Sandoval v. American Building Maintenance Industries, Inc. (765 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 2010)

United States District Court for the District of Minnesota 2010-12-21

Citations

Full opinion text

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN R. TUNHEIM, District Judge.

This case is before the Court on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Plaintiffs and defendants have filed motions for summary judgment on the remaining issues in the case. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies plaintiffs’ motion and grants defendants’ motion in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

On May 12, 2006, plaintiffs Francisca Sandoval, Ines Hernandez, Miriam Pacheco, Eva Reyes, Arminda Gomez, Nidia Guerrero, Lucila Marquez, and Maria Perez (collectively, the “original plaintiffs”) brought this action against American Building Maintenance Industries, Inc. (“ABMI”), alleging claims for sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (the “MHRA”), Minn.Stat. §§ 363A.01 to 363A.41. (Compl. ¶ 1, Docket No. 1.) On June 29, 2006, ABMI notified the original plaintiffs that American Building Maintenance Co. of Kentucky (“ABMK”) was plaintiffs’ employer, not ABMI. (Brasel Aff. Ex. C, Docket No. 42.) The parties proposed stipulations that would amend the complaint to add ABMK, but did not finalize an agreement to a stipulation. (Brasel Aff. Ex. E, Docket No. 42.) Plaintiffs also intended to amend their complaint to add three plaintiffs: Azucena Garcia, Estela Laureano, and Marlene Giron (collectively, the “timely plaintiffs”). (Brasel Aff. Ex. H, Docket No. 42.) On September 15, 2006 — more than one month after the deadline for the original plaintiffs to amend their complaint had passed — -plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding the timely plaintiffs and adding ABMK as a defendant. (Am. Compl., Docket No. 25.)

ABMK filed a motion to dismiss the original plaintiffs. (Mot. to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summ. J., Docket No. 35.) ABMK argued that the initial complaint against ABMK was untimely and that the relation-back doctrine under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 did not permit plaintiffs to amend their complaint. (Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summ. J. at 7-8, Docket No. 41.) The district court granted ABMK’s motion to dismiss the original plaintiffs’ claims against ABMK, finding that the relation-back doctrine did not save the untimely amendment and that equitable tolling did not apply. (Order, Docket No. 76.)

ABMI and ABMK (collectively, “defendants”) filed a motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ Title VII quid pro quo sexual harassment, hostile work environment, sex discrimination, and retaliation claims. (Mot. for Summ. J., Docket No. 147.) ABMI moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether it was plaintiffs’ employer for Title VII purposes. (Id.) ABMK moved for summary judgment on the merits of plaintiffs’ claims. (Id.) The district court granted ABMI’s motion as to the original plaintiffs, concluding ABMI and ABMK were not an “integrated enterprise,” and, therefore, plaintiffs could not allege a Title VII claim against ABMI as the parent company of plaintiffs’ actual employer, ABMK. Sandoval v. American Bldg. Maint. Indus., Inc. (Sandoval I), 552 F.Supp.2d 867, 891-92 (D.Minn.2008). The district court also granted defendants’ motion as to the merits of the timely plaintiffs’ claims. Id. at 916. The district court did not address the merits of the original plaintiffs’ claims, because the original plaintiffs did not timely file claims against ABMK, and because the court concluded ABMI was not plaintiffs’ employer and therefore was not liable. Id. at 892.

Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s orders on the motion to dismiss and on the motion for summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Sandoval v. American Bldg. Maint. Indus., Inc. (Sandoval II), 578 F.3d 787 (8th Cir.2009). The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying plaintiffs’ motion to amend, concluding that neither equitable tolling nor the relation-back doctrine permitted plaintiffs to amend their complaint after the deadline for amendment had passed. Id. at 792. The Eighth Circuit also affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the merits of the timely plaintiffs’ quid pro quo sexual harassment, retaliation, and sex discrimination claims, and on the merits of timely plaintiff Garcia’s hostile work environment claim. Id. at 800. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling that there was no genuine issue of material fact that ABMI and ABMK acted as an integrated enterprise for the purposes of establishing an employer-employee relationship between the original plaintiffs and ABMI. Id. The Eighth Circuit remanded “for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” Id. at 801. The Eighth Circuit also reversed and remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Laureano and Giron’s hostile work environment claims “with instructions to consider the [plaintiffs’] evidence of widespread sexual harassment” in determining whether Laureano and Giron’s work environment was objectively hostile and whether ABMK had constructive notice of plaintiffs’ harassment. Id. at 803.

On remand, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the undisputed facts demonstrate that ABMI and ABMK are an integrated enterprise, and that ABMI was the original plaintiffs’ employer. (Pis.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Docket No. 221.) Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the merits of the original plaintiffs’ claims and on the merits of Laureano and Giron’s hostile work environment claims. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Docket No. 225.) The Court first considers plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the integrated enterprise issue and then addresses defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ remaining claims.

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party can demonstrate it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit, and a dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A court considering a motion for summary judgment must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

II. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs argue that there is no genuine dispute of fact that ABMI was plaintiffs’ employer. Plaintiffs assert that on appeal, the Eighth Circuit declared ABMI to be plaintiffs’ employer, (Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 2, Docket No. 223); that ABMI has conceded it is plaintiffs’ employer, (id. at 2-3); and that undisputed facts show that ABMI dominated plaintiffs’ workplace throughout plaintiffs’ employment, (id. at 3).

A. The Eighth Circuit Decision in Sandoval II

As an initial matter, the Court disagrees with plaintiffs’ characterization of the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Sandoval II. Although the Eighth Circuit stated, “ABMI is the [plaintiffs’] employer,” Sandoval II, 578 F.3d at 796, the Eighth Circuit reviewed the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, the non-moving party in the initial motion for summary judgment before the district court. See, e.g., Merriam v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 572 F.3d 579, 583 (8th Cir.2009). Contrary to plaintiffs’ argument, the Eighth Circuit expressly held that the “descriptions of ABMI’s involvement in the operations of its subsidiaries, and in particular ABMK’s, are sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether ABMI and ABMK are an integrated enterprise.” Sandoval II, 578 F.3d at 800 (emphasis added); see also id. at 803 (Gruender, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I also agree with the Court’s determination ... that under the four-factor test set out in Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389, 392 (8th Cir.1977), there is a material question of fact with respect to whether ABMI and ABMK are an integrated enterprise.”).

Here, the Court views the facts in a light most favorable to defendants, the nonmovants, and concludes that there is a genuine fact dispute with respect to whether ABMI and ABMK are an integrated enterprise for the purposes of imposing liability on ABMI under Title VII and the MHRA.

B. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist Regarding Whether ABMI Was Plaintiffs’ Employer

Under Title VII, “separate entities that form an integrated enterprise are treated as a single employer for the purposes of both coverage and liability and relief can be obtained from any of the entities that form part of the integrated enterprise.” See generally Sandoval II, 578 F.3d at 793 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, there is a “strong presumption that a parent company is not the employer of its subsidiary’s employees.” Brown v. Fred’s, Inc., 494 F.3d 736, 739 (8th Cir.2007). For a parent company to be liable as an integrated enterprise, the parent company must either “so dominate the subsidiary’s operations that the two are one entity and therefore one employer,” or be “linked to the alleged discriminatory action because [the parent company] controls individual employment decisions.” Sandoval II, 578 F.3d at 795 (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts consider four factors to determine if a parent company sufficiently dominates operations or controls individual employment decisions of a subsidiary: “the degree of interrelation between the operations, the degree to which the entities share common management, centralized control of labor relations, and the degree of common ownership or financial control.” Id. at 793; accord id. at 796. Evidence of these four factors can overcome the strong presumption against parent company liability. Id. at 796.

1. Interrelation Between the Operations

“When evaluating the degree of interrelation [between the operations], the [Court] considers sharing services such as check writing, preparation of mutual policy manuals, contract negotiations, completion of business licenses, sharing payroll and insurance programs, sharing services of managers and personnel, sharing office space, equipment, and storage, and operating the entities as a single unit.” Sandoval II, 578 F.3d at 793.

Both parties submit evidence that ABMK and ABMI are parties to a service agreement. Under the agreement, ABMI agrees to perform certain services for ABMK, including services for human resources, treasury, employee benefits, accounting, insurance, administration, real estate, information technology, safety, marketing and legal assistance. (Cummins Aff. Ex. 34, Docket No. 224; Mrachek Aff. Ex. 31, Docket No. 169.) In exchange, ABMK pays ABMI one percent of its annual revenue, and pays for the employee benefits, insurance, electronic services, and safety services it receives. (Cummins Aff. Ex. 34, Docket No. 224; Mrachek Aff. Ex. 31, Docket No. 169.) Plaintiffs contend that the functions that ABMI performs for ABMK demonstrate that ABMI and ABMK share operations and that evidence of ABMI’s name on ABMK’s documents, including insurance claims, establishes interrelation between operations. (Cummins Aff. Ex. 46, Docket No. 224.) Taking facts in a light most favorable to defendants, however, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that ABMI does not share these operations with ABMK, but rather performs them independently for charge, similar to an independent contractor. Thus, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the extent to which ABMK and ABMI share operational functions.

2. Common Management

“The degree to which the entities share common management includes whether the same individuals manage or supervise the different entities or whether the entities have common officers and boards of directors.” Sandoval II, 578 F.3d at 793.

Plaintiffs cite ABMI’s corporate filings, which show ABMI and ABMK have the same Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer, Secretary, Vice President of Finance, Auditors and Accountants, Bond and Insurance Signatories, Principal Place of Business, Officer Place of Business, Director Place of Business, Website and Counsel. (Cummins Aff. Exs. 35-37, 39-41, Docket No. 224.) Both ABMK and ABMI’s corporate filings with the state of California from 2005-2006 list Henrik C. Slipsager as CEO, Linda S. Auwers as Secretary, and George B. Sundby as CFO. (Cummins Aff. Ex. 35-36, Docket No. 224.) The filings also list the same address for ABMI and ABMK. (Id.) ABMI’s minute books show that ABMI’s Chief Financial Officer and Chief Executive Officer appoint a small group of individuals to direct all of ABMI’s subsidiaries, and that all subsidiaries use the same governing instruments. (Cummins Aff. Ex. 37, App. 2505-10, 2520-23, Docket No. 224)

By contrast, ABMI’s officers stated that ABMK has its own management and Human Resources departments that are separate from ABMI. (See, e.g., Southard Aff. ¶¶ 4-5, Docket No. 175). Jeffory Southard states that each branch of ABMI, including ABMK, has its own Human Resources Director. (Southard Aff. ¶¶ 4-5, Docket No. 175.) Southard also notes that ABMK makes all decisions regarding its employees in Minnesota, and that ABMI takes no part in these decisions. (Id.)

Plaintiffs also argue that the use of ABMI’s name on documents related to plaintiffs’ employment demonstrates that ABMI shared management with ABMK. (Cummins Aff. Exs. 4, 10-12, 14, 15, 46, Docket No. 224.) For example, a state court proceeding regarding original plaintiff Hernandez lists “ABM Industries, Inc.” as her employer, (Cummins Aff. Ex. 4, Docket No. 223), and plaintiffs’ pay stubs list “ABM Janitorial Services” as their employer, (id. Ex. 5). Other documents identify ABMI as the employer of plaintiffs’ alleged harassers. (See id. Exs. 10-12, 15.) Defendants contend that such uses of ABMI’s name do not demonstrate that ABMI was in fact operating or issuing those documents, and that uses of ABMI’s name usually reference American Building Maintenance Janitorial Services (“ABMJS”), which is a subsidiary of ABMI. (Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 12, Docket No. 237.)

Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to defendants, the Court finds that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that ABMI and ABMK do not share common management.

3. Centralized Control of Labor Relations

The Court also considers “the extent to which there is a centralized source of authority for development of personnel policy, maintenance of personal records, human resources, and employment decisions.” Sandoval II, 578 F.3d at 793.

Defendants argue that this factor is the most important, and that to demonstrate centralized control, plaintiffs must adduce evidence that ABMI controls the “day-to-day employment decisions” of ABMK. (Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 10, Docket No. 237 (citing Romano v. U-Haul Int’l, 233 F.3d 655, 666 (1st Cir.2000)).) The Eighth Circuit has not held, however, that plaintiffs must show a parent company controlled “day-today employment decisions” to establish centralized control of labor relations. Cf. Sandoval II, 578 F.3d at 796. But even under the more general standard, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether ABMI was the centralized source of authority for labor relations decisions.

Plaintiffs claim that ABMI handles hiring, employee legal claims, information systems, collective bargaining, and the administration of the employee benefits program for ABMK. (Cummins Aff. Exs. 4, 7, 12; Ex. 14, App. 2306-22; Exs. 16-33; Ex. 34 ¶ 1.4-1.7, 1.9; Ex. 48; Ex. 50 at 33; Ex. 58 at 96-97, 105-07; Ex. 62, at 66-70, 137-45, Docket No. 224) A collective bargaining agreement lists “American Building Maintenance” as a participating company, (id. Ex. 7), “ABM Industries Incorporated” is at the bottom of every page in the “Participant’s Workbook” accompanying a sexual harassment “Field Guide”, (id. Ex. 14), and insurance forms list “ABM Industries Incorporated” as plaintiff Hernandez’s employer, (id. Ex. 16). There is also evidence that ABMI directly managed certain employee functions relating to sexual harassment training. (See, e.g., id. Exs. 20-24).

Defendants cite ABMK and ABMI managers’ depositions to show that ABMK has its own independent Human Resources Department, through which it makes all decisions regarding employees, keeps the payroll, corresponds with the Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development and the Minnesota Department of Revenue, and participates in collective bargaining agreements. (Robbins Aff. Docket No. 238, Southard Dep. Tr. 242-243; Mrachek Aff. Exs. 3, 18, 24, Docket No. 169.) Defendants note that ABMK has its own job application, affirmative action program, field guide for personnel, and policies for unlawful harassment, safety, sexual harassment, and employee vehicle safety. (Mrachek Aff. Exs. 4-5, 7-8, 27-30, Docket No. 169; Robbins Aff. Docket No. 238, Mork Dep. Tr. 59-62, 130-32, 279-80.)

With regard to sexual harassment claims, plaintiffs submit evidence of communication between ABMK’s Human Resources Contact and an ABM Corporate Human Resources Contact to show that ABMI “actively participates” in investigating sexual harassment reports at ABMK. (Cummins Aff. Ex. 29, Docket No. 224.) On the other hand, ABMI’s General Counsel states that ABMK performs the investigations and that ABMI is not involved unless ABMK seeks advice from ABMI. (Miller Aff. ¶ 9, Docket No. 178.) ABMK’s Human Resources Contact states that ABMK performs its own sexual harassment trainings. (Mork Dep. Tr. 61-64, 67-70, 76.)

Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to defendants, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that ABMK controls its own employment policies, procedures, practices, and investigations of sexual harassment reports. Thus, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether ABMI provides a centralized source of authority for labor relations matters.

4. Common Ownership

In evaluating the degree of common ownership, the Court considers whether one company owns the majority or all of shares of the other company and whether the entities share common officers or directors. Sandoval II, 578 F.3d at 793.

The parties do not dispute that ABMI owns all shares of ABMK’s stock. (Miller Aff. ¶ 3-4, Docket No. 178; Cummins Aff. Ex. 37, Docket No. 224.) The parties dispute, however, whether ABMI manages ABMK’s finances. Plaintiffs claim that ABMI handles ABMK’s treasury, employee benefits, insurance and accounting functions, (Cummins Aff. Ex. 37, Docket No. 224), while ABMI claims that its finances are not “commingled” with ABMK’s finances, (Miller Aff. ¶ 12, Docket No. 178). Even viewing those facts in a light most favorable to defendants, the Court is not persuaded that there is a genuine fact dispute regarding the degree of common ownership in these circumstances. The existence of this factor, alone, does not entitle plaintiffs to summary judgment.

For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment regarding whether ABMI and ABMK are an integrated enterprise.

III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the original plaintiffs’ claims for sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation. Defendants also moved for summary judgment on Laureano’s and Giron’s hostile work environment claims, which the Eighth Circuit remanded.

The Court first considers plaintiffs’ quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile work environment claims. The Court discusses common facts supporting those claims and then turns to the merits of the parties’ arguments. Second, the Court considers defendants’ motion as it relates to plaintiffs’ retaliation claims. Third, the Court addresses defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ sex discrimination claims.

A. Sexual Harassment Claims

1. Background

Plaintiffs are all ABMK employees and work at various ABMK worksites as cleaners. ABMK has at least 2,800 worksites in the Minneapolis branch, and 300 accounts. (Ketchum Dep. Tr. 48, 96.) As discussed in Sandoval I, ABMK has implemented an extensive sexual harassment policy and has taken measures to apprise its employees of that policy through a variety of media: The ABM Janitorial Services Employee Handbook (“Employee Handbook”), The ABM Janitorial Services General Work Rules (“Work Rules”), and the Unlawful Harassment Policy. 552 F.Supp.2d at 899-900. ABMK also provided employees with access to a “Harassment Hotline,” which has a toll-free number that “allows ANY employee to report any allegation of sexual harassment, discrimination, retaliation, theft, or any safety concern that occurs in the workplace or any harassment by a third party.” Id. at 900 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). The Court incorporates by reference Sandoval I’s discussion of ABMK’s sexual harassment policies and training. Id. at 899-900; cf. Sandoval II, 578 F.3d at 801 (noting ABMK’s “extensive anti-harassment policy and procedures”).

a. Francisca Sandoval

Francisca Sandoval claims that her on-site supervisor at ABMK’s Valspar work-site, Daniel Gonzalez, sexually harassed her beginning in November 2004. In one instance, Sandoval testified that Gonzalez approached her in a conference room at a cleaning site and told Sandoval he loved her. (Sandoval Dep. Tr. 225.) Gonzalez then attempted to hug her and put his hand inside her shirt. (Id. 225-26.) When Sandoval attempted to run away, Gonzalez caught up with her and again put his hand inside her shirt and touched her breast. (Id.) In another incident, Sandoval testified that Gonzalez approached her at the Valspar worksite. Sandoval testified:

[Gonzalez] pushed me on the bed as well. I tried to get up. He also threw himself on top of me. I pushed him. I told him to get off of me. He wouldn’t listen to me. He wanted to kiss me. The only thing I could do was to move my head and to try to get him off of me. I tried to get loose from him.

(Id. 246.) Sandoval testified that between November 2004 and December 2005, Gonzalez told Sandoval he loved her three to five times. (Id. 215-17.) Sandoval testified that Gonzalez made comments about buying lingerie for her, looked at her in a manner she thought was inappropriate six times, made sexual comments to her approximately ten times, and tried to kiss her “once [or] twice a week.” (Id. 263-64, 334.) Sandoval testified that she did not immediately report the sexual harassment because she was afraid and embarrassed, did not think anyone would believe her, and did not want her husband to find out. (Id. 235-37.)

On August 12, 2005, Sandoval first reported Gonzalez’s alleged harassment to ABMK. (Id. 276-77.) Sandoval, her husband, and ABMK Human Resources Director Julie Mork met at ABMK’s offices and told Mork about some of the incidents of harassment. (Id. 282-84.) Sandoval did not disclose all of the incidents of harassment, however, because her husband was in the room. (Id.) After the meeting, ABMK immediately suspended Gonzalez for three days and began an investigation into his conduct. (Mork Decl. ¶¶ 15-18, Docket No. 179; Cummins Aff. Ex. 52, Docket No. 233.) ABMK was unable to substantiate Sandoval’s harassment allegations, in part because ABMK’s records showed that Gonzalez was not working on a date on which Gonzalez allegedly harassed her. (Mork Decl. ¶ 15, Docket No. 179.) On August 17, 2005, at Sandoval’s request, ABMK transferred Sandoval to a different worksite. (Id. ¶ 17.) Sandoval testified she has not experienced any harassment, retaliation, or discrimination since her transfer. (Sandoval Dep. Tr. 299-301.)

b. Ines Hernandez

Ines Hernandez’s sexual harassment allegations arise out of incidents that took place in 2004 and 2005 at ABMK’s Park Nicollet worksite. Hernandez testified that in July 2004, Felix Olivar approached her and told her about a burn on his genitals, and Hernandez believed that Olivar was going to attempt to expose himself to her. (Hernandez Dep. Tr. 206-07.) Hernandez testified that on one occasion in August 2004, while Hernandez was vacuuming her assigned floor, Olivar slapped her on the buttocks. (Id. 191) After she told him to stop, he laughed and left. (Id.) Hernandez testified that Olivar slapped her on the buttocks on a second occasion during August or September of 2004. (Id. 194.) Hernandez testified that in September 2004, Olivar joined her in an elevator she was riding to go to a floor where she would be cleaning. (Id. 198.) Hernandez states that Olivar slapped her between her legs “almost groping [her] with his slap down there,” and started laughing. (Id.) Hernandez told him to stop, but did not tell anyone about the incident that night because she was embarrassed. (Id.)

After the encounter with Olivar in the elevator, Hernandez met with Osvaldo Arce, a project manager at the Park Nicollet worksite, and Olivar to report Olivar’s behavior. (Id. 234-35; McCoy Aff. ¶ 4, Docket No. 174.) Arce told Hernandez that she was “misinterpreting things,” but later said that Olivar’s actions were “rude.” (Hernandez Dep. Tr. 234-37.) Arce told Hernandez he would talk to Olivar separately, but he was not going to file a report. (Id. 239.)

Hernandez also testified that Olivar made sexual comments to her approximately once a week. (Id. 458.) For example, Olivar told her that her husband was “so lucky he gets to enjoy [her] as much as he wants,” which Hernandez understood to mean that her “husband was lucky because he was having sex with [her].” (Id. 214-15, 231.) Hernandez testified that Olivar stated her husband would “have something to grab,” which she interpreted to mean that she “ha[d] a big ass.” (Id. 216.) Hernandez also testified that Olivar told her that “[her] husband was going to sleep warm,” which she understood to mean that Olivar wanted to be in her husband’s place. (Id. 217-18.)

Hernandez also complains of harassment by other ABMK employees. She testified that an employee named “Reyes” told her approximately ten times that “he liked the way [she] dressed and that he liked [her] body.” (Id. 275.) Hernandez testified that Reyes grabbed her hand and would not let go for five or ten minutes, though she tried to pull away. (Id. 272-74.) On another occasion Reyes would not let her through a doorway for about twenty minutes. (Id.) Hernandez testified that in July 2004, she complained to Arce that another employee, Eric Ortiz, gave her multiple gifts, which made Hernandez think her co-workers were “betting” or vying for her attention. (Id. 296-97, 301.) Hernandez testified that in November or December 2004, an employee named “Cesar” “made a sexual advance,” which she reported to Arce. (Id. 288-89.)

In April 2005, Hernandez met with ABMK Human Resources Director Mork, Park Nicollet account manager Michelle McCoy, and two union leaders. (Id. 463; Morillo-Alicea Aff. ¶¶ 2-3, Cummins Aff. Ex. 50, Docket No. 183.) At the meeting, Hernandez reported Olivar’s behavior. (Hernandez Dep. Tr. 239-40.) ABMK assured Hernandez that she would no longer have contact with Olivar, and that they would begin an investigation. (Morillo-Alicea Aff. ¶2, Cummins Aff. Ex. 50, Docket No. 183.) ABMK suspended Olivar for three days while they conducted the investigation. (Hernandez Dep. Tr. 246-47; Arce Dep. Tr. 119-20.) On May 11, Mork notified Olivar that although ABMK’s investigation had been inconclusive, ABMK was transferring Olivar to a different building to avoid further problems. (Cummins Aff. Ex. 129, Docket No. 233.) ABMK transferred Olivar to another building, (Arce Dep. Tr. 118-19), and in June 2005, ABMK transferred Hernandez to a position at a different location with similar pay. (Hernandez Dep. Tr. 264 & Dep. Ex. 2.)

c. Miriam Pacheco

Pacheco began working for ABMK at the Meridian Crossings worksite in August 2002. (Pacheco Dep. Tr. 177.) Pacheco testified that in September 2002, her on-site supervisor Miguel Vidal began pressuring Pacheco to have sex with him, offering her money in exchange for sexual favors and threatening to fire her if she refused. (Id. 172-75, 178.) Pacheco initially refused Vidal’s advances. (Id. 178.) Pacheco testified that on one occasion, Vidal asked Pacheco to join him in the conference room, began to talk to her romantically, and threatened that she would lose her job if she would not have sex with him. (Id. 182-84.) Pacheco refused, but did not physically resist when Vidal had sex with her because she was afraid of him. (Id.) Pacheco did not tell anyone about the incident, and did not tell Meridian Crossings project manager Scott Martin because she was afraid she would get in trouble or lose her job. (Id. 188-89, 194.) Pacheco testified that a few weeks later, Vidal took her into the conference room and had sex with her again, (id. 195), and that they had sex a third time in the last week of September 2002, (id. 201-02). After the third time, Pacheco told Vidal that she would not have sex with him anymore and that, “if he wanted to fire [her], that he could.” (Id. 202.) Pacheco testified that after the final incident Vidal stopped pressuring her to have sex with him. (Id. 210.)

Pacheco continued working at ABMK with Vidal through April 2003, when she left ABMK to give birth. (Id. 250-52.) In July 2004, Pacheco reapplied to ABMK, and requested an assignment to the Meridian Crossings worksite. (Id. 234-37, 269.) Pacheco testified that in 2005, Vidal again made suggestive comments about her breasts and told Pacheco he “wanted” her. (Id. 336-42, 396-98.) Pacheco did not report Vidal’s behavior in part because she was friends with Vidal’s wife and did not want ABMK to fire Vidal. (Pacheco Dep. Tr. 189-90, 367-70.)

Pacheco testified that on August 22, 2005, Vidal asked her for sex, and on August 23 she reported the incident to the union. (Id. 264-65, 398-99, 418-28.) On September 26, 2005, Pacheco filed an official complaint with ABMK management. (Id. 420-21.) On October 10, 2005, Mork notified Pacheco by letter that ABMK had concluded its investigation of her claims against Vidal and suspended Vidal for three days, but noted that the findings of the investigation were inconclusive. (Cummins Aff. Ex. 271, Docket No. 183.) ABMK placed Vidal on a 60-day probation and transferred him to work at a St. Cloud worksite. (Vidal Dep. Tr. 72.). Pacheco did not have contact with Vidal after ABMK transferred him. (Pacheco Dep. Tr. 436-37, 449.)

d. Eva Reyes

Reyes began working as a cleaner for ABMK at the airport worksite in approximately March 2001. Reyes claims that at the end of 2003, project manager Joe Lozano began to joke about spanking her on the buttocks approximately four times a week. (Reyes Dep. Tr. 328, 407, 590-91.) Reyes testified that she believed Lozano spread a rumor that she had invited Lozano to her apartment when her husband was not there. (Id. 294-95.) Reyes also testified that Lozano told her that one of her co-workers was sexually promiscuous. (Id. 281, 414.)

Reyes also claims that Juan Flores, an ABMK foreperson, made comments to her that he and Lozano used Viagra. (Id. 414.) Reyes testified that she had heard from a coworker that Flores had told people that she was “going out with a black man,” (id. 460), and that Flores talked about a co-workers’ sexual relations with male ABMK employees, (id. 594).

Reyes first notified ABMK of the alleged harassment by Lozano and Flores when she filed a Charge of Discrimination in August 2005. (Reyes Dep., Ex. 58, Robbins Aff. Ex. 5, Docket No. 228; Mork Aff. ¶ 31, Docket No. 179.) ABMK immediately began an investigation, but concluded that Reyes’ claims could not be substantiated. (Mork Decl. ¶¶ 31-32, Docket No. 179.) Regardless, ABMK counseled both Lozano and Flores regarding the company’s sexual harassment policies. (Id.) Lozano’s employment with ABMK ended shortly thereafter. (Id.)

e. Arminda Gomez

Gomez alleges that Joe Lozano sexually harassed her while she was working at ABMK’s airport worksite. Gomez testified that Lozano told her almost daily that she had a beautiful smile and beautiful hair, often asked her if she was married or had children, and asked her where she bought her pants and how they were fitting. (Gomez Dep. Tr. 72-74, 83-93, 139-40.) Gomez testified that Lozano once claimed she had promised to have sex with him and told her he was “ready for [her],” but Lozano became angry when Gomez indicated she was not interested. (Id. 73-74, 166) Gomez also claims that Lozano called her and her aunt lesbians. (Id. 74, 93-94, 216, 218.)

Initially, Gomez did not notify ABMK about Lozano’s conduct. (Gomez Dep. Tr. 92, 107, 136-38.) In 2006, members of ABMK’s Human Resources Department visited workers at the airport, but Gomez did not inform them that she had any concerns. (Mork Decl. ¶¶ 27-28, Docket No. 179.) ABMK first learned of Gomez’s harassment allegations when she filed a Charge of Discrimination. (Id.) Although ABMK investigated and found no evidence corroborating Gomez’s allegation, defendants counseled Lozano about his conduct. (Id.) Lozano’s employment with ABMK ended approximately a month later. (Mork Decl. ¶ 30, Docket No. 179.) Gomez testified that she has not experienced any behavior she would consider harassment since her report to ABMK. (Gomez Dep. Tr. 185-87.)

f. Nidia Guerrero

Guerrero’s allegations of sexual harassment arise out of her interactions between 2003 and 2005 with Jesus Analco, an ABMK “zone manager” at the Medtronic worksite. Guerrero claims that when she began working for ABMK, Analco “was very kind with [her] ... more so than with other people or the rest of the people” at her worksite. (Guerrero Dep. Tr. 143.) Guerrero testified that when Analco became more comfortable, her started telling her that she looked good or looked pretty, that he liked the way she dressed, and that he liked her. (Id. 143, 281.) Guerrero claims that Analco made those comments “five times on a daily basis.” (Id. 282.) Guerrero also testified that Analco touched her in an offensive manner. For example, Guerrero testified that five to ten times a week, Analco would sneak up behind Guerrero and hug her while rubbing his genitals against her. (Id. 278, 316.) Guerrero claims that Analco frequently attempted to kiss her and touch her shoulders or hands. (Id. 278-79.) Guerrero claims that at one point when Analco and Guerrero were in Analco’s car, Analco locked the doors and “confessed his love” to her. (Id. 282.)

In October 2005, ABMK terminated Guerrero’s employment as a result of her failure to complete Leave of Absence paperwork in preparation for taking leave from work lasting longer than three days. (Bonier Aff. ¶ 6, Docket No. 172; Guerrero Dep. Tr. 197-99.) Guerrero did not report Analco’s alleged conduct while employed by ABMK. (Guerrero Dep. Tr. 133-34, 201.) ABMK first became aware of Guerrero’s allegations five months after ABMK terminated her employment, when Guerrero filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination on March 21, 2006. (Mork Decl. ¶ 18, Docket No. 179.) In response to the Charge, ABMK wrote to Guerrero requesting an opportunity to interview her, but Guerrero refused to cooperate. (Mork Decl. ¶ 18, Docket No. 179.) Regardless, ABMK investigated and determined there was no evidence to corroborate Guerrero’s claims. (Id.) After plaintiffs filed their complaint, plaintiffs provided affidavits from three other individuals claiming the Analco had harassed them. (Id. ¶ 19.) After investigating those claims, ABMK offered Analco a transfer to a lower-paying position. (Id.) Analco refused, and ABMK terminated his employment. (Id.)

g. Lucila Marquez

Marquez claims that project managers Saul Ramirez and his brother Ruben Ramirez sexually harassed Marquez while she was working at ABMK’s Prairie Lakes Center worksite. Marquez claims that beginning in approximately September 2005, Saul Ramirez began harassing her. Marquez testified that Saul Ramirez propositioned her for sex on multiple occasions and made sexually suggestive comments to her. (Marquez Dep. Tr. 202, 207-08, 221, 227-28 356-57.) Marquez claimed that in one instance, Saul Ramirez “found [her] in the bathroom” and asked her if she would like to have sex with him. (Id. 356-57.) Marquez claims that in another instance, Saul Ramirez “toueh[ed] himself’ and bragged about his ability to sexually satisfy another woman. (Id. 227-30.)

Marquez told Ruben Ramirez that Saul Ramirez “was always bothering [her] and telling [her] sexual stuff.” (Id. 248.) Ruben Ramirez responded by telling Marquez not to pay attention to Saul Ramirez because “he was crazy.” (Id.) Marquez testified that Ruben Ramirez also asked her to go out with him or to be his girlfriend. (Id. 235-37.)

Marquez did not notify ABMK about the alleged harassment against Saul Ramirez until she contacted the union in February 2006 and the EEOC filed a Charge of Discrimination in March 2006. (Mork Decl. ¶ 20, Docket No. 179; Marquez Dep. Tr. 259-61.) ABMK immediately began an investigation and suspended Saul Ramirez for three days without pay, transferred him to a new worksite, and demoted him. (Mork Decl. ¶ 20, Docket No. 179; Mrachek Aff. Ex. 78, Docket No. 169.) After receiving additional complaints from other co-workers about Saul Ramirez, ABMK terminated his employment. (Mrachek Aff. Ex. 80, Docket No. 169.) ABMK also reprimanded Ruben Ramirez for failing to report what Marquez said about Saul Ramirez. (Mrachek Aff. Ex. 79, Docket No. 169.)

h. Maria Perez

Maria Perez alleges that Saul Perez and Selso Romero, lead cleaners, and Doug Hussa, a project manager, sexually harassed her while she was working at ABMK’s United Health Group worksite. Maria Perez claimed that on one occasion in October 2003, Saul Perez grabbed her from behind, thrust his genitals against her buttocks, and groped her breasts and genital area. (Maria Perez Dep. Tr. 58-62.) Maria Perez immediately reported the incident to ABMK. (Id. 61-63, 67-75.) ABMK contacted her the day after it was notified of the incident. (Mork Decl. ¶ 26, Docket No. 179.) ABMK immediately suspended Saul Perez pending an investigation, and subsequently terminated his employment as a result of the incident. (Mrachek Aff. Ex. 58, Docket No. 169.) Maria Perez testified she had no complaints about how ABMK responded “because [Saul Perez] was fired.” (Maria Perez Dep. Tr. 81.)

Maria Perez claims that Saul Perez’s replacement, Selso Romero, also sexually harassed her. Maria Perez testified that on one occasion, Romero walked into a bathroom while she was using the bathroom. (Maria Perez Dep. Tr. 86.) Maria Perez testified that she could see Romero’s shoes from under the bathroom stall and told him “I already know that it’s you, Selso.” (Id.) She told him to leave the bathroom, or she would tell Hussa. (Id.) Romero said he was checking towels in the bathroom, then left the bathroom after he did so. (Id. 87) Maria Perez claims that after the bathroom incident, Romero asked her out, but she declined. (Id. 102-03.) Maria Perez later found a CD with a picture of a naked woman on the cover in her purse. (Id. 122-23.) Although she could not say with certainty that someone from ABMK had put the CD in her purse, she gave the CD to Hussa. (Id.) Hussa contacted ABMK’s Human Resources department about the incident the next day. (Hussa Dep. Tr. 160.) When Maria Perez asked Hussa to return the CD to her so that she could give it to Human Resources, Hussa stated that he had destroyed it. (Mork Dep. Tr. 267-68.) Maria Perez testified that after Saul Perez’s employment was terminated and after she gave the CD to Hussa, she did not experience harassment again. (Id. 136.)

i. Estela Laureano and Marlene Giron

The Court incorporates by reference Sandoval I’s discussion of facts relating to Laureano and Giron’s sexual harassment claims. Sandoval I, 552 F.Supp.2d at 903-06.

Plaintiffs bring quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment claims. “Both quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment claims are grounded in the same legal theory under Title VII, the former involving an explicit, and the latter a constructive, change in conditions of employment.” Henthorn v. Capitol Commc’ns, Inc., 359 F.3d 1021, 1026 (8th Cir.2004). The Court first addresses plaintiffs’ quid pro quo sexual harassment claims and concludes that the original plaintiffs’ alleged harassers did not have supervisory authority for the purposes of Title VII and the MHRA. Defendants therefore are not vicariously liable for the alleged harassers’ actions under a theory of quid pro quo sexual harassment. The Court then turns to plaintiffs’ hostile work environment claims. Plaintiffs have not adduced adequate evidence demonstrating that ABMK had actual or constructive notice of plaintiffs’ allegedly hostile work environments and failed to take prompt and effective remedial action. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ sexual harassment claims.

2. Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment

Plaintiffs allege that ABMK’s policies and practices constitute quid pro quo sexual harassment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and the MHRA, see Minn.Stat. § 363A.08 subd. 2, “by making submission to unwelcome sexual advances and other sexual conduct and statements among the terms and conditions of employment and by using submission to, or rejection of, such sexual conduct and statements as a factor in Defendants’] decisions about employment opportunities for Plaintiffs.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 295, Docket No. 25.) To establish a claim for quid pro quo sexual harassment a plaintiff

must show that (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances or requests for sexual favors; (3) the harassment was based on sex; and (4) her submission to the unwelcome advances was an express or implied condition for receiving job benefits or her refusal to submit resulted in a tangible job detriment.

Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 49 F.3d 466, 473 (8th Cir.1995). “Sexual harassment is quid pro quo if a tangible employment action follows the employee’s refusals to submit to a supervisor’s sexual demands.” Henthorn, 359 F.3d at 1026-27 (citations omitted). For the purposes of Title VII, a supervisor is an individual who has the power “to take tangible employment action against the victim, such as the authority to hire, fire, promote, or reassign to significantly different duties.” Joens v. John Morrell & Co., 354 F.3d 938, 940 (8th Cir.2004). An employer is not liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment based on the actions of an individual with apparent authority, but who is not a supervisor. See Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir.1999); see also Weyers v. Lear Operations Corp., 359 F.3d 1049, 1057 n. 7 (8th Cir.2004). That is, the alleged harasser must have “actual authority to make a significant change in employee status or make economic decisions affecting employees.” Sandoval I, 552 F.Supp.2d at 895 (emphasis added).

In Sandoval I, the district court concluded that the timely plaintiffs’ accused harassers were not supervisors for Title VII purposes, and granted AMBK’s motion for summary judgment on Garcia, Laureano, and Giron’s quid pro quo sexual harassment claims. Sandoval I, 552 F.Supp.2d at 893-99. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court “properly concluded [that Garcia, Laureano, and Giron’s] supervisors were not authorized to take adverse employment actions against them, and thus ABMK was not liable under a theory of quid pro quo harassment.” Sandoval II, 578 F.3d at 801.

On remand, defendants argue that the original plaintiffs’ claims for quid pro quo sexual harassment cannot survive summary judgment because their alleged harassers did not have the authority to take tangible employment action against plaintiffs and therefore were not supervisors under Title VII. The Court agrees. The record demonstrates that the original plaintiffs’ accused harassers did not have supervisory authority, and summary judgment for ABMK is appropriate on the original plaintiffs’ quid pro quo sexual harassment claims.

a. Francisca Sandoval

Sandoval alleges that her on-site supervisor at the Valspar site, Daniel Gonzalez, made unwelcome sexual advances toward her, including pushing her onto a bed and attempting to kiss her. Gonzalez was a non-exempt “supervisor” and “project manager.” (Balfe Aff. ¶ 8, Docket No. 170; see also Cummins Aff. Ex. 133, Docket No. 233.) With regard to his work duties, Gonzalez testified he was responsible for cleaning buildings and supervising other employees, including assigning cleaners to different areas of the facility, but that he could not determine which days of the week employees worked or what hours they were going to work. (Gonzalez Dep. Tr. 39-42.) Gonzales testified that he could issue warnings if an employee was late to work, but Gonzales’ manager made decisions about suspension or other disciplinary decisions. (Gonzales Dep. Tr. 40-41, 51.) Mike Balfe, an operations manager for ABMK, stated that Gonzalez did not have authority to take disciplinary action resulting in an adverse employment action such as a demotion, reduction in pay, or termination. (Balfe Aff. ¶¶ 8-9, Docket No. 170.)

Gonzalez’s testimony suggests that he may have had the authority to hire an employee. During Gonzalez’s deposition, plaintiffs’ counsel produced a document describing the duties of a project manager. Addressing each bullet point in the list of possible duties, plaintiffs’ counsel asked Gonzalez if he “hires, supervises, motivates, disciplines, and directs all staff personally or through subordinate supervisors,” to which Gonzales responded, “Yes.” (Gonzales Dep. Tr. 36 (“Q: The next bullet point is: hires, supervises, motivates, disciplines, and directs all staff personally or through subordinate supervisors. Is that a duty or responsibility of yours? A. Yes.”).) By contrast, defendants cite a document titled “Position Description,” which lists a project manager’s duties as “[m]anage the supervisors and be responsible for the ABM operations at a specific site, direct and supervise scheduling of work load adjustment with the Supervisor, Foremen utility crew and janitors ... Supervision — carry out disciplinary action as needed.” (Mrachek Aff. Ex. 14, Docket No. 169.) ABMK Human Resources Director Julie Mork stated that ABMK has never used the position description used by plaintiffs’ counsel at Gonzalez’s deposition. (Mork Decl. ¶ 34, Docket No. 179.) Balfe also noted he had never seen the job description provided by plaintiffs. (Balfe Aff. ¶ 15, Docket No. 170.)

Regardless of whether there is appropriate foundation for the project manager position description provided by plaintiffs, the Court concludes that Gonzalez’s deposition testimony does not create a genuine issue of material fact that Gonzalez was a supervisor for the purposes of Title VII and the MHRA. Gonzalez’s testimony amounts to no more than a “scintilla” of evidence tending to show he was a supervisor. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that Gonzalez’s work duties were substantially limited to performing his own work and supervising other employees’ cleaning work. See Merritt v. Albemarle Corp., 496 F.3d 880, 883 (8th Cir.2007) (“The fact that an alleged harasser may have been a team leader with the authority to assign employees to particular tasks will not be enough to make that person a supervisor.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Gonzalez could not discipline, demote, or fire employees. To the extent Gonzales testified that part of his job duties was to “hire” staff, in the Court’s view, a reasonable trier of fact could not find from the evidence presented that Gonzalez was a supervisor under Title VII. The Court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Sandoval’s quid pro quo sexual harassment claim. Cf. Sandoval I, 552 F.Supp.2d at 897-98 (concluding that Francisco Martinez, a “project manager,” was not a supervisor).

b. Ines Hernandez

Hernandez alleges that Felix Olivar sexually harassed her and that she reported Olivar’s behavior to Osvaldo Arce, a project manager. (Hernandez Dep. Tr. 191-221.) Olivar was responsible for passing out keys, turning off lights, and securing buildings at the end of a shift. (McCoy Aff. ¶ 6, Docket No. 174; Olivar Dep. Tr. 68.) Olivar testified that if another cleaner did not do a job properly, he instructed the cleaner to “clean a little better.” (Olivar Dep. Tr. 44.) Olivar stated that he never gave an employee a “verbal warning.” (Id. 45.) Michelle McCoy, the Prairie Lakes Center worksite account manager, stated that Olivar did not have the authority to hire, fire, discipline, or reassign an employee to significantly different duties. (McCoy Aff. ¶¶ 2, 6-7, Docket No. 174; see also Olivar Dep. Tr. 44-45, 68, 70, 83.)

Arce, a “non-exempt project manager,” was responsible for inspecting other employees’ cleaning work. (McCoy Aff. ¶ 4, Docket No. 174.) If Arce determined that an assignment was not completed properly, he could discuss the issue with the assigned cleaner, do it himself, or notify his supervisor. (Id.) Arce, however, did not have authority to “issue disciplinary action that could result in adverse employment action such as a demotion or termination or reduction in pay or hours.” (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.)

Given the above facts, no reasonable fact-finder could find that Olivar or Arce had actual authority to take tangible employment action against Hernandez or any other employee. Plaintiffs have produced no evidence that Olivar or Arce had authority to hire, fire, promote, or reassign employees to significantly different duties. As a result, Olivar and Arce were not supervisors for the purposes of Hernandez’s quid pro quo sexual harassment claim and the Court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment on that claim.

c. Miriam Pacheco

Pacheco claims that Miguel Vidal, a non-exempt “foreperson” at the Meridian Crossings worksite, sexually harassed her. Vidal had duties similar to “a utility worker or a general cleaner.” (Balfe Aff. ¶¶ 4-5, Docket No. 170.) Although Vidal was assigned to inspect the work of others, he did not have authority to issue disciplinary action that could result in adverse employment actions. (Id.) Vidal testified that if he had an issue with a cleaner’s performance, he “would report it to a project manager,” but that he did not have the power to fire cleaners or impose any other disciplinary actions. (Vidal Dep. Tr. 118.) Based on those facts, a reasonable trier of fact could not find that Vidal was a supervisor for the purposes of Title VII or the MHRA, and the Court accordingly grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Pacheco’s quid pro quo sexual harassment claim.

d. Eva Reyes

Reyes alleges that Joe Lozano sexually harassed her at ABMK’s airport worksite. Reyes alleges that another supervisor, Juan Flores, made inappropriate remarks about her. Lozano was a “nonexempt project manager” at the airport, and he was assigned duties of a general cleaner, but was also responsible for inspecting the work of others. (Hunter Aff. ¶ 3, Docket No. 173.) If Lozano determined that a cleaner did not complete a job, he could ask the cleaner to re-clean, do the work himself, or notify his supervisor. (Id.) Lozano did not have the authority to take disciplinary action or otherwise impose employment action such as a demotion, termination, or reduction in pay or hours. (Id.) Flores was a “foreperson” at the airport during the time period relevant to Reyes’ claims. (Id. ¶ 5.) Flores was responsible for cleaning and also assisted Lozano with the inspection of other cleaners’ work. (Id.) Thomas Hunter, an ABMK operations manager at the airport, stated that like Lozano, Flores did not have the authority to hire, fire, demote, promote or take any other significant adverse employment action against those he “supervised.” (Id.)

On the above set of facts, the Court concludes that no reasonable fact-finder could find that Lozano or Flores were supervisors for the purposes of Title VII or the MHRA. Accordingly, the Court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Reyes’ quid pro quo sexual harassment claim.

e. Arminda Gomez

Gomez also alleges that Joe Lozano sexually harassed her at ABMK’s airport worksite. For the reasons discussed above regarding Reyes’ quid pro quo sexual harassment claim, a reasonable fact-finder could not find that Lozano had supervisory authority, and the Court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Gomez’s quid pro quo sexual harassment claim.

f. Nidia Guerrero

Guerrero alleges that Jesus Anal-co sexually harassed her at ABMK’s Medtronic worksite. Analco was a “zone manager” responsible for cleaning the “clean rooms” at Medtronic, which requires special training, and for inspecting other areas to ensure that they were properly cleaned. (Bonier Aff. ¶ 3, Docket No. 172; Analco Dep. Tr. 43-44.) If Analco determined that an area was not properly cleaned he could discuss the deficiency with the cleaner, clean the area himself, or notify his supervisor. (Bonier Aff. ¶ 4, Docket No. 172.) Analco testified that he did not handle scheduling issues or workload changes for the employees he supervised. (Analco Dep. Tr. 84.) Analco did not have the authority to hire, fire, promote, or demote cleaners; to adjust an employee’s schedule or pay rate or benefits; or to make economic decisions affecting the terms or conditions of any employee’s employment. (Bonier Aff. ¶ 3, Docket No. 172; Analco Dep. Tr. 99-105.)

Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, a reasonable factfinder could not find that Analco was a supervisor for the purposes of Title VII or the MHRA. Accordingly, the Court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Guerrero’s quid pro quo sexual harassment claim.

g. Lucila Marquez

Marquez alleges that Saul Ramirez and his brother, Ruben Ramirez, sexually harassed Marquez at ABMK’s Prairie Lakes Center worksite. Saul Ramirez had duties similar to a utility worker or general cleaner, but was also responsible for inspecting the work of other cleaners. (Wheeler Aff. ¶ 2, Docket No. 177.) If Saul Ramirez determined that a cleaner did not clean properly, he could complete the job himself or report the deficiency to his supervisor, Dick Nylander. (Id.) Saul Ramirez did not have the authority to hire, fire, promote, demote, or impose any tangible employment action on employees. (Id. ¶¶ 2-3.) Ruben Ramirez was a “lead” who was responsible in part for managing a small budget relating to costs for the cleaning project to which he was assigned, for assigning some cleaning projects to certain cleaners, and for inspecting their work. (Ruben Ramirez Dep. Tr. 63-82, 132-33.) Ruben Ramirez testified that he could not give part-time employees extra hours without first consulting his supervisor, and that he did not have the authority to suspend, terminate, or impose any other disciplinary action on employees. (Id. 69, 132-33.)

Based on those facts, a reasonable fact-finder could not find that Saul Ramirez or Ruben Ramirez were supervisors for the purposes of Title VII and the MHRA and the Court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Marquez’s claims,

h. Maria Perez

Maria Perez alleges that Saul Perez, Selso Romero, and Douglas Hussa sexually harassed her while she was working at ABMK’s United Health Group worksite. United Health Group account manager Jason Bergdahl stated that Saul Perez and Selso Romero were both “lead cleaners” who did not have authority to “hire, fire, demote, promote, discipline, reassign an employee to significantly different duties,” or otherwise take adverse employment action against other employees. (Bergdahl Aff. ¶¶ 5-6, Docket No. 171.)

Hussa was a project manager. (Bergdahl Aff. ¶4, Docket No. 171.) Hussa occasionally conducted safety or sexual harassment trainings with the employees that he supervised. (Huss Dep. Tr. 26, 37.) Hussa testified that when he believed an employee should be disciplined, he would make a recommendation to his supervisor. (Id. at 57-58.) Hussa testified that he occasionally granted employees’ requests to come to work a half hour late or a half hour early and that he occasionally granted employees the opportunity to work overtime to compensate for staffing shortages. (Id. 61-62, 71.) Hussa stated, however, that he did not have the ability to terminate employees. (Id. at 75.)

Given those facts, a reasonable fact-finder could not find that Saul Perez, Selso Romero, or Douglas Hussa had supervisory authority under Title VII and the MHRA. In particular, Hussa’s broader discretion in giving employees extra hours to make up for staffing shortages or in granting employees’ requests for minor scheduling changes do not constitute a power to reassign employees to significantly greater duties or take other tangible employment action. The Court thus grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Maria Perez’s quid pro quo sexual harassment claims.

In sum, plaintiffs have not adduced evidence creating a genuine fact dispute that plaintiffs’ accused harassers had authority to take tangible employments action against them, and no reasonable fact-finder could find that the harassers were supervisors for the purposes of Title VII and the MHRA. As a result, the Court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the original plaintiffs’ quid pro quo sexual harassment claims.

3. Hostile Work Environment

Plaintiffs allege that ABMK’s policies and practices create and maintain a hostile work environment by subjecting plaintiffs “to unwelcome conduct and statements based on sex that are objectively and subjectively offensive and are so severe and pervasive as to alter materially the terms and conditions of employment.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 296, Docket No. 25.) Plaintiffs contend that ABMK had actual or constructive notice of the harassment. (Id.)

Plaintiffs may prove sexual harassment by demonstrating that inappropriate conduct creates a “hostile work environment.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3). Plaintiffs must establish that “1) they are members of a protected group, 2) they were subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, 3) the harassment was based on sex, and 4) the harassment affected a term, condition or privilege of their employment.” Sandoval II, 578 F.3d at 801. “To establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual harassment by non-supervisory coworkers, [plaintiffs] must also establish [defendants] knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.” Id.; see also Gordon v. Shafer Contracting Co., Inc., 469 F.3d 1191, 1195 (8th Cir.2006); Meriwether v. Caraustar Packaging Co., 326 F.3d 990, 993 (8th Cir.2003). As stated by the Eighth Circuit:

The fourth element involves both objective and subjective components. The harassment must be severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment and the victim must subjectively believe her working conditions have been altered. There is no bright line between sexual harassment and merely unpleasant conduct. ... Accordingly, we view the ‘totality of the circumstances’ in determining whether there is a hostile work environment. The factors we look to include the frequency of the behavior, its severity, whether physical threats are involved, and whether the behavior interferes with a plaintiffs performance on the job.

Sandoval II, 5