United States v. Merton (274 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 2003)

ORDER

DANIEL, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants’ motions to suppress evidence obtained through twelve separate wiretaps and extensions thereto authorized by Senior United States District Judges Zita L. Weinshienk and John L. Kane, Jr. The Court held evidentiary hearings on these motions on April 80, May 1, 29 and 30, 2002. Having now carefully considered and evaluated the wiretap pleadings (Applications, Affidavits and Orders), Defendants’ motions, the Government’s responses, the testimony and evidence adduced, oral arguments, and the applicable law, it is Ordered, for the reasons set forth below, that Defendants’ motions are DENIED.

I. Background Investigation

The investigation which ultimately led to the wiretaps at issue in this case began in August 2000 in Colorado Springs, Colorado, with the arrest of Jeremy Dieffenbach. Dieffenbach provided information which led to the identification of John Sposit (“Sposit”) as a major supplier of 3, 4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (“MDMA”) (commonly referred to as “Ecstasy”) for distributors throughout Colorado. Based on that information, after months of collecting additional evidence against Sposit, investigators applied for and received authorization to conduct electronic surveillance of Sposit’s cellular telephone.

II. Wiretaps

A. First Wiretap: Subject Telephone One, 01-Wt-01-Z (issued February 14, 2001)

This First Wiretap order authorized the interception of communications from cellular telephone number (303) 844-8142, subscribed to Tom Snyder, 8220 W. Eastman Place, Denver, Colorado (“First Wiretap”). That cellular telephone was allegedly in the possession of and utilized by John Sposit. The named intereeptees in the First Wiretap were John Sposit, Nathan Kern, Reynaldo Mendoza, Luis Hurtado, John Gerak, Megan Schey, Cory Hynes, Tony Stoker, Shawn Hartnett, Shawn Sweeney, Nathan Burr ess, and Lisa Twoeagles. The wiretap terminated on March 16, 2001. An extension was granted on March 20, 2001, and added Ryan Krueger, Justin Lynes, Liana Parisi, and Caine Knapp to the list of named intercep-tees. A final extension was granted on April 18, 2001, and added John Georges, Elijah D. Williams, Brad Benham, Tyler Fader, Frank Edmonds, Angel LNU (last name unknown), Pamela LNU, and Mo LNU to the list of named interceptees.

B. Second Wiretap: Subject Telephone Two, 01-Wt-02-K (issued March 1, 2001)

The Second Wiretap order authorized the interception of communications from cellular telephone number (720) 220-8700, subscribed to Cristin Irwin, 8196 W. Eastman Place, Lakewood, Colorado (“Second Wiretap”). That cellular telephone was allegedly in the possession of and utilized by John Sposit. The named interceptees included John Sposit, Nathan Kern, Reynaldo Mendoza, Luis Hurtado, John Ge-rak, Megan Schey, Cory Hynes, Tony Stoker, Shawn Hartnett, Shawn Sweeney, Nathan Burress, and Lisa Twoeagles. The second wiretap terminated on March 31, 2001.

C. Third Wiretap: Subject Telephones Three and Four, 01-Wt-04-Z (Issued March 23, 2001)

The Third Wiretap order authorized the interception of communications from: (1) cellular telephone number (303) 249-1323, subscribed to Ben Coleman, P.O. Box 97061, Redmond, Washington; and (2) cellular telephone number (720) 217-6919, subscribed to Cory Hynes, P.O. Box 22614, Denver, Colorado (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Third Wiretap”). Both cellular telephones were allegedly in the possession of and utilized by Cory Hynes. The named interceptees in the Third Wiretap were John Sposit, Nathan Kern, Reynaldo Mendoza, Luis Hurtado, John Ge-rak, Megan Schey, Cory Hynes, Tony Stoker, Shawn Hartnett, Shawn Sweeney, Nathan Burress, Lisa Twoeagles, Ryan Krueger, Justin Lynes, Liana Parisi, Caine Knapp, and John Georges. The Third Wiretap terminated on April 21, 2001.

D. Fourth Wiretap: Subject Telephone Five, 01-Wt-09-Z (issued April 13, 2001)

The Fourth Wiretap order authorized the interception of communications from cellular telephone number (303) 523-9536, subscribed to Yer Yang, 3641 W. 88th Way, Westminster, Colorado, and allegedly in the possession of and utilized by Mark Williams. The named interceptees were Mark Williams, John Sposit, Nathan Kern, Reynaldo Mendoza, Luis Hurtado, John Gerak, Megan Schey, Cory Hynes, Tony Stoker, Shawn Hartnett, Shawn Sweeney, Nathan Burress, Lisa Twoea-gles, Ryan Krueger, Justin Lynes, Liana Parisi, Caine Knapp, John Georges, Elijah Williams, Brad Benham, Tyler Fader, Frank Edmonds, Angel LNU, Pamela LNU, and Mo LNU.

E. Fifth Wiretap: Subject Telephone Six, 01-Wt-11-Z (issued May 18, 2001)

On May 18, 2001, Judge Weinsheink entered an order authorizing the interception of electronic communications from cellular telephone number (303) 921-2020, subscribed to Gina Madrid, 8350 E. Crescent Parkway, Suite 400, Englewood, Colorado (“Fifth Wiretap”). That cellular telephone was allegedly in the possession of and utilized by Mark Williams. The Fifth Wiretap commenced on May 22, 2001, and terminated on May 23, 2001.

F. Sixth Wiretap: Subject Telephone Seven, 01-Wt-12-Z (issued May 24, 2001)

On May 24, 2001, Judge Weinshienk authorized the interception of communications from cellular telephone number (303) 885-3168, subscribed to Jason Price, 4050 S. Holly Street, Englewood, Colorado (“Sixth Wiretap”) and allegedly in the possession of and utilized by Jason Price. The interception of the Sixth Wiretap terminated on June 22, 2001.

G. Seventh Wiretap: Subject Telephone Eight, 01-Wt-15-Z (issued June 4, 2001)

On June 4, 2001, Judge Weinshienk authorized the interception of communications from cellular telephone number (303) 726-5300, subscribed to Gina Madrid, 8350 E. Crescent Parkway, Suite 400, Engle-wood, Colorado. That cellular telephone was allegedly in the possession of and utilized by Mark Williams. The interceptions of the Seventh Wiretap commenced on June 5, 2001, and terminated shortly thereafter.

H. Eighth Wiretap: Subject Telephone Nine, 01-Wt-17-Z (issued June 13, 2001)

The Eighth Wiretap authorized the interception of communications from cellular telephone number (720) 840-8090, subscribed to RG/MM, Inc., 612 Washington St., Suite 107, Denver, Colorado, which was allegedly in the possession of and utilized by Mark Williams. The interceptions on the Eighth Wiretap terminated on July 12, 2001, and an extension was granted on the same day. The extension of the Eighth Wiretap terminated on August 10, 2001.

I. Ninth Wiretap: Subject Telephone Ten, 01-Wt-18-Z (issued June 26, 2001; extended On July 25, 2001)

The Ninth Wiretap order authorized the interception of communications from cellular telephone number (303) 347-1869, subscribed to Vladiflav Radosavljevic, 6498 W. Arbor Dr., Littleton, Colorado, which was allegedly in the possession of and utilized by Vladislav Radosavljevic. An extension for the Ninth Wiretap was granted on July 25, 2001. The named interceptees in the extension of the Ninth Wiretap were Vlad-islav Radosavljevic, Mark Williams, Corey Jackson, Stanislav Stamenkovie, Srdjan Josimov, Tihomir Josimov, Mario Marja-nac, Dragan Kojic, and Djole LNU. The extension terminated on August 23, 2001.

J. Tenth Wiretap: Subject Telephone Eleven, 01-Wt-19-Z (issued July 11, 2001)

The Tenth Wiretap order authorized the interception of communications from cellular telephone number (720) 244-6737, subscribed to Jason D. Holley, 2964 E. Floyd Dr., Denver, Colorado (“Tenth Wiretap”). That cellular telephone was allegedly in the possession of and utilized by Jason Price. The named interceptees in the Tenth Wiretap are Jason Price, Mark Williams, Tod Holley, Jim Dowd, Ed Gleason, Johnny Keiser, David Kole, Damon Newman, Julie Payne, David Price, John Studebaker, Chad Vice, Andre Walker, Cliff Houser, Quincy Bentley, Steve LNU, and Gonzo LNU. The Tenth Wiretap terminated on August 10, 2001.

K. Eleventh Wiretap: Subject Telephone Twelve, 01-Wt-21-Z (issued July 18, 2001)

The Eleventh Wiretap order authorized the interception of communications from cellular telephone number (303) 898-1178, subscribed to Jaon Hicks, 16794 E. Happy Canyon, Englewood, Colorado (“Eleventh Wiretap”). That cellular telephone was allegedly in the possession of and utilized by Mark Williams. The Eleventh Wiretap terminated on August 21, 2001.

L.Twelfth Wiretap: Subject Telephone Thirteen, 01-Wt-22-Z (issued August 16, 2001)

The final wiretap order authorized the interception of communications from cellular telephone number (303) 944-5314, subscribed to Francisco Vasquez, 11821 Elm Drive, Thorton, Colorado (“Twelfth Wiretap”) and commenced on August. 16, 2001. That cellular telephone was allegedly in the possession of and utilized by Juan Ceja-Ponce. The named interceptees in the Twelfth Wiretap were Juan Ceja-Ponce a/k/a Orlando LNU, Mark Williams, Ismael Asuncion, Douglas Lindell, Jimmy Graham, Hector Lascina, and Jose LNU.

III. The ‘Necessity’ Requirement

Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“Title III”) governs the use of wiretaps and the evidence obtained therefrom. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. “In order to prove that a wiretap is necessary, the government must show that traditional investigative techniques have been tried unsuccessfully, reasonably appear to be unsuccessful if tried, or are too dangerous to attempt.” United States v. Ramirez-Encarnacion, 291 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir.2002) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(l)(c), 2518(3)(c)). “A wiretap authorization order is presumed valid, and the defendant bears the burden of proof to show otherwise.” United States v. Radcliff, 331 F.3d 1153, 1160 (10th Cir.2003). A successful challenge to the necessity of a wiretap results in the suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to that wiretap. Ramirez-Encarnacion, 291 F.3d at 1222.

The traditional investigative techniques to be considered by a district court in reviewing the necessity requirement were identified in Ramirez-Encarnacionas:

“(1) standard visual and aural surveillance; (2) questioning and interrogation of witnesses or participants (including the use of grand juries and the grant of immunity if necessary); (3) use of search warrants; [] (4) infiltration of conspiratorial groups by undercover agents or informants” and (5) “[p]en registers and trap and trace devices.”

Id. at 1222 n. 2. “If any of these traditional investigative techniques has not been tried, the government must explain why with particularity.” Id. at 1222 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir.2001)). The Tenth Circuit has also stated that “ ‘it is not necessary for the government formally to address each category with an explanation ... if it is clear, under the government’s recitation of the facts of the case, that requiring the government to attempt the unexhausted and unexplained normal investigative techniques would be unreasonable.’” United States v. Garcia, 232 F.3d 1309, 1313 (10th Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d 1179, 1188 (10th Cir.1997)).

For the most part, the Defendants contend that all of the evidence obtained from each wiretap in this case should be suppressed because the Government failed to satisfy the necessity requirement. The Defendants’ necessity arguments fall into two categories: (1) challenges to the facial validity of wiretap authorizations; and (2) subfacial challenges to the wiretap authorizations. As to the first category of challenges, a district court confines its analysis to the information before the issuing judge. United States v. Oregon-Cortez, 244 F.Supp.2d 1167, 1172 (D.Colo.2003). Under this analysis, a district court “examines de novo whether ‘a full and complete statement’ was submitted meeting § 2518(l)(c)’s requirements and reviews for an abuse of discretion the issuing judge’s conclusion under § 2518(3)(e) that the wiretaps were necessary.” Id.; accord Ramirez-Encarnacion, 291 F.3d at 1222 n. 1.

In contrast to the first category of challenges to necessity, the second category of challenges proceeds under the framework of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), and permits the district court to adduce evidence that was not before the issuing judge. Oregon-Cortez, 244 F.Supp.2d at 1171-72 n. 4; United States v. Small, 229 F.Supp.2d 1166, 1179, 1189-90 (D.Colo.2002). However, to be entitled to such a hearing, a defendant must make a “substantial preliminary showing” that the affiant included a false statement in the wiretap affidavit, either knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth, and that this misstatement was necessary to the finding of probable cause or necessity. Id. A material omission in the wiretap affidavit may also qualify for a Franks hearing if the same requisite showing is made. United States v. Green, 175 F.3d 822, 828 (10th Cir.1999).

In this case, I held hearings before the decisions in Ramirez-Encarnacion and Oregon-Cortez were published, which clarified when an evidentiary hearing on necessity is required. At the time of the hearings in this case, I still adhered to the practice (which has since been discontinued) of holding evidentiary hearings on necessity without first requiring the Defendants to satisfy the threshold for a Franks hearing. See Oregon-Cortez, 244 F.Supp.2d at 1170-71. Although I conclude from my subsequent review of the Defendants’ Franks challenges that they should not have been entitled to such a hearing, the evidence adduced at those hearings does not alter my conclusion that the necessity requirement has been satisfied here. See Section IV, infra.

I will now analyze the challenges to the facial validity of wiretap authorizations by examining de novo whether a “full and complete statement” was submitted meeting § 2518(l)(c)’s requirements and by reviewing for an abuse of discretion Judge Weinshienk’s and Judge Kane’s conclusions under § 2518(3)(e) that the wiretaps were necessary. Oregon-Cortez, 244 F.Supp.2d at 1172. My review is limited to the information before the issuing judges, to wit, the Applications, Affidavits and Orders authorizing the wiretaps as well as the testimonial evidence introduced at the in camera proceedings before the issuing judge. Id.

A. Facial Challenges to the Wiretaps

(i.) First Wiretap: Subject Telephone One, OI-Wt-OI-Z, Feb. 14, 2001.

Defendants move to suppress evidence obtained through the use of electronic surveillance, arguing that the First Wiretap was unnecessary and therefore improper because the Government had successfully utilized traditional investigative techniques prior to the initiation of the First Wiretap. Defendants claim that the Superseding Indictment reflects their supposition; twelve of the Counts against Sposit allege conduct that precedes in time the commencement of the First Wiretap.

The Defendants’ argument incorrectly assumes that the purpose of the First Wiretap was only to obtain evidence of the sort that the Government had succeeded in obtaining through traditional investigative techniques used with limited success. The First Wiretap, however, was sought and authorized in order to allow investigators to intercept conversations thought necessary to explore matters that the Government had not successfully investigated through traditional techniques. These matters included the identification of all Sposit’s suppliers, co-conspirators and distributors; the locations used by Sposit and others to distribute controlled substances; and the times of the delivery of controlled substances into and within the District of Colorado. Affidavit for the First Wiretap, February 14, 2001 (“Aff. of Feb. 14, 2001”), ¶ 12. The Affidavit contained sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that traditional investigative techniques had been tried and failed or were unlikely to provide evidence of these matters.

Specifically, the Affidavit explains that investigators conducted surveillance on Sposit for several months preceding the commencement of the First Wiretap. Agents observed confidential informants and an undercover agent make controlled purchases of Ecstasy from Sposit. Id. at ¶¶ 30-31, 33, 35, 46. Sposit was also observed meeting with his alleged co-conspirators in a manner consistent with money or drug transactions. Id. at ¶¶ 46, 53-55. Surveillance was additionally conducted on Sposit’s alleged co-conspirators, including' Megan Schey, Shawn Sweeney, Nathan Burress, and Lisa Twoeagles. Id. at ¶¶ 42, 44, 47-50, 52. The Affidavit also explains that DEA agents in San Francisco had conducted surveillance on Nathan Kern, Sposit’s alleged Ecstasy source. Id. at ¶ 72. Finally, the Affidavit describes the shortcomings of this surveillance and why continued surveillance would not adequately meet the objectives of the investigation. Id. at ¶¶ 75-81. For the most part, surveillance merely revealed the suspects in the company of other persons allegedly involved in the conspiracy. Id. at ¶¶ 42, 46, 53-55.

The Affidavit also describes the results of questioning and interviewing witnesses and participants prior to the First Wiretap. The Affidavit indicates that Dieffen-bach, as well as two individuals who ultimately became cooperating sources, CS-1 and CS-2, provided investigators with valuable information regarding Sposit’s organization. Id. at ¶¶ 21-28, 38-39. Though this information was integral to the initial success of the investigation, it proved to be limited to their personal involvement with Sposit’s organization. Id. at ¶ 92. They were unable to provide any information regarding the highest level of Sposit’s organization, particularly his Ecstasy source. Id. Investigators also attempted to interrogate or question Shawn Hartnett following his arrest on February 6, 2001, while in possession of 20,000 Ecstasy pills. Id. at ¶ 66. Although agents believed that Hartnett was a courier for Sposit’s alleged MDMA source, Nathan Kern, they were unable to inquire about Hartnett’s relationship with Sposit because he requested an attorney and refused to cooperate with agents. Id.

The Affidavit also explains why investi- • gators rejected issuing grand jury subpoenas or granting immunity in this case. See Aff. of Feb. 14, 2001, at ¶ 93. Investigators speculated that if the suspects were called to testify before the grand jury, they would most likely be uncooperative and invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify. Id Further, the Affidavit describes investigators’ concern that offers of immunity might preclude prosecution of individuals who could later be revealed as the most culpable in Sposit’s organization. Id.

The Affidavit describes why investigators rejected using search warrants to obtain evidence against Sposit’s organization. Although Agent Roach believed he had probable cause to search Sposit’s home address and another residence associated with the organization, he also believed that the execution of search warrants would be premature and deleterious to the ongoing investigation. Id. at ¶¶ 82-86. Investigators had observed Sposit travel directly from his residence to drug transactions, but they did not have proof that he used his residence as a storage facility for large quantities of Ecstasy. Id. at ¶ 84.

The Affidavit describes the use of two cooperating sources, CS-1 and CS-2. Id. at ¶¶ 89-90. The Affidavit also indicates that investigators received reliable information from an individual (“California CS”) cooperating with DEA agents in San Francisco. Id. at ¶ 67. CS-1 was a tremendous asset to investigators as he/she provided detailed information on Sposit’s methods for conducting drug transactions and Sposit’s new telephone number and also introduced an undercover agent to Sposit. However, the Affidavit explains that CS-l’s knowledge is limited to his/her direct involvement with Sposit. Id. at ¶ 90. CS-1 does not have knowledge of Sposit’s Ecstasy source, Ecstasy distributors, or what Sposit did with drug proceeds. Id.

The Affidavit also explains that CS-2’s assistance and knowledge of Sposit’s organization was limited. CS-2 did not have contact with Sposit and only dealt with Shawn Sweeney. Id. at ¶¶ 38-46. Although information provided by CS-2 helped investigators determine that Sweeney obtained Ecstasy from Megan Schey, an alleged distributor for Sposit, CS-2 could not provide any information on Spo-sit or any member of his organization other than Sweeney. Id. at ¶¶ 45^46, 89.

The Affidavit also describes the use of two undercover agents, Task Force Officer Patrick McElderry (“TFO McElderry”) and Special Agent Jennifer Cotter (“Agent Cotter”), during the pre-wiretap investigation. Id. at ¶¶ 25-46. TFO McElderry and CS-1 were able to purchase Ecstasy directly from Sposit. Id. at ¶ 33. However, after Agent Cotter, acting as TFO McElderry’s girlfriend, paid Sposit for the Ecstasy pills obtained on consignment, Sposit would no longer deal with TFO McElderry and Agent Cotter directly. Id. at ¶¶ 37, 96. Sposit informed CS-1 that he was leery of Agent Cotter and that TFO McElderry should deal with Sposit’s subordinates. Id. The Affidavit states Agent Roach’s belief that Sposit was insulating himself from criminal liability by having drug buyers deal with lower-level members of his organization. Id. at ¶ 97. Further, the Affidavit explains that TFO McElderry and Agent Cotter were not able to determine the full scope of Sposit’s organization or to identify the individuals supplying the organization with Ecstasy. Id. at ¶¶ 94, 97.

The Affidavit also describes the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices during the pre-wiretap investigation. Id. at ¶¶ 46, 67-68, 70, 72, 98-100. Agents collected and analyzed the information obtained from this investigative technique to identify the individuals who called or were called by Sposit’s telephone. Id. at ¶ 72. This information confirmed that Sposit was in contact with individuals who were suspected associates in the organization, but it could not reveal the nature of the contacts. Thus, these investigative techniques merely confirmed the investigators’ suspicions without providing additional information regarding the scope of the organization.

Finally, the Affidavit explains that investigators also checked public records for Sposit and performed “trash runs” on his residence. Id. at ¶¶ 22, 24, 101. Investigators collected and examined discarded trash at Sposit’s residence on three occasions: October 30, 2000; November 28, 2000; and January 5, 2001. Id. at ¶ 101. On one occasion, agents found a clear plastic bag that contained a green powdery residue which tested positive for MDMA. Id. Nothing else of significant evidentiary value was discovered from Sposit’s trash.

Based on my de novo review, I find that the Government provided a “full and complete statement” meeting § 2518(l)(c)’s requirements. I also find that Judge Weinshienk did not abuse her discretion in concluding under § 2518(3)(c) that the first wiretap was necessary.

(ii.) Second Wiretap: Subject Telephone Two, 01-Wt-02-K, March 1, 2001.

Investigators confirmed during the interceptions of Subject Telephone One that Sposit was using different cell phones interchangeably. See Affidavit for the Second Wiretap, March 1, 2001 (“Aff. of Mar. 1, 2001,”), ¶ 85. An analysis of the trap and trace and pen register data, together with the interceptions on Subject Telephone One, indicated that Sposit would place and receive calls on both Subject Telephones One and Two sometimes within minutes of one another. Agent Roach believed that Sposit’s interchangeable use of various cell phones was intended to thwart law enforcement’s efforts to detect Sposit’s criminal activity. Id. at ¶ 74. Agent Roach also believed that the Title III wiretap on Subject Telephone One was only providing agents with a partial picture of Sposit’s organization. Thus, for the same reasons identified in the Application and Affidavit for the wiretap on Subject Telephone One, it was Agent Roach’s belief that a wiretap on Subject Telephone Two was necessary to successfully achieve the objectives of the investigation. Id.

Common sense influences my decision here; a necessity finding for Subject Telephone One goes a long way toward satisfying the necessity requirement for Subject Telephone Two. The Application to intercept communications on Subject Telephone Two was submitted only two weeks after the commencement of the First Wiretap and contains most if not all of the information set forth in the Affidavit submitted in support of the Application for the First Wiretap. The target, named inter-eeptees and objectives for this wiretap were identical to the target, named inter-ceptees and objectives for the First Wiretap. Moreover, the information obtained during the interception of the First Wiretap demonstrated that Sposit’s organization continued to operate in the same manner as described in the Application and Affidavit for the First Wiretap.

Specifically, the Affidavit describes new information obtained during the first few days of interceptions on the First Wiretap. It detailed an alleged drug transaction involving Sposit, Hynes and Mendoza. Id. at ¶¶ 82-85. Investigators believed that Sposit obtained Ecstasy from Hynes and then provided the Ecstasy to Mendoza for distribution. Id. This alleged drug transaction additionally demonstrated that Spo-sit was placing calls on both Subject Telephones One and Two in furtherance of his criminal activities. Id. at ¶ 85. The Affidavit also details the pen register and trap and trace data for Subject Telephone Two. Id. at ¶ 73.

The Application and Affidavit for a wiretap on Subject Telephone Two contains the same information set forth in the Affidavit for the First Wiretap and sufficiently reflects that even after the commencement of the First Wiretap, the continued use of traditional investigative techniques was unlikely to advance the investigation. As of the date of the Application for the Wiretap on Subject Telephone Two, the First Wiretap had not yet met the aims of the investigation. Accordingly, based on my de novo review, I find that the Government provided a “full and complete statement” meeting § 2518(l)(c)’s requirements. I also find that Judge Weinshienk did not abuse her discretion in concluding under § 2518(3)(c) that this wiretap was necessary.

(iii.) First Extension of the First Wiretap, 01-Wt-01-Z, March 20, 2001.

On March 20, 2001, the Government applied for an extension order for the wiretap on Subject Telephone One. To demonstrate that the extension was necessary, the Government submitted an Affidavit and also incorporated by reference the original Affidavit filed on February 14, 2001. See Affidavit for the Extension of First Wiretap, March 20, 2001 (“Aff. of Mar. 20, 2001”), at ¶ 15. Together, the Government claims that these Affidavits contain a “full and complete statement” regarding traditional investigative techniques. Although investigators obtained a great deal of evidence during the first thirty days of interceptions, the Affidavit explains that investigators still did not know the full scope and activities of Sposit’s organization. Id. at ¶¶ 16, 81. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5), “[extensions of an order may be granted, but only upon application for an extension made in accordance with subsection (1) of this section and the court making the findings required by subsection (3) of this section.” Although this Affidavit contains much of the same information from the original Affidavit, I find that it contains a sufficient amount of new information, together with the information in the original Affidavit, to satisfy § 2518(l)(c).

The first extension Affidavit describes the continued use of physical surveillance on Sposit and various members of his organization. See Aff. of Mar. 20, 2001, at ¶¶ 20, 22, 33, 47. Surveillance, in conjunction with the interceptions of Subject Telephone One, enabled investigators to determine that Hynes was supplying Sposit with Ecstasy. Id. at ¶¶ 20-24. Surveillance also enabled investigators to identify additional members of the organization. Id. at ¶¶ 16, 22. However, continued surveillance had not enabled investigators to identify where Sposit stored large quantities of Ecstasy and had not revealed the full extent of the organization. Id. at ¶¶ 16, 58-59.

The first extension Affidavit also describes investigators’ unsuccessful efforts to interrogate or question known witnesses or participants since the commencement of the First Wiretap. On March 6, 2001, Agent Roach and two detectives from the Boulder County Drug Task Force interviewed Shawn Sweeney regarding the recent death of a teenage girl in Boulder, allegedly caused by the girl’s use of Ecstasy. Id. at ¶ 37. Sweeney confessed to providing the Ecstasy that the deceased girl and her friends ingested. Id. However, Sweeney refused to provide investigators with any detailed information regarding his source of Ecstasy. He stated that he would be killed by his associates for cooperating with law enforcement and that he would rather do twenty years in prison than assist the investigation. Id. at ¶¶ 37, 71.

The first extension Affidavit also details an unsuccessful attempt to question and interrogate newly identified participants in the organization. Id. at ¶¶ 47-50. On March 8 and 9, 2001, agents intercepted numerous telephone calls concerning a pending Ecstasy transaction involving Spo-sit. Based on physical surveillance and the intercepted calls, agents believed that Sposit purchased a quantity of Ecstasy from Cory Hynes and subsequently sold a quantity of Ecstasy to an unknown individual driving a blue Pontiac. Id. at ¶¶ 42, 47. Agents maintained surveillance on the Pontiac and instructed the Colorado State Patrol to make a traffic stop. Id. at ¶ 47. After giving the driver, Ryan Krueger, a traffic warning ticket, the officer searched the car for drugs. Id. When the officer requested permission to search the trunk, both Krueger and his passenger, Justin Lynes, claimed they did not have a key. Id. Although agents had seen them open the trunk earlier in the evening, agents could not divulge this information without compromising the investigation. Id. As such, Krueger and Lynes’s evasiveness successfully thwarted agents’ efforts to question and interrogate them about their involvement with Sposit’s organization. They even bragged to Sposit during an intercepted call that they had emerged unscathed from their confrontation with the state patrol. Id. at ¶ 49. Despite the evidence obtained from the intercepted communications and physical surveillance, agents could not even confirm that a drug transaction took place on March 8, 2001. Id. at ¶¶ 38-50.

The first extension Affidavit also describes Agent Roach’s continued belief that executing a search warrant was unlikely to materially advance the investigation. Id. at ¶¶ 60-64. Further, agents did not identify any new residences during the interceptions of the First Wiretap that evidenced sufficient probable cause to execute a search warrant. Id.

The first extension Affidavit states that investigators had identified two new cooperating sources since the commencement of the First Wiretap. See Aff. of Mar. 20, 2001, at ¶ 67. CS-3 had purchased Ecstasy from Krueger, one of Sposit’s associates, in the past. Id. On March 16, 2001, CS-3 introduced an undercover agent to Krueger, and the agent was able to purchase a certain quantity of Ecstasy from Krueger. Id. Although CS-3 provided some assistance to the investigation, he/ she was unable to provide any information about Krueger’s source or involvement in Sposit’s organization. Id.

Agents also obtained the cooperation of CS-4 since the commencement of the First Wiretap. Id. at ¶ 68. CS-4 provided useful information on Sposit’s organization, including the identity of Sposit’s previous Ecstasy source, Nathan Kern. Id. However, CS^i’s involvement with Sposit and Kern was limited to marijuana trafficking, and CS-4 incorrectly informed agents that Sposit was no longer distributing Ecstasy. Id. On that basis, agents reasonably concluded that the continued use of CS^i was unlikely to satisfy the investigation’s objectives. Id. Finally, the first extension Affidavit describes agents’ belief that the continued use of pen registers and toll analysis, without continued wire interceptions, would be of limited use. Id. at ¶¶ 78-79.

Thus, based on my de novo review I find that the Government satisfied § 2518(l)(c)’s “full and complete statement” requirement. I also find that Judge Weinshienk did not abuse her discretion in concluding under § 2518(3)(c) that this extension was necessary.

(iv.) Third Wiretap: Subject Telephones Three and Four, 01-Wt-04-Z, March 23, 2001.

Three days after Judge Weinshienk authorized the first extension of the First Wiretap, the Government applied for and received authorization to intercept wire communications on two telephones in the possession of and utilized by Cory Hynes. Although agents knew that Cory Hynes was involved in Sposit’s organization — he was a named interceptee in 01-WT-01-Z, its first extension and 01-WT-02-K — following the interceptions on 01-WT-01-Z, agents believed that Cory Hynes was supplying Ecstasy to Sposit. See Affidavit for Third Wiretap, March 23, 2001 (“Aff. of Mar. 23, 2001”) at ¶ 16. The request for a wiretap to investigate the “drug organization run by Cory HYNES” marks a divergence in the investigation. Id. at ¶ 12(a).

As set forth in the Affidavit for this wiretap, and more fully set forth in the Affidavits in support of the First Wiretap and its extension, the Government had used traditional investigative techniques against Hynes almost since the commencement of the investigation against Sposit. The Affidavits describes the use of physical surveillance to track Hynes during suspected drug transactions, (see, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 56, 60), and why search warrants would be unsuccessful (id. at ¶¶ 64, 66-68). The Affidavits specifically referenced certain confidential informants’ knowledge of the Hynes organization and explained why these informants would not aid in the investigation of the organization. Id. at ¶¶ 70-74. The Affidavit further indicates that witness interviews provided no information regarding the Hynes organization, and it detailed similar unsuccessful efforts of undercover agents. Id. at ¶¶ 75-81.

Thus, based on my de novo review, I find that the Government provided a “full and complete statement” meeting § 2518(l)(c)’s requirements. I also find that Judge Weinshienk did not abuse her discretion in concluding under § 2518(3)(c) that this wiretap was necessary.

(v.) Fourth Wiretap: Subject Telephone Five, 01-Wt-09-Z, April 13, 2001.

The target of this wiretap was the drug organization run by Mark Williams. See Affidavit for the Fourth Wiretap, April 13, 2001 (“Aff. of Apr. 13, 2001”) at ¶ 12. The Government learned of Mark Williams and his alleged drug trafficking through the wiretaps on the Sposit and Hynes organizations; hence, this wiretap is a “spinoff’ from a known target to a newly discovered target. United States v. Crumpton, 54 F.Supp.2d 986, 1007, 1009 (D.Colo.1999). The Defendants contend that because Mark Williams and his drug organization had never been the subject of an investigation prior to this wiretap application, “the government was required to set forth a ‘full and complete statement’ ... particularized as to Williams and his organization independent of any necessity that may have been shown relative to the Sposit and Hynes drug organizations.” See Def. Price Mot., July 1, 2002, p. 37.

The Defendants’ interpretation of “independent” is too literal. While it is true that the Government first learned of Mark Williams from wiretapping Hynes’s telephone, it does not follow that all of the information contained in the Government’s “full and complete statement” concerning the Sposit and Hynes organizations is irrelevant to the “full and complete statement” for the Mark Williams wiretap. There is necessarily some overlap in the analysis due to the interrelatedness of the Sposit, Hynes and Mark Williams organizations as reflected in this Affidavit. For example, the cooperating sources and undercover agents used during the Sposit and Hynes investigations failed to identify Hynes’s MDMA supplier. Even though this information was known to agents before they considered Mark Williams a target for a wiretap, it is relevant to the Government’s explanation as to why their cooperating sources and undercover agents were unlikely to succeed if tried with respect to Mark Williams, the alleged supplier for Hynes.

The Defendants are correct, however, that the Government may not move swiftly from wiretap to wiretap without pausing to consider whether traditional investigative techniques can be used effectively against a newly identified target. Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d at 1196. This proposition is of particular significance here because the Government only learned of Mark Williams’s involvement several weeks before seeking to wiretap his cellular telephone. I reject the Defendants’ contention that my analysis here is completely independent of any necessity shown relative to the Sposit and Hynes organizations. Nonetheless, I have examined this Affidavit closely to ensure that the Government paused to consider traditional investigative techniques “particularly in light of any evidence obtained as a result of’ the Hynes wiretap, and more specifically, relative to Mark Williams, before it obtained authorization to intercept Mark Williams’s telephone calls. Id.

As to physical surveillance, the Affidavit describes an instance where law enforcement attempted to establish surveillance on a meeting between Mark Williams and Hynes near St. Luke’s Hospital in Denver on March 27, 2001. See Aff. of Apr. 13, 2001, at ¶¶ 25-26, 36. The Affidavit describes calls from Mark Williams intercepted on the Hynes wiretap wherein Mark Williams inquired about Hynes’s whereabouts. Hynes indicated that he was in the area, but there were “a couple of cars behind me, man, [ ] kind of weird ... and it’s a white Ford Taurus[.]” Id. at ¶ 25. After Mark Williams ascertained that the car was no longer following Hynes, they agreed to meet at the Hospital. Id. The Affidavit indicates that agents were in fact following Hynes in a white Ford Taurus and observed him driving in a manner consistent with counter-surveillance techniques. Id. at ¶¶ 26, 36. After the meeting, agents attempted to follow Mark Williams, but he too began driving in a manner consistent with counter-surveillance techniques, and agents terminated the surveillance to avoid detection. Id. Thus, the Affidavit describes, with particularity, an instance where surveillance was attempted and failed because Mark Williams detected agents’ efforts. In addition, Mark Williams, at a minimum, suspected that a criminal associate had been followed by agents prior to meeting with him at the hospital.

While it is true, as several Defendants have pointed out, that this Affidavit contains several so-called “boiler plate” paragraphs concerning surveillance which might be applicable to most MDMA investigations (see, e.g., id. at ¶ 37), I find that the Affidavit contains sufficient particularized information to establish that standard visual and aural surveillance of the Mark Williams organization had been tried and failed and that future attempts would be unlikely to succeed or too dangerous. It is of particular significance that the Affidavit describes an instance where Mark Williams detected surveillance and engaged in counter-surveillance techniques. See Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d at 1191, 1192 (“[e]ven assuming arguendo, as we must, that the evening of September 5, 1994, was the one and only time that Cef-erino Castillo-Garcia was ever subject to visual surveillance, we find it dispositive that, on that occasion, Ceferino Castillo-Garcia detected the surveillance”). Moreover, the Tenth Circuit interprets the necessity requirement in a “common sense fashion” and takes into account “all of the facts and circumstances” when evaluating whether the Government’s showing of necessity was sufficient to justify a wiretap. Ramirez-Encarnacion, 291 F.3d at 1222 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Accordingly, I find that the Government sufficiently established that surveillance had been tried and failed, or continued to be used or attempted against the Mark Williams organization but was unlikely to be successful.

This Affidavit and the Affidavits incorporated by reference also demonstrate that the use of cooperating sources or undercover agents had failed or would be reasonably unlikely to succeed. First, as illustrated supra, I reject Defendants’ contentions that the use of cooperating sources and undercover agents as to the Sposit and Hynes organizations “is largely irrelevant to the showing of necessity to Williams and his organization.” See Def. Price Mot., Jul. 1, 2002, pp. 40, 42. The Affidavit expressly provides that these cooperating sources “are not in a position to advance the investigation against WILLIAMS and his higher-level criminal associates” and that “no realistic scenario existed by which an undercover agent could be introduced to WILLIAMS.” See Aff. of Apr. 13, 2001, at ¶¶ 48, 52. These individuals did not know of or interact with Mark Williams, and the Affidavit accurately reflected that they would not be able to provide information which achieves the investigation’s objectives. Id. at ¶ 46.

Further, the Affidavit indicates that the new cooperating source (CS-5) identified since the Hynes wiretap was unable to materially advance this investigation. Id. at ¶¶ 45-48. While this individual provided background information concerning Mark Williams based on his/her connections to and familiarity with the Denver drug community, the Affidavit sufficiently explained why CS-5 would not be of assistance to agents even though he/she could potentially purchase MDMA from Mark Williams. Id. The Affidavit describes the agents’ belief that it would not benefit the investigation to have CS-5 purchase MDMA from Mark Williams, as he/she had never done so previously and had no knowledge whatsoever of Mark Williams’s source of MDMA. Id. at ¶¶ 47-48. Accordingly, I find that the Affidavit demonstrates that it would be unreasonable to require agents to locate or develop additional cooperating sources or undercover agents given the posture of the investigation.

Moreover, the Affidavit explains that interviews with known subjects or their associates would not advance the investigation. Id. at ¶¶ 49-50. The individuals previously interviewed by the Government were not aware of Mark Williams’s role in the alleged drug trafficking and were equally without knowledge of Mark Williams’s drug source, one of the objectives of this investigation. Id. Therefore, the Affidavit sufficiently explained that questioning and interrogation of witnesses or participants had failed and, if pursued further, were unlikely to succeed.

I also find that the Affidavit demonstrates that it would have been unreasonable to attempt to use a search warrant against Mark Williams or examine his trash. The Affidavit details the agents’ desire not to alert Mark Williams to the investigation and expressed their belief that “suspects may [ ] flee, destroy other evidence, or temporarily cease their drug trafficking business” if search warrants were used. Id. at ¶¶ 43, 44. Further, the Affidavit states that Mark Williams lived in a condominium, making “trash runs” futile because Mark Williams “does not place trash anywhere where agents could obtain it.” Id. at ¶ 59.

Moreover, the Affidavit states that the pen register and trap and trace data for Subject Telephone Five indicated that Mark Williams had extensive contact with telephone numbers in several areas in the United States associated with international MDMA importers. Id. at ¶¶ 29-30. Coupled with DEA intelligence information, the Affidavit describes agents’ belief that Mark Williams was potentially contacting national and international drug traffickers staying in hotels in such areas as New York and California. Id. at ¶ 30. The Affidavit further states that Subject Telephone Five was in contact with telephone numbers in areas recognized as major distribution areas in the United States such as Chicago, Hawaii, and Las Vegas. Id. The difficulty with using this information to assist the investigation, however, was also described in the Affidavit. Agents could not identify the individuals placing or receiving the telephone calls from pen register or trap-and-trace information and could only speculate as to the purpose of such calls. Id. at ¶ 56. Therefore, the Affidavit sufficiently explained that this traditional investigative technique was of limited usefulness and unlikely to succeed.

Based on my de novo review, I find that the Government provided a full and complete statement meeting § 2518(l)(c)’s requirements. I also find that Judge Weinshienk did not abuse her discretion in concluding under § 2518(3)(c) that the first wiretap was necessary.

(vi.) Second Extension of the First Wiretap, 01-Wt-01-Z, April 18, 2001.

On April 18, 2001, Judge Weinshienk entered an Order authorizing the continued interception of electronic communications on Subject Telephone One, John Sposit’s cellular telephone. The application to extend communications describes how each of the traditional investigative techniques had been tried and failed, or was unlikely to succeed or too dangerous. See Affidavit for the Second Extension of First Wiretap, April 18, 2001 (“Aff. of Apr. 18, 2001”), at ¶¶ 29-56. The Affidavit details new developments in the investigation of the organization run by Sposit since the prior Applications, but it stated that these new developments did not affect the Government’s need for a wiretap, and, if anything, supported the continuing need to intercept communications. Id. at ¶¶ 17-28, 46. For example, the Affidavit describes a meeting between CS-4 and Sposit on April 6, 2000, for which agents could not use surveillance because Sposit showed up at CS^á’s home unexpectedly. Id. at ¶ 46. Sposit informed CS-4 that he was considering using an MDMA source other than Nathan Kern, but he did not reveal any information about this source to CS^4. Id. Despite the use of traditional investigative techniques, agents were only able to deduce the identity of this alternative source based on prior intercepted communications. Id. Accordingly, I find that the Government complied with § 2518(l)(c) and find no abuse of discretion on behalf of Judge Weinshienk in ruling that this extension was necessary.

(vii.) Fifth Wiretap: Subject Telephone Six, 01-Wt-11-Z, May 18, 2001.

One day after the wiretap on Subject Telephone Five expired, the Government applied to intercept communications over a different cellular telephone used by Mark Williams. The Affidavit describes how in early May 2001, the number of telephone calls intercepted on Subject Telephone Five decreased significantly. See Affidavit for the Fifth Wiretap, May 18, 2001 (“Aff. of May 18, 2001”) at ¶ 18. Further, the Affidavit details the agents’ belief that Mark Williams wanted to change his telephone number to avoid detection by law enforcement as he coordinated his drug trafficking activities. Id. at ¶ 48. Although the Tenth Circuit has determined that a target may not vitiate the necessity showing for a prior wiretap by simply changing his telephone number (see Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d at 1196), I have carefully reviewed this Application and Affidavit to determine if the Government paused to consider traditional investigative techniques in light of any evidence obtained from the wiretap on Subject Telephone Five before seeking to intercept communications on Subject Telephone Six.

The Application for Subject Telephone Six incorporated the Affidavit for Subject Telephone Five and details the information obtained during the first thirty days of that wiretap. As a result of the interceptions on that telephone, agents learned that Mark Williams had international ties to MDMA traffickers and, together with a newly identified drug trafficker, Jason Price, was operating at the highest level of MDMA distribution in Colorado. See Aff. of May 18, 2001, at ¶¶ 14, 72. Despite this newly acquired evidence, the Affidavit states that agents continued to attempt traditional investigative methods and had either failed completely, had limited success but failed to achieve the full objectives of the investigation, reasonably appeared unlikely to succeed, or were too dangerous to employ. Id. at ¶ 48.

The Affidavit provides the results of continued surveillance of Mark Williams and his associates. Id. at ¶¶ 25, 40, 49-54. Surveillance assisted agents in successfully seizing large quantities of MDMA (specifically, 26,000 MDMA pills during the interceptions on Subject Telephone Five). However, the Affidavit indicates that surveillance was only helpful when used in connection with information from intercepted communications. Id. at ¶ 49. In addition, the Affidavit describes another instance where Mark Williams and an associate detected surveillance. Id. at ¶ 51. Accordingly, the Government sufficiently demonstrated that surveillance alone was unable to conclusively establish the sources of the drugs and had even potentially jeopardized the investigation.

In addition to the information incorporated from the previous wiretap application, the Affidavit details unsuccessful efforts to interrogate and question witnesses or participants. Id. at ¶¶ 62-63. The Affidavit describes the agents’ efforts to interrogate Daniel Chum after a search of his automobile that yielded 1,000 MDMA pills and $8,750 cash. Id. at ¶25. Chum informed the agents that he had received 2,000 MDMA pills from “Mark” but would not provide any other information about “Mark” because he feared retribution for cooperating with the agents. Id. The Affidavit further provides that subsequent to Chum’s interaction with the agents, communications were intercepted in which Mark Williams threatened to kill Chum and burn Chum’s house down. Id. at ¶ 63.

The Affidavit also describes the agents’ belief that the use of search warrants, cooperating sources, or undercover agents would not assist in this stage of the investigation. The Affidavit indicates that the known cooperating sources had exhausted their usefulness and that no new sources with information on or access to Mark Williams had been developed. Id. at ¶¶ 60-61. Similarly, the undercover agents assisting at the outset of the investigation did not have contact with Mark Williams, and no new information indicated that an undercover agent could be introduced to Mark Williams. Id. at ¶¶ 66-67. The Affidavit also explains that the use of search warrants would not achieve the objectives of the investigation for the same reasons identified in prior wiretaps. Id. at ¶¶ 55-59.

Finally, detailed information obtained through trap and trace devices and pen registers was included in the Affidavit. Id. at ¶46^)-&). This information led agents to suspect that Mark Williams had criminal connections and an MDMA supplier in New York. Id. at ¶ 69. However, this information benefitted the investigation only when used in tandem with intercepted communications. Id. Based on my de novo review, I find that the Government complied with § 2518(l)(c). I also find that Judge Weinshienk did not abuse her discretion in concluding under § 2518(3)(c) that the Fifth Wiretap was necessary.

(viii.) Sixth Wiretap: Subject Telephone Seven, 01-Wt-12-Z, May 24, 2001.

The target of this wiretap was Jason Price, whom agents identified during the interceptions of Subject Telephones Five and Six as a drug trafficker and MDMA source for Mark Williams. The Affidavit indicates that agents had little information about Jason Price or his drug trafficking activities. See Affidavit for the Sixth Wiretap, May 24, 2001 (“Aff. of May 24, 2001”), at ¶17. While the Defendants, particularly counsel for Jason Price, contend that the paucity of particularized factual information contained in the Affidavit is fatal to the Government’s necessity showing for this wiretap, I find that this Affidavit, together with the Government’s statements during the colloquy with Judge Weinshienk on May 24, 2001, is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of § 2518(l)(c).

The Affidavit provides a general statement that physical surveillance had been conducted on numerous occasions against “key members of the organization, including PRICE,” but indicates that such surveillance had been only partially successful in identifying co-conspirators and detecting the receipt or distribution of shipments of MDMA. See Aff. of May 24, 2001, at ¶ 50. The only particularized statement regarding surveillance of Jason Price is set forth in ¶ 53 of the Affidavit and describes an instance where he detected surveillance. On May 16, 2001, an agent was parked in an empty parking lot attempting surveillance on Jason Price. Id. at ¶ 53. Jason Price parked his car so that it nearly touched the front of the agent’s car. Id. After staring at the agent for a brief time, Jason Price exited the parking lot. Id. The following day, Jason Price contacted AT & T Wireless and changed his telephone number. Id. Therefore, the Affidavit does provide a particularized instance where surveillance had been tried and failed.

Further, the Affidavit indicates that agents could not use a pole camera to further their investigation. The Affidavit provides that agents did not even know the location of Jason Price’s residence. Id. at ¶ 55. Although the Defendants contend that the Affidavit lacks any particularized information regarding agents’ inability to locate Jason Price’s home, the Government supplemented this information during the in camera hearing with Judge Weinshienk on May 24, 2001, as follows:

THE COURT: Okay. So [Jason Price] apparently suspects that there is surveillance.

SPECIAL AGENT ROACH: Yes. He suspects. And we have not even been able to figure out where he fives. We’ve tried to follow him. He drives like a maniac. And as indicated by the time when he saw surveillance and approached them, he’s very surveillance conscious.

See Transcript (“Tr.”) of May 24, 2001, pp. 3-4. It is clear from the particularized facts submitted to Judge Weinshienk in the Affidavit and at the in camera hearing that Jason Price was aware of the Government’s surveillance attempts and that surveillance was unavailing due to his counter-surveillance techniques. Thus, I find that it is clear from the Government’s recitation of the facts that this traditional investigative technique had proved unsuccessful in advancing the investigation and had threatened to expose or compromise the investigation.

The Affidavit also demonstrates that other traditional techniques had been tried and failed or were unlikely to succeed, or that it would be unreasonable to require the agents to attempt such techniques given the present posture of the investigation. As to search warrants, the Affidavit indicates that agents had executed search warrants on two locations associated with the investigation. See Aff. of May 24, 2001, at ¶ 58. Jason Price contends that this information is not relevant because it pertains to the “John Sposit” phase of the investigation and was not directed at Jason Price or his drug organization. I disagree. The Affidavit sufficiently details the agents’ belief that John Sposit obtained his drugs from Mark Williams and that Mark Williams obtained his drugs, in part, from Jason Price. Id. at ¶¶ 13(b), 14. Despite this connection, the Affidavit reveals that executing search warrants at a storage location utilized by John Sposit and at the residence of John Sposit’s distributors did not provide evidence of Jason Price’s drug trafficking. Id. at ¶ 58. Together with the information concerning agents’ inability to locate Jason Price’s residence or the existence and location of his stash house, I find that the Government’s statements regarding search warrants satisfied the requirements of § 2518(l)(c). See id. at ¶¶ 57-62; Tr. of May 24, 2001, p. 4.

As to cooperating sources and undercover agents, the Affidavit explains that there was none in contact with Jason Price. See Aff. of May 24, 2001, at ¶¶ 64, 70. The Affidavit- specifically provides that there are “no sources available to provide timely information regarding Price’s drug trafficking activities.” Id. at ¶ 64 (emphasis added). To the point of histrionics, Defendants take issue with the Government’s need for “timely” information, arguing that if the Government does not have “ ‘timely’ information at the moment they first learn the identity of another target of the investigation, they simply throw up their hands and claim they need a wiretap of that individual’s phone.” Def. Price Mot., Jul. 1, 2002, pp. 54-55. I disagree with the Defendants’ characterization of the Government’s decision-making process for requesting a wiretap. As represented in the Government’s recitation of the facts of the case, the agents did not have a cooperating source or undercover agent in contact with Defendant Price, nor did they believe that one could be timely developed. Jason Price was acutely aware and suspicious of the Government’s efforts at tracking his activities. Based on the facts contained in the Affidavit, I am unwilling to second-guess the agents’ assessment of their ability to introduce an undercover agent or develop a new cooperating source with respect to Jason Price. The Affidavit sufficiently demonstrates that it would have been unreasonable to further pursue these traditional investigative techniques.

Information concerning agents’ prior unsuccessful attempts to interview witnesses is also contained in the Affidavit. See Aff. of May 24, 2001, at ¶¶ 65-67. As agents had not identified any new witnesses for questioning, the Government sufficiently explained that the interrogation of witnesses had failed and, if pursued further, was unlikely to succeed. Moreover, the Affidavit demonstrated that pen register and trap and trace data had been used but did not reveal the information that investigators needed to further their objectives. See id. at ¶¶ 72-73.

Based on my de novo review, I find that the Government provided a full and complete statement meeting § 2518(l)(c)’s requirements. I also find that Judge Weinshienk did not abuse her discretion in concluding under § 2518(3)(c) that the Sixth Wiretap was necessary.

(ix.) Seventh Wiretap: Subject Telephone Eight, 01-Wt-15-Z, June 4, 2001.

The Affidavit for Subject Telephone Eight sought to intercept communications on another telephone used by Mark Williams. The Affidavit indicates that agents only intercepted communications on the previous Mark Williams wiretap for two days, May 22 and 23, 2001, because it became clear to agents from the outset that Mark Williams was now using Subject Telephone Eight to coordinate his MDMA trafficking activities. See Affidavit for the Seventh Wiretap, June 4, 2001 (“Aff. of June 4, 2001”), at ¶¶ 19-25. The Affidavit describes the agents’ belief that Mark Williams was extremely concerned about possible law enforcement detection of his criminal activities following the seizure of MDMA pills from Elijah Williams and Daniel Chum, believed to be Mark Williams’s MDMA distributors. Id. at ¶¶ 13(r), (bb) and 25. Agents confirmed their suspicions through intercepted conversations between Mark Williams and his associates wherein they discussed obtaining new cellular telephones and their need to proceed cautiously in the future. Id. at ¶ 25.

Further, this Affidavit provides particularized factual information that Mark Williams was using Subject Telephone Eight to facilitate the activities that he had previously coordinated through the use of Subject Telephone Six. This Affidavit incorporates the Affidavit submitte