Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER TOM S. LEE, District Judge. The United States of America brought this action against the Noxubee County Democratic Executive Committee and its chairman, Ike Brown, and the Noxubee County Election Commission alleging claims under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and also asserting claims against Brown and the Noxubee Democratic Executive Committee under Section 11 of the Voting Rights Act. The case was tried to the court from January 16 to January 31, 2007, following which the parties submitted post-trial briefs presenting what they contend are the factual and legal issues pertinent to the court’s decision. Having considered the evidence presented and the parties’ memoranda, the court makes the following findings and conclusions. The Parties: The plaintiff is the United States Department of Justice (the Government) which brought this action pursuant to the authority granted by 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(d), which states, Whenever any person has engaged ... in any act or practice prohibited by Section [2 or 11] ..., the Attorney General may institute for the United States, or in the name of the United States, an action for preventive relief, including an application for a temporary or permanent injunction ... or other order. The defendants are the Noxubee County Democratic Executive Committee, its chairman Ike Brown, and the Noxubee County Election Commission. Under state law, the Noxubee County Democratic Executive Committee (NDEC) is responsible for “performing all duties that relate to qualifications of candidates for (Democratic) primary elections” and for conducting Democratic primary elections in Noxubee County. See Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-263. Ike Brown has been chairman of the NDEC since 2000, having been elected to the position at the county convention in 1999. The Noxubee County Election Commission is responsible for conducting general elections, as well as for maintaining the county’s voter registration rolls. See Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-213. The defendants, together with the registrar, who in Noxubee County is the circuit clerk, have control over every electoral activity “from voter registration, to voter roll maintenance, to voting itself, and to canvassing returns and certifying election results.” Jeffrey Jackson and Mary Miller, Mississippi Practice Series: Encyclopedia of Mississippi Law § 6 (2003). Their authority is thus said to be “superior to that of any other players in the process.” Id. (“the local parties’ role in the conduct of the primaries is all encompassing”). The Government’s Claims: When the Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965, the population of Noxubee County was approximately 70% black and 30% white, but 100% of the elected officials in the county were white. Now, forty years later, the population of Noxubee County is still about 70% black and 30% white, but 93% of elected officials are black. Four of five members of the Board of Supervisors are black; five of five members of the Election Commission are black; five of five members of the Board of Education are black; and with the exception of the county prosecuting attorney, all countywide elected officials are black, including the circuit clerk, chancery clerk, sheriff, tax assessor, superintendent of education, coroner, two justice court judges and two constables. Moreover, the Democratic party in Noxubee County, once dominated by whites, is now majority black; and Democratic party officials in Noxubee County, including NDEC Chairman Ike Brown and all but one of the 30 current members of the NDEC, are black. Thus, whereas whites were historically in power in this majority black county, the tables have turned, and, as the Government’s expert Dr. Theodore Arrington has put it, “You now have a situation in which whites are the minority and blacks are in a position to discriminate against them very much in the same way as whites discriminated against blacks in the history further back.” As the Government sees it, that is precisely what has occurred and is occurring in Noxubee County. Accordingly, in what is an unconventional, if not unprecedented use of the Voting Rights Act, the Government filed this suit claiming that Noxubee County Democratic party officials have engaged in conduct that has infringed the voting rights of white voters, the minority group, and has denied white voters equal access to the electoral process. In broad terms, the Government charges that defendants have administered the Democratic primary in Noxubee County in such a way as to discriminate against white voters and white-preferred candidates; that the racially discriminatory way the elections are conducted is with the purpose of diluting the voting strength of white voters and reducing the opportunities for white voter-preferred candidates to be elected to local office; and that the result of this discriminatory administration of the Democratic primary is the dilution of white voting strength, thereby denying white voters the opportunity to elect candidates of their choice and ensuring that the black candidates preferred by defendants will be elected. In short, the Government claims that defendants have intentionally practiced racial discrimination and that their actions have had the racially discriminatory result of reducing the electoral opportunities of white voters and white voter-preferred candidates. Section 2: Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act protects against discrimination in voting on account of race, and is the “major statutory prohibition of all voting rights discrimination.” S.Rep. No. 97-417, at 30 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207. Section 2 prohibits states from applying any “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice or procedures ... which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizens of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). A violation of Section 2 is established where, “based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election ... are not equally open to participation by members of [a] class of citizens ... in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). This is an atypical Section 2 case in a number of ways, principal among which is the fact that the case involves alleged discrimination against white voters. Yet Section 2 provides no less protection to white voters than any other class of voters. Any doubt as to this conclusion is allayed by a review of the history of Section 2. As originally enacted, Section 2 was not considered controversial because it was viewed essentially as a restatement of the Fifteenth Amendment, which provides: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,” U.S. Const, amend. XV, § l. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 1496-97, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) (plurality opinion). The Fifteenth Amendment had been enacted in the wake of the Civil War “to guarantee to the emancipated slaves the right to vote, lest they be denied the civil and political capacity to protect their new freedom.” Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 512, 120 S.Ct. 1044, 1054, 145 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2000). Yet as the Supreme Court acknowledged in Rice, the amendment goes beyond this vital objective: Consistent with the design of the Constitution, the Amendment is cast in fundamental terms, terms transcending the particular controversy which was the immediate impetus for its enactment. The Amendment grants protection to all persons, not just members of a particular race. The design of the Amendment is to reaffirm the equality of races at the most basic level of the democratic process, the exercise of the voting franchise. A resolve so absolute required language as simple in command as it was comprehensive in reach. Fundamental in purpose and effect and self-executing in operation, the Amendment prohibits all provisions denying or abridging the voting franchise of any citizen or class of citizens on the basis of race ... The Court has acknowledged the Amendment’s mandate of neutrality in straightforward terms: “If citizens of one race having certain qualifications are permitted by law to vote, those of another having the same qualifications must be. Previous to this amendment, there was no constitutional guaranty against this discrimination: now there is.” United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 218, 23 L.Ed. 563 (1875). Rice, 528 U.S. at 512, 120 S.Ct. at 1054 (emphasis added). Consistent with Rice, the court in United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Wilson concluded that white voters had standing to bring a vote dilution claim under the fifteenth amendment, reasoning, [Tjhere is no reason ... that a white voter may not have standing, just as a nonwhite voter, to allege a denial of equal protection as well as an abridgement of his right to vote on account of race or color, regardless of the fact that the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments were adopted for the purpose of ensuring equal protection to the black person. While we generally tend to think of white voters as being in the majority because in the country as a whole and in most states they are, it is plain enough that in a given state or political subdivision they may not be; to the extent that the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments can be construed as extending the rights of minority groups, in a given situation that group may of course be white. 510 F.2d 512, 520 (2d Cir.1975), aff'd sub nom., United Jewish Org.’s of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 97 S.Ct. 996, 51 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977). See also Enlargement of Boundaries of Yazoo City v. City of Yazoo City, 452 So.2d 837, 843 (Miss.1984) (“A person does not have to be a member of any particular race or group in order to have his right to vote respected. White persons have the same constitutional and legal immunity against the abridgment of, or dilution of, their right to vote on account of race and color as do black persons.”). The Supreme Court has recognized that the coverage provided by Section 2, as originally enacted, “was unquestionably coextensive with the coverage provided by the Fifteenth Amendment; the provision simply elaborated upon the Fifteenth Amendment.” Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 391-92, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 2362, 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); see also Bolden, 446 U.S. at 60-61, 100 S.Ct. at 1496 (“[I]t is apparent that the language of § 2 no more than elaborates upon that of the Fifteenth Amendment and the sparse legislative history of § 2 makes it clear that it was intended to have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself.”). It follows, then, that Section 2 was intended to protect the rights of all voters, regardless of race. See White v. Alabama, 74 F.3d 1058, 1073-74 (11th Cir.1996) (finding that right of class of “non-black voters” to be free from racial discrimination, as protected by Section 2, was violated by a settlement agreement which racially apportioned state judicial offices). While Section 2 was amended in 1982, the amendment was intended “to broaden the protection afforded by the Voting Rights Act,” not constrict the Act’s coverage. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 404, 111 S.Ct. at 2368. See also Hayden v. Pataki 449 F.3d 305, 353 (2d Cir.2006) (stating that “from its inception and particularly through its amendment in 1982, Congress intended that § 2 ... be given the broadest possible reach”). From the foregoing, it is manifest that Section 2 broadly protects the voting rights of all voters, even those who are white. This case also differs from the majority of more recent Section 2 cases in that the Government is not merely claiming that defendants have engaged in racially neutral activities that have resulted in discrimination; rather, it is claiming that defendants have engaged in intentional, purposeful racial discrimination against white voters. In Bolden, the plurality opinion held that there was no violation of either the Fifteenth Amendment or Section 2 absent proof of intentional discrimination. 446 U.S. at 60-61, 100 S.Ct. at 1496. Responding to the Court’s holding, Congress amended Section 2 in 1982 to eliminate any requirement of a purpose or intent to discriminate and to provide that proof of discriminatory. results or discriminatory impact is sufficient. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 392-93, 111 S.Ct. at 2362-63. Following the 1982 amendment, “[P]laintiffs need not prove a discriminatory purpose in the adoption or maintenance of the challenged system or practice in order to establish a violation. Plaintiffs must prove such intent, or, alternatively, must show that the challenged system or practice, in the context of all the circumstances in the jurisdiction in question, results in minorities being denied equal access to the political process.” McMillan v. Escambia County, Fla., 748 F.2d 1037, 1046-1047 (5th Cir.1984) (quoting S.Rep. No. 97-417, 205). See also Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 766 (9th Cir.1990) (“[T]he Voting Rights Act can be violated by both intentional discrimination in the drawing of district lines and facially neutral apportionment schemes that have the effect of diluting minority votes.”); Dillard v. Town of North Johns, 717 F.Supp. 1471, 1476 (M.D.Ala.1989) (“[A] violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act is established if action was taken or maintained with a racially discriminatory ‘intent’ or the action has racially discriminatory ‘results,’ determined according to certain congres-sionally approved criteria”). Most Section 2 cases brought since the 1982 amendment have been “results” cases, rather than “intent” cases, so there are few cases addressing the specific proof requirements in intent cases in the wake of the 1982 amendment. In any Section 2 case, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the challenged situation constituted a qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure within the meaning of Section 2, and based on the “totality of the circumstances,” that the challenged practice has resulted in members of a protected class having “less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” United States v. Jones, 57 F.3d 1020, 1023 (11th Cir.1995) (quoting Section 2, and citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79-80, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2781, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986)). The inquiry into the “totality of circumstances” is guided by a number of factors set forth in the Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendment, which in “results” cases, function as “signals of diminished opportunity for political participation of the minority group and election of the representatives of their choice.” See League of United Latin American Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 986 F.2d 728, 844-45 (5th Cir.1993). The Senate factors include: a. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; b. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized; c. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; d. whether members of the minority group have been denied access to [any candidate slating] process; e. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; f. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; g. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction; h. whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group; [and] i.whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous. Magnolia Bar Ass’n, Inc. v. Lee, 994 F.2d 1143, 1147 (5th Cir.1993) (quoting S.Rep. No. 97-417, at 206-07). In a results case, these factors tend to show whether and to what extent a challenged practice has affected minority voters’ participation in the political process. “Claims of intentional discrimination under Section 2 are assessed according to the standards applied to constitutional claims of intentional racial discrimination in voting,” United States v. Charleston Cty., 316 F.Supp.2d 268, 272 (D.S.C.2003) (citing Garza, 918 F.2d at 766), and while the Senate factors, or some of them, may still be relevant in such cases, they “serve a different purpose in litigation under section 2 from their purpose in constitutional litigation,” McMillan, 748 F.2d at 1043 n. 11 (quoting United States v. Marengo County Comm’n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1564-66 (11th Cir.1984)). “[I]f a section 2 plaintiff chooses to prove discriminatory intent, ‘direct or indirect circumstantial evidence, including the normal inferences to be drawn from the foreseeability of defendant’s actions’ would be relevant evidence of intent.” McMillan, 748 F.2d at 1046-47 (quoting S. Rep. 97-417, 205 n. 108). “Where direct evidence of discriminatory motive is proffered, a case is easily made, ... as it is where the circumstantial evidence of racially discriminatory motivation is so strikingly obvious that no alternative explanation is plausible.” Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 221-222 (5th Cir.1978). Because such cases are rare, courts must usually look to other evidence. Id. In an intent case, the Senate factors may provide such “other evidence” of a discriminatory purpose. McCarty v. Henson, 749 F.2d 1134, 1136 (5th Cir.1984) (“The existence of the Zimmer factors might be indicative, though not conclusive, of discriminatory purpose”). See also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 620, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 3277, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982) (agreeing that “although the evidentiary factors outlined in Zimmer [are] important considerations in arriving at the ultimate conclusion of discriminatory intent, the plaintiff is not limited to those factors”). For example, “[a] history of discrimination is important evidence of both discriminatory intent and discriminatory results,” because “[a] history of pervasive purposeful discrimination may provide strong circumstantial evidence that the present-day acts of elected officials are motivated by the same purpose, or by a desire to perpetuate the effects of that discrimination.” Under the results test, the inquiry is more direct: past discrimination can severely impair the present-day ability of minorities to participate on an equal footing in the political process. Past discrimination may cause blacks to register or vote in lower numbers than whites. Past discrimination may also lead to present socioeconomic disadvantages, which in turn can reduce participation and influence in political affairs. Marengo County Com’n, 731 F.2d at 1567 (citing Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1306). Circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent may also be found to exist in the form of starkly differential racial impact; the historical background of the practice, “particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes”; the “specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision”; procedural or substantive departures from normal decision-making; and statements, including legislative or administrative history, reflecting on the purpose of the decision. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267, 97 S.Ct. 555, 564, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (cited in Nevett, 571 F.2d at 221-222). A final wrinkle here is that unlike most Section 2 cases, which have involved “entrenched electoral practices” such as at-large elections or existing district voting plans, this case involves episodic, or “one of a kind” practices. Nevertheless, it is clear that Section 2 “prohibits practices which, while episodic and not involving permanent structural barriers, result in the denial of equal access to any phase of the electoral process for minority group members.” S.Rep. No. 97-417, at 207. See also Welch v. McKenzie, 765 F.2d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir.1985) (Section 2 “covers episodic practices, as well as structural barriers, that result in discrimination in voting”); Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia Office of City Com’rs Voter Registration Div., 824 F.Supp. 514, 521-522 (E.D.Pa.1993)(scope of Section 2 “includes all electoral practices that deny minority voters equal opportunity to participate in any phase of the political process and to elect candidates of their choice, even if the challenged practice is episodic rather than involving a permanent structural barrier infringing upon the right to vote”); Goodloe v. Madison County Bd. of Election Com’rs, 610 F.Supp. 240, 243 (S.D.Miss. 1985) (“Section 2 on its face is broad enough to cover practices which are not permanent structures of the electoral system but nevertheless operate to dilute or diminish the vote of blacks”). However, the Senate Report notes that “[i]f the challenged practice relates to ... a series of events or episodes, the proof sufficient to establish a violation would not necessarily involve the same factors as the courts have utilized when dealing with permanent structural barriers.” S.Rep. No. 97-417, at 207. Taking their cue from this comment, most of the relatively few courts that have addressed alleged episodic violations of Section 2 generally have not applied the Senate factors. United States v. Jones, 846 F.Supp. 955, 964 (S.D.Ala.1994) (citing Welch, 765 F.2d 1311, and Brown v. Dean, 555 F.Supp. 502 (D.R.I.1982)). “Whether these factors are considered or not, however, ‘the ultimate test would be ... whether, in the particular situation, the (episodic) practice operated to deny the minority (plaintiff) an equal opportunity to participate and to elect candidates of their (sic) choice.’ ” Id. (quoting S.Rep. No. 97-417, at 30); Welch, 765 F.2d at 1315 (5th Cir.1985). The court is convinced that Ike Brown, and the NDEC under his leadership, have engaged in racially motivated manipulation of the electoral process in Noxubee County to the detriment of white voters. A Racial Agenda: The court has not had to look far to find ample direct and circumstantial evidence of an intent to discriminate against white voters which has manifested itself through practices designed to deny and/or dilute the voting rights of white voters in Noxub-ee County. The court is hesitant to find that Ike Brown, or any member of the NDEC, has a specific racial animus against whites. Brown, in fact, claims a number of whites as friends. However, there is no doubt from the evidence presented at trial that Brown, in particular, is firmly of the view that blacks, being the majority race in Noxubee County, should hold all elected offices, to the exclusion of whites; and this view is apparently shared by his “allies” and “associates” on the NDEC, who, along with Brown, effectively control the election process in Noxubee County. This is a view that Brown has expressed publicly and privately over the years, and one that has been the primary driving force in his approach to all matters political since his first involvement in Nox-ubee County politics in the 1970s. A Brief History: At the time the Voting Rights Act was passed in 1964, there were no black elected officials in Noxubee County and only a small number of the county’s black population were registered to vote. This began to change when federal registrars came to Macon, the county seat, in 1968 to register voters. The year 1971 saw the county’s first black candidates on the ballot, and the first black elected official, Joseph Wayne, who won a seat on the Board of Supervisors. Ike Brown first became involved in Nox-ubee County politics in 1977 when he worked in the campaign of William Dant-zler, a black candidate for supervisor. At the time of the Dantzler campaign, Brown was living in Madison County but he eventually moved to Noxubee County in 1979 to help black candidate Reecy Dickson in her bid for election as superintendent of education. Dickson’s election to this countywide office, as defendants put it, was “the first major crack in the wall of white dominance in county elective offices.” The 1980s brought a sea change in the political landscape of Noxubee County. More and more blacks were running for office and blacks began going to the polls in increasing numbers. Brown was active throughout these years in support of black candidates and the cause of blacks taking control, and as blacks steadily gained power, so did Brown gain influence in' the black community. By the mid-1990s, blacks held the majority of elected positions in the county. Defendants readily admit that Brown has been the most vocal, opinionated and controversial political figure in Noxubee County, and they do not deny that he has promoted a racial agenda. For example, in a 1995 letter authored by Brown while in federal prison on a conviction for income tax fraud, Brown addressed the county’s black voters: TO THE BLACK VOTERS OF NOXUBEE COUNTY Lest We Forget We are not free yet. As I am imprisoned, so could you, but in a different manner. They thought by getting rid of me they could fool you. Don’t let them carry you back to the old days, when blacks were found dead in the jail, you couldn’t even go in the courthouse, you weren’t even respected, I help bring change to Noxubee County, and I will be back soon. You must win this one yourself. I am asking you to remember me by supporting these candidates who have pledge to keep the dream alive.... After then presenting a slate of all black candidates, Brown concluded: Please support these candidates. As Jessie Jackson said, “Keep Hope Alive Vote Black in '95’.” Similar racially-based encouragement had been offered by Brown to black voters at one polling place in 1994. As related by Judith Ann Ewing, a white bailiff at the Democratic table at the Title 1 polling place, Brown entered the polling place and, speaking loudly, announced (to the blacks) in the room, “You’ve got to put blacks in office, our candidates, because we don’t want white people over us anymore.” At the same time he was publicly appealing to black voters to “vote black” and put “our candidates” in office, Brown was privately recruiting and counseling black candidates about the importance of defeating white candidates and of black officials governing the county. David Boswell, who is black, testified that in 1995, Brown asked him to a meeting to discuss Boswell’s candidacy for District 5 supervisor. According to Boswell, at the meeting, attended only by blacks, Brown told him he was looking for a “good black candidate,” expressed concern that a white candidate might win the position, and told him that since the county was predominately black, all county officials should be black. Brown told Boswell, “We want to keep this thing as black as possible.” Similar testimony was presented from Larry Tate, the current member of the Board of Supervisors for District 1, who is also black. Tate reported that when he ran for chancery clerk in 1991 and again in 1995, Brown told him he wanted a black to be elected to the position since the county was predominately black. Brown was also openly critical of blacks he saw as supporting white candidates and/or working with whites. In the early 1990s, for example, during a particularly divisive debate in the county over the efforts of Federated Technologies, Inc. (FTI), Brown, who supported FTI, criticized John Gibson, another black man, for making an “alliance” with the whites (the majority of whom opposed FTI). And in a 1998 meeting of the Board of Supervisors in which black supervisor William “Boo” Oliver voted, along with Eddie Coleman, a white supervisor, to fire two black justice court clerks who were accused of stealing, Brown accused Oliver of being “a white man’s nigger” and “selling out to the white folks.” Brown made this accusation, notwithstanding that the motion to terminate the employees had been made by another black supervisor, Robert Henley, and two of the three members of the Board voting for the terminations were black. In 1999, another letter from Brown, in which he identified himself as “Chairman, Noxubee County Voters League,” was published in the Macon Beacon, directed to “the voters of Noxubee County,” but the substance of which was directed to black voters, in which Brown wrote: Three years ago, Marzine Robinson (Soul) was sentenced to 35 years in prison for selling a rock of cocaine less than one ounce. Two years later, a whole field of dope was found on the property of two white public officials, Judge Sher-lene Boykin and Supervisor Eddie Coleman. Nothing was done, but you can do something — vote both of them out of office. Saturday, July 10th, a representative for Forrest Allgood, District Attorney, was at a political rally in Macon. When questioned as to why no blacks had ever been hired to work for Forrest, he replied, “None are good enough.” Remember, if none are good enough for him, then he is not good enough for our vote. Brown identified black candidates for each of the positions of justice court judge, supervisor District 4 and district attorney, and concluded, [Rjemember, I will be at the polls in Shuqualak all day, so stand with me and I will stand with you, and may God bless you. When Brown wrote this letter, Boykin, Coleman and Allgood were among the few remaining white elected officials in Noxub-ee County and the few whites running for election. Brown wanted them out of office and used racial appeals to “get the job done.” In fact, a representative of Forrest Allgood had not said that blacks were not “good enough” to work in the district attorney’s office; this was instead Brown’s spin on the representative’s statement, conveyed in a manner which was calculated to inflame black voters. And while there were rumors that marijuana had been found on property owned by Boykin and Coleman, there was nothing to suggest that either official was aware of or had any involvement in this alleged discovery, but more pertinently, there was no reason for Brown to have identified Boykin and Coleman in the letter as “white” public officials other than to raise the ire of black voters and galvanize black opposition to these “white” officials. All of these remarks and incidents— Brown’s letters and declarations to black voters, his statements to Tate and Boswell, his chastisement of Gibson and racial slurs against Oliver-occurred prior to Brown’s ascent to the chairmanship of the NDEC and have not been suggested by the Government to have violated Section 2. Indeed, as an individual, Brown was free to promote his racial views and agenda among the electorate with impunity. See Welch, 765 F.2d at 1316 (“Section 2 only affords redress for voting practices ‘imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision’ ”). However, Brown’s comments and actions predating his tenure as NDEC chairman present a clear picture of Brown’s racial agenda and, to the extent it might otherwise be unclear, give context and meaning to his actions as NDEC chairman. This agenda did not change when he assumed his duties as chairman of the NDEC in 2000 following his election to the position at the 1999 county convention. What did change was Brown’s ability to affect the electoral process in a much more direct fashion. Recruitment of Black Candidates: The credible evidence plainly establishes that, among other actions Brown took once he became NDEC chairman in an effort to further his racial agenda, Brown attempted to recruit black candidates to run for offices for which he knew they were not qualified according to state residency requirements. Although he denies having done so, the court finds that prior to the 2003 Democratic primary, Brown encouraged a black attorney, Winston Thompson, whom he knew to be a nonresident of Noxubee County, to run against the white incumbent, Ricky Walker, for the office of county prosecuting attorney, the only countywide elected office held by a white. In so doing, race was Brown’s sole motivation: He wanted to find a black candidate who could unseat the white incumbent. After learning of Thompson’s candidacy, Walker began inquiring about him and determined that Thompson was not a resident. He learned, for example, among other things, that while Thompson had rented an apartment (which he did with Brown’s assistance), the apartment had no utilities, appliances or furniture, and the phone number on Thompson’s qualifying forms was a Madison County number. Walker first tried unsuccessfully to have Thompson declared disqualified by Brown and the NDEC, and was eventually forced to file suit in chancery court where he was successful in getting Thompson disqualified. See Walker v. Noxubee County Democratic Executive Committee, Civil Action N0.2003-028 (Nox.Cty.Cir.Ct. May 13, 2003) (finding Thompson had not shown an actual residence in Noxubee County with a bona fide intention to remain and that not being a resident of Noxubee County, was not qualified for the Office of County Attorney). The court also finds that in 2005, Brown tried to convince Kendrick Slaughter, a black resident of Ward 4 for the City of Macon, to use his sister’s address and run against the white incumbent, James Watkins, in Ward 2, telling Slaughter that if he ran in Ward 4, where Slaughter in fact lived, he and another black candidate, Willie “Man” Dixon, would “split the black votes between [them] and let the white one (Barbara Hutchinson) win.” Despite Brown’s appeal to him, Slaughter refused because he was not, in fact, a resident of Ward 2 but a resident of Ward 4; Slaughter lost his bid for the position. Both of these instances occurred at a time when Brown was chairman of the NDEC, and in both instances, Brown not only recruited black candidates to run against whites with the aim of defeating white incumbents, but his plan involved the candidates’ falsely representing their residency in order to qualify to run. Although Brown was ultimately unsuccessful in his efforts to get Thompson on the ballot and to get Slaughter on the ballot for the ward in which Brown wanted him to run, the fact that he made these attempts speaks volumes on the issue of his racial intent and his willingness to violate the law to achieve his goal of all-black leadership for Noxubee County. Walker’s Petition: Brown’s blatantly obstructionist conduct with respect to Walker’s petition challenging Thompson’s candidacy is consistent with complicity on Brown’s part in recruiting Thompson and is evidence of his racial intent. Brown purported to schedule a hearing on Walker’s petition, to be held at Brown’s personal residence, of all places, but he gave Walker short notice of the meeting and specifically refused Walker’s request for a current list of NDEC members and a copy of the State Party Constitution. Brown did not give notice of the hearing to all members of the NDEC, and when Walker appeared for the hearing, Brown refused to allow him to present his petition and accompanying evidence to the members present, claiming the petition was inadequate because it did not set forth the specific basis for Walker’s challenge, even though Brown was well aware of the basis and Walker was armed with evidence substantiating his position. Without taking a vote or consulting any members of the NDEC, Brown refused to allow Walker to proceed. Moreover, Brown banned two white NDEC members from even attending the meeting/hearing. When Wallace Gray and Robert Cunningham arrived, Brown met them in the garage, told them they had been put off the committee and were no longer members and that he might have to get the law. Brown allowed them into his house, but told them they would have to stay in the kitchen. In fact, in keeping with the party’s constitution, Gray and Cunningham could only have been removed from the NDEC after proper written notice and an opportunity for a hearing, which never occurred. That Brown was willing to ignore those rules altogether and exclude Gray and Cunningham from the meeting with no proper cause and yet was totally inflexible in denying Walker’s reasonable request to present his petition to the NDEC supports the court’s finding that Brown’s handling of the entire Walker/Thompson situation was motivated by discriminatory intent. Racial Appeals: Similar to his racial appeal to black voters to vote Eddie Coleman out of office in 1999, in May 2003, Brown made a direct charge of race discrimination against Coleman which he knew was unfounded and did so to motivate black voters. In a letter published in the Macon Beacon in May 2003 from Brown, as “Democratic Chairman” and “Chairman East Mississippi Voters League” to the “Concerned Citizens of Noxubee County,” Brown wrote: This is an open letter to all Democratic voters. In 2003, 138 years after the end of slavery and 38 years after the passage of the Voting Rights Act, we still have the vestiges of discrimination and slavery in Noxubee County. There is discrimination in the location of paved roads and slavery to the Board of Supervisors in Noxubee County. Discrimination is evident because roads that are paved are primarily where the whites live, blacks live on gravel roads. In District 4 Mashulaville Supervisor Eddie Coleman paved a road to the last white resident’s house and stopped. He then paved a road in an all-white area where his cousin and Foreman, Gerald Butler, lived. This is not fair and must end. Slavery is evident because the Supervisors do not want you to have paved roads; they want you to have to beg them for gravel and to fix your road. This is not fair and must end. Brown had previously written a letter to the newspaper criticizing each of the four incumbent members of the Board of Supervisors who were running'for reelection, including three black board members. However, in the May 8 letter, he singled out Eddie Coleman, making what he knew were unfounded charges of race discrimination by Coleman. Brown admitted at trial that he believed that Coleman had done the best job of all the supervisors with respect to the paving of roads. He also clearly knew the allegation that Coleman had paved roads only where white residents lived, or that he had paved one particular road only to the point where the last white person lived and stopped, falsely portrayed Coleman’s actions. Yet Brown again used race “to get the job done.” Absentee Ballot Program: The most serious charge by the Government in this case relates to Brown and the NDEC’s alleged involvement in racially motivated abuses of the absentee ballot process in Noxubee County. To fully appreciate the Government’s position, it is first necessary to understand the basic rules governing absentee voting in Mississippi. Under Mississippi law, a voter may not simply choose to vote absentee; rather, the election statutes provide that only certain registered voters are eligible to vote by absentee ballot. See Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-713. Under the applicable statutes, a voter can obtain an absentee ballot in only two ways: appearing in person at the county registrar’s office (here, the circuit clerk’s office) and voting early, or requesting a ballot by mail and mailing it back. See Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-715. However, only certain voters may qualify to vote by mail, namely persons 65 and over, disabled, temporarily residing outside the county or who have a spouse, parent or child hospitalized more than fifty miles away and who will be with the spouse, parent or child on election day. Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-721. Whether voting in person or by mail, the voter must first request an application for an absentee ballot; this request may be made orally or in writing by the voter or a third party acting on his behalf. Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-715. Once the voter has completed the application for an absentee ballot, which must be signed and sworn by the elector, the voter is to be provided a ballot and an envelope to be sealed and be imprinted with a voter’s affidavit and a certificate of an attesting witness. Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-719. If the voter requests to vote by mail, the circuit clerk’s office will mail the application and the absentee ballot and ballot envelope to the address provided by the voter. Miss.Code. Ann. § 23-15-715. By law, the voter must appear before an official authorized to administer oaths and mark the ballot in secret but in the presence of such an official. Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-719. The voter is to then seal the ballot in the envelope, sign his name across the flap of the envelope, sign the affidavit, have his affidavit notarized, and have the attesting witness sign. Id. For those voting by mail, the envelope containing the ballot must be mailed to the registrar so that it is received prior to 5:00 p.m. of the day preceding the day of the election. Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-731. The provisions requiring that a voter request an absentee ballot, that he actually vote his own ballot, and that he place and seal the ballot in the provided envelope “are intended to ensure the integrity of absentee ballots.” Lewis v. Griffith, 664 So.2d 177, 185 (Miss.1995). Turning to the Government’s allegations, with respect to the August 2003 primary and runoff in particular, the Government has proposed that Brown and the NDEC engaged in a pattern of absentee ballot abuses that was designed, from start to finish, to minimize white voter participation. According to the Government’s theory, the first phase of this absentee ballot scheme involved Brown’s hiring notaries and sending them into the black community to collect ballots from voters who were encouraged to vote for his candidate of choice or for whom his notary actually completed the ballot (sometimes with, but sometimes without the knowledge and consent of the voter). Then, to ensure these ballots would be counted, Brown and the NDEC put in place a nearly all black force of poll workers and managers, over whom they had effective influence and control, and who, under Brown’s direction, ignored or rejected proper challenges to the ballots of black voters. While the Government’s theory in this regard, that Brown and his “associates” and “allies” orchestrated such a scheme, may seem improbable, having thoroughly reviewed and considered the evidence, the court has come to the firm and definite conclusion that there is substance to the Government’s position. What is most striking about absentee voting in Noxubee County is the sheer volume of absentee ballots cast in relation to the number of qualified electors. The Government’s expert testified without contradiction that in other jurisdictions, including other jurisdictions in Mississippi, the normal rate of voting by absentee ballot in a given election ranges from around three to six percent. In Noxubee County, however, the rate is around twenty to twenty-three percent. This rate is astounding given that Mississippi is not an “early voting” state and that voters must meet one of the eligibility requirements to vote absentee. It is highly unlikely that twenty percent or more of those on the voter rolls of Noxubee County are eligible to vote by absentee ballot. The Government’s expert maintains, and the court would agree, that even taking into account that there could have been an exceptionally efficient “get out the vote” campaign at work here, this level of absentee voting “cannot happen except when you’re generating absentee ballots on a fraudulent basis,” for there is no “reasonable legal rationale that would account for this degree of difference.” The question becomes whether this situation is traceable to defendants. The Government insists it is. As all absentee voters, with the exception of those who are temporarily disabled, are required to have their absentee ballot application and certificate notarized, to conduct an effective, widespread absentee ballot operation, access to notaries is critically important; and the simplest way to ensure voters have easy access is to have a notary going to people’s homes to notarize and collect their ballots for mailing. This was undeniably done on a large scale in Noxubee County. Nearly every local candidate running for office had one or more notaries doing absentee ballot work for them, traveling around and collecting ballots from persons they considered supporters. As the court understands the process, if the candidate found that a supporter wanted to vote absentee, the candidate would help the voter by letting him know how to get an application to vote absentee; and once the candidate determined from records in the circuit clerk’s office that an application and ballot had been mailed to that voter, he would give the voter’s name and address to a notary (this would usually involve a list of names), who would then go to the voter’s house to notarize and collect the ballot for mailing once the voter had voted. Some notaries did this work as a public service or because they supported and wanted to help a particular candidate. However, it seems that most were hired and paid in one form or another for their services. The witnesses who addressed this subject, including Dr. Arrington, agreed there was nothing impermissible about paying notaries for their services, so long as they were not paid based on the number of ballots collected, as it is illegal under Mississippi law to pay a notary per absentee ballot collected. See Welch v. McKenzie, 592 F.Supp. 1549, 1553 (S.D.Miss.1984) (“It is not ... improper for a candidate to urge his supporters to utilize the absentee voting procedures where they are applicable, nor is it improper for a candidate to instruct his supporters as to how they may obtain and vote such ballots.”). Although not a candidate, Ike Brown was plainly heavily involved in an absentee ballot program. The uncontroverted evidence showed that from 1999 to 2004, but principally in late 2002 and 2003, a corporation owned by Brown, RMB Enterprises, paid the notary application fees of more than fifty persons, nearly all of them residents of Noxubee County. For at least some of these applicants (three of which Brown actually admitted but likely more), Brown’s corporation also paid for their surety bonds, which they required in order to do notary work. Brown’s acknowledged purpose in paying these fees was so these notaries could become involved in the absentee ballot process. That, in itself, would not be improper, for facilitation of lawful and proper absentee voting would be a legitimate facet of any effort to turn out votes, which Brown claims is all he was doing. But the Government claims Brown’s efforts were anything but legitimate. Brown testified that his work in establishing notaries in Noxubee County was part of an effort by him to turn out as many Democratic votes as possible in the 2002 congressional race between Chip Pickering and Ronnie Shows, and he insists that he was highly successful in this regard, as Noxubee County had one of the highest turnouts on election day 2002. The evidence does support his position in this regard. For example, in 2002, prior to the Pickering/Shows race, Brown requested that the state Democratic party-pay substantial sums to fund the application and certification fees for notaries; and the fact that most of the notary applications for which RMB paid were made in 2002 is consistent with Brown’s testimony concerning his “get out the vote” efforts in the 2002 race. However, there is also credible direct evidence, as well as circumstantial evidence, which links Brown to improper absentee ballot activity during the 2003 election in Noxubee County. Gwendolyn Spann, called as a witness by the Government, testified that Brown approached her in 2003 about doing notary work; at Brown’s direction, she got an application from Circuit Clerk Carl Miek-ens’ office, which she completed and gave to deputy clerk Freda Phillips to mail. After Spann received her kit in the mail, Brown hired her to do absentee ballot work in the 2003 Democratic primary. Spann explained that she was told to get a list from Phillips of the voters she needed to contact and she did so; all of the voters on the list were black so all of the voters from whom she collected ballots were black. Spann periodically reported the number of ballots she had collected to Brown, who paid her in cash, not “per ballot,” she maintained, but based on “the amount of work”; in other words, she said, the more ballots she collected, the more she was paid. In the end, she said, Brown was satisfied with her work, but felt she could have collected more ballots. Although Spann testified that she never assisted anyone in marking a ballot unless they asked for help (which she claims happened only about three times), and stated that Brown never gave her instructions to do anything she thought was wrong, the fact remains, he paid her (by volume) to collect absentee ballots from black voters and black voters only. Testimony from Mable Jamison provided further evidence of Brown’s involvement in an absent ballot program. Jami-son, a notary public who lives in Noxubee County, did some notary work during the 2003 primary, not for any particular candidate but as a public service, to help people who needed a notary. Jamison testified that Brown called her on the phone and was upset that she was picking up his ballots. Brown, she reported, did not appreciate what she was doing: “He pretty much said that his people had did the initial leg work and I shouldn’t be picking up his ballots.” Brown clearly indicated there were specific people collecting absentee ballots under his direction, and he wanted control over who was collecting those ballots. The Government also presented direct evidence of fraud in the collection of absentee ballots by one notary in particular, Carrie Kate Windham, who became a member of the NDEC during Brown’s chairmanship and whose notary application fee and surety bond were paid by Ike Brown. Susan Wood, who is black, testified that after she voted absentee at the courthouse one time in 1999, she inexplicably began receiving absentee ballots by mail notwithstanding that she is neither illiterate nor disabled nor incapable of going to the poll to vote. Windham started coming over to Wood’s house to assist her in voting, and Wood now votes absentee in every election and each time is assisted in voting by Windham. According to Wood, Windham actually marks Wood’s ballot for her and selects candidates when Wood does not know whom she wants to vote for because, as Wood put it, Windham “knows folks” better than Wood does. Wood testified that her daughter lives with her, and although her daughter is not disabled or illiterate and was not going to be out of the county on election day, she was recruited to vote absentee by Windham. The same was true of Otis Shanklin, who also lives in Wood’s home. Shanklin is not disabled, can read, and is able to go to the poll on election day, yet he casts his vote by absentee ballot in every election and is assisted in every election by Windham; and if he does not know whom to vote for, he has Windham vote for him. Another black voter, Nikki Nicole Hal-bert, testified at trial that Windham came to her home and recruited her and her mother to vote absentee, telling them all they had to do in order to vote absentee was to let Windham know. Although Hal-bert never requested an absent ballot application, a ballot came in the mail. Not long after, Windham came by Halbert’s house to pick up the ballots. Halbert had already voted her ballot. Halbert handed Windham the envelope and ballot and Windham left without signing or sealing it. When shown the application form and envelope at trial, Halbert maintained that the signatures on the application and ballot envelope were not hers, and that whoever had filled out the application had checked the box indicating Halbert was voting absentee because she had a temporary or permanent disability, which was untrue. To refute Halbert’s testimony, the defense offered testimony from Catherine Johnson, who claimed to have accompanied Wind-ham to Halbert’s home and to have observed Halbert sign the application and ballot envelopes; the court fully credits Halbert’s testimony in this regard. It is hardly likely that these incidents represent the extent of Windham’s fraudulent absent ballot activities in the 2003 election conducted under Brown’s leadership; on the contrary, the court considers it quite likely these are merely examples of Windman’s activities. Moreover, while the only direct evidence linking Brown to Windham’s notary activities is the fact that he paid for her notary application fee and bond, based on the totality of the evidence, the court has little doubt that Windham was one of Brown’s “people.” Furthermore, while Brown may not have specifically directed Windham’s activities, the court is convinced the two were working together and that he encouraged her actions, or at the very least was aware of and condoned Windham’s tactics, which furthered his agenda. The evidence at trial showed that Brown closely monitored the activity surrounding the circuit clerk’s receipt of absentee ballot requests and the mailing and return of voted absentee ballots during the August 2003 Democratic primary. The circuit clerk’s office is required by law to maintain a record of all absentee ballot activity, which includes a list of every person who has made request for an absentee ballot, the date on which the application and ballot were mailed to the voter and the date on which the application and ballot were returned. Brown checked the absentee ballot record book in the clerk’s office at least once and usually twice or more each day to see who had requested absentee ballots, what precinct the ballots were mailed to, whether the ballots were mailed, and whether the ballots had yet been returned by the voters. Notably, too, there was evidence that for the runoff election between Johnny Kemp and Bruce Brooks, Brown copied the pages of the absentee ballot book and tallied the number of white and black ballots returned for each precinct. His interest, in the court’s opinion, was more than casual. An absentee ballot can only be effective if it is counted; and according to the Government, toward ensuring that the ballots collected by “his people” would be counted, Brown and the NDEC, working together, put in place a force of poll workers and managers that was more than 90% black and that was comprised largely of persons over whom they had influence, and then took steps to push them through the counting process by preventing, ignoring or rejecting challenges. There is ample credible proof of the extent of Brown and the NDEC’s control over the process of counting ballots and that the process was conducted in many instances in blatant disregard of applicable law. The Government does not claim that Brown or the NDEC rejected any white person’s request to be a poll worker for the Democratic primary. Rather, it claims that, notwithstanding that there was no shortage of white persons available and willing to work the polls, Brown made no effort to include any whites as poll workers. Rickey Cole, Chairman of the State Democratic Executive Committee, testified the Democratic party has a rule of thumb, honored by most local chairs, that encourages the hiring of poll workers in each precinct to be representative racially of the Democratic electorate in that precinct. According to Cole, the general consensus among most chairs was that it was desirable that there be a racial composition reflective of the Democratic electorate. He recalled that Brown, in contrast, was very adamant in saying, “In Noxubee County we hire who we want to.” And that is precisely what he and the NDEC did. For the August 5, 2003 primary, 103 of 110 workers were black, so that the workforce on the Democratic side was only 6.3% white; and in most of the thirteen precincts, all of the poll managers, whose job it was to review and count absentee ballots, were black. For the August 26 runoff, 74 of 78 poll workers were black, or only 2.6% white. At trial, Brown insisted that he had no control over the selection of poll workers and that this was solely the prerogative of the NDEC; his only input was as to his own district, District 2. Although it may be true that the chairman is not ultimately responsible for choosing poll workers and that this is a function of the NDEC, the court is convinced that Brown had vastly more influence over these decisions than he would have the court believe. In any event, the NDEC is also a defendant. Brown also claimed that he told the NDEC that the number of white poll workers needed to be increased; his testimony on this point is not credible. Brown finally attempted to justify the dearth of white Democratic poll workers by reference to the all-white force of Republican poll workers; yet in Noxubee County, the Republican party, unlike the Democratic party, is all white, and contrary to what Brown may believe, the Democratic party is not all black. Courts have found that a low number of minority poll workers can impair minority access to the electoral process by making the polls feel less open to minority voters and can undermine the confidence minorities have in the openness of the system. See Harris v. Graddick, 593 F.Supp. 128, 130-31 (M.D.Ala.1984). White voters in Noxubee County, not being encumbered by the memories and lingering effects a long history of official discrimination, are not likely to feel intimidated by the voting process; but white voters, like black voters, are no less likely to be skeptical of a process which they do not perceive as open. This, however, is not the court’s greatest concern here. Rather, the court finds that Brown and members of the NDEC intentionally selected a nearly all-black work force primarily as a means of facilitating a scheme to disenfranchise and dilute white voting strength by pushing through absentee ballots that had been collected by Brown’s people. Mississippi law prescribes in detail the procedure for handling and counting absentee ballots, which is the responsibility of the poll managers. When the polls have closed, the poll managers “shall then publicly open the box and immediately proceed to count the ballots,” Miss.Code. Ann. § 23-15-581, including absentee ballots. By law, Each candidate shall have the right, either in person or by a representative to be named by him, to be present at the polling place, and the managers shall provide him and his representative with a suitable position from which he or his representative may be able to carefully inspect the manner in which the election is held. He or his representative shall be allowed to challenge the qualifications of any person offering to vote, and his challenge shall be considered and acted upon by the managers. Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-577. Further, “Candidates or their duly authorized representatives shall have the right to reasonably view and inspect the ballots as and when they are taken from the box and counted.” Id. Before the absentee ballots are removed from the sealed envelopes, poll managers mus