Public Citizen, Inc. v. Pinellas County (321 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 2004)

ORDER

MERRYDAY, District Judge.

Public Citizen, Inc., and Public Citizen Foundation, Inc. (collectively, “Public Citizen”); Greenpeace, Inc., and Greenpeace Fund, Inc. (collectively, “Greenpeace”); American Charities for Reasonable Fund-raising Regulation, Inc. (“American Charities”); and the Direct Marketing Association, Inc. (“DMA”) (collectively, the “charities”), move for summary judgment to enjoin the enforcement of Pinellas County Ordinance No. 93-106 (the “ordinance”), which regulates the solicitation of charitable contributions in Pinellas County (Docs. 42 & 43). The charities assert claims pursuant to Section 1983 of Title 42, United States Code (Doc. 1), and contend that the ordinance on its face and as applied to the charities violates the United States Constitution (Doc. 43). Specifically, the charities contend that the ordinance (1) imposes an impermissible prior restraint of protected speech in violation of the First Amendment, (2) imposes an unreasonable burden on protected speech in violation of the First Amendment, and (3) unduly burdens interstate commerce in violation of Article I’s Commerce Clause (Doc. I). The charities contend that the ordinance fails to achieve its stated purpose of preventing deception, fraud, and misrepresentation and of promoting the disclosure of information useful to a potential donor.

Pinellas County and Sheryl Lord, the director of the county’s Department of Justice and Consumer Services (collectively, the “county”), move for summary judgment and argue that the ordinance (1) is narrowly tailored to advance a substantial interest and (2) comports with the Commerce Clause (Doc. 59). In addition, the county contends that an earlier action by fundraising consultants, in which American Charities appeared, adjudicates the charities’ claims and renders this action an impermissible “second bite at the apple” (Doc. 60).

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Pinellas County Charitable Solicitation Ordinance

Promulgated pursuant to Section 496.421, Florida Statutes, the ordinance requires the registration of any charitable organization (and any sponsor, federated fundraising organization, or professional solicitor ) that desires to solicit a charitable contribution in Pinellas County from other than a “member” of the charitable organization. Pinellas County Code § 42-272(a). A charitable organization may not “contract with any professional solicitor, federated fundraising agency, or sponsor for the purpose of raising or soliciting funds for the charity or sponsor before the professional solicitor, federated fundrais-ing agency or sponsor has been issued a charitable solicitations permit” by the director of the Department of Justice and Consumer Services. Pinellas County Code § 42-321(c). Following the parties’ motions for summary judgment, the county twice amended the ordinance (Docs. 81 & 88). This order addresses the current version of the ordinance.

The ordinance requires “registration and full public disclosure by persons who solicit contributions for a charitable ... purpose from the public ... in order to prevent deception, fraud, or misrepresentation in the solicitation, use and reporting of contributions.” Pinellas County Code § 42-270. The ordinance requires a charitable organization to register with the Department of Justice and Consumer Services (the “department”) and requires a permit before soliciting a contribution in Pinellas County. See Pinellas County Code § 42-291. Generally, a permit expires in twelve months. See Pinellas County Code §§ 42-294(b) (“All permits ... shall be valid for 12 months from the date of issuance, except for one-time events.”) & 42-294(d) (“A permit that is not renewed under this article shall expire one year from the date of issuance.”). Section 42-292 of the ordinance requires filing a sworn application that discloses with respect to the applicant a name and business information; a conviction for theft, fraud, misrepresentation, or violation of any funds solicitation law; a denial, suspension, or revocation of a solicitation permit under the ordinance or under Florida’s charitable solicitation law; and both the applicant’s mailing and street address and the “federally issued identification number.” Pinellas County Code §§ 42-292(a)(1) to 42-292(a)(5). In addition, an applicant must submit any agreement with a federated fundraising organization, professional solicitor, or sponsor; the applicant’s registration or exemption statement issued by the state pursuant to Chapter 496, Florida Statutes; and the applicant’s tax return (i.e., Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) Form 990 or 990-EZ) for the preceding year or, if exempt from filing a tax return, a “report of results” or an unaudited financial statement for the preceding fiscal year. See Pinellas County Code §§ 42-292(a)(6) & 42-292(a)(8) to 42-292(a)(10). Further, Section 42-292(a)(7) requires “[a] statement as to whether any of the owners, directors, or officers of the [applicant] ... are related as parent, spouse, child, or sibling to any other directors, officers, or owners of the applicant, or knowingly related to any officer, director, or trustee of any charitable organization or sponsor under contract to the [applicant] ..., or knowingly related to any supplier or vendor providing goods or services to any charitable organization or sponsor under contract to the applicant.” Section 42-292(a)(ll) requires identification of the purpose of the charitable organization and the method of execution. Finally, the ordinance requires information on each solicitation program, including the name of the solicitation, the manner or method of solicitation, the contemplated receipts and expenses of the solicitation, the proportion of the contribution destined for the “object of the solicitation,” and the plan for the distribution of contributions. Pinellas County Code § 42-292(a)(12)(a) to (12)(e).

Pursuant to Section 42-276(c), the director of the department (the “director”) promulgated application forms to collect the information ostensibly required by the ordinance. Aside from other information, the “Charitable Solicitation New Permit Application,” required for a new permit, requests the name, title, address, telephone and fax number, date of birth, and state and number of the driver’s license of (1) a contact; (2) the applicant’s chief elected, executive, or operating officer; (3) the individual “managing the solicitation described in [the] application;” (4) the applicant’s treasurer or individual “with control of financial records;” and (5) the manager of any telephone room either in or operating into Pinellas County. In addition, the new permit application form requests the location for the planned solicitation; the method of solicitation; the “purpose or work of the organization ben-efitting from the solicitation” and how the work is “carried out;” and whether the applicant previously registered with the county and whether the applicant registered with the state. Further, the new permit application form requires disclosure of any “professional assistance;” the amount and method of compensation provided to any “professional” or other third party providing assistance; the projected contributions and gross revenues for the coming year either from Pinellas County residents or “[biased on ... [s]tate, or [n]ational [accounting;” the projected cost of program services; the anticipated management and general expenses, separated into twenty-five categories; the fund-raising expenses; the compensation of “officers, directors, etc.;” the “net assets or fund balances” at both the beginning and the end of the year; and whether any director, supervisor, manager, or “person with authority to receive and/or disburse solicitation income [has] ever been employed by or a member of another organization registered with Pinellas County for solicitation.” In addition, the new permit application form requests whether the “applicant or any manager, director, supervisor, advisor, or other person with similar responsibilities and/or responsibility over income and distribution of income” (1) in the preceding ten years has been convicted of a violation of either the ordinance, the state charitable solicitation statute, or any other federal, state, or local law governing theft, fraud, misrepresentation, or the solicitation of funds and (2) in the preceding ten years has had a solicitation permit issued under either the ordinance or the state statute “suspended, revoked, or by court order [has] been required to cease operation or fined or otherwise sanctioned.” Finally, the new permit application form requests whether any “owner, director, officer, supervisor, manager, or employee” of the applicant is a parent, spouse, child, or sibling of (1) any other owner, director, officer, supervisor, manager, or employee of the applicant or (2) any director, officer, supervisor, manager, or employee of any professional assistance firm “involved in a current services contract with the applicant.”

The new permit application form requires attachment of a “registration or exemption acknowledgment” for the state’s charitable solicitation registration requirements (or attachment of the state application if still pending); the applicant’s tax return for the preceding year or, if exempt from filing a tax return, an “itemized budget showing anticipated income and expenses;” any contract between the applicant and a professional solicitor, federated fundraiser, or commercial co-venturer; a list of any other state or agency with which the applicant is registered; proof of tax exemption; a list of the name, title, address, birth date, and telephone number of the applicant’s officers and directors; “evidence of any fictitious name registration;” the wording imprinted on any “placed or installed devices, canisters, or honor receptacles;” the “wording of a verbal solieitation(s), including any telephone ‘pitch’, and any written or printed materi-ales) used in solicitation;” verification of incorporation; and the applicant’s internet address.

Section 42-292(b) of the ordinance authorizes the board of county commissioners to set and charge an application fee. “Calculation of the appropriate fee shall be determined by adding the total of direct public support, indirect public support, and net proceeds from the sale of goods and fundraising events in Pinellas County as reported on the organization’s Internal Revenue Service form.” Pinellas County Code § 42-292(b). According to the application forms, the application fee ranges from $25 to $300 and depends on the gross contributions received or generated from Pinellas County residents or, if unavailable, from state or national gross contributions, during the past fiscal year. For new organizations, the county calculates the application fee based on an “itemized budget for the coming year.”

An incomplete application requires notification of the applicant by a code enforcement officer, after which the applicant receives fifteen days to complete the application. Pinellas County Code § 42-292(c). Failure by the applicant to respond within thirty days to a request for completion of the application results in denial of the application. Pinellas County Code § 42-292(c) (“Failure to respond within 30 days to a request for information necessary to complete the application shall result in a denial of the application.”). The code enforcement officer has thirty days from the application’s “proper filing” to grant or renew a charitable solicitation permit. Pinellas County Code § 42-293(a)(1) (“The code enforcement officer shall grant a new or renewal charitable solicitations permit within 30 days from the date of its proper filing.”). Otherwise, the director must mail a notice of intent to deny a permit within thirty days from the application’s filing. Pinellas County Code § 42-293(a)(2) (“The director or his or her designee shall mail a notice of intent to deny a charitable solicitations permit within 30 days from the date of its filing”). If the director bases the notice of intent to deny on deficiencies in the application, the director “shall” deny a permit if the applicant fails to correct the deficiencies listed in the notice of intent to deny within fifteen days. Pinellas County Code § 42-293(a)(3) (“The director shall send a notice of denial based on any of the grounds set forth in subsection (c) of this section, or for failure to correct within 15 days any of the deficiencies contained in the notice of intent to deny as set forth in subsection (a)(2) of this section.”). An applicant who receives a permit denial “may request a hearing before the director within 15 days ... [and the] director shall set a date for the requested hearing and decide whether to maintain the denial within fifteen (15) days of receipt of the request for hearing.” Pinellas County Code § 42-293(a)(4). Any decision by the director “may be reviewed as a matter of right by the circuit court upon the filing of an appropriate pleading by an aggrieved party.” Pinellas County Code § 42-278.

The director “shall” deny a permit if (1) in the three years preceding the application, the applicant was convicted of theft, fraud, misrepresentation, or of violating a fund solicitation law, Pinellas County Code § 42 — 293(c)(1); (2) in the three years preceding the application, the applicant had a permit revoked for a violation of either the ordinance or the state charitable solicitation law, Pinellas County Code § 42-293(c)(2); (3) in the two years preceding the application, the applicant had a permit suspended twice, Pinellas County Code § 42-293(c)(3); (4) the application contains “material false information,” Pinellas County Code § 42-293(c)(4); or (5) the application omits “material information.” Pinellas County Code § 42-293(c)(5).

The “director or designee may deny, suspend or revoke the charitable solicitations permit of any person for any violation of [the ordinance].... The director or designee shall notify the permit holder in writing of his or her basis for the decision.” Pinellas County Code § 42-276(e). For violations of provisions other than those detailing the application and registration requirements, the ordinance grants the permit holder fifteen days from notification from the county to correct the violation. Pinellas County Code § 42-296(a). Failure to correct the violation within fifteen days results in the permit’s suspension for one year or revocation for a minimum of three years. Pinellas County Code §§ 42 — 296(b), 42-296(g), & 42-296(h). However, a permit holder may request a hearing with the director, which hearing must be held within thirty days after the notice of violation. Pinellas County Code § 42-296(c). Within fifteen days following the hearing, the director must decide whether to maintain the suspension or revocation. Pinellas County Code § 42-296(d). At the hearing, “the code enforcement officer shall have the burden to show competent and substantial evidence to support the decision to issue a notice of the permit holder’s violation, based on the information available to the code enforcement officer at the time of his or her decision.” Pinellas County Code § 42-296(d). Pending an appeal, the permit holder need not surrender the permit, Pi-nellas County Code § 42-296(e), but the permit holder may not solicit a charitable contribution. Pinellas County Code § 42-327 (“It shall be a violation of this [ordinance] ... for any permit holder to solicit in the county pending final action by the director on a notice of intent to suspend or revoke a charitable solicitations permit.”).

“If there is no basis for denial of a charitable solicitations permit pursuant to [Sections 42-293(c)(l) through (c)(5) ] ..., the code enforcement officer shall grant the permit, notify the applicant, and issue the permit to the applicant upon payment of the appropriate annual fee.” Pinellas County Code § 42-293(b). According to the ordinance, the “code enforcement officer shall register any person and grant or renew a charitable solicitations permit upon compliance” with the ordinance. Pi-nellas County Code § 42-276(a). Six months after receipt of a new permit (instead of a permit renewal), the permit holder must submit a “financial statement which shows all contributions and expenses and for what uses all such contributions were or are to be disbursed or distributed.” Pinellas County Code § 42-295(b)(l)a. In addition, a permit holder must inform the county of any change to information requested by the ordinance within fifteen days of any change. Pinellas County Code § 42-295(b)(4).

The ordinance authorizes the code enforcement officer to “request, for purposes of inspection and investigation, all financial records of any person which pertain to the solicitation and expenditure of contributions received for a charitable or sponsor purpose.” Pinellas County Code § 42-276(d). With probable cause, a code enforcement officer may investigate any suspected violation of the ordinance. Pinellas County Code § 42-276(b). In addition, a violation of the ordinance is punishable both with a -civil fine and, pursuant to Section 125.29, Florida Statutes, as a misdemeanor. See Pinellas County Code §§ 42-268 & 42-276(f).

A permit holder “may renew the charitable solicitations permit by submitting a renewal application ... and by submitting the financial information required and paying the appropriate fee.” Pinellas County Code § 42-294(c). The required financial information consists of the applicant’s tax return for the preceding year or, if exempt from filing a tax return, a “report of results on a form provided by the department” or an unaudited financial statement for the preceding fiscal year. Pinellas County Code § 42-295(b)(l)b. In addition, the renewal applicant must explain “for what uses all ... contributions were or are to be disbursed or distributed.” Pinellas County Code § 42-295(b)(l)b. According to the county’s “Charitable Solicitation Renewal Application,” a renewal application “must be received ... thirty (30) days before the current permit expires.” Permit renewal requires the same fee as a new permit application, but a late renewal application (i.e., a renewal application submitted after expiration of the current permit) subjects the applicant to an additional $10 fee for every thirty days beyond the current permit’s expiration. In part, the renewal application form requests information also requested by the new permit application, including the name, title, address, telephone and fax numbers, date of birth, and state and number of the driver’s license of both a contact and the renewal applicant’s chief elected, executive, or operating officer. Further, the renewal application form requires attachment of “[ejxamples of current printed material(s) used in solicitation, and the wording of the verbal solicitation or ‘telephone pitch” ’ and of any agreement “between solicitation income beneficiaries and affiliated fundraisers.” Finally, the applicant’s IRS Form 990 or 990-EZ or equivalent IRS financial filing for the preceding year must accompany the renewal application form or, if exempt from filing, the renewal applicant must disclose the total gross revenue; contributions; cost of program services; itemized expenses (divided into the same twenty-five categories required by the new permit application); fundraising expenses; compensation of “officers, directors, etc.;” and net assets or fund balances at both the beginning and the end of the year. Failure to comply with the ordinance’s reporting requirements requires denial of a renewal request. Pinellas County Code § 42-294(c)(2).

Failure by a permit holder to apply for renewal before the current permit’s expiration date requires filing of a “Late Renewal Application.” Pinellas County Code § 42-294(c)(l). The department’s “Late Renewal Application” requests essentially the same information requested by the new permit application form.

B. The Florida Solicitation of Contributions Act

Chapter 496, Florida Statutes, regulates the solicitation of charitable contributions within Florida and establishes a registration process. The state statute’s intent and purpose mirror those of the county ordinance. Fla. Stat. § 496.402. The statute requires the development of a public information program to distribute information that furthers the purposes of the statute. Fla. Stat. 496.423. Before any solicitation in Florida, the state requires a charitable organization to submit to the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services a sworn registration statement disclosing the applicant’s name and purpose; the purpose for which the solicited funds will be used; the name of the person in charge of the solicitation; whether the applicant is authorized by another state to solicit contributions; whether the applicant or any officer, director, trustee, or “principal salaried executive personnel” has been either enjoined in any jurisdiction from soliciting contributions or found to have engaged in an unlawful practice in the solicitation of contributions or the administration of charitable assets; whether the applicant has had authorization to solicit denied, suspended, or revoked and the reason for any denial, suspension, or revocation; whether the applicant has settled an investigation into violation of a charitable solicitation statute by entering into an “assurance of voluntary compliance;” whether in the last ten years the applicant or any officer, director, trustee, or employee has been convicted of a felony or of a crime involving fraud, theft, larceny, embezzlement, fraudulent conversion, misappropriation of property, or the conduct of a charitable solicitation and the details of any such conviction; whether the applicant or an officer, director, trustee, or employee has been enjoined from violating any charitable solicitation law and the details of any such injunction; information about any professional solicitor, professional fund-raising consultant, or commercial co-ven-turer that will act on behalf of the applicant, including the “specific terms of the arrangements for salaries, bonuses, commissions, expenses, or other remunerations to be paid the fundraising consultant and professional solicitor;” and details of the applicant’s formation and tax-exempt status, accompanied by any federal tax exemption determination letter. See Fla. Stat. §§ 496.405(l)(a) to 496.405(2)(f). Further, the registration statement must contain, subject to prompt supplementation, if a change occurs, the address and telephone number of the applicant and of any office in Florida, or, if the applicant has no office in the state, the name, address, and telephone number of the person having custody of the applicant’s financial records; the name and address of each officer, director, trustee, and “principal salaried executive personnel;” the end date of the applicant’s fiscal year; a list or description of the applicant’s “major program activities;” and the name, address, and telephone number of each individual or officer with “final responsibility for the custody of the contributions and who will be responsible for the final distribution of the contributions.” Fla. Stat. § 496.405(2) (g). In addition, the applicant must annually submit a renewal statement. Fla. Stat. § 496.405(l)(a). Along with both the registration and the annual renewal statement, the applicant must submit IRS Form 990 or 990-EZ for the preceding year (a newly formed organization must submit a budget for the current fiscal year) or a “financial report,” including a balance sheet; revenue and expenses; any change in the fund balance; the name and address of and the amount received from any professional fundrais-ing consultant, professional solicitor, or commercial co-venturer; and “functional expenses,” which include any program, management, fundraising, and general expense. Fla. Stat. §§ 496.405(2)(a) & 496.407(1). The state imposes an annual application fee that ranges from $10 to $400 and depends on the contributions received for the last fiscal year. Fla. Stat. § 496.405(4)(a).

The state imposes separate registration requirements on a professional fundraising consultant and a professional solicitor. See Fla. Stat. §§ 496.409 & 496.410. No charitable organization that aspires to solicit a contribution in Florida may contract with a professional fundraising consultant or professional solicitor not registered with the state. Fla. Stat. § 496.411(5). Among other information, these professionals must disclose details of any familial relationship within the applicant and between the applicant and both any charitable organization under contract with the applicant and “any supplier or vendor providing goods or services to any charitable organization ... under contract to the applicant.” Fla. Stat. §§ 496.409(2)(d) & 496.410(2)(e). Further, the applicant must submit a copy of any contract with a charitable organization, which contract must disclose the fee paid to the applicant. Fla. Stat. §§ 496.409(4), 496.409(5), & 496.410(7).

The state statute prohibits violation of any registration requirement. For example, the statute prohibits (1) false or misleading information in a registration submission and (2) any misrepresentation or other misleading or fraudulent statement or conduct in connection with a solicitation. See Fla. Stat. § 496.415. The statute authorizes the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services to investigate “any person or organization whenever there is an appearance, either upon complaint or otherwise, that a violation of [the statute] ... has been committed or is about to be committed.” Fla. Stat. § 496.419(1). Among other remedies, the state may assess a civil penalty, criminally prosecute, refuse to register, and cancel or suspend the registration of any violator. Fla. Stat. §§ 496.417, 496.419(5), & 496.420.

C. American Charities for Reasonable Fundraising Regulation, Inc. v. Pi-nellas County

The county contends that American Charities for Reasonable Fundraising Regulation, Inc. v. Pinellas County, 32 F.Supp.2d 1308 (M.D.Fla.1998), aff'd in part, 221 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir.2000), a challenge to an earlier version of the county’s charitable solicitation ordinance, disposes of the charities’ current challenge (Doc. 69). The charities respond that (1) an August 3, 2001, order (Doc. 19) in this action rejects any preclusive effect of American Charities and (2) American Charities involves a challenge by professional fundraising consultants, rather than charities, and presents distinct facts (Doc. 61).

With the exception of American Charities, the parties in the two actions differ. American Charities involved a challenge by professional fundraisers and American Charities appeared in the action only as “the assignee of a claim and in its representational capacity of various supporters who engage in professional fundraising.” American Charities, 32 F.Supp.2d at 1312. Although Judge Kovachevich denied the plaintiffs’ First Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges, Judge Kovachevich ruled after only “minimal discovery.” 32 F.Supp.2d at 1313. Further, Judge Kovachevich’s substantive rulings addressed only the parties’ facial challenge and, following remand, addressed the parties’ as-applied challenge only under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, a challenge not raised in this action. See American Charities for Reasonable Fundraising Regulation, Inc. v. Pinellas County, 189 F.Supp.2d 1319 (M.D.Fla.2001). In addition, American Charities remained silent about both the permit application forms promulgated by the director and the ordinance’s updating and.interim reporting requirements. Finally, the county both amended the ordinance on several occasions since American Charities’ substantive review and raised the application fee. In short, American Charities fails to preclude any issue or claim raised in this action. See Pleming v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 142 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir.1998).

II. FIRST AMENDMENT: PRIOR RESTRAINT

The charities allege that the ordinance’s regulatory scheme is an unconstitutional prior restraint of protected speech because the scheme (1) is unjustified under the circumstances, (2) provides excessive discretion for the director to “delay and censor free speech,” and (3) lacks adequate procedural safeguards (Docs. 1 & 43). Specifically, the charities argue that achievement of the ordinance’s goal requires no prior restraint because the county (or the state, the United States Department of Justice, the IRS, or the United States Postal Service) can prosecute if any solicitation contains a misrepresentation or other fraudulent communication. Next, the charities argue that although the ordinance purportedly delineates circumstances that require either a denial, suspension, or revocation of a permit, the ordinance is “vague” and permits “highly subjective judgment calls.” The charities contend that the “issuance and revocation of permits in ... [Pinellas] County is a highly subjective affair dependent on differing interpretations regarding what the [o]rdinance and forms require, negotiation with charities and their representatives regarding what the [c]ounty will accept, and the exercise of discretion in deciding when to deny or revoke a permit for failure to satisfy the [c]ounty’s requirements.” Despite the time limits imposed by the ordinance, the charities contend that in practice months elapse while the applicant and the county negotiate the information required for a permit (Doc. 56). Finally, the charities argue that the ordinance fails to impose the procedural safeguards required by Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965), including a reasonable time period for a decision, authorization of solicitation absent a denial from the county within a prescribed period, prompt judicial resolution of any adverse decision, and abatement of any adverse decision pending judicial review.

In relevant part, the county responds that (1) experience with fraud by purportedly charitable organizations before enactment of the ordinance demonstrates the necessity for the ordinance’s regulatory scheme; (2) the director’s discretion is “ministerial and bound within the limits of the [ordinance;” and (3) the required safeguards flow from FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990), rather than from Freedman, because “applicants for a license have every incentive to stick it out and see litigation through to its end” (Doc. 69).

The First Amendment protects charitable solicitation. See Riley v. National Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 789, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632, 100 S.Ct. 826, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980); Church of Scientology Flag. Serv. Org. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1543 (11th Cir.1993). Therefore, because the ordinance grants the county authority to prevent an organization from soliciting a charitable contribution, the ordinance receives First Amendment scrutiny. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 801, 108 S.Ct. 2667. Although the ordinance imposes a prior restraint, see, e.g., American Target Adver., Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir.2000) (a law that bars a professional solicitation consultant from assisting with a solicitation before complying with registration requirements “definitionally qualifies as a prior restraint”); Famine Relief Fund v. West Virginia, 905 F.2d 747, 753 (4th Cir.1990) (a law imposes a prior restraint if it bars solicitation pending judicial determination of an administrative denial of permission to solicit), “[p]rior restraints are not unconstitutional per se.” Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975). However, “[a]ny system of prior restraint ... [bears] a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.” Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 558, 95 S.Ct. 1239 (quotations omitted) (“[A] free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand.”); see Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 628 (5th Cir.1981) (“[G]overnmental authorities may not, except in demanding circumstances, deny access to a public forum in anticipation of consequences that may flow from the contemplated activity.”).

Freedman, which requires comprehensive “procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system,” 380 U.S. at 58, 85 S.Ct. 734, is “inapposite because the licensing at issue here is not subject-matter censorship.” Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322, 122 S.Ct. 775, 151 L.Ed.2d 783 (2002) (“We have never required that a content-neutral permit scheme regulating speech in a public forum adhere to the procedural requirements set forth in Freedman.”)] cf. Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139, 88 S.Ct. 754, 19 L.Ed.2d 966 (1968). The ordinance need not contain the comprehensive safeguards of Freedman because the ordinance “does not authorize a licensor to pass judgment on the content of speech: None of the grounds for denying a permit has anything to do with what a speaker might say.” Thomas, 534 U.S. at 322, 122 S.Ct. 775.

Two features of any system that imposes a prior restraint are unconstitutional. See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 225, 110 S.Ct. 596. First, no system of prior restraint may place “ ‘unbridled discretion in the hands of a government official or agency.’ ” FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 225, 110 S.Ct. 596 (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 & 764, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) (“[T]he government ... may not condition ... speech on obtaining a license or permit from a government official in that official’s boundless discretion.”)); see Cafe Erotica of Fla., Inc. v. St. Johns, 360 F.3d 1274, 1283 (11th Cir.2004). Second, “a prior restraint that fails to place limits on the time within which the decision maker must issue the license is impermissible.” FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 226, 110 S.Ct. 596; see Cafe Erotica, 360 F.3d at 1282.

A. The Director’s Discretion

The Supreme Court has “condemn[ed] systems in which the exercise of ... authority [by a public official to deny use of a forum in advance of actual expression] was not bounded by precise and clear standards.” Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 553, 95 S.Ct. 1239 (“[T]he danger of censorship and of abridgment of our precious First Amendment freedoms is too great where officials have unbridled discretion over a forum’s use.”). “[A] law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license must contain narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority.” Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 131, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992) (quotations omitted) (“The reasoning is simple: If the permit scheme involves appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion by the licensing authority, the danger of censorship and of abridgment of our precious First Amendment freedoms is too great to be permitted” (quotations and citations omitted)). “Standards provide the guideposts that cheek the licensor and allow courts quickly and easily to determine whether the licensor is discriminating against disfavored speech.” City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 758, 108 S.Ct. 2138.

1. The County Ordinance

Although the county may require periodic licensing, neutral criteria must exist to "insure that the licensing decision is not based on the content or viewpoint of the speech being considered." City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 760, 108 S.Ct. 2138. Despite the charities' contrary contention, the ordinance contains sufficiently precise and clear neutral standards that govern whether to deny, suspend, or revoke a permit. The director must grant a permit unless (1) the applicant fails to "properly complete" the application form, Pinellas County Code § 42-292(c); (2) in the preceding three years, the applicant has been convicted of theft, fraud, misrepresentation, or violation of any fund solicitation law, Pinellas County Code § 42-293(c)(1); (3) in the preceding three years, the applicant has had a permit revoked for violation of either the ordinance or the state charitable solicitation law, Pinellas County Code § 42-293(c)(2); (4) in the preceding two years, the applicant has had a permit suspended twice, Pinellas County Code § 42-293(c)(3); (5) the application contains "material false information," Pinellas County Code § 42-293(c)(4); or (6) the application omits "material information," Pinellas County Code § 42-293(~)(5). Further, the director "may" deny, suspend, or revoke a permit for "any violation of [the ordinance]." Pinellas County Code § 42-276(e). None of these provisions grants a county official unbridled and unconstitutional discretion to restrain a charity's speech. See Church of Scientology, 2 F.3d at 1548 ("It is a purely ministerial function to determine whether a registration form provides a statement of the nature and identity of the organization, its tax-exempt status, other Florida cities in which it is registered, and the criminal histories of its officers and solicitors. . . . Thus, the clerk has no latitude to engage in invidious discrimination against disfavored speakers or religions.”); International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness of Houston, Inc. v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 541, 547 (5th Cir.1982) (“There is no provision, explicit or implicit, for the exercise of discretion. The information sought is purely objective&emdash;names, addresses, telephone numbers, and related matters of an identifying nature.... The regulatory scheme is based on providing the general public with facts identifying the solicitors and describing the solicitation.”); Fernandes, 663 F.2d at 629 (an ordinance may require denial of a solicitation permit if the permit application either omits information or contains false statements); Holy Spirit Ass’n for the Unification of World Christianity v. Hodge, 582 F.Supp. 592, 597-98 (N.D.Tex.1984) (finding constitutional the denial of a solicitation permit either if “[o]ne or more of the statements made in the application are not true” or if the applicant “has made ... false statements or misrepresentations in the application”); cf. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 769, 108 S.Ct. 2138. But see Hodge, 582 F.Supp. at 597-98 (finding unconstitutional the denial of a permit if the applicant either “has been convicted ... of a crime involving moral turpitude” or has “violated any of the terms of the permit or [the ordinance]” because “[d]enying a permit for prior misconduct is impermissible unless the government can show that the speech prohibited will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage”).

2. The Application Forms

In contrast to the ordinance provisions that govern the denial, suspension, and revocation of a permit, Section 42-276(c) of the ordinance, which grants the director authority to “promulgate the forms deemed necessary to carry out his or her responsibilities,” insufficiently limits the director’s discretion. Section 42-276(c) enables the director’s promulgation of application forms that request an expansive and forbidding quantity of information not authorized by the ordinance and, consequently, lacks the precise and clear standards compelled by the First Amendment. See American Target, 199 F.3d at 1251 n. 3 & 1252 (a solicitation ordinance that grants the decisionmaker authority to request “any additional information” confers “unconstitutional discretion ... because it presumes that [the decisionmaker] ... will use her blanket authority to request additional information only in good faith and consistent with implicit standards”); cf. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 770, 108 S.Ct. 2138 (limits imposed on the decision-maker’s discretion must “be made explicit by textual incorporation, binding judicial or administrative construction, or well-established practice”).

The insufficient limit on the director’s discretion enables the director’s promulgation of application forms that require information and documents not specified in the ordinance. Because the ordinance authorizes neither issuance of a permit absent a completed application form nor solicitation absent a permit, the ordinance, in violation of the First Amendment, enables both the denial of a permit application and the consequent restraint of speech based on an applicant’s failure to provide information requested by the director’s application forms but not enumerated in the ordinance. See Pinellas County Code § 42-293(a)(3). In other words, the ordinance impermissibly allows denial of a permit for failure to comply with requirements uniquely formulated by the director and, consequently, confers to the director unbridled and unconstitutional discretion to enforce a prior restraint and to silence protected speech.

B. Time Limits

“[A] prior restraint that fails to place limits on the time within which the decision maker must issue the license is impermissible.” FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 226, 110 S.Ct. 596. Although the ordinance permissibly limits to thirty days the time for the director to grant, renew, or deny a permit, the ordinance precludes solicitation in the absence of a timely decision by the director. Consequently, upon expiration of the thirty-day deadline the applicant remains unauthorized to solicit, even if the applicant receives no permitting decision. See Pinellas County Code §§ 42-293(a)(l) & 42-293(a)(2). Although the county insists that expiration of a pertinent deadline with no action by the department automatically authorizes the applicant’s solicitation, neither the ordinance nor the record supports the county’s contention. No demonstrable need exists to “depend on the individuals responsible for enforcing the Ordinance to do so in a manner that cures it of constitutional infirmities.” Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir.1994).

In practice, the ordinance’s failure to authorize an applicant’s solicitation in the absence of a permit’s grant, renewal, or denial by the deadline enables a county official’s indefinite and unconstitutional restraint of a charity’s solicitation. See Artistic Entertainment, Inc. v. City of Warner Robins, 223 F.3d 1306, 1310-11 (11th Cir.2000) (finding violative of the First Amendment a licensing ordinance that “imposes a deadline on the City to consider an adult business license application, [but] ... does not guarantee the adult business owner the right to begin expressive activities within a brief, fixed time frame”); Redner, 29 F.3d at 1501; Cafe Erotica/We Dare To Bare/Adult Toys/ Great Food/Exit 91, Inc. v. St. Johns, 143 F.Supp.2d 1331, 1335 (M.D.Fla.2001) (“Although the Ordinance sets out a specific and reasonable time in which the County Administrator must issue a permitting decision, the Ordinance makes no provisions for what shall happen if the County Administrator fails to comply with the fourteen day time period set out in the Ordinance.”). On its face, Section 42-293(a)(l) “risks the suppression of protected expression for an indefinite time period prior to any action on the part of the decisionmaker or any judicial determination.” Redner, 29 F.3d at 1501. Accordingly, Section 42-293(a)(1) violates the First Amendment’s guarantees.

The ordinance also fails to require the department’s response to an incomplete application. Although Section 42-292(c) of the ordinance specifies a deadline for denial of an incomplete application after a request for additional information and Sections 42-293(a)(l) through 42-293(a)(3) provide for grant or denial of a permit following “proper” filing of an application, the ordinance fads both to guide the determination of whether submission of an application constitutes “proper” filing and to require a response to an application not deemed a “proper” filing. In other words, no time constraint requires the department’s response to an application the department deems not a “proper” filing. Consequently, the department may avoid the deadline for a decision and indefinitely restrain speech by failing to characterize an application as a “proper” filing. This lack of restraint permitted by the ordinance violates the First Amendment. See Gospel Missions of Am. v. Bennett, 951 F.Supp. 1429, 1445 (C.D.Cal.1997) (finding unconstitutional an ordinance without a deadline for approval or denial of an “amended” charitable solicitation permit application because the ordinance enables the government’s indefinite restraint of speech); cf. American Target, 199 F.3d at 1253 (“The state, by regulation, requires that all initial [charitable solicitation] applications and renewals of registration be processed within ten days of their receipt by the Division of Consumer Protection.”).

III. FIRST AMENDMENT: UNDUE BURDEN

The charities complain that the ordinance’s registration requirements “are unduly onerous, demanding detailed, extensive, and intrusive information from charitable organizations” that cannot comply “without incurring prohibitive costs” (Doc. 1). Although an ordinance “that requires ... a ‘license’ for the dissemination of ideas is inherently suspect,” Secretary of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 964 n. 12, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984), “[s]olicitmg financial support is undoubtedly subject to reasonable regulation.” Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632, 100 S.Ct. 826; see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (“[A] state may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent.”). However, regulation “must be undertaken with due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views or economic, political, or social issues, and for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease.” Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632, 100 S.Ct. 826. When reviewing an ordinance for compliance with the First Amendment, “the issue is whether the [county] has exercised its power to regulate solicitation in such a manner as not unduly to intrude upon the rights of free speech.” Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 633, 100 S.Ct. 826.

The First Amendment requires intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral regulation of protected speech because “in most cases [a content-neutral regulation poses] a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 642, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (citations omitted). The “principal inquiry in determining content neutrality ... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989); see Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 642, 114 S.Ct. 2445. “A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (“Government regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech” (citations omitted)); see Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 643, 114 S.Ct. 2445 (“As a general rule, ... laws that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed are in most instances content neutral.”). A measure designed to control the “secondary” effects of speech rather than to “suppress the expression of unpopular views” is content neutral. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986); see Artistic Entertainment, 223 F.3d at 1308.

With the ordinance, the county intends to oversee and to target the potential for abuse of solicitations but not to “regulate speech because of the message it conveys.” Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 645, 114 S.Ct. 2445. The ordinance authorizes no content-based review of a charitable solicitation. Any applicant that submits a completed application, falls outside the specified and objective categories of applicants barred from solicitation, and otherwise complies with the ordinance receives a permit. A charity may neither avoid nor mitigate its obligations under the ordinance by changing the content of its solicitation. See Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 644, 114 S.Ct. 2445. Consequently, the ordinance is content neutral and subject to intermediate scrutiny. See Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 661-62, 114 S.Ct. 2445; Ward, 491 U.S. at 792, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (a guideline is content neutral if its justification “has nothing to do with content” (quotations omitted)); see also American Target, 199 F.3d at 1247.

Because the ordinance imposes content-neutral regulation, the county must demonstrate that the ordinance (1) serves a substantial government interest and (2) is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 792, 108 S.Ct. 2667; Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636 & 637, 100 S.Ct. 826; American Target, 199 F.3d at 1247; see also Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 662 & 664-65, 114 S.Ct. 2445 (“When the Government defends a regulation on speech as a means to redress past harms or prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than simply posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured.... It must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.”); Church of Scientology, 2 F.3d at 1547 (the government failed to satisfy its burden of showing “that the required financial, operational and organizational disclosures are narrowly tailored to serve compelling interests”).

A. Substantial Government Interest

Protecting the public from deception, fraud, and misrepresentation represents “a sufficiently substantial interest to justify a narrowly tailored regulation.” Riley, 487 U.S. at 792, 108 S.Ct. 2667; see Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 164-65, 122 S.Ct. 2080, 153 L.Ed.2d 205 (2002) (finding fraud prevention an “important” government interest that supports “some form of regulation of solicitation activity”); Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 637, 100 S.Ct. 826 (finding fraud prevention a substantial government interest). The ordinance requires public disclosure of information about “persons who solicit contributions for a charitable or sponsor purpose” in Pinellas County to prevent “deception, fraud, or misrepresentation in the solicitation, use and reporting of contributions.” Pinellas County Code § 42-270. To accomplish this goal, the ordinance requires detailed disclosure about both the applicant and the solicitation and requires denial of a solicitation permit in specified circumstances that manifest an unacceptable risk of deception, fraud, or misrepresentation. In short, the ordinance serves a substantial government interest.

B. Narrowly Tailored Regulation

The county must narrowly tailor the ordinance to serve the substantial government interest of preventing deception, fraud, and misrepresentation. Joseph H. Munson recognizes that “concerns about unscrupulous professional fundraisers [and] ... fraudulent charities, can and are accommodated directly, through disclosure and registration requirements and penalties for fraudulent conduct.” 467 U.S. at 968 n. 16, 104 S.Ct. 2839. Riley emphasizes that government “may constitutionally require fundraisers to disclose certain financial information.” 487 U.S. at 795, 108 S.Ct. 2667. The “[e]fforts to promote disclosure of the finances of charitable organizations ... may assist in preventing fraud by informing the public of the ways in which their contributions will be employed. Such measures may help make contribution decisions more informed, while leaving to individual choice the decision whether to contribute.... ” Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 637-38, 100 S.Ct. 826.

A challenged ordinance need not constitute the “least restrictive” or “least intrusive” means of obtaining the legislative objective. Joseph H. Munson, 467 U.S. at 961, 104 S.Ct. 2839; see Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 662, 114 S.Ct. 2445; Ward, 491 U.S. at 798, 109 S.Ct. 2746. Rather, narrow tailoring requires promotion of “a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 & 801, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (quotations omitted) (“[T]he validity of the regulation depends on the relation it bears to the overall problem the government seeks to correct, not on the extent to which it furthers the government’s interests in an individual case.”). However, “this standard does not mean that a ... regulation may burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests. Government may not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.... So long as the means chosen are not substantially •broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest, ... the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government’s interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799-800, 109 S.Ct. 2746; see Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 662, 114 S.Ct. 2445 (“Narrow tailoring ... requires ... that the means chosen do not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests” (quotations omitted)). In other words, some substantial relationship must exist between the ordinance and its goal. See Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 638, 100 S.Ct. 826.

The charities contend that the ordinance lacks narrow tailoring because (1) the registration requirements are either “unduly onerous or seek information to which the [c]ounty is not reasonably entitled;” (2) the ordinance duplicates the state’s registration requirements and the IRS’s filing and disclosure requirements; (3) absent a written complaint or similar alarm, the county neither verifies nor otherwise uses the information submitted by an applicant; (4) the ordinance imposes unnecessarily repetitive updating and interim reporting requirements; and (5) the county inappropriately bases the application fee on performance indicators (Doc. 43). According to the charities, the “cumulative burden of [the] duplicative and onerous registration and reporting requirements on charities is excessive and not justified by any interest advanced by the [c]ounty” (Doc. 70). Consequently, the charities argue, the ordinance impermissibly burdens free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment.

1. The Registration Requirements

The charities assert that reporting information required by the county ordinance imposes an unreasonable burden. In essence, the ordinance requires reporting of both general and financial information about the applicant and the solicitation in the county.

a. General Information

Generally, the charities contend that the information required by the ordinance lacks narrow tailoring to prevent deception, fraud, or misrepresentation. The charities argue that rather than requiring detailed and intrusive information, the county could achieve its goal by prosecuting any perpetrator of deception, fraud, or misrepresentation. In addition, the charities specifically attack Section 42-292(a)(7), which section is intended to reveal a potential conflict of interest resulting from a familial relationship between specified persons associated with either an applicant, a “charitable organization or sponsor under contract” with the applicant, or a “supplier or vendor providing goods or services to any charitable organization or sponsor under contract to the applicant.” According to the charities, Section 42-292(a)(7) lacks narrow tailoring because it requires expansive investigation of the relationship between a charity’s officers, directors, and certain other employees, their family members, and any outside vendor, including law firms, fundraising consultants, accounting firms, print shops, mail houses, courier services, custodial and janitorial services, office supply stores, and others.

In general, the ordinance’s reporting and disclosure provisions are narrowly tailored to achieve the substantial government interest of preventing deception, fraud, and misrepresentation. See American Target, 199 F.3d at 1248 (finding the following registration and disclosure requirements narrowly tailored to serve the government’s substantial interest in fraud prevention: the applicant’s name, address, telephone number; the name and address of any organization or person controlled by, controlling, or affiliated with the applicant; disclosure of any injunction, judgment, or administrative order against the applicant or any officer, director, manager, operator, or principal of the applicant or their conviction for any crime involving moral turpitude; a copy of any written agreement between a professional solicitor and a charitable organization; and a copy of all agreements to which the applicant is, or proposes to be, a party regarding the use of proceeds); Church of Scientology, 2 F.3d at 1546 & 1548 (finding disclosure requirements similar to those imposed by the ordinance and the following application requirements narrowly tailored to prevent fraud by a charitable organization: the applicant’s name; whether the applicant is a natural person, partnership, corporation, or association; reference to any determination of tax-exempt status; and the names of other Florida cities in which the applicant has collected funds for charitable purposes within the past five years); Gospel Missions, 951 F.Supp. at 1450 (“[Disclosure requirements that specifically relate to the planned charitable solicitation are constitutional....”); Famine Relief Fund, 905 F.2d at 751-52 (finding constitutional a solicitation statute that requires submission of any contract between a charity and a professional fundraiser); Hodge, 582 F.Supp. at 601 (a solicitation ordinance may require an applicant to submit a sworn application that discloses the applicant’s identity and address; -■ the names and addresses of all officers, directors, and trustees of the applicant and the name and city of residence of all officers and directors or trustees of any parent organization; the purpose for which the solicitation is performed; the name and address of any person “in charge of conducting the charitable solicitation;” all methods “to be used in conducting the charitable solicitations campaign;” the period of the charitable solicitation; a statement of the “character and extent of the charitable, educational, patriotic or philanthropic work done by the applicant within the city during the last preceding year;” for a corporation, a copy of its charter or articles of incorporation, and for a foreign corporation, a copy of its certificate to do business in the state; and for a charitable organization, proof that contributions to the organization are tax deductible).

Similarly, Section 42-292(a)(7) complies with the narrow tailoring requirements of the First Amendment. See Famine Relief Fund, 905 F.2d at 752 (finding constitutional regulation that prohibits conflicts of interest that may affect a charity