Houston v. Township of Randolph (934 F. Supp. 2d 711, 2013)

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 2013-03-21

The Public Health and Welfare Telecommunications

Citations

Full opinion text

OPINION

KEVIN McNULTY, District Judge.

Todd M. Houston, a disabled volunteer firefighter, brings this action against the Township of Randolph, the Township of Randolph Volunteer Fire Department (“RVFD” or the “Department”), and RVFD’s Chief, John McAndrew (“Chief McAndrew”). Houston alleges violations of his Free Speech, Due • Process, and Equal Protection rights, the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”). He also alleges conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and neglect or refusal to prevent the § 1985 conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1986. All of these causes of action seek damages. This matter comes before the court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P.

Because Houston alleges claims under the United States Constitution and federal statutes, jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343(a). Supplemental jurisdiction over his state constitutional and statutory claims is permissible pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), because they are so related to his federal claims as to form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution, Venue in this District is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because the events underlying Houston’s claims occurred in New Jersey. This matter is decided without oral argument, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 78.

Citing policy disagreements with RVFD relating to the deployment of the Rapid Intervention Crew (“RIC”), Houston wrote a letter to Chief McAndrew in which he stepped down as a trainer for the .RIC. Chief McAndrew responded by accepting Houston’s resignation, stating that Houston should no longer conduct any training sessions, and suggesting that Houston take a break from the RVFD. Houston, however, remained a member of the Department. Houston now contends that this was not an acceptance of his resignation, but a “pretextual suspension” in retaliation for his speaking out about what he viewed as RVFD’s violation of its own policies. In addition, Houston believes that, by prohibiting him from participating in training sessions, RVFD is illegally refusing to make a reasonable accommodation to his physical disability. Houston also alleges that RVFD withheld certain participation incentive payments as retaliation for his voicing disagreement with RVFD’s policies.

One factual weakness common to Houston’s retaliation claims is that, as a result of his disagreement with Chief McAndrew over RIC policies, Houston resigned as a RIC trainer. Chief McAndrew did no more than accept Houston’s resignation when he prohibited Houston from participating in any further training sessions. True, McAndrew suggested a cooling-off period. Houston, however, was not expelled from the RVFD; he remained a member of the Department. He continued to qualify for LOSAP points and any other benefits. In addition, Houston also received all of the incentive payments to which he was entitled, and he did not properly appeal the denials of which he now complains.

Factual weaknesses aside, Houston’s claims are seriously flawed as a matter of law, for the’ reasons stated herein. I find that McAndrew’s response to Houston’s resignation letter did not violate Houston’s constitutional or statutory rights. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Most of the essential facts underlying this suit are not disputed, even under a liberal interpretation of the procedural rules governing summary judgment.

A. The Randolph Volunteer Fire Department and the RIC

RVFD is a fully volunteer fire department consisting of four companies, each of which is led by a Battalion Chief. (John McAndrew Aff. ¶¶ 2-3 [ECF No. 32-2]). The Department as a whole is overseen by a Chief and Deputy Chief. (Id. at ¶ 4). Since 2011, John McAndrew has served as the Chief of the RVFD. (Id. at ¶ 1).

A Rapid Intervention Crew, or RIC, is a group of firefighters . that reports to a structural fire to assist and rescue firefighters who become lost, injured, or trapped. (Id. at ¶ 5). RVFD set up a RIC, sometimes also called a Rapid Intervention Team (“RIT”) or Firefighter Assist and Search Team, in either 1986 or 1996.

The RIC does not confine its activities to the Township of Randolph, but also responds to fires in other jurisdictions in Morris County. (John McAndrew Dep. at 59:8-12, Ex. J to Harrison Aff. [ECF No. 32-8]). The fire scene’s Incident Commander (the “IC”) in the Authority Having Jurisdiction (the “AHJ”) will contact a neighboring department, such as RVFD, via an electronic page seeking available RIC members. (John McAndrew Aff- ¶ 23). Once the chief of the responding department ascertains the number of available RIC-trained firefighters, he lets the IC know what resources are available. (Id. ¶ 24). The IC will then decide whether to summon the RIC members or to keep them on standby. (Id. ¶ 25).

A RIC may deploy to the fire scene as a whole team — that is, all of the RIC members, who come from the same fire department, may assemble at the firehouse, and only then go to the fire scene. Alternatively, partial RIC units from different departments may combine at the fire scene to form a RIC. (Id. ¶ 53). The former, whole-team method, in Houston’s estimation, prioritizes the safety of the. .RIC members because they have trained together and have experience working together. The latter, partial-team method prioritizes speed by dispatching RIC members to the fire as soon as they are available. (Houston Dep. at 109:7-109:23, 114:6-116:8; John McAndrew Aff. ¶¶ 53-54). The practice of Morris County fire departments has been to defer to the judgment of the IC about which method to follow. (Id. ¶¶ 49-51). The Morris County RIC Best Practices Guidelines (the “Guidelines”), which RVFD adopted in February 2011, do not require that a RIC be composed of firefighters from the same department. (Ex. C to Harrison Aff. [ECF No. 32-7]; John McAndrew Aff. ¶ 21). In any case, the Guidelines contain an “Important Notice” that “[a]nyone using this document should rely on his or her own independent judgment or, as appropriate, seek advice.” (Guidelines at 2).

B. Houston’s Work as a Firefighter

Houston originally served as a full-time firefighter for North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue. On that job, he was injured, and his foot is now fused at a 90 degree angle. (Houston Dep. 9:6-11, 59:1-62:4, Ex. I to Harrison Aff. [ECF Nos. 32-7, 32-8]). He retired from North Hudson with a permanent disability. (Id.).

Around March 2001, Houston began to volunteer for the RVFD. (Id. at 15:18-16:6). He is a member of Company # 2. (July 12, 2011 Letter from John McAndrew to Ted Carman, Ex. G to Harrison Aff. [ECF No. 32-7]). Houston’s Battalion Chief since 2010 has been Ted Carman. (Houston Dep. at 97:18-22).

As a volunteer, Houston does not receive wages, expense accounts, health benefits, disability benefits, or any other standard compensation or benefits. (Final Pretrial Order at 6 [ECF No. 34]). If he participates in a certain number of activities, he is eligible to receive modest incentive payments, described in Section I.C, infra. He has stated that he is also eligible for free family memberships in the local YMCA and tuition assistance for certain classes at a community college. (Id. at 6-7).

Houston and RVFD’s then-Chief, William Wagner, reached an agreement as to what Houston’s role would be in the RVFD in light of the limitations imposed by his injury. (Houston-RVFD Agreement, Ex. B to Harrison Aff. [ECF No. 32-7]). Their agreement, although dated May 10, 2010, indicates that the terms had been worked out earlier that year. (Id.). It provides that Houston would remain as RIC Team Captain; in this role, he would train firefighters and otherwise administer the RIC. (Id.). He would also respond to RIC calls when possible, reporting at the scene to the Incident Command Post and acting as liaison to the Department’s RIC. (Id.). Because Houston could no longer drive RVFD vehicles or work as an active interior firefighter, he could not go into the “hot zone.” (Id.). The agreement provides that it is to be reviewed annually. (Id.).

C. The LOSAP Program

The Emergency Services Volunteer Length of Service Award Program Act, which established the Length of Service Award Program (“LOSAP”), became effective in 1998. (Ex. M to Harrison Aff. at 1 [ECF No. 32-9]). LOSAP is a voluntary, municipally-funded, deferred-compensation program for volunteer emergency services personnel. (Id.; Thomas McAndrew Aff. ¶¶ 2, 15 [ECF No. 32-3]). A sponsoring agency, such as RVFD, establishes the local LOSAP and sets the yearly eligibility requirements. (Ex. M to Harrison Aff. at 1 [ECF No. 32-5]).

In the RVFD, to be eligible for LOSAP benefits in a particular year, the firefighter must amass a certain number of LOSAP Points, comprising Activity Points and Length of Service Points. (Thomas McAndrew Aff. ¶4 [ECF No. 32-3]). Participants earn Activity Points by, for example, attending meetings and training sessions, serving in leadership roles, or sitting on committees. (Id. ¶ 6; Ex. O to the Harrison Aff. at 1 [ECF No. 32-10]). Length of Service Points are based on the number of active years a firefighter has served and are distributed as follows: seven per year for the first fifteen years, and three per year for each subsequent year. (Ex. O to the Harrison Aff. at 1).

Firefighters with less than 15 years of service must earn at least 105 Activity Points to be eligible for a payment; those with 15 or more years need only 60 Activity Points. (Thomas McAndrew Aff. ¶ 9). If a firefighter meets a certain point threshold, thereby becoming ■ eligible, RVFD will make a one-time deposit into the firefighter’s deferred income account. (Thomas McAndrew Aff. ¶ 5). The maximum available benefit payments are gradated by category, and the categories depend on the total number of points earned.

Category Total Points Maximum Payment

I 104 or less ' 0

II 105 to 149 $233.00

III 150 to 204 $815.00

IV 205 or more $1339.00

(Source: id: ¶¶ 10-12).

Houston’s LOSAP results for 2008-11 are below. ■ Because he had fewer than 15 years of service, he could only receive a LOSAP payment if he earned at least 105 Activity Points:

Year Activity Points Longevity Points Total Points Category (eligibility)

2008 135 35 170 Category

2009 93 42 135 Not

2010 91 42 133 Not

2011 135 42 180 Category

(Source: Thomas McAndrew Aff., Exs. 1-4). ■ ;

The procedure for making a LOSAP eligibility' determination is as follows. RVFD’s Secretary of Accounts, currently Thomas McAndrew, maintains the Department’s LOSAP records. (Thomas McAndrew Aff. ¶ 1). At the end of the year, the Secretary creates and submits to the Chief an “Individual Year-End Report” that states the number of LOSAP points earned by each firefighter that calendar year. (Id. ¶ 13). The Chief then mails each firefighter a Year-End Report. (Id.). The firefighter has 30 days to sign and return it, and can either accept or challenge the calculation. (Id. ¶ 14). If he or she accepts it, the Department will notify the Township’s Chief Financial Officer and Risk Manager of the firefighter’s benefit category. (Id.). The firefighter will then receive the appropriate contribution amount for his or her category. (Id.). A challenge to the category determination is deemed an appeal of the decision as long as it is in writing, as required by RVFD’s By-Laws and the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs’ LOSAP Rules. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 21; Ex. K to Harrison Aff. at 24 [ECF No. 32-9]; Ex. N to Harrison Aff. at 3 [ECF No. 32-10]). Upon receiving the written appeal, Secretary McAndrew will then meet with the firefighter to determine whether a point adjustment is appropriate. (Thomas McAndrew Aff. ¶ 14). If a firefighter does not sign and return the Year-End Report, he or she may be deemed to have elected not to participate in LOSAP for that year. (Id. ¶ 15).

The Department did not receive any written appeal from Houston regarding the 2008, 2009 or 2010 determinations. (Thomas McAndrew Aff. ¶¶ 17, 21). For 2011, Houston (and apparently four other firefighters) did not sign their Year-End Reports, but RVFD awarded them LOSAP benefits anyway. (Lovell Aff. ¶ 6 and Ex. 3 [EOF No. 32-4]).

D. Houston’s Disagreement with RIC Practices Culminates in His Resignation

Houston holds strong views of how the RIC should function. When RIC policies conflicted with his understanding of best practices, he communicated his disagreement to Chief McAndrew and other firefighters. (Houston Dep. at 114:6-116:2; 50:6-51:25; 93:2-97:3; 102:11-105:5; 106:2-19; 210:3-6; John McAndrew Aff. ¶¶ 37-39, 40-44, 47-49; 51-53, 56). These disagreements centered on policies relating to RIC deployment, destruction of property when the RIC was at the scene of a fire, and RIC training. (Id.).

1. RIC Deployment Policy

Houston believed that the Guidelines required that an RIC could (and should) deploy to a fire only if and when an entire team had assembled. In his view, a RIC whose members have previously trained together is a safer RIC. (Houston Dep. at 40:13-16, 50:21-51:16; 93:2-11). Lacking a quorum, then, the Department should send no assistance to the IC. Chief McAndrew believed that Houston’s favored approach might fatally impair .the functions of the RIC, which must. deploy quickly. (Id. ¶ 49). Chief McAndrew interpreted the Guidelines to allow, if the IC requested it, for a partial RIC team to be deployed to the scene of a fire, where they could be combined with members from other fire departments to form a whole RIC. (John McAndrew Aff. IT 53). McAndrew’s preferred approach dovetailed with the practice of the mutual aid agencies of Morris County: to defer to .the judgment of the IC as to the deployment of RIC resources. (Id. ¶ 50).

RVFD’s deployment of a partial RIC led to Houston’s voicing his disagreement with the Department’s policy in three instances: one at the end of 2010, the second a few months later, and the third in early July 2011. (Houston Dep. 50:6-51:16; 93:2-11). After each of the first two deployments, Houston expressed his concern to Chief McAndrew that the Department was sending out understaffed RICs. (Id.). After the July 2011 deployment, Houston sent Chief McAndrew a letter resigning from his service as a RIC trainer, as described in Section I.D.3, infra.

Houston expressed his disagreement to others aside from Chief McAndrew, including RVFD firefighters, firefighters in other departments, neighbors, and family members. (Id. at 94:21-95:4). Houston directly spoke to about fifteen to twenty members of his company, and the whole company knew his views. (Id. at 95:15-96:8). Chief McAndrew believed that this threatened the cohesiveness of the RVFD. (John McAndrew Aff. ¶¶ 51, 57-58).

2. Other RIC-Related Policy Disagreements

Houston’s, views of proper RIC policies also diverged from those of Chief McAndrew regarding the procedure for certain RIC drills, the destruction of property at fire sites, and Houston’s presentation style in training sessions.

On May 26, 2011, the RIC was scheduled to conduct a drill in a condemned structure. (John McAndrew Aff. ¶ 40). Specifically, Chief McAndrew wanted RIC personnel to practice maintaining communication with the potentially trapped firefighters they were assigned to aid. (Id. ¶ 41). Houston believed that, a “hands-on” drill, i.e., a physical simulation of rescuing trapped firefighters involving destruction of the property, was more appropriate. (Id., ¶¶ 42-43; Houston Dep. at 98:22— 102:2). Houston shared this opinion with Chief McAndrew and Deputy Chief Dunn. Voices were raised, and the RIC Captain, John Pedrick, was upset. (John McAndrew Aff. ¶¶ 42-43; Houston Dep. at 102:17-104:20). In that conversation, Houston was defiant and insubordinate to Chief McAndrew. (John McAndrew Aff. ¶ 41). Chief McAndrew explained that while he understood Houston’s view, he had .decided that the drill should focus on communication. (Id. ¶ 43). The situation was resolved by a compromise in which everyone agreed to a hands-on drill with a communications component. (Houston Dep. at 106:2-106:19). Houston was satisfied with that outcome. (Id. at 106:20-22).

During the same discussion, Chief McAndrew and Houston talked about the protocol for a RIC’s destruction of property at the scene of a fire. Chief McAndrew’s policy (and the custom of the mutual aid departments of Morris County) is that RIC members should not destroy property unless the IC authorizes it. (John McAndrew Aff. ¶ 37). Houston, by contrast, believed that RIC members should have discretion to destroy property. (Id. ¶ 38). The conversation did not change Houston’s mind, and he did not indicate that he would instruct his RIC trainees to follow the policy favored by Chief McAndrew. (Id. ¶¶ 45-46). Chief McAndrew regarded this as defiance, and was concerned that Houston would not teach his preferred protocol to RIC trainees. (Id. ¶¶ 45-46). •

In the same conversation, Chief McAndrew spoke with Houston about Houston’s RIC training methods. (Id. ¶ 47). On several occasions, Chief McAndrew observed Houston leading training sessions. (Id. ¶ 34). Chief McAndrew found that Houston delivered these lessons in an overly aggressive and dramatic manner. (Id. ¶¶ 34-35). Consequently, Chief McAndrew thought that young volunteer firefighters might be demoralized and discouraged from participating in the Department. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 48). Chief McAndrew asked Houston to modify his presentation. (Id. ¶ 48). Houston refused, replying that to do so would put lives at risk. (Id. ¶ 49). At subsequent training sessions that Chief McAndrew attended, Houston’s presentation style remained the same. (Id.).

S. Houston resigns as trainer

The July 2011 partial RIC deployment served as the “proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back.” (Houston Dep. at 107:22-24). On July 8, 2011, Houston sent a letter to Chief McAndrew stating that because of the Department’s “repeated disregard of the numerous rules, regulations and guidelines pertaining to the [RIC],” Houston “could no longer function as the training officer of the [RIC].” (Letter from Houston to Chief McAndrew, July 8, 2011). Houston wrote that deploying partial teams “is an extreme safety hazard, as well as being a disservice to the incident commander, who is expecting a fully equipped, staffed and trained Complement of firefighters to respond.” (Id.). Houston, in his own view, was teaching the proper standards to trainees, but the Department was “completely disregarding those standards when [the RIC was] activated.” (Id.). He felt that this “promote[d] unsafe practices with potentially fatal consequences.” (Id.).

Chief McAndrew replied by letter dated July 11, 2011:

I have in the past appreciated your perspective concerning operations and procedures, and have had a few discussions with you debating the merits, pros and cons, and applicability, of both your and my own opinion. “What I find troubling is your increasing criticism of the RIC deployments, and now this letter. Although you have an acute recollection of the “rules”, you have limited understanding of the application of such. You completely refuse my repeated attempts to explain the nuances and operational differences of our Mutual Aid Departments and my colleague Chiefs. You may disagree with a Command decision, and I have always been willing to discuss the details and circumstances of any and all, but at this point you have gone beyond criticism to become uncooperative (combative). This attitude is detrimental to the operation of the Fire Department, harmful to moral [sic] and is borderline insubordinate.

I accept this “resignation”, although a single training “officer” for the RIC was not formally established, and further state that you are not to proctor, lecture, instruct, or participate in any training at all with the RIC, Fire Company 2, or the Department.

At this point, I think some time off is appropriate. I suggest you take a break and re-'evaluate if you can be cooperative and participate with this Department.

(Letter from Chief McAndrew to Houston, dated July 11, 2011, Ex. F to Harrison Aff. [ECF No. 32-7]).

On July 12, 2011, Chief McAndrew followed this letter with a memo to Houston’s Battalion Chief, Ted Carman. The memo reiterated that Houston was not to be a part of any training activities, and that Houston’s “only involvement in [Department] activities is to be observation only, as his allowable activity is still in question.” (July 12, 2011 Chief McAndrew Memo to Ted Carman, Ex. G to Harrison Aff. [ECF No. 32-7]).

Houston replied to Chief McAndrew’s letter on July 14, 2011, reiterating many of the points made in his resignation letter. Houston did, however, ask that Chief McAndrew reconsider the training ban. This letter noted Houston’s significant experience and certifications and stated that permitting him to resume teaching trainees would be a reasonable accommodation of his disability. (Letter from Houston to Chief McAndrew, July 14, 2011, Ex. H to Harrison Aff. [ECF No. 32 — 7]). The record does not indicate that Chief McAndrew responded to this letter.

The RVFD Bylaws provide for a Board of Past Department Chiefs that advises Department officers and typically serves as a grievance committee. (RVFD Bylaws Art. Ill, § M, Ex. K to Harrison Aff. [ECF No. 32-8], John McAndrew Aff. ¶ 59). Houston did not complain about Chief McAndrew’s interpretation of the RIC rules to the Board of Past Department Chiefs. He did complain to the Board of Past Company # 2 Chiefs. (John McAndrew Aff. ¶ 60). The Board of Past Company # 2 Chiefs contacted Chief McAndrew to meet with him, but Houston filed this suit before such a meeting could take place. (Id. ¶ 61).

Houston remains a member of the RVFD' and remains eligible for LOSAP. (Id. ¶ 61).

E. This Action

Houston filed this action on August 19, 2011. In it, he alleges that Chief McAndrew’s response to his resignation letter was in fact a “suspension.” The grounds for this suspension, he alleges, were pretextual because it was in fact a form of retaliation for his criticism of the Department’s RIC policies. In addition, Houston alleges that the RVFD failed to reasonably accommodate his disability when it declined to let him continue to serve as a trainer. He also asserts, generally, that the retaliation includes failing to make LO-SAP payments that he earned for calendar years 2009, 2010, and 2011, and that his suspension prevented him from earning enough points to qualify for a LOSAP contribution. His suspension and the failure to pay him benefits, he alleges, violate his rights under the federal and state Free Speech and Equal Protection Clauses, the federal Due Process Clause, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (the “CEPA”). He cites 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (conspiracy to violate civil rights) and 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (neglect to prevent a violation of civil rights); he does not cite 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but the court presumes that such a claim was intended.

II. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine .issue of material fact to be resolved and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”); Alcoa, Inc. v. U.S., 509 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir.2007). Summary judgment is desirable because it eliminates unfounded claims without resort to a costly and lengthy trial, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, but it should be granted only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue.as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

“[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists rests initially on the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party has made a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir.1976).

If a party fails to address the other party’s properly supported assertion of fact, the court may consider “granting] summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials — including the facts considered undisputed — show that the movant is entitled to it .... ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Local Civil Rule 56.1(a) deems a movant’s statement of material facts undisputed where a party does not respond or file a counterstatement. L. Civ. R. 56(a). A failure to dispute a - party’s statement of material facts, however, “is not alone a sufficient basis for the entry of a summary judgment.” See Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir.1990) (holding that even where a local rule deeming unopposed motions to be conceded, the court was still required to analyze the movant’s summary judgment motion under the standard prescribed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)); see also Muskett v. Certegy Check Servs., Inc., Civ. No. 08-3975, 2010 WL 2710555 (D.N.J. July 6, 2010) (“In order to grant Defendant’s unopposed motion for summary judgment, where, as here, ‘the moving party does not have the burden of proof on the relevant issues, ... the [Court] must determine that the deficiencies in [Plaintiffs] evidence designated in or in connection with the motion entitle the [Defendants] to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” (quoting Anchorage Assocs., 922 F.2d at 175)).

Because the law is so clear and the evidence so one-sided as to entitle the Defendants to judgment, I am granting the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

III. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS

A. Introduction: The Civil Rights Statutes, Qualified Immunity and . the Monell Limitation on Municipal Liability

To sustain each of Houston’s constitutional claims, it is first necessary to find a viable claim of deprivation of a constitutional right. Even where such a potential violation is identified, however, the court must also analyze two prospective barriers to liability: Chief McAndrew’s defense of qualified immunity and the municipality’s Monell argument that an actionable injury must have resulted from an official policy or custom.

1. Causes of action for violations of constitutional rights

Houston asserts a number of claims for damages based on alleged violations of his rights under the Constitution of the United States. Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, provides for such a cause of action:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law ....

See City of Greenwood, Miss. v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 829, 86 S.Ct. 1800, 16 L.Ed.2d 944 (1966) (“Under [§ 1983 state] officers may be made to respond in damages ... for violations of ... federal constitutional [rights]”); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”).

Houston also alleges causes of action for violations of the conspiracy and failure-to-prevent sections of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986. It is most helpful to identify first what, if any, actionable civil rights violations exist under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. I will then analyze the § 1985(3) and § 1986 claims separately.

2. Qualified immunity

“[Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability as long ‘as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 364 (3d Cir.2005) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). In analyzing whether qualified immunity attaches to a government official who has moved for summary judgment, • a court must “first determine whether the facts, and inferences drawn therefrom, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, establish that the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” McGreevy, 413 F.3d at 364 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)). If that first step is satisfied, the court must then “determine whether, as a legal matter, the right that the defendant’s conduct allegedly violates was a clearly established one, about which a reasonable person would have known.” Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 298 (3d Cir.2000).

A right is “clearly established” when the “contours of the right” are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. A clearly established right is not limited to one that “has previously been held unlawful.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). Instead, “it merely means that in light' of preexisting law, the unlawfulness of the official’s conduct was reasonably and objectively apparent.” McGreevy, 413 F.3d at 366 (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)). “[Officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508.

The knowledge of a reasonable person “is measured by an objective standard; arguments that the defendants desired to handle or subjectively believed that they had handled the incidents properly are irrelevant.” Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 726 (3d Cir.1989) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). Thus, the party asserting that qualified immunity applies is “entitled to [it] if reasonable officials in the defendants’ position at the relevant time could have believed, in light of clearly established law, that their conduct comported with established legal standards.” Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 726.

3. The Monell limitation on municipal liability

Houston has named the Township of Randolph and its Fire Department as defendants. A municipality is not vicariously liable via respondeat superior for the constitutional torts of its officials. Rather, a plaintiff must show that any violation of his constitutional rights “implement[ed] or execute[d] a policy, regulation or decision officially adopted by the governing body or informally adopted by custom.” Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir.1996) (citing Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). “In other words, the County may not be held liable for constitutional torts under § 1983 on a vicarious liability theory rooted in respondeat superior but ‘it can be held responsible as an entity when the injury inflicted is permitted under its adopted policy or custom.’ ” Mulholland v. Gov’t Cty. of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d Cir.2013) (citing Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir.1990) and quoting Beck, 89 F.3d at 971). Thus there are two paths to municipal liability under § 1983: municipal policy or custom. Beck, 89 F.3d at 971.

“Policy is made when a decisionmaker possessing final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.” Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480 (internal citations omitted). “An official has pohcymaking authority for Monell purposes when the official is responsible as a matter of state law for making policy in the particular area of county business in question, and the official’s authority to make policy in that area is final and unreviewable.” Mulholland, 706 F.3d at 237 (citing Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 245-46 (3d Cir.2006)).

A course of conduct is considered to be a “custom” when, though not authorized by law, “such practices of state officials [are] so permanent and well-settled” as to virtually constitute law. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480 (internal citations omitted). “Custom ... may also be established by evidence of knowledge and acquiescence.”' Beck, 89 F.3d at 971.

In Sections III.B, C & D of this opinion, then, for each of Houston’s constitutional claims, I will first analyze the substantive claim and then consider any applicable qualified immunity defense or Monell limitation on liability.

B. First Amendment Retaliation

Houston claims that he was “suspended” in retaliation for his vocal disagreement with RIC policies, in violation of his constitutional right to free speech. I find that Houston’s statements are not protected by the First Amendment because he was not speaking as a citizen, but rather as a public employee pursuant to his official duties. A fortiori, a reasonable public official in Chief McAndrew’s position would not necessarily have seen the challenged “suspension” as a constitutional violation, and qualified immunity therefore shields his actions. As to the municipal defendants, I find that there is no proof, or even really an allegation, that any arguable constitutional deprivation resulted from an established policy or custom, as required by Monell.

1. The constitutional merits

A First Amendment retaliation claim has three essential elements:

(1) The plaintiffs speech was protected under the First Amendment;

(2) The defendant took an adverse or retaliatory action; and

(3) A causal connection between (1) and (2), ie., that the protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the retaliatory action, shifting the burden of proof to defendant to demonstrate it would have taken the same action absent the protected speech.

See Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir.2010); Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir.2009); Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 241 (3d Cir.2006); Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir.2001). The first element is an issue of law; the second and third are questions of fact. Baldassare v. New Jersey, 250 F.3d 188, 195 (3d Cir.2001); Johnson v. Lincoln Univ., 776 F.2d 443, 454 (3d Cir.1985); see also Gorum, supra. This discussion focuses on the first.

That First Amendment analysis applies differently to private and public employment, as explained further below. A person who goes into government service does not give up the First Amendment right to express oneself freely as a citizen. But limitations may be placed on the speech of public employees as employees. The Supreme Court has clearly stated the reasons for limiting First Amendment protection in the public employee context: first, a citizen in government service accepts certain restrictions on his freedom; second, the government, like any employer, must exercise some control over employees’ words and actions; and third, a public employee is in a position of public trust, and cannot be permitted to express views that “contravene governmental policies or impair the proper performance of governmental functions.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418-19, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006).

The threshold question is therefore whether Houston, as a volunteer firefighter, was the equivalent of a public employee. The Third Circuit case of Versarge v. Twp. of Clinton N. J., 984 F.2d 1359, 1364 (3d Cir.1993), treated a volunteer firefighter as a public employee for purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim, and I believe that approach remains sound. Houston’s position was so parallel to that of a public employee that it should be treated as such for First Amendment purposes. The RVFD is a municipal entity, (Ex. 0 to the Harrison Aff. at 1 (acknowledging that the Township has fire companies); see also Township Rev. Ordinances § 20-31), and the RVFD fulfills a vital function of municipal government. See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976), overruled on other grounds by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985) (fire prevention is a “typical” activity “performed by state and local governments in discharging their dual functions of administering the public law and furnishing public services”). The organization of the RVFD is bureaucratic, like that of a municipal department with paid employees. Indeed it is paramilitary, with a chain of command analogous to that of a police department. Houston’s involvement, moreover, cannot be regarded as a vocational or casual.

Houston, then, will be treated as a public employee. Whether a public employee’s speech is protected by the First Amendment depends on three issues:

(1) was the plaintiff speaking as a citizen rather than as a public employee discharging her employment duties;

(2) did the plaintiffs statements address a matter of public concern as opposed to a personal interest; and

(3) did the plaintiffs employer have “an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public” as a result of the statement [the employee] made.

Montone v. City of Jersey City, 709 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir.2013) (line breaks added) (quoting Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 185 (3d Cir.2009), quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951).

I conclude as a matter of law that Houston’s vocal disagreements with RIC policies are not protected by the First Amendment because they fail to satisfy two of the three Garcetti factors, all of which are necessary. Under the first prong, Houston spoke as a Fire Department member, not as a citizen, as a matter of law. The second prong, whether the statements raised matters of public concern, I will not rely on; it is at least arguably in Houston’s favor. The third, however, is not, because the Department had adequate justification to treat persons in the chain of command differently from members of the public. I now discuss factors one and three in more detail.

A public employee making statements pursuant to his or her official duties is not acting “as a citizen,” and those státements are not protected by the First Amendment. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951; see also Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 241 (3d Cir.2006). As the Supreme Court reasoned in Garcetti, “restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.” 547 U.S. at 421, 126 S.Ct.’1951. Therefore, “expressions employees make pursuant to their' professional duties” fall outside the protections of the First Amendment. Id. at 426, 126 S.Ct. 1951. Whether a statement is made pursuant to official duties is a practical inquiry, not limited to the technicalities of the employee’s job description. Id. at 424, 126 S.Ct. 1951. Factors considered include whether the speech fell within the individual’s job duties, whether it related to special knowledge or experience acquired on the job, whether it was made inside or outside the work place, and whether it concerned the job’s subject matter. Id., 547 U.S. at 420-21, 126 S.Ct. 1951; Gorum, 561 F.3d at 185.

In short, “the First Amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline based on an employee’s expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424, 126 S.Ct. 1951. Reporting to superiors, for example, is unprotected because it does not have a “relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not government employees.” Id. Thus the Third Circuit has repeatedly held that “complaints up the chain of command about issues related to an employee’s workplace duties — for example, possible safety issues or misconduct by other employees — are within an employee’s official duties” and therefore unprotected. Morris v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 487 Fed.Appx. 37 (3d Cir.2012) (non-precedential) (holding that plaintiffs reporting instances of potential misconduct of subordinates to his superiors was within his official job duties); Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 240 (3d Cir.2007), abrogated on other grounds by Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2488, 180 L.Ed.2d 408 (2011) (“Price and Warren were acting within their job duties when they expressed their concerns up the chain of command.... ”); Hill, 455 F.3d at 242 (a town borough manager’s reports to his superiors about harassment by the town mayor were not protected speech because his reports were made pursuant to his managerial duties).

Houston did not speak “as a citizen” when he disagreed with the Department’s policies on RIC deployment, property destruction, and drills. The central retaliatory action about which he complains — his “suspension” — allegedly occurred because he criticized RIC protocols to Chief McAndrew. (Houston Opp. at 1-2, 4); see also John McAndrew Aff. ¶ 57. These are classic, employment-related complaints up the chain of command. The Third Circuit cases cited above establish that such statements are made as an employee, and are therefore outside the ambit of the First Amendment.

More generally, Houston’s statements are employment-based because they fall within the scope of Houston’s duties as a firefighter and RIC trainer. He would be expected to inform his superiors and coworkers about perceived safety issues, including those involving RIC policies. And Houston’s knowledge of safety procedures and RIC protocols certainly arises from or “relates to special knowledge or experience acquired through his job.” Gorum, 561 F.3d at 185. In short, Houston’s RIC-policy related complaints are public employee speech, not private citizen speech protected by the First Amendment.

The conclusion that Houston spoke as a public employee, even taken alone, is dis-positive. His speech is not protected by the First Amendment, and his First Amendment retaliation claims cannot survive summary judgment scrutiny. Foraker, 501 F.3d at 243 (concluding speech was not protected and therefore declining to analyze other First Amendment retaliation factors).

The third prong of Garcetti, moreover, supplies an alternative ground to . grant summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim. Even assuming arguendo that Houston spoke as a citizen, and spoke on a matter of public concern, his “speech is not automatically privileged.” Borough of Duryea, Pa., 131 S.Ct. at 2493. A court may then consider whether, in the public employment context, the employer had “adequate justification” to treat the employee in a manner that might have violated the First Amendment with regard to a private citizen. To do so, the court must apply the Pickering balancing test, weighing “the First Amendment interest of the employee against the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Id. (citing Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968)); accord Montone, 709 F.3d at 194-95; Miller v. Clinton County, 544 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir.2008). “The determination of whether speech is protected pursuant to the Pickering balancing, test is one of law.” Versarge, 984 F.2d at 1364.

The government is entitled to “promote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties, and to maintain proper discipline in the public service.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-51, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (quoting Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373, 1 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed. 232 (1882)). To further that purpose,

the Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control over the management of its personnel and internal affairs. This includes the prerogative to remove employees whose conduct hinders efficient operation and to do so with dispatch. Prolonged retention of a disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory employee can adversely affeet discipline and morale in the work place, foster disharmony, and ultimately impair the efficiency of an office or agency.

Connick, 461 U.S. at 151, 108 S.Ct. 1684. That is particularly true where, as here, the government employer is a paramilitary organization, in which discipline and respect for authority are essential. See Rivell v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 115 N.J.Super. 64, 72, 278 A.2d 218 (App.Div.), cert. denied, 59 N.J. 269, 281 A.2d 531 (1971), rev’d on other grounds by Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 410 A.2d 686 (1980) (“Many New Jersey cases indicate the importance of maintaining discipline within the paramilitary organization of a police department. Refusal to obey orders and disrespect cannot be tolerated. Such conduct adversely affects the morale and efficiency of the department.”); see also Anderson v. Burke Cty., Georgia, 239 F.3d 1216, 1222 (11th Cir.2001) (“In addition, a paramilitary organization, such as a fire department has a need to secure discipline, mutual respect, trust and particular efficiency among the ranks due to. its status as a quasi-military entity different from other public employers.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); Figueroa-Rodriguez v. Lopez-Rivera, 878 F.2d 1488, 1489 (1st Cir.1988) (noting paramilitary nature of fire departments); Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 470 n. 10 (9th Cir.1983) (when paramilitary organizations are involved, the state’s interest in regulating speech is greatest).

A court must consider whether the plaintiffs speech “impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker’s duties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise.” Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S., at 570-573, 88 S.Ct. 1731). Also important is whether the statement was made in a public or a nonpublic forum. Roseman v. Indiana Univ. of Pennsylvania, at Indiana, 520 F.2d 1364, 1368 (3d Cir.1975),

Houston had numerous, vocal disagreements with Chief McAndrew concerning RIC policy, some of them expressed in front of other officers and in discussions with other firefighters. (John McAndrew Aff. ¶¶ 42-43; Houston Dep. at 95:15-96:8, 102:17-104:20). Even after direct instructions from his superior, Chief McAndrew, Houston would not waver from his determination to train RIC members as he, Houston, believed best. (John McAndrew Aff. ¶¶ 45-46, 49). Although Houston’s resignation letter refers to violations of “numerous rules, regulations and guidelines,” they are not identified; the “rules” and “guidelines” at issue seem to be nothing more than Houston’s own policy preferences. This course of activity clearly had the capacity to impair discipline in the department and interfere with the regular operation of the RVFD. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388, 107 S.Ct. 2891.

In Roseman, the plaintiff, an associate professor, made statements at a faculty meeting that were critical of the head of her department. Specifically, she alleged that he had improperly reviewed an application for chairmanship of the department. 520 F.2d at 1366. Her contract was not renewed, and she sued, alleging that the university retaliated against her for exercising her right to free speech. Id. at 1365. After a bench trial, the district court granted judgment in favor of the university. Id. The Third Circuit affirmed. Id. In doing so, the Third Circuit applied the Pickering balancing test and distinguished Pickering in two respects. Id. at 1367-68. First, in Pickering, the statements at issue related to a pending tax proposal, and were contained in' a published letter to the editor of a local newspaper — a “classic example of public communication on an issue of public interest.” Id. Roseman, by contrast, spoke in a nonpublic faculty meeting, concerning an issue of “less public interest.” Id. at 1368. Second, Roseman’s communications had a

potentially disruptive impact on the functioning of the Department.- Pickering’s attacks were on a remote superintendent and school board; in contrast, Roseman’s called into question the integrity of the person immediately in charge of running a department which, it is fair to assume, was more intimate than a school district.... [Plaintiff’s attacks upon Faust’s integrity in a faculty meeting would undoubtedly have the effect of interfering with harmonious relationships with plaintiffs superiors and co-workers.

Id. Roseman’s statements, in short, raised questions of maintaining “discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among coworkers.” Id.

Houston’s statements are far closer to Roseman’s than to Pickering’s. The communications that concerned Chief McAndrew were made to him and to other members of the Fire Department — not in a forum open to the general public. The statements were made to, and about, Houston’s immediate superior, not some remote public official. The topic — the particular composition of RIC deployments— is of some public concern, to be sure, but does not resemble the quintessential issue of public policy in Pickering. Unlike local taxation, .RIC deployment is: not an issue that citizens are called upon to learn about or vote on. Houston’s statements also resemble Roseman’s in that they raised doubts about Chief McAndrew’s ability to maintain discipline and harmony in a relatively small Department; indeed, they tended to impugn McAndrew’s competence and concern for firefighters’ safety.

In short, the RVFD’s paramilitary structure, combined with the similarity of Houston’s statements to those of the plaintiff in Roseman, suggests that the Pickering balancing test weighs in favor of the Township. So even if Houston had been speaking as a citizen when he disagreed with RIC policy (and I do not think he was), I would nevertheless find that the Township did not violate his First Amendment rights.

Based on these issues of law, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be granted as to the First Amendment retaliation claims. That being so, I need not consider the other, more fact-based elements of a retaliation claim (a retaliatory act and causation).

2.. Qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim

To get past the qualified immunity hurdle, any “unlawfulness must be apparent,” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987), because “qualified immunity provides government officials with leeway in applying difficult or murky law, even if that law is clearly established.” Carlino v. Gloucester City High Sch., 57 F.Supp.2d 1, 34 (D.N.J.1999). Even assuming arguendo that Houston’s speech enjoyed First Amendment protection, Chief McAndrew would nevertheless be entitled to qualified immunity. A person in Chief McAndrew’s position could reasonably have believed, in light of clearly established law, that Houston spoke as a public employee and that the First Amendment did not shield Houston’s speech. A reasonable person could have concluded that allowing Houston to continue as a trainer would undermine the morale and cohesion of the Department and compromise the command decisions that McAndrew as Chief was entitled to make.

As noted above, internal policy-based complaints and disagreements voiced by a public employee do not enjoy First Amendment protection as a matter of law. A fortiori, a reasonable fire chief could think so. Whether a public employee’s speech was made pursuant to his or her official duties is a “practical” inquiry that includes analyzing numerous factors, including the employee’s job description, whether the speech is based on special knowledge or experience obtained through the job, the location (at or outside of work), and the type of content, such as safety issues, misconduct by other employees, or other pertinent job-related subject matter. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420-21, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006); Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 185 (3d Cir.2009); Morris v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 487 Fed.Appx. 37 (3d Cir.2012) (non-precedential). Under such a multifactor test, Chief McAndrew could well have struck the balance reasonably, even if erroneously. See Carlino, 57 F.Supp.2d at 34 (school principal, who removed a field hockey coach in retaliation for a sign she placed on her lawn that questioned his suitability as a role model, violated the First Amendment but was nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity, because the Pickering balancing test is difficult, fact-intensive, and murky).

I do not hasten to immunize a mistaken deprivation of First Amendment rights, because “speech on public issues occupies the ‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.’ ” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982)). Here, however, I do not believe any such deprivation occurred. Chief McAndrew is duty-bound to ensure that the RVFD is functioning efficiently and effectively to fulfill its duty to protect the residents of Randolph and neighboring towns. Houston simply disagreed with the manner in which McAndrew did so. McAndrew would not have been unreasonable — would have been correct, in fact — in thinking he had the discretionary authority to enforce his own point of view about, e.g., the proper staffing of a RIC. Accordingly, even if Houston’s speech fell under the protection of the First Amendment, Chief McAndrew would be entitled to qualified immunity.

3. Monell liability on the First Amendment claim

Even if Houston could show that he was deprived of his First Amendment rights, the Township and the Department ■ could not be held liable. Houston has not made any showing, or even alleged, that his “suspension” occurred pursuant to a Township policy or custom. Houston’s opposition papers do not address the Township’s Monell argument, and I see no evidence of an unconstitutional policy or custom in the record. Therefore, under Monell and its progeny, there is no municipal liability. See Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir.1996).

Defendants’ summary judgment motion will be granted as to the First Amendment relation claims.

C. Due Process

1. Deprivation of procedural or substantive due process

Houston alleges that his “pretextual suspension” violated the Due Process clause. He is not very specific about how, or about the level of process he believes was due. I hold that Chief McAndrew’s actions fall short of violating Houston’s procedural due process rights because Houston has no property interest in his RIC trainer position and no entitlement to a particular level of procedure. Chief McAndrew’s conduct falls short of violating Houston’s substantive due process rights because it does not shock the conscience.

To state a claim that he was denied procedural due process, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of “life, liberty, or property,” and (2) the procedures afforded him did not constitute “due process of law.” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 234 (3d Cir.2006) (quoting Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir.2000)); accord Iles v. de Jongh, 638 F.3d 169, 173 (3d Cir.2011).

“In evaluating a procedural due process claim, we first determine whether the asserted individual interests are encompassed within the fourteenth amendment’s protection of life, liberty, or property.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 205 (3d Cir.2007) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Id. Moreover, even where there is a recognized property interest, if it is de minimis, the protections of due process do not attach. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975); Versarge v. Twp. of Clinton N.J., 984 F.2d 1359, 1370 (3d Cir.1993); In short, to satisfy the first prong of a procedural due process property claim, Houston must have a legitimate, more than de minimis, property interest in his volunteer position as a trainer or firefighter. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).

The “Supreme Court has held that a public employee with no statutory or contractual entitlement to his employment has no property interest subject .to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Johnson v. Yurick, 156 F.Supp.2d 427, 436 (D.N.J.2001) aff'd, 39 Fed.Appx. 742 (3d Cir.2002) (non-precedential) (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976) and Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)). A fortiori this would apply to a volunteer position. The record does not show that Houston has a statutory entitlement to his position. Further, Houston has no contractual entitlement to be a RIC trainer. While he does not raise this point, I have examined whether the agreement between him and the Department gives rise to a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause. I conclude that it does not. The salient part of the agreement states: “You (as [RIC] captain) will train and administer the [RIC] team.” (Houston-RVFD Agreement, Ex. B to Harrison Aff.). It does not seem to be in the nature of an employment contract; rather, it seems to be an effort to define the duties that Houston could still perform in light of his disability. This provision was predicated on Houston’s serving as RIC Captain. Houston, however, voluntarily stepped down as RIC Captain in January 2011 (and he has not alleged that this is connected to his later resignation as a RIC trainer). Once he resigned as RIC Captain, this provision loses its force and it cannot constitute a contractual entitlement for the purposes of the Due Process Clause. And even this ignores the question of whether Houston was deprived of any property interest; he resigned from the position of trainer, and remains associated with the Department.

Houston argues that his property interest may lie in certain benefits ancillary to his volunteer position, such as the incentive payments under the LOSAP point system. Initially, I fail to see why such benefits would entitle Houston to more process than one deprived of a salaried position. See Johnson, supra.. The claimed benefits, moreover, have no independent significance; they are entirely a function of Houston’s volunteer employment.

In Versarge v. Twp. of Clinton N.J., the T