Full opinion text
ORDER GRANTING REVISED MOTION TO DISMISS Susan Oki Mollway, Chief United States District Judge I. INTRODUCTION. This case arises out of a decision by Defendant State of Hawaii Land Use Commission (the “Commission”) to reclassify a parcel of land from urban use to agricultura! use. Plaintiff Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC (“Bridge”), the owner of the parcel, claims that, in reclassifying the land, the Commission and certain commissioners violated Bridge’s rights under the United States Constitution, the Hawaii constitution, and various Hawaii laws. The Hawaii Supreme Court has upheld the state trial court’s invalidation of the Commission’s reclassification ruling. Defendants Vladimir P. Devens, Kyle Chock, Thomas Contrades, Lisa M. Judge, Normand R. Lezy, Nicholas W. Teves, and Ronald I. Heller (collectively, “Individual Capacity Commissioners”), sued in their individual capacities, were commissioners at the time of the events underlying Bridge’s suit. The former, commissioners have been removed from this case as Official Capacity Commissioners, and the current commissioners — Edmund Aczon, Chad McDonald, Jonathan Scheuer, Kent Hiranaga, Linda Estes, Aaron Mahi, Nancy- Cabral, and Arnold Wong — have been substituted as Defendants in their official capacities pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On March 30, 2012, this court stayed the entirety of the present action pending resolution of Bridge’s administrative appeal of the Commission’s decision in state court. Defendants appealed the stay, and Bridge filed a cross-appeal challenging this court’s denial of its motion seeking a remand of all or part of this removed action to state, court. After the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed the state trial court in the administrative appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled, “While this case originally met Pullman’s requirements, abstention is no longer necessary.” ECF 64, PagelD #662. The stay was dissolved, and the case is back on remand before this court, which now considers the-merits of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. . The motion is granted in all respects now being moved on by Defendants. II. BACKGROUND. A. Factual Background. The subject parcel of land consists of 1,060 acres in South Kohala, on the island of Hawaii.' See ECF No. 1-2, PagelD # 15. On November 25, 1987, Signal Puako Corporation, the then-owner of the parcel, petitioned for reclassification of the land from “agricultural use” to “urban use” to allow development of a large residential community. See id. On January 17, 1989, the Commission issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law; and Decision and Order approving the petition on condition that 60 percent of the units built be “affordable” units. See id. at PagelD #16. On May 4, 1990, Signal Puako Corporation transferred the property to Puako Hawaii Properties (“PHP”). See id. at PagelD # 16. On April 1, 1991, PHP filed a motion to amend the 1989 Decision and Order, seeking to decrease the total number of units in the project. See id. at PagelD #17. On July 9,1991, the Commission issued its Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Order, which permitted a decrease in the project’s density. See id. The 1991 Decision and Order also amended the affordable housing condition by requiring a minimum of 1,000 affordable units, in addition to the earlier 60 percent requirement. See id. By September 1,: 2005, Bridge had become the owner of the property. On that date, Bridge filed a motion to amend certain conditions imposed by the 1991 Decision and Order so that the affordable housing conditions would be “consistent and coincide with County of Hawaii affordable housing requirements.” See id at PagelD #20. On November 25, 2005, the Commission entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision and' Order granting in part and denying in part Bridge’s motion. See id, at PagelD # 21. The Commission stated: Petitioner shall provide housing opportunities for low, low-moderate, and moderate income residents of the State of Hawaii by offering at least twenty percent (20%) of the Project’s residential units at prices determined to be affordable by the County of Hawaii Office of Housing and Community Development, provided, however, in no event shall the gross number of affordable housing units within the Petition Area be less than 385 units. The affordable housing units shall meet or exceed all applicable County of Hawaii affordable housing standards, and shall be completed in substantial compliance with the representations made to the Commission. - See id. at PagelD # s 21-22. The Commission also required Bridge to “obtain, and provide copies to the Commission [of] the certificates of occupancy for all of the Project’s affordable housing units within five (5) years of November 17, 2005.” Id. at PagelD # 22] On December 9, 2008, the Commission issued an order to show cause as to why the property should not revert to its former agricultural classification given Bridge’s alleged failure to perform in accordance with the conditions imposed by the Commission and the representations and commitments made to the- Commission. See id. at PagelD # 24. On March 20, 2009, Bridge notified the Commission that it intended to assign its interest in the project to DW Aina Le’a Development, LLC (“DW”). See id. at PagelD # s 26, 27. At the end of a hearing on April 30, 2009, the Commission voted unanimously to return the property to agricultural use. See id. at PagelD # 27. On August 19, 2009, Bridge moved for rescission of the Commission’s ruling returning the land to agricultural use. Bridge argued that reversion of the land was improper because Bridge had made “substantial commencement of the use of the land” in accordance with section 205-4(g) of Hawaii Revised Statutes. See id. at PagelD # 28. On September 28, 2009, the Commission rescinded its order to show cause but imposed a condition that sixteen affordable units be completed by March 31, 2010. See id. at PagelD #29. The Commission also permitted DW to be named as a co-petitioner with Bridge. See id. at PagelD # 30. Bridge alleges that sixteen affordable units were completed by Mai-ch 31, 2010, as the Commission required. See id. at PagelD # 30. The Commission, however, determined by vote that Bridge and DW had not completed' the sixteen- units by March 31, 2010. See id. at PagelD # 33. The - Commission also voted to keep in place the earlier order to show cause, to have a further hearing on the matter, and to affirm that the date of November 17, 2010, was the deadline by which 385 affordable units had to be built, not just a goal. See id. The Commission issued a written order to that effect on July 26, 2010. See id. at PagelD # 34. On August 30, 2010, DW moved to amend certain conditions imposed by the Commission. See id. at PagelD #35. Bridge later filed a motion alleging violations- of various statutes and administrative rules by the Commission, which Bridge contended rendered action by the Commission invalid. See id. At a hearing on January 20, 2011, the Commission, by a 5-3 vote, decided to return the property to agricultural use. See id. at 37. The Commission also voted to deny as moot Bridge’s motion seeking invalidation of earlier action by the Committee. See id. at 38. The Commission did not at that time rule on DW’s motion to amend. On April 25, 2011, the Commission entered a written order returning the property to agricultural use. See id. at PagelD #44. On May 13, 2011, the Commission denied DWs motion to amend. See id. at PagelD # 45. B. Procedural Background. Bridge filed two actions challenging the Commission’s decision to reclassify the land to agricultural use. Bridge not only sought judicial review of the Commission’s decision through an administrative appeal, Bridge also filed a separate action in state court. See ECF No. 1-2. It is that separate action that was removed to this court on June 27, 2011. See ECF No. 1. Bridge’s Complaint in this action asserts the following claims: (1) denial of due. process of law in violation of the federal and state constitutions (Count I); (2) inverse condemnation in violation of the federal and state constitutions (Count II); (3) denial of equal protection of the law under the federal and state constitutions (Count III); (4) deprivation of common law vested rights (Count IV); (5) equitable estoppel (Count V); (6) deprivation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VI); (7) violation of chapters 91, 92, and 205 of Hawaii Revised Statutes and chapter ISIS of Hawaii Administrative Rules (Count VII); (8) unconstitutional land development conditions in violation of the federal and state constitutions (Count VIII); (9) injunctive and declaratory relief (Count IX); (10) declaratory relief pursuant to section 632-1 of Hawaii Revised Statutes and Rule 57 of the Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure (Count X); and (11) attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Count XI). See id. On July 27, 2011, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss all claims in this action. See ECF No. 14. On March 6, 2012, the circuit court in the administrative appeal entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Order Reversing and Vacating the State of Hawaii Land Use Commission’s Final Order. See ECF No. 41-3. On March 30, 2012, this court stayed the present action pending final resolution of the administrative appeal of the Commission’s decision in state court. See ECF No. 48. This court declined Bridge’s remand request. Both sides appealed to the Ninth Circuit. See ECF Nos. 49, 56. On June 15, 2012, the state circuit court entered its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Order Reversing and Vacating the State of Hawaii Land Use Commission’s Final Order. See ECF No. 71-2, PagelD # 716. The circuit court concluded that the Commission: (1) exceeded its statutory authority and violated chapter 205 of Hawaii Revised Statutes; (2) violated section 205-4(h) of Hawaii Revised Statutes; (3) violated section 205-16 of Hawaii Revised Statutes; (4) violated section 205-17 of Hawaii Revised Statutes; (5) violated section 205-4(g) of Hawaii Revised Statutes; (6) violated chapters 91 and 205 of Hawaii Revised Statutes and chapter 15 of Hawaii Administrative Rules; and (7) violated Bridge’s and DW’s federal and state due process and equal protection rights. See ECF No. 71-2, PagelD # s 716-20. The Commission filed a notice of appeal and an application to transfer the appeal from the Intermediate Court of Appeals to the Hawaii Supreme Court. See id. at PagelD #721. The transfer application was granted. See id. On November 25, 2014, the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the state circuit court’s second amended-final judgment. See DW Aina Lea Dev., LLC v. Bridge Aina Lea, LLC., 134 Hawai’i 187, 339 P.3d 685 (2014). The Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed the state circuit court’s determination that the Commission had erred in returning the property to agricultural use without complying with section 205-4 of Hawaii Revised Statutes, but reversed the state circuit court’s determination that Bridge and DW had had them procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection rights violated. See id. at 191, 339 P.3d at 689. On January 23, 2015, the Ninth Circuit remanded this case to this court for appropriate action in light of the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision. See ECF 64, Pa-gelD # 663. The Ninth Circuit concluded that, while this case originally met the requirements for Pullman abstention, abstention was no longer necessary. See id. at PagelD # 662. On April 2, 2015, Defendants filed a request to reopen this case in light of the Ninth Circuit’s remand ruling and the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in the administrative appeal. See ECF No. 71. Defendants also asked this court to resolve their earlier motion to dismiss, which had been subject to this court’s stay. See id. The court reopened the present action and instructed the parties to submit supplemental briefing discussing what issues remained in dispute in this ease following the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in the administrative appeal. See ECF No. 75. . The parties dispute the effect of the Hawaii Supreme Court’s ruling on this case. See ECF Nos. 76, 77. Bridge contends that-the only claims rendered moot by the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in the administrative appeal are its claims for declaratory relief. See ECF No. 76, Pa-gelD # 775; ECF No. 86, PagelD # 1121. Defendants, on .the other hand, have taken the position in supplemental briefs, as amended by statements at the hearing on June 29, 2015, that all of Bridge’s claims except the monetary relief portions of the cláims based on alleged takings, imposition of unconstitutional land development conditions, and deprivation of common law vested rights were resolved by the Hawaii Supreme Court. See ECF No. 77, PagelD #s 786-89; ECF No. 83, PagelD #s 1114-15. ' The court first addresses the viability of Bridge’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, and turns thereafter to the claims for monetary forms of relief. III. LEGAL STANDARDS. The motion to dismiss relies on both jurisdictional and failure-to-state-a-claim grounds. A. Rule 12(b)(1). Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint may be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This court’s subject matter jurisdiction is limited to “cases” or “controversies.” Temple v. Abercrombie, 903 F.Supp.2d 1024, 1030 (D.Haw.2012). This requires a federal court to determine whether a plaintiffs challenge is justiciable, a task accomplished through consideration of the doctrines of standing, mootness, and ripeness. See Culinary Workers Union, Local 226 v. Del Papa, 200 F.3d 614, 617 (9th Cir.1999). These doctrines reflect that the court’s role “is neither to issue advisory opinions nor to declare rights in hypothetical cases, but to .adjudicate live cases or controversies consistent with the powers granted the judiciary in Article III of the Constitution.”. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir.2000). Federal courts may raise a jurisdictional issue sua sponte if not raised by the parties. See Bernhardt v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir.2002); S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 502 (9th Cir.1990). B. Rule 12(b)(6). Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court’s review is generally limited to the contents of the complaint, Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.2001); Campanelli v. Bockrath, 100 F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir.1996). If matters outside the pleadings are considered, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion is treated as one for summary judgment. See Keams v. Tempe Tech. Inst., Inc., 110 F.3d 44, 46 (9th Cir.1997); Anderson v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir.1996), On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to- dismiss, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Fed’n of African Am. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir.1996). However, conclusory allegations of law, unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988; In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir.1996). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either: (1) lack of,a cognizable legal theory, or (2)-insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1988) (citing Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533—34 (9th Cir.1984)). . . “[T]o survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in -the complaint are true even if doubtful in fact.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)- (“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed' factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need • detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions,, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The complaint must “state a claim .to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, IV. BRIDGE’S PROCEDURAL COMPLAINTS ARE WITHOUT MERIT. , Bridge raises various “procedural concerns,” contending that it has been prejudiced by Defendants’ failure to file a new motion to dismiss after the conclusion of the state administrative appeal and the reopening of this case, and by this court’s permitting of supplemental briefing regarding the effect of the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision and the viability of certain of Bridge’s claims. See ECF No. 86, Pa-gelD # s 1123, 1130. This court is unpersuaded by Bridge’s complaints about the procedure used in addressing Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Defendants were under no obligation to file a new motion to dismiss after this case was reopened. Bridge points to no such requirement and fails to explain, nearly four months after this case was reopened, why imposition of such a requirement would have been necessary. Had this court required Defendants to file a new motion, it is the issues raised through supplemental briefing that would likely have been briefed. Bridge identifies no specific matter that has prejudiced it or that it has been denied an opportunity to- address. At most, Bridge says that Defendants have been permitted to “backfill” their motion to dismiss through supplemental briefing. See ECF No. 86, PagelD # 1123. This argument is plainly without merit. First, a new motion could have done the same, or greater, “backfilling.” Second, the supplemental briefing, which addressed the effect of the Hawaii Supreme Court’s ruling on this action, gave Bridge the same opportunity it gave Defendants to respond to the court’s inquirles. It is difficult to envision how Bridge could possibly have been prejudiced by a supplemental briefing process in which it had equal opportunity to respond to the court’s inquiries. See ECF No. 75; ECF No. 82; ECF No. 84. In fact, the supplemental briefs and the hearing held on June 29, 2015, have led to a reduction in the scope of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The original motion to dismiss sought dismissal of all claims against all Defendants. See ECF No. 14. However, the original motion to dismiss has been reduced in scope, so that the revised motion to dismiss no longer covers all claims. In a supplemental memorandum filed on June 15, 2015, Defendants concede that, to the extent asserted against, the Commission and Official Capacity Defendants, the monetary relief portions of certain claims are not rendered moot or otherwise precluded by the Hawaii Supreme Court ruling. Specifically, Defendants agree that the monetary relief portions of Bridge’s takings claims may proceed. Count I alleges a regulatory taking, and Count II alleges a taking by inverse condemnation. Defendants also concede that the monetary relief portions of the vested rights claim in Count IV and the unconstitutional conditions claim in Count VIII are not resolved by the Hawaii Supreme Court’s ruling. See ECF No. 77. At the hearing held on June 29, 2015, the parties therefore agreed that, as against the Commission and Official Capacity Defendants, certain matters would be deleted from the motion. The court’s minutes reflect that the motion no longer seeks dismissal of the monetary relief portions of the takings claims, the vested rights claim, and the unconstitutional conditions claim. See ECF No. 82 (minutes of hearing). This means that this court does not presently have before it the question of whether those claims for monetary relief are barred by Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194-95, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985) (holding that federal takings claim is not reviewable in federal court until plaintiff has sought compensation from state and been denied). Bridge’s complaints about this court’s requests for supplemental briefing on issues of mootness and ripeness are particularly weak. Both issues being jurisdictional, they may be raised by this court even if the parties fail to raise them. See, e.g., Wilson v. Fisch, Civ. No. 08-00347 JMS/KSC, 2009 WL 464334, at *3 (D.Haw, Feb. 24, 2009) (“[T]he court has an obligation to ensure that it has jurisdiction over the claims raised by the parties, and may raise this issue sua sponte.”). V. CLAIMS FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. This court begins its discussion of Bridge’s claims with an examination of the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. A. Bridge’s Claims Seeking Declaratory Relief Are Moot. Bridge concedes that the Hawaii Supreme Court decision renders moot its claims for declaratory relief. See ECF No. 86, PagelD # 1121. Part of Count VII (state statutory and regulatory violations), part of Count IX (seeking injunctive and declaratory relief), and all of Count X (seeking declaratory relief) are therefore dismissed. See Rosemere Neighborhood Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot Agency, 581 F.3d 1169, 1172-73 (9th Cir.2009) (“A claim is moot if it has- lost its character as a present, live controversy.”); Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir.2003) (“Mootness is a jurisdictional issue, and federal courts have no jurisdiction to hear a case that is moot, that is, where no actual or live controversy exists.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). B. Bridge’s Claims for Injunctive Relief Are Barred. 1. All Injunctive Relief Claims Seeking to Stop the Reclassification of Bridge’s Property as Agricultural Are Moot. The Hawaii Supreme Court’s ruling has the effect of rendering moot all of Bridge’s requests for an injunction barring the reclassification of its land as agricultural. No further relief in the form of an injunction is in issue given the Hawaii Supreme Court’s ruling that the Commission acted improperly in reclassifying the land as agricultural. The reclassification has been invalidated. This mootness bar does not prejudice Bridge in any way. Instead, it operates to avoid the need for a second ruling barring the reclassification that has already been invalidated. As this court has already noted with respect to the declaratory relief claims, a claim is moot “if it has lost its character as a present, live controversy.” Rosemere, 581 F.3d at 1172-73. If a plaintiff has already obtained the relief requested for a certain claim, that claim is moot. See Foster, 347 F.3d at 745 (“If there is no longer a possibility that an appellant can obtain relief for his claim, that claim is moot and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Weinberg v. Whatcom Cnty., 241 F.3d 746, 755 (9th Cir.2001) (“[R]emand for trial on the other bases underlying [plaintiffs] procedural due process claim would be moot, given that [plaintiff] could not, in any event, receive more than the nominal damages which we have already awarded him here.”); Am. Rivers v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 126 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir.1997) (“A federal court does not have jurisdiction ‘to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affe'ct the matter in issue in the case before it.’____ If an event occurs that prevents the court from granting effective relief, the claim is moot and must be dismissed.”); Ortega v. Sherman, No. CV 14-6544 JLS FFM, 2015 WL 3901649, at *3 (C.D.Cal, June 23, 2015) (“Claims Four and Five are subject to dismissal because Petitioner has already obtained the relief that he seeks in these claims.... Consequently, this Court can provide no further relief in regards to either of these claims. As such, the claims are moot.”); Reyes v. Graber, No. CV-14-01866-PHX-DJH, 2015 WL 727931, at *3 (D.Ariz. Feb, 19, 2015) (“[W]here a complainant has already obtained the relief he sought, the claim is moot.”). The Hawaii Supreme Court has issued a final judgment on the merits of the state administrative appeal. While the Hawaii Supreme Court remanded the case to the state circuit court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, that does not require the state circuit court to make 'further substantive decisions regarding the validity of the reclassification. The state circuit court will presumably refer the matter back to the Commission, but that will be a largely ministerial act. There is no indication that the Hawaii Supreme Court intended to permit further judicial consideration of the reclassification issue, and there is no longer a live controversy as to, whether the Commission may implement its earlier reclassification ruling. -. . The injunctive relief requests against Individual Capacity Commissioners and Official Capacity Commissioners are no less moot- than the injunctive relief requests directed at the Commission, even though the Commission was the only Defendant in this case that was a party in the state administrative appeal. A claim against a state official in that person’s official capacity is essentially a suit against the state. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). As for Individual Capacity Commissioners, prospective relief as against them is unavailable not only because of the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision, but also because their terms on the Commission have ended and they now lack the authority to take any action regarding the classification of Bridge’s property. Although relief under the heading of “injunctive relief’ was likely unavailable to Bridge in the state administrative appeal, the relief available in that proceeding was essentially equivalent. • The state courts, in reviewing an administrative decision, have the ability to “affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case with instructions for further proceedings; or ... reverse or modify the decision and order if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced.” Haw.Rev. Stat. § 91-14. Given that authority, the state administrative appeal made available relief that would lead Bridge to essentially the same result sought by its requests for injunctive relief in this action. Fpr example, if this court granted Bridge’s request to enjoin- Defendants from enforcing the order reclassifying Bridge’s property, see EOF No. 1-2, PagelD #64, this court’s ruling would lead to the same result as the state court’s reversal of the reclassification order. Bridge has not demonstrated that there is any relief available in this court under the heading of injunctive relief that has not already been obtained in the state administrative appeal. At most, Bridge may be arguing that the state administrative appeal did not make available relief equivalent to its request that this court enjoin future action unrelated to the precise reclassification at issue. That form of injunctive relief, while not moot, is unavailable to Bridge for other reasons, as discussed later in this order. Admittedly, it may be easier to discern the mootness of some injunctive relief claims than others. Count I (due process violations), Count III (equal protection violations), Count VII (violations of chapters 91, 92, and 205 of Hawaii Revised Statutes and chapter 15-15 of Hawaii Administrative Rules), and Count VIII (imposition of unconstitutional land development conditions) seek injunctive relief based on allegations expressly addressed by the Hawaii Supreme Court., See Bridge Aina Lea, 134 Hawai’i at 218-19, 339 P.3d at 716-17 (addressing due process rights); id. at 219-20, 339 P.3d at 717-18 (addressing equal protection rights under federal and state constitutions); id. at 209-16, 339 P.3d at 707-14 (concluding that reversion of property to agricultural use violated section 205-4 of Hawaii Revised Statutes); id. at 215, 339 P.3d at 713 (addressing unconstitutional land development condition claim). However, even with respect to subjects the Hawaii Supreme Court does not appear to have addressed, the injunctive relief requests are moot. The regulatory taking portion of Count I is not expressly addressed by the Hawaii Supreme Court, but the injunctive relief prayed for in Count I is the cessation of Defendants’ allegedly illegal actions that “have divested the Property of substantially all of its economic use, rendering it unmarketable, and forbidden substantially all practical, beneficial or economic use of the Property.” ECF No. 1-2, Page ID #48. This is essentially a prayer to end the implementation of the Commission’s reclassification decision. The invalidation of that decision is the very heart of the Hawaii Supreme Court’s ruling. Similarly, the injunctive relief prayed for in Count II (inverse condemnation), Count IV (vested rights claim) and Count V (equitable or zoning estoppel) is an order stopping the reclassification of the land to agricultural. Thus, those counts ask for prospective relief to end violations of law, all as detailed in Count IX (a general request for injunctive and declaratory relief) and X (declaratory relief request) of the Complaint. The portion of Count IX that seeks an end to continuing violations of law asks for an end to the land reclassification so that Bridge will be “entitled to continue to develop the Property as an urban parcel in accordance with the 1989 Decision and Order, as amended.” Id. at Page ID # 65. While the Hawaii Supreme Court stated that it was not ruling on Bridge’s zoning estoppel and vested rights claims, see Bridge Aina Lea, 134 Hawai’i at 207, 339 P.3d at 705, Bridge does not identify cognizable injunctive relief that it might obtain under counts not addressed by the Hawaii Supreme Court other than the relief it has already obtained via the invalidation of the Commission’s reclassification ruling. At the hearing on this motion and in supplemental briefing, Bridge has relied on the “voluntary cessation” doctrine to support its claims for injunctive relief, arguing that those claims should not be dismissed because Defendants have failed to meet their burden of coming forward with evidence showing that it is absolutely clear that wrongful conduct will not recur. See ECF No. 86, PagelD # s 1124-27. “Voluntary cessation” is an exception to mootness, under which “the mere cessation of illegal activity in response to pending litigation does not moot a case, unless the party alleging mootness can show that the ‘allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.’” Rosemere, 581 F.3d at 1173. Defendants do not appear to be arguing that their voluntary cessation of challenged conduct moots out Bridge’s claims for injunctive relief. Such an assertion is more typically made when there is ongoing conduct that has not in large part been addressed through related litigation. See, e.g., Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., 816 F.Supp.2d 831, 860 (N.D.Cal.2011) (addressing voluntary cessation doctrine when defendant argued that it had voluntarily ceased conduct that plaintiffs alleged inhibited access by removing and remediating all barriers in its restaurants and issuing new accessibility policies). The cases Bridge relies on simply do not apply to the circumstances of this case, which involves past conduct that is the subject of state court rulings. Those' cases provide a poor source for imposing a burden on Defendants to produce evidence of future compliance. Defendants are not voluntarily ceasing any activity. They are under an order that concludes that they improperly reclassified Bridge’s property. 2. The Injunctive Relief Claims Relating to Conduct Other Than Invalidation of the Reclassification Ruling Are Dismissed as Overbroad or as Simply Seeking an Order Requiring Compliance with Law. To the extent Bridge also seeks injunctive relief relating to future action other than implementation of the reclassification ruling, those injunctive relief claims are dismissed as overbroad. The court notes at the outset that Count IX is not really a separate claim alleging some cognizable wrongdoing distinct from what is alleged in other counts. Instead, Count IX is a mere request for the remedies of injunctive and declaratory relief “[biased on Defendants’ numerous violations of Federal and State law as set forth herein.” ECF No. 1-2, PagelD # 64. As a mere remedies request, Count IX is dismissed as not stating a claim. Even if Count IX could proceed without stating an actual claim, it is subject to dismissal for reasons also applicable to the requests in other counts for injunctive relief. Bridge seeks to enjoin Defendants from, inter alia, “taking any further action to reclassify the Property and amend the district boundaries from from urban to agricultural,” “further interfering with or denying Bridge’s rights to develop the Property in accordance with the 1989 Decision and Order, as amended,” and “taking any further acts that will prevent, interfere, or hinder Bridge’s rights to develop and use the Property, except only nondiscriminatory and non-dilatory enforcement of reasonable land use requirements legitimately necessary to ensure health and safety.” ECF No. 1-2, PagelD #s 64-65. To the extent those requests seek to enjoin something other than the implementation of the existing reclassification ruling, those requests in Count IX for injunctive relief are overbroad. The injunctive relief requests in other counts are similarly vague and rely on the overbroad allegations in Count IX. Thus, for example, Count II asserts, “Based on Defendants’ gross violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States of America and Article I, Section 5 and 20 of the Hawaii Constitution, Bridge is entitled to prospective relief to end continuing violations of federal and state law as set forth in Counts IX and X of this Complaint.” ECF No. 1-2, PagelD # 50. Count IV similarly asserts, “Based on Defendants’ deprivation of Bridge’s vested rights, Bridge is entitled to prospective relief to end continuing violations of federal and state law as set forth in Counts IX and X of this Complaint.” Id. at PagelD #55. Counts V and VI similarly seek injunctive relief as set forth in Counts IX and X. See id. at PagelD # s 56, 59. Overbroad injunctive relief claims cannot proceed. See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1140 (9th Cir.2009) (an injunction must be “tailored to remedy the specific harm alleged.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1297 (9th Cir.1992) (“An overbroad injunction is an abuse of discretion.”). Any claim for injunctive relief going beyond invalidation of the existing reclassification ruling is not tailored to eliminate a specific harm involved in this case, but instead targets a broad range of future action, even if lawful. Bridge would have this court prevent Defendants from “taking any further action to reclassify the Property” and from “further interfering with or denying Bridge’s rights to develop the Property.” See EOF No. 1-2, PagelD #s 64, 65. This language fails to define the prohibited activity specifically enough to give notice to Defendants of what is enjoined. Defendants would be left uncertain whether they could exercise even lawful authority to reclassify property. The Commission might want to reclassify Bridge’s property in the future through a completely lawful process for completely lawful reasons, yet such a reclassification, under Bridge’s requested injunctive relief, would be barred. The Commission would end up being unable to impose any requirement at all on Bridge’s development of its property. Bridge offers no reason for this court to prevent Defendants from exercising their lawful authority. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F.Supp.2d 1197, 1230 (C.D.Cal.2007) (“The Court is guided generally by the principle that it should only restrain or prohibit actions that violate the law.”). Bridge does appear to be trying to address this overbreadth in at least one of its requests for injunctive relief. That request asks that Defendants be enjoined from “taking any further acts that will prevent, interfere, or hinder Bridge’s rights to develop and use the Property, except only nondiscriminatory and non-dilatory enforcement of reasonable land use requirements legitimately necessary to ensure health and safety.” ECF No. 1-2, PagelD # s 64-65 (emphasis added). Even with this qualification, however, the scope of the requested injunction is unclear. Bridge essentially seeks a general “obey the law” injunction barring Defendants from taking any action Bridge might view as violative of its rights. Such an injunction would be impermissibly vague and overbroad. See Cuviello v. City of Oakland, No. C-06-5517 MHP (EMC), 2009 WL 734676, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 19, 2009) (“[Bjoth provisions are ‘obey the law* injunctions and thus not enforceable.”); United States v. DeAngelo, No. SACV03-251GLT(MLGX), 2003 WL 23676571, at *2 (C.D.Cal. June 26, 2003) (“Such an injunction does no more than instruct Defendants to ‘obey the law,’ and is too broad and vague for the Court to enforce.”); see also S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 241 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir.2001) (“Under Rule 65(d), an injunction must be more specific than a simple command that the defendant obey the law.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1201 (11th Cir.1999) (noting that courts are “incapable of enforcing so broad and vagué an injunction” as “obey the law”). 3. Injunctive Relief Claims with Respect to the Takings Claims Are Dismissed on the Ground that, Assuming a Taking has Occurred, an Injunction is Not a Proper Remedy for a Taking. There is an additional reason warranting dismissal of the overbroad injunctive relief portions of Counts I, II, and VIII. All three of those counts include takings claims. Count I alleges a regulatory taking. Count II alleges an inverse condemnation. Count VIII purports to be a claim relating to .the imposition of unconstitutional conditions, but any such claim is a takings claim under a different name. See Kamaole Pointe Dev. LP v. Cnty. of Maui, 573 F.Supp.2d 1354, 1366 (D.Haw.2008) (“[I]t is clear that Plaintiffs’ unconstitutional conditions argument, relying as it does on Nollan/Dolan, can only be classified as a takings challenge.”). If Bridge establishes a taking, the proper remedy is just compensation for the property taken rather than an order enjoining any action. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984) (“Equitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign, subsequent to the taking.”); In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 669 F.3d 928, 932 (9th Cir.2011) (same).. In seeking injunctive relief as part of its takings claims, Bridge appears to be blurring the distinction between its takings claims and its due process claim. The Ninth Circuit clearly considers a claim that government action was not in pursuit of a public purpose to fall outside a takings claim. In Equity Lifestyle Properties, Inc. v. County of San Luis Obispo, 548 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir.2008), the Ninth Circuit said: The parties dispute whether takings jurisprudence governs this challenge, ‘ or whether its merits turn only upon our due process doctrine. The Supreme Court’s decision in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., ... answers this .question: ‘[The Takings Clause] is designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference.... ’ Due process violations cannot be remedied under the Takings Clause, because ‘if a government action is found to be impermissible — for instance because it fails to meet the ‘public use’ requirement or is so arbitrary as to violate due process— that is the end of the inquiry. . No amount of compensation can authorize such action.’ Id. at 1194 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accord Action Apartment Ass’n, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1026 n. 1 (9th Cir.2007) (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 161 L.Ed.2d 876 (2005), to explain “the distinction between substantive due process and Takings Clause claims”); Miranda v. Bonner, No. CV 08-03178 SJO (VBKX), 2013 WL 794059, at *10 (CD.Cal. Mar. 4, 2018) (“[T]he takings clause only ‘requires compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.’.... Thus, ‘the unlawful seizure of property does not constitute a public use.’ ” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Takings. Clause presumes that the government has acted in furtherance of a “public use.” See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543, 125 S.Ct. 2074 (“[T]he Takings Clause presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose. The Clause expressly requires compensation where government takes private property ‘for public use.’ ”). Bridge therefore may not rely on a “public use” challenge to support entitlement to injunctive relief with respect to its takings claims. VI. BRIDGE’S PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY ISSUE PRECLUSION. In part of Count I, Bridge asserts that its federal and state procedural and substantive due process rights were violated. In Count III, Bridge asserts that its federal and state equal protection rights were violated. Having already determined that the injunctive relief portions of Counts I and III are moot, this court, relying on the Hawaii Supreme Court’s ruling in the state administrative appeal, concludes that the portion of Count I seeking monetary relief for due process violations (other than for a taking), as well as Count Ill’s request for monetary relief, are barred by issue preclusion. Issue preclusion applies to the monetary relief claims because monetary relief for constitutional violations was not available to Bridge in the state administrative appeal. It is thus the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decisions on the issues of whether due process and equal protection rights were violated that this court relies on, rather than any actual adjudication of monetary relief claims. See, e.g., Plough By & Through Plough v. W. Des Moines Cmty. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 512, 516 (8th Cir.1995) (noting that issue preclusion does not require identity of remedies or availability of requested remedy). Issue preclusion, a doctrine distinct from the doctrine of claim preclusion, “applies to a subsequent suit between the parties or their privies on a different cause of action and prevents the parties or their privies from relitigating any issue that was actually litigated and finally decided in the earlier action.” Bremer v. Weeks, 104 Hawai’i 43, 54, 85 P.3d 150, 161 (2004). Issue preclusion applies when: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the one presented in the action in question; (2) there is a final judgment on the merits; (3) the issue decided in the prior adjudication was essential to the final judgment; and (4) the party against whom [issue preclusion] is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. Id., 85 P.3d at 161. Issue preclusion bars relitigation of whether Bridge’s due process and equal protection rights were violated. Those issues, contained in Counts I and III, were decided by the Hawaii Supreme Court in the state administrative appeal, to which Bridge, the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted, was a party. See Bridge Aina Lea, 134 Hawai’i at 218-19, 339 P.3d at 716-17 (concluding that state circuit court erred in determining that Bridge’s due process rights under federal and state constitutions were violated); id. at 219-20, 339 P.3d at 717-18 (concluding that state circuit court erred in determining that Bridge’s equal protection rights under federal and state constitutions were violated). Those issues were essential to the final judgment. Under Hawaii law, an issue decided in a prior adjudication is essential to the final judgment when the final determination of the litigation would have changed if the issue had been decided differently. See Matsuura v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., Civ. No. 00-00328 SOM/LEK, 2007 WL 30600, at *5 (D.Haw. Jan. 4, 2007); see also Keahole Def. Coal., Inc. v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res., 110 Hawai’i 419, 430, 134 P.3d 585, 596 (2006) (holding that issue was essential to final judgment because it ultimately led to court’s determination). With respect to the present case, the Hawaii Supreme Court’s final determination would have changed had it determined that Bridge’s due process and equal protection rights were violated. The determination of those issues led directly to the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision affirming in part and vacating in part the circuit court’s judgment. Bridge argues that its federal constitutional claims are not precluded by the Hawaii Supreme Court decision because federal courts are not bound by a state court’s interpretation of the United States Constitution. See ECF No. 76, PagelD #776. Bridge’s argument ignores the doctrine of issue preclusion and would allow relitigation of issues already decided by a state court. While Bridge cites eases standing for the proposition that a federal court is not bound by state court precedent on federal constitutional questions, those cases were not decided in the context of matters that had already been litigated in a prior suit by the very plaintiff now seeking relief here. It cannot be the case that a federal court may sit in review of a state court decision every time a state court passes on federal constitutional issues. Bridge also contends that the Hawaii Supreme Court’s rulings on its constitutional claims in the state administrative ease cannot preclude Bridge’s constitutional claims in this action because the Hawaii Supreme Court’s constitutional discussion was dicta. See ECF No. 86, PagelD # 1133. Bridge is mistaken. The Hawaii Supreme Court’s discussion of Bridge’s constitutional claims was clearly necessary to its decision affirming in part and vacating in part the circuit court’s judgment. See ECF No. 71-2, PagelD #757. The Hawaii Supreme Court expressly stated that “the circuit court erred in concluding that their procedural due process rights had been violated.” Bridge Aina Lea, 134 Hawai’i at 219, 339 P.3d at 717. Similarly, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that “the circuit court erred in concluding the LUC violated Bridge’s and DW’s substantive due process rights.” Id. The Hawaii Supreme Court also said, “Bridge’s and DW’s equal protection rights were not violated....” Id. at 220, 339 P.3d at 718. A ground of decision is not dicta merely because it is one of multiple grounds of decision. See Exp. Grp. v. Reef Indus., Inc., 54 F.3d 1466, 1471-72 (9th Cir.1995) (‘Where a decision rest[s] on two or more grounds, none can be relegated to the category of obiter dictum.” (quoting Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537, 69 S.Ct. 1235, 93 L.Ed. 1524 (1949)) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). In aid of escaping the preclusive effect of the Hawaii Supreme Court’s ruling, Bridge also appears to raise issues it believes the Hawaii Supreme Court decided incorrectly. This court, however, is not sitting in review of that decision and cannot ignore its effect on this case merely because a party disagrees with the outcome. Bridge makes the curious argument that issue preclusion does not bar litigation of whether its due process and equal protection rights were violated because the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment on alternative grounds. See ECF No. 86, PagelD # 1131. Citing comment “o” to section 27 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, Bridge argues that the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision is only “conclusive as to the ruling that the [Commission] violated HRS Chapter 205-4.” Id. at PagelD # 1133. Comment “o” states: If a judgment rendered by a court of first instance is reversed by the appellate court and a final judgment is entered by the appellate court (or by the court of first instance in pursuance of the mandate of the appellate court), this latter judgment is conclusive between the parties. If the judgment of the court of first instance was based on a determination of two issues, either of which standing independently would be sufficient to support the result, and the appellate court upholds both of these determinations as sufficient, and accordingly affirms the judgment, the judgment is conclusive as to both determinations. In contrast to the case discussed in Comment i, the losing party has here obtained an appellate decision on the issue, and thus the balance weighs in favor of preclusion. If the appellate court upholds one of these ■ determinations as sufficient but not the other, and accordingly affirms the judgment, the judgment is conclusive as to the first determination. If the appellate court upholds one of these determinations as sufficient and refuses to consider whether or not the other is sufficient and accordingly affirms the judgment, the judgment is conclusive as to the first determination. Bridge relies on the third paragraph of comment “o” to contend that due process and equal protection issues may be litigated in this case. Bridge’s argument misses the mark. Comment “o” to section 27 does not apply to the Hawaii Supreme Court’s ruling on Bridge’s constitutional claims. While the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision in certain respects, the court stated, “[W]e vacate the judgment to the extent it is based pn the circuit court’s conclusion that the LUC violated Bridge’s and DW’s constitutional .rights — ” Bridge Aina Lea, 134 Hawai’i at 220, 339 P.3d at 718. Thus, in addressing Bridge’s constitutional claims, the’ Hawaii Supreme Court was not “accordingly” affirming any judgment. Additionally, despite stating that Hawaii courts “recognize and apply” section 27 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, Bridge makes no showing that Hawaii courts rely on comment “o” to that section. Bridge cites Dorrance v. Lee, 90 Hawai’i 143, 976 P.2d 904 (1999), but that case cites only comment “h” to section 27. See id. at 149, 976 P.2d at 910. The gist of Bridge’s contention appears to be that this court can give preclusive effect only to the issues underlying the portion of the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision affirming the lower court’s judgment. This court finds no basis in Hawaii .-law to ignore the issues determined in vacating part of. the lower court’s Judgment, Because all elements of issue preclusion are present in this case with respect to whether Bridge’s due process and equal protection rights were violated, those issues may not be litigated in this action in connection with any party or any form of relief. The preclusive effect of the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision with respect to the due process portion of Count I and the entirety of Count III (equal protection) applies to all Defendants. This court is unpersuaded by Bridge’s argument that issue preclusion does not apply in this case because Defendants are judicially estopped from advancing arguments in this court contrary to their state court argument that the record was insufficient to decide Bridge’s constitutional claims. See ECF No. 86, PagelD # s 1130-31. In the state proceeding, Defendants stated: “The circuit court erred-in ruling in an agency appeal — without any opportunity for- presentation of evidence and without regard to the right to trial by jury — that the LUC and individual commissioners violated developers’ constitutional rights to equal' protection and due process.” Id. at PagelD #1131. Bridge contends that this assertion- precludes Defendants from argüing that Bridge’s constitutional claims are precluded in this court. See id. The crux of the judicial estoppel doctrine is “whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party’s earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create the perception that either the first or the second court was misled.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750-51, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).- No such concern arises in this case. At the outset, it does not appear that Defendants’ position in this action is inconsistent with their earlier position. Defendants’ argument in the state court action that the circuit court erred in finding constitutional violations “without any opportunity for presentation of evidence and without regard to the right to trial by jury” is not inconsistent with arguing that preclusion principles bar the constitutional issues arising in this subsequent proceeding. Defendants are no longer arguing about whether the circuit court correctly found constitutional violations. If Defendants were indeed arguing that the state circuit court had correctly determined the constitutional issues without presentation of evidence and without regard to á jury trial right, Bridge would have a viable argument as to inconsistency. That, however, is not the situation presented here. The issue arising in this action is whether the Hawaii Supreme Court’s rulings on Bridge’s constitutional claims have preclusive effect, a distinct issue from whether or not the state circuit court erred in even considering Bridge’s constitutional claims. Defendants’ reliance on preclusion is not inconsistent with their prior assertions. Further, even assuming Defendants were asserting inconsistent positions, the Hawaii Supreme Court explicitly rejected Defendants’ argument that the circuit court had erred in considering Bridge’s due process and equal protection claims without the presentation’ of evidence or. a trial by jury. While vacating the state circuit court’s substantive rulings on those constitutional claims, the Hawaii Supreme Court found no procedural error of the type argued by Defendants. See Bridge Aina Lea, 134 Hawai’i at 218, 339 P.3d at 716. Judicial estoppel only applies when the court “relied on, or accepted, the party’s previous inconsistent position.” Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir.2001). Because the elements' of judicial estoppel are not met in this case, Bridge’s judicial estoppel argument fails. VII. COUNT V (EQUITABLE ESTOP-PEL) IS DISMISSED . AS AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS. In Count V, Bridge alleges that Defendants are estopped from taking certain actions because they made “numerous representations to Bridge” and Bridge changed its position in reliance on those assurances that it had met the zoning and other conditions imposed by Defendants. See ECF No.1-2, PagelD # 56. Count V prays for-.injunctive relief and money damages. This court has already, dismissed the injunctive relief-portion of Count V and turns now to the money damages portion of Count. V. Money damages are not available under Hawaii law on an equitable estoppel theory. In Allen v. City & County of Honolulu, 58 Haw. 432, 571 P.2d 328 (1977), the Hawaii Supreme Court held that an award of damages was not the proper remedy.for an equitable estoppel claim. In reversing the trial court’s award of. damages for cpsts incurred in reliance on prior zoning requirements, the court stated: [T]o permit damages for development costs is not only unprecedented but would also be unsound policy. Were we to affirm the award of damages, the City would be unable to act, if each time it sought to rezone an area of land it feared judicially forced compensation. Monetary awards in zoning disputes would inhibit governmental experimentation in land use controls and have a detrimental effect on the community’s control of the allocation of its resources____ Prohibiting damages for development costs does not mean that a property owner must suffer an injury without compensation, for if the facts establish that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should apply to prevent the City from enforcing newly enacted prohibitive zoning, then the property owner is entitled to continue construction. Id. at 438, 571 P.2d at 331. In addition, Count V is insufficiently pled. This is so with respect to the monetary relief sought, as well as to the injunctive relief claim, already dismissed on other grounds in this order. Injunctive relief is the appropriate remedy for equitable estoppel. That is, a defendant could be estopped from acting in a manner inconsistent with a defendant’s assurances on which a plaintiff reasonably relied. The problem for Bridge, however, is that the allegations concerning the assurances and any reasonable reliance by Bridge on such assurances are so vague and confusing as to provide no notice to Defendants as to the bases of Count V. Count V does indeed allege that Defendants gave Bridge assurances. Bridge says, “Defendants made numerous representations to Bridge, including, but not limited'to, assurances that Bridge would be entitled to proceed with its development based on the 1989 Decision and Order, as amended.” See ECF No. 1-2, PagelD # 56. However, Count V also “repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference” all preceding allegations in the Complaint. Id. at PagelD # 55. Those preceding allegations refer to numerous changes to the 1989 Decision and Order, making it unclear exactly which assurances Bridge is basing Count V on. Moreover, those preceding allegations refer to various conditions imposed by Defendants on whatever Defendants agreed to. Because Count V is unclear as to which particular assurances form the foundation for Count V, it is unclear which conditions applied to those assurances, or whether Bridge complied with the applicable conditions. Count V alleges that “Bridge reasonably relied in good faith and to its detriment on the promises and representations of Defendants and past conduct of Defendants, and based on such reliance, changed its position to its detriment.” Id. at PagelD # 56. This conclusory allegation is not tied to any factual detail and is notably silent as to whether Bridge complied with any attendant conditions. Such compliance appears from the allegations in the Complaint to be necessary for any reasonable reliance. In short, the allegations in Count V consist of nothing more than the very “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” that the Supreme Court said in Twombly “will not do.” 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. This court recognizes that detailed factual allegations are not required, and that the factual allegations must be taken as true on a motion to dismiss, but here Count V does not provide the grounds of Bridge’s entitlement to relief. See id. This court therefore cannot draw “the reasonable inference that the defendant is hable for the misconduct alleged.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The monetary relief portion of Count V is dismissed. VIII. ALL REMAINING CLAIMS IN ISSUE ON THIS REVISED MOTI