Full opinion text
Opinion and Order BAER, District Judge. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual and Procedural Background Defendants in this action, the City of New York and the Department of Corrections, et. al. (collectively the “Department”) brought a motion to terminate the Consent Decrees and all supplemental orders entered in this action and the six related cases that are encompassed herein under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA” or “the Act”), Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, §§ 801-810 (Apr. 26,1996). The procedural background of the decrees is set forth in this Court’s Opinion and Order dated June 5, 2000 (June 5th Order) and will not be repeated here except as is necessary. To summarize, the June 5th Order terminated the Consent Decrees pertaining to detainee correspondence and law libraries. Thereafter, upon the joint submission of the parties, this Court entered an Order Re: Partial Termination of Consent Decrees and Supplementary Orders, dated August 30, 2000, terminating numerous provisions of the Consent Decrees and certain additional orders. By Order dated December 15, 2000 this Court terminated (pursuant to the PLRA) three additional orders related to the Consent Decrees. This Court’s order of December 9, 1999 prescribed separate hearings for several groups of issues addressed by the Consent Decrees. The hearing on environmental health and the provision of personal hygiene supplies was held on May 8-10 and May 15-17, 2000 (the “May Hearings”). The May Hearings are the subject of this Opinion and Order. It is worth underscoring at the outset that the Decrees cover the conditions of confinement for pre-trial detainees held on Rikers Island and several county facilities. The conditions of confinement applicable to convicted or sentenced prisoners are not an issue here. At the May Hearings, this Court heard testimony from 18 present and former detainees in the New York City jails. In addition, 11 prisoners gave testimony concerning environmental health and personal hygiene issues at an earlier hearing, held in February 2000. The plaintiffs also presented testimony from Robert W. Powitz, Ph.D., an expert in the field of environmental health, and called as an adverse witness Tanya Rodriguez Barrows, unit chief for the Mental Health Center on Rikers Island and an employee of St. Barnabas Hospital. The defendants presented the testimony of the Department of Correction’s Director of Environmental Health, Patrjcia Feeney, who also testified as an expert; the Department of Correction’s Assistant Commissioner for Assets Management and Support Services, Vincent Cara; and the Department of Design and Construction’s Assistant Commissioner who serves the Department of Corrections and the Police Department, Kuo Tsu. In addition, both parties presented documentary evidence, which included additional deposition testimony from Commissioner Cara and Director Feeney (Pl.Ex. 369 & 370) and deposition testimony of Roger Slattery, defendants’ Assistant Deputy Warden for Administration at AMKC, and responsible for environmental health in the Mental Health Center (Pl.Ex. 17). The parties engaged in discovery in this case during the latter half of 1999 and through the first four months of 2000. A review of Director Feeney’s notes reveals that she conducted joint inspectional tours with the plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Powitz on the following days: November 22, 23, 24, 29 and 30, December 1, 2, 3, 17, 20, and 21, 1999 and March 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 24, 29, and 30, 2000. Pl.Ex. 365-66. (These notes are mis-dated March 23 at Pl.Ex. 366 E066715.) Common sense supports the proposition that these visits were not unannounced. The hearing was conducted on an expedited schedule because of the statutory prescription of the PLRA that termination motions be ruled upon “promptly.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(1). Pending this and other hearings on defendants’ termination motion, the court by Memorandum and Order of December 17, 1999, suspended the effect of the PLRA’s “automatic stay” provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2). Following submissions by both sides (on a timetable agreed upon by both sides and the Court), this matter became subjudice on September 5, 2000. B. The Facilities The fourteen jails under review in this proceeding currently house over 10,000 prisoners. The facilities are the Anna M. Kross Center (AMKC), the Adolescent Reception and Detention Center (ARDC), the George Motchan Detention Center (GMDC), the James A. Thomas Center (JATC), the Rose M. Singer Center (RMSC), the George R. Vierno Center (GRVC), the North Infirmary Command (NIC), and the West Facility (West) on Rikers Island; the Vernon C. Bain Center (VCBC), a “maritime facility” anchored off the Bronx; the Manhattan Detention Center, (MDC), the Queens Detention Center (QHD), the Brooklyn Detention Center (BKHD), and the Bronx Detention Center (BXHD). (The latter three have also been known as the Queens, Brooklyn and Bronx Houses of Detention.) The Correctional Institution for Men (CIFM), referred to occasionally in testimony and documents, holds sentenced misdemeanants and is not at issue in this proceeding. C. Standard of Review The PLRA provides that Prospective relief shall not terminate if the court makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is naiTowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3). As this Court has observed previously, the PLRA authorizes courts to “continue to define the scope of prisoners’ constitutional rights, review the factual record, apply the judicially determined constitutional standards to the facts as they are found in the record and determine what relief is necessary to remedy the constitutional violations.” Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 151-52 (2d Cir.1999) quoting Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F.Supp. 332, 351 (S.D.N.Y.1996). In Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), the Supreme Court held that [prison] conditions ... alone or in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. Such conditions could be cruel and unusual under the contemporary standard of decency that we recognized in [Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) ]. But conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are not unconstitutional. To the extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society. In this case, however, because the plaintiff class is compromised of pre-trial detainees who have not been found guilty of any crime, they are not subject to punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). The Bell Court concluded that the conditions of a pre-trial detention facility are properly reviewed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment. 441 U.S. at 537, n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861. In Kost v. Kozakiewicz, the Third Circuit had occasion to consider claims of pretrial detainees alleging inadequate medical treatment and observed that: Pretrial detainees ... are entitled to at least as much protection as convicted prisoners, so the protections of the Eighth Amendment would seem to establish a floor of sorts. It appears that no determination has as yet been made regarding how much more protection unconvicted prisoners should receive. 1 F.3d 176, 188, n. 10 (3d Cir.1993); City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983) (the Due Process rights of a pretrial detainee are “at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner.”) To make out an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, “extreme deprivations are required.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). To prevail in this litigation, plaintiffs’ claims need not rise to such a threshold. The Department of Corrections may subject [the plaintiffs] to the restrictions and conditions of the detention facility so long as those conditions and restrictions do not amount to punishment, or otherwise violate the Constitution. * * :|c :|: * * Due process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished. A sentenced inmate, on the other hand, may be punished, although that punishment may not be “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment. ****** Thus, if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to “punishment.” Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal' — if it is arbitrary or purposeless — a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees. Courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather than a court’s idea of how best to operate a detention facility. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-536, 539, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447. In Bell, the Supreme Court explained that Restraints that are reasonably related to the institution’s interest in maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had he been released while awaiting trial. We need not here attempt to detail the precise extent of the legitimate governmental interests that may justify conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention. It is enough simply to recognize that in addition to ensuring the detainees’ presence at trial, the effective management of the detention facility once the individual is confined is a valid objective that may justify imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention and dispel any inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment. Bell, 441 U.S. at 540, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (footnote omitted). In a footnote, the Bell Court cautioned the judiciary to be wary of second-guessing the reasoned decisions of prison administrators: In determining whether restrictions or conditions are reasonably related to the Government’s interest in maintaining security and order and operating the institution in a manageable fashion, courts must heed our warning that “[s]ueh considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 540, n. 23, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974)). The PLRA, which guides the review of the Consent Decrees in this litigation serves to reinforce the notion that prison administrators, not federal judges, are best suited to manage the conditions of confinement. Defendants argue that the plaintiffs must show deliberate indifference to prevail. The parties agree that deliberate indifference means that a prison official “knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). The parties also agree that the Second Circuit has applied a standard of deliberate indifference to pretrial detainees’ constitutional challenges to jail conditions in at least two cases: Liscio v. Warren, 901 F.2d 274 (2d Cir.1990) and Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.1986). In Liscio, the complaint alleged that a doctor and others “were deliberately indifferent to [plaintiffs] serious medical needs while [he] was undergoing drug and alcohol withdrawal as a pretrial detainee ... resulting in serious physical injury.” 901 F.2d at 277. In Bass, the Circuit was presented with a claim of “failure to protect [ ] from physical harm in violation of [plaintiffs] constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments” arising out of an instance of inmate-on-inmate violence in a county correctional facility. The Bass court observed that The Supreme Court has recently made clear that the Due Process Clause is “not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty or property.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 663, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) (emphasis in original). That case explicitly did not consider whether something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or gross negligence, is enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause. Id., 106 S.Ct. at 667 n. 3. In the absence of further guidance, we must adhere to our recently restated position that [ a]n isolated omission to act by a state prison guard does not support a claim under section 1983 absent circumstances indicating an evil intent, or recklessness, or at least deliberate indifference to the consequences of his conduct for those under his control and dependent upon him. Ayers v. Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205, 209 (2d Cir.1985) (quoting Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 546 (2d Cir.1974)). 901 F.2d at 278. It is worth noting that in adhering to Ayers, the Bass decision relied on a case that set forth standards applicable to convicted and sentenced state prisoners, who are subject to punishment and protected under the more stringent Eighth Amendment standards. The Bass court rejected the appellant’s second claim as well, i.e., that he was not afforded prompt medical attention after an incident of violence. The Circuit there applied the deliberate indifference standard set forth in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (“deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.”). Both the Liscio and Bass decisions appear to have overlooked the standard applicable to pretrial detainees set forth in Bell v. Wolfish, i.e. those decisions did not even cite Bell nor examine whether the condition challenged was “reasonably related to a legitimate goal.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 539, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Neither party here mentions this oversight, nor does either party take notice of a more recent decision by the Second Circuit wherein the Circuit acknowledged that It remains unsettled ... whether a pretrial detainee must meet the “deliberate indifference” standard of Estelle or show “gross negligence” or “recklessness” or prove conduct not amounting to intentional acts, but that is more than simple negligence to state a claim of a constitutional deprivation under the Due Process Clause. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334 n. 3, 106 S.Ct. at 666 n. 3 (refusing to consider whether “something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or ‘gross negligence,’ is enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause”); cf. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1204 n. 8, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (noting that question remains unresolved). Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 983 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849, 112 S.Ct. 152, 116 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991). Mindful that the requisite standard under the Due Process Clause remains unsettled, I find that the plaintiffs here have met the “deliberate indifference” standard with respect to certain environmental conditions in the Department’s prisons. Under that standard, a plaintiff to prevail must satisfy two requirements, consisting of an objective and subjective component in order to find a prison official liable for violating an inmate’s right to humane conditions of confinement. The objective component requires that the alleged deprivation be “sufficiently serious.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991). This test is met, for instance, when, as in this case, a claim involves a number of inhumane confinement conditions, and the court finds that, when taken together, these conditions satisfy even the stricter Eighth Amendment standards and that this occurs when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise — for example, a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets.... Nothing so amorphous as “overall conditions” can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304-05, 111 S.Ct. 2321 (citations omitted). The subjective component requires the jail official to have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297, 111 S.Ct. 2321. In the context of prison-condition claims, the required state of mind is one of “ ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health and safety.” 501 U.S. at 302-03, 111 S.Ct. 2321. In other words, a prison official is liable only if he or she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). The Farmer Court noted that “even prison officials who had a subjectively culpable state of mind when the lawsuit was filed could prevent issuance of an injunction by proving, during the litigation, that they were no longer unreasonably disregarding an objectively intolerable risk of harm and that they would not revert to their obduracy upon cessation of the litigation.” 511 U.S. at 847, n. 9, 114 S.Ct. 1970. And of course, under the Eighth Amendment standard, a district court must take into account “prison officials’ ‘current attitudes and conduct.’ ” Id. (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993)). In this case, the Consent Decrees have been in place for more than a generation, and accordingly, the Department, qua Department cannot demonstrate that it did not have actual knowledge of any conditions which are unconstitutional from an objective standpoint. The deficiencies shown at trial are largely the continuations of deficiencies that have been known, obvious, and commented upon by the Office of Compliance Consultants (“OCC”) and plaintiffs’ counsel for years, (see App. 1, Section T), and that have been the subject of further court orders between the entry of the Consent Decrees and the present proceedings. While past actions that have failed to cure or avert the harm at issue may have appeared reasonable at the time, “patently ineffective gestures purportedly directed towards remedying objectively unconstitutional conditions do not prove a lack of deliberate indifference, they demonstrate it.” Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F.Supp. 1282, 1319 (E.D.Cal.1995), appeal dismissed, 101 F.3d 705, 1996 WL 665551 (9th Cir.1996). In this case, the Court must focus on any continuing and ongoing violations of plaintiffs’ constitutional right to adequate shelter and environmental health conditions, and the defendants’ good intentions, without more, cannot constitute grounds to terminate the Consent Decrees. Finally, it should be emphasized at the outset that the review of prison conditions set forth below represents only a snapshot of conditions in the Department’s jails. This Court has not been apprised of any changes (for the better or the worse) which.may have taken place since the May Hearings. Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the parties to document any changes in conditions when submitting proposed orders recommending prospective relief. II. REVIEW OF CONDITIONS A. Ventilation A lack of adequate ventilation in a detention facility can contribute to the transmission of air-borne diseases, a problem which, is magnified for detainees who have compromised immune systems as a result of HIV infection or suffer from asthma or other respiratory ailments. Dr. Powitz, relying on information from New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, testified that approximately 9,000 asthmatics passed through the New York City jails in 1999. (Tr. 432-33.) Inadequate ventilation also undermines efforts to maintain minimum levels of sanitation within the Department’s facilities, providing an environment where mildew, mold, rust, and bacteria can flourish. In Hoptowit v. Spellman, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the finding of the district court which concluded that the lack of adequate ventilation violated the Eighth Amendment. 753 F.2d 779, 783 (9th Cir.1985). The Tenth Circuit has held that prison officials must provide “reasonably adequate ventilation” to inmates. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 568 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041, 101 S.Ct. 1759, 68 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981). In Ramos, the record indicated that the prison failed to meet the “minimal health and safety needs of the prisoners”, in part, because, “[ijnadequate ventilation, especially in the cells and shower areas, results in excessive odors, heat, and humidity with the effect of creating stagnant air as well as excessive mold and fungus growth, thereby facilitating personal discomfort along with health and sanitation problems.” Id. at 569. This court found that such conditions were “ ‘grossly inadequate and constitutionally impermissible.’ ” 639 F.2d at 570. Ventilation involves two facets: supply of fresh air and exhaust of impure air. Ventilation may be achieved through either active or passive means. Active ventilation is commonly used in sealed buildings with few apertures, and involves the use of mechanical air delivery and exhaust systems. Passive ventilation relies on the exchange of air through open windows. The parties disputed how to measure whether a particular area within a jail receives adequate ventilation. Director Feeney testified that the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) “would actually recommend that you use carbon dioxide as an indicator to check for ventilation problems and air-quality problems.” (Tr. 795.) Director Feeney further testified that according to the EPA and the American Society for Heating, Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE), carbon dioxide levels between 600 and 1000 parts per million are considered acceptable and a level below 600 parts per million is considered excellent. (Tr. 797.) Dr. Powitz did not measure the levels of carbon monoxide or carbon dioxide present in the ah* at the Department’s facilities. (Tr. 794.) Instead, Dr. Powitz opined that air quality should be measured by whether the ventilation system removes particulates, aldehydes, and odors from the ah*. (Tr. 493.) The presence of environmental tobacco smoke, condensate from showers and odors from the prison cells themselves were also relevant to indoor air quality in Dr. Powitz’s opinion. (Id.) When asked how carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide was relevant to air quality, Dr. Powitz stated Carbon dioxide is [relevant] if under crowded conditions we look at the concentration of carbon dioxide in the absence of air movement and people. Carbon monoxide comes from internal combustion sources such as motors, some from environmental tobacco smoke. (Tr. 494.) Dr. Powitz testified that the consequences of inadequate ventilation in the Department’s facilities are myriad. As noted, poor ventilation can exacerbate asthma and allergies, and allows molds, mildews and bacterial slimes to accumulate fester in shower rooms and restrooms where moisture-laden air is not exchanged and refreshed. (Tr. 547-48.) Lack of ventilation in chronically wet areas can also lead to “profound” deterioration of surfaces including floors, walls, ceilings, and windows. (Tr. 547.) Dr. Powitz testified that he found the ventilation systems at OBCC, YCBC, West Facility, and MDC to be operational, but explained that the MDC system was not functional. (Tr. 746.) Plaintiffs contend that but for BKHD, QHD, YCBC, and West Facility, each of the ten remaining institutions fails to pass constitutional muster. Problems with respect to adequate ventilation in each of the ten remaining institutions follows: AMKC The ventilation situation in AMKC presents a mixed picture. Dr. Powitz testified that “maintenance people told us that fully 10 percent of the windows were actually broken.” (Tr. 549.) On November 22, 2000, there was no ventilation in C-71, the mental health unit within AMKC because the windows were “inoperable”, and thus that area “was rather malodorous.” (Tr. 549, 552.) Further, lack of ventilation was also observed in the dorm toilet areas, and in Upper 9 (a mental observation unit) and Lower 1, there was no ventilation at all. (Tr. 549.) Director Feeney noted the following deficiencies with respect to 6 of 16 AMKC housing areas: Mod 9 A: “Ventilation inoperable” (PL Ex. 365 at E06547) Mod 6 B: “Exhaust registers were very dirty” (Id. at E06547) Upper 9: “Ventilation was poor” (shower area) (Id. at E06548) 5 Lower: ‘Ventilation was not operable” (Id. at E06548) Lower 1 and Lower 3: “Ventilation was inoperable throughout both houses.” (.Id. at E06550.) Director Feeney’s report of April 10, 2000 reflects that “Four exhaust fans were installed in AMKC for Lower 1 and 3” and that “[t]he Supervisor of Mechanics estimates that the wiring will be completed by the middle of May [2000] for these units.” (Defendants’ Exhibit (“Def.Ex.”) F-l at 6.) Commissioner Cara testified that he was only aware of ventilation problems in Lower 1 and 3, part of the Mental Health Center. (Pl.Ex. 370 at 352) This description of the ventilation system at AMKC does not support the plaintiffs’ contention that the majority of detainees are subjected to conditions of inadequate ventilation. The evidence does not show inadequate ventilation in the residential areas of AMKC, however it is clear that the Department does not provide adequate ventilation in C-71 and Upper 9. For this reason, the Court will enter an order directing the Department to take immediate remedial measures with respect to ventilation in the mental observations units of AMKC. ARDC According to Director Feeney’s notes taken during tours of ARDC in November of 1999: Ventilation was inoperable throughout the entire building. The Supervisor of Mechanics stated that a ventilation project was underway in the facility and more than 20% of the areas were restored. However, ventilation was not provided in any area inspected and the Supervisor of Mechanics was not able to inform Dr. Powitz of the areas that were already restored. (PLEx. 365 at E06554.) Moreover, the exhaust registers in the Intake/New Admission areas were noted as “dirty throughout.” (Id. at E06557.) A minority of the ventilation registers in the cells inspected were observed to be “dirty” or “excessively dirty.” (Id. at E06556, E06561, E06566, E06567, E06571, E06572.) However, at her deposition on April 13, 2000, Director Feeney testified that 75% of the exhaust units at ARDC had been repaired since November 1999. (Def. Ex. X-7 at 377.) Additionally, Dr. Powitz testified that the beds in Modular 10 were placed head-to-head, rather than six feet apart which is required to minimize disease transmission. (Tr. 690.) Dr. Powitz explained that droplets emanating from one person’s mouth remain airborne for at least three feet, but that most will not travel as many as six feet, which is why the beds should be placed that far apart. (Tr. 690-91.) BXHD Dr. Powitz testified that BXHD relies on an active ventilation system as well as air from windows, which are located across a catwalk from the prisoners and although barred, are inaccessible to the prisoners. (Tr. 557.) (PI. Mem. at 17.) Further, Dr. Powitz explained that “many of the window controls were either missing or broken and that [a] request had been in for window replacement.” (Tr. 557-58.) He found “very few windows in any cellblock ... that could be open for cross ventilation.” (Tr. 558.) Defendants’ smoke tests of certain areas of BXHD indicated that there was no exhaust in two of five cell areas tested on the fifth floor and that there was non-detectable exhaust in two areas of the third floor. (Def.Ex. F-10.) However, defendants point out that the carbon dioxide levels of all of the areas tested at BXHD were below 600 parts per million, and thus argue that air quality is excellent under prevailing EPA and ASH-RAE standards. (Def. Mem. at 21.) On these facts, I find no current and ongoing violation with respect to adequate ventilation at BXHD. GMDC The notes taken by Dr. Powitz regarding his fall 1999 visit to GMDC indicate that there were ventilation problems in almost every housing area inspected. (PI. Ex. 106 at P84-P128.) Director Feeney’s report states that “numerous ventilation units were inoperable at the facility” but that as of April 10, 2000, “sixty percent of the exhaust units were repaired by service contracts.” (Def. Ex. F-l at 18.) Plaintiffs draw the inference that forty percent of the ventilation thus remains inoperable at GMDC. (PL Mem. at 17.) Commissioner Cara testified at his deposition that he was unaware of the status of any efforts at GMDC with respect to ventilation. (Pl.Ex. 370 at 356-357) (“I haven’t been asked for assistance on it so I don’t know.”) On this record, I cannot help but conclude that inadequate ventilation at GMDC constitutes a current and ongoing violation of federal law. GRVC The notes taken by Director Feeney during her fall 1999 inspection of GRVC indicate that ventilation registers were inoperable in a significant minority of cells surveyed. (See Pl.Ex. 365 at E06628 to E06644.) Additionally, a minority of cell exhaust registers were dirty and a minority wTere clogged with paper or otherwise rendered inoperable by detainees. (See id.) Air flow readings taken by Dr. Powitz with a velometer in a number of GRVC’s buildings indicated that the ventilation system was operable. (Def. Ex. F-l at 24.). Detainee witness Keith Todd testified that during the fall of 1999 in GRVC’s “5 Block”, the heat was turned up in the cell housing area until his throat and nose dried up. He indicated that there was a window in the cell, but that no air is circulating if you have the door closed. The door was locked whenever it was lock in time, which included every day from “quarter to eleven at night until about 8:30 the next morning.” (Pl.Ex. 16 at 135-136.) Detainee witness Ralph White reported that he was housed in a cell area in 6B, which was very hot and humid. He testified that “there is ventilation but the only ventilation is the windows which the screens are murky so there is no ventilation really coming in or going out.” (Tr. 249.) Detainee witness Blake Wingate was housed in GRVC in the summer of 1999. He described GRVC as “a new building and like this courtroom is air conditioned GRVC is supposed to be air conditioned. But the officers turn the air conditioner on in their bubble cube and they don’t turn it on for us[.]” (Tr. 334.) He went on to explain that there was no ventilation, because “when the air is off, that is it. And GRVC — it was built as a central air unit facility.... if they didn’t turn the units on we had it bad in there.” (Tr. 334.) Finally, detainee witness Robert DeRo-sario testified that the ventilation within GRVC was adequate. (Tr. 203.) The record reveals a mixed picture with regard to ventilation at GRVC and is sufficient to support a finding that there is a continuing violation of federal law which must be remedied by an order that directs the Department to implement at the GRVC facility appropriate practices and procedures designed to maintain a functioning ventilation system. JATC In a report on environmental health at Department facilities, dated April 10, 2000 (the “April Report”), Director Feeney writes that “[t]he ventilation was operable in all areas.” (Def. Ex. F-l at 20.) However, Director Feeney’s notes indicated that during the fall of 1999, ventilation and exhaust registers were dusty, dirty, or clogged in fifteen of twenty-five cells surveyed. (See Pl.Ex. E06604 — E06607.) The defendants did not present a ventilation survey of the carbon monoxide or carbon dioxide levels in JATC and the April Report does not discuss whether the compromised ventilation and exhaust registers had been cleaned and unclogged. This record is sufficient to sustain a finding that ventilation is constitutionally inadequate in JATC. MDC MDC is a “closed jail” that depends on a mechanical ventilation system in which the “supply air is provided through a forced air duct system.” (Pl.Ex. 370 at 179.) Dr. Powitz testified that while the ventilation system was largely operational, he found that vents had been plugged so that the system could not function. (Tr. 557.) He testified that “good housekeeping practices of unplugging the exhaust grills and insuring that the intake is free of debris and being plugged would make that building quite functional.” (Id.) Director Feeney’s notes reveal that 44 of 63 ventilation registers or exhaust vents in cells and showers were clogged or dirty during a visit to MDC. See PLApp. 2 at 5, citing Pl.Ex. 366 at E06659 to E06670. This figure does not include the additional number of ventilation registers that Dr. Powitz believed were inoperable because he could not detect airflow across his hand. Defendant’s report of an environmental survey of air quality at MDC conducted on April 24, 2000 indicates that exhaust ventilation could not be detected by smoke test tubes tested in any occupied cells, day rooms or showers. (Def. Ex. F-10 at E12885.) This uncontradicted record is sufficient to sustain a finding that ventilation is constitutionally inadequate in MDC. NIC When the temperatures are moderate, there is good cross ventilation in the old building at NIC due to numerous operable windows. (See Def. Ex. F-10 at E12888.) However, Dr. Powitz found very little operational mechanical ventilation at NIC. (Tr. 559-560; Pl.Ex. 106 at P253-256.) In colder weather, Dr. Powitz testified ventilation would thus be inadequate. (Tr. 560.) Detainee Richard Fischetti described being housed in Dorms 2A and 2B in the infirmary where there was no ventilation. He reported no ventilation in the bathroom area of 2A where he observed paint chips coming off the wall, tiles coming up and mold. (Tr. 113-114.) Mr. Fischetti also described being in a punitive segregation cell in the back of Dorm 3 in the Annex, were there was no ventilation in the cell for two weeks. He described the cell as “muggy, stuffy no ventilation whatsoever.” (Tr. 114-15.) Detainee Robert DeRosario testified that the window in the bathroom of 5 south is “covered with a sheet of plexiglass that is screwed in because apparently the window is broken in the open position so I guess in the winter it must have been quite cold so they covered it, but because of the warm weather now it’s making it quite hot.” He explained that because there is no functioning vent (he tested it with cigarette smoke), when plumbing breaks, the odor from stopped up toilets is a problem. (Tr. 200-01.) Defendant’s report of an environmental survey of air quality at MDC conducted on April 20, 2000 indicates that exhaust ventilation could not be detected by smoke test tubes tested in any of the 11 tested residential and intake areas. (Def. Ex. F-10 at E12887 — E12888.) However, the shower which was tested was adequately ventilated. (Id. at E12888.) This record is sufficient to sustain a finding that ventilation is constitutionally inadequate in NIC. OBCC Director Feeney’s notes of a March 22, 2000 survey of OBCC indicate problems with ventilation in six of the ten housing areas inspected at OBCC. Specifically, in 5 South, exhaust registers were clogged in 3 of 7 cells, though another cell had an open window for ventilation. (Pl.Ex. 366 at E06717A — E06718.) In 4SW, the vents were clogged in one shower and no exhaust was provided in another. (Id. at E06718-9.) In 2South, there was no vent in the upper shower. (Id. at E06721.) In 5N/Annex, the exhaust was dirty in 2 of 8 cells surveyed, the exhaust register was clogged in 2 of 8 cells. (Id. at E06723^.) However, 2 of the 8 cells had opened windows. In 6 Lower, a smoke tube test revealed that the air supply was not operable and that the exhaust was not open. (Id. at E06733.) Finally, in 6 Upper, the exhaust was inoperable in the shower area. (Id. at E06733.) A Departmental environmental review of ventilation in the OBCC dormitory sleeping areas indicated that the air supply and exhaust systems were inoperable in the sleeping areas surveyed by means of a smoke tube test conducted on April 25, 2000. (Def. Ex. F-10 at E12890-1.) Detainee Richard Johnson testified that there was no discernable air circulating in his dormitory housing area: “For some reason there is no air. It is just stagnant.” (Tr. 282.) This record is sufficient to sustain a finding that ventilation is constitutionally inadequate in OBCC. RMSC Detainee witness Mary Johnson described generators at the back of Dorm 20 that gave off diesel fuel fumes. She testified that there is no ventilation in the Dorm except for the windows and if you open the windows the -room fills with fumes. The fumes “caused a lot of asthma attacks, a lot of seizures and my myself, I have angina and high blood pressure. It caused my pressure to rise very high.” (Tr. 236-37.) Detainee witness Wonder Fields described the vents in Dorm 17, both those on the walls and those on the ceiling as filthy. “They are black and nasty. They are dirty and need to be cleaned.... You see lint and all type of cluttered stuff inside them.” (Tr. 396.) She reports that the wall vents were cleaned a week before the hearing for the first time since she had been in the dorm. She moved to Dorm 17 in early October (7 months earlier). (Tr. 393.) The ceiling vents had still not been cleaned. (Tr. 396.) She also reported that there was no ventilation in the bathroom: “[tjhere is no way for the steam to go but to move out toward the bed area.” (Tr. 400.) Detainee witness Valerie Buehler explained that there is absolutely no ventilation in the Sprung, because the windows can’t open and there is constant hot air blowing in. She stated that it is very hard for people with respiratory problems to breathe. (Pl.Ex.14 at 13.) She has asthma, sinusitis and a history of pneumonia and upper respiratory infections. (Id. at 14.) An April 5, 2000 survey of the Rose M. Singer Center found no or non-detectable exhaust ventilation in 21 of the 43 locations surveyed in the intake area of RMSC, including non-detectable ventilation in the two medical treatment rooms and the examination room. (Def. Ex. F-ll at E12894-95.) Dr. Powitz testified that there was “variable ventilation” at RMSC. (Tr. 558-59.) Dr. Powitz found problems with ventilation in only five of 14 housing areas at RMSC. (Def. Br. at 19, citing Pl.Ex. 6 at P000264-P0000278.) On these facts, I find that RMSC’s lack of ventilation is constitutionally deficient. In summary, the Court determines that there is a continuing and ongoing violation of the basic right to adequate ventilation in ARDC, GMDC, GRVC, JATC, MDC, NIC, OBCC, and the mental observations units at AMKC, and the intake areas at RMSC. The parties are directed to submit proposed orders with recommendations including (where appropriate) timetables for prospective relief governing ventilation in these facilities within 30 days from the date of this opinion. B. Air Temperature In Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304-05, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) the Supreme Court defined “warmth” as an “identifiable human need,” the deprivation of which may constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. Such a deprivation would doubtlessly violate the Due Process standard applicable to pretrial detainees. Extremes of temperature present health risks as well as discomfort. Director 'Fee-ney testified that lack of heat for an extended period can disrupt sleep patterns, “make someone more susceptible to disease,” and “can be stressful.” (Pl.Ex. 369 at 69.) Dr. Powitz testified that the human comfort zone is a range of temperatures between 67 and 78 degrees Fahrenheit, but that because detainees are for the most part sedentary, their general comfort zone is between 72 and 78 degrees F. (Tr. 489.) Exposure to temperatures much below that cause the body to feel chilled. (Id.) Excessive heat, too, can be dangerous. For people on psychotropic medications, “when it starts to get in the 80’s, mid-80’s or so they start having problems.” (Tr. 588, Testimony of Dr. Powitz). According to Director Feeney, extremely hot conditions affect the ability of people on psychotropic medication to regulate their own body temperatures, (Tr. 780), and can lead to heat exhaustion or heat stroke. In addition, Dr. Powitz explained that people with respiratory problems can become more symptomatic as the temperature gets higher. (Tr. 588.) The Department of Correction has adopted the minimum standards established in the New York City Health Code: Pursuant to section 131.03 of the N.Y.C. Health Code, heat shall be supplied to every occupied portion of a building. During the months between October 1st and May 31st between the 0600 and 2200 hours, a temperature of at least 68 degrees F. when the outside temperature falls below 55 degrees F. and during the period of 2200 and 0600, a temperature of at least 55 degrees F. shall be maintained if the outside temperature falls below 40 degrees F. Def. Ex. F-20 at E07051. The credible evidence tends to show that air temperatures in the Department’s jails did not meet constitutional standards. Prolonged exposure to cold temperatures poses a direct risk to the health of detainees and is not reasonably related to any legitimate Departmental interest. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 538, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Dr. Powitz identified what he claimed to be serious problems with temperatures in six of the fourteen jails he toured. Director Feeney took issue with Dr. Powitz’s methodology, pointing out that he relied on radiant temperatures, which measure the temperature of some surface in a room, rather than ambient temperatures, which measure the actual air temperature and is thus a more reliable indicator of comfort. (Tr. 783.) Indeed, Dr. Powitz acknowledged that radiant temperature readings are relevant only insofar as they are used to gauge ambient temperature. (Tr. 566-67; Tr.1068). Defendants argue that Dr. Powitz’s own measurements “demonstrate the unreliability of using radiant temperatures — or at least the radiant temperatures that he measured' — for determining ambient temperature. On the occasions when Dr. Powitz took both measurements, or when Department staff took ambient temperatures where Dr. Powitz took radiant temperatures, the difference between the two was usually at least 14"F, a significant difference in terms of comfort levels.” (Def. Mem. at 52-53.) For example, when Dr. Powitz measured a radiant reading of 47"F in one cell, the ambient temperature reading was actually 62 "F, and where he obtained a radiant temperature reading of 56"F for cell 5 at the GMDC infirmary, he obtained an ambient temperature of 70~F for the very same cell. (Pl.Ex. 106 at P00098-99; T1007-08.) The plaintiffs point out that Dr. Powitz generally did not tour on the coldest days of winter, and was not able to tour in summer weather at all. His tours, conducted between November 22, 1999 and December 21, 1999 and between March 15, 2000 and March 30, 2000, mostly took place on moderate days, with temperatures reaching into the sixties; not the coldest days of this winter. In fact, during the nineteen days on which he toured the jails, there were only four days (November 30, 1999 through December 2, 1999 and December 17,1999) when the average temperature for the day fell below forty degrees. (Pl.Ex. 301) (listing average temperatures for the tour dates). By contrast, there were a total of 57 days between November, 1999 through March, 2000 when the average temperature dropped below 40 degrees. Pl.Ex. 301. On those four cold days he toured GMDC (November 30, 1999 through December 2, 1999) (Pl.Ex. 106 at P00074, 98, 121 (indicating date and facility inspected)), JATC (December 2, 1999) (Pl.Ex. 106 at P00130), and Brooklyn House of Detention (December 17, 1999) (Pl.Ex. 106 at P00154). (PI. Mem. at 31-32) (footnote omitted). Moreover, Dr. Powitz did not have the opportunity to tour the jails during the summer months, and thus as plaintiffs acknowledge, Dr. Powitz “had little opportunity to observe the jails’ abilities to respond to extreme heat conditions.” (PI. Mem. at 32.) The plaintiffs’ expert observed heat deficiencies in ■ the minority of the facilities which he surveyed, and the temperature extremes observed were, for the most part, not facility-wide, but limited to a particular cell or housing area. (See PI. Mem. at 32-35) (cataloguing deficiencies in ARDC, GMDC, JATC, NIC, OBCC, and RMSC.) Detainee testimony helps to fill in some of the gaps in Dr. Powitz’s account. A review of that testimony reveals the following: AMKC Two detainees reported that they could see their breath in the freezing air in the fall of 1999. (Pl.Ex. 16 at 510-11, Pl.Ex. 16 at 194-95.) Two different detainees reported “very cold” temperatures in housing areas during the fall of 1999; one reported extreme heat in C-71 during February 2000; and yet another reported extreme heat during the summer of 1999. ARDC The testimony of the seven detainees who reported on temperature extremes at ARDC can be summarized as follows: the temperature was either too hot or too cold in the winter months. (Pl.App. 6 at 1-2.) Detainee Breeland described no heat at all for a three day period in the fall of 1999, followed by a transfer to another unheated housing area for 3-7 days. (Pl.Ex.-13 at 5, 17.) Detainees Breeland and Wingate both testified to the occurrence of food strikes by detainees which were designed to call the warden’s attention to the extreme cold. (PLApp. 6 at 2.) The entirety of the detainee testimony concerning ARDC suggests that when one part of a of a cell block is heated, another part of that block will grow far too hot, while yet another will remain cold. (Id.) Detainees did not testify to the existence of temperature extremes during the summer months. (Id.) BKHD During the summer months, a detainees embarked upon a food strike in order to get a fan, which was provided after 6 weeks, according to Robert Jones. (PI. App. at 3.) Three detainees including Jones described exceedingly cold winter temperatures. One detainee reported being able to see his breath and another testified that a cup of water would freeze if left on the floor of a cell on the lower tier. BXHD Detainee Sherrod testified that a cold cellblock was temporarily remedied by a captain who instructed corrections officers to provide the men with a second blanket. (Pl.Ex. 15 at 15-17.) GMDC Five detainees testified to an exceedingly brutal picture of life in GMDC: detainees testified that even corrections officers kept winter coats on indoors, detainees huddled in blankets in the day room, extra blankets were not available for all detainees, detainees could see theif breath, and detainees would try to seal unsealed windows themselves with any plastic they could find. (Tr. 73-74, 93, 110, 112, 136-7, 206-210; Pl.Ex. 16 at 359, 364-66.) GRVC The testimony of eight detainees who were housed in GRVC revealed that detainees were subjected to either extremely hot or extremely cold temperatures, sometimes for more than a week at a time, in the colder months. (Pl.App. at 4-5.) The summer temperatures within the facility were so unbearable that one detainee told of officers who permitted water fights to alleviate the extreme discomfort. (Pl.Ex. 16 at 196.) JATC The testimony of four detainees from JATC paints a somewhat less extreme picture. Nonetheless testimony revealed that in the summer, JATC was uncomfortable and in the wintertime, uneven heating in the facility left those in the rear of the facility “freezing cold.” (Pl.Ex. 16 at 540.) Detainee Jones testified that “you could see your breath.” (Pl.Ex. 16 at 88.) Requests for extra blankets were “usually” met with the response that “there wasn’t one available” so that detainees would “wait until somebody moved out and take it from the person [who] was leaving.” (Id.) NIC The testimony of three detainees who had been housed in NIC paints a sorry picture. Detainee Robert Jones was housed in Dorm 3 in January and February, 2000. He testified that the windows didn’t close, that there was plastic covering them and that it was so cold every night that he could see his breath inside and wore his heavy coat under the blankets to sleep. He described that on windy days the plastic would blow off the windows. He testified that he made his complaints known to housing area officers. (Tr. 163-64.) Robert DeRosario was also housed in Dorm 3 in late December 1999 and all of January 2000. (Tr. 197, 203) (he moved from Dorm 3 on February 2). He said that it was “freezing” and he could see his breath. “Water and snow would come in through the broken windows and freeze right there on the window sill.” He went on to explain that “[t]here were at least 15, 20 leaks coming from the ceiling on a daily basis, snow and rain. At least 10 or 15 broken windows where rain would come through. At night 3 blankets weren’t even enough, that is how freezing it was in there. The COs used to walk around with their blue parkas they wear with a blanket around them.” (Tr. 197-98.) OBCC The testimony of three detainees who were housed in OBCC revealed that temperature extremes were experienced by detainees in the winter months. Specifically, detainee Alexander Gregory testified that it got so cold that the prisoners called the Inspector General’s Office and that someone came to take temperatures and then sent staff to fix the heat. The heat worked for a few days and then it was freezing again. He reports that he was then taken to the intake area of the jail to warm up, but that as soon as he was warm, he was returned to the cold cell. Thereafter, extra blankets were provided. (Tr. 180-81.) On cross-examination, he admitted that the officers let the inmates decide whether or not they wanted to be transferred to another location and the majority of the inmates decided to stay. (Tr. 187.) Detainee Dorian Miles testified that “people in the house wore extra clothes. Some people wore coats, hats just to walk around the house.” He testified that people complained, but that the situation was never remedied. (Tr. 316.) OHD Detainees confined in Queens House of Detention testified that air temperature within the facility was often uncomfortable during extreme hot or cold weather. The testimony of the detainees included accounts of sleeping on the floor during extremely hot weather to keep cold and being denied extra blankets in extremely cold temperatures and having to wait for another detainee to leave in order to access an extra blanket in the wintertime. (Pl.Ex. 16 at 417-18; Tr. 126-27.) Detainee Wingate testified that “sometimes it’s so cold you couldn’t sleep” (Tr. 329.) RMSC Female detainees housed in RMSC fared no better. Four of them testified that they were exposed to excessively hot and cold temperatures. Detainee Mary Johnson testified she had to wear her jacket in the Dormitory 17 at times to cope with the cold temperatures. (Tr. 243.) Detainee Fields testified that she was issued a sheet but not a blanket upon admission to Building One on September 29, 1999, and that for one week, she could not get warm even though she slept in her clothes. (Tr. 391.) Fields testified that in the modular units, icicles formed on the inside of the windows and that she wore a full set of long johns, a sweat suit, a coat, and three or four pairs of socks. (Tr. 394.) She also testified that during the wintertime in Dorm 17, heat was unavailable intermittently. (Tr. 393, 405.) According to Fields, when the women in her dormitory requested extra blankets, the facility provided one extra blanket to each woman, and when she requested more blankets, she was told that “[t]hey [did not] have any more.” (Tr. 394.) With respect to summer temperatures, Fields testified that the dormitory was extremely hot for 4 or 5 days. She reported that a captain took the temperature and stated that the dorm was above 90 degrees. She testified that “Captain Jones told us when it got real hot about four days ago, they couldn’t turn the heat off. Then we were told that they were working on the air conditioning but the air conditioning never came up and the heat never went off.” (Tr. 395.) The defendants did not elicit detainee testimony that contradicts the witness testimony set forth above. Nor did the defendants attempt to discredit the testimony on cross examination, except to question whether the detainees’ estimates of the actual temperature were based on a verifiable measurements. The record established with regard to extreme temperatures is thus essentially uncontradict-ed. The fact that the Department’s environmental survey, conducted on March 30, April 24 and 25, 2000 reports temperature well within the comfort zone of indoor temperatures does nothing to assuage my concerns that detainees are being subjected to constitutionally indefensible air temperatures. The survey was conducted on days when the outside temperature was moderate, so it is unsurprising that the readings corresponded. Finally a review of the Department’s maintenance records submitted into evidence shows numerous references to reports of no heat in Department facilities. While the Department’s records show that in the majority of cases, heat was restored within twenty-four hours, in a significant number of instances, there is an indication that work was not completed for days on end thereafter. (See Def. Ex. C-6, C-7 passim). In her testimony, Director Feeney described the Department’s approach to identifying and monitoring temperatures in the jails. First, while her Unit responds to complaints, there is no mechanism for detainees to relay their complaints to Director Feeney’s Unit. Detainees complain to guards, but there is no system that assures a report of extreme temperatures will ever reach her Unit. (Tr. 929-30.) Second, beginning last summer “in the summer months when the temperature outside is going to be around 90 degrees the sanitarians monitor the temperatures in the mental health areas and the clinics on Rikers Island.” (Tr. 779.) (Fee-ney); (Pl.Ex. 369 at 93) (explaining that the practice of checking these areas on extremely hot days began last summer). Third, “on very cold days with high wind loads we will check areas where we historically had temperature problems to just see that the temperature is acceptable.” (Tr. 780.) Additionally, between May and August 1999, the Environmental Health Unit took 853 separate temperature measurements (and an additional seven on a hot day that March). (See PLEx. 300.) These measurements yielded readings in the high 80 degree and 90 degree range, corroborating detainee witness accounts of merciless summertime temperatures, (see, e.g., Pl.Ex. 300 at E01072, E01081.) As I noted earlier, the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Seiter observed that “[sjome conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in combination’ when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as ... warmth ... for example, a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets.” 501 U.S. 294, 304, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991). On the facts set forth above, this Court finds that the defendants have violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional right to warmth in AMKC, ARDC, BKHD, GMDC, GRVC, JATC, NIC, QHD, OBCC, and RMSC. The Court also finds that plaintiffs in AMKC, BKHD, GRVC, QHD, and RMSC were subjected to excessively high air temperatures which constituted a direct threat to their health and safety. I ‘note too that defendants have testified that the Department plans to have a number of improvements in place by this winter’s heating season. (Tr. 1125-1127.) Accordingly, OCC is directed to monitor the temperature at the above listed facilities this winter and again in the summer season to determine whether continuing and ongoing relief is warranted or whether the risk to human health has been abated. A comprehensive plan is to be worked out between the parties so that the monitoring may begin promptly and in no event more than 30 days from the date hereof. C. Plumbing It is self-evident that access to adequate and functional plumbing is essential to a healthy jail environment because of the importance of water for drinking, personal hygiene, laundry, kitchen use, and housekeeping. (Tr. 576-77.) As the plaintiffs point out, “[ejither cold water or excessively hot water will discourage prisoners from taking showers (and in the latter case, affirmatively prevent them), resulting in an increased risk of skin problems and transmission of disease from person to person, T596-97; Pl.Ex. 369 at 72-73 and, says common sense, a foul and malodorous environment.” (PL Mem. at 45-46.) Not surprisingly, Dr. Powitz testified that hot water is essential for effective bathing and for handwashing, which is essential for personal cleanliness and public health. (Tr. 582-84.) These considerations are recognized by relevant correctional health standards as well as by the trial witnesses. Lack of hot water also impairs prisoners’ ability to clean their clothing. According to Dr. Powitz, “any soap has a melt temperature and it does take hot water to melt the soap or detergent and hot water basically makes water wetter in the presence of a surfactant.... [H]ot water is necessary for clothes washing unless the detergent or the soap is [designed] for cold water washing.” (Tr. 597.) While plumbing facilities in the Department’s jails leaves much to be desired, their condition does not reach constitutional dimensions. The notes taken by Dr. Powitz and Director Feeney during their survey of Department plumbing found numerous inoperable sinks, toilets, and showers, as well as shower fixtures that provided water that was either too cold or would cause scalding, yet the majority of the Department’s plumbing fixtures were operable. The plaintiffs argue that the degree of force required for a detainee to operate the pushbutton controls on some of the plumbing fixtures is excessive in some cases. (PI. Mem. at 54-57.) However, as defendants point out, not a single detainee witness testified that excessive force was required to operate the pushbut-ton sinks. Moreover, the problem of missing vacuum breakers on back-flow prevention devices (preventing the contamination of potable water) constitutes a general violation, not a critical violation, of section 10-C of the New York City Health Code and is a situation that is routinely rectified by the Department. (Tr. 806-807.) The defendants cite both Dr. Powitz’s notes, and the plaintiffs’ summary of Director Feeney’s notations of plumbing deficiencies set forth in Appendix 11 to show that Half the fixtures or more are available in 80% (57 of 71) of the cases where Powitz noted deficiencies in locations with multiple fixtures, and many of those noted deficiencies are not serious, such