a rage after she finally ended the relationship and began excluding him from family activities. As we concluded in the discussion of the first issue, evidence of prior violence between Simpson and Nicole was properly admissible. Five such incidents were properly proved either by direct testimony of third party eyewitnesses or by Nicole’s spontaneous statements to officers at the time. The killings themselves were violent and suggestive of rage. Although the telephone call, letter, and diary referred to some of these prior incidents and suggested there were other beatings, threats, or recent stalking, they were not admitted for the truth of the matter. They were not unduly inflammatory in light of all the other admissible evidence of violence. (People v. Yovanov, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 406.)

The trial court instructed the jury that this evidence was limited to showing Nicole’s state of mind about the relationship. Simpson contends the evidence should have been excluded entirely on the ground that despite this instruction, there was too much danger the jury would consider the statements for the truth of the matters asserted. Simpson attempts to distill from certain cases a rule that it is impossible for a jury to separate the state of mind of the declarant from the truth of the facts contained in declarations admitted into evidence solely to show state. of mind. He cites People v. Hamilton (1961) 55 Cal.2d 881, 895-896 [13 Cal.Rptr. 649, 362 P.2d 473], People v. Coleman (1985) 38 Cal.3d 69, 81-86 [211 Cal.Rptr. 102, 695 P.2d 189], and Shepard v. United States (1933) 290 U.S. 96, 104-106 [54 S.Ct. 22, 25-26, 78 L.Ed. 196].

There is no such general rule. In People v. Ortiz, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 377, 385-394, the Court of Appeal reviewed these authorities. It pointed out that Hamilton, a 1961 case, was expressly repudiated in the subsequent adoption of the Evidence Code. “The Law Revision Commission Comments accompanying the new code sections make clear the code’s repudiation of the Hamilton rule.” (Ortiz, supra, at p. 387.) When the declarant’s state of mind is relevant and the statements of threats or brutal conduct are circumstantial evidence of that state of mind, the evidence is admissible so far as a hearsay objection is concerned. “ ‘Evidence Code Section 352 provides the judge with ample power to exclude evidence of this sort where its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. But, under Section 352, the judge must weigh the need for the evidence against the danger of its misuse in each case. The Evidence Code does not freeze the courts to the arbitrary and contradictory standards mentioned in the Hamilton case for determining when prejudicial effect outweighs probative value.’ ” (Id. at pp. 387-388.) “[N]ow that section 352 codifies a safeguard for the evaluation of such evidence before it can be admitted, the trial court has a mechanism for considering the potential for misuse on the unique facts and statements in each case. Where the statement is offered as relevant circumstantial evidence of the victim’s state of mind, the court may consider [a variety of circumstances, one of which is whether the trial court believes, based on the particular facts, that the jury cannot] follow the limiting instruction.” (Id. at pp. 391-392.) The general rule is that juries are presumed to follow a trial court’s limiting instruction. (People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th 690, 725.) This is “[t]he crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury” (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17 [286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84]), “the almost invariable assumption of the law.” (Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200, 206, 207 [107 S.Ct. 1702, 1707, 95 L.Ed.2d 176].) Whether it would be impossible for a jury to follow limiting instructions is determined by the circumstances of each case, primarily in the trial court’s discretion under Evidence Code section 352. (People v. Ortiz, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 386, 388, 394.) Even in two of the cases cited by Simpson where declarations of the victim’s fear of the defendant should not have been admitted at all, because the victim’s state of mind was not genuinely in issue, the Supreme Court held the error harmless because the trial court had instructed the jury the evidence could be considered only for that limited purpose. (People v. Ruiz, supra, 44 Cal.3d 589, 609-610; People v. Noguera, supra, 4 Cal.4th 599, 622-623.) For the same reasons we have discussed why the evidence was not unduly inflammatory, the trial court could reasonably conclude the jury was capable of following the limiting instruction.

Finally, Simpson contends with respect to the telephone call to the battered women’s shelter that the record does not show the trial court actually exercised its discretion pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 and actually weighed the probative value against the potential for undue prejudice. If a proper objection under section 352 is raised, the record must affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court did in fact weigh prejudice against probative value. The trial court need not make findings or expressly recite its weighing process, or even expressly recite that it has weighed the factors, so long as the record as a whole shows the court understood and undertook its obligation to perform the weighing function. (People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th 690, 724, fn. 6; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 135 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887]; People v. Triplett (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 624, 627-629 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 225].)

Simpson’s pretrial motions in limine addressed the admissibility of Nicole’s out-of-court statements in general, but not the telephone call to the battered women’s shelter in particular. In ruling on those motions, the trial court stated that it assumed the nature of the relationship between Simpson and Nicole would be relevant. The court stated that it would rule on particular specific statements when they were offered during the trial, and would at that time “make a weighing under People vs. Ortiz, 38 Cal.App.4th 377, under 352 of the Evidence Code. The Court is mindful of People vs. Coleman, 38 Cal.3d[] 69, regarding the high threshold of probative value outweighing its prejudicial effect . . . .” When the issue of the call to the battered women’s shelter came up later during trial, the court received written memoranda from plaintiffs and defendant. Defendant’s papers addressed primarily the hearsay/relevance issue of whether Nicole’s state of mind was genuinely in issue. The written motion cursorily suggested that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative and should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352. The court’s minute order states it “read and considered all papers filed on the issue.” The court invited oral argument on the motion. Both counsel orally addressed only the state of mind hearsay issue. At the conclusion the court stated, “Well, the Court has reread People versus Ortiz, 38 Cal.Ap[p].4th 377 .... I think on that basis, on the basis on which the plaintiff has represented that he is offering the testimony, the Court finds that. . . there is an exception, in view of the Evidence Code, for those purposes, and the objection is overruled.”

Contrary to Simpson’s contention, this record shows that the trial court engaged in the Evidence Code section 352 weighing process. People v. Ortiz, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pages 385-397, extensively discussed Evidence Code section 352 in the context of different types of statements made by the deceased murder victim. The trial court’s remark here that it had reread Ortiz in connection with this motion, the same case it had cited earlier when it expressly referred to the section 352 weighing process, shows the trial court engaged in that process as to the battered women’s shelter call. (In re Romeo C. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1838, 1845 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 85].)

Reference to Lie Detector

Simpson contends the trial court erred in failing to sustain an initial objection, and failing to grant a motion for mistrial, when Goldman’s counsel cross-examined Simpson about allegedly taking and failing a lie detector test. We conclude that the trial court’s admonitions to the jury to disregard any insinuations in counsel’s questions cured any possible prejudice from the inquiry.

Factual Background

During his opening statement to the jury, Simpson’s counsel described how Simpson cooperated with authorities during the early investigation of the murders. He stated, “Mr. Simpson, through his attorneys, offered the services of some forensic scientists .... It was refused. He offered to take a polygraph. It was refused.” (Italics added.) Plaintiffs’ counsel did not object at the time that this was an improper statement because an offer to take a polygraph test is not admissible evidence.

During cross-examination of Simpson by Goldman’s counsel, Simpson indicated that when police asked him about taking a polygraph test he wanted to wait because he was tired, he was having “weird thoughts,” and he wanted to find out more about how a polygraph test works.

Counsel then asked: “Q. And you did take the test, and you failed it, didn’t you? [Simpson’s counsel:] Objection. . . . Q. [Goldman’s counsel:] You failed it, true? A. No. [Simpson’s counsel:] Objection. A. That’s not correct. Q. [Goldman’s counsel:] You got a minus 22? [Simpson’s counsel:] Your Honor, I’m going to object to this.”

The objection was then discussed at the bench. Goldman’s counsel argued the opening statement by Simpson’s counsel, that Simpson offered to take a lie detector test and it was refused, implied that Simpson would have taken and successfully passed one, and thereby “opened the door” for plaintiffs’ counsel to rebut that suggestion by inquiring whether Simpson took one and failed it. Simpson’s counsel argued the questioning was improper because (1) it was not factually correct that Simpson took a lie detector test, or failed it, (2) the results of Simpson’s consultation with a polygraph examiner were protected by attorney-client privilege, and (3) Simpson’s offer to take one, which the police refused, did not open the door to inquiry that he had taken and failed one. Goldman’s counsel replied he was basing his inquiry on facts related in a book which had been published and that any attorney-client privilege was waived by the publication. The trial court at that point overruled the objection.

Goldman’s counsel then cross-examined Simpson further. Simpson testified he went to the office of an expert Edward Gelb only for the purpose of understanding how a polygraph worked, and after he was finished he told his attorneys he was willing to take a lie detector test. Simpson denied that the consultation with Gelb was actually a lie detector test, rather it was only a demonstration. He testified, “As far as I know, I didn’t take a polygraph test.” When Goldman’s counsel asked whether Simpson scored a minus 22, indicating extreme deception, the court sustained an objection.

Later in the trial, the court decided it should admonish the jury in connection with this line of questioning. The court drafted and discussed with counsel its proposed instruction. Simpson’s counsel argued the instruction was not sufficient to cure the allegedly false implication that Simpson took and failed a lie detector test. Simpson’s counsel moved instead for a mistrial, which the court denied. Goldman’s counsel reiterated his claim that his questioning was proper because Simpson’s counsel had opened the door in his opening statement. The trial court rejected that argument also, noting that Goldman’s counsel had not objected to the opening statement. Goldman’s counsel requested the court modify the instruction to make it “more balanced.” The trial court also rejected this suggestion, then proceeded to deliver its instruction to the jury as follows: “Ladies and gentlemen, the Court at this time will give you specific instructions regarding the plaintiffs’ examination of Mr. Simpson which was just completed concerning lie detectors. I want you to listen very closely. All communications between an attorney and his client are absolutely privileged. This means that such communications cannot be used by anyone for any purpose except with the permission of the client. Mr. Simpson cannot be asked any questions about any communications with his attorneys. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Mr. Simpson consented to the publication of any of his communications with his attorney. You will recall, Mr. Simpson’s attorney, Mr. Baker, in his opening statement to you, spoke on the subject of a lie-detector test. By this opening statement, Mr. Simpson opened the subject of lie detectors to examination by the plaintiff. This, however, did not open the subject of any communication on this matter between Mr. Simpson and his attorneys, or persons acting for the attorneys for any purpose. In this trial, Mr. Petrocelli questioned Mr. Simpson whether he took a lie-detector test, any score and meaning thereof. I instruct you that his questions do not and cannot establish that Mr. Simpson took a . . . lie-detector test, a score and meaning thereof. Statements of counsel, that is, the statements or questions of Mr. Petrocelli, are not evidence and may not be considered by you for any purpose. The references or statements regarding a lie-detector test and Mr. Petrocelli’s questions are not evidence unless they were adopted by Mr. Simpson in his answers. A question by itself is not evidence. You may consider questions only to the extent the content of the questions are adopted by the answer. Mr. Simpson’s answer to the question of whether he took a lie-detector test was that he was given an explanation of how the test worked and that he did not take the test. There is no other evidence before you that Mr. Simpson took a lie-detector test, and the plaintiff is bound by Mr. Simpson’s response. Likewise, when Mr. Petrocelli asked Mr. Simpson whether he knew what the score on the test was, whether it was a minus 22, or whether it indicated extreme deception, these were questions by an attorney and do not constitute evidence. Mr. Simpson denied any test score or any knowledge of what test scores meant, and there is no evidence before you of any test score or what a score means. There was only Mr. Petrocelli’s questions which were not adopted by an answer. Plaintiff is bound by Mr. Simpson’s response. Therefore, there is no evidence before you that Mr. Simpson took a lie-detector test, no evidence about any score on such a test, nor any evidence of what any score means. You must totally disregard the questions about taking lie-detector tests, test scores and their meanings, and treat the subject as though you had never heard of it. Do all of the jurors understand these instructions? [The jurors nodded affirmatively, and when asked if any had questions, nodded negatively.]”

Discussion

In the absence of a stipulation between the parties, the results of a polygraph examination, as well as the fact of an offer to take, a refusal to take, or the taking of a polygraph examination, are inadmissible as evidence in California criminal and civil proceedings. (Evid. Code, § 351.1; People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 193 [279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949]; Arden v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 713, 723 [239 Cal.Rptr. 68, 739 P.2d 1236, 79 A.L.R.4th 559]; People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 763-764 [114 Cal.Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267].) But the present case is not one in which the results of a polygraph test were admitted into evidence. There were only statements by counsel, which the trial court appropriately instructed the jury are not evidence. The trial court’s instructions prevented any prejudice to Simpson from insinuations in counsel’s questions. (People v. Parrella (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 140, 147 [322 P.2d 83]; see People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 194; People v. Paul (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 32, 40 [144 Cal.Rptr. 431]; People v. Babcock (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 813, 817-818 [36 Cal.Rptr. 178].)

This case is strikingly similar to People v. Parrella, supra, 158 Cal.App.2d 140. There the defendant on direct examination by his own attorney stated that while in custody he volunteered to take, and did take, a lie detector test. The prosecutor did not object to this testimony on the ground the defendant’s willingness to take a lie detector test was inadmissible; rather, contending that defendant had opened the door, the prosecutor asked the defendant on cross-examination for the results of the test. Defense counsel objected that this question was improper because the results of a lie detector test are not admissible evidence. The trial court ruled that the prosecutor’s question went too far, and instructed the jury that “ ‘the question of lie detector has no place in the case. It has been determined that lie detectors are not admissible in evidence in a trial of a case.’ ” (Id. at pp. 144-145.) When the prosecutor mentioned it again during final argument the trial court again admonished the jury not to consider any mention of the test. (Id. at p. 146.) The appellate court affirmed. It held the defendant’s objectionable testimony to which the prosecutor failed to object did not open the door for the prosecutor to show the results of the test, but the prosecutor’s questions were not prejudicial to the defendant in light of the trial court’s instructions. (Id. at p. 147.)

Here, the only evidence regarding a lie detector test elicited by the cross-examination was Simpson’s testimony that he did not take and fail one, and the trial court specifically instructed the jury that plaintiffs were bound by that answer. Simpson’s claim that the instructions were ineffective to cure contrary insinuations in counsel’s questioning lacks merit under the circumstances. (People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d 152, 194 [jury is presumed to have followed instructions]; People v. Paul, supra, 78 Cal.App.3d 32, 40 [the testimony concerning the actual results of the lie detector test, although stricken, was favorable to the defendant, that he had passed it].) The cases cited by Simpson involved far more extensive or egregious emphasis on the results of the test. (Simpson cites People v. Wochnick (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 124, 128 [219 P.2d 70] [police officer extensively testified about the lie detector test he administered to the defendant and having asked defendant at the conclusion of it whether defendant had any explanation for the responses of the machine; held, despite a limiting instruction that this testimony was admitted only as background to the officer’s accusatory statement and