Mireles v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (845 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 2012)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO REMAND; DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AS MOOT

MARGARET M. MORROW, District Judge.

On August 16, 2011, plaintiffs filed this action in Los Angeles Superior Court. Defendants removed the case to this court on September 16, 2011, asserting that the action was a “mass tort” action and invoking jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Defendants also invoked the court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). On October 14, 2011, plaintiffs filed a motion to remand. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss one week later, on October 21, 2011. Both motions are opposed.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Complaint’s Factual Allegations

The complaint in this action was filed on behalf of 108 named plaintiffs. It is a sprawling document that is 84 pages and 387 numbered paragraphs long; many paragraphs contain multiple subparagraphs. The court summarizes the complaint’s allegations below.

The complaint alleges that “[a]s the result of an aggressive and relentlessly pursued growth strategy between 2003 and 2009,” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) became the fourth largest banking institution in the nation, and was the “master servicer” for loans and mortgages at issue in this action. As part of a massive scheme of investor fraud, defendants allegedly inflated property appraisals, disregarded underwriting standards, sold' predatory loan products, and promised refinancing packages, all while asserting that they were “prudently lending to qualified homeowners.” Defendants allegedly sold mortgage products to borrowers who could not otherwise meet traditional underwriting standards for such loans, and thereby contributed to a massive housing price bubble. After the bubble collapsed, plaintiffs’ net worth and credit ratings were devastated. The complaint alleges that defendants are responsible for a host of other ills related to the current economic crisis, including a “mortgage meltdown in California that was substantially worse than any economic problems facing the rest of the United States,” and a “knowing[ ] and systematic ] destruction of] California home values.” They assert that defendants “acted with callous or reckless disregard” for the fact that “their actions [might] cause California home prices to plummet.”

Defendants allegedly created risky “mortgage pools,” promising investors lucrative benefits, and “managed risk through leverage and derivatives trading.” They purportedly knew that the mortgage pools contained loans that were at very high risk of default. Borrowers like plaintiffs were allegedly “handcuffed” and required to accept these “dangerous products” because defendants imposed substantial early payment penalties if borrowers “tried to get out of the[] toxic loans [and replace them with] more stable fixed rate products.”

With the proceeds of TARP funds, defendants allegedly committed numerous fraudulent acts, including issuing notices of default in violation of California law, misrepresenting their intention to arrange loan modifications for plaintiffs, and failing to respond to plaintiffs’ communications. Plaintiffs assert that defendants have been foreclosing on their homes without proof that defendants hold the notes and deeds of trust they seek to enforce, and without being able to demonstrate ownership of notes and trust deeds in question.

The complaint also contains a number of allegations regarding Wachovia, and its acquisition of Golden West Financing Corporation (“Golden West”). Golden West was an Oakland, California-based mortgage lender run by Herbert and Marion Sandler. It offered a product known as the “Pick-A-Pay” mortgage. This type of mortgage permitted borrowers to choose from multiple payment options every month: (1) full payment of interest and principal sufficient to pay down the loan over a traditional 30 year term; (2) a higher payment that would pay off the loan in 15 years; (3) an interest-only payment; or (4) a minimum payment that did not cover interest, and caused the unpaid interest to be added to the loan balance. Plaintiffs contend that the fourth option resulted in “negative amoritization,” i.e., in growth of the outstanding balance over time. Plaintiffs contend that this product lured borrowers to take out loans by offering low “teaser” rates that “ratcheted sharply upwards as interest rates increased.” It was purportedly marketed to unsophisticated home buyers who did not understand the financial risks they faced if they entered into such a loan. Plaintiffs assert that Golden West’s loans were labeled the “Typhoid Mary of the mortgage industry” by The New York Times, and that the Sandlers were included on a list of “25 people to blame for the financial crisis” by Time Magazine, After Wachovia acquired Golden West, its mortgage portfolio was dominated by Pick-A-Pay mortgages. By the end of 2007, it held $120 billion of these mortgages, compared with $50 billion of “traditional mortgages.” More than $70 billion of Wachovia’s Pick-A-Pay mortgages were issued to California borrowers.

When Wachovia announced its purchase of Golden West, the housing market was already beginning to decline, and investors were concerned about their potential exposure. To reassure its investors, Wachovia’s officers made various representations regarding the safety and stability of Golden West’s portfolio, and claimed to have implemented policies to ensure that borrowers could pay their loan obligations. Wachovia stated in 2007 that it did not “anticipate any meaningful potential impact to earnings with the sub prime going forward.”

The Pick-A-Pay loans were allegedly concentrated in California, and when these loans “reset prematurely due to the contractual breaches by Wells Fargo,” many homeowners lost their homes through foreclosure. Plaintiffs allege that defendants were motivated to foreclose on properties quickly so that the homes could be added to their growing inventory of Real Estate Owned (“REO”) properties. When Wells Fargo acquired Wachovia, it allegedly took a large ‘paper loss’ on Wachovia’s nonperforming loans and mortgages, so that whatever money or benefits it was able to recoup on the defaulted mortgages could be reflected as new profits.

Plaintiffs contend that, according to data reported pursuant to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, fully one-fifth of all the loans defendants made to low and moderate income borrowers, including plaintiffs, were high-cost refinance loans with an average interest rate of 9.8%; these loans purportedly represented close to $11 billion in lending. Plaintiffs assert that the loans went directly into mortgage pools securitized and sold by defendants, who profited from the loans’ “secret excessive markups.”

The complaint alleges that had all of this information been properly disclosed to plaintiffs, they would have behaved differently, deferring their purchase of a home and refusing to enter into expensive adjustable rate mortgages. It pleads a multitude of purportedly deceptive acts by defendants, including their failure to:

“(1) establish due diligence policies, procedures and controls reasonably designed to detect and report instances of money laundering, (2) establish procedures to take reasonable and practicable measures to verify the identity of those applying for an account with the institution and maintain records of the information used to verify a person’s identity, including name, address, and other identifying information, (3) determine and report the sources of funds used for the mortgages they originate[d] and service[d], as well as the sources of funds used to acquire any mortgages, [and] (4) disclose to Plaintiffs the identities, address and telephone numbers of transferees of their mortgages.”

Essentially, the complaint asserts that defendants engaged in a fraudulent scheme by offering mortgages at unsustainable loan-to-value ratios, often to individuals who they knew were a poor credit risk and at high risk of default. Defendants were allegedly aware of the consequences of their actions, and knew that defaults on a large scale would have a cascade effect and depress property values throughout the state, causing plaintiffs and other similarly situated individuals to lose the equity in their homes and have no means to refinance their mortgage or sell their home.

Plaintiffs charge that defendants fraudulently misrepresented to multiple plaintiffs that they would receive assistance securing a loan modification. They also implied or stated that if plaintiffs sought a loan modification, defendants would assist them and they would often be able to obtain a modification. Defendants purportedly made these representations with no intention of providing assistance to plaintiffs, or with knowledge that plaintiffs were not good candidates for loan modifications.

Plaintiffs also allege that defendants sold the notes and deeds of trust relating to plaintiffs’ properties in transactions that were unlawful or fraudulent in various ways. The sales allegedly

“(a) [i]ncluded sales to nominees who were not authorized under law at the time to own a mortgage, including, among others, MERS;

(b) [involved misrepresentations by Defendants to investors and concealment from investors of Plaintiffs’] true financial condition and the true value of Plaintiffs’] home[s] and mortgaged];

(c) [finvolved misrepresentations by Defendants to investors and concealment from investors of the true financial condition of other borrowers and the true value of their homes and mortgages also included in the pools;

(d) [w]ere for consideration greater than the actual value of the said notes and deeds of trust;

(e) [w]ere for consideration greater than the income stream that could be generated from the instruments even assuming a 0% default rate thereon....”

Plaintiffs assert that, had they been aware of defendants’ conduct, they would not have entered into their mortgages or purchased homes. lations related to the Pick-A-Pay loan product; the settlement purportedly contemplates that the bank will make $2 billion in loan modifications. Wells Fargo has also allegedly entered into settlements with the attorneys general of Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, Texas, and Washington. The company purportedly agreed to make $600 million in loan modifications, and to fund a $50 million settlement fund in order to resolve a lawsuit against Wachovia’s mortgage unit. Finally, on April 5, 2011, Wells Fargo and the SEC purportedly settled charges related to “misrepresentations to investors associated with selling mortgage backed securities.”

Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo is now under investigation by various governmental agencies, and is being sued in several class actions. They contend that Wells Fargo settled a lawsuit with the California Attorney General that alleged lending vio-

The complaint describes in detail a consent decree into which Wells Fargo entered with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC Order”). The decree purportedly states that various federal agencies, including the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the FDIC, and the Office of Thrift Supervision, found that Wells Fargo had engaged in “unsafe or unsound practices” in its handling of foreclosure-related activities. The OCC Order allegedly states that Wells Fargo

“filed or caused to be filed in state and federal courts numerous affidavits executed by its employees or employees of third-party service providers making various assertions, such as ownership of the mortgage note and mortgage, the amount of the principal and interest due, and the fees and expenses chargeable to the borrower, in which the affiant represented that the assertions in the affidavit were made based on personal knowledge or based on a review by the affiant of the relevant books and records, when, in many cases, they were not based on such personal knowledge or review of the relevant books and records----”

Plaintiffs allege that under the OCC Order, Wells Fargo was required to submit to audits and execute a comprehensive plan to “reimburse homeowners who had been improperly foreclosed upon.” The OCC Order purportedly concluded that Wells Fargo had litigated foreclosure proceedings and initiated non-judicial foreclosure sales without properly endorsed or assigned documents in violation of law. Plaintiffs assert that governmental investigations are ongoing; they quote from a news article stating that the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s inspector general is conducting a confidential audit of the company.

The complaint pleads six state law claims. The first four, asserted by all plaintiffs, allege (1) fraudulent concealment; (2) intentional misrepresentation; (3) negligent misrepresentation; and (4) violation of the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq. The complaint also pleads a wrongful foreclosure claim on behalf of eleven plaintiffs who lost their properties to foreclosure, and a breach of contract claim on behalf of nine plaintiffs who signed Pick-A-Pay mortgage loan agreements with defendants.

B. The Complaint’s Allegations Regarding Citizenship of the Parties and Amount in Controversy

The complaint contains various allegations regarding the citizenship of the parties and the amount in controversy. Paragraphs 43 through 153 are a non-alphabetized list of the 108 plaintiffs, all of whom are alleged to reside in and own property in California. Defendants are alleged to have “acted as Servicer or [in] some other control capacity over [the] processing [of plaintiffs’] loan[s].” The complaint alleges that fewer than 100 plaintiffs allege claims that “would, as to them, equal or exceed the jurisdictional amount for federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).”

The complaint names nine defendants: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., which is a national banking association that is chartered in Sioux Falls, South Dakota and has its primary headquarters in San Francisco, Califorma; Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, a national banking association with its principal place of business in Des Moines, Iowa; America’s Servicing Company, a national banking association with its principal place of business in Des Moines, Iowa; Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, a national banking association with its principal place of business in Charlotte, North Carolina; Wachovia Bank, FSB, formerly known as World Savings Bank, a national banking association with its principal place of business in Charlotte, North Carolina; Golden West Financial Corporation, a Delaware corporation whose principal asset is World Savings Bank, based in Oakland, California; World Savings Bank, FSB, a national banking association that was “knowingly and willingly doing' business” in California; World Savings, Inc., a California corporation; and Cal-Western Reconveyance Corporation, a California corporation.

As respects the amount in controversy, the prayer for relief seeks, inter alia, general and special damages, exemplary damages, statutory relief, restitution, injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees. The prayer for relief reiterates that

“fewer than 100 plaintiffs are alleging claims or amounts in controversy that would, as to them[,] equal or exceed the jurisdictional amount for federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) and that no relief of any kind is sought under any federal statute or rule.”

C. The Notice of Removal

1. CAFA “Mass Action” Jurisdiction

Defendants Wells Fargo and Cal-Western invoke the court’s jurisdiction over “mass actions” as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(i). Defendants contend that 108 plaintiffs have joined to plead claims for monetary relief and seek to have those claims tried jointly because they involve common questions of law and fact. Defendants dispute plaintiffs’ contention that the amount in controversy does not exceed the “jurisdictional amount for federal jurisdiction,” as their claims exceed $5 million in the aggregate, exclusive of interest and costs. Noting that plaintiffs seek injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of their mortgage loans, defendants contend that the total unpaid principal on the loans exceeds $5 million. They also assert that each individual plaintiffs claims exceed $75,000, excluding interest. Defendants proffer evidence that each plaintiff had a mortgage loan with an outstanding balance in excess of the jurisdictional threshold. The notice of removal cites allegations in the complaint that “similar lawsuits” have settled for billions or hundreds of millions of dollars.

Defendants also assert that the minimal diversity requirement is satisfied because at least one plaintiff is a California citizen and Wells Fargo is a South Dakota citizen. The notice of removal states that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, America’s Servicing Company, Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, Golden West Corporation, and World Savings, Inc. are either are divisions of Wells Fargo or have merged into Wells Fargo and thus no longer exist for purposes of determining diversity of citizenship. Moreover, defendant Wachovia Bank, FSB, has since changed its name to Wells Fargo Bank South Central, N.A., which is a national bank with a home office in Houston, Texas. Consequently, it is a Texas citizen, which also and provides a basis for finding that the minimal diversity requirement is met.

2. Diversity Jurisdiction

In addition to asserting that this is a mass action over which the court has jurisdiction under CAFA, defendants invoke the court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). As noted, most of the named defendants have either merged into Wells Fargo or no longer exist. The only non-Wells Fargo defendant is Cal-Western. Wells Fargo contends that Cal-Western’s citizenship should be disregarded because it was fraudulently joined. Wells Fargo asserts that Cal-Western was merely the trustee of plaintiffs’ deeds of trust, which had contractual duties were limited by state law. It contends that the complaint pleads no wrongdoing by Cal-Western, and that Cal-Western is referenced explicitly in the complaint only once — in an allegation that concerns its citizensh ip. Wachovia Bank, FSB (formerly known as World Savings Bank, FSB), is a Texas citizen. Wells Fargo maintains that when the citizenship of defendants that have merged into Wells Fargo or ceased to exist and Cal-Western is ignored, complete diversity exists because plaintiffs are residents of California, and defendants are either South Dakota or Texas citizens.

Defendants cite allegations in the complaint to establish that amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. They note that paragraph 153 alleges that “fewer than 100 plaintiffs are alleging claims in amounts that would, as to them, equal or exceed” the jurisdictional threshold. As the complaint alleges claims on behalf of 108 individuals, defendants argue that this statement implies that at least some plaintiffs allege damages exceeding $75,000.

Finally, defendants submit evidence that each plaintiff has placed more than $75,000 in controversy. They proffer the declaration of Michael J. Dolan, an operations analyst in Wachovia Mortgage, FSB’s Portfolio Retention Department. Dolan states that each plaintiff for whom he could locate records has or had a mortgage loan exceeding $75,000 with defendants. Defendants alternatively assert that an order setting aside even one of the foreclosure sales at issue in this litigation would involve a sum greater than $75,000, and permit the court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over causes of action involving less than that amount. See 28 U.S. C § 1367(a).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Remand 1. Legal Standards Governing Removal Jurisdiction

The right to remove a case to federal court is entirely a creature of statute. See Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir.1979). The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, allows defendants to remove when a case originally filed in state court presents a federal question or is between citizens of different states and involves an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), (b); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a). Only state court actions that could originally have been filed in federal court can be removed. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987); Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir.1988). “[Jjurisdiction in a diversity case is determined at the time of removal.” American Dental Industries, Inc. v. EAX Worldwide, Inc., 228 F.Supp.2d 1155, 1157 (D.Or.2002) (citing St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938) (“The inability of plaintiff to recover an amount adequate to give the court jurisdiction does not show his bad faith or oust the jurisdiction____ Events occurring subsequent to the institution of suit which reduce the amount recoverable below the statutory limit do not oust jurisdiction”)).

The Ninth Circuit “strictly constructs] the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “[federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.1992) (citing Boggs v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir.1988), Takeda v. Northwestern Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 818 (9th Cir.1985), and Libhart, 592 F.2d at 1064). “The ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Id. (citing Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d 709, 712 n. 3 (9th Cir.1990), and Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir.1988)).

2. Requirements for Jurisdiction as a CAFA Mass Action

CAFA supplements the original removal statute, giving district courts, inter alia, original jurisdiction over a “mass action” in which the amount of controversy exceeds $5,000,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and minimal diversity exists. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(A) (“For purposes of this subsection and section 1453, a mass action shall be deemed to be a class action removable under paragraphs (2) through (10) if it otherwise meets the provisions of those paragraphs”). 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(i) defines “mass action” as “any civil action ... in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact, except that jurisdiction shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirements.... ”

Essentially, “CAFA provides that a qualifying mass action ‘shall be deemed to be a class action’ removable to federal court under the Act, so long as the rest of CAFA’s jurisdictional requirements are met. Among these requirements, the aggregate amount in controversy must exceed ‘$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs,’ and at least one plaintiff must be a citizen of a state or foreign state different from that of any defendant. In addition, there must be minimal diversity between the parties.’ ” Tanoh v. Dow Chemical Co., 561 F.3d 945, 952 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(A)).

CAFA’s mass action provisions contain a number of exceptions, however. As the mass action statutes explicitly incorporate the other requirements necessary to maintain a class action, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(A), any exceptions to the court’s jurisdiction under CAFA’s class action provisions also apply. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3) (setting forth various situations in which the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a class action “in the interests of justice and looking at the totality of the circumstances”); id. § 1332(d)(4) (setting forth circumstances in which the district court is required to decline to exercise jurisdiction). In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(i) provides that in a mass action, “jurisdiction shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirements under subsection (a).”

The mass action-specific exceptions are found in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(B), which states:

“[T]he term ‘mass action’ shall not include any civil action in which—

(I) all of the claims in the action arise from an event or occurrence in the State in which the action was filed, and that allegedly resulted in injuries in that State or in States contiguous to that State;

(II) the claims are joined upon motion of a defendant;

(III) all of the claims in the action are asserted on behalf of the general public (and not on behalf of individual claimants or members of a purported class) pursuant to a State statute specifically authorizing such action; or

(IV) the claims have been consolidated or coordinated solely for pretrial proceedings.”

3. Whether CAFA’s Mass Action Requirements Are Met

The parties do not dispute: (1) that the number of plaintiffs in this action exceeds 100; (2) that “plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact,” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(B); (3) and that the citizenship of the parties is minimally diverse, as all the plaintiffs are citizens of California and Wells Fargo Bank South Central, N.A. (formerly known as Wachovia Bank, FSB) is a Texas citizen. The parties’ disputes concerns whether the amount in controversy requirement is met, and whether various exceptions to CAFA apply.

a. The Applicable Burden of Proof

Although the burden of proving that removal jurisdiction exists rests with defendants, the burden of proof they must satisfy differs depending on the nature of the damages allegations included in plaintiffs’ complaint. “[W]hen the plaintiffs] fail[] to plead a specific amount of damages, ... defendants] seeking removal ‘must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy requirement has been met.’ ” Lowdermilk v. United States Bank Nat’l Assoc., 479 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir.2006) (per curiam)); see also Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 700 (9th Cir.2007) (“In the Jurisdiction and Venue section, it is alleged that ‘[t]he damages to each Plaintiff are less than $75,000. In addition, the sum of such damages and the value of injunctive relief sought by plaintiff in this action is less than $75,000.’ ... [B]ecause the allegation in the Jurisdiction and Venue section is not repeated in the Prayer for Relief and does not take account of attorneys’ fees, accounting of moneys, or payment of back taxes and benefits, the complaint fails to allege a sufficiently specific total amount in controversy”). See also Dupre v. General Motors, No. CV-10-00955-RGK (Ex), 2010 WL 3447082, *2 (C.D.Cal. Aug. 27, 2010) (“As in Guglielmino, the complaint is facially unclear as to whether the requisite total amount in controversy has been pled, and GM ‘bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds [the jurisdictional amount]’ ”).

“[I]f the complaint alleges damages in excess of the federal amount-in-controversy requirement, [however,] then the amount-in-controversy requirement is presumptively satisfied unless ‘it appears to a ‘legal certainty’ that the claim is actually for less than the jurisdictional minimum.’ ” Id. (quoting Abrego Abrego, 443 at 683 n. 8). Similarly, a defendant seeking to remove an action where the complaint affirmatively limits the amount in controversy to avoid federal jurisdiction must demonstrate to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy satisfies the jurisdictional threshold. The Lowdermilk court outlined this variable standard of proof for two reasons. First, it noted that “federal courts ... are courts of limited jurisdiction and ... strictly construe [their] jurisdiction.” Id. at 998 (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994)). Second, it noted the “well established [proposition] that the plaintiff is ‘master of her complaint’ and can plead to avoid federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 999. Taking these principles together, the court concluded that “subject to a ‘good faith’ requirement in pleading, a plaintiff may sue for less than the amount she may be entitled to if she wishes to avoid federal jurisdiction and remain in state court.” Id. (citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 288-89, 58 S.Ct. 586); see also id. at 999 (“By adopting ‘legal certainty’ as the standard of proof, we guard the presumption against federal jurisdiction and preserve the plaintiffs prerogative, subject to the good faith requirement, to forgo a potentially larger recovery to remain in state court”).

Here, plaintiffs do not allege the aggregate amount in controversy on their claims. They also do not allege a specific amount in controversy for each individual plaintiff. Instead, the complaint pleads that “fewer than 100 plaintiffs are alleging claims or amounts in controversy that would, as to them[,] equal or exceed the jurisdictional amount for federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Although it appears that plaintiffs seek to avoid federal jurisdiction, the complaint neither pleads that the total aggregate amount in controversy is less than a certain amount, nor that each plaintiffs individual amount in controversy is less than $75,000. Instead, the complaint alleges that some number of plaintiffs — fewer than 100 — allege an amount in controversy that, “as to them,” does not exceed $75,000.

This manner of pleading, however, is apparently explained by plaintiffs’ interpretation of certain portions of CAFA’s mass action provisions. Plaintiffs cite § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(i), which states that where jurisdiction exists to hear a mass action, it “exist[s] only over those plaintiffs whose claims ... satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirements under subsection (a).” Plaintiffs contend this means that the court has mass action jurisdiction only when “100 or more persons” each place an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000, even if the action otherwise meets CAFA’s minimal diversity and aggregate amount in controversy requirements. Defendants, by contrast, urge that the court adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s view that “the $75,000 provision was not intended to bar district courts from asserting jurisdiction over the entire case if each individual plaintiffs claims do not exceed $75,000,” so long as the numerosity and $5 million aggregate amount in controversy thresholds are met. Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1205 (11th Cir.2007).

The Ninth Circuit has twice taken note of the statutory ambiguity but declined to address the question directly. See Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 682 (observing that the parties had raised the “thornfy]” issue of whether “removed mass actions remain in federal court even if the plaintiffs alleging claims in excess of $75,000 do not meet the numerosity or aggregate total amount in controversy requirement of § 1332(d),” but remanding case on other grounds); see also Tanoh, 561 F.3d at 953 n. 4 (“In Abrego Abrego, we left open the question whether this clause requires that one hundred or more plaintiffs individually satisfy the $75,000 amount in controversy requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction to qualify as a ‘mass action’ under CAFA. Given our disposition in this case, we once again do not decide the issue” (citation omitted)).

The court similarly concludes that addressing this difficult question of statutory interpretation is not necessary here to address the applicable burden of proof or to answer the ultimate question as to whether the court can exercise jurisdiction over this case. As to burden of proof, to remove a mass action under CAFA, the aggregate amount in controversy for all plaintiffs must exceed $5 million. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). The complaint here neither affirmatively alleges an amount in controversy of less than $5 million, nor pleads specific amounts in controversy as to each individual plaintiff. The only allegation plaintiffs offer is that some number of plaintiffs “fewer than 100” alleges an amount in controversy less than $75,000. This is insufficient to quantify the aggregate amount placed at issue by the complaint.

The ambiguity of the pleading places it squarely within the rule articulated in Abrego Abrego and Guglielmino that defendants must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied. See, e.g., Guglielmino, 506 F.3d at 701.

b. Whether Defendants Have Met Their Burden of Proof as to Amount in Controversy

The court thus examines whether defendants have met their burden of showing by a preponderance that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. As noted, the only proof defendants proffer is the Dolan declaration. Dolan states that as an operations analyst in Wachovia Mortgage, FSB’s portfolio retention department, he has “custody over and access to various business records of Wells Fargo, and [is] familiar with Wells Fargo’s business practices and business records.” He asserts that based on his review of those records, he has “determined that the total unpaid principal on the outstanding mortgage loans at issue in this litigation is well in excess of $5,000,000.” No further explanation is provided and the declaration attaches no records or documents supporting Dolan’s statement. Nor does Dolan identify the records he reviewed to reach this conclusion.

Dolan also states that “each of the Plaintiffs has, or at one time had, a mortgage loan with an outstanding principal balance in excess of $75,000.” Dolan does not specify the amount of any plaintiffs outstanding balance, how many have past balances as opposed to current balances, nor what the amounts of any current balances may be. With respect to the plaintiffs who allege wrongful foreclosure claims, Dolan has determined that at the time their properties were sold at foreclosure, “each loan had an unpaid principal balance in excess of $75,000.” Once again, however, no documents are provided supporting this contention.

Dolan notes that he could find no records for thirteen of the 108 plaintiffs and was unable to “locate any loans in [their] names.” Two of the individuals about whom he lacks information allege wrongful foreclosure claims.

Defendants contend that Dolan’s declaration is sufficient to demonstrate an aggregate amount in controversy exceeding $5 million. This contention is largely based on their assertion that whatever the allegations of the complaint, plaintiffs actually seek to enjoin foreclosure of their properties or to unwind foreclosures that have already taken place. As evidence of this, they cite allegations challenging defendants’ rights to enforce the mortgages and foreclose on plaintiffs’ properties. These allegations, defendants contend, indicate that plaintiffs have placed the entire value of their mortgages at issue. See Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 651 F.3d 1039, 1045 n. 2 (9th Cir.2011) (“Here, the object in litigation is the Property, which was assessed at a value of more than $200,000, and therefore satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement”); Garfinkle v. Wells Fargo Bank, 483 F.2d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir.1973) (treating the value of real property as the amount in controversy in an action to enjoin a foreclosure sale). “Even if the property at issue has already been sold in foreclosure by the defendant, as is the case here, the property may still be the object of the litigation when the plaintiff sues for injunctive [or declaratory] relief.” Reyes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C-10-01667 JCS, 2010 WL 2629785, *4-5 (N.D.Cal. June 29, 2010). See also Kehoe v. Aurora Loan Services LLC, No. 3:10-cv-00256-RCJ-RAM, 2010 WL 4286331, *3-4 (D.Nev. Oct. 20, 2010) (“Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional limit. In cases seeking injunctive relief from a foreclosure sale, the value of the property at issue is the object of the litigation for the purposes of determining the amount in controversy. In this matter, Plaintiffs are seeking to undo a non-judicial foreclosure sale in which the property was sold for approximately $981,000. Because the object of the litigation is worth significantly more than $75,000, the amount in controversy requirement has been met and this case was properly removed”); Barrus v. Recontrust Co., N.A., No. C11-618-RSM, 2011 WL 2360206, *3 (W.DWash. June 9, 2011) (“Here, Plaintiffs seek a declaration ‘canceling’ the Deed of Trust that secures their home loan and an injunction of the upcoming foreclosure sale of their home. The loan amount — the object of the litigation— is $286,750. Accordingly, the amount in controversy is well over the $75,000 threshold” (citations omitted)); Delgado v. Bank of America Corp., No. 1:09cv01638 AWI DLB, 2009 WL 4163525, *6 (E.D.Cal. Nov. 23, 2009) (accepting an affidavit submitted by defendants that appraised the property plaintiffs sought to reclaim at more than $75,000 as evidence that the amount in controversy requirement was satisfied).

While the complaint is hardly a model of clarity, the court believes that defendants have not read it accurately. It is true that the pleading contains various allegations questioning defendants’ right to enforce the mortgages in question. A closer examination of each of the claims and causes of action, however, does not support the view that plaintiffs seek injunctive or declaratory relief that places the entire value of their mortgages at issue. See Naiyan v. Sodexo, Inc., No. CV 10-9872 PSG (CWx), 2011 WL 1543371, *2 (C.D.Cal. Apr. 25, 2011) (assessing the amount in controversy by examining each claim). The first through third causes of action allege claims for fraudulent concealment, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation respectively. Plaintiffs do not seek injunctive relief on these claims, but rather damages caused by plaintiffs’ reliance on defendants’ misconduct. While the complaint contends that defendants do not have a valid right to enforce the mortgages, these allegations are included to show that defendants misrepresented the facts by holding themselves out as the owners of valid loans and mortgages. Plaintiffs describe the damages they seek as the “loss of [their] equity investments,” i.e., the “loss of equity in their houses, costs and expenses related to protecting themselves, reduced credit scores,” etc. Defendants’ evidence does not quantify these damages in any respect. Rather, in two somewhat conclusory paragraphs, Dolan addresses only the amount of the mortgage loans that 95 of the plaintiffs had or have; he provides no information regarding the thirteen plaintiffs for whom he could find no records. The fact that plaintiffs “at one time had” loans exceeding $75,000 says nothing about their current outstanding mortgage balances, which potentially could be below that amount.

The fourth cause of action arises under the UCL, and seeks restitution “for all sums received by Defendants with respect [to the mortgages], including, without limitation, interest payments ..., fees ..., and premiums received upon selling the mortgages at an inflated value.” The claim seeks injunctive relief to prevent defendants “from any further concealment with respect to the sale of notes and mortgages,” and to enjoin them from further unlawful conduct. Like the three claims that preceded it, this cause of action does not put the entire value of plaintiffs’ properties at issue, nor does it seek to block enforcement of the mortgages. Defendants have adduced no evidence regarding the aggregate value of payments or interest they received.

The fifth cause of action, which is asserted by eleven plaintiffs, alleges wrongful foreclosure. Defendants were, as noted, unable to provide any information about two of these individuals; thus, Dolan’s calculation concerns nine individuals only. The claim alleges that “[plaintiffs were dispossessed of the value of [their] homes” and that the foreclosure sales were void. The sixth and final cause of action, which is asserted by a different subset of nine plaintiffs who entered into Pick-A-Pay mortgage agreements with defendants, alleges a breach of contract claim. These plaintiffs contend that defendants breached the mortgage contract by prohibiting them from choosing two of the four payment options available under the contract, which caused them to default and led to the foreclosure of their homes, or the “commencfement] [of] the foreclosure process.” It also alleges that defendants’ material breaches damaged plaintiffs by “[clausing Plaintiffs’ properties to enter into the foreclosure process and be foreclosed ....” The prayer for relief seeks injunctive relief under the fourth cause of action and “any other causes of action for which such relief may be available....” It is thus possible that plaintiffs seek to enjoin or set aside foreclosure sales.

Unlike the claims that precede them, the fifth and sixth claims — which are asserted by small subsets of individual plaintiffs— implicate the foreclosure or threatened foreclosure of their homes and may fairly be said to place the full value of then-properties into controversy. The Dolan declaration contains minimal information about nine of the plaintiffs who allege wrongful foreclosure. It reports only that each of their “loan[s] had an unpaid principal balance in excess of $75,000.” The declaration contains no information concerning the nine individuals who have pled a breach of contract claim. The court has no information that would permit it to conclude that defendants have shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the wrongful foreclosure claims involves aggregate damages of more than $5 million. The same is true of the breach of contract claims. Defendants’ evidence is thus insufficient to meet their burden.

Defendants also contend that the amount in controversy is satisfied by allegations that purport to describe the magnitude of the fraudulent scheme at issue here. Specifically, defendants cite paragraphs 25 and 360 of the complaint. Paragraph 25 states that “Wells Fargo and the other Defendants took from Plaintiffs and other borrowers billions of dollars in interest payments and fees.” Because plaintiffs seek restitution of “all sums received by Defendants with respect [to their mortgages], including without limitation interest payments [and] fees,” defendants assert that they have placed “billions of dollars” in controversy. This interpretation does not withstand scrutiny. As noted, the complaint alleges a wide-ranging fraudulent scheme involving the homes of individuals across the country. Given this fact, the allegation that “[p]laintiffs and other borrowers” were collectively deprived of “billions of dollars” does not show that the amount in controversy in this litigation is similarly huge. Because this is a mass action, rather than a class action, the only damages at issue are those the named plaintiffs suffered. Allegations regarding borrowers other than plaintiffs are not relevant to calculating the amount in controversy.

Defendants’ reliance on other allegations concerning sizable settlements is similarly unavailing. The complaint contains a number of allegations concerning settlements into which Wells Fargo entered to resolve other lawsuits. Paragraph 230, for example, alleges that Wells Fargo settled a lawsuit filed by the California Attorney General that alleged predatory practices involving the Pick-A-Pay mortgages; the bank purportedly agreed to make $2 billion in loan modifications. The next paragraph alleges that Wells Fargo agreed to settle “a lawsuit” by making $600 million in loan modifications and “fund[ing] a $50 million settlement fund.” Paragraph 247 refers to a Huffington Post article, which purportedly stated that Wells Fargo “had agreed to pay $85 million to settle civil claims....” Plaintiffs assert that these settlements were in cases in which government agencies and private parties asserted claims of wrongdoing “similar to the wrongful acts alleged” in this case.

Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ allegations concerning these settlements constitute admissions that the amount in controversy in this litigation exceeds $5 million. While settlements and jury verdicts in similar cases can provide evidence of the amount in controversy, the cases must be factually identical or, at a minimum, analogous to the case at issue. See Simmons v. PCR Technology, 209 F.Supp.2d 1029, 1034 (N.D.Cal.2002) (considering damages awarded in a “not perfectly analogous” case as evidence “that emotional distress damages in a successful employment discrimination case may be substantial”); Conrad Associates v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 994 F.Supp. 1196, 1200 (N.D.Cal.1998) (accepting evidence of jury verdicts on analogous punitive damages claims as sufficient to show that the amount in controversy requirement was met). Defendants here proffer no evidence that the lawsuits and settlements alleged in the complaint are factually or legally similar to plaintiffs’ claims. The complaint alleges few details concerning the settlements; there is absolutely no indication that the claims purportedly settled were similar in size or scope to those asserted in this litigation. At oral argument, Wells Fargo’s lawyer described this case as a “microcosm” of the cases referenced in the complaint; it appears therefore that even defendants understand that the claims at issue here are a subset, and most probably a small subset, of the claims at issue in the governmental lawsuits referenced in the complaint. Similarly, the fact that Wells Fargo has allegedly paid $85 million to settle all or some of the civil claims filed against it speaks not at all to the value of the claims of the 108 plaintiffs who have sued in this case. The court declines defendants’ invitation to extrapolate from vague allegations regarding settlements of litigation initiated by governmental entities— which obviously alleged misconduct larger in scope than plaintiffs allege here — or from allegations regarding the overall sums defendants have purportedly paid to settle similar claims — that the amount in controversy here exceeds $5 million. Defendants’ argument obfuscates the fact that they have failed to proffer concrete evidence regarding the actual amount in controversy in this case. It is defendants’ burden to adduce evidence regarding the amount in controversy. The allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint that they cite do not suffice to satisfy this burden.

“The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction necessarily means that federal jurisdiction ‘must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.’ ” Sauer v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am,., No. 2:11-cv-08699-JHN-RZ, 2011 WL 5117772, *1 (C.D.Cal. Oct. 28, 2011) (quoting Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566); see also Haase v. Aerodynamics Inc., No. 2:09-cv-01751-MCE-GGH, 2009 WL 3368519, *2 (EJD.Cal. Oct. 19, 2009) (“[I]f there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance, remand must be granted”). As defendants have failed to meet their burden of proving that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million by a preponderance of the evidence, the court lacks jurisdiction over this case as a CAFA mass action.

4. Whether the Court Has Diversity Jurisdiction to Hear this Action

Defendants also invoke the court’s diversity jurisdiction over each of the individual plaintiffs’ claims. “The district courts ... have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.... ” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see also Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir.2003) (“[jurisdiction founded on [diversity] requires that the parties be in complete diversity and the amount in controversy exceed $75,000”). In any case where subject matter jurisdiction is premised on diversity, there must be complete diversity, i.e., all plaintiffs must have citizenship different than all defendants. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806); see also Caterpillar Inc. v. Leiws, 519 U.S. 61, 68 & n. 3, 117 S.Ct. 467, 136 L.Ed.2d 437 (1996).

The parties dispute a number of issues concerning diversity jurisdiction. First, they disagree as to whether Wells Fargo should be considered a California citizen; if it is, this would defeat complete diversity. Second, defendants contend that plaintiffs have fraudulently joined Cal-Western Reconveyance; if this is not the case, the fact that it is a defendant would also defeat diversity. Finally, the parties dispute whether defendants have adequately proved the amount in controversy. The court addresses each issue in turn.

a. Whether the Complete Diversity Requirement Is Satisfied

i. Legal Standard Governing the Citizenship of National Banking Associations for Diversity Purposes

28 U.S.C. § 1348 states:

“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action commenced by the United States, or by direction of any officer thereof, against any national banking association, any civil action to wind up the affairs of any such association, and any action by a banking association established in the district for which the court is held, under chapter 2 of Title 12, to enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency, or any receiver acting under his direction, as provided by such chapter. All national banking associations shall, for the purposes of all other actions by or against them, be deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located.”

In Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 126 S.Ct. 941, 163 L.Ed.2d 797 (2006), the United States Supreme Court considered whether, as used in § 1348, “located ... signaled] ... that the bank’s citizenship is determined by the place designated in the bank’s articles of association as the location of its main office,” or rather “that a national bank is a citizen of every State in which it maintains a branch[.]” Id. at 306-07, 126 S.Ct. 941. The Court recognized that “ ‘located’ is not a word of ‘enduring rigidity,’ but one that gains its precise meaning from context,” and therefore considered the unique historical circumstances giving rise to Congress’s adoption of § 1348. Id. at 307, 126 S.Ct. 941 (citing Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35, 44, 98 S.Ct. 88, 54 L.Ed.2d 218 (1977)). It reasoned:

“When Congress first authorized national banks in 1863, it specified that any ‘suits, actions, and proceedings by and against [them could] be had’ in federal court. National banks thus could ‘sue and be sued in the federal district and circuit courts solely because they were national banks, without regard to diversity, amount in controversy or the existence of a federal question in the usual sense.’ State banks, however, like other state-incorporated entities, could initiate actions in federal court only on the basis of diversity of citizenship or the existence of a federal question. Congress ended national banks’ automatic qualification for federal jurisdiction in 1882. An enactment that year provided in relevant part:

‘[T]he jurisdiction for suits hereafter brought by or against any association established under any law providing for national-banking associations ... shall be the same as, and not other than, the jurisdiction for suits by or against banks not organized under any law of the United States which do or might do banking business where such national-banking associations may be doing business when such suits may be begun[.]’ ...

Under this measure, national banks could no longer invoke federal-court jurisdiction solely ‘on the ground of their Federal origin;’ instead, for federal jurisdictional purposes, Congress placed national banks ‘on the same footing as the banks of the state where they were located.’ ” Id. at 309-10, 126 S.Ct. 941 (citations omitted).

The Court further explained that, “[i]n 1887 revisions to prescriptions, on federal jurisdiction, Congress replaced the 1882 provision on jurisdiction over national banks and first used the ‘located’ language today contained in § 1348.... Like its 1882 predecessor, the 1887 Act ‘sought to limit ... the access of national banks to, and their suability in, the federal courts to the same extent to which non-national banks [were] so limited.’ ” Id. at 310-11, 126 S.Ct. 941. Addressing the precise question before it, the Court noted that “[n]ot until 1994 did Congress provide broad authorization for national banks to establish branches across state lines.” Id. at 314, 126 S.Ct. 941. Considering Congress’ purpose of achieving jurisdictional parity between state and national banks, and the fact that the relevant language in § 1348 was placed in the statute at a time when national banks could not operate branches outside their home state, the Court held that

“a national bank, for § 1348 purposes, is a citizen of the State in which its main office, as set forth in its articles of association, is located. Were we to hold, as the Court of Appeals did, that a national bank is additionally a citizen of every State in which it has established a branch, the access of a federally chartered bank to a federal forum would be drastically curtailed in comparison to the access afforded state banks and other state-incorporated entities. Congress, we are satisfied, created no such anomaly.” Id. at 307,126 S.Ct. 941.

The Court did not decide whether, given the imprecision of the word “located,” a national bank might also be “located,” for purposes of § 1348, in the state where it maintains its principal place of business. Indeed, it specifically noted that in the case before it, the bank’s principal place of business was its main office. It stated:

“To achieve complete parity with state banks and other state-incorporated entities, a national banking association would have to be deemed a citizen of both the State of its main office and the State of its principal place of business. Congress has prescribed that a corporation ‘shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business.’ 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). The counterpart provision for national banking associations, § 1348, however, does not refer to ‘principal place of business;’ it simply deems such associations ‘citizens of the States in which they are respectively located.’ The absence of a ‘principal place of business’ reference in § 1348 may be of scant practical significance for, in almost every case, as in this one, the location of a national bank’s main office and of its principal place of business coincide.” Id. at 317 n. 9, 126 S.Ct. 941 (additional citation omitted).

ii. Whether Wells Fargo Is a Citizen of California

In the absence of guidance from either the Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit, district courts in the circuit have reached conflicting conclusions regarding the citizenship of national banks. Compare Goodman v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. CV 11-2685 JFW (RZx), 2011 WL 2372044, *2 (C.D.Cal. June 1, 2011) (remanding after concluding that Wells Fargo was a citizen of California, where it has its principal place of business, and that its citizenship was not diverse from that of a California plaintiff); Saberi v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., No. 10CV 1985 DMS (BGS), 2011 WL 197860, *3 (S.D.Cal. Jan. 20, 2011) (“Accordingly, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, Wells Fargo Bank is both a citizen of South Dakota, where it has designated its main office, and California, where it has its principal place of business”); Mount v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV 08-6298 GAF (MANx), 2008 WL 5046286, *2 (C.D.Cal.2008) (holding that Wells Fargo is a citizen of the state where it has its principal place of business and the state where its main office is located) with Tse v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CIO-4441 TEH, 2011 WL 175520, *2 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 19, 2011) (“[T]he test for a national bank’s citizenship under section 1348 is determined solely by the location of its main office designated in its articles of association”); Cochran v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., et al., Case No. CV 10-018 CAS (AGRx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38379 (C.D.Cal. Mar. 9, 2010) (concluding that a national bank was a citizen only of the state in which its main office is located); DeLeon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 729 F.Supp.2d 1119, 1124 (N.D.Cal.2010) (“[T]he Court concludes that Wells Fargo is a citizen of the state in which its main office, as specified in its articles of association, is located”); Kasramehr v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. et al., CV 11-0551 GAF (OPx) at 3 (reconsidering the position taken in Mount and concluding that Wells Fargo is a citizen only of the state in which it has its main office); Nguyen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 749 F.Supp.2d 1022, 1028 (N.D.Cal.2010) (‘Wells Fargo is a citizen of the state in which it has designated its ‘main office’ ”).

Courts concluding that Wells Fargo is a California citizen, including this one, have been swayed by the fact that § 1348 was intended to place national banks “on the same footing as the banks of the state where they were located.” Wachovia Bank, 546 U.S. at 310, 126 S.Ct. 941. Focusing on Congressional intent, they have concluded that the citizenship of national banks should be coextensive with the citizenship of state banks. See Horton v. Bank One, N.A., 387 F.3d 426, 431 (5th Cir.2004) (“It follows that we should read section 1348 as retaining its objective of jurisdictional parity for national banks visá-vis state banks and corporations.... We are persuaded that this goal of jurisdictional parity is best served by interpreting ‘located’ as referring to a national bank’s principal place of business as well as the state specified in the bank’s articles of association”); Mount, 2008 WL 5046286 at *2 (concluding that a national bank was a citizen of the state where its principal place of business was located because “this would place national banks on the same footing as any other corporation”); Stewart, 2011 WL 3323115 at *5 (“Since Congress wished national banks to have the same access to federal courts as state-chartered banks, interpreting § 1348 so as to foreclose the possibility that a national bank is ‘located’ where it maintains its principal place of business would not further Congress’ purposes”).

In Excelsior Funds, Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 470 F.Supp.2d 312 (S.D.N.Y.2006), however, one court offered a compelling counter-argument refuting this reasoning. Recognizing Congress’s intent to create parity, the Excelsior court noted that at the time § 1348 was enacted, a state bank was only a citizen of a single state: the state in which it was incorporated. Id. at 319. As a result, jurisdictional parity at the time the statute was passed was achieved by limiting a national bank’s citizenship to a single location. The concept that a corporation was a citizen of the state where it had its principal place of business did not arise until 1958, when 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) was first enacted. See An Act of July 25, 1958, Pub.L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415; S.Rep. No. 85-1830 (1958), as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101-02; Excelsior, 470 F.Supp.2d at 319. Reasoning that the most relevant time period for determining the meaning of a statute is the time it was enacted, the Excelsior court concluded that the citizenship of national banks did not remain permanently tethered to the citizenship of state banks, and that Congressional expansion of the state banks’ citizenship in 1958 did not result in a corresponding expansion of the citizenship of national ba