Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER SPARR, District Judge. THIS MATTER is before the court on the following fifteen motions filed by the Defendants: 1. Defendant Carrillo’s Motion to Suppress Intercepted Electronic and Wire Communications (filed September 21, 2000); 2. Defendant Hinojosa Gonzales’ Motion to Suppress Electronic Communications and for Franks Hearing (filed September 25, 2000); 3. Defendant Atayde’s Motion to Suppress Intercepted Communications (filed September 25, 2000); 4. Defendant Luna’s Motion to Suppress Intercepted Electronic and Wire Communication (filed September 26, 2000); 5. Defendant Licon’s Motion to Suppress Wiretap Evidence and for a Franks Hearing (filed September 26, 2000); 6. Defendant Castorena’s Motion to Suppress Wiretaps (filed September 22, 2000); 7. Defendant Olivas’ Motion to Suppress Evidence Derived from Wiretaps 99-WT-3-Z, 99-WT-4-Z, 99-WT-6-Z, and 99-WT-9-Z (filed September 25, 2000); 8. Defendant Pacheco-Vasquez’ Motion to Suppress Wiretap Evidence (filed September 25, 2000); 9. Defendant Mark Jones’ Motion to Suppress Intercepted Wire Communications (filed August 25, 2000); and 10. Defendant Brandy Jones’ Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized Pursuant to Wiretap (filed September 24, 2000); 11. Defendant Carrillo’s Motion to Join in Co-Defendant Motions to Suppress Intercepted Electronic and Wire Communications (filed September 21, 2000); 12. Defendant Licon’s Motion for Leave to Join the Wiretap Suppression Motions of CoDefendants (filed September 26, 2000); 13. Defendant Jiron’s Motion to Join Co-Defendant’s [sic] Motions to Suppress Evidence Seized Pursuant to Wiretap (filed October 13, 2000); 14. Defendant Castorena’s Motion to Join in Specific Motions Filed by Co-Defendants (filed May 9, 2000); and 15. Defendant Morales’ Motion to Adopt (filed October 4, 2000). All Defendants have joined in all of the motions listed above. The court has reviewed the motions, the Government’s Consolidated Response (filed October 11, 2000), the extensive exhibits, the entire case file, the evidence and arguments presented at the hearing held November 1 and 2, 2000, and the applicable law and is sufficiently advised in the premises. At the hearing held November 1 and 2, 2000, Defendants narrowed the arguments raised in their written motions. Defendants contend that the evidence obtained from 99-WT-3-Z, 99-WT-4-Z, and 99-WT-6-Z must be suppressed because the Affidavits in support of the Applications for interception of electronic communications failed to satisfy the “necessity” requirement set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(e). In addition, Defendant Li-con argues that the Affidavits in support of the Applications for interception of electronic communications failed to establish probable cause to believe that the interception of communications would produce evidence of his involvement in the criminal offenses outlined in the Applications. I.The Challenged Wiretaps 1. 99-WT-3-Z The first wiretap Order, issued April 6, 1999, authorized interception of communications from cellular telephone number (303) 810-5990, assigned Electronic Serial Number (“ESN”) 25301332699 and purchased from AT & T Wireless by the FBI for use as an undercover phone in this investigation. The subject cellular telephone was subscribed to by the FBI in the name of Curt Ramsey at an undercover address in Denver, Colorado, and was in the possession of and utilized by Raul Atayde. The named targets and intereep-tees in the first wiretap Order were “members of the Manuel Carrillo drug distribution organization, including but not limited to ... Raul Atayde, Andres Luna, Manuel Carrillo, Hector Gonzalez, Augustine Oli-vas, Hilda Gutierrez, Omar Nunez, Emili-ano Licon, and others yet unknown.” (Government’s Exhibit 3 ¶A). The first wiretap expired on May 5, 1999. (See Government’s Exhibits 1, 2, and 3). 2. 99-WT-4-Z The second wiretap Order, also issued April 6, 1999, authorized interception of communications from a digital display paging device assigned telephone number (303) 836-6202 and purchased from Communications Unlimited by the FBI for use as an undercover pager in this investigation. The subject pager was subscribed to by Curt Ramsey of the FBI at an undercover address in Denver, Colorado. As of March 12, 1999, the subject pager was in the possession of and utilized by Raul Atayde. On or about April 6, 1999, when 99-WT-3-Z commenced, the subject pager was transferred to the possession of Manuel Carrillo. The named targets and in-terceptees in the second wiretap Order were Raul Atayde, Andres Luna, Manuel Carrillo, Hector Gonzalez, Augustine Oli-vas, Hilda Gutierrez, Omar Nunez, Emili-ano Licon, and others yet unknown. (Government’s Exhibit 5 1A). The second wiretap also expired on May 5, 1999. (See Government’s Exhibits 1, 4, and 5). 3.99-WT-6-Z The third wiretap Order, issued May 18, 1999, approximately two weeks after the first two wiretaps expired, authorized interception of communications from cellular telephone number (303) 898-3004 bearing ESN 25301438370. The subject cellular telephone was subscribed to by Curt Ramsey of the FBI at an undercover address in Denver, Colorado, and was in the possession of and utilized by Manuel Carrillo. The named targets and interceptees in the third wiretap Order were “members of the Manuel Carrillo drug distribution organization, including but not limited to” Raul Atayde, Andres Jaquin Luna III, Manuel Guillermo Carrillo, Hector Hinojosa Gonzalez, Hilda Gutierrez, Omar Nunez, Emi-liano Zapata Licon, Angel LNU, Raul Garcia, Tomas Guerra, Oscar Pacheco-Vasquez, Oscar LNU, Alejandro Hernandez, Jose Juan Melendez, Chilas LNU, Augustine Olivas, Xavier Davis, and others yet unknown. (Government’s Exhibit 9 ¶ A). The third wiretap expired on June 15, 1999. (See Government’s Exhibits 7, 8, and 9). II. The Investigation According to the Affidavits submitted in support of the three wiretap Applications, affiant Denver Police Officer/F.B.I. Special Federal Officer Jamie D. Akens began Ms participation in the investigation of the charged offenses in January of 1997. The investigation in this case and related Criminal Action Nos. 99-CR-298-S and 99-CR-299-S spanned almost three years. Through confidential sources, Officer Akens learned that Manuel Carrillo was the founder and leader of a violent Denver street gang known as the Mexican Criminal Mafia Sureño 13 (“MCM SUR 13”) and that Carrillo was personally distributing and using others to distribute large quantities of cocaine and methamphetamine in the Denver metropolitan area. Officer Aliens learned that Andres Luna and Hector Gonzalez were members of the MCM SUR 13 and closely assisted Carrillo in the drug distribution business. The investigation focused on a conspiracy by members and associates of the Mexican Criminal Mafia to possess and distribute cocaine, crack cocaine, and methamphetamine. The investigation revealed that Carrillo was in the middle of a drug distribution conspiracy that lasted from January 1997 until Carrillo went to jail in August 1999. The conspirators were members or associates of the Mexican Criminal Mafia and either supplied drugs to, purchased drugs from, or worked directly with Carrillo in the drug organization. The investigation showed that Carrillo obtained cocaine, crack cocaine, and methamphetamine from several sources, including but not limited to Hector Gonzalez, Jose Manuel Aguilar Perez, Jose Juan Melendez, and Eduardo Morales. Carrillo then distributed these drugs to other distributors, many of whom were members of the Mexican Criminal Mafia, including Raul Atayde, Andres Luna, Juan Castoreña, Oscar Pacheco-Vasquez, and Augustine Olivas. These individuals then further distributed the drugs. Members of the drug organization acted as Carrillo’s assistants by, inter alia, locating customers to purchase drugs, delivering drugs to customers, collecting money from drug sales, weighing and storing drugs at their homes and the homes of their relatives and girlfriends, serving as protection for Carrillo during drug transactions, and obtaining and carrying weapons for use during drug deals. Many of Carrillo’s assistants in the drug organization also worked for Carrillo as employees in two restaurants, the El Acapulco and the Acapulco Beach II. These restaurants served as stash locations for drugs and guns. Conspirators used the telephones at the restaurants for drug deals and sold a substantial quantity of drugs from the restaurants. While in the restaurants, confidential sources observed numerous guns that were used in connection with the drug business. Brothers in law Emiliano Licon and Roger Jirón were large buyers of and brokers for the Carrillo organization’s drugs, primarily cocaine. Licon and Jirón each sold large quantities of cocaine in east Denver and Aurora. Mark and Brandy Jones were also large buyers of the Carrillo organization’s drugs, primarily methamphetamine. The investigation used surveillance, confidential sources, search warrants, witness interviews, undercover officers, pen registers, trap and trace information, toll record information, and records searches. These investigative methods revealed the conspirators in the company of other suspected participants in the drug conspiracy and confirmed some of the activities of the suspects. Several confidential sources provided Officer Akens information about numerous drug deals and other crimes committed by Carrillo and other members of the drug organization. Confidential sources observed large quantities of drugs and several handguns at Carrillo’s residence and at the restaurants. During the course of the investigation, law enforcement agents continually attempted to corroborate by numerous means the information gained from confidential sources. Confidential sources and an undercover officer were able to make controlled purchases of narcotics from members of Carrillo’s drug distribution organization between January 1997 and August 1999. The investigation also focused on the drug trafficking activities of Hector Gonzalez that were separate from his dealings with the Carrillo drug organization. Hector Gonzalez was a primary supplier of drugs to Carrillo’s drug distribution organization. The Gonzalez conspiracy charged in Criminal Action No. 99-CR-298-S began in July of 1999 and ended in September of 1999. The investigation revealed that Hector Gonzalez was receiving shipments of marijuana in hundred-pound quantities and cocaine in kilogram quantities from sources in El Paso, Texas and Juarez, Mexico identified as Humberto Pe-legrina and Manuel Aldo Yee Quintero. The investigators learned that shipments arriving in El Paso, Texas were transported to Denver, Colorado in automobiles by female “mules” hired by Alvaro Cano. Valerie Jarocki and Yadira Villalba were two of these “mules.” The drugs were delivered to Hector Gonzalez in Denver and money was sent via couriers, such as Mario Najera, back to Mexico. The investigation also revealed that Jose Arturo Hernandez-Rodriguez arranged cocaine deals between a Mexican source and Hector Gonzalez and that Alejandro Hernandez was a source of drugs for Hector Gonzalez. Thomas Cruz was a large buyer of marijuana from Hector Gonzalez. David Wallace was a significant buyer of marijuana from Cruz. Other associates of Hector Gonzalez in the drug business were Ricardo Gonzalez, Augustine Olivas, Raul Garcia, and Roberto Gutierrez Borjon. These individuals assisted Hector Gonzalez in distributing marijuana, cocaine and methamphetamine, collecting money, and locating drug customers. Ricardo Gonzalez, Augustine Olivas, and Raul Garda were also employed by Hector Gonzalez in a restaurant, La Playa del Acapulco, which was used as a front for drug trafficking and was the location of many of Gonzalez’ criminal activities. The stated objectives of the investigation that led to the Applications for 99-WT-3-Z and 99-WT-4-Z were to obtain admissible evidence of: (1) information leading to the identification of individuals supplying Raul Atayde, Andres Luna, Manuel Carrillo, Hector Gonzalez, Augustine Olivas, Hilda Gutierrez, Omar Nunez, Emiliano Licon, and others unknown with controlled substances; (2) information leading to the identification of persons distributing and transporting controlled substances on behalf of Raul Atayde, Andres Luna, Manuel Carrillo, Hector Gonzalez, Augustine Olivas, Hilda Gutierrez, Omar Nunez, Emiliano Licon, and others unknown; (3) information leading to the identification of times and locations of meetings during which Raul Atayde, An- . dres Luna, Manuel Carrillo, Hector Gonzalez, Augustine Olivas, Hilda Gutierrez, Omar Nunez, Emiliano Licon, and others unknown distribute controlled substances; (4) information leading to the identification of other communication facilities utilized by Raul Atayde, Andres Luna, Manuel Carrillo, Hector Gonzalez, Augustine Oli-vas, Hilda Gutierrez, Omar Nunez, Emili-ano Licon, and others unknown in furtherance of their criminal activity; and (5) information leading to the identification of times of importation into and delivery of controlled substances to the District of Colorado. (Government’s Exhibit 1 pp. 7-9). The stated objectives of the investigation that led to the Application for 99-WT-6-Z were to obtain admissible evidence of: (1) information leading to the identification of individuals supplying Raul Atayde, Andres Luna, Manuel Carrillo, Hector Gonzalez, Hilda Gutierrez, Omar Nunez, Emiliano Licon, Angel LNU, Raul Garcia, Tomas Guerra, Oscar Pacheco-Vasquez, Oscar LNU, Aejandro Hernandez, Jose Juan Melendez, Chilas LNU, Augustine Olivas, Xavier Davis, and others unknown with controlled substances; (2) information leading to the identification of persons distributing and transporting controlled substances on behalf of Raul Atayde, Andres Luna, Manuel Carrillo, Hector Gonzalez, Hilda Gutierrez, Omar Nunez, Emiliano Licon, Angel LNU, Raul Garcia, Tomas Guerra, Oscar Pacheco-Vasquez, Oscar LNU, Aejandro Hernandez, Jose Juan Melendez, Chilas LNU, Augustine Olivas, Xavier Davis, and others unknown; (3) information leading to the identification of times and locations of meetings during which Raul Atayde, Andres Luna, Manuel Carrillo, Hector Gonzalez, Hilda Gutierrez, Omar Nunez, Emiliano Licon, Angel LNU, Raul Garcia, Tomas Guerra, Oscar Pacheco-Vasquez, Oscar LNU, Aejandro Hernandez, Jose Juan Melendez, Chilas LNU, Augustine Olivas, Xavier Davis, and others unknown distribute controlled substances; (4) information leading to the identification of other communication facilities utilized by Raul Atayde, Andres Luna, Manuel Carrillo, Hector Gonzalez, Hilda Gutierrez, Omar Nunez, Emiliano Licon, Angel LNU, Raul Garcia, Tomas Guerra, Oscar Pacheco-Vasquez, Oscar LNU, Alejandro Hernandez, Jose Juan Melendez, Chilas LNU, Augustine Olivas, Xavier Davis, and others unknown in furtherance of their criminal activity; and (5) information leading to the identification of times of importation into and delivery of controlled substances to the District of Colorado. (Government’s Exhibit 7 pp. 7-8). III. Standard of Review The judge to whom the application for a wiretap is submitted is vested with considerable discretion in his or her analysis. United States v. Brone, 792 F.2d 1504, 1506 (9th Cir.1986) (citation omitted); United States v. Sandoval, 550 F.2d 427, 429 (9th Cir.1976) (citation omitted). A defendant must make a prima facie showing that the wiretap was conducted pursuant to an illegal order. United States v. Crumpton, 54 F.Supp.2d 986, 1003 (D.Colo.1999) (citation omitted); United States v. Barrios, 994 F.Supp. 1257, 1261 (D.Colo.1998) (citation omitted). Not every failure to comply with Title Ill’s requirements renders the interception of wire or oral communications unlawful. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 575, 94 S.Ct. 1849, 40 L.Ed.2d 380 (1974). A defendant must not only demonstrate a deviation from the requirements of the wiretap statute, but this deviation must be substantial. Crumpton, 54 F.Supp.2d at 1003 (citation omitted). While the determination of necessity is a question of law subject to de novo review, “a wiretap authorization order is presumed proper, and a defendant carries the burden of overcoming this presumption.” United States v. Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir.1997) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. Killingsworth, 117 F.3d 1159, 1163-64 (10th Cir.1997) (citation omitted); United States v. Quintana, 70 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir.1995) (citation omitted); United States v. Mondragon, 52 F.3d 291, 292 (10th Cir.1995) (citation omitted). Thus, the defendant carries the burden of persuasion on the legal question of whether the wiretaps were “necessary.” Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d at 1186. The district court’s conclusion that a wiretap was necessary is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Armendariz, 922 F.2d 602, 608 (10th Cir.1990) (citation omitted); United States v. Carneiro, 861 F.2d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir.1988) (citation omitted); United States v. Zambrano, 841 F.2d 1320, 1329-30 (7th Cir.1988). But see Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d at 1186 (“The question of whether the government demonstrated sufficient ‘necessity’ under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c) (1994) to support the issuance of a wiretapping order is a question of law which we review de novo.”). The court need not attempt to resolve the issue of the proper standard of review of the necessity determination because the court would reach the same result under either standard of review. While this court owes no deference to the issuing judge in assessing whether the wiretaps were necessary, the court knows of no prohibition of this court’s consideration of the issuing judge’s findings regarding the necessity determination. (See Government’s Exhibits 6 and 10). The court may properly limit its de novo review of the issuing judge’s necessity determination to the information before the issuing judge. See United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227, 1231-32 (9th Cir.1978) (necessity determination made based on review of affidavit in support of wiretap application); United States v. Anderson, 542 F.2d 428, 431 (7th Cir.1976) (decision to authorize electronic surveillance should be upheld if the wiretap affidavit, viewed as a whole, reveals a “factual predicate” sufficient to support a finding of necessity); United States v. Kail, 612 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir.1979) (compliance with § 2518(l)(c) should be evaluated by viewing each affidavit in support of an electronic surveillance application as a whole); United States v. Bennett, 825 F.Supp. 1512, 1525 (D.Colo.1993) (citations omitted) (“[i]n determining whether the Government has substantially complied with the necessity requirement, it is appropriate to look both to the applications and the affidavits submitted with them”). Accordingly, the court confines its analysis to the information before the issuing judge: the Applications (Government’s Exhibits 2, 4, and 8), the Affidavits in support of the Applications (Government’s Exhibits 1 and 7), the in camera proceedings (Government’s Exhibits 6 and 10), and the Orders Authorizing the Interception of Wire communications (Government's Exhibits 3, 5, and 9). IV. The “Necessity” Requirement Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c), an application for an electronic surveillance order must contain “a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” Title 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) in turn provides that before a court issues an electronic surveillance order it must determine on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” “These two sections together make up the so-called necessity requirement for granting a wiretap order.” United States v. Ippolito, 774 F.2d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir.1985). “[T]he government must show, by a full and complete statement, and the issuing court must find, that normal investigative techniques employing a normal amount of resources have failed to make the case within a reasonable period of time.” Ippolito, 774 F.2d at 1486 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Each wiretap application, standing alone, must satisfy the necessity requirement. Carneiro, 861 F.2d at 1176 (citations omitted); Brone, 792 F.2d at 1507. The application or accompanying affidavit must contain, in writing, either a statement concerning alternate investigative procedures, or a statement incorporating that information by specific reference. Mondragon, 52 F.3d at 293. An affidavit in support of a wiretap application must show with specificity why in this particular investigation ordinary means of investigation will fail. United States v. Robinson, 698 F.2d 448, 453 (D.C.Cir.1983) (per curiam) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The purpose of the necessity requirement “is not to foreclose electronic surveillance until every other imaginable method of investigation has been unsuccessfully attempted, but simply to inform the issuing judge of the difficulties involved in the use of conventional techniques.” United States v. Dennis, 786 F.2d 1029, 1035 (11th Cir.1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It is not necessary that every other conceivable means of investigation be exhausted or that a wiretap be employed only as a last resort. Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d at 1187; Armendariz, 922 F.2d at 607 (citation omitted); United States v. Nunez, 877 F.2d 1470, 1472 (10th Cir.1989) (citations omitted); United States v. Apodaca, 820 F.2d 348, 350 (10th Cir.1987) (citations omitted); United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821, 825 (9th Cir.1977) (citations omitted). The “necessity” requirement of § 2518 is “simply designed to assure that wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where traditional investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime.” United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n. 12, 94 S.Ct. 977, 39 L.Ed.2d 225 (1974) (citation omitted); see also Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d at 1187 (citation omitted). Because §§ 2518(l)(c) and (3)(c) are worded in the disjunctive, the government has three alternative ways to establish the need for a wiretap. United States v. Smith, 31 F.3d 1294, 1298 n. 2 (4th Cir.1994). “[T]he government may establish the need for a wiretap by showing either: (i) that normal investigative procedures have been tried and failed, or (ii) that normal investigative procedures, though not yet tried, reasonably appear to be either ‘unlikely to succeed if tried’ or ‘too dangerous.’” Smith, 31 F.3d at 1298 n. 2 (emphasis added). “The Government’s burden of showing that other procedures reasonably appear unlikely to succeed or that they are too dangerous to use is not great .... Substantial compliance with the statute is all that is required.” Bennett, 825 F.Supp. at 1525 (citations omitted). The government need only lay a factual predicate sufficient to inform the issuing judge why other methods of investigation are not sufficient. United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 345 (3d Cir.1992) (citation omitted). “[T]he government -must show only that alternative means are likely, not certain, to fail.” Abascal, 564 F.2d at 825. Necessity is demonstrated where “normal investigative techniques employing a normal amount of resources have failed to make the case within a reasonable period of time.” United States v. Bailey, 607 F.2d 237, 242 (9th Cir.1979) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Ippolito, 774 F.2d at 1486. “[T]he government must base its need on real facts and must specifically describe how it has encountered difficulties in penetrating the criminal enterprise or in gathering evidence with normal techniques to the point where wiretapping becomes reasonable.” United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1298 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Sufficient justifications for the use of electronic surveillance include “the identification of all the members of a conspiracy, learning the precise nature and scope of the illegal activity, the apprehension of accomplices, and the determination of the dimensions of an extensive conspiracy.” United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1443 (10th Cir.1990). Where the objective is to discover the full scope of a drug operation, ie. suppliers, major buyers, satellite conspirators, assets, the necessity requirement is met if normal investigative procedures have not succeeded in developing evidence against all members of the narcotics conspiracy. United States v. Torres, 908 F.2d 1417, 1422 (9th Cir.1990). The necessity requirement should be read in a common sense fashion to realize the statutory purpose of granting investigative discretion to law enforcement agents. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d at 1298; see also Armendariz, 922 F.2d at 607. The showing of necessity in an affidavit supporting a wiretap application must be tested in a “practical and common-sense fashion” after “consideration of all the facts and circumstances.” Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d at 1187; see also Sandoval, 550 F.2d at 429 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); McGlory, 968 F.2d at 345 (citation omitted); Nunez, 877 F.2d at 1472; Abascal, 564 F.2d at 825 (citation omitted); United States v. Kalustian, 529 F.2d 585, 589 (1975) (citation omitted). In evaluating the showing of the government’s good faith effort to use normal alternative means because of danger or a low probability of success, the reviewing court should use a standard of reasonableness. Ippolito, 774 F.2d at 1486. The district court should not take too narrow and restrictive a perspective of the scope and objectives of the investigation. See Sandoval, 550 F.2d at 430. The Tenth Circuit has named five normal investigative techniques that the government must address in its application for authorization to intercept wire communications: ... To obtain an electronic surveillance order, the government must explain fully in its application what investigative techniques have been tried against the target of the wiretap. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(l)(c), 2518(3)(c) (1994). If any of the four categories of normal investigative techniques referred to in the legislative history of Title III have not been tried, the government must explain with particularity why each of such untried, techniques would be either unsuccessful or too dangerous. Those investigative procedures are: (1) standard visual and aural surveillance; (2) questioning and interrogation of witnesses or participants (including the use of grand juries and the grant of immunity if necessary); (3) use of search warrants; and (4) infiltration of conspiratorial groups by undercover agents or informants. In addition, if other normal investigative techniques such as pen registers or trap and trace devices have not been tried, a similar explanation must be offered as to why they also would be unsuccessful or too dangerous. .We add pen registers and trap and trace devices to this list because they possess a logical relationship and close affinity to wiretaps and yet are less intrusive. Thus, unless the government can show that they would be ineffective or dangerous they must be tried before resorting to wiretaps. Whether other normal investigative techniques must also be explored before turning to wiretaps will depend on the unique circumstances of each investigation. For example, it will often be the case that the government must consider first the less intrusive technique of reviewing available public, private, or governmental records pertaining to the suspects under investigation to see if the requisite information needed to prosecute may be obtained in that way. However, we articulate no general rule as to such other normal investigative techniques because they are so dependent upon the nature of the investigation and the crimes being investigated.... Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d at 1187-88; see also Killingsworth, 117 F.3d at 1163. Defendants argue that the Affidavits in support of the Applications for 99-WT-3-Z, 99-WT-4-Z, and 99-WT-6-Z failed to satisfy the “necessity” requirement set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c), that is, that they did not contain “a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(e); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(3)(c). More specifically, Defendants argue that: (1) because law enforcement agents achieved partial success with traditional investigative methods, there was no necessity for the wiretaps; (2) the Affidavits contained merely “boilerplate” language and conclusory statements of necessity for the wiretaps; and (3) the Affidavits failed to demonstrate necessity as to each and every target or individual whose communications were likely to be intercepted. The court examines the three challenged wiretap Applications and Authorizations to determine whether they comply with Title Ill’s necessity requirement. V. Analysis of “Necessity” Showing' A. Partial Success of Traditional Investigative Methods Defendants argue that because law enforcement agents achieved partial success with traditional investigative methods, there was no necessity for the wiretaps. With the benefit of 20io hindsight Defendants suggest that the traditional investigative methods used by the Government were somewhat productive and that the Government could have continued to pursue its investigation by traditional methods. “[T]he mere attainment of some degree of success during law enforcement’s use of traditional investigative methods does not alone serve to extinguish the need for a wiretap.” United States v. Bennett, 219 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir.2000). Necessity will still exist even where traditional investigative procedures can lead to the successful development of evidence against some, but not all, members of a narcotics conspiracy. Torres, 908 F.2d at 1422. The court finds and concludes as follows that the Government’s explanations in the Applications for 99-WT-3-Z, 99-WT-4-Z, and 99-WT-6-Z comprise “a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous” in compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c). 1. 99-WT-3-Z and 99-WT-4-Z a. Standard visual or aural surveillance The record is clear that investigators did extensive surveillance over a substantial period of time before applying for the wiretaps. Surveillance was done in connection with information provided by five confidential informants and numerous controlled purchases involving the confidential informants and the undercover officer. Surveillance was done on the restaurants that were used as covers for the Carrillo drug organization’s activities. Surveillance was done at the residences of Carrillo, Luna, Gutierrez, Gonzalez, Atayde, and Atayde’s girlfriend. Surveillance was done at locations where investigators believed drugs might be stored. Officer Akens explained that surveillance was partially successful, but that surveillance could not accomplish the objectives of the investigation. Surveillance helped identify some of the participants in the conspiracy. However, some suspects sent others to conduct the drug transactions and rarely appeared personally. Surveillance merely revealed the suspects in the company of other suspected participants in the drug conspiracy, but surveillance could not reveal the nature of the suspects’ meetings. Surveillance suggested possible locations where drugs and money were being stored but did not lead to the discovery of any drugs or cash. The success of visual surveillance was limited unless surveillance officers had some advance knowledge of the suspects’ meetings at known locations. Surveillance would have been required on a 24-hour basis to monitor all of the suspects’ activities. Surveillance could not conclusively establish the sources of the drugs and money, the locations where the drugs and money were being stored, or the roles of every conspirator. The Affidavit explained that Carrillo, Luna, Gutierrez, and others were wary of being followed by law enforcement. Luna stated his concern that he was being followed by the police. Carrillo, Luna, Gutierrez, Atayde, and others utilized various driving techniques to evade surveillance by law enforcement officers, such as circling the neighborhood, driving at a high rate of speed, turning off all vehicle lights while driving at night, driving through red lights, weaving in and out of traffic, driving through parking lots, and making abrupt U-turns. A suspect’s detection of surveillance can be dispositive of the standard surveillance prong of the Tenth Circuit’s necessity test. Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d at 1191-92 (citation omitted). The Affidavit explained that surveillance was of limited usefulness because the suspected conspirators were wary and rarely met or dealt with persons unknown to them. Meetings were set up by telephone in various public locations in or around Denver. The alleged crimes were conducted almost entirely by wire communications or in brief, closely guarded personal meetings. It was unlikely that surveillance could be conducted for long before it was detected by the suspects and the entire investigation was jeopardized. The limited usefulness of surveillance was also discussed in the in camera hearings before Judge Weinshienk on April 6, 1999. 0See Government’s Exhibit 6). The issuing judge was “satisfied that there has been very careful details in these Affidavits and applications of the crimes and the reasons why there can’t be other methods used.” (Government’s Exhibit 6 p. 16). Defendant Atayde points out that Officer Akens did not mention every instance of surveillance of Atayde in the Affidavit. The omitted instances of surveillance did not lead to any enlightening or new information. The omissions identified by Defendant Atayde did not affect Officer Akens’ conclusion as to the necessity for the wiretaps. In sum, the court finds and concludes that the Affidavit in support of the Applications for 99-WT-3-Z and 99-WT-4-Z fully and completely explained that physical surveillance was tried and failed to reveal the scope of the drug organization and became dangerous to continue. b. Questioning and interrogation of witnesses or participants (including the use of grand juries and the grant of immunity if necessary) The Affidavit in support of the Applications for 99-WT-3-Z and 99-WT-4-Z explained several reasons why questioning of witnesses or participants was unlikely to succeed in developing evidence about the members of the Carrillo drug organization or was too dangerous. In Officer Akens’ general experience and in his specific experience with this investigation, the only persons with knowledge of the scope of the criminal conspiracy were the participants themselves. No known witness had knowledge of the full scope of the drug distribution network under investigation. The participants in the conspiracy were not likely to talk to law enforcement agents because of fear of reprisal by their confederates and reluctance to implicate themselves in criminal activity. The investigators had no basis to believe any of the participants would be willing to cooperate. There was little or no likelihood of developing any information through participants. The entire investigation could have been jeopardized by pressing co-conspirators for information. The use of interviews or grand jury testimony would have alerted the other conspirators to the investigation. If called to testify before a grand jury, the subjects would likely have invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege. Any grant of immunity would have foreclosed prosecution of guilty individuals. If alerted to the investigation, many of the suspects would likely have fled the jurisdiction. The government’s desire not to alert any of the targets of the investigation is reasonable. Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d at 1193. Law enforcement agents attempted to interview potential witnesses where possible. Upon being asked to cooperate with law enforcement after his arrest, Luna indicated “I won’t rat on my homies.” On June 12, 1998, two individuals were arrested in New Mexico with twenty two pounds of marijuana that belonged to Carrillo. Upon being asked to cooperate with law enforcement after their arrest, the individuals refused. Defendants suggest that the investigators should have further pursued these possible witnesses. However, there was no reason to believe that these two individuals would have any information about the Carrillo drug organization’s sources of cocaine, methamphetamine, or crack cocaine. The circumstances of this case demonstrate that it would be unreasonable for the court to require further pursuit of these two individuals. During the execution of the search warrant at 3052 S. Zenobia St. on November 10, 1998, Gutierrez was arrested on outstanding warrants. Gutierrez spoke to Officer Akens that night and provided certain information about Carrillo’s drug distribution organization. Shortly after her interview, Gutierrez refused to cooperate further with investigators. The Affidavit explained Officer Akens’ concern that Gutierrez might be an unreliable witness because she was Carrillo’s girlfriend, lived with Carrillo, was employed by Carrillo, and was an admitted crack cocaine user. Officer Akens also explained his concerns about jeopardizing the investigation and Gutierrez’ safety. Officer Akens believed that Gutierrez might inform Carrillo of her discussion with investigators and compromise the investigation. Officer Akens knew that Carrillo had recently shot Gutierrez in the leg because he thought she was stealing drugs from him. Based on Carrillo’s past violence toward Gutierrez, Officer Akens reasonably concluded that use of Gutierrez as a witness was too risky. The Applications for 99-WT-3-Z and 99-WT-4-Z sufficiently established that questioning and interrogation of witnesses or participants, even under a grant of immunity, had not succeeded so far and was unlikely to succeed or would become too dangerous if attempted further. The Applications for 99-WT-3-Z and 99-WT-4-Z demonstrated sufficient necessity under this prong of the test set forth in Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d at 1187. c. use of search warrants The Affidavit in support of the Applications for 99-WT-3-Z and 99-WT-4-Z explained that the execution of search warrants had not and would not develop sufficient evidence to determine the scope of the drug conspiracy or the activities of the conspirators. In general, search warrants would have been helpful only to the extent that the officers knew where to search and could establish probable cause for a warrant. Some of the suspects had more than one residence and were believed to keep drugs at various locations. Investigators reasonably expected that they would not find incriminating records in executing a search warrant. See Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d at 1189-90. Search warrants would have jeopardized the investigation before the completion of its objectives. More specifically, on November 5, 1998, investigators conducted a canine sniff of and obtained a search warrant for a Cadillac driven by Carrillo. No drugs were recovered during the search. On November 10, 1998, investigators obtained a search warrant for Carrillo’s residence at 3052 Zenobia St., Denver, Colorado. The search resulted in recovery of a handgun on Carrillo’s person, but no drugs or other weapons were recovered. While. Officer Akens believed there was probable cause to obtain a search warrant for 1280 S. Raleigh St., Denver, Colorado, he reasonably determined that execution of a search warrant at that residence would jeopardize the overall investigation. Because that residence was believed to be only a temporary stash location used by Atayde, it was unlikely that a search would recover anything more than a small amount of drugs. A search of that residence would alert Atayde and other members of the Carrillo drug organization and could have jeopardized the safety of the undercover officer. At the time of the wiretap Applications, Officer Akens did not believe there was probable cause for any other search warrants. The Applications explained that the execution of search warrants would not develop sufficient evidence of the drug conspiracy, such as Carrillo’s suppliers of drugs, the methods of delivery, the identities of other conspirators, the location of the drugs and money, or the location and times of drug transactions. The Applications for 99-WT-3-Z and 99-WT-4-Z sufficiently established that the use of regular search warrants had not succeeded and was unlikely to succeed in leading to the identification and prosecution of the members of this drug trafficking conspiracy. The Applications also sufficiently demonstrated that the use of search warrants would jeopardize the investigation rather than succeed in determining the scope of the drug dealing activities of the Carrillo drug organization. d. infiltration of conspiratorial groups by undercover agents or informants. The investigation utilized five confidential informants and one undercover officer who were able to provide certain information and make numerous controlled purchases of drugs from some of the members of Carrillo’s drug organization. However, the Affidavit in support of the Applications for 99-WT-3-Z and 99-WT-4-Z explained that the confidential informants and the undercover officer had reached their maximum possible usefulness. The limited usefulness of the informants and the undercover officer was also explained in the in camera hearing before Judge Weinshienk on April 6,1999. (See Government’s Exhibit 6). i. use of confidential informants The Affidavit explained that CS-1 had not been able to determine who Carrillo’s sources of supply were, from where the drugs were coming, or where the drugs were being stored before further distribution. While CS-1 conducted one or two drug transactions with Carrillo, CS-1 was not permitted to attend many of the drug deals and was usually confined to dealing with Luna. In addition, Officer Akens had determined that CS-1 could no longer appropriately be used as a proactive informant. Officer Akens became concerned that CS-1 was engaging in drug dealing with Carrillo because CS-1 had specifically ignored Officer Akens’ directions and handled narcotics on two occasions without authorization. Officer Akens concluded that further pro-active use of CS-1 could compromise the entire investigation. Officer Akens continued to accept information that CS-1 gave him, but reasonably concluded that CS-1 was of no further proactive use in investigating the drug conspiracy- The Affidavit also explained that CS-2 was not able to advance the objectives of the investigation. CS-2 never dealt directly with Carrillo or anyone higher up the drug supply chain. Carrillo directed CS-2 to deal with Luna, one of Carrillo’s assistants, and CS-2 was able to make one controlled purchase of cocaine from Luna. CS-2 was also able to introduce an undercover officer to Luna. The Affidavit explained that CS-2 could not assist in investigating members of the conspiracy other than Luna and that the continued use of CS-2 was too dangerous. CS-2 feared for his/her safety based on Carrillo’s involvement in two stabbings and a shooting, Luna’s statement that before he went to prison he planned to drive around town shooting at people, Luna’s pending criminal charges, and Carrillo’s statement “if people talk, people die”. CS-2 could not infiltrate the drug organization without risk to his/her personal safety. The Affidavit further described why CS-3 could not successfully achieve the objectives of the investigation. CS-3 never dealt directly with Carrillo or anyone higher up the drug supply chain. CS-3 dealt only with Luna. The investigators had no reason to believe that CS-3, a low-level marijuana dealer, would advance the investigation. CS^i provided information that Gutierrez, Carrillo’s girlfriend, sometimes sold drugs for Carrillo and that Augustine Oli-vas was a drug runner for Carrillo. While CS-4 made one controlled purchase from Gutierrez, CS-4 had only limited dealings with Gutierrez and had no dealings with anyone else in the Carrillo organization. The Affidavit explained that CS^l was unlikely to be able to provide any useful information about the Carrillo organization. CS-4 was also fearful of Carrillo based on his/her knowledge of Carrillo’s prior acts of violence, that Carrillo owned numerous guns and that Carrillo had threatened a police officer. CS-5 briefly provided information to investigators but quickly refused to cooperate against Carrillo and fled to Mexico out of fear of retaliation by Carrillo or others in Carrillo’s organization. Information could not be gained from informants who did not know the sources of the drugs. The known confidential informants had no knowledge about Carrillo’s drug sources and could not realistically be used to investigate up the drug supply chain. See Bennett, 825 F.Supp. at 1525-26 (citations omitted) (necessity for wiretap found where other investigative measures failed to identify the members and scope of the conspiracy). Investigators had overseen sixteen controlled drug purchases but-were no closer to the sources of the Carrillo organization’s drugs. Investigators reasonably believed that it was highly unlikely that Carrillo would introduce any of the informants to his suppliers. Necessity for a wiretap has been found where informants have failed to discover the source of the drug supply. See Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d at 1192. Wiretaps have been found necessary when traditional investigatory techniques alone could not lead to the apprehension and prosecution of the conspirators higher up in the drug distribution scheme. See United States v. Plescia, 48 F.3d 1452, 1463 (7th Cir.1995); Sandoval, 550 F.2d at 430. All of the confidential informants expressed fear that they could be killed for assisting law enforcement. Some of the informants had heard Carrillo threaten Officer Akens’ life. The reasonableness of the investigators’ decision to forego further use of informants cannot seriously be questioned. Investigators knew of no other informants that could have been of any assistance. ii. use of undercover officer The record is clear that investigators utilized one undercover officer who was partially successful in achieving the objectives of the investigation. However, by March of 1999, the undercover officer had reached his maximum potential usefulness and was exposed to unreasonable danger. The undercover officer made several small purchases from Luna but was unable to learn anything more about the sources of the drugs. Luna then referred the undercover officer to Atayde for future dealings. At the time of the wiretap Applications, investigators believed that Atayde was lower in the organization than Luna. The undercover officer made numerous drug purchases from Atayde. While prosecutions could have been initiated against Luna and Atayde based on the evidence obtained by the undercover officer, Officer Akens reasonably concluded that prosecution of these two individuals would not achieve the objectives of the investigation. The conspirators were suspicious of the undercover officer. Luna indicated that he turned off his cellular telephone because he thought police were listening to his calls. Based on his suspicions, Luna stopped dealing with the undercover officer for more than three weeks in October and November of 1998. Atayde was cautious with the undercover officer, directing him to contact him only by pager and not at the restaurant telephone number. Atayde would not introduce the undercover officer to Carrillo. Carrillo almost never made personal contact with the undercover officer and attempted to conceal his identity from the undercover officer. Investigators reasonably concluded that additional undercover agents likely could not infiltrate the drug organization and could not advance the investigation as to the drug sources. Despite the partial success of the undercover agent, investigators were unable to discover the main sources of the drugs. The suspected higher level conspirators were wary and sent lower level associates to conduct the transactions with informants and undercover officers. Additional drug purchases from Atayde by the undercover officer reasonably appeared unlikely to bring the investigation any closer to Carrillo or reveal the scope of the drug organization. Investigators reasonably concluded • that it was highly unlikely that the undercover officer would meet any of Carrillo’s suppliers. The undercover officer was unable to determine the other members of the conspiracy, the sources of the drugs, or where the drugs and money came from or went. Necessity for a wiretap has been found where an undercover agent has been unsuccessful in reaching the higher levels of a drug organization. Killingsworth, 117 F.3d at 1164. By March of 1999, the undercover officer’s efforts also were becoming too dangerous. Officer Akens had learned that CS-1 was handling drugs for the Carrillo organization without authorization. Because CS-1 would have recognized the undercover officer as a police officer, CS-1 could not be allowed near the undercover officer. This limited the effectiveness of the undercover officer and increased the danger to him. The decision not to expose the undercover officer to further risk to his safety cannot reasonably be questioned. Defendants argue that the undercover officer was “underutilized” in the investigation. Based on three conversations on March 25, 1999 and one conversation on April 4, 1999, Defendants suggest that the undercover officer could have started working at the Acapulco Beach II and that another undercover officer could have been introduced to Atayde. Defendants also argue that more money should have been spent for undercover drug buys before a wiretap was sought. First, the undercover officer would not have been safe working at the Acapulco Beach II, because surveillance inside the restaurant was not possible. Based on the circumstances of this investigation, including past incidents of violence perpetrated by members of this drug organization. Officer Akens reasonably concluded that allowing the undercover officer to work at the Acapulco Beach II was too dangerous. Second, it was reasonable under the circumstances for Officer Akens to conclude that the undercover officer and any additional undercover officer would only continue to purchase drugs from Atayde and would not advance the investigation or learn the sources of the drugs or the scope of the drug operation. While the undercover officer had two contacts with Carrillo, all of his other contacts were with Luna or Atayde. The undercover officer had already made seven drug purchases in ever-increasing quantities from Atayde in an attempt to reach Carrillo and his drug sources, but these purchases had not resulted in any admissible evidence about the sources of the drugs and the larger scope of the Carrillo drug operation. The conversations referenced by the Defendants merely validate Officer Akens’ conclusion that further undercover purchases would have been from Atayde. Third, it would be unreasonable to require more undercover drug purchases under these circumstances. The investigation used confidential informants and an undercover officer to make at least seventeen drug purchases, including cocaine, methamphetamine, and crack cocaine, over a period of 27 months. The purchases began with one-ounce quantities, escalated to two- and three-ounce quantities, and culminated in a purchase of one pound of methamphetamine at a cost of $11,000.00 on February 4, 1999. The government is not required to expend an extraordinary amount of resources prior to seeking a wiretap. The government need only demonstrate that “normal investigative techniques employing a normal amount of resources have failed to make the case within a reasonable period of time.” United States v. Spagnuolo, 549 F.2d 705, 710 (9th Cir.1977); see also Ippolito, 774 F.2d at 1486; Bailey, 607 F.2d at 242. After all of these purchases, the investigation had not revealed admissible evidence of Atayde’s source, much less the scope of the Carrillo drug organization and its sources. It is clear under the Government’s recitation of the facts that requiring the Government to attempt the unexhausted and unexplained investigative methods suggested by the Defendants would be unreasonable. The Government’s failure to explicitly explain why it did not use the investigative methods suggested by the Defendants is not fatal to the wiretap application. See Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d at 1188. The Applications for 99-WT-3-Z and 99-WT-4-Z fully and completely explained the attempted use of confidential informants and the undercover officer. The Applications for 99-WT-3-Z and 99-WT-4-Z sufficiently established that infiltration of conspiratorial groups by an undercover agent and five informants had been extensively tried and had been unsuccessful. The Applications for 99-WT-3-Z and 99-WT-4-Z fully and completely explained that investigators had exhausted the knowledge and usefulness of all the known informants and the undercover officer and that continued use of the known informants and undercover officer would be too dangerous to continue. The Applications for 99-WT-3-Z and 99-WT-4-Z demonstrated sufficient necessity under this prong of the test set forth in Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d at 1187. e. pen registers or trap and trace devices “[I]f other normal investigative techniques such as pen registers or trap and trace devices have not been tried, a similar explanation must be offered as to why they also would be unsuccessful or too dangerous.” Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d at 1187. On March 11, 1999, pen registers and trap and trace devices were authorized on the subject cellular telephone and pager used by and in the possession of Atayde. The Applications for 99-WT-3-Z and 99-WT-4-Z explained that the pen register method reveals the date and time of both incoming and outgoing calls and the telephone numbers called from the particular telephone. The Applications explained that the trap and trace method reveals the origin of telephone calls made to a particular telephone number. The pen registers and trap and traces revealed that numerous calls were made from the subject cellular telephone to individuals and locations known to be connected to the Carrillo drug organization, including Carrillo, Luna, Atayde, Licon, and the Acapulco Beach II. However, the pen registers and phone traps were of limited use. While pen register, trap and trace, and toll information was gathered and extensively analyzed, these methods cannot identify the persons making or receiving wire and electronic communications, the contents of the conversations, or whether they were in furtherance of the drug operation. These methods were used to corroborate the investigators’ suspicions, but could not significantly advance the investigation. Use of pen registers and phone traps could not achieve the objectives of the investigation, such as identification of Carrillo’s suppliers and distributors, the location and time of drug transactions, and the method of transportation and delivery of drugs and money. The Applications for- 99-WT-3-Z and 99-WT-4-Z sufficiently demonstrated that pen registers and phone trap and trace devices were tried but reasonably appeared to be unlikely to succeed in advancing the investigation. See United States v. Garcia, 232 F.3d 1309, 1315 (2000). f. Review of available public, private, or governmental records pertaining to the suspects under investigation The Applications explained that searches of criminal history and computer records revealed little about the suspected drug conspiracy. Searches of criminal records revealed only that several of the suspects had many prior arrests and/or convictions and gang affiliation. These records did not reveal any information regarding ongoing criminal activity. The Applications sufficiently demonstrated that records searches were inadequate to advance or complete the investigation. 2. 99-WT-6-Z First, the Application for 99-WT-6-Z explained that the first thirty days of wiretap surveillance did not succeed in achieving the goals of the investigation. The conversations intercepted during the first wiretap confirmed that Atayde was dealing with customers under the direction of Carrillo and that Carrillo was dealing with individuals who were higher up the chain of supply for the drug organization. The first wiretap did not intercept any conversations that would lead to the drug sources. The Application for 99-WT-6-Z also explained that the continued use of conventional investigative techniques did not succeed in achieving the goals of the investigation. The targets of 99-WT-6-Z included all of the same targets of 99-WT-3-Z and 99-WT-4-Z plus additional individuals who had been determined to be involved in the drug distribution organization. a. Standard visual or aural surveillance The Application for 99-WT-6-Z explained that the use of standard surveillance continued to be unlikely to succeed. Surveillance was used in conjunction with the initial wiretaps and traffic stops to identify Xavier Davis, a significant customer of the Carrillo drug organization, and others associated with Davis. Surveillance also revealed the identity of some possible sources of drugs to the Carrillo drug organization. Again however, surveillance merely revealed the suspects in the company of other suspected participants in the drug conspiracy but could not reveal the nature of the suspects’ meetings and activities or their roles in the drug distribution business. The limited success of surveillance at this time in the investigation was only due to the information gained through intercepted conversations pursuant to the first wiretaps. Surveillance could only support speculation, not admissible evidence, as to who was supplying the drugs to the Carrillo organization. The use of surveillance was also becoming extremely risky to the investigation. Luna and his mother had seen police outside their house. As a result, Luna took the cocaine that he was storing at his house and put it behind a dumpster in the alley behind his house. The police seized the cocaine from the alley in a warrantless search of the alley. Atayde and Carrillo became suspicious of Luna because of the disappearance of the cocaine. Also in April of 1999, when Atayde called for a taxi, a female dispatcher for the Metro Cab Company alerted him that the police were following him. The problems with surveillance were also discussed in the in camera hearing before Judge Weinshienk on May 18, 1999. (See Government’s Exhibit 10). The issuing judge concluded that “surveillance has not been very successful or really is dangerous.” (Government’s Exhibit 10 p. 7; see also p. 12). In sum, the Application and Affidavit for 99-WT-6-Z sufficiently established that standard surveillance had been tried and was unsuccessful in advancing the investigation and had become too dangerous. b. Questioning and interrogation of witnesses or participants (including the use of grand juries and the grant of immunity if necessary) The Application for 99-WT-6-Z explained that the use of general questioning or interrogation of witnesses and participants continued to be unlikely to succeed and too dangero