Thomas v. Cate (715 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 2010)

United States District Court for the Eastern District of California 2010-02-19

Citations

Full opinion text

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITIONER’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY RESPONSES

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO SUBSTITUTE RESPONDENT

JOHN M. DIXON, United States Magistrate Judge.

Procedural Background

Petitioner Brian Thomas (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

On March 19, 2009, the Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing in this matter in order to permit Petitioner to present evidence that article V, section 8(b) of the California Constitution created a significant risk of prolonging Petitioner’s incarceration and therefore violated Petitioner’s rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. (Doc. 27). On July 10, 2009, Petitioner filed a request for leave to propound discovery pursuant to Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. (Doc. 36).

The Court granted Petitioner’s request for leave to propound discovery on July 21, 2009, 2009 WL 2171564. (Doc. 38). On August 7, 2009, 2009 WL 2424683, the District Judge denied Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the order granting Petitioner leave to propound discovery. (Doc. 44).

Petitioner filed a motion to compel discovery on August 31, 2009. (Doc. 48). On October 19, 2009, the parties filed a Joint Statement regarding the parties’ outstanding discovery disputes. (Doc. 19). For reasons explained below, Petitioner’s motion to compel is granted in part and denied in part.

Discussion

I. Introduction

The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits the States from enacting a law which, by retroactive operation, increases the punishment for a crime after its commission. U.S. Const., Art. I § 10; E.g. Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 249-50, 120 S.Ct. 1362, 146 L.Ed.2d 236 (2000) (citing Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)). In the parole context, a prisoner may demonstrate an ex post facto violation by establishing that, as applied to him, a retroactive parole law “creates a significant risk of prolonging [his] incarceration.” Garner, 529 U.S. at 250, 120 S.Ct. 1362 (citing Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 445-46, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997)); Brown v. Palmateer, 379 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 2004). In Garner, the Supreme Court established that whether a retroactive parole law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause depends on the manner in which the law is applied to the prisoner challenging its application. Garner, 529 U.S. at 256-57, 120 S.Ct. 1362.

In addition to imposing a new, substantive standard for evaluating ex post facto claims in the parole context, the Supreme Court’s decision in Gamer revealed the importance of affording a prisoner the opportunity to obtain discovery. Id. at 257, 120 S.Ct. 1362. Although the Supreme Court noted that the proper scope of discovery lies within the discretion of the district courts, it identified two types of information that are generally relevant to ex post facto inquiries: 1) internal policies regarding implementation of the challenged statute by the agency charged with implementing the statute, and 2) data reflecting the real-world operation of the challenged statute. Id. at 255-57, 120 S.Ct. 1362. Much of Petitioner’s requested discovery falls within the two categories of information discussed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Gamer: the Governor’s practices and policies regarding his implementation of article V, section 8(b), and the real-world practical effect of article V, section 8(b) on parole trends in California. Because the Governor’s internal practices and policies are relevant to Petitioner’s claim for relief, discovery in this action raises important privilege issues that must be decided with care.

A. The Deliberative Process Privilege

As this case is before the court based on a federal question, federal privilege law applies. NLRB v. North Bay Plumbing Inc., 102 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir.1996) (citing Fed.R.Evid. 501). “Federal common law recognizes the deliberative process privilege.” North Pacifica, LLC v. City of Pacifica, 274 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1120 (N.D.Cal.2003). The deliberative process privilege exempts from discovery information reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations comprising part of a process by which government decisions and policies are formulated. FTC v. Warner Comm’s., Inc., 742 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir.1984). The deliberative process privilege is designed to allow agencies to freely explore possibilities, engage in internal debates, or play devil’s advocate without fear of public scrutiny. Assembly of California v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 920 (9th Cir.1992) (discussing Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)). Information is protected by the deliberative process privilege if it predates the governmental decision and is “deliberative” in nature. Warmer Comm’s., 742 F.2d at 1161. The key inquiry in determining whether particular information is “deliberative” is whether disclosure of the information would expose the decision making process in such a way as to discourage candid discussion within the agency and thereby undermine the agency’s ability to perform its functions. Carter v. United States DOC, 307 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir.2002).

The burden of establishing application of the deliberative process privilege is on the party asserting it. E.g. North Pacifica, 274 F.Supp.2d at 1121. Assertion of the deliberative process privilege requires: (1) a formal claim of privilege by the head of the department having control over the requested information; (2) assertion of the privilege based on actual personal consideration by that official;(3) a detailed specification of the information for which the privilege is claimed, with an explanation why it properly falls within the scope of the privilege; and (4) a showing that the material for which the privilege is asserted has been kept confidential. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111653 *19 (E.D.Cal.2009) (citing Landry v. F.D.I.C., 204 F.3d 1125, 1135 (D.C.Cir.2000) and National Wildlife. Federation v. U.S. Forest Service, 861 F.2d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir.1988)). While the party invoking the deliberative process privilege must establish that material subject to its privilege claim contains personal opinions of the type that would chill deliberations, the invoking party does not bear the burden of showing each individual document would actually chill deliberations. See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dept. of Energy, 617 F.2d at 866, 869 (D.C.Cir.1980).

The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege, and a litigant may obtain deliberative materials if his or her need for the materials and the need for accurate fact-finding override the government’s interest in non-disclosure. E.g. Warner Comm’s., 742 F.2d at 1161. Among the factors to be considered in determining whether to sustain a deliberative process privilege claim are: 1) the relevance of the evidence; 2) the availability of other evidence; 3) the government’s role in the litigation; and 4) the extent to which disclosure would hinder frank and independent discussion regarding contemplated policies and decisions. Id.; accord, Hinckley v. United States, 140 F.3d 277, 285 (D.C.Cir.1998) (employing similar balancing approach).

1. The Parties’ Contentions

Petitioner contends that the deliberative process privilege does not apply at all to Petitioner’s claim because the Governor’s decision making process is itself at issue in this action. (Joint Statement at 28). The Governor and Respondent contend that even where the government’s decision-making process is at issue, the privilege prohibits discovery of deliberative materials unless the party seeking discovery makes “a clear showing of misconduct or wrongdoing.” (Joint Statement at 35). The Court cannot fully accept either position.

a. Petitioner’s Contention

A number of courts have held that the deliberative process privilege does not apply in actions where the government’s decision making is central to the plaintiffs case. E.g. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 145 F.3d 1422, 1424-25 (D.C.Cir.1998); United States v. Lake County Bd. of Comm’rs, 233 F.R.D. 523, 526 (N.D.Ind.2005) (collecting eases). As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia explained in In re Subpoena:

The privilege was fashioned in cases where the governmental decisionmaking process is collateral to the plaintiffs suit. See, e.g., In re Subpoena Served Upon the Comptroller of the Currency, 296 U.S.App.D.C. 263, 967 F.2d 630 (D.C.Cir.1992) (shareholders sought Comptroller’s bank examination reports to prove fraud charges against corporation); Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. NLRB, 329 F.2d 200 (4th Cir.1964) (petitioner wanted deliberative materials to establish a defense to an unfair labor practice charge). If the plaintiffs cause of action is directed at the government’s intent, however, it makes no sense to permit the government to use the privilege as a shield. For instance, it seems rather obvious to us that the privilege has no place in a Title VII action or in a constitutional claim for discrimination. The Supreme Court struggled in Crawford-El [v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998) ] and Webster [v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988) ] with governmental claims that discovery in such a proceeding should be limited, but no one in any of these cases ever had the temerity to suggest that the privilege applied. The argument is absent in these cases because if either the Constitution or a statute makes the nature of governmental officials’ deliberations the issue, the privilege is a nonsequitur. The central purpose of the privilege is to foster government decisionmaking by protecting it from the chill of potential disclosure. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975).

In re Subpoena, 145 F.3d at 1424-25. Here, the Constitution puts the nature of the Governor’s deliberations at issue in this case, as the Supreme Court has established that ex post facto analysis of facially neutral parole laws requires courts to inquire the manner in which parole authorities exercise their discretion. Gamer, 529 U.S. at 256-57, 120 S.Ct. 1362 (proving ex post facto violation requires prisoner to adduce “evidence drawn from the rule’s practical implementation by the agency charged with exercising discretion”). Pursuant to Gamer, internal deliberations which reveal the manner in which a retroactive parole law was applied to a prisoner may provide significant — if not essential' — ■ evidence of an ex post facto violation. . See Mickens-Thomas v. Vaughn, 321 E.3d-374, 389 (3rd Cir.2003) (finding of ex post facto violation based on analysis of “the Board’s own internal notes” and “deliberations”); see also Dyer v. Bowlen, 465 F.3d 280, 288 (6th Cir.2006) (remanding case to permit discovery on issue of “how the parole board has actually exercised its discretion”). Because the manner in which the Governor exercised his discretion is • the issue underlying Petitioner’s claim for relief, there are sound reasons why the deliberative process privilege should not apply at all in this action. See id. (noting that key issue underlying Petitioner’s ex post facto claim was “the effect of the [retroactive] provision on [prisoner’s] parole eligibility in the minds of the parole board”) (emphasis added); see also Lake County Bd. of Comm’rs, 233 F.R.D. at 526 (holding that “dominant view is that the ... the deliberative process privilege does not apply when the government’s intent is at issue”).

Although this Court finds the reasoning set. forth in cases such as In re Subpoena and Lake County highly persuasive, given the lack of binding Ninth Circuit authority on the matter, the Court adopts the balancing approach set forth in Warner Comm’s. with respect to each individual discovery request, keeping in mind that the fact that the decision making process is at issue in this case weighs heavily against Respondent’s assertion of privilege.

b. The Governor’s Position

The Governor cites Franklin Sav. Ass’n. v. Ryan, 922 F.2d 209, 211-12 (4th Cir.1991) in support of his position that Petitioner must make a clear showing of wrongdoing or misconduct in order to overcome the deliberative process privilege. (Joint Statement at 35). In Frank lin, the plaintiff challenged a decision made by the Director of the Office of Thrift Savings on the basis that the decision was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 209. Plaintiff sought to expand the court’s inquiry beyond the administrative record, contending that the record was incomplete because it did not contain confidential agency memoranda considered by the agency during its deliberations. In holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to discovery of the agency’s deliberative material, the Fourth Circuit held that deliberative materials are discoverable only “where there is a clear showing of misconduct or wrongdoing.” Id. at 212. The Franklin Court relied on “hornbook administrative law” as stated in Feller v. Board of Education, 583 F.Supp. 1526, 1528 (D.Conn.1984), to support its conclusion that:

[i]n reviewing a decision of an administrative agency, it is not the proper function of the court to probe the mental processes of the agency or its members .... Such probing should ordinarily be avoided, and there must be a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior before such inquiry may be made.

Id. at 212 (emphasis in original). Examination of the precedent underlying the rule expressed in Franklin reveals that the rule is inapplicable to Petitioner in the context of the instant action.

The Feller Court relied on United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 61 S.Ct. 999, 85 L.Ed. 1429 (1941) and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) as authority for the proposition that a strong showing of bad faith is a prerequisite to overcoming the mental process privilege. Feller, 583 F.Supp. at 1528. Morgan is the seminal case which spawned the deliberative process and mental process privileges. In Morgan, the Supreme Court held that where an administrative proceeding “has a quality resembling that of a judicial proceeding,” it is not the function of the courts to “probe the mental processes” of the administrative body. 313 U.S. at 422, 61 S.Ct. 999. The Supreme Court stated that probing the mental processes of a judge would be “destructive of judicial responsibility” and reasoned that “just as a judge cannot be subjected to such a scrutiny ... so the integrity of the administrative process must be equally respected.” Id. (citations omitted). The notion that courts must afford agencies “appropriate independence” and respect underpinned the Supreme Court’s holding in Morgan. See id. The Morgan Court did not discuss any exceptions to the general prohibition against probing the mental processes of administrative actors. See id.

In Overton Park, the Supreme Court qualified the rule set forth in Morgan, holding that although “inquiry into the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers is usually to be avoided,” in some instances, “it may be that the only way there can be effective judicial review is by examining the decisionmakers themselves.” 401 U.S. at 420, 91 S.Ct. 814 (emphasis added). The High Court stated:

Of course, such inquiry into the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers is usually to be avoided. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422, 61 S.Ct. 999, 85 L.Ed. 1429 (1941). And where there are administrative findings that were made at the same time as the decision, as was the case in Morgan, there must be a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior before such inquiry may be made. But here there are no such formal findings and it may be that the only way there can be effective judicial review is by examining the decisionmakers themselves. See Shaughnessy v. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280, 75 S.Ct. 746, 99 L.Ed. 1074 (1955).

Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420, 91 S.Ct. 814 (emphasis added). Read in the context of the Supreme Court’s holding in Overton Park, the rule stated in Franklin is not as broad as the Governor urges. A “strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior” is only required where a party challenges the substantive merits of an administrative decision that is supported by contemporaneous formal findings; this rule appears to be based on the general prohibition against consideration of extra-record evidence during judicial review of administrative action. See id. at 417, 91 S.Ct. 814 (noting that narrow standard of review applies to judicial review of agency action and that “court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency”).

The general rule prohibiting courts from receiving extra-record evidence when reviewing agency action is based on the presumption of regularity afforded to agency decisions, coupled with the principal that a reviewing court should not usurp the agency’s function. See, e.g., id.; see also Hyatt v. Doll, 576 F.3d 1246, 1267-68 (Fed.Cir.2009) (discussing general principals applicable to judicial review of agency decisions); United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 123 F.R.D. 3, 43 (W.D.N.Y.1988) (administrative law doctrines defining the scope of judicial review of agency actions are “tied in important ways to the delegation of authority inherent in the creation of administrative agencies”); Taiwan Semiconductor Indus. Ass’n v. United States, 24 C.I.T. 220, 224, 105 F.Supp.2d 1363, 1367-68 (Ct. Int'l. Trade 2000) (stating that rule expressed in Morgan is consistent with presumption of regularity and noting that rule is limited to instances in which the agency has made formal findings). When a reviewing court considers evidence relevant to the substantive merits of the agency action that was not included in the administrative record, it inevitably leads the reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Asarco, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir.1980). Accordingly, as a general matter, courts will not receive extra-record evidence related to the agencies deliberative process absent a strong showing of bad faith. E.g. Taiwan Semiconductor, 24 C.I.T. at 224, 105 F.Supp.2d at 1367-68.

Petitioner’s ex post facto claim does not entail a direct challenge to the substantive merits of the Governor’s decision — i.e., the Governor’s determination that Petitioner posed an unreasonable risk of danger. Here, as in Dyer, the purpose of taking extra-record evidence is to assess the quantum of risk entailed by a retroactive statute. 465 F.3d at 288-89 (discussing reason for remand). Because Petitioner’s ex post facto claim does not challenge the substantive merits of the Governor’s decision, the concerns underlying the rule set forth in Overton Park and applied in Franklin are not implicated. See Asarco, 616 F.2d at 1160 (where evidence is not introduced for the purpose of challenging “substantive merits” of agency action, consideration of such evidence raises “fundamentally different concerns” than those traditionally implicated by the introduction of extra-record evidence); see also United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267-68, 74 S.Ct. 499, 98 L.Ed. 681 (1954) (distinguishing habeas petitioner’s prejudgment claim from typical challenge to substantive merits of agency action and remanding the case for development of extra-record evidence regarding agency deliberations). The rule discussed in Franklin is thus inapplicable in the context of Petitioner’s ex post facto claim.

2. Application of the Deliberative Process Privilege in this Action

The Court concludes that where a litigant seeks to probe the mental processes of an administrative official in connection with a claim for judicial review that does not challenge the substantive merits of the administrative decision, the litigant must make a prima facie showing sufficient to call the decision-making process into issue. See, e.g., Franklin Sav. Ass’n, 922 F.2d at 212 n. 3 (citing Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. NLRB, 329 F.2d 200, 208 (4th Cir.1964) for proposition that only a prima facie showing is required); Lake County, 233 F.R.D. at 529 (same) (citing Alexander v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 154, 165 (D.D.C.1999)); see also In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 746 (D.C.Cir.1997) (“the privilege disappears altogether when there is any reason to believe government misconduct occurred”) (emphasis added); Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. at 268, 74 S.Ct. 499 (habeas petitioner’s allegation of prejudice, based on double hearsay statement offered by petitioner’s attorney, held sufficient to permit introduction of evidence of agency’s internal deliberations); Denver First Church of the Nazarene v. Cherry Hill Village, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49483 *20 (D.Col.2006) (“as long as Plaintiff can set forth any evidence, including circumstantial evidence, of illegal motive, Plaintiff can overcome Defendants’ claim for deliberative process privilege”). Once a litigant makes a prima facie showing sufficient to call the decision-making process into issue, the litigant may be entitled to discovery of information that 'reveals the deliberative and mental processes of the administrative actor, subject to the balance of interests between the parties. E.g. Warner Comm’s., Inc., 742 F.2d at 1161.

Petitioner has made the requisite prima facie showing necessary to call the Governor’s decision making process into issue in this action. (See 637 F.Supp.2d at 844-45) (discussing evidence Petitioner has presented which suggests possibility of entitlement to relief). Petitioner alleges that the Governor implements his review authority under article V, section 8(b) in a manner that ensures “almost certain gubernatorial reversal” of parole grants. (See Pet. at 33-35; 28-29). If Petitioner can prove that the Governor was unfaithful to his statutory commands in reversing Petitioner’s parole grant, or that the Governor exercised his review authority over Petitioner in a way that created a significant risk of prolonging Petitioner’s incarceration, Petitioner will be entitled to relief. Accordingly, the Court must evaluate Petitioner’s discovery requests and the Governor’s claims of privilege within the balancing framework set forth in Warner Comm’s.

B. The Mental Process Privilege

The mental process privilege is a corollary to the deliberative process privilege that “protects uncommunicated motivations for a policy or decision.” E.g. North Pacifica, 274 F.Supp.2d at 1122; Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D: 318, 325 (D.D.C.1966). The “mental process privilege is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the deliberative process privilege.” Lake County, 233 F.R.D. at 526. Like the deliberative process privilege, the mental process privilege must be raised with particularity, and the party asserting the privilege bears the burden of establishing its applicability. See Tenneco Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 475 F.Supp. 299, 319 (D.Del.1979); see also Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. at 327 n. 33.

Whether the mental process privilege affords broader protection than the deliberative process privilege is unsettled. Compare Hooker Chems., 123 F.R.D. at 42 (“If the justification for the existence of the mental processes privilege is that it complements the deliberative privilege, its scope and application is coextensive with the scope and application of that privilege”) with North Pacifica, 274 F.Supp.2d at 1122-23 (noting that because “the level of intrusiveness entailed when a person’s mental processes are probed may be greater than when objective indicia of deliberation ... are disclosed ... the two privileges may be subject to different outcomes depending on the circumstances”). It is clear, however, that like the deliberative process privilege, the mental process privilege is a qualified one that may be overcome by a litigant. E.g. id. at 1122 (citing Overion Park, 401 U.S. at 420, 91 S.Ct. 814 and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252, 268, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977)).

The Governor contends that, in order to overcome the mental process privilege, Petitioner must demonstrate a “strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior.” (Joint Statement at 36) (citing Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420, 91 S.Ct. 814). As discussed above, the rule urged by the Governor is inapplicable in the context of the instant action because Petitioner does not challenge the substantive merits of an agency decision. Accordingly, the Court must evaluate each of the Governor’s objections in light of the balancing approach set forth in Warner Comm’s.

II. Interrogatories

Interrogatory No. 1

When Governor Schwarzenegger issued his Indeterminate Sentence Parole Release Review, dated November 15, 2004, reversing the Board’s grant of parole to Thomas, did he personally review materials provided him by the Board pursuant to California Penal Code 3041.2(a) and author a review?

a. If not, please identify the person or persons who reviewed those materials and authored the Review, providing his, her, or their name(s) business address(es) business telephone numbers), and title(s).

b. If so, please state:

i. The date(s) of the review of the materials and the drafting of the Indeterminate Sentence Parole Release Review;

ii. The amount of time spent in such review and drafting; and

iii. The documents or other input reviewed

A. Governor’s Response to Interrogatory No. 1

The Governor objects to Interrogatory No. 1 based on the deliberative process privilege and mental process privilege. (Joint Statement at 13).

1. Deliberative Process Privilege

Initially, the Court notes that the applicability, of the deliberative process privilege to Interrogatory No. 1 is doubtful, as it does not seek to discover, the substance of any deliberative communications. See, e.g., United States v. Farley, 11 F.3d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir.1993) (“deliberative process privilege protects communications that are part of the decision-making process of a governmental agency”) (emphasis added); Hooker Chems., 123 F.R.D. at 43 (same); In re Franklin, 478 F.Supp. 577, 581 (E.D.N.Y.1979) (privilege “only protects expressions of opinions or recommendations”); North Pacifica, 274 F.Supp.2d at 1121 (“government can withhold documents or prevent testimony that “reflect[s] advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations” ”); but see Franklin Sav. Ass’n v. Ryan, 922 F.2d 209, 211 (4th Cir.1991) (privilege protects testimony regarding “the manner and extent of [entity’s] study of the record”). Interrogatory No. 1 does not seek to discover mental impressions or opinions expressed during the deliberative process. Interrogatory No. 1 merely seeks discovery of the identity of the person or persons who reviewed the materials provided by the parole board, how much time was spent on such review, and the date on which such review occurred. The factual information sought in Interrogatory No. 1 is not “deliberative,” as responses to Interrogatory No. 1 would not expose the decision making process in such a way as to discourage candid discussion during parole considerations. See Carter, 307 F.3d at 1090 (key inquiry in determining whether particular information is “deliberative” is whether disclosure of the information would expose the decision making process in such a way as to discourage candid discussion); see also Public Citizen, Inc. v. OMB, 569 F.3d 434, 443 (D.C.Cir.2009) (evidence deemed deliberative “if it reflects the give-and-take of the consultative process”).

Alternatively, assuming arguendo that the privilege does apply to the information sought in Interrogatory No. 1, the Court finds that Petitioner’s interest in accurate fact-finding outweighs the government’s interest in keeping the information classified. The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege, and a litigant may obtain deliberative materials if his or her need for the materials and the need for accurate fact-finding override the government’s interest in non-disclosure. E.g. Warner Comm’s., 742 F.2d at 1161. Among the factors to be considered in making this determination are: 1) the relevance of the evidence; 2) the availability of other evidence; 3) the government’s role in the litigation; and 4) the extent to which disclosure would hinder frank and independent discussion regarding contemplated policies and decisions. Id. Each of the factors discussed in Warner Comm’s. weighs against upholding the Governor’s claim of privilege.

a. Relevance

The information sought in Interrogatory No. 1 is clearly relevant to assessing whether the Governor’s review of Petitioner’s parole grant was carried out in accordance with the Governor’s statutory commands, which is an important factual question in this action. (See Doc. 27, Order Setting Evidentiary Hearing at 5 n.2). Article V, section 8(b) of the California Constitution states that the Governor “may only affirm, modify, or reverse the decision of the parole authority on the basis of the same factors which the parole authority is required to consider.”, “The Governor, in reviewing parole board’s decision, is to apply the same factors that the [parole] board,” In re Rosenkrantz 29 Cal.4th 616, 640, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174 (Cal.2002), and the Governor may only reverse a board’s grant of parole if some evidence demonstrates on the record indicates that the prisoner “will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison,” Cal.Code. Regs. Tit 15, § 2402(a) (2008); In Re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1202, 82 Cal. Rptr.3d 169, 190 P.3d 535 (Cal.2008). If responses to Interrogatory No. 1 reveal that neither the Governor nor anyone on his staff reviewed the materials provided by the parole board, or that the time spent reviewing such information was plainly insufficient to permit a complete review, such evidence could support Petitioner’s contention that application of article V, section 8(b) to him created a significant risk of prolonging his incarceration because the Governor’s review of his parole grant was substantively different than the parole board’s review.

The Governor’s purported distinction between “the manner in which the Governor exercises his discretion” and “how the Governor [made] his decision” in Petitioner’s specific case is more semantic than substantive. (Joint Statement at 35). Ascertaining how a retroactive statute was implemented in a particular case is the essence of an as-applied analysis under the Ex Post Facto Clause. See Gamer, 529 U.S. at 255, 120 S.Ct. 1362; see also Vaughn, 321 F.3d at 389 (examining parole board’s deliberations in prisoner’s specific case in order to adjudicate ex post facto claim). The general manner in which the Governor exercises his parole review authority is relevant to the ultimate issue in this action; the manner in which the Governor exercised his authority in Petitioner’s particular case is the ultimate issue in this action. Even if the Governor generally complies with his statutory commands in implementing article V, section 8(b), if he did not do so in Petitioner’s case, Petitioner may be entitled to relief. Accordingly, the Governor’s contention that the information sought in Interrogatory No. 1 is irrelevant lacks merit.

The Governor is also incorrect in his assertion that Petitioner has not alleged improper purpose or intent. (Joint Statement at 36). Petitioner alleges that the Governor implements his review in a manner that ensures “almost certain gubernatorial reversal” of parole grants. (See Pet. at 33-35; 28-29). If Petitioner can prove that the Governor is unfaithful to his statutory commands, or that the Governor otherwise exercises his review authority in a manner that creates a significant risk of prolonging Petitioner’s incarceration, Petitioner will be entitled to relief. Petitioner has already presented some evidence that the Governor’s review is implemented in a way that may violate the ex post facto clause. (See 637 F.Supp.2d at 844-45) (discussing evidence Petitioner has presented which suggests possibility of entitlement to relief). Petitioner has put the Governor’s decision making process at issue in this action, and thus the information sought in Interrogatory No. 1 is relevant. The fact that Interrogatory No. 1 seeks to discover information relevant to an important issue in this action weighs heavily against Respondent’s assertion of the deliberative process privilege. See, e.g., In re Subpoena, 145 F.3d at 1424; accord L.H. v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL 2009807 *4 n. 7, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52060 *15 n. 7 (E.D.Cal.2007) (citing In re Subpoena with approval); see also United States v. Irvin, 127 F.R.D. 169, 174 (C.D.Cal.1989) (rejecting privilege claim were deliberative process was a central issue in the ease) (citing United States v. Board of Education, 610 F.Supp. 695, 700 (N.D.Ill.1985); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Diamond, 137 F.R.D. 634, 642 (S.D.N.Y.1991)) (rejecting privilege claim because “statutory mandate to take certain considerations into account in its deliberations” was directly at issue in the case); Cal. Native Plant Soc’y v. United States EPA 251 F.R.D. 408, 415 (N.D.Cal.2008) (rejecting privilege where decision making process was at issue),

b.Availability of Other Evidence

The Governor contends that “there is other evidence which clearly informs Petitioner of the reasons for the 2004 decision, and the basis for the Governor’s decision.” (Joint Statement at 35). The evidence the Governor alludes to — the Governor’s written decision reversing Petitioner’s grant of parole — does not reveal the information sought in Interrogatory No. 1. Interrogatory No. 1 seeks to discover logistical information concerning the process employed in reviewing Petitioner’s parole grant; this information is distinct from the Governor’s stated reasons for reversing Petitioner’s parole grant. The fact that no other evidence concerning the information sought in Interrogatory No. 2 is available to Petitioner weighs against Respondent’s assertion of the deliberative process privilege. See Warner Comm’s., 742 F.2d at 1161.

c.Government’s Role in the Litigation

The fact that a governmental entity’s action is the focal point of litigation weighs against upholding the deliberative process privilege. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Kempthorne, 488 F.Supp.2d 1188, 1193 (S.D.Ala.2007); see also Agresta v. Goode, 1993 WL 40306 *2, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1858 *8 (E.D.Pa.1993) (fact that Government was a defendant alleged of wrongdoing weighed against assertion of the privilege); Brock v. Weiser, 1987 WL 12686 *3, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14093 *7 (N.D.Ill.1987) (rejecting privilege where Secretary of Labor was a party to the action, and decision-making process itself had become an issue); Byrd v. Jossie, 2008 WL 4274432 *3-4, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70202 *10-11 (D.Or.2008) (noting, without further analysis, that government was a party to the action in rejecting privilege claim). Although the general rule requiring a federal habeas petitioner to name his custodian as respondent precluded Petitioner from naming the Governor individually in this action, see, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 438, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 159 L.Ed.2d 513 (2004), the Governor’s reversal of Petitioner’s parole grant is the governmental action that allegedly violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, despite the fact that the Governor is not a nominal party to this action, the role of the Governor in this litigation weighs heavily against upholding the deliberative process privilege with respect to the information sought in Interrogatory No. 1. See In re Subpoena, 145 F.3d at 1424 (noting that “the privilege was fashioned in cases where the governmental decision-making process is collateral to the plaintiffs suit”).

d.Effect of Disclosure

The purpose of the deliberative process privilege is to allow agencies to freely explore possibilities, engage in internal debates, or play devil’s advocate without fear of public scrutiny. See, e.g., Assembly of California, 968 F.2d at 920. In essence, Interrogatory No. 1 seeks identification of the materials that were reviewed in connection with Petitioner’s parole reversal, the identity of the person reviewing such information, and the length of time spent on such review and the subsequent drafting of the parole reversal. It does not appear that disclosure of the information sought in Interrogatory No. 1 would chill the Governor’s willingness to freely explore possibilities or engage in internal debates in any way, and neither Respondent nor the Governor’s representative has articulated any reason why responding to Interrogatory No. 1 would do so. Although the Governor’s Legal Affairs Secretary, Andrea Lynn Hoch, makes the conclusory assertion that “disclosure of such communications will have a significant chilling effect on the exchange of information,” Ms. Hoch’s statement clearly applies to substantive communications contained within the documents identified in the privilege log and does implicate the factual responses sought in Interrogatory No. 1. (Joint Statement, Attachment 4). Interrogatory No. 1 does not seek to discover the substance of any communications or documents. To the extent that issuing responses to Interrogatory No. 1 would have some chilling effect on the Governor’s function, the Court finds that Petitioner’s interest in accurate fact-finding outweighs the Governor’s interest in the confidentiality of the factual information sought in Interrogatory No. 1. Accordingly, the Governor’s objection to Interrogatory No. 1 on the basis of the deliberative process privilege is overruled.

2. Mental Process Privilege

The Governor objects to Interrogatory No. 1 on the grounds that “the Governor should not be forced to disclose his mental process while acting in a quasi-judicial capacity.” (Joint Statement at 36).

The applicability of the mental process privilege to the logistical information sought in Interrogatory No. 1 is extremely doubtful. See North Pacifica, 274 F.Supp.2d at 1122 (privilege applies to “uncommunicated motivations”); see also Irons v. Sisto, 2007 WL 4531560, *5, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95310 *13 (E.D.Cal. 2007) (holding that “petitioner is free to ask questions regarding any parole policies the Commissioners were aware of, but may not ask questions regarding how those policies affected their decisions”) (emphasis added). Assuming arguendo that the mental process privilege applies to Interrogatory No. 1, for the same reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the balance of interests requires the Court to overrule the Governor’s mental process privilege objection. See Id. (“where the mental processes privilege is available, the analysis is the same as that for the deliberative processes privilege”).

B. Secretary Cate’s Response to Interrogatory No. 1

Respondent objects to Interrogatory No. 1 on the grounds that he does not have personal knowledge of the information sought and cannot provide the requested information. Petitioner replies to Respondent’s objection by noting that it is Respondent’s duty to provide information available to Respondent, even if such information is beyond Respondent’s personal knowledge. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 33. In light of the Governor’s invocation of the mental process and deliberative process privileges, the Court is satisfied that the information sought in Interrogatory No. 1 is not “available” to Respondent within the meaning of Rule 33. Accordingly, Respondent’s objection is sustained.

Interrogatory No. 4

Is it your contention that the Governor’s exercise of his review authority California Constitution article V, section 8(b), and California Penal Code § 3041.2 did not create a significant risk of lengthening the term of Thomas’ incarceration?

a. If so, please specify all facts and evidence upon which you base that contention.

The Governor objects to Interrogatory No. 4 on the grounds that it calls for a legal conclusion, calls for speculation, and is vague and ambiguous. (Joint Statement at 23).

A. Calls for Legal Conclusion

Generally, the fact that an interrogatory calls for a legal conclusion is not grounds for an objection. E.g., Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., 220 F.R.D. 633, 648 (D.Kan.2004) (“that a discovery request ‘calls for a legal conclusion’ is not valid objection”); see also WhitServe LLC v. Computer Patent Annuities N. America, 2006 WL 1273740 *2, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27048 *6 (D.Conn.2006) (party may even “demand that its opponent state exactly what its claims are, even asking for legal conclusions or opinions”) (citing S.S. White Burs, Inc. v. Neo-Flo, Inc., 2003 WL 21250553 at *1, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7718 at *3-4 (E.D.Pa.2003) and Conopco, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 2000 WL 342872 at *1, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1601 at *4-5 (D.N.J. Jan. 26, 2000)); G.D. v. Monarch Plastic Surgery, P.A., 2007 WL 201150 *10, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5509 *35-36 (D.Kan.2007) (“The court finds that this is not a proper objection to an interrogatory”); Donahay v. Palm Beach Tours & Transp., Inc., 242 F.R.D. 685, 688 (S.D.Fla.2007) (“Defendants objection that the subject interrogatories ... call for a legal conclusion is unavailing”); Campbell v. Washington, 2009 WL 577599 *3, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21718 *7 (W.D.Wash.2009) (The Federal Rules expressly direct that “[a]n interrogatory is not objectionable merely because it asks for an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact”); Sellick Equip, v. United States, 18 C.I.T. 352, 355 (Ct. Int’l. Trade 1994) (same) (citing Diversified Prods. Corp. v. Sports Center Co., 42 F.R.D. 3, 5 (D.Md.1967)). “The only kind of interrogatory that is objectionable on the basis that it calls for a legal conclusion is one that extends to legal issues unrelated to the facts of the case.” Holland v. GMAC Mortg., 2005 WL 1285678 *3, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10737 *10 (D.Kan.2005). Interrogatory No. 4 is clearly related to the facts of the instant case. Accordingly, this objection lacks merit, and it is overruled.

B. Calls for Speculation

The Governor offers no analysis in support of his argument that Interrogatory No. 4 calls for speculation. Interrogatory No. 4 asks simply for a contention, a query which does not require speculation. In order to' respond to Interrogatory No. 4, the Governor need only consider his knowledge and experience concerning implementation of article V, section 8(b) and form a contention. Contention interrogatories such as Interrogatory No. 4 are clearly authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(a)(2). The objection is overruled.

C. Vague and Ambiguous

The Governor objects that the phrase “significant risk of lengthening the terms [sic] of Thomas’ incarceration” is vague and ambiguous. (Joint Statement at 23). The Governor offers no analysis of why he views Interrogatory No. 4 as too vague and ambiguous to respond.

The party objecting to discovery as vague or ambiguous has the burden to show such vagueness or ambiguity by demonstrating that “more tools beyond mere reason and common sense are necessary to attribute ordinary definitions to terms and phrases.” E.g. Moss v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 241 F.R.D. 683, 696 (D.Kan.2007); Johnson v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 238 F.R.D. 648, 655 (D.Kan.2006); accord Milinazzo v. State Farm Ins. Co., 247 F.R.D. 691, 695 (S.D.Fla.2007) (“party properly objecting to an objection on the grounds of vagueness must explain the particular ways in which a request is vague”). The Governor has failed to meet his burden and therefore the objection is overruled. Further, the only portion of Interrogatory No. 4 that can be characterized as vague and ambiguous in good faith is the phrase “significant risk.” The Court finds that a common sense reading the disputed phrase based on the ordinary definitions of the terms “significant” and “risk” permits the Governor to respond to Interrogatory No. 4.

D. Request to Delay Response

The Governor asks the Court to permit them to respond to Interrogatory No. 4 after designated discovery is complete. (Joint Statement at 44). The request is granted.

Interrogatory No. 8

During the period January 17, 1980 through November 7, 1988, how many times each year was an indeterminate sentence life prisoner whose commitment offense was murder found to be suitable for parole by a hearing panel of the Board?

a. Of that number, how many were released on parole without having to appear before a subsequent hearing panel?

A. Governor’s Response

The Governor and Respondent object to Interrogatory No. 8 on the grounds that the information sought is not relevant to this action; that the interrogatory is over-broad; that the information sought is not in the custody, possession, or control of the Governor’s office; and that responding to the interrogatory would be extremely burdensome and onerous. The Joint Statement indicates that the parties’ dispute has been narrowed to the propriety of subpart (a).

1. Relevance

The Governor’s relevancy objection lacks merit. The Governor aptly articulated the reason why the information sought in Interrogatory No. 8 is relevant to this action: “Petitioner contends that ... if the numbers of inmates being found suitable for parole have increased, but the inmates have not been released without having to appear before a subsequent hearing panel, this would help establish the real world, practical effect” of the Governor’s review. (Joint Statement at 49). The contention that the relevance of the information sought in Interrogatory No. 8 is “speculative” is of no avail; “discovery should ordinarily be allowed under the concept of relevancy unless it is clear that the information sought can have no possible bearing upon the subject matter of the action.” La Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Company, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 164, 170-71 (D.Del.1973). The Governor’s argument that Petitioner “seeks to compare situations which are not the same” does no more than state the obvious. (Joint Statement at 50). As Petitioner correctly notes, “it is precisely because the situations before and after the enactment of article V, section 8(b) are not the same that the information sought” by Interrogatory No. 8 is relevant. (Joint Statement at 50). The relevancy objection is overruled.

2.Overbroad

A party opposing discovery on the basis that the request is overbroad bears the burden of showing why discovery should be denied. E.g., SEC v. Brady, 238 F.R.D. 429, 437 (N.D.Tex.2006). The Governor’s objection fails to articulate a legitimate basis for his contention that Interrogatory No. 8 is overbroad. The Governor complains that Interrogatory No. 8 seeks information that dates back nearly thirty years, however, he does not explain why such a request is overly broad in the context of this action. Although Interrogatory No. 8 does encompass a large period of time, Interrogatory No. 8 seeks data needed to conduct a comparative analysis of the operation of California’s parole system before and after the challenged statute. Because comparative analysis of the likelihood of release before and after the enactment article V, section 8(b) is clearly relevant to Petitioner’s claim, the objection is overruled.

3.Absence of Custody or Control

The Governor objects to Interrogatory No. 8 on the grounds that the information requested therein is not in the custody, possession, or control of the Governor’s office. The fact that the information sought in Interrogatory No. 8 is not currently in the Governor’s “custody, possession, or control” is not a valid basis for an objection to an interrogatory request.

Rule 33 imposes a duty on the responding party to secure all information available to it. See e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1211 (8th Cir.1973) (discussing duty of corporate entity to furnish information possessed by its officers and agents); Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co., 96 F.R.D. 684, 686 (E.D.Wis.1983) (holding that information possessed by parent corporation’s subsidies was “available” to parent corporation for purposes of Rule 33). Where an interrogatory is directed at a party that is a governmental entity, Rule 33(b)(1)(B) requires the party to furnish information “available” to an officer or agent of the governmental entity. Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(b)(1)(B). The Governor does not contend that the information sought in Interrogatory No. 8 is not “available” to him within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(b)(1)(B). Accordingly, the Governor’s objection is overruled.

4.Undue Burden

The Governor objects that responding to Interrogatory No. 8 would be “extremely burdensome and onerous as it requires the Governor’s office to conduct research and investigation on behalf of Petitioner.” (Joint Statement at' 45). In making a decision regarding burdensomeness, a court must balance the burden on the interrogated party against the benefit to the discovering party of having the information. See, e.g., Hoffman v. United Telecommunications, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 436, 438 (D.Kan.1987) (citing Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir.1975)); see also Sadofsky v. Fiesta Prods., LLC, 252 F.R.D. 143, 152 (E.D.N.Y.2008) (balancing burden imposed by interrogatory against relevance of the information sought to the action); Tolstih v. L.G. Elecs., USA, Inc., 2009 WL 439564 *7, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18573 *22 (S.D.Ohio 2009) (same). Discovery should be allowed unless the hardship is unreasonable in the light of the benefits to be secured from the discovery. Azimi v. UPS, Inc., 2007 WL 2010937 *8, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49762 *25 (D.Kan.2007) (citing Snowden v. Connaught Lab., Inc., 137 F.R.D. 325, 333 (D.Kan.1991)).

As a threshold matter, the Governor’s objection is insufficient, as an objecting party must specifically establish the nature of any alleged burden, usually by affidavit or other reliable evidence. See, e.g., Bur ton Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Foreman, 148 F.R.D. 230, 233 (N.D.Ind.1992). The Governor failed to support his objection with any explanation or citation to evidence. However, in support of its identical objection to Interrogatory No. 8, Respondent cites the declaration of Thomas Remy. (Joint Statement at 52). Accordingly, the Court evaluates the Governor’s objection in light of the Remy declaration.

Remy.declares that he is a Senior Legal Analyst with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (Remy Sup. Dec. at 2). Remy states that there is not an “existing list identifying the inmates who were granted parole” during the period from 1981 to 2007, and that “in order to determine who those inmates are, one would have to conduct an individual manual search through various forms of data.” (Id). In order to ascertain the information requested in Interrogatory 8, Remy states that “one would have to run a list of every inmate with a commitment offense of murder who was found suitable for parole, and then manually check the inmate’s hearing history to determine if they were released without having to appear before a subsequent hearing panel.” (Id at 3). Remy estimates that it would take fifteen minutes to check each inmate’s hearing history, although he does not provide the basis for his estimate.

Remy’s declaration does not establish that Interrogatory No. 8 imposes an undue burden. As several district courts have noted:

The fact that a responding party maintains records in different locations, utilizes a filing system that does not directly correspond to the subjects set forth in Plaintiffs’ interrogatory, or that responsive documents might be voluminous does not suffice to sustain a claim of undue burden. Cf. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2466, 1997 WL 33165848, *4 (N.D.Ind.1997). See also Simon v. Pro-national Insurance Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96318, 2007 WL 4893477, *2 (S.D.Fla.2007) (in granting plaintiffs motion to compel documents regarding similarly situated policy holders over a six-year period, held that defendant’s claim of undue burden was insufficient to preclude production; noted that a company cannot sustain a claim of undue burden by citing deficiencies in its own filing system); Kelly v. Montgomery Lynch & Associates, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93651, 2007 WL 4412572, *2 (N.D.Ohio 2007) (in granting plaintiffs motion to compel, rejected defendant’s claim of undue burden, notwithstanding defendant’s proffer that its “filing system is not maintained in a searchable way and the information sought would require ‘manually searching through hundreds of thousands of records.’ ”)

Greystone Constr., Inc. v. Nat’l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2008 WL 795815 *6, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106695 *17 (D.Col.2008). The fact that, according to Remy’s declaration, it would take approximately one-hundred and eleven hours to conduct the data review necessary to respond to Interrogatory No. 8 is insufficient to establish an undue burden. Accord Azimi, 2007 WL 2010937 at *7-8, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49762 at *24-26 (D.Kan.2007) (responding party’s estimate that it would take more than 100 hours and at least two months to locate and print information sought held insufficient to establish undue burden); Beach v. City of Olathe, 203 F.R.D. 489, 493-94 (D.Kan.2001) (overruling objection where responding to interrogatory required hundreds of hours of document review); Weller v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 2007 WL 1097883 *4-5, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27284 *12-14 (N.D.W.Va.2007) (overruling objection despite responding party’s affidavit which stated response would entail “at least hundreds of man hours”). Although Interrogatory No. 8 may indeed be burdensome, it is not unduly so given the importance of comparing the likelihood of release on parole before and after the passage of article V, section 8(b) in this action.

In order to prevail on his ex post facto claim, Petitioner must establish that article V, section 8(b) created a significant risk of prolonging his incarceration as compared to Petitioner’s likelihood of release under the previous statutory scheme. The data sought in Interrogatory No. 8 will facilitate a comparative analysis of the likelihood of a parole grant resulting in actual release before and after the enactment of article V, section 8(b) and thus may help establish that Petitioner is entitled to relief. Because the information sought in Interrogatory No. 8 may provide significant evidence in support of Petitioner’s claim, Petitioner’s interest in obtaining the discovery sought in Interrogatory No. 8 outweighs the burden imposed on the Governor by the request. Compare Azimi, 2007 WL 2010937 at *8, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49762 at *25 (no undue burden where information was needed to conduct a comparative analysis critical to plaintiffs claim) until Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 202 F.R.D. 35, 37-38 (D.D.C.2001) (sustaining objection where it was estimated compliance would take 1,500 hours and the search was unlikely to produce relevant information). The Court finds that, in light of the importance of the information sought, the Governor has not established that Interrogatory No. 8 imposes an undue burden. The Governor’s objection is overruled.

B. Secretary Cate’s Response

Secretary Cate objects to Interrogatory No. 8 on the basis of relevancy and burdensomeness. For the reasons discussed above, Secretary Cate’s objections are overruled.

Interrogatory No. 9

During the period November 7, 1988 through the present, how many times each year was an indeterminate sentence life prisoner whose commitment offense was murder found to be suitable for parole by a hearing panel of the Board?

a. Of that number, how many were released on parole without having to appear before a subsequent hearing panel?

A. The Governor’s Response

The Governor objects to Interrogatory No. 9 on the grounds that the information sought is not relevant to this action; that the interrogatory is overbroad; that the information sought is not in the custody, possession, or control of the Governor’s office; and that responding to the interrogatory would be extremely burdensome and onerous. The Joint Statement indicates that the parties’ disputes have been narrowed to the propriety of the inquiry contained in subpart (a) of Interrogatory No. 9.

1. The Governor’s First Three Objections

As discussed above, comparative analysis of a prisoner’s likelihood of release without appearing before a subsequent hearing panel before and after the enactment of article V, section 8(b) is relevant to determining whether article V, section 8(b) creates a significant risk of prolonging Petitioner’s incarceration. Because the information sought in Interrogatory No. 9 is necessary to conduct a comparative analysis of parole release trends before and after the enactment of article V, section 8(b), the information is relevant to this action. The Governor’s relevancy objection is overruled.

For the same reasons discussed above in response to the Governor’s objections to Interrogatory No. 8, the Governor’s objection that Interrogatory No. 9 is overbroad is overruled. For the same reasons discussed above, the Governor’s objection that the information sought in Interrogatory No. 9 is not in the custody, possession, or control of the Governor’s office is overruled.

2. Undue Burden

The Governor adopts Secretary Cate’s undue burden objection to Interrogatory No. 9. The analytical framework set forth above in response to the Governor’s undue burden objection to Interrogatory No. 8 applies with equal force to the Governor’s objection to Interrogatory No. 9. Because Interrogatory No. 9 concerns a larger body of data, the parties’ objection warrants independent consideration.

The Remy declaration states that approximately 1,600 prisoners convicted of murder were granted parole release dates between 1981 and 2009; 442 of these grants occurred prior to 1988. (Remy Sup. Dec. at 2-3). Thus, according to Remy’s declaration, Interrogatory No. 9 would require either the Governor or Secretary Cate to conduct a “manual cheek” of the hearing histories of approximately 1,158 murderers granted parole between 1989 and 2009. (Id.). Remy estimates that, due to the manner in which the relevant data is compiled and stored, each manual check would take approximately fifteen minutes. Based on Remy’s estimations, responding to Interrogatory No. 8 and No. 9 would take a total of 400 hours; 110.5 hours for the 442 prisoners’ records implicated by Interrogatory No. 8, plus 289.5 hours for the 1,158 prisoners’ records implicated by Interrogatory No. 9. (Id.). However, the Court finds Remy’s estimation to be unreliable, at least with respect to the data implicated by Interrogatory No. 9.

The Remy declaration states, “since 1991, the Governor’s office has submitted Legislative Reports which contain the information as to who has had a parole grant reversed. Petitioner can deduce from those reports who appeared for subsequent parole consideration hearings.” (Remy Sup. Dec. at 4). Both the Governor and Secretary Cate are also equipped with the powers of deductive reasoning. Where a prisoner’s name appears in the Governor’s Legislative Report for a given year, a fifteen-minute “manual check” of that prisoner’s hearing history will not be necessary. Thus, the number of “manual checks” needed to respond to Interrogatory No. 9 is certain to be less than the total number of parole grants issued between 1989 and 2009, perhaps significantly so. Because Remy’s declaration fails to account for the time savings that can be achieved through use of the Governor’s Legislative Reports, the Court finds that Remy’s declaration is not sufficiently rel