Youssef v. Holder (19 F. Supp. 3d 167, 2014)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, United States District Judge.

Bassem Youssef (“Youssef’), an employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the “FBI”), brings this action against the United States Attorney General (the “Attorney General”) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). Youssef, an Egyptian-born American citizen, asserts two claims — one sounding in discrimination and the second sounding in retaliation — each challenging his non-selection for an Assistant Section Chief position in the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division Communications Exploitation Section. Presently before the Court is the Defendant’s [41] Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court finds that Youssef has failed to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning his claim of national origin discrimination. The Court finds that Youssef has, however, demonstrated the existence of genuine issues of material fact as to whether the FBI retaliated against him in response to his statutorily-protected activities. Accordingly, upon careful consideration of the pleadings, the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Defendant’s [41] Motion for Summary Judgment for the reasons that follow.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Scope of this Action

On September 18, 2009, the FBI announced a vacancy for the Assistant Section Chief of the Counterterrorism Division’s Communications Exploitation Section. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 17. Youssef applied for the position, but, at the end of November 2009, he was informed that he had not been selected. IdA 50. Youssef commenced this Title VII action on July 25, 2011, claiming that his non-selection was discriminatory based on his Egyptian-national origin and was retaliatory due to his participation in prior Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) activity. See Compl., ECF No. [3], ¶¶ 65-72. Youssefs prior EEO activity involved a separate lawsuit brought in this Court in 2003. See generally Youssef v. F.B.I., 541 F.Supp.2d 121 (D.D.C.2008).

B. FBI Method for Selecting Mid-Level Supervisors

The FBI selects mid-level supervisors through a process involving a Local Career Board (“LCB”), which is composed of a non-voting chairperson and three voting members, all of whom are career supervisory special agents. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 1. The FBI component with the vacancy selects the preferred qualifications, known as competencies, for the position. Id. ¶ 3. The competencies are divided into primary and secondary competencies; four primary competencies are selected from a list of eight core management competencies developed by the Employee Development and Selection Program (“EDSP”) and up to three secondary competencies are selected from a separate list of specialized skill competencies. Id. The primary competencies are accorded greater weight than the secondary competencies in rating the candidates for a position. Id. ¶4. Candidates interested in a job vacancy apply by submitting a Candidate Qualification Form, which contains the applicant’s personal data, education level, and work history. Id. ¶ 6. As part of the form, the candidate also submits two examples of achievements demonstrating his or her experience and ability with regard to each required competency. Id. The competency examples are rated on a five-tier scale: Exemplary, Skilled, Competent, Marginal, and Ineffective. Id. ¶ 7. According to the LCB Chairperson Training presentation, “[i]f correctly applied, ‘Competent’ characterizes [the] majority of examples; ‘Exemplary’ and ‘Ineffective’ are rare.” Def.’s Ex. 4 (LCB Chairperson Training Presentation), at FBI 3417. The FBI has published detailed criteria to be used by the LCB in rating candidates’ examples. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 7.

After the job posting has closed, the EDSP determines which candidates meet the position’s minimum qualifications and sends their application forms to the LCB chair, who distributes them to the voting members of the LCB at least three days before the LCB convenes to rank the candidates. Id. ¶ 12. The voting members independently review and rate each candidate’s competency examples on separate scoring forms prior to the LCB meeting. Id. The competency examples are rated based on their written content. Id. ¶ 9. The LCB chair or voting members may introduce personal knowledge into the LCB proceedings only when the information is first-hand knowledge and it is directly related to a specific competency example or work assignment cited by the candidate. Def.’s Ex. 4 (LCB Chairperson Training Presentation), at FBI 3425. Voting members cannot take into account a candidate’s performance appraisals or any factor not included under the qualifications in the job posting. Def.’s Ex. 5 (ASAPP Training Guide), at FBI 2748.

The LCB chair then convenes an LCB meeting, which is audio recorded. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 13. The voting members bring their scoring forms and state their ratings. Id. The LCB chair documents the ratings and calculates the candidates’ overall rating for each competency. Id. A majority vote determines the overall rating for a particular competency example; for example, if two voting members rate a particular competency as Competent and the third voting member rates it as Skilled, that example receives an overall rating of Competent. Id. For each competency, if a candidate receives an overall rating of Competent for Example 1 and an overall rating of Skilled for Example 2 of that same competency, the overall rating is determined by rounding down, meaning the candidate receives an overall rating of Competent for that particular competency. Id. The individual ratings are only discussed if two voting members deviate by two tiers in their ratings of a competency example. Id. ¶ 14. Once the overall competency ratings are determined, the LCB Chair ranks the applicants based on their overall competency ratings, taking into consideration the weight of the competencies. Def.’s Ex. 4 (LCB Chairperson Training Presentation), at FBI 3435. The selecting component then informs EDSP and the Special Agent Mid-Level Management Selection System (SAMMS) Board of the LCB competency example ratings and applicant rankings. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 15. The SAMMS Board then selects the candidate for the position. Id.

C. Events Preceding Selection of Assistant Section Chief of the Communications Exploitation Section

Youssef began working for the FBI in June 1988. See Def.’s Ex. 10 (Youssefs Candidate Qualification Form), at FBI 331-332. Over the next fifteen years, Youssef held numerous high-level counter-terrorism and counterintelligence assignments throughout the United States and across the globe. Id. From January 2003 through December 2004, Youssef served as the Unit Chief for the Document Exploitation Unit within the Communications Exploitation Section (“CXS”). Id. at FBI 332. In December 2004, Youssef was transferred into his current position as the Unit Chief of the Communications Analysis Unit within CXS. Id. at FBI 331. While working as Unit Chief within CXS, Youssef would from time to time serve as the Acting Section Chief for CXS. Id.

On July 18, 2003, Youssef filed a lawsuit against the FBI alleging national origin discrimination and retaliation. See generally Youssef v. F.B.I., 541 F.Supp.2d 121 (D.D.C.2008). Youssef alleged that the FBI discriminated against him following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by excluding him from positions associated with counterterrorism and by retaliating against him after he filed an EEO complaint. None of the individuals who were involved in the alleged discriminatory and retaliatory action at issue in the present case — Youssefs non-selection as ASC of CXS — were identified as alleged discriminating officials in this prior 2003 action. However, the 2003 action was ongoing at the time of Youssefs 2009 application for the ASC position. Indeed, at the end of 2009, Youssef was preparing to go to trial for his retaliation claim, which was held before a jury in the fall of 2010. Youssef thus took leave throughout 2009 in order to participate in EEO-related proceedings. See Pl.’s Resp. Stmt. ¶ 91-93.

In October 2009, Youssefs first-line supervisor, Arthur Zarone, an ASC of CXS, completed Youssefs 2009 Performance Appraisal Report (“PAR”). Although Zarone gave Youssef an overall “Excellent” rating in 2008 and 2009, the two years Zarone supervised Youssef, in his 2009 PAR, Za-rone rated Youssef one step lower in five “critical elements” than he had been rated the year prior. See Def.’s Ex. 15 (Yous-sefs 2008 and 2009 Performance Appraisal Reports). In Youssefs 2008 PAR, Zarone had rated Youssef “excellent” at “maintaining high professional standards” and “achieving results,” but he rated Youssef “successful” in both categories in 2009. Id. In addition, Zarone rated Youssef as “Outstanding” in “Organizing, Planning, and Coordinating,” “Acquiring, Applying, and Sharing Job Knowledge,” and “Communicating Orally and in Writing” in 2008, but lowered his rating to “Excellent” in these three categories in 2009. Id. Included with Youssefs 2009 PAR were Za-rone’s notes of his impressions of Youssefs performance in 2009. See Def.’s Ex. 18 (Zarone Handwritten Notes). These notes stated:

Issue: drop of performance level from 08 -> 09.

Distractors:

Legal Matter

OIG Report

See id. In their declarations and deposition testimony prepared for the present case, both Zarone and Fernandez attributed the decline in Youssefs 2009 perform-anee to his “excessive absences from the office [due to his legal matter].” Zarone Decl. ¶2; see also Zarone Dep. 82-83; Fernandez Decl. ¶ 4; Fernandez Dep. 19-20, 22. As an example of the impact of Youssefs absences from the office, both Zarone and Fernandez specifically noted Youssefs supposed failure to timely renew a telecommunications contract, which they alleged nearly resulted in the loss of the contract. See Zarone Decl. ¶ 12-14; Fernandez Decl. ¶5; Fernandez Dep. 23-26.

Youssefs 2009 PAR was signed by Za-rone on October 22, 2009, one day before the LCB — of which Zarone was a member — met to select the new ASC of CXS. Def.’s Reply Stmt. ¶ 86. In early November 2009, Youssef contacted the FBI’s EEO Office requesting counseling. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 51; Pl.’s Ex. 1 (Letter to EEO Office). Youssef also requested of the EEO Office and of the Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, Michael Heimbach, that his evaluation be corrected on the basis that his “participation in a Title YII proceeding was a motivating factor in the downgrade.” Pl.’s Ex. 1 (Letter to EEO Office); PL’s Ex. 2 (Letter to Michael Heimbach). On November 20, 2009, Assistant Director Heim-bach responded by increasing Youssefs rating in “Organizing, Planning, and Coordinating,” and “Acquiring, Applying, and Sharing Job Knowledge” from “Excellent” to “Outstanding.” Pl.’s Ex. 5 (Heimbach Response to PAR Grievance). In adjusting these two ratings, Assistant Director Heimbach stated that he reviewed Za-rone’s comments and recommendations along with Youssefs appeal comments and “only considered [Youssefs] actual work performance when making [his] decision.” Id. Assistant Director Heimbach found that Youssef demonstrated outstanding skills in these two areas by his “efforts and dedication to the [redacted] initiative, [Youssefs] coordination with the telecommunication carriers, and participation in the [redacted]. Id. Assistant Director Heimbach, however, concluded that Yous-sef had not provided the Office enough detail regarding the remaining critical elements in which he had been downgraded to support a rating of “Outstanding” and that he had provided insufficient evidence “to make a decision other than to sustain [Youssefs] ratings on these Critical Elements.” Id. Youssef does not presently challenge his 2009 PAR as discriminatory or retaliatory, but presents it as evidence that his non-selection as ASC violated Title VII.

D. Selection of Assistant Section Chief of the Communications Exploitation Section

On September 18, 2009, CXS published a job posting for an ASC position. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 17. CXS is responsible for leading and supporting law enforcement and intelligence efforts to target terrorist communications. Id. ¶ 16. CXS was hiring an ASC to replace Zarone who was taking an ASC position in the Critical Incident Response Group. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 18; Zarone Decl. ¶ 55. The job posting listed four primary competencies which were weighted equally — Leadership, Problem solving/judgment, Interpersonal ability, and Initiative — and three secondary competencies, weighted in descending order — Liaison, Counterterrorism-complex CT, and Communication. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 20. The minimum qualifications for the position were three years’ FBI investigative experience, one year relief supervisory experience, and a current minimum performance appraisal of “Successful.” Id. ¶ 19.

The Section Chief of CXS, Armando Fernandez, was designated as the LCB chair for the position. Id. ¶ 23. Fernandez, a Hispanic man of Mexican national origin, was Youssefs second-line supervisor at the time of the LCB. Id. ¶¶ 21, 26. Prior to Fernandez selecting the LCB members and receiving the candidates’ applications, three individuals, Richard Davidson, Matthew Desmond, and Daniel Powers, contacted Fernandez to let him know that they would be applying for the position. Id. The same day that Powers introduced himself to Fernandez, he also introduced himself to Zarone and indicated that he would be applying for the ASC position. Id. ¶ 29. Shortly prior to becoming aware of the applicants for the position, Fernandez asked Hipólito Castro, Jr., Erkan Chase, and Arthur Zarone to serve as LCB voting members. Id. ¶ 24. Castro, a Hispanic man of Puerto Rican national origin, was ASC of the Terrorist Financing Operations Section in the Coun-terterrorism Division at the time of the LCB. Id. ¶¶24, 26. Chase, an African American man of Turkish national origin, was an ASC, Technical, of CXS from 2008 through the time of the LCB, but did not supervise Youssef. Id.; Chase Deck, ¶ 1, 8. Zarone, a Caucasian man of European national origin, served as an ASC of CXS from April 2008 through October 2009, and, as noted before, was the direct supervisor and rating official for Youssef during that period. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 18; Zarone Signed Sworn Stmt, at 2. Importantly, the LCB voting members deny knowing at the time of the LCB that Youssef was involved in an EEO-related lawsuit. Youssef, however, adamantly disputes their testimony and presents evidence, which he contends shows that, at the time of the LCB, each voting member was aware that he was engaged in EEO activity.

After designating the voting members, Fernandez received from EDSP the applications of four candidates: Youssef, Davidson, Desmond, and Powers, the eventual selectee. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 27. Fernandez then distributed the applications to the LCB voting members and each voting member independently rated the competency examples for each candidate. Id. ¶28. On October 23, 2009, the LCB members convened to report their independent ratings of each candidate’s competency examples. Id. ¶¶ 47-48. Chase rated Powers as Skilled in eight of his competency examples and as Competent in six examples. Id. ¶30. He rated Youssef as Skilled in one competency example and as Competent in thirteen examples. Id. Castro rated Powers as Skilled in eight of his competency examples and as Competent in six examples. Id. ¶39. He rated Youssef as Skilled in three competency examples and as Competent in eleven examples. Id. Finally, Zarone rated Powers as Skilled in six competency examples and as Competent in eight examples. Id. ¶42. He rated Youssef as Skilled in three competency examples and as Competent in eleven examples. Id. There was no other discussion of the candidates. Id. ¶48; see also Def.’s Ex. 11 (Oct. 23, 2009 LCB Transcript). Based on the individual ratings, Fernandez then determined the overall competency ratings for each of the applicants. Id. Overall, Powers was rated Skilled in one primary competency (Problem Solving/Judgment) and in one secondary competency (Counterterrorism), and Competent in the five remaining competencies placing him first amongst the four candidates. Id. Youssef was rated Competent in all seven competencies and thus ranked last among the candidates. Id. The LCB voting members rated Davidson similarly, though slightly higher, than Youssef and Desmond similarly to Powers although slightly lower. See Def.’s Ex. 8 (LCB Scoring Matrices). Based on these overall competency ratings, the LCB declared Powers the top-ranked candidate and Youssef the last-ranked candidate. See Def.’s Ex. 12 (LCB Memorandum to SAMMS Board), at 9. Fernandez then opened the envelope containing the Division Head Recommendations. Def.’s Ex. 11 (Oct. 23, 2009 LCB Transcript), at 12-13. The Division Heads recommended all candidates for the vacancy. Id. at 13.

On November 19, 2009, the SAMMS Board, consistent with the competency ratings of the LCB voting members, selected Powers for the ASC position. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 50. In the period between Zarone stepping down as ASC of CXS in November 2009 and Powers assuming the position in March 2010, Youssef was designated by Fernandez to serve as the acting ASC of CXS. Id. ¶61. Youssef had previously served as Acting Section Chief of CXS. See Def.’s Ex. 10 (Youssefs Candidate Qualification Form), at FBI 331.

E. Procedural Background

Shortly after learning of his non-selection for the ASC position, Youssef contacted an FBI EEO counselor and explained that he believed that his non-selection had been “in retaliation due to his prior EEO activity.” Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 51. At the conclusion of EEO counseling, Youssef filed a formal EEO complaint, alleging that he had been discriminated against based on his national origin and retaliated against for his participation in prior EEO activity. See Def.’s Ex. 16 (Feb. 16, 2010 EEO Compl.), at 1. On May 19, 2010, the EEO Office informed Youssefs counsel that it would commence an investigation into Youssefs allegations. PL’s Resp. Stmt., Ex. 1 (May 19, 2010 Ltr.), ECF No. [24-1], at BY 00038. It is not clear whether the FBI ever conducted an investigation into Youssefs administrative complaint. It is clear, however, that the FBI never issued a final decision resolving Youssefs complaint even though a year and a half elapsed between the filing of Youssefs administrative complaint and the commencement of this action.

Youssef initiated this lawsuit on July 25, 2011, claiming that his non-selection was discriminatory based on his Egyptian-national origin and retaliatory due to his participation in EEO activity related to his 2003 lawsuit against the FBI. See Compl., ECF No. [3], ¶¶ 65-72. On December 23, 2011, the Defendant filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, Alternatively Summary Judgment, contending that Youssef could not pursue his non-selection claims because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Court disagreed and by Order dated August 7, 2012, denied the Defendant’s Motion. See Youssef v. Holder, 881 F.Supp.2d 93 (D.D.C.2012). The Defendant subsequently filed the present Motion for Summary Judgment. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. [41]. In short, the Defendant now argues that Youssef s claims must fail because he cannot show that the FBI’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for selecting Powers was pretextual or otherwise offer any evidence of discriminatory motive and because he cannot show a causal link between his protected activity and his non-selection.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that .he] ... is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The mere existence of some factual dispute is insufficient on its own to bar summary judgment; the dispute must pertain to a “material” fact. Id. Accordingly, “[ojnly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Nor may summary judgment be avoided based on just any- disagreement as to the relevant facts; the dispute must be “genuine,” meaning that there must be sufficient admissible evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to find for the non-movant. Id.

In order to establish that a fact is or cannot be genuinely disputed, a party must (a) cite to specific parts of the record— including deposition testimony, documentary evidence, affidavits or declarations, or other competent evidence — in support of his position, or (b) demonstrate that the materials relied upon by the opposing party do not actually establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Conclusory assertions offered without any factual basis in the record cannot create a genuine dispute sufficient to survive summary judgment. Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 564 F.3d 462, 465-66 (D.C.Cir.2009). Moreover, where “a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact,” the district court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e).

When faced with a motion for summary judgment, the district court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence; instead, the evidence must be analyzed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, with all justifiable inferences drawn in his favor. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If material facts are genuinely in dispute, or undisputed facts are susceptible to divergent yet justifiable inferences, summary judgment is inappropriate. Moore v. Hartman, 571 F.3d 62, 66 (D.C.Cir.2009). In the end, the district court’s task is to determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to [the trier of fact] or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In this regard, the non-movant must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); “[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not sufficiently probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted).

Importantly, “[w]hile summary judgment must be approached with specific caution in discrimination cases, a plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation to support his allegations by affidavits or other competent evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Morgan v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 172 F.Supp.2d 98, 104 (D.D.C.2001), aff'd, 328 F.3d 647 (D.C.Cir.2003); see also Marshall v. James, 276 F.Supp.2d 41, 47 (D.D.C.2003) (special caution “does not eliminate the use of summary judgment in discrimination cases”) (citing cases). Accordingly, the Court reviews the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment under a “heightened standard” that reflects “special caution.” Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 879 (D.C.Cir.1997) (internal quotations omitted), overturned on other grounds, 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C.Cir.1998) (en banc). Nonetheless, while this special standard is more exacting, it is not inherently preclusive. Although more circumspect, the Court shall grant a motion for summary judgment where the nonmoving party has failed to submit evidence that creates a genuine factual dispute and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

III. DISCUSSION

A. National Origin Discrimination Claim

Pursuant to Title VII, all personnel actions affecting employees of the federal government “shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). To prove a violation of Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the actions taken by the employer were “more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors” such as race, ethnicity, or national origin. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, “the plaintiff may prove his claim with direct evidence, and absent direct evidence, he may indirectly prove discrimination” under the burden-shifting analysis created by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Brady v. Livingood, 456 F.Supp.2d 1, 6 (D.D.C.2006) (quoting Kalekiristos v. CTF Hotel Mgmt. Corp., 958 F.Supp. 641, 665 (D.D.C.1997)). Where, as here, the record contains no direct evidence of discrimination, it is necessary to employ the McDonnell Douglas tripartite burden-shifting framework. Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 516 (D.C.Cir.2000) (citing McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)).

Under the McDonnell Douglas paradigm, Youssef has the initial burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a “prima facie” case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. If he succeeds, the burden shifts to the FBI to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason as to why Youssef was not selected for the ASC position, and to produce credible evidence supporting its claim. Id. The FBI’s burden is only one of production, and it “need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089; see also St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“[T]he determination that a defendant has met its burden of production (and has thus rebutted any legal presumption of intentional discrimination) can involve no credibility assessment.”). As such, “the McDonnell Douglas framework shifts intermediate evidentiary burdens between the parties, [t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Morgan v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 328 F.3d 647, 651 (D.C.Cir.2003) (internal quotations and citation omitted), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 881, 124 S.Ct. 325, 157 L.Ed.2d 146 (2003); see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089. If the FBI is successful, the burden then shifts back to Youssef to prove that the FBI’s proffered motive was “not its true reason, but was a pretext for discrimination.” Barnette v. Chertoff, 453 F.3d 513, 516 (D.C.Cir.2006) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)).

At the summary judgment stage, however, the D.C. Circuit has instructed that, once an employer provides a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for its decision, “the district court need not — and should not — decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.” Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C.Cir.2008) (emphasis in original). Rather, the central question for the Court to resolve is whether “the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Id. Effectively, “[t]his bods down to two inquiries: could a reasonable jury infer that the employer’s given explanation was pretextual, and, if so, could the jury infer that this pretext shielded discriminatory motives?” Murray v. Gilmore, 406 F.3d 708, 713 (D.C.Cir.2005).

Still, the Supreme Court has taken care to instruct trial courts that “the trier of fact may still consider the evidence establishing the plaintiffs prima facie case ‘and inferences properly drawn therefrom ... on the issue of whether the defendant’s explanation is pretextual.’ ” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n. 10, 101 S.Ct. 1089). “[A] plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” Id. at 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has distilled this analysis, noting that the factfinder can infer discrimination from the combination of:

(1) the plaintiffs prima facie case; (2) any evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the employer’s proffered explanation for its actions; and (3) any further evidence of discrimination that may be available to the plaintiff (such as independent evidence of discriminatory statements or attitudes on the part of the employer) or any contrary evidence that may be available to the employer (such as evidence of a strong record in equal opportunity employment).

Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C.Cir.1998) (en banc). However, evidence in each of the three categories is not required. Id.

“At this stage, if [the plaintiff] is unable to adduce evidence that could allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that [the defendant’s] proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination, summary judgment must be entered against [plaintiff].” Paquin v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 119 F.3d 23, 27-28 (D.C.Cir.1997). “[T]he court must consider all the evidence in its full context in deciding whether the plaintiff has met his burden of showing that a reasonable [fact-finder] could conclude that he has suffered discrimination.” Aka, 156 F.3d at 1290.

1. The FBI’s Proffered Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reasons

The Court must first assess whether the FBI has produced evidence that Youssef was not selected for the ASC position for one or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097. The FBI asserts that Youssef was not selected as ASC because he was not the top-rated candidate based on the strength of his competency examples. To support this explanation, the FBI has produced the independent score sheets of each LCB voting member which show that each member independently ranked Powers first based on his competency examples, as well as the LCB Chairperson’s Scoring Matrix, the transcript of the LCB meeting, and the LCB’s memorandum to the SAMMS Board, which all show that Powers was ranked first overall and Yous-sef fourth overall based on the LCB voting members ratings of the candidates’ competency examples. As these documents only show the rating each LCB voting member gave to each candidate’s competency examples but not the rationale for the rating, the FBI has also provided declarations and deposition testimony from each LCB voting member explaining the reasoning behind their ratings. As an initial matter, each LCB voting member declared that he based his ratings on the candidates’ competency examples relying solely on the narrative provided by the candidate in the application form and did not conduct any independent research or consult with anyone concerning the candidates’ examples. See Castro Decl. ¶ 19; Chase Deck ¶ 6; Zarone Deck ¶28; see also Def.’s Ex. 13 (LCB Memorandum to SAMMS Board) (“There were no undocumented, informal communications between [L]CB members and other individuals regarding the candidates for this position.”). The LCB voting members all also declared that the geographic location of an example or the terrorist target involved was less important to the voting member in evaluating the candidates’ examples, than the actual work the candidate illustrated in the example. See Castro Deck ¶ 21; Zarone Deck ¶ 49; Chase Deck ¶ 14.

Specifically, Castro explained in his declaration that Youssef could have drafted his examples more effectively. Castro Deck ¶ 15. Castro also found that “[i]n several instances, [Youssef] did not describe his role in the depicted investigation or scenario that he used as an example, and failed to provide significant, necessary-information.” Id. As an example, Castro explains that in the candidates’ Counter-terrorism examples he was “looking for whether the candidate had served as a case agent on a counterterrorism investigation, as case agents are .the frontline personnel doing the hands-on work in any investigation.” Id. ¶16. Castro notes that one of Youssefs example indicated that he was the AGAI coordinator, but Castro asserts that he was not aware of AGAI or of an AGAI “coordinator” and Youssef did not explain the significance of his coordinator position, nor indicate that he was a case agent. Id. Castro found that Yous-sefs example “illustrated] that he was doing his job effectively, but did not differentiate his role from what agents throughout the FBI were doing and thus Castro rated it “Competent.” Id. Castro rated one of Powers’ Counterterrorism examples as “Skilled” because it “demonstrated that he had effectively headed a Joint Terrorism Task Force (“JTTF”), responsible for all counterterrorism investigations in his field office, and utilized techniques and achieved results that demonstrated skilled performance of complex counterterrorism work.” Id. ¶20.

Similarly, Chase believed that Yous-sefs examples were weaker in terms of specificity and underlying work. Chase Decl. ¶ 11. As an example of his reasoning, Chase explains that he found Powers’ example of leadership in the FBI’s investigation of the 2008 Mumbai attacks demonstrated that Powers “led teams of investigators and intelligence officers in difficult and urgent missions, provided direction and effectively delegated work to them, and directed his teams in meeting the mission objectives.” Id. ¶12. On the other hand, Chase found Youssefs example describing his service as the first legal attaché to Saudi Arabia “did not indicate that he was responsible for leading any subordinates or how he had done so.” Id. ¶13. As for Youssefs Leadership example describing his efforts as the first Unit Chief of the Document Exploitation Unit, Chase found that “it was expected that he would establish the unit’s goals, objectives and mission” as “every unit chief, not just the first one, does this.” Id. Furthermore, Chase felt the fact that the Document Exploitation Unit increased in size during Youssefs leadership — a fact emphasized by Youssef in his application — was “true of all units in [the Counterterrorism Division], as coun-terterrorism became a top priority for the FBI” during that period. Id. Chase also found that Youssefs emphasis on the weekly and sometimes daily briefings he led within his unit was “exactly what a Unit Chief is expected to do.” Id.

In the area of counterterrorism, Chase was interested “in examples in which the applicant had a lead role as a case agent in a counterterrorism investigation, and the sophistication of the techniques employed during the investigation.” Id. ¶14. Chase rated Powers’ first Counterterrorism example as “Skilled” because it established that he had supervised a JTTF and been responsible for international investigations that involved “several significant and sophisticated investigative techniques” and for the “initiation of an approach that involved multi-jurisdictional, interagency, and transnational components.” Id. ¶15. He rated Powers’ second Counterterrorism example as “Skilled” because it demonstrated leadership in investigations, specifically, that Powers had “instituted weekly JTTF meetings” and that he had “been able to develop a team approach to complicated international and domestic terrorism investigations” and thus had “developed a skillful approach to the difficult problem of law enforcement coordination” in addition to “being substantially responsible for engaging the JTTF.” Id. 1Í16. Chase rated Youssefs first Counterterrorism example as “Competent” because “although it showed him doing his job well, it did not articulate case agent investigation responsibilities or use of sophisticated techniques.” Id. ¶17. Specifically, although Youssefs example indicated that he obtained important information from an asset, Youssef “did not indicate that he had authored any FISA warrants or used other sophisticated techniques” and also “did not indicate that he was leading a particular investigation.” Id. As for Youssefs second example explaining Youssefs role as the “AGAI coordinator,” Chase rated it as “Competent” because “in [his] mind” there is “a significant difference between being supervisor of an investigation and the coordinator for a particular group” with the latter “simply administratively coordinating] the investigations focusing on a particular group” as opposed to “supervising] the investigation” and -being “involved in the daily decisions of investigating the terrorist cell.” Id. ¶18. Moreover, Chase states he “was not very familiar with AGAI, and was not aware of its role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing or of any affiliation with Osama bin Laden” and that it was Youssefs “responsibility, as the applicant, to provide the contextual information if he believed it significant to his example.” Id. ¶19.

Finally, Zarone found that Youssefs examples “were not as current and did not involve field terrorism work when compared to Powers’ experience.” Zarone Decl. ¶ 37. Zarone rated Youssefs Leadership example describing his work as the first legal attaché in Saudi Arabia as “Competent” because it described work that was “part of every [legal attaché’s] job.” Id. ¶38. Moreover, Zarone was aware that “when the FBI opens a [legal attaché] office overseas, numerous FBI headquarters divisions are involved in the effort, which includes funding, coordination, security and human resources. No FBI [legal attaché] office is opened by the singular efforts of any one person.” Id. However, Zarone found this example to be a “Skilled” demonstration of the Liaison competency and rated it as such. Id. ¶39. Zarone also rated as “Competent” Yous-sefs Problem Solving/Judgment example in which Youssef describes his efforts to coordinate a Persian Gulf states visit by the FBI Director on the “Director’s very tight schedule.” Id. ¶40. Based on Za-rone’s experience in the same role, he found that the length of the Director’s visit described by Youssef presented less of a security concern and that the advance team, not the legal attaché for the region, handled the logistics and security component of the Director’s travel. Id. Finally, Zarone rated as “Competent” Youssefs Counterterrorism example describing the information he obtained from an asset because it “was the type of work an agent is expected to perform,” and because “the information provided by Mr. Youssefs source was but one piece in a tapestry of information ... that allowed the FBI to make the necessary legal showing to obtain authority to perform certain intelligence gathering activities.” Id. ¶42.

On the other hand, Zarone rated Powers’ example of Leadership after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks as “Skilled” because it demonstrated “skilled leadership during a time of crisis” that was commended by the FBI Director for “furthering the legacy of the FBI throughout the region.” Id. ¶45. Zarone also rated Powers’ Initiative example describing a national investigative strategy that Powers implemented concerning a major domestic terrorism case as “Skilled” because it demonstrated that Powers “was able to establish priorities, overcome adversity, persevere through obstacles, and that his efforts resulted in 70 spin-off domestic terrorism investigations.” Id. ¶46. Similarly, Za-rone rated Powers’ first Counterterrorism example as “Skilled” because “it established that, as the head of a JTTF, Mr. Powers led all aspects of an international terrorism investigation out of the FBI’s Indianapolis Division that involved several intelligence community partner agencies, a foreign government, and several FBI headquarters units.” Id. ¶48. Zarone found this example important because JTTFs are a “foundational component of the FBI’s counterterrorism efforts,” and several of the investigators under Powers’ supervision were nominated for the FBI Director’s award and received pay increases. Id. Finally, Zarone rated Powers’ first Liaison example as “Skilled” because it indicated that Powers “successfully obtained information from a previously uncooperative subject,” “briefed a three-star general and his command staff’ about the information, and as a result of the information, “received authority to plan a mission to identify and locate a terrorist training camp” with a U.S. Special Forces team. Id. ¶47.

As the LCB voting members’ sworn affidavits, their deposition testimony under oath, and the documentary evidence from the LCB meeting are all admissible evidence, the Court finds that the FBI has met its burden of production and established a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Youssefs non-selection. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (to establish a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, “the defendant must simply set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiffs rejection.”).

2. Evidence of Discrimination, Vel Non

Since the FBI has presented legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons justifying Youssefs non-selection, the Court therefore proceeds directly to considering the ultimate question of “discrimination vel non ” — whether Youssef has adduced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the FBI’s proffered reason for its decision is pretextual, and that its real motivation was discrimination based on Youssefs national origin. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43, 120 S.Ct. 2097. Pretext may be established “directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089; see also Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097. “Proof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persua sive.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 517, 113 S.Ct. 2742) (“[Pjroving the employer’s reason false becomes part of (and often considerably assists) the greater enterprise of proving that the real reason was intentional discrimination.”); see also Aka, 156 F.3d at 1290 (“[A] plaintiffs discrediting of an employer’s stated reason for its employment decision is entitled to considerable weight.”). Youssef can also attempt to “avoid summary judgment by presenting other evidence, direct or circumstantial, that permits an inference of discrimination,” such as “discriminatory statements by the employer,” “other attitudes suggesting the decision maker harbors discriminatory animus,” and/or other “data” concerning his protected class(es). Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 899 (D.C.Cir.2006) (internal citations omitted).

As always, Youssef retains the “ultimate burden of persuading the court that [he] has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089. At this point,

a court reviewing summary judgment looks to whether a reasonable [fact-finder] could infer intentional discrimination or retaliation from all the evidence, including (1) the plaintiff’s prima fade case; (2) any evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the employer’s proffered explanation for its action; and (3) any further evidence of discrimination that may be available to the plaintiff (such as independent evidence of discriminatory statements or attitudes on the part of the employer).

Carter v. George Washington Univ., 387 F.3d 872, 878 (D.C.Cir.2004) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Court shall first evaluate the strength of Youssefs prima fade case and then address the additional evidence Yous-sef presents of pretext and discriminatory motive.

i. Youssefs Prima Facie Case

Youssef argues that the LCB’s failure to select him as ASC constituted discrimination on the basis of his national origin. See PL’s Opp’n. at 15-23. Youssef may establish a prima fade case of national origin discrimination by showing that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he applied for and was qualified for an available position; (3) despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (4) either someone filled the position or it remained vacant and the employer continued to seek applicants. Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895 (citing Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d 1085, 1088 (D.C.Cir.2003)). Youssef easily establishes a prima fade case and the FBI concedes as much. Youssef is of Egyptian national origin; he was on the list of qualified candidates for the ASC position but was not selected; and another individual, Powers, was selected to fill the position.

ii. Evidence of Pretext

In addition to his prima fade case, Youssef essentially makes two overarching arguments in an attempt to show that the FBI’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his non-selection are pretextual and that this pretext shielded discriminatory motives: (1) events surrounding Youssefs 2009 Performance Appraisal Report (“PAR”) and the ASC selection suggest that the LCB members harbored discriminatory bias, and (2) a reasonable jury could infer discrimination from the fact that the LCB misstated or overstated the qualifications of the respective candidates and Youssef was the objectively superior candidate. Having examined the parties’ arguments, including Youssefs voluminous Statement of Material Facts and Response to the FBI’s Statement of Material Facts, in addition to the record, the Court finds that Youssef has not adduced evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer that the FBI’s proffered justification for his non-selection was pretext for national origin discrimination. The Court addresses each of Youssefs arguments in turn.

a. Evidence of Discriminatory Bias

Youssefs first argument is that a trier of fact could reasonably infer that the FBI “is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose” from the following evidence: (1) Zarone’s (and other Career Board members’) attempt to deny any knowledge that the legal matters in which Youssef was engaged were EEO related; (2) Za-rone and Fernandez’s “creation” of a “contrived issue” to justify their “illegal” downgrade of Youssefs PAR; (3) the Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division overturning two performance ratings in Youssefs PAR, which Zarone lowered the day before the LCB met; (4) Fernandez and Zarone’s meeting with Powers prior to the LCB meeting; and (5) Fernandez’s appointment of Youssef as Acting ASC prior to Powers assuming the position, despite Zarone and Fernandez lowering Youssefs performance ratings in five categories. Pl.’s Opp’n. at 17. Yous-sef argues that each of these pieces of evidence suggest discriminatory bias on the part of the FBI and, accordingly, that the FBI’s reason for not selecting Youssef as ASC is pretextual.

Individually and collectively, none of these five pieces of evidence rise to the level of creating a genuine dispute as to whether the explanation provided by the FBI for Youssefs non-selection was pretext for a discriminatory motive. Youssef first argues that the LCB voting members’ “denial of knowledge that Mr. Youssefs [prior] legal matter concerned EEO issues, taken in the light most favorable to Mr. Youssef, creates a jury question on issues related to credibility, pretext and discriminatory bias.” Pl.’s Opp’n. at 18. First, Youssef “must do more than merely express an intent to challenge the credibility of the defendant’s witnesses on cross examination. [Youssef] must produce specific facts that raise an inference of discriminatory motive.” Mulrain v. Donovan, 900 F.Supp.2d 62, 73 (D.D.C.2012) (quoting Howell v. Sullivan, 1992 WL 675147, at *5 (D.D.C.1992)). Even assuming Youssef has established a genuine dispute as to whether the LCB voting members knew Youssef was engaged in an EEO-related legal matter against the FBI and thus lied in denying their knowledge of the nature of this legal matter in their depositions and declarations, this evidence suggests that the LCB voting members are seeking to cover up the fact that the LCB did not select Youssef because he was engaged in an EEO lawsuit against the FBI, not because he was of Egyptian national origin. In other words, these facts would at best allow a reasonable trier of fact to infer retaliatory intent in not selecting Youssef for the ASC position; these facts are insufficient to “raise an inference of discriminatory motive” based on Youssefs national origin. Mulrain, 900 F.Supp.2d at 73. In other words, as it has been presented by Youssef, this. See Warner v. Vance-Cooks, 956 F.Supp.2d 129, 156, 2013 WL 3835116, * 21 (D.D.C.2013) (supervisor’s alleged remark that he was going to “let the dogs out” on plaintiff, which plaintiff argued reflected discriminatory intent, was insufficient to defeat summary judgment on plaintiffs sex discrimination claim because “nothing in the statement suggests that the plaintiff was being targeted based upon her gender.”).

Youssefs next two arguments also fail to raise an inference of discriminatory motive. Youssef argues that once Zarone and Fernandez “illegally downgraded [Yous-sefs PAR] in response to Youssefs protected right to take time off for his EEO claim,” Zarone and Fernandez falsely alleged that Youssef was “responsible for mishandling contract negotiations concerning the renewal of services provided by telecommunications companies to the FBI” in order to justify their downgrade of Youssefs PAR. PL’s Opp’n. at 18. Yous-sef posits that “if the jury were to credit Mr. Youssefs version of events, this incident would constitute further evidence of motive, pretext and intentional discrimination.” Id. at 19. Similarly, Youssefs third argument is that the Assistant Director of Counterterrorism’s decision to upgrade two of the five competencies in which Za-rone had downgraded Youssefs PAR “is strong evidence that Mr. Zarone and Mr. Fernandez had negative views of Mr. Youssef which could not be objectively sustained.” Id. at 20. Youssef contends that “Zarone’s admission that these views were premised on Mr. Youssefs ‘legal matter,’ in which Mr. Youssef was attempting to resolve a discrimination concern, undermines the FBI’s argument on this matter.” Id. In other words, the Assistant Director’s upgrade of two competencies in Youssefs 2009 PAR is further evidence that Zarone improperly downgraded Yous-sefs PAR based on his involvement in an EEO lawsuit. In both of these arguments, Youssefs own presentation of the facts— as evidence that Zarone and Fernandez were biased against Youssef because of his involvement in protected activity — at most allows an inference of retaliatory motive, not discriminatory bias against Youssefs national origin. Consequently, these arguments are insufficient to raise an issue of material fact as to whether Youssefs non-selection was motivated by discriminatory bias.

Youssefs fourth argument is that the fact that he “was the only applicant [with] whom Fernandez did not interview or speak [ ] prior to the Career Board meeting,” and Powers was the only candidate to have a face-to-face meeting with Zarone, is “clearly suspicious, and demonstrate[s] evidence of bias and disparate treatment between Youssef and Powers.” Id. at 20-21. Youssef contends that there are factual disputes as to what was discussed during the meeting between Fernandez and Powers and why Zarone arranged for that meeting. Id. The FBI responds that the fact that every candidate except for Yous-sef contacted Fernandez prior to the LCB in no way suggests discriminatory bias because Fernandez was listed in the job posting as the point of contact for questions regarding the ASC position and each candidate took it upon himself to contact Fernandez and Youssef could have done the same. Def.’s Reply at 18. The FBI also points to Fernandez’s declaration stating that the candidates’ discussions with Fernandez lasted no more than a minute and “the extent of the discussion was Fernandez wishing the applicants good luck.” Def.’s Reply at 19; Fernandez Decl. ¶ 12. The Court agrees with the FBI that these brief introductory encounters initiated by the candidates are far from sufficient to raise any suspicion in the mind of a trier of fact, much less an inference of discriminatory bias. In his deposition testimony, Fernandez explains that he received an introductory call from Davidson and Desmond, but that Powers stopped by his office to introduce himself because he was at FBI Headquarters for a Legal Attaché conference. Fernandez Dep. at 52. Fernandez explains that Powers “just wanted to stop by, introduce [himself] and tell [Fernandez] that [he] was applying for the Assistant Section Chief job” to which Fernandez responded, “Oh, okay. Thank you very much,” and walked away. Id. Fernandez further explains that all of these encounters happened before the LCB was selected and before Fernandez knew the identity of the candidates. Id. at 52, 57. Likewise, Zarone states in his declaration that he “briefly met Mr. Powers shortly before the LCB, when [Powers] had introduced himself and indicated that he was applying for the ASC position.” Zarone Decl. ¶ 43. Zarone further states that he and Powers did not discuss Powers’ application. Id. Although Youssef alleges in his pleadings that there are factual disputes about what was discussed in these meetings and why they occurred, Youssef cites to no evidence and the Court, in its own review of the record, has found none to dispute the FBI’s explanation of these meetings as nothing more than brief introductory encounters initiated by the candidates. The Court finds these meetings to be particularly innocuous given that both Zarone and Fernandez already knew Yous-sef, but had not previously met Powers. The Court also finds the fact that Powers met with Zarone does not raise suspicion as Powers was seeking the position Zarone was vacating and the encounter happened before the LCB members were selected. Accordingly, the Court finds that Youssef fails to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a reasonable trier of fact could infer national origin discriminatory bias from these encounters.

Finally, Youssef argues that discriminatory bias can be inferred from the fact that Fernandez “suspiciously” appointed Yous-sef Acting ASC for the period between Zarone leaving the position and Powers assuming it even though Fernandez believed “Youssef was so incompetent as to his job.” PL’s Opp’n. at 21. Youssef contends that the “PAR downgrade, combined with Mr. Fernandez’s deposition testimony that was highly critical of Mr. Youssefs performance immediately before the [LCB] meeting, simply cannot be squared with Fernandez’s decision to appoint Mr. Youssef as the acting Assistant Section Chief.” Id. Youssef posits that “[biased on this conflict!,] a strong inference can be made that Zarone and Fernandez lied about these so-called performance issues [ (including the telecommunications contract) ] in order to justify Youssefs non-selection and the performance downgrade.” Id. at 22. The FBI responds that Fernandez’s decision to have Youssef act as ASC “is perfectly consistent with the fact that Youssefs overall work performance had been rated Excellent” and “cuts against an inference of retaliatory or discriminatory animus.” Def.’s Reply at 19 n. 7. The Court agrees that this evidence is insufficient to raise an inference of discriminatory motive. Although Zarone and Fernandez raised some concerns about Youssefs performance in their depositions and declarations and in Zarone’s notes attached to Youssefs PAR, the FBI has presented evidence that Youssefs supervisors still considered him to be doing his job very well, as directly demonstrated by Youssefs overall performance rating of “Excellent” in 2009 — the same overall rating he received in 2008. See Def.’s Ex. 15 (Youssefs 2008 and 2009 PAR). Indeed, Youssef was recommended for the ASC position by the head of the Counterterrorism Division. See Def.’s Ex. 11 (Oct. 23, 2009 LCB Transcript), at 13. Furthermore, Youssefs appointment as Acting ASC was also consistent with his tenure in the section and the fact that he had served several times as Acting Section Chief of CXS in the past. See Def.’s Ex. 10 (Yous-sefs Candidate Qualification Form), at FBI 331. Accordingly, Youssef has failed to establish a genuine inconsistency between Zarone and Fernandez’s performance reviews and his appointment as Acting ASC that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find his appointment as Acting ASC suspicious and revelatory of Zarone and Fernandez’s discriminatory bias.

b. Failure to Properly Evaluate Yous-sef and Powers’ Overall Qualiñcations and Competency Examples

Youssefs second overarching argument is that the FBI’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason is called into question by the fact that Youssef was not selected for the ASC position despite having starkly superior qualifications and by the fact that the LCB did not stick to the “four corners” approach in rating the competency examples of the candidates. Specifically, Yous-sef argues that the LCB voting members considered outside information regarding Powers’ examples and “presumed or aggrandized [Powers’] statements in a manner that made his application appear stronger than written,” while “cavalierly brushfing] off’ Youssefs accomplishments, “which are well known throughout the FBI and which are matters of public record.” PL’s Opp’n. at 22-23.

Although the D.C. Circuit has stated that a court must not “serve as a ‘super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions,’ ” Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 897 (quoting Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d 1342, 1346 (D.C.Cir.1999)), a factfinder may infer discrimination if the evidence shows a reasonable employer would have found the plaintiff “significantly” better qualified for the job but nevertheless failed to offer the job to the plaintiff. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1294. In order to justify an inference of discrimination, the plaintiff must demonstrate a “qualifications gap ... great enough to be inherently indicative of discrimination.” Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 897; see also Stewart v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 422, 429-30 (D.C.Cir.2003) (examining record for evidence of a “stark superiority of credentials” and concluding that “fine distinctions” were insufficient to raise a jury question).

Youssef offers the following as “objective evidence” that his qualifications for the ASC position were starkly superior to Powers’: (1) At the time Youssef was a “highly experienced FBI case agent, with responsibility as the coordinator for the investigation into the Blind Sheik’s organization, Mr. Powers was still working as a highway patrolman in Juniper, Florida”; (2) Youssef served as a Legal Attaché in the Middle East (“an area of particular import for combating Middle Eastern terrorism”) for 41 months, while Powers only served as an Attaché for 15 months in India, “a country not as directly involved in international terrorism as Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf nations served by Yous-sef’; (3) Youssef served “on numerous occasions” as the Acting Section Chief of CXS — a position higher than Assistant Section Chief — while Powers never served in that capacity; and (4) Youssef served in two Unit Chief positions in CXS while Powers never held a position in CXS. Pl.’s Opp’n. at 30. Essentially, Youssef claims that a reasonable trier of fact could infer discriminati