Yah Kai World Wide Enterprises, Inc. v. Napper (195 F. Supp. 3d 287, 2016)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

KETANJI BROWN JACKSON, United States District Judge

This lawsuit arises from a dispute between members of the African Hebrew Israelite community (the “Community”) and Geoffrey Napper (“Napper” or “Defendant”), one of the Community’s former members, regarding the ownership and control of a business located in Capitol Heights, Maryland; the business in dispute is presently named Everlasting Life Restaurant & Lounge. “Everlasting Life” is a phrase that has special significance to the members of the Community, who claim to be descendants of biblical Israelites and who follow a strict vegan diet. Thus, when the Community undertook to open a food-service establishment to support their members’ dietary needs, the name Everlasting Life—which was eventually trademarked by one of the group’s leaders, Immanuel Ben Yehuda (“Prince Immanu-el”)—was selected to be the official moniker. The Community appointed Napper to manage its first Everlasting Life restaurant and grocery store, which was a cooperative in the District of Columbia, and Napper was also tapped to manage the expansive Everlasting Life Health Complex that the Community later opened in Maryland. When the Community subsequently decided to replace Napper as manager of the Complex and to form a corporate entity named Yah Kai World Wide Enterprises (‘Yah Kai”) to run that facility, Napper seemed to accept that management decision and continued his involvement with certain, limited aspects of the Complex’s business operations—right up until the point at which he forcibly evicted Prince Immanuel, Yah Kai, and other Community members from the premises, took over the facility and all of its equipment, and began operating that Everlasting Life establishment as his own.

Before this Court at present is the complaint that Prince Immanuel and Yah Kai (“Plaintiffs”) have brought against Napper under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129, and ■ Maryland common law. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Last year, this Court conducted a three-day bench trial, during which five witnesses testified regarding the facts underlying Plaintiffs’ various trademark infringement and unfair business practices claims and Napper’s defenses. The Court subsequently received and reviewed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law from the parties, and it has now carefully examined the myriad legal tenets that the parties contend squarely apply to the established facts of this case. As explained in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth below, this Court has determined that Plaintiffs have sustained their burden of proof with respect to the complaint’s two Lanham Act claims (trademark infringement, and unfair competition/false designation of origin), and also two of the claims that Plaintiffs have brought under Maryland common law (unfair' competition, and conversion). However, the elements of Plaintiffs’ claim for usurpation of corporate opportunity have not been established as a matter of law, given the lack of any fiduciary duty between Napper and Plaintiffs during the relevant period. Accordingly, JUDGMENT WILL BE ENTERED IN PLAINTIFFS’ FAVOR as to liability with respect to Counts I, II, III, and VI of the complaint, and JUDGMENT WILL BE ENTERED IN DEFENDANT’S FAVOR with respect to Count IV. A separate order consistent with the Court’s findings and conclusions will follow.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit on December 8, 2011; the complaint has six counts, only five of which proceeded to trial. Counts I and II—which were brought under Sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act, respectively—claim that Napper’s operation of the Everlasting Life Restaurant & Lounge infringes upon Prince Immanuel’s registered trademark (see id. ¶¶ 32-39 (Count I)), and that Napper has engaged in federal unfair competition and false designation of origin (see id. ¶¶ 40-45 (Count II)). Counts III through VI allege various violations of Maryland common law; specifically, Plaintiffs maintain that Napper has engaged in unfair competition (see id. ¶¶ 46-49 (Count III)), has usurped Yah Kai’s corporate opportunity (see id. ¶¶ 60-54 (Count IV)), has breached a fiduciary duty of loyalty he owed to Yah Kai and the Community (see id. ¶¶ 65-69 (Count V)), and has converted Yah Kai’s tangible property (see id. ¶¶ 60-64 (Count VI)).

On November 12,2013, this Court held a status conference with respect to this matter, during which it denied Napper’s first motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the evidentiary record was significantly underdeveloped due to the parties’ failure to engage in robust discovery. (See Order, ECF No. 33, at 1; see also Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 24.) The Court directed the parties to undertake an extended period of discovery and also referred the matter to mediation. (See Order, ECF No. 33, at 1-2.) On July 17, 2014, after discovery was complete and mediation was unsuccessful, Napper filed a second motion for summary judgment. (See Def.’s 2d Mot. for Summ. J, ECF No. 43.) The Court, denied this motion on the grounds that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding ownership of the restaurant at issue (see Minute Order of Feb. 11, 2015); the parties then proceeded to prepare for trial.

The Court held a final pre-trial conference on this matter on July 10; 2015. During that conference, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim (see Compl. ¶¶ 55-59 (Count V)) as legally unfounded under Maryland law and dupli-cative of the usurpation of corporate opportunity claim. (See Order, ECF No. 57, at 2.) Furthermore, during this same , pretrial conference, the parties waived their right to a jury trial on the issue of liability with respect to the remaining counts of the complaint, but reserved their right to a jury trial on the issue of damages. (See id. at 1.) Accordingly, the Court bifurcated the previously scheduled jury trial and proceeded to hold a bench trial regarding Defendant’s liability, expressly noting that, if needed, a separate jury trial would be held thereafter to determine any damages. (See id. at 1-2.)

The bench trial in this matter took .place over three days between July 14, 2015, and July 16, 2015. Plaintiffs called five' witnesses, including Prince Immanuel and Dr. Cheryl Lee Butler (“Dr. Lee”), who is a member of the Community and a corporate designee of Yah Kai. The Court also heard the testimony of Carol Allen (“Allen”), the leasing administrator for Kingdom Management, and Darrel Edwards (“Edwards”), Yah Kai’s accountant. Napper was called to the stand by Plaintiffs to testify as an adverse witness; however, Napper’s counsel did not call any, witnesses in Napper’s case-in-chief.

After the bench trial concluded, the parties submitted proposed findings of fact in table format and in three iterations, in accordance with this Court’s bench-trial practices. (See Order, ECF No. 61 (explaining Proposed Findings of Fact Table).) Plaintiffs went first, laying out their proposed findings of fact with citations to the record, (see Proposed Findings of Fact, ECF No. 62 (“1st FOF Tbl.”)), and in the second iteration of the table, Defendant noted any disputes regarding Plaintiffs’ listed facts and added his own proposed findings (see Proposed Findings of Fact, ECF No. 63 (“2d FOF Tbl.”)). Plaintiffs responded to Defendant’s representations in ■ the third iteration of the table. (See Proposed Findings of Fact, ECF No. 64 (“3d FOF Tbl.”)). In addition, both parties submitted proposed conclusions of ■ law. (See Pis.’ Proposed Concls. of Law (“Pis.’ COL”), EOF No. 66; Def.’s Proposed Concls. of Law (“Def.’s COL”), EOF No. 68.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“In an action tried on the facts without a jury ... the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1). “In setting forth the findings of fact, the court need not address every factual contention and argumentative detail raised by the parties, [n]or discuss all evidence presented at trial.” Moore v. Hartman, 102 F.Supp.3d 35, 65 (D.D.C.2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Instead, “ ‘the judge need only make brief, definite, pertinent findings and conclusions upon the contested matters! ]’ ” in a manner that is “sufficient to allow the appellate court to conduct a meaningful review.” Wise v. United States, 145 F.Supp.3d 53, 57 (D.D.C.2015) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment); see also Lyles v. United States, 759 F.2d 941, 943 (D.C.Cir.1985) (“One of [Rule 52(a)’s] chief purposes is to aid the appellate court by affording it a clear understanding of the ground or basis of the decision of the trial court.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

III. FINDINGS OF FACT

This Court’s findings of fact with respect to the instant case are based on the evidence—ie., the testimony and exhibits— that the parties submitted during the bench trial, the Court’s observations of the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, the parties’ stipulations, and the record as a whole. Notably, because many of the basic facts regarding the formation and ownership of the Everlasting Life Health Complex are disputed, this Court has made its factual findings based largely on its evaluation of the believability of the testifying witnesses, whose general credibility the Court necessarily assessed in its role as the finder of the fact at trial. The Court finds, as a general matter, that Plaintiffs’ four affirmative witnesses—Carol Allen, Darrel Edwards, Prince Immanu-el, and Dr. Lee—presented relevant facts of which they had first-hand knowledge in a clear, frank, and candid manner, and that their testimony was entirely credible. By contrast, the Court found Napper to be disingenuous at times, and the Court did not believe some of his most salient representations, as described below.

A. Overview Of The Testimony Presented At Trial

Allen, who is the leasing administrator for the lease management company Kingdom Management, testified about her interactions with Napper and Young regarding the anticipated expiration of the Complex’s lease, the circumstances leading to renewal of the lease, the receipt of rent payments signed by Yah Kai, and certain facts related to overpayments for utilities with respect to the property. (See July 14, 2015 Trial Tr. at 168:6-197:12; July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 85:3-96:13.) Edwards, an accountant for both Yah Kai and Napper, testified about his accounting work for Yah Kai during the time that Yah Kai operated the Complex, including his observation that Yah Kai undertook all of the Complex’s legal responsibilities and business expenditures from 2009 through 2011. (See July 14, 2015 Trial Tr. at 198:1-213:7; July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 11:15-30:20.)

Prince Immanuel and Dr. Lee, who are members of the Community and have a personal relationship with both Napper and vnth the Everlasting Life businesses, provided pertinent background and related specifics regarding the events underlying the instant trademark dispute. As a leader of the Community, Prince Immanu-el testified about the Community’s history (its origins, structure, beliefs, culture, and founding); the Community’s development and ownership of the Everlasting Life restaurant businesses; his own registration of the Everlasting Life service mark; Napper’s involvement in the restaurant businesses on behalf of the Community; Napper’s subsequent removal from management; and the events surrounding Napper’s eviction of Yah Kai and the Community from the Capitol Heights facility. As the corporate designee of Yah Kai, Dr. Lee testified about the Community’s history in establishing -the Everlasting Life food-service businesses and its instructions to Napper -with respect to starting the businesses. Dr; Lee also described the Community’s decision to remove Napper as manager of Everlasting Life Health Complex, and its formation of Yah Kai as the legal entity that the Community entrusted with the responsibility of restructuring and operating that establishment. Notably, the Court found that when Prince Immanuel and Dr. Lee testified about the same events (e.g., Napper’s removal as manager) they did so in a manner that was entirely consistent, and that they recounted the relevant events with a clear recollection of the matters described.

Napper’s overall demeanor and testimony was quite to the contrary. The Court observed that' Napper’s testimony, which was presented as part of Plaintiffs’ case-in-chief, was riddled with contradictions and, at times, appeared manifestly inconsistent with undisputed facts in the record, which cast doubt upon his credibility and reliability as a witness. In addition, Napper displayed some signs of dissembling, such as the. evasive nature of his answers with respect to the existence of a purportedly independent and unincorporated food business that he claimed to have created by himself in his home garage prior to the Community’s formation of its restaurant businesses; according to Napper, this separate food-service business was also called “Everlasting Life” and was operating contemporaneously with, and in the same physical space as, the Community’s Everlasting Life businesses, unbeknownst to any other members of the Community. To be sure, Napper did not falter in his insistence that he—alone—was the rightful owner of the Everlasting Life Health Complex. But much of Napper’s logic appeared to turn on his mistaken belief that, as the Community member who helped to conceptualize the Community’s food-service businesses and was tasked (at least initially) with the responsibility of bringing that vision to fruition, he owned that business; consequently, many of his explanations were simply not believable.

In short, as reflected in the specific findings of fact that follow, this Court has generally resolved the parties’ myriad disputes regarding material factual matters in favor of the testimony provided by Plaintiffs’ affirmative, witnesses—whose consistent and credible testimony was that the Community formed, funded, and owned the Everlasting Life business operation at issue in this case—and against Napper, who, the Court finds, improperly appropriated that trademarked, profitable ongoing business concern,.and has continued to operate it without the Community’s permission and in a manner that risk? confusing the public about the nature, origins, and ownership of that business,

B. The Everlasting Life Restaurant Businesses, And The Entities That Formed And Operated Them

Members of the African Hebrew Israelite community claim to be “descendants of the biblical Israelites from the African-American tradition” (July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 52:15-16 (Prince Immanuel)), and significantly for present purposes, African Hebrew Israelites strictly “follow a natural vegan plant-based 'diet” as a means of “enhancing and sustaining” their lives (id. 53:1-6; see also 3d FOF Tbl. at 7 (A, B)). Napper “entered the [Community] in 1988' and was a leader within the group” (3d FOF Tbl. at 4 (A, B)), as were Young, Dr. Lee, and Prince Immanuel (see id. at 2-3, 6 (A, B)). In 1993, the Community, which generally believes in collective ownership and eschews typical notions of individual property (see id, at 19 (A, B); see also July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 55:11-15, 106:3-13, 109:23-110:20 (Prince Immanuel)), collectively started and operated a vegetarian restaurant called Soul Vegetarian in Washington, D.C. (see July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 61:8-19 (Prince Immanuel)). Two years later, in or around 1995, the Community opened a second food-based retail establishment: an organic vegetarian food market and restaurant in the same vicinity called the Everlasting Life Community CoOp (“the Co-Op”). (See id. at 61:8-22.) Napper helped to establish the Co-Op (see July 14, 2015 Trial Tr. at 48:15-18 (Napper)), and was selected by the Community to act as its official manager and to run its operations (see July 15, 2015 Trial Tr..at 65:3-4 (Prince Immanuel)).

In order to operate the business activities of the Co-Op legally and in accordance with broader societal norms, Community members undertook to incorporate a general cooperative association—a corporate structure that does not have individual ownership interests or issued shares—in the District of Columbia on August 22, 1996. (See 3d FOF Tbl. at 11-17 (A, B); see also July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 154:18-21 (Prince Immanuel); July 14, 2015 Trial Tr. at 50:9-12, 54:12-18, 115:12-18 (Napper),) The Community named this corporate entity after the Co-Op itself, calling it the “Everlasting Life Community Cooperative” (hereinafter “ELCC”). (See 3d FOF Tbl. at 11-17 (A, B); see also July 14, 2015 Trial Tr. at 122:4-7 (Napper).) Napper was one of the listed incorporators of ELCC, and according to the articles of incorporation, also served as a director for.the first year of its corporate existence. (See ELCC Certificate of Incorporation, Pis.’ Ex. 29.) Given the legal structure of the association, however, Napper could not have legally owned any share of-ELCC in his individual capacity. (See July 14, 2015 Trial Tr. at 64:11-18 (Napper' concedes as much).)

Sometime in the year 2000, the Community expanded its food-service operations to Capitol' Heights, Maryland, where it opened the business that is at issue in this lawsuit. The Maryland facility was located in a sprawling building at 9185 Central Avenue (see Restaurant Lease between Hampton Mall and Everlasting Life Cooperative & 2004 Amendment to Lease, Pis.’ Ex. 5, at 4-51), and the Community named this business the Everlasting Life Health Complex (“the Complex”). (See July 14, 2015 Trial Tr. at 66:15-18 (Napper).) The Complex offered an array of vegan soul food goods and services, including a restaurant, bakery, juice bar, and grocery store. (See July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 168:13-23 (Dr. Lee).) The Complex also contained administrative offices, a large banquet hall, and a health center offering massage therapy services. (See id. at 168:24-169:9.)

Importantly, the initial financial outlay for start-up expenses for the Complex came from investments and donations provided by Community members (see 3d FOF Tbl. at 43 (A, B)); specifically, the members’ collective financial input totaled “about $1.2 million” in the form of investments and charitable contributions, including donations “to help buy” building materials, such as paint brushes, lightbulbs, bricks and drywall (July 14, 2015 Trial Tr. at 166:6-14 (Napper)). Similarly, prior to the grand opening of the Complex, Community members from various parts of the country and around the world traveled to Maryland to aid “at every phase” of the project development: “from the conceptualization, [to] the structure, the design, .., [and] the build-out” of the Complex, (July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 72:1-6 (Prince Im-manuel).) Members “spent four or five hours each evening preparing th[e] space” (Young Dep. 15:5-16:1), including offering manual labor and skills such as carpentry and plumbing (see July 14, 2015 Trial Tr. at 165:22-166:5 (Napper)). The Community appointed Napper to manage the Complex, just as it had done with the Co-Op. (See July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 64:22-65:11 (Prince Immanuel).)

Moreover, just as with the Co-Op, Community members established a no-shares corporation so that the Complex could operate legally and In accordance with the laws of Maryland. The Complex’s operating entity was incorporated in 2001 in the state of Maryland, and this corporate entity was given the same official name as the restaurant itself: the Everlasting Life Health Complex (hereinafter “ELHC”). (See 3d FOF Tbl. at 24 (A, B); July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 165:23-166:15 (Dr. Lee).) Napper served as ELHC’s registered resident agent. (See July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 165:23-166:15 (Dr. Lee).) However, the original lease for the Capitol Heights building—where ELHC would be operating the Complex—was entered into by ELCC as the contractual tenant, and Napper signed the original lease and all subsequent modifications and extensions in his capacity as an officer of ELCC. Napper also eventually negotiated a substantial settlement agreement between ELCC and the management company that oversaw the Capitol Heights building concerning the overpayment of utilities, as described below.

Unfortunately for the Community, authorities in Maryland and the District of Columbia revoked the corporate statuses of ELHC and ELCC. (in the years 2008 and 2012, respectively) because these entities failed to comply with the statutory requirements for remaining in good standing. (See 3d FOF Tbl. at 35 (A, B); see also July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 150:20-151:7 (“The Court will take judicial notice of the facts of the forfeiture [on October 8, 2008] of the entity known as Everlasting Life Health Complex, Inc.”); id. at 155:7-10 (Plaintiffs’ counsel) (“Everlasting Life Community Cooperative corporate status was revoked or was not in good standing effective 2012”).) However, somehow, the Complex and the Co-Op continued to operate despite these difficulties, and with respect to the Complex, the Community decided to form yet another legal corporate entity—Yah Kai Worldwide Enterprises, Inc.—in 2009, to take on the responsibility of “restructurfing] and reformulating] Everlasting Life Health Complex to become a viable business again.” (July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 173:23-25 (Dr. Lee).)

Three Community members—Dr. Lee, Young, and Reginald Clay—registered Yah Kai as a non-profit corporation under the laws of the District of Columbia. (See id. 173:9-22; 3d FOF Tbl. at 52-53 (A, B).) The Community then authorized Yah Kai to “t[ake] over Everlasting Life Health Complex, rearrange[ ] it, and pa[y] all bills and taxes.” (See 3d FOF Tbl. at 52 (A, B).) It is undisputed that Yah Kai managed and operated all the legal and business activities of the Everlasting Life Health Complex from 2009 until Napper forced it to relinquish the Capitol Heights facility in November of 2011, as described infra in Part III.D. (See July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 155:16-22 (Prince Immanuel); see also id. at 176:21-178:16 (Dr. Lee).) Specifically, in its role as manager of the Complex between 2009 and 2011, Yah Kai:

(1)acquired all of the necessary licenses and permits for the Complex’s operations (see 3d FOF Tbl. at 57 (A, B); Maryland Permit to Yah Kai to Operate Facility, Pis.’ Ex. 3);

(2) assumed and repaid ELHC’s debts with respect to tax arrears and outstanding payments owed to suppliers and Community members (see July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 177:19-179:5 (Dr. Lee));

(3) paid rent for use of the building at 9185 Central Avenue, where the Complex was housed (see 3d FOF Tbl. at 67(A); Yah Kai’s 2009-2011 Rent Checks, Pis.’ Exs. 34-36);

(4) paid the Complex’s bills, including utilities and food supplies (see July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 178:15-16, 188:1-10 (Dr. Lee); July 14, 2015 Trial Tr. at 209:18-210:5 (Edwards); see also 3d FOF Tbl. at 52, 60 (A, B); Everlasting Life Health Complex Financial Records for 2011-2015, Pis.’ Ex. 31 (used for Yah Kai’s tax returns));

(5) paid taxes related to the Complex’s business (see 3d FOF Tbl. at 56, 60-61, 64-65, 68-69 (A, B); Yah Kai’s Tax Returns, Pis.’ Ex. 9);

(6) paid the salaries of the Complex’s employees (see 3d FOF Tbl. at 62-63, 66, 69 (A, B); Income Records for Yah Kai Employees, Pis.’ Ex. 10); and

(7) publicly sold goods and services under the name Everlasting Life Health Complex (see 3d FOF Tbl. at 55 (A, B); Yah Kai’s Certificate of Business Registration, Pis.’ Ex. 8; Yah Kai’s DCRA Basic Business License Application, Pis.’ Ex. 7).

C. Napper’s Relationship To The Community

The events that give rise to the claims at issue in this case center on the personal and professional relationships between Napper and members of the Community, which date back to the mid-1980s. Napper held a leadership position within the Community’s organizational structure, a structure that is best characterized as a hierarchical apportionment of authority that has representative members on an international, national, and local level. (See July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 55:9-15, 152:6-28 (Prince Immanuel).) Briefly, the “anointed spiritual leader of the African-American Hebrew community”—Ben Ami—sits at the helm of the leadership hierarchy. (Id. at 54:16-17.) Directly under him are the “member[s] of the Holy Council, the [Community’s] spiritual guiding body[,]” who receive the title of “Prince” (id. at 52:9-12); Plaintiff Prince Immanuel is one such leader. Under the Princes are the . “Ministers,” who “oversee the day-to-day actions in the particular areas of focus, be it agricultural, education, sports and recreation” (id. at 152:12-14), and on the lowest rung of the ladder of leadership are the “Crowns,” such as Napper and Dr. Lee, “who are also involved in the day-to-day oversight and coordination of the activities of the members of the community, the brothers and sisters” (id. at 152:14-18). Notably, the leaders play a crucial role in the establishment and operation of the Community’s businesses, éach of which is individually managed by a selected leader for the benefit of the Community. (See id. at 65:4-11.)

Prince Immanuel met Napper in 1986 or 1987, when they were both “holding classes [and] meetings, [and were] very much involved in the [C]ommunity.” (Id at 56:14-20 (Prince Immanuel).) By 1992, when Dr. Lee first joined the Community, Napper was already a leader among its members (id. at 162:1-10 (Dr. Lee)),-.and in the years to follow, Napper would come to be identified as a “champion[ ] [for] the cause of the Hebrew Israelite Community” (id. at 164:21-24). Napper was a highly “personable” and “effective” leader, who would often “motivate the members” to engage in Community activities. (Id. at 164:16-20.) Napper was also “important to the members of that [C]ommunity .., not only [in his capacity as] a leader” and “the manager of the Everlasting Life Health Complex,” but also as their “friend and ... brother.” (Id. at 175:24-176:3.)

In the mid-1990s, Prince Immanuel was appointed the local leader for the African Hebrew Israelites in the District of Columbia, and as such, he was “responsible for teaching, coordinating, [and] directing” the members and their activities. (Id. at 63:3-5 (Prince Immanuel).) It was under Prince Immanuel’s supervision that the Community members in the District of Columbia decided to establish the Everlasting Life Community Co-Op in 1995 (see id. at 61:20-63:18). At the time, Napper and Prince Immanuel had an amicable and “fruitful relationship,” interacted regularly, and were both closely involved in the inception of the Co-Op. (Id. at 58:8-9, 57:17-21, 61:17-22.) The Community and its local leaders chose Napper to manage the CoOp and he became a prominent contributor to its success; he undertook essential re-sponsibilitiés such as securing the location’s lease, which he did under his own name. (See id. at 65:3-4 (Prince Immanuel); July 14, 2015 Trial Tr. at 118:4-10 (Napper).)

Once the Co-Op proved to be a profitable venture, the Community began to explore the possibility of expanding to a new location, and Napper played a' pivotal role in the development of the new business as well. For example, it was Napper who “located a space in [Capitol Heights, Maryland] and suggested that [the Community] come together and develop that space into a restaurant and other associated facilities.” (July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 65:18-21 (Prince Immanuel).) The leaders of the Community in the Washington Metropolitan area agreed, and after consulting with Ben Ami and other leaders around the world, decided to pursue that business opportunity. (See id. at 65:21-66:2.) Napper then proceeded to become intricately involved in the structuring, financing, and development of the project; for example, he was directly involved in the deliberations with Prince Immanuel to name the business the “Everlasting Life Health Complex” (see id. at 66:5-18), and he secured the lease for the property where the Complex would operate—this time, he did so as an officer of ELCC and as one of the guarantors, and not in his individual capacity (see Original Lease between Hampton Mall as Landlord and Everlasting Life Co-Op, Pis.’ Ex. 5A). Napper was also selected to be the manager of the Complex’s day-to-day operations. (See July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 170:1-6 (Dr. Lee).) Alongside other members of the Community, Napper contributed his “time, ... energy and money” to the betterment. of this collectively-owned business (id. at 175:8-10), and even if he disagreed with the Community leaders at times regarding strategic business operations, his “love” for his “brothers] and [his] sister[s]” motivated his continued “adherence and obedience to the Community” (July 14, 2015 Trial Tr. at 78:5-20 (Napper)).

Lamentably, the relatively harmonious relationship that developed between Napper and the Community during the creation of the Complex began deteriorating about four years after the Complex opened its doors to the public. By 2004, the Complex business “was in serious arrearage,” so the Community decided to reduce the size of the premises and modify the Complex’s management structure. (July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 72:13 (Prince Immanu-el).) The 2004 restructuring also included a decision by the Community’s leaders to remove Napper as the manager of the Complex and the Co-Op (id, at 73:3-8), and to replace him, initially, with Young—“a former military man” with meticulous skills who they believed would successfully turn the business around (id. at 73:16-19). To address Napper’s concerns about his displacement and his significant debts— most which he had acquired in order to establish the businesses—the Community agreed to pay Napper a monthly stipend of $9,000 for the next two to three years, for a total of approximately “$200,000 to $236,000.” (See id. at 74:21-75:14.)

Under Young’s management, the businesses thrived and the Complex’s operations regained profitability. (See id. at 74:14-15 (Prince Immanuel).) But three years later, in 2007, Young had to “step back” from management “due to health challenges” (id. at 76:4-7), and after another Community member failed to take his place successfully, Napper was reinstituted as manager of the Complex (see id. at 76:8-77:6). Napper remained in that position for about a year, until October of 2008, when the Community’s leaders reconvened once more to address problems with the Complex’s operations. Like before, the Complex had begun to fail under Napper’s management, but this time the leadership was determined to restructure all of the Community’s business operations in the D.C. Metropolitan area. (See id. at 78:5-79:20.) In a meeting that took place at Young’s house in early October of 2008, with Napper in attendance, the Community leaders concluded that a new “economic committee” would have to be established to revamp and reorient the Community’s businesses. (Id. at 81:16-19.) The leaders selected Young, Dr. Lee, and Reginald Clay to comprise that committee (see id. at 79:8-14 (Prince Immanuel); see also id. at 173:9-25 (Dr. Lee) (explaining that these three members later formed Yah Kai)), and in that same meeting, Napper was permanently relieved- of his position as manager of the Complex by a “consensus of the leadership” (id. at 81:13-15 (Prince Immanuel)). As a peace offering to Napper, and also to assist him in recouping his considerable investment in the Complex, Napper was given a full individual ownership interest in the Co-Op, which was at that time a profitable business. (Id. at 82:9-18.)

Notably, although Napper had been an incorporator and/or corporate officer of ELCC and ELHC, see supra Part III.B, he was not involved in the subsequent creation or organization of Yah Kai, nor was he involved in the management of the Complex after October of 2008 (see 3d FOF Tbl. at 129 (A, B); July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 81:8-21 (Prince Immanuel) (“Mr. Napper was offered a position on [the Complex’s restructuring scheme] along with Dr. Lee, Mr. Young and Mr. Clay. He refused.”)). Thus, when Yah Kai was managing the Complex between 2009 and 2011, see supra Part III.B, Napper’s only remaining involvement with that business was his sponsorship of a health counter within .the facility from which he sold juices and other products, and which he operated without paying rent or utilities for the use of that counter area. (See July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 99:16-25 (Prince Im-manuel).)

D. Napper’s Eviction Of Yah Kai And Other Community Members

As mentioned above, Napper had signed the original lease for' the Complex on December 6, 2000, on behalf of ELCC as the contractual tenant. (See Original Lease between Hampton Mall as Landlord and Everlasting Life Co-Op, Pis.’ Ex. 5A.) Napper also acted as a guarantor for ELCC’s obligations along with Cheryl Marshall, another corporate officer of ELCC. (See id.) The lease for the Complex subsequently underwent two modifications—on June 2, 2002 and October 1, 2004—to address ELCC’s past-due rent payments and the Community’s “desire to reconfigure and reduce the size of the” premises leased. (Second Amendment to the Lease, Pis.’ Ex. 5B.) Notably, with respect to the second amendment, Young replaced Cheryl Marshall. as the second guarantor for ELCC (see id.), and both he and Napper signed a promissory note undertaking the obligation to satisfy ELCC’s debt, which amounted to a sum of $172,836.45 in arrears (see id.).

In June of 2011, approximately two and a half years'after Yah Kai took over as the manager of the Complex, Young reached out to Kingdom Management (the management company that the landlord used with respect to the Capitol Heights building) on behalf of Yah Kai in anticipation of the November 2011 expiration of the original lease to inquire about getting a new lease for the space that the Complex was using. The Community’s leadership reasoned that the Community could continue successfully operating the Everlasting Life Health Complex at the Capitol Heights location with Yah Kai as the leaseholder. (See July 14, 2015 Trial Tr. at 178:13-180:8 (Allen).) However, because ELCC was the contractual tenant under the lease and Napper was listed as ELCC’s registered agent, Kingdom Management considered Napper to be the current leaseholder, and it gave him “the first right of refusal” and priority with respect to extension of the existing lease, rather than immediately accepting Yah Kai’s new lease proposal. (Id. at 189:20-190:6.) Napper expressed interest in extending the lease and Kingdom Management then engaged in lease-related negotiations directly with Napper, who at that point proclaimed himself CEO of ELCC. (See 3d FOF Tbl. at 92 (A, B); see also July 14, 2015 Trial Tr. at 65:19-22 (Napper) (“Q: So effectively you self-designated yourself as the CEO of Everlasting Life Community Cooperative; correct? A: In this document, yes.”).) And as a result of these negotiations—which included discussions of the newly-discovered fact that the landlord and utilities company had been overbilling for utilities payments related to the Capitol Heights location since 2004—Napper, as ELCC’s designated representative, received a reduced-rent extension of the original lease for one year, until September 30, 2012. (See 2011 Lease Extension and Modification, Pis.’ Ex. 6; 3d FOF Tbl. at 88 (A); see also July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 8:19-9:25 (Napper’s counsel arguing that he does “not disput[e] that Yah Kai paid, the utility bills”).).Consequently, on July 13, 2011, Kingdom Management notified Yah Kai that it would not enter into a new lease for the facility because the existing lease had been extended. (See Kingdom Management Letter to Yah Kai, Pis.’ Ex. 39.)

One week later, on July 20, 2011, Napper delivered to Yah Kai, Young, and the Community a ‘Notice to Vacate’ that pertained to the Complex building. (See 1st Notice to Vacate, Pis.’ Ex. 14A; 3d FOF Tbl. at 75 (A, B).) The notice stated that Yah Kai’s “rights of occupancy and possession” were terminated, and that all occupants had three days to take their personal effects and exit the premises at 9185 Central Avenue, Capitol Heights, Maryland. (1st Notice to Vacate, Pis.’ Ex. 14A.) The notice explicitly warned that no one would “be allowed to remove any of the equipment in the building or. inventory” and that “no equipment large or small [would] be allowed out of the building,” (Id.) This surprising notification sparked a series of discussions between Napper and the Community regarding Yah Kai’s “continuing use of the space” and the possibility of “additional compensation for ... Nap-pert.]” (July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 99:8-15 (Prince Immanuel).) But by October 15, 2011, attempts to resolve the dispute “amiably” had failed (id. at 100:8), and Napper sent a second Notice to Vacate; this one was addressed to Young and Yah Kai, and it expressly included “all representatives, subordinates, associates and affiliates of Yah Kai[J” (2d Notice to Vacate, Pis.’ Ex. 14B; see also 3d FOF Tbl. at 111 (A, B).) The notice demanded that these parties vacate the premises on or before November 15, 2011, and, again, it noted that they were not allowed to remove any equipment. (See 2d Notice to Vacate, Pls.’ Ex. 14B; 3d FOF Tbl. at 111 (A, B).)

On the fateful night of November 15, 2011, members of the Community and rep-, resentatives of Yah Kai arrived at the Capitol Heights facility with moving trucks to remove their personal items and their own equipment and inventory from the premises. (See July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 103:4-6 (Prince Immanuel).) Napper called the police, and when the officers arrived, they informed Yah Kai’s representatives that no equipment would be allowed to leave the building because Napper was the official the tenant of the space, and that any dispute with Napper would have to be resolved in court. (See id. at 102:21-103:6 (Prince Immanuel); see also id. 184:3-18 (Dr. Lee).) Napper also requested that the police physically remove Yah Kai’s representatives, along with Prince Immanuel and the other Community members who had come to assist. (See July 14, 2015 Trial Tr. at 102:8-12 (Napper).) The Community members and Yah Kai representatives complied with the officers’ order to vacate the premises, leaving behind Complex-related business records and a plethora of other items that Yah Kai had created, purchased, or built during its management of the Complex, including furniture, food products, and restaurant equipment. (See 3d FOF Tbl. at 79-82 (A); July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 103:7-104:9 (Prince Immanuel); id. 185:25-186:9, 187:17-188:16 (Dr. Lee); Young Dep. 49:18-52:2, 98:12-99:6; see, e.g., July 14, 2015 Trial Tr. at 91:7-14 (Napper) (acknowledging that Yah Kai was not allowed to remove food supplies that it had bought).)

E. Napper⅛ Unauthorized Use Of The Everlasting Life Mark

Since his eviction of Yah Kai and other members of the Community from the facility formerly known as the Everlasting Life Health Complex in November of 2011, Napper has continued to operate a food-service business in that same location in Capitol Heights, Maryland, under the name “Everlasting Life Restaurant and Lounge.” (See 3d FOF Tbl. at 96,103,106, 113-14 (A, B).) Napper is the sole owner and member of a limited liability company called “Fair and Balanced,” which he incorporated in the state of Maryland in November of 2011, and Fair and Balanced manages and operates the Everlasting Life Restaurant & Lounge. Fair and Balanced promotes Napper’s food-service business using the Everlasting Life name (see Everlasting Life Restaurant & Lounge Storefront, Def.’s Ex. 1; Promotional Events by Fair & Balanced for Everlasting Life, Pis.’ Ex. 22; see also 3d FOF Tbl. at 127(A, B)), even though Prince Immanuel has notified Napper that, by operating a vegan food establishment under the name Everlasting Life in the same location as the prior Everlasting Life Health Complex, he is infringing on Prince Immanuel’s registered trademark (see 3d FOF Tbl. at 132 (A, B); see also Def.’s Answer to Int., Pis.’ Ex. 23, ¶ 13; Trademark Infringement Notice from Prince Immanuel, Pis.’ Ex. 15).

With respect to the trademark-infringement allegations, it is undisputed that, back in April of 2004 while the Complex was still under the Community’s control, Prince Immanuel filed a registration for the Everlasting Life service mark with the United States Patent & Trademark Office (“USPTO”). (See USPTO Service Mark Registration, Pis.’ Ex. 1, ECF No. 29-1, at 2.) The registration became effective on November 22, 2005 (see id.), once the statutorily required publication and examination requirements were satisfied, see § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 1062 (“Upon the filing of an application for registration ... the Director shall refer the application to the examiner in charge of the registration of marks [and] ... shall cause the mark to be published in the Official Gazette of the Patent and Trademark Office.”). Pictured below, Prince Immanuel’s registered trademark consists of: (i) the words “Everlasting Life” in large “black” font; (ii) the words “Community Owned Cooperative” in “green” font; (iii) the words “Health Complex & Organic Market” in “black” font; and (iv) a depiction of various fruits and vegetables. (USPTO Service Mark Registration, Pis.’ Ex. 2, at 2.)

Moreover, the registration document disT claims any “exclusive right to use [the words] Community Owned Cooperative Health Complex & Organic Market,” but no similar disclaimer was made regarding use of the words “Everlasting Life.” (Id.) The USPTO categorized the service mark’s use as “retail grocery store for natural foods.” (Id,)

According to Prince Immanuel, the Community decided that the mark should be registered in order to protect the Community’s reputation with respect to service and food standards, given that the name “Everlasting Life” has long been associated with the business operations of the African Hebrew Israelite community. (See July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 133:13-21, 135:24-136:8 (Prince Immanuel).) Ben Ami, the founder of the Community, wrote a publication named “Everlasting Life” in 1994 (see 3d FOF Tbl. at 5 (A, B)), and that term, which is intended to refer specifically to the concept of “restoring the natural life cycles that an individual has and possesses in order to prolong their life” (July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 108:3-6 (Prince Immanuel)), is a fundamental tenet for Community members, Even more important, the name Everlasting Life has become directly associated with the Community’s commercial enterprises and is inextricably intertwined with the Community’s particular service standards in the realm of food establishments. (See id. at 67:9-12, 131:11-21, 133:3-134:7, 145:23-146:8 (Prince Immanuel).) No other food establishment, beyond the one presently under dispute, trades under'the name Everlasting Life in the D.C. metropolitan area. (See 3d FOF Tbl. at 26 (A, B).)

Because Prince Immanuel was the Community member who registered the Everlasting Life service mark, “no one.else could authorize [its] use[.]” (Id. at 32 (A, B).) Prince Immanuel permitted the Community, including its legal enterprises, to use the registered mark (see July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 134:12-15 (Prince Immanuel)), but he did not authorize Napper’s use of the name Everlasting Life in an individual capacity or through Fair and Balanced (see 3d FOF Tbl. at 102(C)). Furthermore, when Prince Immanuel tendered the infringement notice to Napper in November of 2011, he stated specifically that he-was “revoking” any license that Napper had had to use the mark, while he was still a member of the Community. (See Trademark Infringement Notice from Prince Immanuel, Pis.’ Ex.-15.) Thus, any use of the mark by Napper after he left the Community—which was in “2008, 2009” by his own account (July 14, 2015 Trial Tr. at 46:2)—was unauthorized. (See Compl. ¶ 35 (“At no time since his 2008 removal as manager of the Complex did Prince Im-manuel authorize Defendant Napper to use said [registered mark].”).)

IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Counts I, II, and III of the complaint allege three separate trademark-related claims against Napper: (1) federal trademark infringement pursuant to Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (Compl. ¶¶ 32-39); (2) unfair competition and false designation of origin under Section 43(a) if the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (id. ¶¶ 40-45); and (3) unfair competition in violation of Maryland common law (id. ¶¶ 46-49). In Counts IV through VI, Plaintiffs bring three additional claims under Maryland common law; specifically, they contend that Napper usurped their corporate opportunity (id. ¶¶ 50-54 (Count IV)); breached a fiduciary duty of loyalty (id. ¶¶ 55-59 (Count V)); and converted their physical property (id, ¶¶ 60-64 (Count VI). Notably, because a violation of a breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty is not a stand-alone legal claim under Maryland law, this Court dismissed Count V before trial. (See Order, ECF No. 57, at 2). Thus, the subject of the bench trial was Napper’s liability for the claims alleged in Counts I, II, III, IV, and VT of Plaintiffs complaint.

As explained in detail below, this Court concludes that Plaintiffs have proven by a preponderance of the evidence that they are the valid owners of the distinctive trade name and mark “Everlasting Life” that Plaintiffs used in connection with a food service business in this local geographic area, and that Napper’s unauthorized use of this name with respect to the Capitol Heights facility after he evicted Plaintiffs from the premises in 2011 is likely to confuse consumers into believing that Napper’s services and products are affiliated with, or sponsored by, Plaintiffs and the African Hebrew Israelite community. This means that Napper has violated both the Lanham Act and Maryland’s common law of unfair competition, as alleged in Counts I, II, and III. The Court also finds that Plaintiffs have established by a preponderance of the evidence that Napper intentionally exerted" ownership and control over Yah Kai’s tangible property when he evicted Yah Kai’s representatives and other Community members without permitting them to remove that property; therefore, the elements of conversion under Maryland common law (Count VI) are also satisfied. However, with respect to Plaintiffs’ claim that Napper impermissibly usurped their corporate opportunity in violation of Maryland common law (Count IV), this Court concludes that, although Napper acted egregiously (and perhaps even fraudulently) in renewing the lease in his own name as the “CEO” of ELCC without the Community’s permission, he never owed a duty of loyalty to either Plaintiff in this case as, a matter of law, and thus, Plaintiffs’ claim that he usurped their corporate opportunity must be dismissed.

A. By Using The Trade Name Everlasting Life, Napper Has Committed Trademark Infringement Under The Lanham Act And Has Engaged In Unfair Competition In Violation Of Maryland Common Law

The Lanham Act provides a cause of action for “the deceptive and misleading use of marks” and “to protect persons engaged in ... commerce against unfair competition.” § 45, 15 U.S.C. § '1127. The Act’s protection covers “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof ... used by a person ... to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.” Id. Furthermore, it is a mark’s “source-distinguishing ability[,]” EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir.2000) (citation omitted), that lies at the heart of Congress’s interest in protecting authentic traders from infring-ers. By permitting lawsuits to be brought against those who would seek to pass off their own goods and services as that of another, the Act’s clear purpose is “to ensure that a product’s maker reaps the rewards of the reputation it has built and to enable consumers to recognize and repurchase goods with which they have previously been satisfied.” EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir.2000) (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164, 115 S.Ct. 1300, 131 L.Ed.2d 248 (1995)).

A claim of unfair competition under Maryland common law has the same impetus, and thus, trademark infringement under-the Lanham Act-and unfair competition under Maryland common law generally turn on the same question: whether or not the defendant’s use of a mark that is substantially similar to the plaintiffs is likely to confuse the average consumer regarding the source or affiliation of the product. See Breaking the Chain Found., Inc. v. Capitol Educ. Support, Inc., 589 F.Supp.2d 25, 29 (D.D.C.2008); Putt-Putt, LLC v. 416 Constant Friendship, LLC, 936 F.Supp.2d 648, 659 (D.Md.2013) (“Under the common law of Maryland, the applicable test for unfair competition is the same likelihood of confusion test applied under the Lanham Act.” (citing Scotch Whisky Ass’n v. Majestic Distilling Co., 958 F.2d 594, 597 (4th Cir.1992))). Hence, “the scope of [legal protection and] exclusivity of a trademark is coextensive with the” degree of confusion likely to result in the consumer’s mind. 3 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair Competition (“McCarthy on Trademarks”) § 2:10 (4th ed. 2016). Moreover, while trademark infringement claims typically involve rival businesses actively competing in the same marketplace, see, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Sears Fin. Network, 576 F.Supp. 857, 863 (D.D.C.1983), the consumer confusion that is the hallmark of trademark infringement and unfair competition “can result even if [the] plaintiffs product is no longer being made” or his services are no longer being offered, McCarthy on Trademarks § 23:8; see also Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1391, 188 L.Ed.2d 392 (2014) (“[A] competitor who is forced out of business by a defendant’s [infringing conduct] generally will be able to sue for its losses[.]”). Indeed, to have a potentially viable claim for trademark infringement, a plaintiff need only show that “consumers in the relevant product market are likely to believe that defendant’s products or services come from the same source or are affiliated with plaintiff.” Appleseed Found. Inc. v. Appleseed Inst., Inc., 981 F.Supp. 672, 674-75 (D.D.C.1997) (citing Foxtrap Inc. v. Foxtrap, Inc., 671 F.2d 636, 639 (D.C.Cir.1982)).

This Court has evaluated the standard trademark-infringement and unfair competition factors in the context of the dispute between Yah Kai, Prince Immanuel, and Napper that was presented at trial. As explained below, the evidence ■ establishes that Napper has engaged in the unauthorized use of a valid, registered service” mark for the distinctive name “Everlasting Life” (which Plaintiff Prince Immanuel owns) in a manner that is likely to confuse and deceive consumers into believing that Plaintiffs sponsor, or are affiliated with, Napper’s food-service establishment. Thus, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover for trademark infringement under Sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act and also for unfair competition under Maryland common law.

1. Napper’s Unauthorized Use Of The Mark And Name Everlasting Life Violates Sections 32 And 43(a) Of The Lanham Act

Section 32 of the Lanham Act, which is codified -as section 1114 of Title 16 of the United States Code, prohibits the use of “any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark” for goods or services “without the consent of the registrant” in a manner “likely to cause confusion, ... [or] mistake, or to deceive” the average consumer. See § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114; see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 763, 112 S.Ct. 2753, 120 L.Ed.2d 615 (1992) (explaining that a claim under Section 32 is designed to “secur[e]-to a mark’s owner the goodwill of his business” and to prevent the public perception that he is affiliated with the infringer’s business). One who registers a trademark in the principal register of the USPTO is entitled to sue an alleged infringer under Section 32. See id. Pursuant to section 7(b) of the Act, registration also entitles the registrant to several, presumptions: that the mark is valid; that he is the owner of the mark; and that he has the exclusive right use to that mark. See § 7(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b). Moreover, “after five years of continuous use” of a registered mark, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 209,120 S.Ct. 1339,146 L.Ed.2d 182 (2000) (citation omitted), proof of registration is conclusive evidence of ownership, validity, and the right to exclusive use, see § 33(b) 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b).

The established elements of a claim for trademark or service mark infringement in violation of Section 32 are (1) ownership of a valid mark, (2) the mark’s inherent distinctiveness or acquisition of a secondary meaning—in other words, “an association in the minds of the buying public between the name ... and the product itself or the source!,]” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Sears Fin. Network, 576 F.Supp. 857, 861 (D.D.C.1983)—and (3) the likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception in the public created by the defendant’s use of the mark, id. Although registration is one means of proving the ownership element, a mark need not be registered with the USPTO in order to receive protection under federal law, nor must the plaintiff who seeks to bring the infringement' action be the owner of the mark in question. This is because Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act ’ establishes a cause of action for infringement of an unregistered mark, and the Section 43(a) option, which requires proof of elements that mirror a claim for infringement under Section 32, is available to “any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by [a defendant’s] act.” See § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (permitting any servicer or producer to sué another for the use of “any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof ... which ... is likely to cause confusion ... as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods”).

It is clear beyond cavil that, as the individual registrant of the Everlasting Life service mark, Prince Immanuel is the only plaintiff with the right to recover for trademark infringement under Section 32. See Globalaw, 452 F.Supp.2d at 25 (“[B]y its very text, a Section 32(1) claim—unlike a Section 43 claim—contemplates that a ‘registration’ has occurred and that a ‘registrant’ is seeking certain remedies.”). But Yah Kai is eligible to recover along with Prince Immanuel under Section 43(a), and because these Plaintiffs have established the elements of a federal infringement claim under Sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act as discussed below, this Court finds that they are entitled to judgment in their favor on Counts I and II of the complaint.

a. Plaintiffs Prince Immanuel And Yah Kai Own A Valid Mark

With respect to the issue of ownership of the mark and name, Plaintiffs maintain that they are the owners and first users of the term “Everlasting Life” in connection with their restaurant and food-service business, as evidenced by the Community’s opening of the Everlasting Life Co-Op in 1995, and Plaintiff Prince Im-manuel’s subsequent registration of the “Everlasting Life” service mark on the federal register in 2005. (See 3d FOF Tbl. at 26, 28 (A).) This Court agrees. First of all, there is no dispute that, based on the evidence presented at trial, Prince Imman-uel registered the Everlasting Life service mark on November 22, 2005. (See USPTO Service Mark Registration, Pis.’ Ex. 1, at 2.) Proof of this registration qualifies as prima facie evidence of Prince Immanuel’s ownership of the mark and his exclusive right to use the mark in commerce, and it also means that the mark is presumptively valid. Thus, in and of itself, the registration goes a long way toward demonstrating that Plaintiff Prince Immanuel is the rightful owner of a valid “Everlasting Life” service mark. See, e.g., Yellow Cab Co. of Sacramento v. Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 419 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir.2005) (“In essence, the registration discharges the plaintiffs original common law burden of proving validity [and ownership] in an infringement action.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Although Yah Kai does not enjoy the presumptions afforded by Prince Immanuel’s registration, it derives its ownership interest in the mark from Prince Immanuel’s license of the mark to it, both individually and as a representative of the Community. See Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) Seccional Metropolitana de Washington-DC, Maryland y Virginia v. Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, Seccional de Maryland y Virginia, 312 F.Supp.2d 1, at *12 (D.D.C.2004) (hereinafter “PRD”) (holding that plaintiff established ownership under Section 43(a) solely based on a non-exclusive license granted to it by registrant, whereas defendant failed to show ownership because he was not authorized to use the mark). In addition, based on the evidence presented at trial, the Court is persuaded that the Community and Prince Immanuel were the first users of the mark and name in commerce starting in 1995—a fact Napper does not contest—and, therefore, Plaintiffs hold superior rights at common law that establish their exclusive ownership of the mark and entrust them with the legal power to prevent junior users (such as Napper) from .infringing upon said mark. See McCarthy on Trademarks § 16:1.50 (“[I]t is not -registration, but only actual [first] use of a designation as a mark that creates rights and priority over others.”); see also United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100, 39 S.Ct. 48, 63 L.Ed. 141 (1918) (explaining that “[t]he general rule is that, as between conflicting claimants to the right to use the same mark, priority of appropriation determines the question”). Plaintiff Prince Immanuel testified that he was a Community member and leader in 1995, and that he worked with others to direct the opening of the Community’s first Everlasting Life restaurant. (See July 15, 2015 Trial Tr. at 61:20-63:18.) And although Yah Kai did not exist as a separate legal entity back then, it can still be deemed a priority user based on the uncontroverted fact that the Community established Yah Kai (which is comprised solely of Community members) for the very purpose of acting as the Community’s successor-in-interest with respect to using the Everlasting Life mark in conjunction with the operation of the Everlasting Life Health Complex business, and Yah Kai’s exclusive use of the mark beginning in 2009 undoubtedly predates Napper’s formation of the Everlasting Life Restaurant & Lounge (through Fair and Balanced) in 2011.

Notably, the Lanham Act provides that an alleged infringer, such as Napper, may seek to challenge the ownership and validity of a registered mark pursuant to the statutory and equitable defenses and defects laid out in section 33. See § 33, 15 U.S.C. § 1115; see also Iowa Farmers Union v. Farmers’ Educ. & Co-op. Union, 247 F.2d 809, 818 (8th Cir.1957) (explaining that the defendant bears the burden of proof with respect to asserted statutory defenses to a Lanham Act infringement claim); Paleteria La Michoacana, Inc. v. Productos Lacteos Tocumbo S.A. De C.V., 79 F.Supp.3d 60, 73 (D.D.C.2015) (stating that the defendant bears burden oí proving acquiescence, laches, and equitable es-toppel). This Court construes Napper’s trial testimony and written submissions as an attempt to launch such a challenge: he claims, among other things, that he used the Everlasting Life mark prior to Prince Immanuel’s regis