Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ CONSOLIDATED AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT [DKT. 189] VANESSA L. BRYANT, District Judge. I. Introduction The Plaintiffs, Debra Miller (“Miller”), Brittany DiCarolis (“DiCarolis”), Hope Kelm (“Kelm”), Jennie H. Pham (“Pham”), Brett Reilly (“Reilly”), Juan M. Restrepo (“Restrepo”), Brian Schnabel, Edward Schnabel, Lucy Schnabel, Annette Sumlin (“Sumlin”), Regina Warfel (“Warfel”), and Debbie Williams (“Williams”), bring this proposed class action against three groups of Defendants, the Trilegiant Defendants, which includes Affinion Group, LLC (“Af-finion”), Trilegiant Corporation, Inc. (“Trilegiant”), and Apollo Global Management, LLC (“Apollo”), the Credit Card Defendants, which includes Bank of America, N.A. (“Bank of America”), Capital One Financial Corporation (“Capital One”), Chase Bank USA, N.A. (“Chase”), Citibank, N.A. (“Citibank”), Citigroup, Inc. (“Citigroup”), Chase Paymentech Solutions, LLC (“Paymentech”), and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (‘Wells Fargo”), and the E-Merchant Defendants, which includes 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc. (“1-800 Flowers”), Beckett Media LLC (“Beckett”), Buy.com, Inc. (“Buy.com”), Classmates International, Inc. (“Classmates”), Days Inns Worldwide, Inc. (“Days Inns”), Wyndham Worldwide Corporation (“Wyndham”), FTD Group, Inc. (“FTD”), Hotwire, Inc. (“Hotwire”), IAC/InterActiveCorp (“IAC”), Shoebuy.com, Inc. (“Shoebuy”), PeopleFin-dersPro, Inc. (“PeopleFinder”), Price-line.com, Inc. “Priceline”), and United Online, Inc. (“United Online”). The Plaintiffs allege several causes of action against the Defendants, including violations of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (RICO), against all Defendants; conspiring to violate RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), against all Defendants; aiding and abetting RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, against the Credit Card Defendants; aiding and abetting commissions of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344, against the Credit Card Defendants; violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (ECPA), against Trilegiant, Affin-ion, and the E-Merchant Defendants; aiding and abetting ECPA violations under 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq., against the Credit Card Defendants; violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn. GemStat. § 42-110a et seq. (CUTPA), against the Trilegiant Defendants and E-Merchant Defendants; aiding and abetting and conspiracy to violate CUTPA, Conn. GemStat. § 42-110a et seq., against the Credit Card Defendants; violations of the California Business and Professional Code § 17602 (Automatic Renewal Statute), against the Trilegiant Defendants and E-Merchant Defendants; and claims of unjust enrichment against all Defendants. Before the Court is the Defendants’ Consolidated Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Strike Various Portions of the Complaint. [Dkt. 189]. Several of the Defendants have also filed separate motions to dismiss, strike, or stay the proceedings on various other grounds. Those motions will be decided in other subsequent orders. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion to dismiss or in the alternative to strike is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth herein. II. Factual Background The following facts and allegations are taken from the Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint (the “Complaint”). [Dkt. 141, hereinafter “CAC at ¶ ”]. The Plaintiffs allege that through the Defendants’ deceptive, unfair, and fraudulent business practices, the Plaintiffs were enrolled in Trilegiant membership programs without their knowledge or explicit consent and that their program memberships remained extant for months and in some cases years. CAC at ¶ 1. The alleged scheme was initiated and orchestrated by Trilegiant with the help of its parent companies, Apollo and Affinion, but was only successful because of a series of quid pro quo agreements executed with several of the E-Merchant Defendants and the willing participation of the Credit Card Defendants. CAC at ¶ 3. The Complaint asserts that Trilegiant sold memberships in its discount membership clubs, which the Plaintiffs conclude have “no real value.” CAC at ¶ 4. Trilegi-ant marketed its memberships in collaboration with and to the customers of various E-Merchant Defendants. CAC at ¶ 72. The E-Merchant Defendants received signing bonuses and/or substantial “bounties,” equal to a percentage of “every dollar” Trilegiant earned from the E-Merchant customers that purchased Trilegiant products and services. CAC at ¶¶ 6, 7. The Plaintiffs also allege that several of the Credit Card Defendants formed partnerships with Trilegiant to allow Trilegiant to advertise and sell “credit guard type” programs to their customers, and others had marketing contracts requiring the Credit Card Defendants to send Trilegi-ant’s hard copy mail advertisements to its customers with the customer’s credit card or bank account statements. CAC at ¶¶ 11(b), 49. The Complaint does not allege, and the Court does not construe it to allege, that the Credit Card Defendants are included as E-Merchants. The Plaintiffs further allege that the written agreements with the E-Merchant Defendants detailed at least four of the insidious business practices that were used to further the scheme’s illegitimate ends. CAC at ¶ 7. First, the Plaintiffs allege that Trilegiant and the E-Merchant Defendants engaged in post-transaction marketing by creating “a false and deceptive appearance,” implying “that [Trilegi-ant’s] offers for discount Membership Programs [were] part of the consumers’ original transactions with the e-merchants.” CAC at ¶ 74. The Plaintiffs also allege that the E-Merchant Defendants had review authority over these designs and have final approval of any advertisement language. CAC at ¶ 117. To induce the feeling that the membership offer was from the E-Merchant Defendant, and not Trilegiant, the Plaintiffs allege that Defendants used three different design tactics: (1) “‘interstitial’ sales offer pages” for Trilegiant’s products, which appear between the checkout page and the confirmation page for the customer’s primary, e-merchant purchase; (2) “ ‘pop up’ windows, detailing the offers, which appear on top of the e-merchant’s confirmation page; and (3) a hyperlink to an enrollment offer (or ‘banners’) that are included on the [E]-[M]erchant Defendant’s confirmation page.” CAC at ¶ 74. Importantly, all of these marketing tactics were used before the customer received confirmation of its purchase with the E-Merchant Defendant. CAC at ¶¶ 7(a), 117. Second, the Plaintiffs allege that the E-Merchant Defendants engaged in “data-pass” with Trilegiant, meaning that each individual E-Merchant Defendant passed its customers’ confidential billing information to Trilegiant without the customers’ explicit consent or knowledge; according to the Plaintiffs, this process is meant to facilitate further online purchases because the customers are not required to reenter their credit card or debit account information to complete a secondary transaction with Trilegiant. CAC at ¶¶ 7(a), 75-80. While it is unclear from the pleadings how and when this process exactly occurs, the Plaintiffs allege that there is an interface token that stores each customer’s confidential billing information entered while making the primary purchase on the E-Merchant’s website. CAC at ¶ 117(c). When the customer clicks on a link, a banner, or a pop-up window that leads to Trilegiant’s disguised offer page, the token transfers the customer’s confidential billing information directly to Trilegiant, presumably before the customer accepts the offer. Id. The Plaintiffs then allege that after the customers unknowingly agree to purchase Trilegiant’s product, they are returned to their original purchase and only then receive confirmation of the original E-Merchant transaction. CAC at ¶¶ 7(a), 117(c). The customer is not aware, however, that on the backend, the token has transferred its personal billing information to Trilegiant, which Trilegiant uses to begin automatically charging the customer a monthly membership fee. CAC at ¶ 117. The Plaintiffs conclude that “[b]ecause the consumer never has to enter any credit card information during a transaction with Trilegiant, they reasonably believe that they did not make any additional purchases apart from their original transaction with an E-Merchant Defendant.” CAC at ¶ 80. Third, Trilegiant practices negative option billing, meaning that consumers are automatically charged a monthly membership fee “unless the consumers take affirmative steps to cancel the membership.” CAC at ¶ 81. The consumers are only made aware of this billing practice by a disclosure in “exceedingly fine print” on Trilegiant’s “offer” page. CAC at ¶ 81. This is the only detail the Plaintiffs provide regarding the content or presentation of Trilegiant’s actual offer page. Finally, the Plaintiffs allege that months or years after the consumer realizes that he or she has been charged an illegitimate monthly membership fee, the Defendants make it nearly impossible to obtain a full refund through their “refund mitigation strategy.” CAC at ¶ 8. Refund mitigation is explicitly employed to minimize “the amount of improper charges [the Defendants] would have to refund to the millions of confused and angry consumers.... ” CAC at ¶ 88. As part of this strategy, Trilegiant’s call-center employees utilize several stall tactics to frustrate customers attempts to cancel their memberships and receive refunds, including “quickly canceling memberships] without a refund as soon as the customer complains, and demanding that the request for cancelation be in writing.” CAC at ¶ 8. The Plaintiffs allege that the E-Merchant Defendants are directly integrated in creating and administering this strategy and have the opportunity to select how many “rebuttals” the call-center employee may pitch during a cancelation call, to participate in the calls, and to review the call-center scripts. CAC at ¶ 8. Disturbingly, the Plaintiffs also allege that before a customer requesting a refund would reach the rebuttal-step stage, call-center employees were instructed to “tell the customers that they somehow signed up for the Membership Programs through their credit card company,” instead of explaining to them “the real method” of their enrollment. CAC at ¶ 86. As proof of this intentional deception, the Plaintiffs allege that a 1-800 Flowers representative complained to a Trilegiant representative that “ ‘we have had increasingly more frequent feedback from our own teams that your agents are telling our customers to call us’ ” when the customers call Trilegiant to cancel their memberships. CAC at ¶ 133. Furthermore, the call centers were supposedly only able to give a maximum refund for two months of membership fees, but if the customer used words such as “fraud,” “attorney,” “attorney general,” or “lawsuit” while on the call, they would be transferred to a call-center manager and could then receive a full refund. CAC at ¶ 86. Ultimately, most customers did not obtain a full refund by calling Trilegiant and were required to submit a written refund request. CAC at ¶ 87. Once the customers were enrolled in a Trilegiant membership program, the Plaintiffs allege that the E-Merchant and Trile-giant Defendants could only have executed their scheme with the willing participation of the various Credit Card Defendants because the Credit Card Defendants were ultimately responsible for processing the charges. CAC at ¶¶3, 8, 11, 73. The Plaintiffs concluded that the Credit Card Defendants were knowing-participants in the scheme by, either intentionally or recklessly, ignoring their own policies and their own sophisticated anti-fraud software when reviewing and processing the membership charges. CAC at ¶¶ 88-95. As proof for this conclusion, the Plaintiffs generally refer to the “thousands” of complaints that the Credit Card Defendants received over the years the scheme was perpetrated. CAC at ¶¶ 14, 88-103. The Plaintiffs further assert that [d]espite [the] abundant evidence that Trilegiant’s business practices did not meet the Defendant Credit Card Companies’ merchant rules, and despite their knowledge that Trilegiant’s membership “club” charges are among the highest sources of complaints brought to the attention of their fraud monitoring groups, the Defendant Credit Card Companies continued to process millions of questionable credit and debit charges every month without first verifying the charges with the account holder, as they do with other questionable credit card charges. CAC at ¶ 93. The Plaintiffs posit that the only explanation for the Credit Card Defendants’ refusal to stop processing the monthly membership charges, is that the Credit Card Defendants were knowing-participants in and “profited from the ... fraudulent scheme — a scheme that could not have operated without” their participation. CAC at ¶¶ 85 103. The Plaintiffs do not allege that the Credit Card Defendants had any written agreement with the Trilegiant or E-Merchant Defendants specifically related to the alleged online marketing scheme at issue in this case. Moreover, the Plaintiffs do not allege that the Credit Card Defendants had actual knowledge of the fraud, just that they possessed constructive knowledge of the scheme given the “thousands” of complaints they received over the years the scheme was being perpetrated and Trilegiant’s alleged infamous reputation for engaging in fraudulent business conduct. CAC at ¶ 103. The Plaintiffs’ only factual allegation related to Trilegiant’s purported infamous business reputation relates to the prior class action litigation and the publicity from the prior government settlements and congressional investigation. The Plaintiffs also allege that to further the fraudulent scheme, the Defendants “repeatedly used interstate wire and mail communications” including sending “thousands” of messages to the other Defendants discussing various aspects of the scheme. CAC at If 160. The Plaintiffs do not allege, however, the actual contents of any such messages aside from the information contained in the credit card and bank account statements that were sent to the Plaintiffs highlighting the membership fee charges. CAC at If 160(h). Furthermore, the Plaintiffs do not allege the details of any one fraudulent statement that was made by any Defendant to the Plaintiffs. Plaintiff DiCarolis alleges that she was a citizen of Oregon who made a purchase on TigerDirect’s website prior to July 2010 using a Chase credit card; shortly thereafter, the Plaintiff was enrolled in a Trilegi-ant membership program, but only noticed the recurring charges around January 2012. CAC at If 24. Plaintiff Kelm alleges that she was a citizen of Texas who made an online purchase on Days Inns’ website in June 2009 using a credit card; shortly thereafter, she was enrolled in a Trilegiant membership program, but only noticed the recurring monthly charges on her credit card statements more than two years later, around November 2011. CAC at ¶ 25. Plaintiff Pham alleges that she was a citizen of California who made an online purchase on Shoebuy’s website on December 3, 2009 using her Chase credit card; shortly thereafter, she was enrolled in a Trilegiant membership program, but only noticed the recurring monthly credit card charges nearly two years later, around September 2011. CAC at ¶ 26. Plaintiff Reilly alleges that he was a citizen of California who made an online purchase on Buy.com’s website with his Chase credit card; shortly thereafter, he was enrolled in a Trilegiant membership program, but only noticed the recurring monthly credit card charges approximately two years later, around January 2012. CAC at ¶ 27. Plaintiff Restrepo alleges that he was a citizen of Arizona and claims that his Chase credit card was charged for a Trile-giant membership program starting on May 9, 2007, but he only noticed the recurring monthly credit card charges nearly four years later in April 2011. CAC at ¶ 28. He does not allege that he made any online purchases from an E-Merchant Defendant. Id. Plaintiff Brian Schnabel alleges that he was a citizen of California and claims that he was told he enrolled in a Trilegiant membership program through Priceline. CAC at ¶ 29. The monthly membership fees were charged to his CitiDiamond Preferred credit card beginning on December 20, 2007, but he only noticed the recurring monthly credit card charges more than two years later in March or April 2010. Id. Plaintiffs Edward and Lucy Schnabel allege that they were citizens of California and claim that they were told they enrolled in a Trilegiant membership program through a rebate. CAC at ¶ 30. The monthly membership fees were charged to their United Mileage Plus credit card beginning on September 21, 2009, but they only noticed the recurring monthly credit card charges six months later on March 9, 2010. Id. Plaintiff Sumlin alleges that she was a citizen of Alabama and claims that her Wells Fargo checking account was charged in April 2012 for a Trilegiant membership. CAC at ¶ 31. She further alleges that her checking account was charged for at least the three or four months prior to April 2012. She does not claim to have been on an E-Merchant Defendant website or that she was charged for her Trilegiant membership by a Credit Card Defendant. Id. Plaintiff Timmcke alleges that she was a citizen of New Mexico who made an online purchase through PeopleFinder’s website around August 2011 using a debit card; shortly thereafter, she was enrolled in a Trilegiant membership program, but only noticed the recurring debits two months later, around October 2011. CAC at ¶ 32. Plaintiff Warfel alleges that she was a citizen of Ohio who had a phone call with Chase’s automated services in December 2004; shortly thereafter, her Chase credit card was charged for a Trilegiant membership, but she only noticed the recurring monthly credit card charges more than six years later, around January 2011. CAC at ¶ 33. She does not allege that she was on an E-Merchant website. Plaintiff Williams alleges that she was a citizen of North Carolina who made an online hotel reservation through Priceline using her Wachovia debit card on or around May 26, 2009; shortly thereafter, she was enrolled in a Trilegiant membership program, but only noticed the recurring charges around October 2011. CAC at ¶ 34. All of the Plaintiffs allege that they did not know of or consent to purchasing a Trilegiant membership and did not use any Trilegiant memberships’ services. CAC at ¶ 35. Each further alleges that he or she did not receive a full refund. CAC at ¶¶ 24-34. Only Plaintiff DiCarolis, however, alleges that Trilegiant continued to charge her account even after she canceled or attempted to cancel her membership. CAC at ¶ 24. Based on these allegations, the Plaintiffs have requested individual and class-based relief under several federal and state statutes. The Defendants’ have moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim for relief and, in the alternative, to strike portions of the Complaint. III. Standard of Review “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: ... (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “ ‘To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Sarmiento v. United States, 678 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citations omitted). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court should follow a “two-pronged approach” to evaluate the sufficiency of the complaint. Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir.2010). “A court ‘can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937). “At the second step, a court should determine whether the ‘well-pleaded factual allegations,’ assumed to be true, ‘plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In general, the Court’s review on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) “is limited to the facts as asserted within the four corners of the complaint, the documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and any documents incorporated by reference.” McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir.2007). The Court may also consider “matters of which judicial notice may be taken” and “documents either in plaintiffs’ possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit.” Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir.1993); Patrowicz v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 359 F.Supp.2d 140, 144 (D.Conn.2005). IV. Discussion The Court will separately address each of the causes of action that the Defendants’ argue should be dismissed. a. Violations of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) The Defendants have moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ substantive RICO claims on several grounds: (1) the Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently plead a RICO enterprise; (2) the Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently plead a pattern of racketeering activity; and (3) some of the Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the relevant statute of limitations. [Dkt. 189-1, Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Class Action Complaint or, in the Alternative, to Strike Portions of the Complaint, p. 10-25, hereinafter “MTD”]. The Plaintiffs respond by arguing that they have sufficiently pled an enterprise among all of the Defendants, they have sufficiently alleged with appropriate particularity the pattern of racketeering activity, and none of the Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations. [Dkt. 219, Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, p. 5-37, hereinafter “Opp.”]. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled a substantive RICO violation to sustain the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Notwithstanding the degree of particularity required by the pleading rules in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]o establish a RICO claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) a violation of the RICO statute ...; (2) an injury to business or property; and (3) that the injury was caused by the violation of’ the RICO statute. Cruz v. FXDirectDealer, LLC, 720 F.3d 115, 120 (2d Cir.2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). To prove a violation of the RICO statute, a plaintiff must plead that the violation occurred through the “(1) conduct, (2) of an enterprise, (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.’ ” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985); see also Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 118 (2d Cir.2013) (the complaint must also allege “‘injury to business or property as a result of the RICO violation ... ’ [and] [t]he pattern of racketeering activity must consist of two or more predicate acts of racketeering”) (quoting Anadian v. Coutts Bank (Switz.) Ltd., 193 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir.1999)). i. RICO Enterprise The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have not adequately pled a RICO enterprise because the Plaintiffs do not allege one enterprise “with an ascertainable structure that works together for a common purpose.” MTD p. 13. They claim that at best the Plaintiffs’ allegations show that there were several individual agreements between Trilegiant and each individual E-Merchant, demonstrating parallel conduct, not a unified or concerted scheme. Id. at 14. The Plaintiffs contend that the facts laid out in the Complaint allege with sufficient particularity one unified enterprise comprised of all the Defendants. Opp. p. 5. For the reasons below, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged one enterprise for purposes of a RICO violation. An “enterprise” is defined as “a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.” United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981). The definition of enterprise includes legal entities, such as corporations, associations or partnerships, and associations-in-fact. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). The Plaintiffs attempt to satisfy the enterprise requirement by alleging that the Defendants formed an “association-in-fact” enterprise. This type of enterprise does not need to have a “hierarchical structure, a chain of command, or other business-like attributes,” but it must have “an ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages.” Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 955, 129 S.Ct. 2237, 173 L.Ed.2d 1265 (2009). “From the terms of RICO, it is apparent that an association-in-fact enterprise must have three structural features: a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Id. The Plaintiffs allege a classic “hub-and-spoke” type enterprise which occurs when there are separate, but bilateral, parallel, or vertical relationships between one central actor, the hub, and several independent actors at least one level removed from the hub, the spokes. Here, the Plaintiffs have alleged that Trilegiant acted as the hub and formed separate contracts with each E-Marketing Defendant, and they, in turn, relied on the help of each Credit Card Defendant to complete the chain. The Defendants argue that a hub and spoke type enterprise is not sufficient for a cause of action under RICO because the purported spokes are separate, uncoordinated, and entirely independent; thus there are no “relationships” between the spokes creating an ongoing and unified purpose. MTD p. 13. Hub-and-spoke enterprises have long been held by courts in this circuit to be insufficient as a matter of law to constitute the requisite enterprise for a RICO violation. See City of N.Y. v. Chavez, 944 F.Supp.2d 260, 269-76 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (detailing historical treatment of Second Circuit courts finding these enterprises insufficient for RICO claims). In Boyle, however, the Supreme Court altered the analysis and directed courts to liberally and expansively interpret RICO’s enterprise requirement by no longer requiring structural formality as a prerequisite. Id. at 270-271. In the wake of Boyle, there has been no authoritative decision by the Second Circuit offering guidance as to how to interpret the enterprise requirement. The Third Circuit has, however, found that classic “hub and spoke” enterprises without allegations of a “rim” or “wheel” still do not sufficiently allege a RICO enterprise even post-Boyle because they do not, by definition, demonstrate that the “components function as a continuing unit.” In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 327, 374-375 (3d Cir.2010). In In re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litig., the court dismissed a RICO claim by several insured plaintiffs who alleged several broker-centered enterprises. Id. at 312. For each alleged enterprise, the plaintiffs accused one insurance broker of forming an agreement with one of several insurance providers to receive hidden brokerage fees for directing certain plaintiff purchasers to those providers. Id. The court found that because the plaintiffs failed to allege any cooperation between the insurance providers, the plaintiffs only described a pattern of uncoordinated parallel conduct by the providers, not a unified enterprise. Id. at 374-75. That court did acknowledge, however, that if a plaintiff pled agreement or organized cooperation between the spokes of the enterprise, it could allege a sufficient enterprise under RICO. Id. at 375-76. This analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Boyle, especially since in that case the loosely knit, non-hierarchical core group of individuals, supplemented by recruits on occasion, met before each bank robbery to plan, gather tools to commit, and assign roles for the commission of each crime. Therefore, even though no strict organization need be found, some structure showing agreement by the parties must be pled for a RICO claim to survive a motion to dismiss. The Court also finds Judge Forrest’s analysis of the “hub and spoke” enterprise in City of N.Y. v. Chavez, particularly convincing and thorough. See Chavez, 944 F.Supp.2d at 269-76 (finding that hub and spoke enterprises are no sufficient under RICO even post Boyle)-, Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. v. Dispatch Trans. Corp., No. 09cv6861(NRB), 2011 WL 1142922, at *7 n. 11 (S.D.N.Y. March 17, 2011) (finding hub-and-spoke enterprises “do not satisfy the enterprise element of a RICO claim”); Conte v. Newsday, Inc., 703 F.Supp.2d 126, 135 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (finding that hub-and-spoke allegations are “insufficient to support a conclusion that the various defendants were associated with one another for a common purpose.”). This Court finds that a classic “hub-and-spoke” formation in which the spokes are separate, distinct and unassociated and whose actions are uncoordinated does not possess the requisite structure to constitute a RICO enterprise, even as that notion was expanded by Boyle, because there is no concerted effort or organized cooperation between the spokes. Here, the Plaintiffs have alleged a series of commercial relationships between the E-Merchant Defendants, the Credit Card Defendants, and the Trilegiant Defendants with the Trilegiant Defendants acting as the hub. CAC at ¶¶ 4-5, 8, 10-1, 72-87. There are no allegations that the spokes, comprised of the various E-Merchant Defendants and arguably the Credit Card Defendants, have any agreements or mutual expectations of reciprocal behavior. At best, the Plaintiffs have alleged a series of bilateral or possibly trilateral agreements between Trilegiant, one E-Merchant Defendant, and possibly one Credit Card Defendant for each alleged fraudulent transaction. Furthermore, there are no allegations that the various E-Merchant Defendants even knew the identity of the other E-Merchants. Similarly, there are no allegations that the Credit Card Defendants worked together to ensure a concerted effort to process membership fees for Trilegiant programs. Without allegations showing that these spokes worked in a concerted manner, the Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged an assoei-ation-in-fact enterprise. ii. Pattern of Racketeering Activity The Defendants also move to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ RICO conspiracy claim, arguing that the Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged a pattern of racketeering activity. MTD p. 17-22. To plead sufficiently a pattern of racketeering activity, the Plaintiffs must allege a pattern of “two or more predicate acts of racketeering” generally within a period of ten years. Lundy, 711 F.3d at 119 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)); see also Curtis & Assocs., P.C. v. Law Offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., 758 F.Supp.2d 158, 167-168 (E.D.N.Y.2010). Section 1961(1) sets out an exhaustive list of predicate acts that qualify as racketeering activity for purposes of RICO. See In re U.S. Foodservice Inc. Pricing Litig., Nos. 3:07MD1894(CFD), 3:06CV1657(CFD), 3:08CV4(CFD), 3:08CV5(CFD), 2009 WL 5064468, at *16 (D.Conn. Dec. 15, 2009) (“Section 1961(1) sets out an exhaustive list of predicate acts”); see also, N.Y. Transp., Inc. v. Naples Transp., Inc., 116 F.Supp.2d 382, 387 (E.D.N.Y.2000) (same). The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants engaged in “predicate acts that constitute violations of the following statutes: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud); and 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (bank fraud),” and by “breaching (1) the settlement agreement they reached with 16 state attorneys general in December 2006, and (2) the settlement agreement they reached with former New York Attorney General Andrew M. Cuomo ...” CAC at ¶¶ 157, 158. However, only Chase and Trilegiant are alleged to have been parties to the settlement agreements with the attorneys general. 1. Mail and Wire Fraud The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs fail to allege with sufficient particularity how the Plaintiffs were defrauded by the Defendants’ scheme, and without describing the alleged fraudulent activity in more detail, the Plaintiffs’ conclusory pleadings must be dismissed. MTD p. 18-21. In fact, they continue, the Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege how any one mail or wire communication was fraudulent. Id. The Plaintiffs respond by arguing that they have sufficiently alleged a fraudulent scheme and that the Defendants used the mail and wires to further that scheme. Opp. p. 28. They further argue that they are not required to allege that any one instance of mail or wire fraud occurred as long as the Defendants used those services in furthering the overall fraudulent scheme. Id. at 29. Where, as here, a RICO claim’s predicate acts include allegations based on fraud, the circumstances constituting the alleged fraud must be pled with the particularity required by Rule 9(b). Fed. R. Civ. Proe. 9(b); see also First Capital Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Satinwood, Inc., 385 F.3d 159, 178-179 (2d Cir.2004). Generally, a complaint based on fraudulent acts must “(1) specify the statements that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when the statements were made, and (4) explain why the statements were fraudulent.” Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2d Cir.1993); see also Lemer v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 459 F.3d 273, 290 (2d Cir.2006) (same); Eaves v. Designs for Finance, Inc., 785 F.Supp.2d 229, 246-47 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (same). In addition to alleging factual particularity with respect to the fraudulent acts, “ ‘the plaintiffs must allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent.’ ” First Capital Asset Mgmt, 385 F.3d at 179. (quoting Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 189 F.3d 165, 169 (2d Cir.1999)). This is done by “(1) alleging facts to show that defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or by (2) alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.” S.Q.K.F.C., Inc. v. Bell Atl. TriCon Leasing Corp., 84 F.3d 629, 633 (2d Cir.1996). Since the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants used interstate “wire and mail communications for the purpose of executing and furthering [their] scheme to defraud Plaintiffs and other Class members,” they must plead with the requisite particularity detailed in Rule 9(b). CAC at ¶ 160. When discussing the use of interstate mail and wire communications, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants sent “thousands of electronic, mail and/or telephone communications” regarding various aspects of the scheme. Id. at 160(a)-(h). For the most part, however, they do not provide the contents of any of those communications, allege the dates and times of any of those communications, or allege the actual author of any of those specific communications. The only communications that have some detail are the credit card and debit account charges that the Credit Card Defendants sent to the Plaintiffs. Id. 160(h)(i)(h)(xiv). In DeSilva v. N. Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys. Inc., the court dismissed a RICO claim in which it was alleged that the defendants defrauded plaintiffs by systematically withholding “from plaintiffs their regular or statutorily required rate of pay for all hours worked.” DeSilva v. N. Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys. Inc., 770 F.Supp.2d 497, 511 (E.D.N.Y.2011). The plaintiffs in that case alleged that the defendants committed mail fraud by sending plaintiffs “thousand” of “payroll cheeks ... that were ‘false and deceptive because they misled Plaintiffs and Class Members about the amount of wages to which they were entitled, the number of hours which they had worked, and whether the defendants had included all compensable time....’” Id. The court found these conclusory allegations insufficient to maintain a RICO claim because the plaintiffs “failed to identify which defendants caused each allegedly fraudulent statement to be spoken, written, or mailed; what the content of the allegedly fraudulent misrepresentation was; or when the communication was made.” Id. at 526. Instead, the “plaintiffs merely allege that unspecified defendants ‘repeatedly’ mailed payroll checks ‘on a regular basis ... in the last 10 years.’ ” Id. Similarly here, the Plaintiffs assert generalities, but fail to describe specifically how any mail or wire communication was used to enroll them in the Trilegiant membership programs. The Complaint asserts that “thousands” of communications were sent between the various Defendants without describing the contents or details of any one mail or wire communication that was fraudulent. The Plaintiffs instead rely on the hyperbolic conclusory allegation devoid of factual content asserting that the Defendants must have defrauded the Plaintiffs because they were engaged in various aggressive marketing and business tactics that resulted in the Plaintiffs’ unknowing enrollment into a membership program. In their roughly ninety page Complaint, the Plaintiffs do not specifically identify one false statement that a Defendant made to any Plaintiff related to enrolling in a Trilegiant membership program. On the other hand, the Plaintiffs admit that the Trilegiant offer page disclosed that Trilegiant practices negative option billing, but that this disclosure was in “exceedingly fine print.” CAC at ¶ 81. Even though they admit that there was a product offer page, they fail to describe any of the other conditions or omissions on that page. Without at least alleging how any mail or wire communication was used to further the fraudulent scheme, let alone when the communication was made and by whom, the Plaintiffs have only provided the type of conclusory statements that Rule 9(b) is meant to preclude. See also In re GlenFed Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir.1994) (“plaintiff must set forth more than neutral facts necessary to identify the transaction.... In other words, the plaintiff must set forth an explanation as to why the statement or omission complained of was false or misleading.”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir.2011). To satisfy the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b), the Plaintiffs claim that they only need to detail the general contours of the RICO scheme and how the use of the mail and wires furthered that fraudulent scheme. Opp. p. 26. In In re U.S. Foodservice Inc. Pricing Litig., the court agreed and held that in complex fraud cases, the complaint does not need to allege the geographical and temporal details of every mail and wire transmission alleged to be a predicate act as long as the “defendant is on notice of the circumstances of the alleged fraud.” In re U.S. Foodservice Inc. Pricing Litig., 2009 WL 5064468, at *18. The Plaintiffs’ allegations here though are substantially less detailed than the allegations in that case. In In re U.S. Foodservice, Inc., the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant enterprise “participated in a scheme to falsely inflate the cost component of the price charged to” the enterprise’s customers for certain goods. Id. at *17. As part of this scheme, the defendants agreed to artificially inflate the cost of the goods through a series of purchases and sales among themselves. Id. The plaintiffs then relied on the defendants’ misrepresentations about their purchase price for the goods in agreeing to purchase the goods from the defendants for an inflated amount. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the invoices and contracts that the resaler defendant sent them constituted the predicate acts of mail fraud under RICO because the invoices and contracts listed a fraudulent value for the goods. Id. In this instance, the court found that it did not need the plaintiffs to plead the specific dates and details of every invoice or contract because the “thousands of separate fraudulent transactions” only furthered the fraudulent scheme that the plaintiffs sufficiently pled. Id. at *18. In our case, however, the Plaintiffs have not even alleged how they were defrauded. Even drawing all reasonable inferences for the Plaintiffs at this stage, without alleging with some particularity how the Defendants defrauded them, the Court cannot find that the contours of the fraudulent scheme have been sufficiently alleged to justify relying on general allegations to sufficiently plead a pattern of racketeering activity. Finally, it is unclear to the Court based on the arguments and pleadings whether the Plaintiffs are alleging that datapass is inherently fraudulent or whether it was an aspect of the mail and wire fraud discussed above. If the marketing scheme was meant to be included as an aspect of mail and wire fraud, it does not change the outcome of the Court’s conclusion because the Plaintiffs have not alleged the Defendants’ statements or omissions that defrauded them. To the extent that the Plaintiffs allege that datapass is inherently fraudulent, their claims also fail because they have not told this Court why datapass is always fraudulent, despite the fact that a particular point in time some members of Congress concluded that certain unspecified practices labeled “datapass” were improper. For example, there are no allegations that datapass ineluctably results in automatic charges without the consumer’s knowledge and consent. Retailers constantly adapt to evolving legal mandates and market demands, and it is not alleged that datapass does not serve some potentially valid underlying sales purpose in helping willing consumers efficiently make online purchases. Without alleging with any particularity how the Plaintiffs were allegedly defrauded into purchasing the Trilegiant memberships, the Court cannot find that datapass is inherently fraudulent in this case. Moreover, without detailed allegations describing what the Plaintiffs did and did not see and when, it is impossible to discern that the Plaintiffs were defrauded. See Berry v. Webloyalty.com, Inc., No. 10-cv-1858-H(CAB), 2010 WL 8416525, at *5 (S.D.Cal. Nov. 16, 2010) (customer error in failing to read the fine print or in failing to review the details of an online purchase does not convert the defendant’s actions into a pattern of racketeering activity). 2. Bank Fraud The Defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs have no standing to allege predicate acts of bank fraud. MTD p. 23. The Plaintiffs failed to respond to the Defendants’ argument on this point. Given the law on this issue, it would appear that the Plaintiffs concede this point, as they do not expressly contest it, but the Court will address the merits regardless. To the extent that this claim still remains, the Plaintiffs cannot allege bank fraud as a predicate act under RICO. See Chanoff v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 857 F.Supp. 1011, 1023 (D.Conn.1994) (dismissing claims in the pleadings because plaintiffs failed to respond to defendant’s motion to dismiss on these claims). Bank fraud provides criminal liability for anyone who “knowingly executed, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice— (1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” 18 U.S.C. § 1344. As the statute’s language makes patently clear, the bank fraud statute protects financial institutions from being the victims of fraudulent activity. See United States v. Chandler, 98 F.3d 711, 715 (2d Cir.1996) (finding that in the criminal context, “to obtain a bank fraud conviction under subsection (1) alone, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engage[d] in or attempted] to engage in a pattern or course of conduct designed to deceive a federally chartered or insured financial institution into released property”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Boceanu, No. 07-cr-00012, 2013 WL 441072, at *2 (D.Conn. February 4, 2013) (finding that an element to prove a conspiracy to commit bank fraud includes an “agreement to engage in a scheme or artifice to defraud, or obtain money or property from, a federally-insured financial institution”); Edmonds v. Seavey, No. 08-cv-5646, 2009 WL 2949757, at *6 n. 8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2009) (stating that “a Rico plaintiff who is not a financial institution under the statute lacks standing or injury to bring a RICO claim based on bank fraud”). Here, the Plaintiffs do not allege that any financial institution was harmed. Conversely, the Plaintiffs allege that several financial institutions, or Credit Card Defendants, are part of the RICO enterprise engaged in defrauding the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs, therefore, may not rely on bank fraud as a predicate act. 3. Breach of the Settlement Agreement The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs cannot assert breaches of settlement agreements as predicate acts under RICO because breach of contract is not an enumerated predicate act. MTD p. 22-23. In response, the Plaintiffs implicitly concede this point, but assert that “[w]hile breaching the settlement agreement is not one of the enumerated predicate acts that constitute racketeering activity as set forth in [the statute], it is one of the bases Plaintiffs have alleged to establish the Defendants’ fraudulent intent and a pattern of racketeering.” Opp. p. 32, n. 23. From the Complaint and the Plaintiffs’ response, it is apparent that the alleged breaches are potentially used for two purposes: (1) as a substantive predicate act under the statute; and (2) to help prove the requisite fraudulent intent. The list of predicate acts in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 is exhaustive. See O’Malley v. N.Y. City Transit Authority, 896 F.2d 704, 707-08 (2d Cir.1990) (finding that state obstruction of justice is not a RICO predicate offense because it was not expressly listed in the statute); Binghamton Masonic Temple, Inc. v. Bares, 189 F.3d 460 (2d Cir.1999) (unpublished opinion) (“As to the RICO claims, plaintiff lists numerous predicate acts, but amongst those only securities fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud and bank fraud are recognized predicate acts under RICO.”); Harvey v. Harvey, 931 F.Supp. 127, 130 (D.Conn.1996) (“The offenses which may serve as predicate acts for a RICO claim are listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 ... [and] [t]he list is exclusive.”). Since breaching a contract or, more specifically, a settlement agreement is not one of the offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), it cannot serve as a predicate act to a RICO violation. iii. RICO Statute of Limitations The Defendants also argue that any RICO claim brought by Plaintiffs Warfel, Reilly, and Restrepo are barred by the relevant statute of limitations. MTD p. 23-25. In response, the Plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations was tolled because the Plaintiffs “suffered new and independent injuries with each imposition of a Trilegiant credit card charge on a class member, as the factual allegations of the CAC show that post-transaction marketing, data pass fraud, negative option billing and industrial scale ‘refund mitigation’ continued unabated for years until after these actions were filed.” Opp. p. 87. Even though the RICO statute does not provide for a specific statute of limitations, the Supreme Court announced a uniform four-year limitations period for civil RICO actions. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156-57, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987). Although the Supreme Court has yet to specify when the RICO period of limitations begins to run, the Second Circuit has held that it “begins to run when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the RICO injury.” In re Merrill Lynch P’ship Litig., 154 F.3d 56, 58 (2d Cir.1998). “The first step in the statute of limitations analysis is to determine when the [plaintiff] sustained the alleged injury for which [the plaintiff] seek[s] redress. [The Court] then determine[s] when [the plaintiff] discovered or should have discovered the injury and begin[s] the four-year statute of limitations period at that point.” Id. at 59 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Second Circuit also “recognizes a ‘separate accrual’ rule under which a new claim accrued and the four-year limitation period begins anew [for a civil RICO claim] each time a plaintiff discovers or should have discovered a new and independent injury.” Id. at 58. As other courts in this circuit have noted, the case law “leaves some ambiguity as to precisely what constitutes a ‘new and independent injury.’ ” Republic of Colombia v. Diageo N. Am. Inc., 531 F.Supp.2d 365, 448 (E.D.N.Y.2007) (citations omitted). 1. Date of the Injury First, the Court must determine when the alleged injury occurred. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff Warfel was enrolled in one of Trilegiant’s monthly membership programs in or around December 2004; Plaintiff Reilly was enrolled in one of Trilegiant’s monthly membership programs in or around May 2007; and Plaintiff Restrepo was enrolled in one of Trilegiant’s membership programs on May 9, 2007. CAC at ¶¶27, 28, 33. Each of the Plaintiffs also alleges that they were shortly thereafter charged monthly fees for the Trilegiant memberships. Id. The Plaintiffs argue, however, that each monthly charge constituted a new and independent injury under the separate accrual doctrine. Opp. 87. The Court disagrees with this contention. The facts of this case are substantially similar to those in In re Merrill Lynch Partnerships Litig., and warrant a finding that no new and independent injury occurred after the initial membership enrollment. In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant scammed real estate investors into purchasing ownership interests in a series of limited partnerships even though the defendant knew that the partnerships could not make the advertised gains. In re Merrill Lynch Partnerships Litig., 154 F.3d at 57-58. The defendant was alleged to have sold the investments hoping to “collect significant fees during the course of the partnership life.” Id. at 59. The plaintiffs alleged they sustained new and independent injuries every time the defendant collected annual partnership fees and every time they received marketing materials designed to reinsure the investors of the strength of their investments. Id. The court found, however, that “later communications, which put a gloss on the losing investments, were continuing efforts to conceal the initial fraud, and not separate and distinct fraudulent acts resulting in new and independent injuries.” Id. at 60. Similarly, “the collection of annual fees [that] occurred in each year of the life of the partnerships ... cannot be viewed as a separate and distinct fraud creating new injuries as it was simply a part of the alleged scheme.” Id. at 60. The Plaintiffs unavailingly rely on AMA v. United Healthcare Corp. In that case, the defendant healthcare company was accused of continually manipulating the databases responsible for establishing reimbursement rates for out-of-network reimbursement claims. AMA v. United Healthcare Corp., No. 00 Civ. 2800(LMM), 2006 WL 3833440, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2006). The court found that each time a new reimbursement rate was determined, the plaintiffs suffered a new and independent injury. Id. at *10. Important for that determination was the fact that the new reimbursement rates were themselves fraudulent. The Plaintiffs here have only alleged that they were fraudulently enrolled into a membership program that automatically charged them monthly dues based on the billing information provided by the Credit Card Defendants. The charges appeared accurately and timely on each of the Plaintiffs credit card or debit account statements. Unlike in AMA v. United Healthcare Corp., the Defendants committed no other continuing fraudulent actions related to the initial scheme that would cause new and independent injuries. Instead, once the Plaintiffs were enrolled in the membership, the initial fraudulent part of the alleged RICO scheme was completed. Here, the facts are more akin to In re Merrill Lynch Partnerships Litig. The Plaintiffs allege that they were fraudulently induced to enroll in Trilegiant’s membership programs through a complex scheme involving several questionable business practices. CAC at ¶¶ 74-87. The scheme resulted in the Plaintiffs’ enrollment in one of the membership programs without their explicit authorization or consent. Each Trilegiant membership charge later collected was simply one in a series of charges unwittingly authorized by and incident to the initial enrollment. As the Plaintiffs concede, negative option billing is used to make “[a]ffirmative consumer action ... impossible” until consumers become aware that they have been enrolled in the membership program, which “does not occur until months, if not years, after Trilegiant first begins to charge recurring membership fees.” CAC at ¶ 82. Refund mitigation, furthermore, is used only to “minimize the amount of improper charges [Trilegiant] would have to refund to ... consumers who eventually discover that they have been unknowingly enrolled in the Membership Programs and charged unauthorized monthly fees.” CAC at ¶ 83. This post-enrollment conduct was not used to create new and independent RCO-related injury, but was meant to conceal and further the initial fraud. 2. Knowledge or Constructive Knowledge Second, the Court now must determine when the Plaintiffs discovered or should have discovered the injury. In the Second Circuit, actual knowledge of the fraudulent scheme is not necessary; an objective standard is used to impute knowledge to the victim when sufficient “storm clouds” are raised to create a duty to inquire. See Dodds v. Cigna Secs., Inc., 12 F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir.1993) (“‘[t]he means of knowledge are the same thing in effect as knowledge itself,’ and, therefore, ‘when the circumstances would suggest to a [person] of ordinary intelligence the probability that she has been defrauded, a duty of inquiry arises, and knowledge will be imputed to the [plaintiff] who does not make such an inquiry.’ ”) (quoting Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir.1983)). Since inquiry notice is a factual examination, “making this determination is frequently inappropriate on a motion to dismiss and is only proper ... when the complaint and documents which the court may take notice of clearly show that the claims are barred as a matter of law.” Lorber v. Winston, 962 F.Supp.2d 419, 440 (E.D.N.Y.2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Importantly, the storm warnings “need not detail every aspect of the alleged fraudulent scheme,” but must suggest to a person of ordinary intelligence the probability of fraudulent activity. Staehr v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 547 F.3d 406, 427 (2d Cir.2008); Marshall v. Milberg LLP, No. 07-cv-6950(LAP), 2009 WL 5177975, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2009). In this case, the Plaintiffs admit that after they were enrolled in Trilegi-ant’s membership programs, they received “credit or debit card statements ... containing the fraudulent charges.” CAC at ¶ 160(h). However, they allege that they only “noticed the recurring charges” years after the initial enrollment. CAC at ¶¶ 27-29, 33. The Plaintiffs claim, therefore, that they had no actual or constructive knowledge of the fraudulent activity. The Court, drawing all inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs, finds that the Plaintiffs did not have actual knowledge of the injury at the time of enrollment. The question before this Court, then, is when the Plaintiffs were on sufficient inquiry notice of the scheme to start running the statute of limitations. Since the Plaintiffs admit that they received credit card or debit account statements accurately reflecting the amounts charged for the membership programs shortly after enrolling in the programs, the Court must determine if this placed them on sufficient inquiry notice of the alleged scheme. In a case brought under the Truth in Lending Act, in which a president of a company sought reimbursement for what he alleged were unauthorized charges by one of his employees on the corporate credit card, the Second Circuit found that the credit card company was not liable for reimbursement. Minskoff v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., Inc., 98 F.3d 703, 708-10 (2d Cir.1996). Importantly, the court stated that “once a cardholder receives a statement that reasonably puts him on notice that one or more fraudulent charges have been made, he cannot thereafter claim lack of knowledge.” Id. at 710. Even in complex securities litigations, the “information that triggers inquiry notice of the probability of an alleged securities fraud is any financial, legal, or other data....” Dietrich v. Bauer, 76 F.Supp.2d 312, 343-344 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (emphasis added); Kosovich v. Thomas James Assocs., Inc., No. 93-cv-5443(AGS), 1995 WL 135582, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 1995); Dodds v. Cigna Sec., Inc., 841 F.Supp. 89, 94 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 12 F.3d 346 (2d Cir.1993). In Dodds, the court found that the inexperienced-investor plaintiff was on inquiry notice that she may have been defrauded by her investment manager because she had access to the prospectuses of the companies in which he proposed to invest. Dodds, 841 F.Supp. at 94. The court stated that a person of ordinary intelligence would have been put on inquiry notice through these materials, and the plaintiffs claims that she did not read the documents because they were overly complex were unavailing because “[a] plaintiff is not free to ignore pertinent documents even if she is not able to fully understand their meaning.” Id. Accordingly, this Court follows the general consensus in this circuit and finds that receiving credit card statements, far less impenetrable than corporate securities filings, should have given the Plaintiffs sufficient inquiry notice of the fraudulent scheme. Indeed, the Plaintiffs own allegations prove this to be true because the Plaintiffs only discovered the charges after eventually reviewing their credit card or