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MEMORANDUM OPINION Denying the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Denying as Moot the Government’s Motion for the Court to Consider Ex Parte Information on the Merits Overruling the Government’s Objection to the Petitioner’s Reliance on Materials Outside the Record RICARDO M. URBINA, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION This matter comes before the court on the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Khairulla Said Wali Khairkhwa (ISN 579) (“the petitioner”), an Afghan national detained at the United States Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (“GTMO”). The government contends that the petitioner, a former senior Taliban official, is lawfully detained because he was part of Taliban forces and purposefully and materially supported such forces in hostilities against the United States. The petitioner maintains that his detention is unlawful because he was merely a civilian administrator in the Taliban government with no involvement in the Taliban’s military operations, and because he had disassociated himself from the Taliban by the time of his capture. In March 2011, the court held a merits hearing to assess the lawfulness of the petitioner’s detention. During the course of that hearing, the parties introduced dozens of exhibits from a variety of classified and public sources, including media reports, scholarly works, interrogation reports and declarations from intelligence analysts. The court also received live testimony and declarations from subject matter experts offered by the petitioner. At the conclusion of the hearing, both parties submitted detailed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law encapsulating and amplifying the evidence and argument presented during the merits hearing. Having carefully considered the parties’ extensive presentations, the court reaches the following findings. The petitioner was, without question, a senior member of the Taliban both before and after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001. The petitioner served as a Taliban spokesperson, the Taliban’s Acting Interior Minister, the Taliban Governor of Kabul and a member of the Taliban’s highest governing body, the Supreme Shura. The petitioner was a close associate of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, who appointed him Governor of the province of Herat in 1999. The petitioner held this office at the time the Taliban government fell to U.S. coalition forces in late 2001. Although the petitioner contends that he had no military responsibilities in any of his posts within the Taliban, the record belies that contention. The petitioner has repeatedly admitted that after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, he served as a member of a Taliban envoy that met clandestinely with senior Iranian officials to discuss Iran’s offer to provide the Taliban with weapons and other military support in anticipation of imminent hostilities with U.S. coalition forces. The petitioner has also exhibited a detailed knowledge about sensitive military-related matters, such as the locations, personnel and resources of Taliban military installations, the relative capabilities of different weapons systems and the locations of weapons caches. Furthermore, the petitioner operated within the Taliban’s formal command structure, providing material support to Taliban fighters both before and after the outset of hostilities with U.S. coalition forces. These facts are consistent with the Taliban’s governance model, in which nearly all senior Taliban officials were tasked with both civilian and military responsibilities. Despite the petitioner’s efforts to portray himself as a reluctant, marginal figure within the Taliban, the record indicates that the petitioner rose to the highest level of the Taliban and had close ties to Mullah Omar, who repeatedly appointed the petitioner to sensitive, high-profile positions. Indeed, even after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, the petitioner remained within Mullah Omar’s inner circle, despite the fact that Mullah Omar had limited his contacts to only his most trusted commanders. The petitioner remained part of Taliban forces at the time of his capture in early 2002. Although the petitioner contacted individuals allied with the United States to discuss the possibility of surrendering himself to U.S. coalition forces, he never turned himself in and was ultimately captured at the home of a senior Taliban military commander. In sum, based on a totality of the evidence, the court concludes that the government has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner was part of Taliban forces at the time of his capture. The petitioner is therefore lawfully detained and his petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied. II. BACKGROUND A. Factual Overview The following facts are undisputed. The petitioner was born in the Kandahar province of Afghanistan some time between 1967 and 1972. GE 91 (Joint Stipulation of Undisputed Facts) ¶ 10; GE 20 (ISN 579 FD-302 (July 2, 2002)) at 1; GE 44 (ISN 579 FD-302 (May 26, 2002)) at 1; GE 45 (ISN 579 FD-302 (May 13, 2002)) at 1; GE 70 (ISN 579 CSRT Summarized Statement (Nov. 8, 2004)) at 1-2. He is a Durrani Pashtu and a member of the Popalzai tribe. GE 91 ¶ 11. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the petitioner relocated with his family to a refugee camp near Quetta, Pakistan. GE 20 at 1. The petitioner spent the bulk of his youth in Pakistan and was educated at different madrassas in that country. GE 91 ¶ 14; GE 43 (ISN 579 MFR (May 10, 2002)) at 1; GE 45 at 1. In 1994, with the Soviets expelled from Afghanistan and various factions fighting for control over the country, the petitioner returned to Afghanistan. GE 91 ¶ 13. He moved to the village of Spin Boldak in Kandahar province, where he began working for the Taliban. Id. In Spin Boldak, the petitioner functioned primarily as a wa/ycmd, or spokesperson, serving as the Taliban’s spokesman to media outlets such as the BBC and Voice of America. GE 20 at 1-2; GE 45 at 1. The petitioner also served as the Taliban’s district administrator for Spin Boldak, the highest-ranking official in that city. GE 71 (ISN 579 ARB Statement (June 22, 2006)) at 3; Mar. 31 Tr. at 87. The petitioner rose quickly through the Taliban ranks. In 1996, the petitioner was appointed Governor of Kabul, PE 110 ¶ 50, and shortly thereafter, became the Taliban’s Acting Minister of the Interior, id.; GE 91 ¶ 16. By that time, the Taliban had seized control over southern and central Afghanistan, including Kabul, and were advancing on the Northern Alliance stronghold city of Mazar-e-Sharif. GE 91 ¶¶ 2-3. The Taliban attempted to seize the city in May and September 1997, but both assaults proved unsuccessful. Id. ¶ 3. The Taliban finally captured Mazar-eSharif in August 1998. Id. ¶ 4. On October 26, 1999, the petitioner was appointed Governor of Herat, id. ¶ 17, the westernmost province in Afghanistan, GE 92. The petitioner held this post when U.S. coalition forces commenced Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7, 2001. See GE 91 ¶ 5. By mid-November 2001, U.S. coalition forces had pushed the Taliban out of Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat and Kabul. Id. ¶¶ 6-8. Kandahar fell in early December 2001. Id. In late January or early February 2002, Pakistani authorities captured the petitioner in Chaman, Pakistan at the home of Abdul Manan Niazi, the former Taliban Governor of Kabul. Id. ¶ 18. The petitioner has been detained at GTMO since approximately March 2002. B. Procedural History In June 2008, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 171 L.Ed.2d 41 (2008), in which the Court held that individuals detained at GTMO are “entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention,” id. at 2262, and that the federal district courts have jurisdiction over such challenges, id. at 2274. Shortly thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his detention at GTMO. See generally Pet. Although the Supreme Court did not specify what procedures the district courts were to employ in resolving habeas petitions filed by GTMO detainees, it did emphasize that the “detainees in these cases are entitled to a prompt habeas corpus hearing.” Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2275. Toward that end, this court and other judges in this district agreed to consolidate their cases before Judge Hogan for the purpose of adopting common procedures for the GTMO detainee litigation. See Minute Order (Oct. 29, 2008). On November 6, 2008, Judge Hogan issued a Case Management Order (“CMO”) to govern these proceedings, which he amended on December 16, 2008. See generally Am. CMO (Dec. 16, 2008). This court adopted the provisions of the amended CMO, subject to modifications set forth in an Omnibus Order issued on April 23, 2009. See generally Omnibus Order (Apr. 23, 2009). The government filed its factual return for the petitioner in December 2008. See generally Factual Return. Following an extensive period of discovery, the petitioner filed his traverse in December 2009. See generally Traverse. In April 2010, the parties filed cross-motions for judgment on the record. See generally Govt’s Mot. for J. on the R.; Petr’s Cross-Mot. for J. on the R. The court denied the parties’ cross-motions after concluding that there were genuine issues of material fact in dispute, and scheduled a merits hearing to begin in November 2010. Order (Sept. 16, 2010). At the petitioner’s request, the court rescheduled the merits hearing to March 2011. Order (Oct. 12, 2010). The merits hearing began on March 28, 2011 and spanned four days. During the course of the hearing, the parties introduced dozens of exhibits and offered extensive argument concerning the lawfulness of the petitioner’s detention. The court also received live testimony from a subject matter expert called by the petitioner. See infra Part III.D. At the conclusion of the merits hearing, the parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. With the record now complete, the court turns to the applicable legal standards and the evidence and argument presented by the parties. III. EVIDENTIARY MATTERS A. Framework for Assessing the Evidence In assessing whether the government has shown that the petitioner is lawfully detained, the court “must evaluate the raw evidence, finding it to be sufficiently reliable and sufficiently probative to demonstrate the truth of the asserted proposition with the requisite degree of certainty.” Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C.Cir.2010) (quoting Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 847 (D.C.Cir.2008)). Thus, when relying on any piece of evidence in these GTMO habeas proceedings, the court must examine that evidence to “determine whether the evidence is in fact sufficiently reliable to be used as a justification for detention.” Khan v. Obama, 646 F.Supp.2d 6, 12 (D.D.C.2009); see also Naji al Warafi v. Obama, 704 F.Supp.2d 32, 38 (D.D.C.2010) (observing that “[i]n Guantanamo habeas proceedings, the Court must assess the accuracy, reliability, and credibility of each piece of evidence presented by the parties in the context of the evidence as a whole” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The reliability of any piece of evidence may be established by the intrinsic characteristics of that evidence, such as the nature and consistency of the details contained in an account, Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 428-29 (D.C.Cir.2010), as well as through corroboration by other evidence in the record, id. at 429 (noting that “an intelligence report’s reliability can be assessed by comparison to ‘exogenous information’ ”); Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725-26 (citing Parhat, 532 F.3d at 849). Two pieces of evidence, “each unreliable when viewed alone,” can corroborate each other and mutually establish their reliability. Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 726 (citing United States v. Laws, 808 F.2d 92, 100-03 (D.C.Cir.1986)). In this case, the government has based its case on a variety of classified and public materials,, including scholarly works, media reports, expert declarations, intelligence reports, interrogation reports reflecting statements made by the petitioner and other detainees and transcripts of the petitioner’s testimony to the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (“CSRT”) and the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”). A number of these documents contain multiple levels of hearsay. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). As dictated by this Circuit, the court shall individually assess the reliability of each exhibit that it relies on in the course of its analysis. See infra Part IV. B. Admissibility and Reliability of Hearsay Evidence Prior to the merits hearing, the government submitted a motion in which it argued that the court should afford a presumption of accuracy and authenticity to its hearsay evidence. See generally Govt’s Hearsay Mot. Noting that the motion was substantively identical to motions resolved by this court in other GTMO cases, the court granted in part and denied in part the government’s motion in an order issued prior to the merits hearing. Order (Mar. 17, 2011) (citing Alsabri v. Obama, 764 F.Supp.2d 60, 66-68 (D.D.C.2011); Hatim v. Obama, 677 F.Supp.2d 1, 7-10 (D.D.C.2009), rev’d on other grounds, 632 F.3d 720 (D.C.Cir.2011)). The reasoning underlying the court’s ruling is set forth in greater detail below. The Circuit has made clear that although “hearsay evidence is always admissible in Guantanamo habeas proceedings, such evidence must be accorded weight only in proportion to its reliability.” Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 428 (D.C.Cir.2010). As the Circuit has stated, “the question a habeas court must ask when presented with hearsay is not whether it is admissible — it is always admissible — but what probative weight to ascribe to whatever indicia of reliability it exhibits.” Al Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 879 (D.C.Cir.2010). Nothing in these Circuit decisions suggests that the court should presume the accuracy or reliability of the government’s exhibits; to the contrary, as previously noted, the Circuit has stated that before relying on any piece of evidence, the court must determine that it is sufficiently reliable and probative. Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725 (citing Parhat, 532 F.3d at 847); cf. Al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8, 14 (D.C.Cir.2010) (holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence where “[t]he government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability, and the court considered the reliability of the evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence”). Drawing on these principles, this court has held that although hearsay evidence is always admissible in these habeas proceedings, the court cannot presume the accuracy of such evidence, but must instead make individualized determinations about the reliability and accuracy of that evidence and the weight it is to be afforded. Alsabri, 764 F.Supp.2d at 66 (citing Hatim, 677 F.Supp.2d at 10). The court has also held that based on the principles underlying Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), which sets forth the hearsay exception for reports of regularly conducted activity, the government’s interrogation reports and intelligence reports are entitled to a presumption of authenticity. Id.; see also Almerfedi v. Obama, 2010 WL 691944, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 1, 2010) (concluding that all of the government’s hearsay evidence was admissible and that any evidence created and maintained by the government in the ordinary course of business was entitled to a rebuttable presumption of authenticity, but rejecting the government’s argument that its evidence should be afforded a presumption of accuracy). As described below, the court has applied the same framework in assessing the hearsay evidence introduced by the government in this case. See infra Part IV. C. Reliance on Ex Parte Information During the course of this litigation, the government has filed a number of motions for leave to provide the petitioner with redacted versions of certain documents that are subject to the automatic disclosure provisions of the CMO. The motions were brought pursuant to § I.F of the CMO, which provides that “[i]f the government objects to providing the petitioner’s counsel with classified information [otherwise subject to disclosure], the government shall move for an exception to disclosure.” CMO § I.F. Relying on the Circuit’s ruling in Al Odah, the court issued a series of rulings on these motions, ultimately granting the government leave to redact portions of certain documents disclosed to the petitioner. See, e.g., Mem. Order (May 25, 2010); Mem. Order (Oct. 5, 2010) (granting in part and holding in abeyance in part the government’s renewed fourth ex parte motion for exception from disclosure and directing the government to provide further explanation for its redaction to one document); see also Al Odah v. United States, 559 F.3d 539, 545-47 (D.C.Cir.2009) (concluding that the court may order the disclosure of classified information to the petitioner only if the evidence is material, access by petitioner’s counsel is necessary to facilitate meaningful habeas review and there are no adequate alternatives to disclosure). In June 2010, the petitioner filed a motion seeking access to the government’s ex parte filings. See generally Petr’s Mot. for Access to Ex Parte Filings. The court denied the motion, concluding that § I.F of the CMO contemplates ex parte applications for exceptions from disclosure. Mem. Op. (Sept. 16, 2010) at 6-9. In so ruling, however, the court noted that it had no intention of relying on any redacted, ex parte information in determining the legality of the petitioner’s detention. Id. at 8-9. On March 27, 2011, the government filed a motion, in which it argued that the court should, in assessing the lawfulness of the petitioner’s detention, consider ex parte certain information redacted from the documents disclosed to the petitioner. See generally Govt’s Mot. that the Court Consider on the Merits Information Contained in Its 3d & 5th CMO § I.F. Motions (“Govt’s Mot. for Ex Parte Consideration”). According to the government, the Circuit’s ruling in Al Odah implicitly acknowledges the court’s authority to rely on ex parte materials when the petitioner’s access to that information is not necessary to facilitate the court’s meaningful review. See generally id. The petitioner disagrees, citing the well-established presumption against the court’s reliance on materials to which both parties do not enjoy access. See generally Petr’s Opp’n to Govt’s Mot. for Ex Parte Consideration. The court is aware that at least one judge in this district has relied on ex parte information to assess the reliability of materials submitted by the government during a merits hearing. See Khan v. Obama, 741 F.Supp.2d 1, 17 (D.D.C.2010) (noting that the court conducted an ex parte review of unredacted copies of certain intelligence reports to assess their reliability). In this immediate case, however, the court finds it unnecessary to rule on the issue because, as discussed below, the evidence to which both parties had access amply establishes the lawfulness of the petitioner’s detention. See infra Part IV. Accordingly, the court denies the government’s motion as moot. D. Qualification of the Petitioner’s Experts During the merits hearing, the petitioner sought to introduce testimony from two individuals proffered as expert witnesses: Hekmat Karzai and Brian Williams. Karzai submitted a declaration on the petitioner’s behalf, see generally PE 110 (Decl. of Hekmat Karzai), and testified at the merits hearing, see Mar. 31 Tr. at 45-152. Williams also offered a declaration on the petitioner’s behalf, see generally PE 111A (Decl. of Brian Williams), though he did not testify at the merits hearing. Following extensive voir dire by the government, the court concluded that Karzai was qualified to offer expert testimony on each of the matters addressed in his declaration. Mar. 31 Tr. at 92. The court also heard extensive argument from the parties regarding Williams’s qualifications to offer expert testimony in this case, though it declined to rule on the matter during the hearing. In the following sections, the court explains in greater detail the basis for its ruling on Karzai’s qualifications and assesses the expert qualifications of Williams. The court begins by briefly recounting the general principles governing the qualification of expert witnesses. 1. Legal Standard for the Qualification of Expert Witnesses Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that a witness must qualify as an expert to testify on matters that are scientific, technical or specialized in nature. See Fed.R.Evid. 702. The court must act as a “gatekeeper” and determine the admissibility of expert testimony and the qualifications of expert witnesses. Meister v. Med. E.ng’g Corp., 267 F.3d 1123, 1127 n. 9 (D.C.Cir.2001) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 n. 10, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)). The trial court’s gatekeeping obligation applies not only to scientific testimony but to all expert testimony. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 148, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). In general, Rule 702 has been interpreted to favor admissibility. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587, 113 S.Ct. 2786; see also Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note (2000) (“A review of the caselaw after Daubert shows that the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule.”). The adversarial system remains the “traditional and appropriate” mechanism for exposing “shaky but admissible evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note (2000) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786). Nonetheless, the party presenting the expert bears the burden, by a “preponderance of proof,” of establishing the qualifications of the proposed expert. Meister, 267 F.3d at 1127 n. 9. Rule 702 does not specify any particular means for qualifying an expert, requiring only that the witness possess the “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” necessary to “assist” the trier of fact. Fed.R.Evid. 702. As the Supreme Court stated in Daubert, the trial court must determine whether the proposed expert possesses “a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline.” 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786. In considering whether this standard is met, courts may consider the factors articulated in Daubert, such as (1) whether the expert’s technique or theory can be or has been tested; (2) whether the technique or theory has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when applied; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific community. Id. The Supreme Court has, however, noted that the Daubert factors are not exclusive and may not apply in all cases. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 150-51, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (noting that Rule 702 envisions a “flexible” inquiry). In cases in which the Daubert factors do not apply, “reliability concerns may focus on personal knowledge or experience.” Groobert v. President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll, 219 F.Supp.2d 1, 6 (D.D.C.2002) (citing Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 149, 119 S.Ct. 1167). Formal education ordinarily suffices, and a person who holds a graduate degree typically qualifies as an expert in his or her field. See, e.g., Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 176-77 (5th Cir.1990); Am. Gen. Life. Ins. Co. v. Schoenthal Family, LLC, 555 F.3d 1331, 1338-39 (11th Cir.2009). There is, however, no requirement that an expert possess formal education, and an expert may be qualified on the basis of his or her practical experience. See, e.g., Thomas v. Newton Int’l Enters., 42 F.3d 1266, 1269-70 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that a longshoreman with twenty-nine years of experience in various positions within the industry was qualified to testify as an expert about proper safety procedures). As noted in the advisory committee notes to Rule 702, “[i]f the witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.” Fed. R.Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note (2000). The degree of “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” required to qualify an expert witness “is only that necessary to insure that the witness’s testimony ‘assist’ the trier of fact.” See Mannino v. Int’l Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846, 851 (6th Cir.1981) (noting that the weight of the evidence is a matter to be assessed by the trier of fact). “[I]t is not necessary that the witness be recognized as a leading authority in the field in question or even a member of a recognized professional community.” 29 Fed. Prac. & Proc. (Evid.) § 6265. “The ‘assist’ requirement is satisfied where expert testimony advances the trier of fact’s understanding to any degree.” Id. 2. Hekmat Karzai Hekmat Karzai, one of the proposed experts on whom the petitioner relies, is the Director of the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies, an independent research institute in Afghanistan dedicated to reducing the threat of political violence and fostering an environment of peace and stability in that nation. PE 110 ¶¶ 1-2. Karzai earned a master’s degree in strategic studies, focusing on issues such as terrorism, militancy and insurgency, has authored scholarly works on the Taliban and its relationship with al-Qaida, has traveled extensively in the region and is personally acquainted with many former Taliban leaders as well as local Afghan officials. Id. ¶¶ 4-6; Mar. 31 Tr. at 46-49, 52. He is also a senior fellow at the Joint Special Operations University, Special Operations Command for the United States Military and regularly briefs senior U.S. commanders in Afghanistan. Mar. 31 Tr. at 46-49. The petitioner offered Karzai to provide expert testimony on the following subjects: (1) background on the Taliban government and its relations with Iran; (2) a profile of Mullah Omar; and (3) the petitioner’s background and his role within the Taliban government. PE 110 ¶ 7. Following a lengthy voir dire, the government conceded Karzai’s qualifications to offer expert testimony on the first two of these issues. Mar. 31 Tr. at 89. The government objected, however, to Karzai offering expert testimony on the third issue, arguing that his views on the petitioner’s roles within the Taliban were based more on ipse dixit than on rigorous analysis. Id. at 89-90. The government noted that Karzai had published no scholarly works about me petitioner and based his opinions about the petitioner primarily on his discussions with individuals associated with the petitioner rather than on any rigorous analytical inquiry. Id. at 90. In effect, the government argued, the petitioner was attempting to introduce hearsay evidence in the guise of expert testimony. Id. at 91. The court overruled the government’s objection based on the following considerations: having authored a master’s thesis on the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaida, as well as numerous scholarly works on the Taliban and Afghanistan, Karzai had amassed over a decade of experience conducting research on issues related to the Taliban and Afghanistan by the time he began researching the petitioner in 2006. Id. at 44-49, 86. Accordingly, Karzai plainly possessed the training and experience necessary to conduct research into the petitioner, a prominent and senior member of the Taliban government. Indeed, it would appear that in a manner consistent with his training and experience, Karzai conducted a systematic inquiry into the petitioner. Karzai testified that he formed his opinions about the petitioner’s background and posts within the Taliban by interviewing numerous people associated with him, including his family, those who worked with him in the Taliban government on a daily basis and current senior Afghan government officials. Id. at 83-85. He also consulted primary and secondary sources, such as local Afghan publications, for information regarding the petitioner’s role within the Taliban. Id. at 84. Karzai testified that he sought out a variety of individuals with firsthand knowledge about the petitioner, speaking not only with individuals from Taliban-dominated southern Afghanistan, but also with individuals from both the Mazar-e-Sharif region in the north and Herat province in western Afghanistan. Id. at 89. Moreover, Karzai attempted to verify the information he obtained from any source by seeking corroboration through other sources. Id. at 86-87. The government did not explain why Karzai’s reliance on information that he obtained from these interviews precludes him from offering expert testimony, particularly in light of his efforts to cross-reference and corroborate this information. Although the government suggested that the rigor of Karzai’s inquiry was undermined by his personal desire to see the petitioner freed, Mar. 31 Tr. at 90-91, in the court’s view, this factor is relevant to the weight afforded to Karzai’s testimony, not his expertise. Accordingly, based on Karzai’s knowledge, training and experience regarding the Taliban and his efforts to research the petitioner’s background and roles within the Taliban, the court concluded during the merits hearing that Karzai was qualified to offer expert testimony on the petitioner’s background and posts within the Taliban. 3. Brian Williams Brian Williams is a professor of Islamic History at the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth, where he has taught since 2001. PE 111A ¶ 1. He has a doctoral degree in Central Asian History, as well as a master’s degree in Russian History and Central Eurasian Studies. Id. Williams has authored more than seventy articles on war and terrorism in Central Eurasia. Id. He has testified as an expert in other GTMO proceedings. See, e.g., Khan, 741 F.Supp.2d at 8 (noting that Williams offered expert testimony on Afghan warlords). In his declaration, Williams offers expert opinion testimony on the following four subjects: (1) the Taliban’s conquest of Mazar-e-Sharif; (2) Iranian-Taliban cooperation against the United States; (3) intelligence sharing between the Taliban and Iran; and (4) al-Qaida bases located in Herat. See generally PE 111A. The government does not dispute Williams’s qualifications to offer testimony on subjects one and four. Mar. 31 Tr. at 6. The government asserts, however, that Williams lacks the qualifications necessary to offer expert testimony on subjects two and three, both of which concern the relationship between the Taliban and Iran. Id. More specifically, the government contends that Williams has little expertise on Afghanistan or the Taliban, having focused the majority of his scholarly endeavors on the Russian Caucasus and Turkey, and that he has no specialized education or training on Iran. Id. at 6-21. The government also points to mistakes and inconsistencies in testimony offered by Williams in other GTMO proceedings as evidence of his lack of expertise. Id. at 22-30. The court disagrees with the government’s assessment of Williams’s expertise. The government itself has previously relied on Williams as an expert on the Taliban. Williams authored a book published in 2001 by U.S. Army Publications entitled “Afghanistan 101: A Guide to the Afghan Theater of Operations,” GE 100 ¶ 5, and has lectured on the Taliban and Afghanistan at the U.S. Special Operations Command at Macdill Air Force Base (“The Role of Foreign Fighters in the Taliban Insurgency”), Air Force Special Operations Command at Hurlburt Airfield (“Waging Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan 1842-2008”), the Joint Information Operations Warfare Command at Lack-land Air Force Base (“Background on Islam, Suicide Terrorism and Jihad in the Middle East”) and the Central Intelligence Agency’s Counter Terrorist Center (“Profiling Afghan Suicide Bombers”), GE 111B (Curriculum Vitae of Brian Williams) at 9-10. Williams has worked for a U.S. Army Information Operations team at NATO Headquarters in Kabul and wrote the Joint Information Operations Warfare Command’s field manual on Afghanistan. PE 111A ¶ 2. Williams has traveled to Afghanistan on four occasions since the fall of the Taliban government. Id. He has also authored articles discussing Afghanistan in the age of Taliban-rule that have been published in scholarly journals, as well as policy journals and other collections. PE 111B at 3-7. Furthermore, Williams has taught at least one course covering modern Afghan history, including the period of the Taliban, titled “Empires and Invasions: A History of Afghanistan from Genghis Khan to the War on Terror.” GE 95 at 1. Given his demonstrated scholarship on the history of the Taliban, as well as the government’s own reliance on him as an expert on matters related to the Taliban, it is clear that Williams possesses the specialized knowledge needed to offer expert opinion testimony on the Taliban and Afghanistan. Indeed, as previously noted, the government has conceded that Williams is qualified to offer expert testimony about the battle for Mazar-e-Sharif during the rise of the Taliban and about the presence of al-Qaida bases in Herat province during the Taliban’s rule over Afghanistan. See Mar. 31 Tr. at 6. Such expertise could not be obtained without developing a specialized knowledge of the Taliban’s relationships with its regional neighbors, including Iran. It is well-established that Iran, which shares a 400-mile border with Afghanistan, played a central role in Afghan affairs during the Taliban’s rise to power, providing substantial military support to the Northern Alliance and other groups in their struggle for control of Afghanistan. See, e.g., PE 75 (Thomas H. Johnson, Ismail Khan, Herat, and Iranian Influence, 3 Strategic Insights, no. 7, July 2004, at 1) at 3; PE 76 (Mohsen M. Milani, Iran’s Policy Towards Afghanistan, 60 Middle E.J., no. 2, Spring 2006, at 235) at 244 (noting that Iran provided key support to the Northern Alliance during the battle for Mazar-e-Sharif, in which the Taliban ultimately prevailed with the aid of Pakistan). Although the fact that Williams has little demonstrated expertise in Iran is relevant to the weight that the court ascribes to his views on the relationship between the Taliban and Iran, it does not preclude him from offering expert testimony on the issue. Accordingly, the court concludes that Williams is qualified to offer expert opinion testimony on all of the issues for which he has been proffered. IV. ANALYSIS A. The Scope of the Government’s Detention Authority The government’s authority to detain individuals at GTMO derives from the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”), which provides that the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attack that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons. Pub.L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). This Circuit has delineated two categories of persons detainable under the AUMF: (1) individuals who are “part of’ forces associated with al-Qaida or the Taliban and (2) individuals who purposefully and materially supported such forces in hostilities against U.S. coalition forces. Al Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872; see also id. at 874 (noting that “both prongs are valid criteria that are independently sufficient to satisfy the standard”). The burden rests with the government to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the detainee falls within one of these categories of detainable persons. See Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C.Cir.2010) (stating that “a preponderance of the evidence standard satisfies constitutional requirements in considering a habeas petition from a detainee held pursuant to the AUMF”); accord Al Bihani, 590 F.3d at 878. The Circuit has observed that because al-Qaida’s organizational structure is amorphous, “it is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of criteria for determining whether an individual is ‘part of al Qaeda.” Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725. Accordingly, the district courts must determine whether an individual is “part of’ alQaida or associated forces on a “case-by-case basis” employing a “functional rather than a formal approach and by focusing upon the actions of the individual in relation to the organization.” Id. “That an individual operates within al Qaeda’s formal command structure is surely sufficient but is not necessary to show that he is ‘part of the organization.” Id.-, see also Awad, 608 F.3d at 11 (“If the government can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a detainee was part of the ‘command structure’ of al Qaeda, this satisfies the requirement to show that he was ‘part of al Qaeda. But there are ways other than making a ‘command structure’ showing to prove that a detainee is ‘part of al Qaeda.”). On the other hand, “the purely independent conduct of a freelancer is not enough” to show that an individual is detainable as “part of’ of those enemy forces. Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725; see also Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 752 (D.C.Cir.2010) (noting that “the government’s failure to prove that an individual was acting under orders from al-Qaida may be relevant to the question of whether the individual was ‘part of the organization when captured”). The government’s “authority to detain an enemy combatant is not dependent on whether an individual would pose a threat to the United States or its allies if released.” Awad, 608 F.3d at 11. The government must prove, however, that the petitioner was “part of’ the Taliban, alQaida or associated forces at the time of his capture to demonstrate that his detention is lawful under the first prong of the standard. See Salahi 625 F.3d at 751 (observing that “the relevant inquiry is whether [the petitioner] was ‘part of alQaida when captured”); Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F.Supp.2d 43, 71 (D.D.C.2009). Few courts have delved at length into the “purposeful and material support” prong of the detention standard. It is nonetheless clear that as with the “part of’ prong of the detention standard, the inquiry into whether an individual has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against U.S. coalition forces requires a fact-specific assessment focusing on the actions of the individual in relation to the organization. See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873 (noting that even if the detainee could prove that he was a civilian “contractor” and was not a formal member of the Taliban, the services that he provided to Taliban fighters engaged in hostilities against U.S. coalition forces, such as cooking for the unit and carrying a brigade-issued weapon, would render him detainable under the support prong of the detention standard). In assessing whether the government has met its burden under either prong of the detention standard, the court may not view each piece of evidence in isolation, but must consider the totality of the evidence. See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105-06 (D.C.Cir.2010). Even if no individual piece of evidence would by itself justify the petitioner’s detention, the evidence may, when considered as a whole and in context, nonetheless demand the conclusion that the petitioner was more likely than not “part of’ the Taliban or alQaida or that the petitioner purposefully and materially supported such forces. Id. (concluding that the district court erred in “requir[ing] each piece of the government’s evidence to bear weight without regard to all (or indeed any) other evidence in the ease”); cf. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 179-80, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987) (observing that “individual pieces of evidence, insufficient in themselves to prove a point, may in cumulation prove it” because the “sum of an evidentiary presentation may well be greater than its constituent parts”). B. The Petitioner Is Lawfully Detained 1. The Petitioner Was a Senior Taliban Official In many of the GTMO habeas cases litigated since Boumediene, the central question before the court has been whether the detainee knowingly associated himself with the Taliban, al-Qaida or related enemy forces. To resolve this question, courts have commonly sifted through evidence of the detainee’s presence at training camps and safe houses and assessed the plausibility of the detainee’s claim that he had no intention of joining forces hostile to the United States. See, e.g., Alsabri, 764 F.Supp.2d at 70-96 (analyzing evidence that the detainee had stayed at alQaida and Taliban-affiliated guesthouses and training camps and evaluating the detainee’s assertion that he traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan to find work and a wife); Kandari v. United States, 744 F.Supp.2d 11, 27-29 (D.D.C.2010) (assessing the detainee’s assertion that he traveled to Pakistan and then to Afghanistan to obtain religious training and perform charitable work); Almerfedi v. Obama, 725 F.Supp.2d 18, 22-31 (D.D.C.2010) (evaluating the detainee’s claim that he traveled from Yemen to Pakistan in the hopes of facilitating a missionary trip to Europe, as well as the government’s evidence that the petitioner stayed at al-Qaida affiliated guesthouses). This case proceeds from a different footing. Here, there is no dispute about the petitioner’s long history as a member of the Taliban. As previously noted, the petitioner acknowledges that he began working for the Taliban in 1994 and that he served as the Taliban’s district administrator in Spin Boldak and spokesperson to media outlets such as the BBC and Voice of America. GE 91 ¶ 15; GE 20 at 1-2; GE 45 at 1; GE 70 at 1-2; GE 71 at 3; GE 110 ¶ 48. It is undisputed that the petitioner was appointed Governor of Kabul in 1996 and, shortly thereafter, became the Taliban’s Acting Interior Minister. GE 91 ¶ 16; GE 110 ¶50. It is also undisputed that in October 1999, the petitioner was appointed Governor of Herat province, a position that he held through the commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom. GE 91 ¶¶ 5, 17. In short, the parties agree that the petitioner was not only functionally part of the Taliban, but that he was, in fact, a formally-recognized, high-ranking Taliban official at the time of the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. As a result, the question before the court is not whether the petitioner ever knowingly associated himself with the Taliban, but instead, whether the nature and duration of that association renders him lawfully detained under the AUMF. The government contends that the petitioner is lawfully detained because he was deeply involved in the Taliban’s military operations throughout his tenure with the Taliban, had close ties to Mullah Omar and remained part of the Taliban at the time of his capture in early 2002. The petitioner, in turn, asserts that although he was a senior Taliban official, he had no involvement with the Taliban’s military operations, had no meaningful relationships with senior Taliban leaders and had disassociated himself from the Taliban by the time of his capture. The court considers these matters in turn. 2. The Petitioner’s Involvement With Taliban Military Operations Throughout this litigation, the petitioner’s chief contention has been that he was merely a civilian administrator who had no involvement with the Taliban’s military operations. According to the petitioner, the evidence purporting to show that he had obtained military training and experience and possessed military responsibilities is inherently flawed and unreliable. The petitioner also relies on the statements of expert witnesses and former Taliban officials who claim that the petitioner was merely a civilian bureaucrat with no military responsibilities. The petitioner asserts that as a purely civilian official, he was not part of Taliban forces, did not purposefully and materially support the Taliban in hostilities against U.S. coalition forces, and, as a result, is not lawfully detained. The government does not dispute that a purely civilian official who had no connection to any military activities would not be subject to detention under the AUMF. According to the government, however, the evidence overwhelmingly indicates that like almost all Taliban leaders, the petitioner obtained military training and experience fighting with the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s, and remained deeply involved in the Taliban’s military operations until the time of his capture in early 2002. The court assesses this evidence in the following sections, a. The Petitioner’s Involvement With the Anti-Soviet Afghan Mujahideen In December 1979, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan and attempted to occupy the country. PE 76 at 287-39. Over the next decade, they fought a protracted guerilla war against a loosely allied coalition of Afghan mujahideen fighters and foreign fighters who had traveled to Afghanistan to wage jihad against the Soviets. PE 67 (Rashid, Taliban, supra) at 197-98. In 1989, Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan. Id. at 198-99. Without Soviet military assistance, the pro-Soviet Afghan government collapsed. PE 70 (Neamatollah Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan (2002)) at 141. During the ensuing struggle for power, Afghanistan descended into civil war. PE 76 at 199-200; PE 110 ¶¶ 8-10. It was during this period of civil strife that the Taliban emerged, originating from madrassas in Afghanistan and Pakistan. See GE 88 (Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon (1999)) at 21 (“The most widely circulated theory is that the leadership of the Taliban emerged from amongst the disgruntled Afghan refugees studying in the deeni madaris [religious schools] around Quetta and Peshawar.”). As Karzai explains in his declaration, Afghan refugees based in Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province (NWFP) had been encouraged to join the growing number of radical madrassas during the resistance against the former Soviet Union. By 1994, there were thousands of Taliban students who had received basic military training. The movement was led by a veteran of the Afghan Jihad, Mullah Mohammad Omar. PE 110 ¶ 9. According to Ahmed Rashid, whose book Taliban is acknowledged by both parties to be an authoritative account of the history of the Taliban, nearly all of the Taliban’s senior leaders were veterans of the anti-Soviet mujahideen who had been educated at madrassas in Afghanistan and Pakistan. See GE 48 at 252-55. For instance, Mullah Omar, a founder of the Taliban and its supreme leader, had fought against the Soviets as part of the mujahideen faction led by Yunas Khalis and had attended various madrassas in Kandahar province. Id. at 253. Mullah Mohammed Hassan, the Taliban’s Foreign Minister, had attended a madrassa in Quetta, Pakistan and also fought under Yunas Khalis in the Afghan mujahideen. Id. Mullah Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Taliban’s Culture and Information Minister, and Mullah Maulvi Qalamuddin, Head of the Taliban’s Religious Police, were both former Afghan mujahideen commanders, members of the Harakat Mujahideen party led by Mohammed Nabi Mohammedi and educated at the Dar-ul Uloom Haqqania madrassa near Islamabad, Pakistan. GE 48 at 253-54. Mullah Mohammed Abbas, the Taliban Health Minister, and Mullah Jalaluddin Haqqani, Minister of Frontier Affairs, were also educated at the Dar-ul Uloom Haqqania madrassa and had fought against the Soviets with the Afghan mujahideen under Yunis Khalis. Id. As reported by Rashid, the petitioner, who became the Taliban’s Acting Interior Minister and a member of its Supreme Shura, fit this mold precisely. More specifically, Rashid reports that the petitioner was a graduate of the Dar-ul Uloom Haqqania madrassa, a member of Mohammed Nabi Mohammedi’s Harakat Mujahideen party and a former mujahideen commander during the Soviet occupation. Id. at 252. The petitioner’s expert witnesses have acknowledged the reliability of Rashid’s reporting on the Taliban. Williams states in his declaration that Rashid’s Taliban is the most significant work on the history of the Taliban and a “must read for anyone trying to understand the events in this case.” PE 111A ¶ 5. Karzai similarly testified that Rashid possesses an understanding of Afghanistan that is superior to that of most other purported experts and noted that Rashid’s account of the history of the Taliban was more reliable than other works because it resulted from Rashid’s field work in Afghanistan. Mar. 31 Tr. at 129. The fact that the petitioner’s own expert witnesses have acknowledged the authoritativeness of Rashid’s reporting supports the reliability of his report that the petitioner fought against the Soviets with the Afghan mujahideen. The court also notes that Rashid’s reporting on the backgrounds of other senior Taliban leaders is independently corroborated by other information in the record. For instance, Rashid’s report that Mullah Omar received a madrassa education in Kandahar and fought with the Afghan mujahideen faction led by Yunas Khalis, GE 48 at 252, is corroborated by Karzai, who has also written articles about Mullah Omar, Mar. 31 Tr. at 79, and stated in his declaration that Mullah Omar was “educated in various madrassas in Kandahar,” PE 110 ¶ 40, and had “participated in the Jihad against the Soviet and Afghanistan communist government under the faction led by Yunas Khalis,” id. ¶ 42. Similarly, Rashid’s report that Mullah Qalamuddin, the Taliban’s Head of Religious Police, was educated at the Dar-ul Uloom Haqqania madrassa is corroborated by a September 2001 article about the Dar-ul Uloom Haqqania madrassa in the The Guardian newspaper. GE 21 at 2 (reporting on an interview with Samiul Haq and listing the Taliban’s “first head of the religious police Qalam Uddin” as a graduate of Haq’s Darul Uloom madrassa). Tellingly, the petitioner has identified no other instance in which Rashid has provided incorrect information about the background of any other senior Taliban leader. Indeed, much of Rashid’s account of the petitioner’s background is independently corroborated by other evidence in the record. For instance, Rashid reports that the petitioner was born in Kandahar province, is a Durrani Pashtun and is a member of the Popalzai tribe, GE 48 at 253, all of which are facts to which the parties have stipulated, GE 91 ¶ 11. Moreover, Karzai, who conducted an independent inquiry into the petitioner, see supra Part III.D.2, acknowledged during his testimony that the petitioner had attended the Dar-ul Uloom Haqqania madrassa and was, at least for a time, a member of the Harakat Mujahideen party of Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, Mar. 31 Tr. at 139, 142, facts also reported by Rashid, GE 48 at 253. Likewise, the September 2001 article in The Guardian discussing Samiul Haq identifies the petitioner as one of the most prominent alumni of the Dar-ul Uloom Haqqania madrassa. GE 21 at 2. Moreover, although the petitioner has given contradictory accounts of his actions during the Soviet occupation, he has admitted on multiple occasions that while living in Pakistan, he traveled to Afghanistan to obtain military training and fight with the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviets. GE 43 at 1; GE 45 at 1; GE 71 at 6-7. During a [redacted] interrogation, the petitioner stated that “[t]he only military training he has [received] consisted of a short period of time at Camp Marof, near Kandahar, when [he] was in his teens. This camp, who[se] Commandant was Abdul Raziq, was a Mujahadeen training facility where people were sent during the AF/Soviet war.” GE 45 at 1. Later, during a [redacted] interrogation, the petitioner acknowledged that “he traveled twice to [Afghanistan] to join the jihad against the communists” and attended “a mujahideen training camp in Marof operated by Abdul Raziq, though the petitioner denied receiving any training during his time at the camp.” GE 43 at 1. Finally, during his June 2006 ARB proceedings, the petitioner testified that he had participated in jihad “for a few days” as a youth during the Soviet occupation but that he had received no military training. GE 71 at 6-7. The fact that the petitioner has admitted that he traveled to Afghanistan to train and fight with the mujahideen and that he participated in jihad “for a few days” provides additional corroboration for Rashid’s account of the petitioner’s background. The petitioner has offered nothing that persuasively refutes or undercuts the evidence establishing the petitioner’s participation in the Afghan mujahideen. Although the petitioner suggests that he was in his teens for most of the Soviet occupation and lacked any formal military training, he has not explained how either fact precludes the possibility that he fought with the Afghan mujahideen or rose through its ranks. Likewise, although the petitioner objects by stating that Rashid has not identified the sources of his information regarding the petitioner’s background, the petitioner’s own experts have acknowledged that Rashid’s reporting is based on his field work in Afghanistan and is highly authoritative. Mar. 31. Tr. at 129; PE 111A ¶ 5. Finally, although Karzai testified that the petitioner had “absolutely no military background,” Mar. 31 Tr. at 119, the petitioner has admitted that he traveled to Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation to receive training and has acknowledged that he engaged in jihad for a period of time, GE 71 at 6-7. Accordingly, the weight of the evidence indicates that the petitioner did fight with the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviets. That the petitioner fought with the Afghan mujahideen, at a time when those forces were allied with the United States and against the Soviet Union, see PE 67 at 197, hardly establishes the lawfulness of his detention. This finding does, however, serve as an important' starting point for assessing the petitioner’s role in the Taliban, for it establishes that the petitioner possessed at least some military experience by the time he joined the Taliban in 1994, and begins to unravel the petitioner’s assertion that he was merely a civilian bureaucrat with no connection to the Taliban’s military forces. b. The Petitioner’s Command of Taliban Forces at Mazar-e-Sharif i. The Taliban’s Efforts to Capture Mazar-e-Sharif As previously noted, by 1992, Afghanistan had descended into civil war, as different factions vied for control over the country following the retreat of Soviet forces. By November 1994, Taliban forces had captured Kandahar and by February 1995, had consolidated their control over the Pashtun lands of southern Afghanistan. PE 110 ¶ 11. They then moved west, conquering Afghanistan’s western provinces, including Herat. Id. In August 1996, the Taliban pushed into Jalalabad and in September, captured Kabul. Id. ¶ 12. By the winter of 1996, the Taliban controlled twenty-two of Afghanistan’s thirty-four provinces. PE 67 at 54. The only major city not under Taliban control was Mazar-e-Sharif, a city near the northern border with Uzbekistan and the stronghold of anti-Taliban General Rashid Dostum, whose Uzbek forces had insulated the city from the fighting sweeping through the rest of Afghanistan. Id. at 54. In the spring of 1997, the Taliban turned their attention northward. PE 110 ¶ 14. The Taliban quickly swept north from Herat and Kabul, seizing control over several northern provinces. PE 67 at 58. General Dostum fled to Uzbekistan. Id. In May 1997, 2,500 heavily-armed Taliban troops under the command of Mullah Abdul Razaq rolled into Mazar-e-Sharif with little resistance. Id. Their occupation of the city was short-lived, however, as a counteroffensive by Uzbek and Hazara fighters pushed the Taliban out of the city days later. Id. at 58-59. After regrouping, the Taliban launched a second assault on Mazar-e-Sharif in early September 1997. GE 91 ¶3. General Dostum returned from exile and pushed the Taliban out of the Mazar region. PE 67 at 62. Because Mazar-e-Sharif had, by that time, been largely taken over by Hazara groups, General Dostum based his Uzbek forces in the nearby city of Sheberghan. Id. at 63. In July 1998, the Taliban commenced a third offensive to capture the Mazar region. GE 91 ¶ 4. Taliban forces stationed in the western province of Herat swept towards Mazar-e-Sharif from the west, routing General Dostum’s forces in Meymaneh on July 12, 1998, and capturing General Dostum’s headquarters in Sheberghan on August 1, 1998. PE 67 at 72-73. These Taliban forces then annihilated the Hazara troops guarding the western road to Mazar-e-Sharif and entered the city on the morning of August 8, 1998. Id. at 73. Rashid writes that once Taliban forces entered Mazar-e-Sharif, “[w]hat followed was another brutal massacre, genocidal in its ferocity, as the Taliban took revenge on their losses the previous year.” PE 67 at 73; see also GE 8 (Amnesty International News Service 171/98, Afghanistan: Thousands of Civilians Killed Follomng Tale-ban Takeover of Mazar-e Sharif Sept. 3, 1998) at 1-2; GE 9 (Dexter Filkins, Afghans Report Ethnic Massacre by Taliban, L.A. Times, Sept. 18, 1998) at 1. On the first day of the occupation, Taliban forces swept through the city in a “killing frenzy,” indiscriminately killing women, children and other civilians. PE 67 at 73; GE 10 (Human Rights Watch Press Release, Afghanistan: The Massacre in Mazar-I Sharif Nov. 1, 1998) at 1. Mullah Abdul Manan Niazi, whom Karzai testified was one of the Taliban commanders who led the offensive on Mazar-e-Sharif, Mar. 31 Tr. at 116, was appointed Governor of Mazar hours after its capture and delivered speeches at mosques throughout the city inciting violence against Hazaras in retaliation for their killing of Taliban soldiers the previous year, PE 67 at 74; GE 12 (The Afghanistan Justice Project, Casting Shadows: War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: 1978-2001 § 7.2 (2005)) at 122. Human Rights Watch stated that “[t]hese speeches, given by the most senior Taliban official in Mazar at the time, clearly indicate that the killings and other attacks on Hazaras were not the actions of renegade Taliban forces but had the sanction of the Taliban authorities.” GE 10 at 1. Over the following days, Niazi implemented a systematic program of ethnic cleansing, overseeing the segregation and massacre of thousands of Hazara residents of Mazar-e-Sharif. GE 11 (Michael Winchester, Inside Story: Afghanistan Ethnic Cleansing, Asiaweek, Nov. 6, 1998) at 3; PE 67 at 73-74. Rashid estimates that between 6,000 to 8,000 civilians were killed during the Taliban’s northern campaign in July and August 1998. PE 67 at 74. ii. The Petitioner’s Role in the September 1997 Assault on Mazar-e-Sharif Reliable evidence indicates that the petitioner was a commander of Taliban forces during the Taliban’s failed September 1997 assault on Mazar-e-Sharif. One such piece of evidence is a State Department cable dated September 17, 1997, which reports on a discussion held earlier that day between an unidentified U.S. political officer and Tayyab Husseini, a Taliban representative at the Taliban-controlled Afghan embassy in Islamabad. GE 2 at 1. According to the cable, Husseini stated that Taliban forces, allied with local Pas[h]tuns, are poised to seize Mazar-iSharif city from the Northern Alliance in the “next several days.” Smiling broadly, Husseini said Khairullah Khairkhwa[], the Taliban commander in the North and their “Acting Minister of [the] Interior,” has been [in] contact