Al-Turki v. Department of Justice (175 F. Supp. 3d 1153, 2016)

ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Wiley Y. Daniel, Senior United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment which is fully briefed.' By way of background, this- case involves Plaintiffs request pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act [“FOIA”] seeking all Federal Bureau of Investigation [“FBI”] records mentioning him. Defendant responded to Plaintiffs FOIA request by releasing some documents and claiming exemptions for others. Defendant divides its documents into two categories for purposes of the claimed exemptions: (1) exemptions for documents not related to ongoing investigation and (2) exemptions for documents related to ongoing investigations. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment explains the FOIA exemptions it relies on as to the documents and information that were withheld, and asserts that Plaintiff has been provided all responsive documents subject to FOIA and not subject to an exemption.

II. BACKGROUND

I have considered all the facts asserted in the summary judgment motion, as well as the responses and replies as to these facts, but have cited only those facts I deem most material to my ruling. As to many of the material facts asserted by Defendant, Plaintiff has responded that he is without sufficient information to admit or deny the fact. Defendant argues that this does not create a genuine issue of material fact and that the asserted fact should be admitted. There is some authority for this argument. See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1267 (7th Cir.1986); Newsom v. Big M. Transp., Inc., No. 1:13cv58 SNLJ, 2014 WL 4978618, at *3 (E.D.Mo. Oct. 6, 2014); see also Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir.1988) (“In response to a motion for summary judgment, a party cannot rest on ignorance of facts... ”). Indeed, a party is required when disputing a fact to cite to specific references in the record supporting the denial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Practice Standards for Civil and Criminal Matters before Senior Judge Wiley Y. Daniel, § II.B.4. This makes sense in a typical case where a party who is without sufficient knowledge or information about an asserted fact could request discovery about that fact pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

However, I find that logic does not apply in a case such as this under FOIA, where the withheld documents purportedly implicate national security, ongoing government investigations, and other sensitive information as declared in the Declarations attached to the Motion for Summary Judgment. In that situation, the plaintiff cannot seek discovery about the documents, and is often unable to verify the truth or falsity of the facts asserted by the government. Thus, I find it improper to deem those facts admitted. Instead, I will consider the source of the facts alleged by Defendant and the level of detail provided to determine if the allegations are sufficiently supported. See Hull v. I.R.S., 656 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir.2011) (“ ‘[a]ffidavits must show, with reasonable specificity, why the documents fall within the exemption’ and ‘will not suffice if the agency’s claims are conclusory, merely reciting statutory standards, or if they are too vague or sweeping’”) (quotation omitted). I discuss the standard relevant to affidavits in support of the motion in more detail below.

Turning to the background facts, Plaintiff is a citizen of Saudi Arabia, He was indicted on June 9, 2005, in this Court on the following four counts: Forced Labor/Attempted Forced Labor, Document Servitude, Harboring an Alien, and a Forfeiture Allegation. (Indictment, Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. [“Pl.’s Resp.”]; see also United States v. Al-Turki, No, 05-cr-280-WDM, ECF No. 8.)

On August 18, 2006, Plaintiff was sentenced by a Colorado state court to 28 years to life following his conviction for various other offenses. The convictions included false imprisonment, 12 counts of unlawful sexual contact, extortion, and theft of $15,000 or more. People v. Al-Turki, 2005CR1571 (Arap. County). Plaintiffs sentence in state court-was later reduced in February 2011 to 8 years to life.

On October 10, 2006, the United States’ motion to dismiss the indictment against Plaintiff was granted as to the case pending in this Court. United States v. Al-Turki, No. 05-cr-280-WDM (D. Colo.).

On May 6, 2013, Plaintiff, through his attorney, requested from the FBI all documents mentioning Homaidan Al-Turki (or any variation of that spelling), born on a certain date in 1968 [“the FOIA Request”]. The documents sought in the FOIA Request included, but were not limited to, interviews, investigative reports, photographs, or summaries. The FBI denied the FOIA request. Plaintiff appealed administratively, and the administrative appeal was denied. Plaintiff then filed this case.

On October 1 and 7, 2014, the FBI released documents to Plaintiffs counsel in response to Defendant’s FOIA request. The releases included documents bates labeled Al-Turki 1 to Al-Turki 726. All pages Al-Turki 1 to Al-Turki 143 were released; the remainder of the release omits certain pages but includes “Deleted Page Information Sheets” stating which pages were omitted and the exemptions claimed for those omissions. Certain information was also deleted/redacted. I requested and received a copy of Defendant’s FOIA production (see Notice of Filing of Documents Released Under FOIA, ECF No. 41, filed July 17, 2015), and have reviewed those documents in connection, with the summary judgment motion. I discuss the facts applicable to the specific exemptions in the sections addressing those exemptions.

III. ANALYSIS

A, Standard of Review

Summary judgment may be granted where the pleadings, depositions, discovery responses and affidavits “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the... moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “A fact is ‘material’ if, under the governing law, it could have an effect on the outcome of the lawsuit.” E.E.O.G. v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir.2000). “A dispute over a material fact is ‘genuine’ if a rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party on the evidence presented.” Id.

The burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists is borne by the moving’party. Horizon, 220 F.3d at 1190. “ ‘Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.’ ” Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1148 (10th Cir.2000) (quotation omitted). The court must “ ‘view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.’” Id. (quotation omitted). All doubts must be resolved in favor of the existence of triable issues of fact. Boren v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 933 F.2d 891, 892 (10th Cir.1991).

B. FOIA Background

FOIA was. passed in 1966 “to provide a public right of access, enforceable in federal court, to agency records.” Trentadue v. Integrity Comm., 501 F.3d 1215, 1225 (10th Cir.2007). “The purpose of the Act ‘is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.’ ” Id. (quotation omitted). FOIA “confers jurisdiction on the district courts ‘to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld.’ ” U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142, 109 S.Ct. 2841, 106 L.Ed.2d 112 (1989) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)). “Notwithstanding FOIA’s aspiration of governmental transparency, Congress recognized that disclosure of certain classes of documents could harm legitimate government interests.” Trentadue, 501 F.3d at 1225-26. Nine specific exemptions were created that allow agencies to withhold otherwise responsive documents. Id. at 1226.

In considering whether information should be disclosed under FOIA, two guiding principles apply. Trentadue, 501 F.3d at 1226. “First, FOIA is to be broadly construed in favor of disclosure.” Id. “Second, its exemptions are to be narrowly circumscribed.” Id. “ ‘[A]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt.’ ” Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § .552(b)). “ ‘To successfully challenge an agency’s showing that it complied'with the FOIA; the plaintiff must come forward with specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue with respect to whether the agency has improperly withheld extant agency records.’” Carter v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 962 F.Supp.2d 130, 135 (D.D.C.2013) (quotations omitted). “The federal agency resisting disclosure bears the burden of justifying withholding.” Trentadue, 501 F.3d at 1226.

“To satisfy its burden of proof under FOIA, an agency typically submits affidavits.” Hull, 656 F.3d at 1177. The affidavit “must contain ‘reasonably detailed descriptions of The documents and allege facts sufficient to establish an exempr tion.’ ” Poll v. U.S. Office of Special Counsel, No. 99-4021, 208 F.3d 226, 2000 WL 14422, at *2. (10th Cir. Oct. 14, 1999) (quotation omitted). “Summary judgment may be granted on the basis of agency affidavits if they contain reasonable, specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory statements, and if they are not called into question by contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.” Gallant v. NLRB, 26 F.3d 168, 171 (D.C.Cir.1994); see also Hull, 656 F.3d at 1177.

Thus, if the affidavits provided by the government “ ‘provide specific information sufficient to place the documents within the exemption category, if the information is not contradicted in the record, and if there is no evidence in the record of agency bad faith, then summary judgment is appropriate without in camera review of the documents.’ ” Hull, 656 F.3d at 1177 (quotation omitted). However, if the court is “unsatisfied with the agency’s affidavits or declarations”, it may, “in its discretion, ...order the agency to produce a Vaughn index or to submit the requested information for an in camera review.” Id. at 1178; see also DeSalvo v. I.R.S. 861 F.2d 1217, 1222 n. 6 (10th Cir.1988) (“The FOIA allows the district court flexibility in utilizing [an] in camera review of the disputed documents,... detailed affidavits, or alternative procedures to determine whether a sufficient factual basis exists for evaluating the correctness of the [agency] determination...”). “But ‘an in camera review should not be resorted to as a matter of course, simply on the theory that ‘it can’t hurt.’” Id. (quotation omitted).

Ultimately,' it has been held that “ ‘an agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears logical or plausible.’ ” Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 862 (D.C.Cir.2009) (quotations and internal quotation marks omitted). If the plaintiff can “offer[ ] nothing more than opinion and speculation” regarding the content of the government’s sworn declarations, he “does not undermine the deference normally accorded to an agency.” Carter, 962 F.Supp.2d at 140; see also Daly v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 09-cv-01722-PAB-BNB, 2011 WL 588046, at *6 (D.Colo. Jan. 7, 2011) (“if the agency’s affidavits are reasonably clear, specific, and detailed, the court normally affords agency determinations substantial weight”).

In the case at hand, a pubjic declaration of David M.- Hardy [“Hardy”], the Section Chief of the Record/Information Dissemination Section, Records Management Division in Virginia, was filed in support of Defendant’s summary judgment motion as Exhibit l. Also, Defendant filed a Motion for Leave to File In Camera and Ex Parte Declaration of Hardy which was granted by Order of May 13, 2015. The Ex Parte, In Camera Declaration was filed on May 21, 2015. (See Notice of Ex Parte, In Camera Filing, ECF No. 40.) I have reviewed the ex parte classified Declaration, and I agree with Defendant that it provides additional details concerning its with-holdings of materials under the FOIA exemptions at issue.

C. Applicability of Exemptions Claimed by Defendant

1. Documents Not Related to Ongoing Investigation

a. Exemption (b)(1): Classified Information

Exemption (b)(1) of FOIA [“Exemption 1”] protects records that are: “(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). In reviewing withholdings under Exemption 1, courts accord “substantial weight” to agency declarations regarding the classified status of disputed records “ ‘because the Executive departments responsible for national defense and foreign policy matters have unique insights into what adverse affects [sic] might occur as a result of a particular classified record.”’ Larson, 565 F.3d at 864 (quotation omitted).

Here, Defendant claims that documents it withheld are exempt from disclosure under Exemption 1 because they are currently properly classified pursuant to Executive Order [“E.O.”] 12958 as information concerning “intelligence sources or methods”. It is undisputed that Exemption 1 was cited, at time in conjunction with (b)(3) and/or (b)(7)(E), on the following pages: Al-Turki-355; 357-8; 361; 372; 571; and 576. (Third Decl. of David M. Hardy, Ex 1 to Mot. Summ. J. [hereinafter “Hardy Decl.”], ¶ 19.) Hardy states that any reasonably segregable portions of those classified documents that did not meet the standard for classification under E.O. 13526 were declassified and marked for release, unless withholding was warranted under other applicable law. (IcL, ¶ 17.e.)

For information to be properly classified and thus properly withheld from disclosure pursuant to Exemption 1 the information must meet the requirements set forth in E.O. 13526, § 1.1(a): (1) an original classification authority is classifying the information; (2) the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government; (3) the information falls within one or more of the categories of information listed in § 1.4 of the E.O. 13526; and (4) the original classification authority determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism, and the original classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage.

I find that Defendant has met its burden of showing that Exemption 1 applies to the information withheld under this exemption because the FBI has shown through the Hardy Declaration that each of the requirements of E.O. 13526 § 1.1(a) has been met. The requirements of E.O. 13526, § 1.1(a) are met as follows:

(1) an original classification authority is classifying the information. FBI declar-ant Hardy is an original classification authority. (Hardy Decl., ¶ 13.) Plaintiff admits this.

(2) the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government. Hardy stated he personally and independently examined the information withheld from Plaintiff pursuant to FOIA Exemption 1. (Hardy Deck, ¶¶ 13, 14.) He determined that this classified information is owned by, was produced by or for, and/or is under the control of the United States Government. (Id.) Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to refute this.

(3) the information falls within one or more of the categories of information listed in § 14 of the Executive Order. Hardy determined that the information falls within § 1.4(c), intelligence activities, sources, and methods. (Hardy Decl., ¶ 15.) He asserts that information was withheld to protect intelligence methods utilized by the FBI for gathering intelligence data. (Id.) The material is classified, according to Hardy, and requires a classification marking at the “Secret” level, because the unauthorized disclosure of this information reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to national security. (Id., ¶ 13.) Hardy asserts more specifically that the material is classified because its release would reveal intelligence activities used by the FBI against specific targets of foreign counterintelligence investigation(s) or operations; identify a target of a foreign counterintelligence investigation;' or disclose the intelligence gathering capabilities of the activities or methods directed at specific targets. (Id., ¶ 16.) Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to refute this.

(Jf) the original classification authority determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism, and the original classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage. Hardy asserts that the information obtained from the intelligence activities or methods is very specific in nature, provided during a specific time period, and known to very few individuals. (Hardy Decl., ¶ 16.) It is Hardy’s determination that disclosure of specific information describing the intelligence activities or methods that have been or are being used in this case, and which are still used by the FBI to gather intelligence information in other cases, could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security for the following reasons: (a) disclosure would allow hostile entities to discover the current intelligence gathering methods used by the FBI; (b) disclosure would reveal current specific targets of the FBI’s national security investigation(s); and (c) disclosure would reveal the determination of the criteria used and priorities assigned to current intelligence or counterintelligence investigation(s). (Id., ¶ 17.) With the aid of this detailed information, Hardy states that hostile entities could develop countermeasures which would, in turn, severely disrupt the FBI’s intelligence gathering capabilities. This severe disruption would also result in severe damage to the FBI’s .efforts to detect and apprehend violators of the United States’ national security and criminal laws. (Id.)

Further, Hardy asserts that the classified information withheld in these documents contains detailed intelligence activity by the FBI on a specific individual or organization of national security interest. (Hardy Decl., ¶ 18.) Hardy states that the disclosure of this information could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security, as it would reveal the actual intelligence activity or method utilized by the FBI against a specific target. (Id.) This information is properly classified at the “Secret” level. pursuant to E.O. 13526, § 1.4(c), and Hardy asserts it is exempt from disclosure. (Id.) It is Hardy’s determination that the release of this information could permit hostile individuals and foreign governments to appraise the scope, focus, location, target, and capabilities of the FBI’s intelligence-gathering methods and activities, and allow the targets and opportunity to devise countermeasures to circumvent these intelligence activities or methods and render them useless in providing intelligence information. (Hardy Deel., ¶ 19.)

In short, FBI declarant Hardy described how unauthorized disclosure of the information for which Defendant asserted this exemption could reasonably be expected to result in damage to the national security. Furthermore, he identifies and describes that damage. I give deference to Hardy’s statements on this issue, noting they have not been contested in any matter.

In addition to -the substantive requirements for information to be classified and withheld from disclosure under Exemption 1, certain procedural and administrative requirements of E.O. 13526 must be followed before information can be considered to be properly classified, such as proper identification and marking of documents. Hardy asserts that he made certain that all procedural requirements of E.O. 13526 were followed in order to ensure the information was properly classified. He made certain that: (a) each document was marked as required and stamped with the proper classification designation; (b) each document was marked to indicate clearly which portions are classified, which portions are exempt from declassification as set forth in E.O. 13526, § 1.5 (b), and which portions are unclassified; (c) the prohibitions and limitations on classification specified in E.O. 13526, § 1.7, were adhered to; (d) the declassification policies set forth in E.O. 13526, §§ 3.1 and 3.3 were followed; and (e) any reasonably seg-regable portions of these classified documents that did not meet the standards for classification under E.O. 13526 were declassified and marked for release, unless withholding was otherwise warranted under applicable law. (Hardy Deck, ¶ 13.)

Plaintiff has not presented the court with any contrary evidence as to Exemption 1 or evidence suggesting bad faith on the part of Defendant in withholding documents under this exemption. Indeed, he made no argument in his response as to why Exemption 1 is inapplicable. Further, Plaintiff did not specifically deny Hardy’s statements in his Declaration as to Exemption 1, asserting only that he was without sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny the assertions. I find that Hardy’s Declaration provides specific information sufficient to place the documents within the exemption category, and that the information provided is plausible and logical.

■ Thus, I accept the assertions in the Hardy Declaration ,and find that Defendant has met its burden of showing the applicability* of Exemption 1 to the documents/ information at issue. Further, Plaintiff has not come forward with specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue with respect to whether Defendant improperly withheld agency records under this exemption. Carter, 962 F.Supp.2d at 135. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted to the extent documents/information were withheld under Exemption 1.

b. Exemption (b)(3): Information Protected by Statute

Exemption (b)(3) [“Exemption 3”] permits an agency to withhold information that is “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.. .if that statute (A) requires that the matter be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). The “purpose of Exemption 3 [is] to assure that Congress, not the agency, makes the basic nondisclosure decision.” Ass’n of Retired R.R. Workers v. U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd., 830 F.2d 331, 336 (D.C.Cir.1987). “Exemption 3 presents considerations distinct and apart from the other eight exemptions.” Id. “ ‘[I]ts applicability depends less on the detailed factual contents of specific documents; the sole issue for decision is the existence of a relevant statute and the inclusion of withheld material within the statute’s coverage.’” Id. (quoting Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 359 (D.C.Cir.1978)).

Two requirements must be satisfied to meet the requirements of Exemption 3. The government must “show that the statute claimed is one of exemption as contemplated by Exemption 3 and that the withheld material falls within the statute. Larson, 565 F.3d at 865; see also C.I.A. v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 167-68, 105 S.Ct. 1881, 85 L.Ed.2d 173 (1985) (setting forth two-part test).

i. Re 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(l) (National Security Act)

Defendant cited Exemption 3, at times in conjunction with Exemption 1 and/or b)(7)E), on the following pages: Al-Turki-333; 355; 357-8; 361; 372; 571; and 576. I ruled in the previous section that Defendant met its burden of showing that many of these documents were properly withheld from disclosure under Exemption 1, and granted Defendant’s summary judgment motion on this issue. I now address whether these documents were also properly withheld under category 1 of Exemption 3 in connection with the National Security Act of 1947 [“NSA”], as amended by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 [“IRTPA”], 50 U.S.C. § 8024(0(1).

Section 1024(i)(l) of the NSA provides that the Director of National Intelligence “shall protect from unauthorized disclosure intelligence sources and methods.” This statute qualifies as a withholding statute under Exemption 3 and meets the first requirement for the exemption. Sims, 471 U.S. at 168, 105 S.Ct. 1881. On its face, this federal statute leaves no discretion to agencies about withholding from the public information about intelligence sources and methods. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the protection afforded to intelligence sources and methods by 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(l) “is as absolute as possible.” Id. at 175, 105 S.Ct. 1881.

Thus, the issue becomes whether the withheld material falls within the statute, i.e., relates to intelligence sources and methods. Sims, 471 U.S. at 168, 105 S.Ct. 1881. To fulfill its obligation of protecting intelligence sources and methods, the Director of National Intelligence is authorized to establish and implement guidelines for the Intelligence Community for the classification of information under applicable laws, Executive Orders, or other Presidential Directives, and for access to and dissemination of intelligence. 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(l) and (2). The FBI is one of 17 agencies comprising the Intelligence Community, and must protect intelligence sources and methods. Agencies such as the FBI who protect the intelligence sources and methods are “familiar with ‘the whole picture,’ as judges are not’ ”, and “are worthy of great deference given the magnitude of the national security interests and potential risks at stake.” Sims, 471 U.S. at 179, 105 S.Ct. 1881; see also Larson, 565 F.3d at 865 (the court must accord “substantial weight” to the government’s affidavits).

Defendant asserts that the exempted material in this case falls within the scope of the NSA. Given that Congress specifically prohibited the disclosure of information pertaining to intelligence sources and methods used by the Intelligence Community as a whole, Hardy asserts that he determined the FBI’s intelligence sources and methods would be revealed if any of the withheld information is disclosed to Plaintiff. (Hardy Deck, ¶ 23.) Plaintiff has not denied this or presented any contrary evidence, instead asserting only that he is without sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny whether Hardy’s determination is accurate. Moreover, Plaintiff made no argument in his response as to why Exemption 3 is inapplicable as to the withholding of documents under the NSA. I accord substantial weight to Hardy’s determination that the exempted material at issue falls within the scope of the NSA, and find that Defendant has met its burden of showing that the documents/information withheld under this exemption were properly withheld under 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(l). Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to this issue.

ii. 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (Child Victims’ and Child Witnesses’ Rights Act)

In its summary judgment motion, Defendant also asserted Exemption 3 based on the Child Victims’ and Child Witnesses’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3509(d)(1). However, Defendant withdrew its reliance on this in its Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, at page 2. Accordingly, I deny as moot the Motion for Summary Judgment to the extent it relies on this category — category 2 of Exemption 3. Defendant has, however, claimed that other exemptions protect this information.

c. Exemption (b)(5): Privileged Information

Exemption (b)(5) of the FOIA [“Exemption 5”] protects “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). This exempts from FOIA documents that are “normally privileged in the civil discovery context”, including documents subject to the attorney-client and attorney work-product privileges. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149, 155, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975).

The only document that Defendant claims is subject to the attorney-client and work product privilege and protected by Exemption 5 is Al-Turki 584.'Plaintiff correctly notes, however, that while Defendant asserts that it referred on that document to attorney work product under this category of Exemption 5, this is incorrect. Defendant cited only to category 1 (attorney-client privilege) on this document. Thus, I address only that privilege.

The communication of factual material is protected under Exemption 5 as to the attorney-client privilege if the communication was made by the client in confidence to the attorney and relates to the solicitation of legal advice, Brinton v. Dep't of State, 636 F.2d 600, 603 (D.C.Cir.1980); see also In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1172, 1182 (10th Cir.2010) (quotations omitted) (to assert attorney-client privilege, the communication must be “‘between a lawyer and client’” and “‘must relate to legal advice or strategy sought by the client’ ” or “ ‘have a tendency to reveal the confidences of the client.’..) (quotations omitted). Attorney-work product is protected under Exemption- 5 if the documents were “prepared in anticipation of foreseeable litigation, even if no specific claim is contemplated,” Schiller v. NLRB, 964 F.2d 1205,1208 (D.C.Cir.1992). The burden of establishing the applicability of these privileges rests on the party seeking to assert it. In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d at 1183-84.

Hardy asserts that the FBI protected communications between and among the U.S. Attorney’s Office (who represented the Government and the FBI in Plaintiffs criminal case), and which reflect the seeking and providing of legal advice related to Plaintiffs indictment. (Hardy -Decl., ¶ 27.) Plaintiff admits that'these communications were made within the Department of Justice [“DOJ”] (i,e,, between the FBI and U.S. Attorney’s Office), and thus satisfy Exemption 5’s threshold.

Hardy further asserts that communications between clients and attorneys were made in confidence, were not shared with or circulated to individuals outside the attorney-client relationship, and were made for the purpose of securing legal assistance or advice in relation to the criminal case against Plaintiff. (Hardy Decl., ¶ 27.) They are, according to Hardy, part of the government’s potential prosecution of Plaintiff in relation to his federal criminal indictment. (Hardy Deck, ¶ 29.)

Plaintiff admits that the attorney-client privilege has been asserted, but is without sufficient information to admit or deny what the redacted communications reflect and whether the redacted, information is protected by the attorney work-product privilege. Plaintiff avers, however, that in a criminal case, communications between law enforcement officers (FBI agents) and prosecuting attorneys (U.S. Attorneys) are presumptively discoverable to criminal defendants. Plaintiff further asserts that these communications are not protected by the attorney-client privilege because the prosecuting attorneys do not have a client; they represent the United States, not the law enforcement agency or their personnel.

Turning to my analysis, Exemption 5 is met, according to Defendant, because Plaintiff was under federal indictment and there was communication between and among the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the FBI related to same. (Hardy Deck, -¶ 27.) I accord substantial weight to Hardy’s determination that the exempted material at issue meets the requirements of the attorney-client privilege and is exempt from release under FOIA because the material was made in confidence, not shared outside of the attorney-client relationship, and made for the purpose of securing legal assistance or advice in relation to the criminal case against Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff has presented no viable evidence or argument to suggest that Hardy’s representations in his Declaration should not be accepted. Moreover, he has not presented facts showing a genuine issue of material fact as to the withholding of the document at issue under Exemption 5 and the attorney-client privilege.

To the extent Plaintiff asserts that the attorney-client privilege is not applicable because the prosecuting attorneys do not have a client; ie., that they represent the United States and not law enforcement agency or their personnel, I reject this argument. Government attorneys, including prosecuting attorneys, are protected under Exemption 5. See Church of Scientology Intern. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 30 F.3d 224, 236 (1st Cir.1994); Miller v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 562 F.Supp.2d 82, 113 (D.D.C.2008); Lipsey v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, No. 06-423(RBW), 2007 WL 842956, at *4 (D.D.C. March 19, 2007).

Accordingly, I find that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment should also be granted as to the withholding of information in Al-Turki 584 based on Exemption 5.

d. Exemptions (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C): Clearly Unwarranted and Unwarranted Invasion of Personal Privacy

Exemption (b)(6) [“Exemption 6”] exempts from compelled disclosure information about individuals in “personnel and medical and similar files” when the disclosure of such information “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Exemption (b)(7)(C) [“Exemption 7(C)”] “exempts records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information could.. .reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).

As to Exemption 6, while “Congressional concern for the protection of the kind of confidential personal data usually included in a personnel file is abundantly clear”, it does not create a blanket exception for personnel or similar files. Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 371-72, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976). Instead, the exemption requires an agency to balance an individual’s right to privacy against the public’s interest in disclosure. Id. The agency must determine whether disclosure of the information would threaten a protectable privacy interest; if so, the agency must weigh that privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure, if any. Reed v. NLRB, 927 F.2d 1249, 1251 (D.C.Cir.1991). The “only relevant ‘public interest in disclosure’ to be weighed in this balance is the extent to which disclosure would serve the ‘core purpose of FOIA,’ which is contribut[ing] significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government.’’ U.S. Dep’t of Defense v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 495, 114 S.Ct. 1006, 127 L.Ed.2d 325 (1994) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 775, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 103 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989) (emphasis in original)). The requester bears the burden of demonstrating that the release of the withheld information would serve this interest. See Carter v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 830 F.2d 388, 391-92 & nn. 8 &13 (D.C.Cir.1987).

The legislative history shows that Congress’s primary purpose in enacting Exemption 6 “was to protect individuals from the injury and embarrassment that can result from the unnecessary disclosure of personal information.” U.S. Dep’t of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 599, 102 S.Ct. 1957, 72 L.Ed.2d 358 (1982). Thus, the term “similar files” relevant to the exemption is to be interpreted broadly. Id. at 600, 102 S.Ct. 1957. The Supreme Court stated that it did “not think that Congress meant to limit Exemption 6 to a narrow class of files containing only a discrete kind of personal information. Id. at 602, 102 S.Ct. 1957. “Rather, ‘[t]he exemption [was] intended to cover detailed Government records on an individual which can be identified as applying to that individual.’ ” Id. (quotation omitted).

“[T]he privacy inquiry of Exemptions 6 and 7(C) [is] essentially the same,” although Exemption 7(C) is broader. Judicial Watch v. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1125 (D.C.Cir.2004); Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 756, 109 S.Ct. 1468. According to the Supreme Court, “Exemption 7(C)’s comparative breadth is not mere accident in drafting”, and Congress gave special consideration to the language in this exemption as a result of specific amendments to an existing statute. Nat’l Archive & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 165-66, 124 S.Ct. 1570, 158 L.Ed.2d 319 (2004). The Court explained:

Law enforcement documents obtained by Government investigators often contain information about persons interviewed as witnesses or initial suspects but whose link to the official inquiry may be the result of mere happenstance. There is special reason, therefore, to give protection to this intimate personal data, to which the public does not have a general right of access in the ordinary course.... In th[e] class of cases where the subject of the documents “is a private citizen,” “the privacy interest.. .is at its apex.”...

Id. at 166, 124 S.Ct. 1570 (internal quotations omitted).

By affording this additional protection, Exemption 7(C) recognizes the “‘strong interest’” that “‘suspects, witnesses, or investigators’” have “‘in not being associated unwarrantedly with alleged criminal activity.’ ” Mays v. DEA, 234 F.3d 1324, 1327 (D.C.Cir.2000) (quotation omitted). The Mays court explained as to this exemption:

When information withheld by the Government implicates this interest, it becomes necessary to determine whether disclosure is warranted by “balancfing] the public interest in disclosure against the interest Congress intended the Exemption to protect.”... Because the FOIA is concerned with the right of the general public to know what their government is up to, the identity and interest of the party requesting the document are irrelevant to this balanc-ing_ Absent exceptional circumstances, the balance categorically favors withholding the names and addresses of third parties as “the type of information sought is simply not very probative of an agency’s behavior or performance.”

Id. at 1327 (quotations omitted). Due to that heightened privacy protection, courts have recognized that information may be categorically withheld under Exemption 7(C). See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 776, 109 S.Ct. 1468; Safecard Servs., Inc. v. S.E.C., 926 F.2d 1197, 1206 (D.C.Cir.1991); see also Anderson v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 518 F.Supp.2d 1, 13 (D.D.C.2007).

A three-part test is used “to determine if information is covered by Exemption 7(C).” World Pub. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 827 (10th Cir.2012). “A court must (1) determine if the information was gathered for a law enforcement purpose; (2) determine whether there is a personal privacy interest at stake; and if there is (3) balance the privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure.” Id.

I address the facts and analysis as to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) in connection with the specific categories presented by Defendant.

i. Names and/or Identifying Information Concerning FBI Special Agents and Support Personnel

Defendant asserts that Exemptions 6 and (7)(C) have been cited on the following pages to protect the names and identifying information concerning FBI Special Agents [“SAs”] and support personnel: Al-Turki-144-8; 160-1; 165; 167-70; 178-88; 190; 193; 197-8; 233-5; 239; 256; 332; 335; 340-1; 344; 347; 409-11; 414-6; 422-3; 425; 427; 430; 433-6; 443; 447; 449-65; 467; 469-70; 472; 474-80; 483-6; 488-96; 498-500; 502; 505; 510-24; 526-9; 531-6; 538-40; 544; 546-7; 553; 558; 561-2; 565-6; 570-1; 573; 576; 578; 581; 584; 592-4; 602-7; 609; 612; 645; 647; 665; 669; 684; 688-9; and 722-4. (Hardy Decl., ¶ 34). Plaintiff correctly points out that Exemptions 6 and (7)(C) are not cited on page Al-Turki 410; thus, I do not address the admissibility of this document in this category. It is, however, addressed in connection with other exemptions, including (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(D)-3, and (b)(7)(E)-1, infra. Plaintiff admits that Exemptions 6 and 7(C) are cited on the rest of the listed pages, and asserts that they are also cited on Al-Turki 353, 355-65, 972-73, and 412.

Turning to the facts relevant to this category, Defendant asserts that the FBI SAs are responsible for conducting, supervising, and/or maintaining the investigative activities in this pending investigation and related investigation(s). (Hardy Deck, ¶ 32.) These responsibilities included conducting interviews and compiling information, as well as reporting on the status of investigation(s). (Id.) Plaintiff is without sufficient information to admit or deny what various FBI SAs are responsible for. The one exception Plaintiff notes is that FBI SAs also write reports that are discoverable to criminal Defendants and FBI SAs frequently testify in public hearings and public trials.

Assignments of SAs to any particular investigation are not by choice. (Hardy Deck, ¶ 32.) Hardy asserts that publicity (adverse or otherwise) regarding any particular investigation to which they have been assigned may seriously prejudice their effectiveness in conducting other investigation(s). (Id.) The privacy consideration is also to protect FBI SAs, as individuals, from unnecessary, unofficial questioning as to the conduct of this or other investigation(s), whether or not they are currently employed by the FBI. (Id.) Plaintiff is without sufficient information to admit or deny the representations of Hardy in this paragraph, but reiterates that SAs, such as the ones involved in Plaintiffs criminal cases, frequently testify in open, public hearings and trials and therefore may not have a legitimate expectation of privacy with-regard to their identity and role in a given criminal case.

Hardy asserts that FBI SAs conduct official inquiries into various criminal and national security violation cases. (Hardy Decl., ¶ 32.) They come into contact with all strata-of society, conducting searches and making arrests, both of which result in reasonable but nonetheless serious disturbances to people and their lives. (Id.) It is possible, .according to Hardy, for an individual targeted by such law enforcement actions to carry a grudge which may last for years. (Id.) Hardy states that these individuals may seek revenge on the agents and other federal employees involved in a particular investigation. (Id.) Further, he asserts that the publicity associated with the release of an agent’s identity in connection with a particular investigation could trigger hostility toward a particular agent. (Id.)

Hardy also notes that the identities of FBI support employees were withheld under these exemptions. He states that support personnel are assigned to handle tasks related to the inquiry into the allegations made against the Plaintiff as reflected in the documents responsive to his request. (Hardy Decl., ¶ 33.) These individuals are in positions of access to information regarding official law enforcement investigation(s), counter-terrorism and national security investigation(s). (Id.) Thus, they could become targets of harassing inquiries for unauthorized access to FBI investigation(s) if their identities were released. (Id.) Accordingly, Hardy states that FBI support personnel have personal privacy interests in not having them identities disclosed. (Id.)

The FBI examined the documents containing the names and identifying information of FBI SAs and support personnel to determine whether there was any public interest that outweighed the substantial privacy interests at stake. (Hardy Decl., ¶ 34.) The FBI could identify no discernible public interest in the disclosure of the names and identifying information of FBI SAs and support' personnel because it would not shed light on the operations and activities of the FBI. (Id., ¶¶ 32, 34.) Thus, the FBI determined that the privacy interests of the SAs and support personnel outweighed any public interest in disclosure, and that disclosure of the names and identifying information of the FBI SAs and support personnel would constitute a clearly unwarranted and unwarranted invasion of person privacy. (Id.)

Plaintiff is without sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny Hardy’s assertions discussed above. He does not make any argument or state any facts which refute Hardy’s statements and assertions as to why the documents were withheld pursuant to the exemption. Nor does he present any evidence of bad faith. In the absence of any conflicting evidence, I give credence to Hardy’s statements that the documents, if produced, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy as to FBI SAs and support personnel. Certainly, “law enforcement personnel”, including FBI employees and SAs, “‘have a legitimate interest in preserving the secrecy of matters that conceivably could subject them to annoyance or harassment in either their official or private lives.’ ” Amuso v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 600 F.Supp.2d 78, 96 (D.D.C.2009) (quoting Lesar v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 487 (D.C.Cir.1980)).

I also give credence to Defendant’s balancing of the private interest of the FBI SAs and their support staff with the public interest in disclosure. Plaintiff has not demonstrated or even argued that the release of the withheld information “would serve the ‘core purpose of FOIA’ ”, i.e., contributing to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government.” U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 510 U.S. at 495, 114 S.Ct. 1006. Thus, he has not shown a public interest in disclosure. In short, I find that the FBI’s decision to withhold names of FBI SAs and support staff is “amply supported”. Amuso, 600 F.Supp.2d at 97. Plaintiff has not presented specific facts to create a genuine issue of material fact as to Defendant’s withholding of documents/information under these exemptions.

Plaintiffs only argument as to the documents withheld under this category is that the FBI waived protection of this information by producing the unredacted names of SAs. (See, e.g, Ex. 3 at 1, 2 and 3; EOF No. 28-6.) Plaintiff asserts upon information and belief that all involved FBI SAs publicly testified multiple times publicly discussing their identities and roles in Plaintiffs criminal cases. Thus, he argues that Defendant waived reliance on the exemptions in regard to this category. I reject this argument.

It is true that voluntary disclosure of information may waive an otherwise valid FOIA exemption. Mehl v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, 797 F.Supp. 43, 47 (D.D.C.1992.) Moreover, under the public-domain doctrine, “materials normally immunized from disclosure under FOIA” may ‘lose their protective cloak once disclosed and preserved in a permanent public record.’ ” Johnson v. FBI, 118 F.Supp.3d 784, 795 (E.D.Pa.2015) (quotation omitted). However, I find no waiver in this case.

First, as pointed out by Defendant, the cases relied on by Plaintiff involved waiver of governmental, not private interests. Plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that the government can waive a private interest protected by FOIA such as those established here. The rule argued by Plaintiff ignores the fact that the privacy interests protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C) can be overcome only if Plaintiff shows a public interest that outweighs the private interest, which Plaintiff has not done. As the Amuso court explained, “[t]he release of information to plaintiff about third parties in any other context is not relevant” because “[t]he sole rationale supporting release of information otherwise protected under Exemption 6 is a legitimate public interest”. 600 F.Supp.2d at 93 (citing Schiffer v. FBI, 78 F.3d 1405, 1411 (9th Cir.1996)).

Moreover, even if the government could waive the private interest involved in the documents at issue, Defendant has shown that the documents/information it withheld in connection with this category are different from the unsealed affidavits, search warrants and other documents Plaintiff relies on to assert a waiver. Indeed, the documents Plaintiff relies on to assert waiver in the other categories discussed below are also different than the documents that Defendant withheld. I find that the release of certain documents — here the unsealed affidavits and similar documents relied on by Plaintiff-does not waive the government’s right to raise exemptions as to other documents. Mobil Oil Corp. v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, 879 F.2d 698, 700 (9th Cir.1989) (citing cases); see also Williams & Connolly v. S.E.C., 662 F.3d 1240, 1245 (D.C.Cir.2011); Fla. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 961 F.2d 941, 947 (11th Cir.1992).

As the Ninth Circuit stated, when “[t]here is no evidence in the record that the documents that are the subject of [the] appeal were ever revealed..., [i]mplying a waiver of exemption for these documents based on the release of related documents.. .would be contrary both to the case law on waiver and to the policies underlying FOIA and its exemptions.” Mobil Oil Corp., 879 F.2d at 700. This makes particular sense in the context of Exemptions 6 and 7(C), which involve significant privacy interests.

Based on the foregoing, I find that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted as to the withholding of information regarding FBI SAs and their support personnel under category 1 of Exemptions 6 and 7(C).

ii. Re Names and/or Identifying Information of Third Parties of Investigative Interest

Hardy asserts that Defendant withheld under this category the redacted informa-

claims establish waiver”. tion in Al-Turki 331 (Hardy Decl., ¶ 35 n. 19.) Plaintiff denies that these exemptions are cited on Al-Turki 331. While I note that Exemptions 6 and 7(c) are cited on that page, I agree with Plaintiff that Defendant does not cite the exemptions in regard to this specific category (category 2). Instead, Al-Turki 331 refers only to categories 3 (names/identifying information regarding a third party) and 5 (names/ identifying information of non-FBI federal, state, and local government law enforcement personnel). Thus, I deny Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as moot as to this category, and address Al-Turki 331 in connection with other categories where it is cited.

iii. Names and/or Identifying Information Regarding a Third Party

Exemptions 6 and 7(C) have been cited on the following pages to protect the names and identifying information of third-party individuals: Al-Turki-144; 146; 158-9; 161-6; 168-9; 177-90; 194; 196; 198; 332-43; 345-9; 351-3; 355-6; 358-9; 361-71; 373; 411-2; 414; 416-24; 426; 428-32; 436-9; 441; 472; 474; 476-84; 486-555; 557-63; 564; 565-72; 580; 582; 611; 669; 684-5; and 687-8. (Hardy Decl., ¶ 36 n. 20.) Additionally, Plaintiff notes that these two exemptions are cited on Al-Turki 425, 427, 433, 447, 449, 465-70, and 689-90. (See Ex. 8.) Plaintiff correctly points out, however, that Exemptions 6 and (7)(C) were not cited on page Al-Turki 688 as to this category. I address this document at the conclusion of this section. I now turn to the other documents at issue in this category.

Hardy asserts that Exemptions 6 and 7(c) have been asserted to protect the names and identifying information of third-party individuals. (Hardy Decl., ¶ 36.) Identifying information withheld concerning these third parties includes names, addresses, dates of birth, social security numbers, and other personal identifying information. (Id.) Plaintiff is without sufficient information to admit or deny this.

Hardy also asserts that being linked with any law enforcement investigation carries a strong negative connotation and a stigma. (Hardy Decl., ¶ 36.) Release of the identities of these individuals to the public could subject them to harassment or embarrassment as well as undue public attention. (Id.) Accordingly, Hardy states that Defendant has determined that these individuals maintain a substantial privacy interest in not having their identities disclosed. (Id.)

Plaintiff denies Hardy’s assertion that disclosure of this information would allegedly subject the individuals to harassment or embarrassment, noting that the names of some of these individuals were already released, unredacted, in response to this lawsuit. Plaintiff also asserts that among other information improperly redacted on this basis, Defendant has inexplicably utilized Exemptions 6 and (7)(C) to redact Plaintiffs name and personal information. (Exs. 4, 5.)

.In making a determination whether to release the names and personal information concerning these third parties, Hardy states that the public’s interest in disclosure was balanced against these individuals’ right to privacy. (Hardy Decl., ¶ 36.) The FBI determined that this information would not enlighten the public on how the FBI conducts its internal operations and investigation(s). (M) Accordingly, the FBI concluded that the disclosure of this information would constitute a clearly unwarranted and unwarranted invasion of the third parties’ personal privacy. (Id.) Plaintiff notes in response that based on the nature and number of names redacted it appears, based on the record, that the FBI performed a perfunctory redaction of names, without a particularized balancing of interests. This is, however, mere unsupported opinion. Moreover, Plaintiff denies that the disclosure of this information would constitute a clearly unwarranted and/or unwarranted invasion of the individuals’ privacy, pointing out as discussed previously that identities of some third parties were released, unredacted, in response to this lawsuit.

I find that Defendant has met its burden of showing the applicability of Exemptions 6 and 7(C) with respect to the documents/information relating to third parties in this category (again with the exception of Al-Turki 688, discussed below). First, the privacy interests of these third parties has been shown through Hardy’s Declaration. Third parties referenced in FBI documents have a “strong interest” in not having their names and information revealed, “even if they are not the subject of the investigation.” Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 767 (D.C.Cir.1990); see also Amuso, 600 F.Supp.2d at 96 (“ ‘third parties who may be mentioned in investigatory files have an obvious and substantial privacy interest in their personal information’”) (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, as referenced above, Hardy has shown that the FBI balanced these private interests against the public interest and found that this -information would not enlighten the public on how the FBI conducts its internal operations and investigations. While Plaintiff denies this, he does not demonstrate or even argue that the release of the withheld information in this category would shed light on government activity. Indeed, he has not articulated any public interest. that outweighs the privacy interests of the third parties whose information was withheld. This is important because “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, the balance categorically favors withholding the names and addresses of third parties..,” Mays, 234 F.3d at 1327.

Plaintiffs only argument as to why Defendant’s summary judgment motion should be denied as to the documents in this category (other than Al-Turki 688) is that Defendant waived the right to rely on the exemptions at issue by releasing the names of some of the third party names in response to this lawsuit. Thus, he cites EOF No. 28-6 at 5 — naming Sitizulaikah Alib and Sarah Khonaizan; EOF No. 28-6 at 6 — naming Bandar Al-Rajhi, Sarah Khonaizan, Bader Al-Turki, Abdullah Al-Turki; EOF No. 28-6 at 8 — naming Michael Scholle, Sitizulaikah Alib, and Sara [sic] Khonaizan; and EOF No, 28-6 at 9— naming Mustapha White. Additionally, he states that on page Al-Turki 340, Defendant' redacted the following sentence: “That [redacted] said she met Al-Turki while working on a committee for the Crescent View Academy.” (Ex. 6.) On page Al-Turki 224; however, Defendant produced the identical information, unredact-ed: “Michelle Hernandez has provided the following information to federal agents and to the Aurora Police Department in a videotaped interview: (a) She met Al-Turki while ’ working on a committee for the Crescent View Academy.” (Ex. 7.)

I reject Plaintiffs waiver argument for the same reasons discussed above in connection with the FBI SAs and their support personnel. First, Plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that the government can waive the private interests protected by FOIA, and Defendant has established that the documents at issue involve private interests the production of which would involve a clearly unwarranted and/or unwarranted invasion of privar cy. Plaintiff has not identified any public interest that would outweigh that public interest. Moreover, the fact that some third party names may have been released in connection with certain documents such as unsealed search warrants and affidavits in support of such warrants does not waive the government’s right to rely on exemptions in other documents where third party names are referenced. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp., 879 F.2d at 700.

Based on the foregoing, I find that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted to the extent information was withheld under category 3 of Exemptions 6 and 7(C) as to all the documents at issue except Al-Turki 688.

As to the information withheld under this category in Al-Turki 688,1 deny Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment without prejudice. As noted previously, Defendant did not cite to category 3 of Exemptions 6 and 7(C) on that page. While I held that information was properly withheld in this document related to FBI SAs and support personnel in Section III. C.l.d.i, supra, that holding would not protect information about third parties. I do not have sufficient information to determine whether there is information in this document that should be disclosed. “FOIA specifically requires that, if a requested record contains information that is exempt from disclosure under one of the FQIA exemptions, ‘[a]ny segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt.’” Transpacific Policing Agreement v. U.S. Customs Serv., 177 F.3d 1022, 1026-27 (D.C.Cir.1999) (quoting 5 U.S.C.§ 552(b)). Thus, “non-exempt portions of a document must be disclosed unless they are inextricably intertwined with exempt portions.’ ” Id. (quotation omitted). Moreover, if this document does contain names and/or identifying information regarding a third party and Defendant erred in not citing to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) with respect to this category, I believe Defendant should be allowed to address this. Accordingly, Defendant is directed to address these issues in a supplemental declaration,

iv. Names and/or Identifying Information of Non-FBI Federal, State, and Local Government and Law Enforcement Personnel

Exemptions (6) and (7)(C) have also been asserted to protect the names and/or identifying information of non-FBI federal, state, and local government and law enforcement personnel whose names appear on the following pages: Al-Turki162; 165; 170; 182; 196; 331-2; 342-4; 354-6; 359; 365; 373; 411; 414; 425; 444-6; 467; 469-70; 475-83; 486-8; 490-3; 497-510; 514-7; 519-20; 522-3; 525-43; 546-7; 561; 571; 580; 590; 592-3; 596; 605-6; 611; and 687. (Hardy Decl., ¶¶ 37, 38 n. 21.) While Defendant also cited to Al-Turki