Borrell v. Bloomsburg University (207 F. Supp. 3d 454, 2016)

MEMORANDUM

A. Richard Caputo, United States District Judge

Presently before me are Defendant Dr. Michelle Ficca’s (“Dr. Ficca”) Post Trial Motions (Doc. 255) and Defendants Geis-inger Medical Center (“GMC”) and Arthur Richer’s (“Mr. Richer”) (collectively “Geis-inger Defendants”) Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or New Trial or Remit-titur. (Doc. 257) Because Dr. Ficca is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Ms. Borrell’s due process claim and property interest claim and Dr. Ficca is not entitled to qualified immunity, her motion will be denied. Further, because Plaintiff Angela Borrell (“Ms. Borrell”) provided sufficient evidence for an award of compensatory damages, Dr. Ficca’s and the Geisinger Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law will be denied. And, because the jury’s verdict was not against the weight of the evidence, and the evidentiary rulings were not erroneous or prejudicial, the Geisinger Defendants’ request for a new trial will be denied. However, because the jury’s compensatory and punitive damages awards were excessive in light of the evidence at trial, I will grant the defendants’ motions for remittitur, but provide Ms. Borrell the option of a new trial if she does not accept the remittitur.

Also, before me are Ms. Borrell’s Motion for Costs and Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. 245) and Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Declaration and Exhibits Concerning Plaintiffs Motion for an Award of Costs and Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. 296). Because Ms. Borrell has not demonstrated her entitlement to all fees and costs as requested, her motion for attorneys’ fees and costs will be granted in part and denied in part. Further, because the supplemental decía-ration Ms. Borrell seeks leave to file is not relevant to the motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, I will deny Ms. Borrell’s motion.

I. Background

As the parties have already been through a trial, only a brief summary of the facts necessary to the resolution of the instant motions will be provided. The factual background was also set forth in my two prior opinions. See (Docs. 49-50); Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ., 955 F.Supp.2d 390 (M.D.Pa.2013) (hereinafter “Borrell I”); (Docs. 151-152) Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ., 63 F.Supp.3d 418 (M.D.Pa.2014)(hereinafter “Borrell II”)).

This is a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ms. Borrell brought this action against Defendants Bloomsburg University, GMC, Mr. Richer, and Dr. Ficca alleging that her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated when she was dismissed from the Bloomsburg University and Geisinger joint Nurse Anesthesia Program (“NAP”). On September 24, 2012, Ms. Borrell met with Mr. Richer and GMC’s Director of Human Relations, Brion Lieberman (“Mr. Lieberman”), and was asked to take a drug test. She refused and the following day she was sent a letter indicating that she was dismissed from the NAP for refusing the drug test.

Prior to trial, it was determined that the defendants were acting under color of state law when Ms. Borrell was dismissed from the NAP, I also decided that Ms. Borrell had a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause in the continuation of her course of study in the NAP. In other words, before Ms. Borrell was dismissed from the NAP for disciplinary purposes, she was entitled to the procedural due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. I granted summary judgment as to liability in Ms. Borrell’s favor finding that her dismissal from the NAP occurred without due process of law and that Ms. Borrell had established a violation of her constitutional rights.

On June 22, 2015, a trial on damages commenced. Ms. Borrell sought compensatory as well as punitive damages. On June 30, 2015, a jury found Ms. Borrell would have been dismissed from the NAP regardless of whether or not she received due process (Doc. 236, 1), but also found that Ms. Borrell suffered an injury based on the denial of procedural due process itself and awarded her compensatory damages against Dr. Ficca, Mr. Richer, and GMC in the amount of $ 415,000.00. (Id. at 2.) The jury also found that GMC acted maliciously or wantonly in violating Ms. Borrell’s rights and awarded $ 1,100,000.00 in punitive damages. (Id. at 3.) Thereafter, Dr. Ficca filed post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law; alteration or amendment of the judgment; or, in the alternative, for a new trial (Doc. 255), and the Geisinger Defendants also filed a post-trial motions requesting judgment as a matter of law, a new trial or remittitur (Doc, 257). Both motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for disposition.

Ms. Borrell also filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, an affidavit, and a brief in support (Docs. 245; 246; 247), and a motion for leave to file a supplemental declaration and a brief in support. (Docs, 296-297). The motion for attorneys’ fees and costs has been fully briefed and is now ripe for disposition. Ms. Borrell’s motion for leave to file a supplemental declaration and exhibits (Doe. 296) has also been briefed and is ripe for disposition. Both motions will also be addressed herein.

II. Legal Standards

A. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

To prevail on a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, the moving party must establish that there was no “legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for [the prevailing party] on that issue.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). In deciding whether to grant a Rule 50(b)motion:

the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and determine whether the record contains “the minimum quantum of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief.” The court may not weigh evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses or substitute its version of the facts for that of the jury. The court may, however, enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict if upon review of the record, it can be said as a matter of law that the verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence.

Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Phila., 5 F.3d 685, 691-92 (3d Cir.1993), abrogation on other grounds recognized by United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir.2003) (citations omitted). The question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the non-moving party, but whether there is evidence upon which the jury could properly find for the non-moving party. See Walter v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 985 F.2d 1232, 1238 (3d Cir.1993) (citing Patzig v. O’Neil, 577 F.2d 841, 846 (3d Cir.1978)).

B. Motion for New Trial

“The court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues ... after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). The decision whether to grant a new trial following a jury verdict is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36, 101 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980); Blancha v. Raymark Indus., 972 F.2d 507, 512 (3d Cir.1992). Courts have granted motions for a new trial where: “(1) there is a significant error of law, to the prejudice of the moving party; (2) the verdict is against the weight of the evidence; (3) the size of the verdict is against the weight of the evidence; or (4) counsel engaged in improper conduct that had a prejudicial effect on the jury.” Todd v. Luzerne Cnty. Children & Youth Servs., No. 04-2637, 2011 WL 841429, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Mar. 8, 2011) (citing Maylie v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 791 F.Supp. 477, 480 (E.D.Pa. 1992), aff'd 983 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir.1992)). A new trial may also be warranted based ‘upon [a] showing that the jury verdict resulted from passion or prejudice.’ ” Evans v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 273 F.3d 346, 352 (3d Cir.2001)(citations and internal quotations omitted). But, “where the evidence is in conflict, and subject to two or more interpretations, the trial judge should be reluctant to grant a new trial.” See Klein v. Hollings, 992 F.2d 1285, 1295 (3d Cir.1993)(citation omitted). “This limit upon the district court’s power to grant a new trial seeks to ensure that a district court does not substitute its judgment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses for that of the jury.” Delli Santi v. CNA Ins. Cos., 88 F.3d 192, 201 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 211 (3d Cir.1992)). Thus, the Third Circuit has indicated that “a District Court reviewing a jury verdict has an ‘obligation.. .to uphold the jury’s award if there exists a reasonable basis to do so.’ ” Evans, 273 F.3d at 351-352 (quoting Matter v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 883 F.2d 1223, 1230 (3d Cir. 1989)).

C. Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment

Under Rule 59(e), a party may seek alteration or amendment of the verdict. “The rationalization for, and use of, the remittitur is well established as a device employed when the trial judge finds that a decision of the jury is clearly unsupported and/or excessive.” Spence v. Bd. of Educ. of Christina Sch. Dist., 806 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir.1986)(citing Kazan v. Wolinski, 721 F.2d 911 (3d Cir.1983); Keystone Floor Products Co., Inc. v. Beattie Mfg. Co., 432 F.Supp. 869 (E.D.Pa.1977)). “A jury verdict which is ‘so grossly excessive as to shock the judicial conscience’ can be the basis for either a new trial or remittitur” and the “[v]erdicts that shock the judicial conscience are those that bear no rational relationship to the evidence presented.” Glass v. Snellbaker, 2008 WL 4371760, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2008) (Simandle, J.)(citing Gumbs v. Pueblo Int’l, Inc., 823 F.2d 768, 773 (3d Cir.1987); Williams v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 817 F.2d 1030, 1038 (3d Cir.1987)). If appropriate, when considering and fixing a remittitur, the court is to “consider similar cases, evaluate the evidence, determine a damages figure related to that evidence, while being ‘mindful that the determination of that amount may not be precisely calculated.” Evans, 273 F.3d at 352 (citing Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 992 F.Supp. 731, 739 (D.N.J.1998))(internal citations omitted).

III. Discussion

A. Dr. Ficca’s Motion

1. Judgment as a Matter of Law

Dr. Ficca first asserts that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because: Ms. Borrell did not have a protected property interest, ie., her continuation in the NAP; Ms. Borrell was afforded all the process she was due; Dr. Ficca is entitled to qualified immunity; and, the evidence did not support the jury’s award of compensatory damages against her. These arguments will be addressed in turn,

a. Protected Property Interest and Due Process

Dr. Ficca argues she is now entitled to judgment as a matter of law because my determinations at the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stages were erroneous. (Doc. 271, 9.) Ms. Borrell contends that Dr. Ficca failed to seek and, thus, waived reconsideration of my decisions, and that my decisions are the law of the case which cannot, under these circumstances, be disturbed. (Doc. 278, 7-18.) Under the Middle District Local Rules, a litigant may ask a court to reconsider its decision within fourteen days. See M.D.Pa. L.R. 7.10. Dr. Ficca did not ask that I reconsider my rulings, but now argues that despite this failure, her current motion is not precluded. (Doc. 291, 4.) Dr. Ficca asserts that a motion for reconsideration is not required “in order to renew a party’s objection at a subsequent time in the case.” (Id.)

Dr. Ficca also contends that the law of the case doctrine does not prevent me from revisiting my pre-trial rulings. (Doc. 291, 3.) The law of the case doctrine was outlined by the Third Circuit in Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776 (3d Cir.2003):

The law of the case doctrine “limits re-litigation of an issue once it has been decided” in an earlier stage of the same litigation. In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 279 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir.2002). We apply the doctrine with the intent that it will promote finality, consistency, and judicial economy. In re City of Philadelphia Litig., 168 F.3d 711, 717-18 (3d Cir.1998). Reconsideration of a previously decided issue may, however, be appropriate in certain circumstances, including when the record contains new evidence. Id. at 718; Bridge v. United States Parole Comm’n, 981 F.2d 97, 103 (3d Cir. 1992).... because when the record contains new evidence, “the question has not really been decided earlier and is posed for the first time.” Bridge, 981 F.2d at 103. But this is so only if the new evidence differs materially from the evidence of record when the issue was first decided and if it provides less support for that decision. City of Philadelphia Litig., 168 F.3d at 720. Accordingly, if the evidence at the two stages of litigation is “substantially similar,” or if the evidence at the latter stage provides more support for the decision made earlier, the law of the case doctrine will apply. Id.

Id. at 786-87. The Seventh Circuit also stated that the “law of the case” doctrine did not prevent a court from departing from the standard employed during summary judgment at the trial when the Supreme Court issued a decision during the pendency of the case that provided guidance. Runyon v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 619 F.3d 736, 739 (7th Cir. 2010).

Therefore, “a judgment may be altered or amended if the party seeking reconsideration shows at least one of the following grounds: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court granted the motion for summary judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir.1999) (citing North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir.1996)). The plaintiff in Dean v. Specialized Sec. Response, 876 F.Supp.2d 549 (W.D.Pa.2012) asked for a new trial on the premise that the court’s decision on summary judgment was wrong. Judge Conti described reconsideration of a prior order as follows:

A motion for reconsideration is not properly grounded in a request for a district court to rethink a decision it has already rightly or wrongly made. Williams v. Pittsburgh, 32 F.Supp.2d 236, 238 (W.D.Pa.1998). Litigants are cautioned to “evaluate whether what may seem to be a clear error of law is in fact simply a point of disagreement between the Court and the litigant.” Waye v. First Citizen’s Nat'l Bank, 846 F.Supp. 310, 314 n. 3 (M.D.Pa.1994) (internal quotation omitted). Plaintiff did not present the court with any intervening change in the law, with new evidence, or with any clear error or manifest injustice resulting from the court’s earlier decision. He raises the same legal issues in his motion for a new trial, which he raised at the summary judgment stage of this litigation, and which the court already addressed. A motion to reconsider is not a vehicle for unending dialogue between litigants and the court on matters already determined.

Id. at 559 n. 8. Similarly, in the current case, there is no new material evidence to consider and there have been no intervening decisions of the Supreme Court raised by Dr. Ficca impacting the standards applied to the motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, therefore, those decisions are the law of the case. However, I will briefly address the issues Dr. Ficca contends were errors of law, but my decisions stand.

1. Protected Property Interest

In regards to her first assignment of error, Dr. Ficca challenges my determination that Ms. “Borrell’s property interest was in the continuation of her course of studies in pursuit of the graduate degree she sought from the [NAP].” Borrell I, 955 F.Supp.2d at 403. Dr. Ficca now argues that “no appellate case holds that a student at a Pennsylvania public university has a protected property interest in continuing her education and she contends that the decision of the Third Circuit in Unger v. Nat’l Residents Matching Program, 928 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir.1991), provides that a graduate student does not, by contract, have a protected property interest in continuing in a graduate program. (Doc. 271, 10-12.) Dr. Ficca contends Ms. “Borrell has failed to establish that the contract between her and the University met” the requirements of Unger. (Doc. 271,12.)

In Unger, after the graduate residency program into which the plaintiff was accepted was discontinued by the university prior to the plaintiffs start date, she brought suit alleging a violation of her procedural due process rights and pendent state law claims. Unger, 982. F. 2d at 1394. The court stated that the circumstances of the plaintiff were distinguishable from cases where the “involved universities. . .took academic or disciplinary action against currently attending students,” Id. at 1397 (citations omitted), and that the plaintiff had only an “abstract type of unilateral expectation” and therefore, she did not have “a property interest in the pursuit and continuance of her graduate medical education”, because not every contractual relationship gives a party a “property interest protectible [sic] by procedural due process.” Id. (citing Reich v. Beharry, 883 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.1989)).

Ms. Borrell’s situation is distinguishable from the plaintiff in Unger, who never attended the program. The Court specifically distinguished cases involving currently attending students. Id. at 1397. Ms. Borrell falls into this category.

The cases I previously relied on have not been overturned; thus, there has been no intervening change in the controlling law. I have not been presented with any previously unavailable evidence, and there is no need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice. In moving for summary judgment, Dr. Fic-ca relied on the same previously rejected argument she presents in the current motion. See Borrell II, 63 F.Supp.3d at 443 (“Dr. Ficca also asks that I reconsider the finding that Borrell had a protected property interest in the continuation of her study in the NAP.”) Regardless of how Dr. Ficca now labels her motion, I will not indulge in an “unending dialogue between litigants and the court on matters already determined.” See Dean, 876 F.Supp.2d at 559 n. 8.

2. Process Due

Dr. Ficca next argues that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Ms. Borrell’s due process claim because “[t]he facts of this case establish that [Ms.] Bor-rell was afforded the level of process that she was due from Bloomsburg University and likely received all the process due from GMC.” (Doc. 271,16.); see Borrell II, 63 F.Supp.3d at 447-51. She again challenges my summary judgment determinations as erroneous.

Notably, Dr. Ficca sought summary judgment on Ms. Borrell’s claim based on her characterization of Ms. Bor-rell’s dismissal as academic, rather than disciplinary. (See Doc. 119, 16-20.) As discussed in my prior opinion, the characterization of the dismissal dictates the process due. See Borrell II, 63 F.Supp.3d at 445-47. I previously rejected Dr. Ficca’s position and determined that the dismissal was disciplinary in nature. See Borrell II, 63 F.Supp.3d at 447. Dr. Ficca did not seek reconsideration, but now reiterates her contention that the dismissal was academic and, therefore, all process that was due was an “informal give and take”. (Doc. 271, 15.) Dr. Ficca now argues that in light of the jury’s determination that Ms. Borrell would have been dismissed “[[Irrespective of any additional process that would have been afforded to [Ms.] Borrell,... she had no means to complete her academic requirements for the NAP,” and therefore, the dismissal was academic in nature. (Doc. 271, 18.) However, Dr. Ficca’s addition of the jury’s determination does not add credence to her already rejected argument. The jury’s determination does not convert Ms. Borrell’s dismissal from disciplinary to academic. The jury was not asked to decide that question.

Dr. Ficca has failed to present any case law or new evidence that requires a deviation from my prior determination and her arguments again fail to persuade. Ms. Borrell’s dismissal was disciplinary in nature as she was dismissed because she failed to comply with Geisinger’s policy, not because of academic performance. The fact that she would then be unable to complete the clinical portion of the NAP is the very property interest that Ms. Borrell was denied without due process. Blooms-burg University’s affiliation with GMC and the reliance on Geisinger’s policies does not make it permissive for an individual to receive less process than they are constitutionally due and as I previously decided, Ms. Borrell did not receive the process she was due under the Constitution. Dr. Fic-ca’s motion will be denied.

b. Qualified Immunity

In ruling on the cross-motions for summary judgment, I considered Dr. Fic-ca’s arguments in favor of a grant of qualified immunity and I decided that Dr. Ficca was not entitled to qualified immunity. See Borrell II, 63 F.Supp.3d at 456-58. During trial, Dr. Ficca again asked that she be granted qualified immunity. (Trial Tr., June 29, 74:12-19.) Her motion was denied. (Id.) Dr. Ficca now renews her request arguing that both Ms. Borrell’s property interest in her continuation in the NAP and the amount of process she was due were not and are not clearly established. (Doc. 271, 19-22.) Dr. Ficca. contends that “it cannot reasonably be said that ‘existing precedent’ placed either the existence of a protected property interest, or the nature of the process due in protecting it, ‘beyond debate’ ” and “because the law is unsettled as to due process obligations of public universities when the employer dismisses the student from the clinical program”, she is, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 271, 20.) Dr. Ficca now raises the same' arguments as when she moved for summary judgment. In fact, the briefing is almost identical. (Compare Doc. 119, 28 and Doc. 271, 22.) Dr. Ficca did not request that I reconsider my summary judgment decision and I have not been presented with any new facts, evidence or case law necessitating reconsideration. Dr. Fic-ca is not entitled to qualified immunity and therefore, she is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law and her motion will be denied.

2. Apportionment of damages

Dr. Ficca next argues that she is entitled to a new trial because the jury was not presented with a verdict slip that allowed for apportionment of compensatory damages among the Geisinger Defendants and herself. (Doc. 271, 27-28.) Dr. Ficca contends that “evidence was presented that any alleged injury attributed to the conduct of the Geisinger Defendants was separate and distinct from the alleged injury caused when Defendant Ficca, arguably, agreed to dismiss [Ms.] Borrell from the NAP without notice or hearing.” (Doc. 271, 28.) Further, Dr. Ficca contends that because the jury chose not to award punitive damages against her, the jury distinguished between the defendants and therefore, compensatory damages should have been similarly apportioned. (Id.)

Dr. Ficca cites to the following footnote in Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 734 n. 14 (3d Cir.1987) in support of her position:

We also reject the defendants’ contentions that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the proper apportionment of compensatory damages. Apportionment is appropriate whenever “a factual basis can be found for some rough practical apportionment, which limits a defendant’s liability to that part of the harm which that defendant’s conduct has been cause in fact.” W. Prosser & W.P. Keeton, The Law of Torts, § 52, at 345 (5th ed. 1984) (cited in McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1387 (7th Cir.1984)). “[G]eneral evidence as to the proportion in which the causes contributed to the result will be sufficient to support a verdict.” Id. at 350... the harm inflicted by separate torts does not lend itself to definite or satisfactory proof, apportionment may properly be left to the jury’s estimate. See id. at 348-49 (and cases cited therein).

However, Dr. Ficca’s argument is unpersuasive. She is correct that section 1983 liability requires proof that the individual defendant caused damage to the plaintiff. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.1988). However, it is improper to allocate “damages between the parties for [a] single indivisible injury.” Thomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 311 (7th Cir.2010) (citing Transcraft, Inc. v. Galvin, Stalmack, Kirschner & Clark, 39 F.3d 812, 821 (7th Cir.1994)).

Despite Dr. Ficca’s contention, the evidence presented at trial did not provide the necessary evidentiary foundation to apportion damages because the jury was not provided a sufficient evidentiary basis to distinguish the denial of due process by Dr. Ficca from the denial of due process by the Geisinger Defendants. The program in which Ms. Borrell was enrolled was a collaborative program between Blooms-burg and GMC, and she was notified of her dismissal by both GMC, through Mr. Richer, and Bloomsbui'g, by Dr. Ficca. (See Trial Tr., June 23, 211:19-212:8.) The jury’s determination that compensatory damages were warranted for the emotional distress Ms. Borrell suffered as a result of being denied due process was not the product of separate torts; it was one injury. (See Trial Tr. June 30, 31:19-20.) Also, the fact that the jury did not award Ms. Borrell punitive damages against Dr. Ficca does not lead to the conclusion that the amount of compensatory damages should be apportioned. Punitive damages do not only address the injury suffered but also the conduct leading to the injury and, therefore, are distinguishable from the damages Ms. Borrell suffered as a result of the denial of due process itself. The jury reasonably concluded that Dr. Ficca played a role in Ms. Borrell’s constitutional injury while also concluding that her conduct did not rise to a level warranting punitive damages. The motion for a new trial based on the verdict slip will be denied.

B. Compensatory Damages

Dr. Ficca and the Geisinger Defendants renew the requests for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of compensatory damages arguing that Ms. Borrell presented insufficient evidence at trial to support an award of compensatory damages. (Doc. 271, 22; Doc. 258, 9-12.) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, the defendants also request a new trial or for amendment or alteration of the judgment or remittitur, asserting that the “jury’s award[] of compensatory damages.. .for the denial of due process itself [is] unprecedented, excessive and literally shock[s] the conscience.” (Doc. 271, 26-26; Doc. 258, 21, 32-33.) I mil address Dr. Fieea’s and the Geisinger Defendants’ motions together as both raise substantially the same arguments. Ms. Borrell opposes the requests arguing that the compensatory damages award was supported by substantial evidence and case law, and, therefore, should not be disturbed. (Doc 278, 21-40; Doc. 279, 5-22.)

1. Legal Standard

Compensatory or nominal damages are available to a plaintiff who is denied due process of law. In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), the Supreme Court held that an award of damages based on denial of due process under Section 1983 “requires] the plaintiff to convince the trier of fact that he actually suffered distress because of the denial of procedural due process itself.” Id. at 263, 1052. Accordingly, “[compensatory damages may include not only out-of-pocket loss and other monetary harms, but also such injuries as ‘impairment of reputation.,., personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.’ ” Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2543, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3012, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974)). But, “a plaintiff must show ‘a reasonable probability rather than a mere possibility that damages due to emotional distress were in fact incurred [as a result of an unlawful act].’” Gagliardo v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 311 F.3d 565, 573 (3d Cir.2002) (citing Spence, 806 F.2d at 1201). The Supreme Court elaborated on the standard for distress damages stating:

We use the term “distress” to include mental suffering or emotional anguish. Although essentially subjective, genuine injury in this respect may be evidenced by one’s conduct and observed by others. Juries must be guided by appropriate instructions, and an award of damages must be supported by competent evidence concerning the injury.

Carey, 435 U.S. at 267 n. 20, 98 S.Ct. 1042 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350, 94 S.Ct. at 3012.). However, “[i]f there is no evidence of actual injury, then [a] plaintiff who suffers a violation of their procedural due process rights should be able to recover nominal damages of one (1) dollar.” Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 2010 WL 1626908, at *6 (M.D.Pa. Apr. 21, 2010), aff'd, 474 Fed.Appx. 85 (3d Cir.2012) (citing Carey, 435 U.S. at 267, 98 S.Ct. 1042.).

a. Judgment as a Matter of Law

Turning first to the requests for judgment as a matter of law, Dr. Ficca asserts that Ms. Borrell “presented no facts at trial that established that Defendant Ficca caused her compensatory damages and [Ms. Borrell] testified that it was not Defendant Ficca who denied her a hearing”, thus, “[a]s a matter of law, Defendant Fic-ca cannot be the cause of any of Plaintiffs damages.” (Doc. 255, ¶ 12.) The Geisinger Defendants argue entitlement to judgment as a matter of law “because there is insufficient evidence that [Ms.] Borrell suffered any injuries resulting from the denial of due process itself.” (Doc. 257, ¶ 5(a).)

Defendants’ renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law asserting there was insufficient evidence to support compensatory damages must be denied. As I stated in ruling on the Rule 50(a) motions during trial, there was a prior determination that Ms. Borrell did not receive the process she was due. (Trial Tr., June 29, 66:22-67:3.) Even if there was insufficient evidence to warrant a compensatory damages award, Ms. Borrell would still be entitled to nominal damages based on the denial of procedural due process, thereby making judgment as a matter of law for defendants inappropriate. See (Trial Tr., June 30, 17:14-23.); Dee, 2010 WL 1626908 at *4 (citing Carey, 435 U.S. at 267, 98 S.Ct. 1042.); see also Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112, 113 S.Ct. 566, 573, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (“Carey obligates a court to award nominal damages when a plaintiff establishes the violation of his right to procedural due process but cannot prove actual injury.”). Therefore, the motions for judgment as a matter of law will be denied.

Dr. Ficca additionally argues causation and contends there was no evidence presented “at trial that any emotional distress [Ms. Borrell] may have experienced related to the denial of due process was caused by Defendant Ficca.” (Doc. 271, 25.) To the contrary, the evidence presented could have led a reasonable jury to conclude that Dr. Ficca played a role in causing Ms. Borrell emotional distress in failing to provide due process. Dr. Ficca was involved in a discussion about Ms. Borrell on September 24, 2012 prior to the meeting between Ms. Borrell, Mr. Richer and Mr. Lieberman. {Id, at 141:20-25; 142:24-143:1.) When Ms. Borrell was dismissed, Dr. Ficca agreed and signed the letter informing Ms. Borrell of her dismissal from the NAP, Borrell II, 63 F.Supp.3d at 436 (“Borrell was informed of her dismissal from the NAP by letter on joint Bloomsburg-Geisinger stationary. That letter reflects Dr. Ficca’s agreement with the decision to terminate Borrell from the NAP.”); {see also Trial Tr., June 24, 146:19-22.), and Dr. Ficca provided the pages enclosed with the letter from the Bloomsburg University nursing handbook detailing a review process, thinking at the time that Ms. Borrell could take advantage of the review process. {Id. at 143:18-23.)

Testimony was also presented that Ms. Borrell wrote Dr. Ficca in an attempt to obtain the process described on the sheets enclosed with the letter. (Trial Tr., June 25,83:4-5.) Ms. Borrell testified:

That’s why I wrote then Michelle a personal letter myself asking for the review panel hearing, because I just wanted to know like the facts of everything and let them hear my side of the story and how I was upset and confused and taken aback by what they were saying, and I just felt like something wasn’t right, and that’s why I refused to take the test and not because I was hiding something.

I just wanted like the opportunity to explain myself and let them hear my side of the story and try to reconsider what they were doing to me.

{Id. at 83:4-13.) However, when asked if she ever received a hearing, Ms. Borrell testified: “No, nobody would talk to me about anything. I never was offered any process. I couldn’t even get them to pick up their telephone, let alone give me a review panel hearing.”(M at 85:6-8.) It was not until several weeks later that Dr. Ficca responded to Ms. Borrell by sending her a letter addressing, the contractual relationship between Bloomsburg and Geis-inger and her violation of Geisinger’s policy, while not offering Ms. Borrell any due process. {Id. at 96:6-20.) There was evidence at trial for the jury to conclude that Dr. Ficca was involved in the failure to provide Ms. Borrell due process and therefore, her motion for judgment as a matter of law will be denied.

b. New Trial/Remittitur

Next, I will address the defendants’ remaining motions that assert there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s compensatory damages award. (Doc. 255, 119; Doc. 257, 116(a); ¶7; Doc. 258, 9-12; Doc. 271, 16-21.) The jury was asked to determine whether Ms. Borrell would have been dismissed from the NAP even if she had been provided the required procedural due process. (Doc. 236, 1.) They answered in the affirmative, thereby, awarding what the jury deemed to be' “the amount of compensatory damages [to] fairly compensate Ms. Borrell for the injuries she suffered as a result of the denial of due process itself.” (Id.) The defendants disagree with the jury’s award.

The defendants argue that the “evidence in this case simply did not support that [Ms.] Borrell suffered an actual injury arising from the denial of due process itself.” (Doc. 271, 24; Doc. 258, 10.) Dr. Ficca and the Geisinger Defendants contend that the testimony presented by Ms. Borrell primarily dealt with her dismissal from the NAP and, therefore, was insufficient to demonstrate injuries attributable to the denial of due process itself. (Doc. 271, 24; Doc. 258, 10.) Specifically, Dr. Ficca argues that the evidence regarding the denial of due process included only “conclusory and self-serving testimony” directly tied to the denial of due process that does not suffice to show actual injury and such testimony has repeatedly been deemed an insufficient demonstration of emotional distress by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. (Doc. 271, 24 (citing Gunby v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir.1988); Spence, 806 F.2d 1198) Similarly, the Geisinger Defendants argue that Ms. Borrell’s statements “circle back to—and [are] indistinguishable from—[Ms.] Borrell’s anger that she was not told all of the reasons for the drug test when it was requested”, despite the fact that a statement of reasons is not required. (Doc. 258, 11.) Both cite to testimony of Ms. Borrell, Ms. Borrell’s mother, and Ms. Borrell’s friend to argue that Ms. Borrell failed to prove an actual injury or that any testimony regarding emotional distress was attributable to Ms. Borrell’s dismissal from the NAP, not the lack of due process. (Doc. 271, 24-25; Doc. 258,10-11.)

Both Dr. Ficca and the Geisinger Defendants contend the inappropriateness of the compensatory damages award in this case is further shown by Ms. Borrell’s failure to produce evidence that she suffered any financial distress or loss of reputation, or that she suffered lasting emotional distress or emotional distress requiring medication. (Doc. 258, 11, 33; Doc. 271, 24.) The Geis-inger Defendants also assert that Ms. Bor-rell did “not allege that she knew that GMC’s actions were somehow Constitutionally deficient” and therefore, any distress could not be deemed attributable to the lack of due process. (Doc. 258, 12.)

In opposition, Ms. Borrell sets forth numerous citations to her testimony that she argues demonstrate the extent of the injury suffered as a result of the denial of due process and that provide validation for the jury’s award. (Doc. 278, 21-40; Doc. 279, 5-22.) Ms. Borrell also contends that a reasonable jury could have considered that her injuries were ongoing from September 25, 2012 to the date of the commencement of the trial, June 22, 2015, because it was the position of defendants that the jury was seated for Ms. Borrell’s due process hearing. (Doc. 278, 31; Doc. 279, 15.) Ms. Borrell further counters that the defendants are trivializing her testimony and “all of the testimony about non-economic damages should be read through the lens of Ms. Borrell’s testimony that not having the opportunity to tell her side of the story, to have at least a chance of fairness, is what hurts the most.” (Doc. 278, 21 n. 5; Doc. 279, 6 n. 3.)

As reviewed below, a new trial will not be granted because there was evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Ms. Borrell actually suffered emotional distress because of the denial of procedural due process itself. Therefore, compensatory damages were warranted. However, while remaining respectful of the jury’s determination, I do agree with Dr. Ficca and the Geisinger Defendants that the award of $ 415,000.00 in compensatory damages was excessive in light of the evidence presented, and, therefore, a remitti-tur is appropriate. The Third Circuit has provided the following guidance on remitti-tur:

‘In general, the determination of compensatory damages is within the province of the jury and is entitled to great deference,’ Spence v. Bd. of Educ., 806 F.2d 1198, 1204 (3d Cir.1986). However, “[t]he district judge is in the best position to evaluate the evidence presented and determine whether or not the jury has come to a rationally based conclusion.” Id, at 1201. Remittitur is utilized when the trial judge finds that a decision of the jury is excessive or clearly unsupported by the evidence. Id.; see also Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 152 (3d Cir.1979). The reduction may not be less than the maximum amount that does not “shock the judicial conscience.” Evans v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 273 F.3d 346, 355 (3d Cir.2001).

Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 474 Fed.Appx. 85, 87 (3d Cir.2012).

1. Trial Testimony

a. Ms, Borrell

Ms. Borrell presented evidence at trial with regard to the lack of due process and how she was impacted by it. Ms. Borrell testified as follows:

Q: Were you ever given any opportunity to tell your side of the story or to, you know, have a chance to get back?

A: No. And that’s what hurt the most, because they always stressed that how they were there to help students and support you, and they understand—like they would say in the beginning, they understand that rumors get spread in the O.R. So if a nurse anesthetist ever said something about you they would sit down and talk to you, get your side of the story.

And then when this was all happening to me they didn’t even learn what had happened, that they really got a report from someone. They never sat down with me and talked to me about it. They just basically like took me and threw me out like trash, like I was nothing to them and my life was nothing, and that’s what hurts the most.

(Trial Tr., June 25, 73:11-25.)

Q: What are you talking about when you say that’s what hurt the most?

A. Basically that they have no consideration and no respect for me or my life or being truthful and honest with me.

(Id. at 74:14-17.) Further, when asked if she was “able to carry on with [her] normal life and have fun and enjoy” herself, Ms. Borrell responded:

A: I still carry on and enjoy my life. It doesn’t take away when I sit and think about what happened to me. I can’t sit and cry everyday. I can’t sit in a corner so I grieve differently. If I can go out and have a drink with friends or if I can go out and smile with somebody I will do that. But it doesn’t take away the hurt I feel inside.

(Id. at 139:10-17.) Following inquiry that she was in fact in a better place after the birth of her baby, a new job and boyfriend, Ms. Borrell responded: “[t]o make this situation any less because I had a baby who is beautiful and makes me happy makes this right, and makes me hurt any less about this situation, that’s not correct.” (Id. at 140:21-24.) Ms. Borrell presented testimony of a lasting impact on her and a change in her personality and demeanor, stating that she felt as though a part of her had been killed and “that she will never be the same from what happened.” (Id. at 97:4-7.)

Ms. Borrell also testified specifically about her attempts to obtain due process. She testified she called Mr. Richer’s personal cell phone, left messages for him, and sent him an email to obtain some type of due process; but Mr. Richer never responded. (Id. at 69:20-23; 73:4-10.) Thereafter, Ms. Borrell received pages of the nursing handbook describing a review process (Id. at 82:22-25,), and she “discovered that there was a non-academic grievance policy.” (Id. at 82:17-21.) She also wrote a letter to Dr. Ficea, addressed above. (See Id. at 83:5-13.)

Although some of Ms. Borrell’s testimony did not support damages for the denial of due process itself because it was more appropriately categorized as relating to her dismissal from the NAP as opposed to the lack of process , when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Ms. Borrell, sufficient evidence was presented showing that Ms. Borrell suffered actual injury as a result of the denial of due process itself not just from her dismissal from the NAP. Ms. Borrell specifically testified that she felt as though she was thrown out like trash because “no one sat down and talked to her...” (Trial Tr., June 25, 73:20-25.), and the jury was able to assess her testimony and see when she was brought to tears while testifying. (Id. at 68:8-10.) Having determined that Ms. Borrell would have been dismissed regardless of whether or not she received any process, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the denial of the opportunity to be heard caused emotional distress, which could have been ongoing until the time of trial because she was never given a hearing or an opportunity to counter the evidence against her. Ms. Borrell presented more than a scintilla of evidence that she experienced emotional distress as a result of the denial of due process itself.

b. Kelly Ann Borrell-Willinsky

The Defendants also take issue with Ms. Borrell’s mother’s testimony. Defendants assert that Ms. Borrell’s mother’s testimony was limited to describing Ms. Borrell’s “efforts to contact individuals at GMC and Bloomsburg; but, she did not describe any emotional distress allegedly experienced by [Ms.] Borrell.” (Doc. 271, 25; Doc. 258, 11.) Citing to trial testimony, the Defendants argue that “[t]he only other evidence of pre-termination distress [her mother] offered was that Borrell started ‘crying. . .uncontrollably’ later in the day on September 24, 2012, which the Geisinger Defendants contend “is not actionable because a due process hearing could not have been held by this time”, and the remainder of Ms. Borrell’s mother’s testimony regarding Ms. “Borrell’s emotional state concerned the effects of the dismissal from the NAP.” (Doc. 258,11.)

However, the defendants fail to acknowledge several statements by Ms. Borrell-Willinsky that the jury could have considered evidence of Ms. Borrell’s emotional distress resulting from the denial of due process. Ms. Borrell-Willinsky testified that the main goal was “to try to get her to the hearing that we thought she deserved in the little manual they have at school. It says that she was due a hearing if anything should go wrong, and she was never allowed to have that hearing. They would not give it to her.” (Trial Tr., June 26, 75:5-9.) Ms. Borrell-Willinsky further testified that Ms. Borrell was trying to get someone to speak to her (Id. at 76:24-77:6,), and that she told her daughter not to give up, because, in her opinion, her daughter was owed a hearing. (Id. at 77:8-10; 78:19-22.) Ms. Borrell-Willinsky testified that her daughter was “devastated” and “hurting”, and although she did not specifically state that this was due to the lack of due process, a reasonable jury could have concluded, based on the overall context of the testimony and the time frame being discussed that Ms. Borrell was “devastated” and “[s]he was hurting” due to the lack of due process. (Id. at 77:16-22.)

Ms. Borrell-Willinsky also testified to a lasting change in Ms. Borrell. She stated that Ms. Borrell was a very trusting person before but she is now “very limited to who she trusts.” (Id. at 80:19-22.) She further stated that the incident affected Ms. Borrell tremendously and that it will be there all of her life stating “[i]t will always be there. It’s like—.. .the death of something horrible in your life, something that you can’t forget,...” (Trial Tr., June 26, 81:17-19.) This testimony, when viewed in a light most favorable to Ms. Borrell shows distress caused by the denial of due process itself.

c. Other testimony

Ms. Borrell also presented testimony from her friend of several years, Tim Col-na. (Trial Tr., June 25, 255:14-22.) The Defendants argue that the testimony of Mr. Colna did not reference a denial of due process but rather focused on the change in Ms. Borrell’s demeanor because she was dismissed from the NAP. (Doc. 271, 25; Doc. 258, 10. (citing Trial Tr., June 25, 258:15, 20-22.)) Although Mr. Colna testified about Ms. Borrell’s lack of a future as a Nurse Anesthetist), he also stated that “I don’t know if her life improved at all after that happened. After the incident happened her life went down.” (Id. at 260:1-2.)

Further, Mr. Colna testified that Ms. Borrell is “a lot different now”, in that “[s]he used to be always happy and fun. And since this incident—I was worried about her. I mean she is just a totally different person... not happy anymore, she’s not sociable.. .it was bad the first year, year or two.” (Id. at 256:20-25.) He also stated that Ms. Borrell no longer trusted anyone. (Id. at 257:2.) Mr. Colna’s testimony, when viewed more fully, may also have reasonably led the jury to conclude that Ms. Borrell was injured by the lack of due process.

In opposing defendants’ motions, Ms. Borrell cites to testimony from her friends and classmates to support her position. (Doc. 278, 2-28; Doc. 279, 11-12.) Both former classmates, Erika Yagel and Amanda Adams, testified that they were contacted by Ms. Borrell on or after September 24, 2012. Ms. Yagel testified that Ms. Borrell “was very upset, she was crying, very emotional” (Trial Tr., June 24, 12:8.), and Ms. Adams testified that Ms. Borrell was very upset. (Trial Tr., June 25, 8:20.) Also cited by Ms. Borrell was the testimony of her former classmate, Doug Ombongi, who testified that when he spoke to Ms. Borrell following her termination, she was “crying very hard. I mean, very inconsolable.” (Trial Tr., June 24, 222:1.) Mr. Ombongi also testified that Ms. Borrell continued to state to him that “[s]he was going to talk to Bloomsburg and maybe the anesthesia program” in an attempt to get back in to the program. (Id. at 223:20-224:5.)

Viewing all of the above cited testimony in a light most favorable to Ms. Borrell, there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate she suffered an actual injury due to the denial of due process itself, but an award of $ 415,000.00 was excessive and a remittitur is warranted. As stated above, when fixing a remittitur, it is appropriate, to consider the evidence and awards in other cases.

A remittitur was ordered in the following cases. In Spence, the plaintiff, an art teacher, was transferred from one school to another in retaliation for the exercise of her First Amendment rights. 806 F.2d at 1199. The plaintiff testified that the transfer caused her to feel depressed, humiliated, embarrassed, and that she lost her creativity. Id. at 1203. The jury awarded compensatory damages. Id. at 1199. Following trial, the entire award was ordered remitted but the plaintiff elected to proceed to a new trial that resulted in a defendants’ verdict. Id. The Third Circuit accepted the district court’s “finding that

‘the award of damages for emotional distress was wholly speculative given the limited quality and quantity of proof that plaintiff submitted on the issue’ ”, stating that the emotional distress evidence consisted “chiefly of plaintiffs own testimony” but did not include any testimony that her peers held her in less esteem, she did not suffer physically and did not seek professional psychiatric counseling.” Id. at 1201; see also Gunby, 840 F.2d at 1120-22 (affirming remittitur of entire $15,000 emotional distress award where only evidence was plaintiffs testimony that he “had been done wrong” and that he was “very upset”);

In Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 2010 WL 1626908,(M.D.Pa. Apr. 21, 2010), aff'd, 474 Fed.Appx. 85 (3d Cir.2012), the plaintiff testified he felt humiliated and emotionally devastated and was prescribed additional high blood pressure medication to control his pre-existing condition, after he was transferred to a less prestigious position in retaliation for his speech.M at *7. The jury awarded the plaintiff $150,000.00 in compensatory damages for the violation of his procedural due process rights. Id. at *1. The award was ordered remitted to $ 50,000.00 because there was no evidence the plaintiff was changed in any lasting way and suffered no other non-economic injury or loss of reputation among his peers. Id. at *7-8; see also Glass, 2008 WL 4371760 at *20 (Compensatory damages award of $ 250,000 was ordered remitted to $ 50,000.00 based on the lack of evidence of ongoing emotional injury); Merritt v. Mackey, 932 F.2d 1317, 1323 (9th Cir.1991) (Affirming award of $35,000 in damages as compensation for emotional distress arising from a due process deprivation after the plaintiff was fired without a pre-termination hearing.); Kercado-Melendez v. Aponte-Roque, 829 F.2d 255, 267 (lst Cir.1987) (award of $15,000 for compensatory damages deemed reasonable under the circumstances where the plaintiff testified of the emotional and mental distress caused by her abrupt dismissal and later discharge.); Laje v. R. E. Thomason Gen. Hosp., 665 F.2d 724, 728 (5th Cir. 1982) (Award of $ 20,000 upheld where plaintiff and wife both testified that the summary proceedings surrounding the plaintiffs dismissal from employment “caused severe anxiety and distress, and that these feelings were not relieved until after the full hearing” eight months later.)

In Dee, I discussed Third Circuit cases where compensatory damages were awarded for violations of substantive rights and the verdicts were upheld based on evidence of emotional distress causing lifelong changes:

In Gagliardo v. Connaught Laboratories, Inc., 311 F.3d 565 (3d Cir.2002), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals considered a jury award including emotional distress damages under plaintiffs claim for discrimination based upon disability. Gagliardo, 311 F.3d at 567. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff on her claim that her employer discriminated against her as a result of her Multiple Sclerosis. Id. at 568. The jury awarded $1.55 million in damages for emotional distress after hearing evidence that the discrimination had a “worsening effect on her life” and transformed her “from a happy and confident person to one who was withdrawn and indecisive.” Id. at 573-74. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to permit the verdict to stand. Id. at 574. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a similar verdict in Bolden v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 21 F.3d 29 (3d Cir. 1994). In that case, plaintiff presented evidence that his employer impermissi-bly terminated him for refusing to take a drug test. Id. at 30. During a subsequent trial for damages, the jury awarded $250,001 in compensatory damages for emotional distress and harm to plaintiffs reputation. Id. at 31. The district court denied the defendants motion for remittitur, finding that the evidence presented was sufficient. Id. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion because the jury award was supported by testimony from the plaintiff, two of his friends, and his wife and daughter who “testified that he had changed a great deal in the wake of the drug test.” Id. at 33. The court distinguished its holding in Spence, saying that while there was no evidence of damage to the plaintiffs reputation or evidence of physical effects as was the case in Spence, in Bolden there was evidence of emotional distress beyond the loss of reputation. Id.

Dee, 2010 WL 1626908, at *7. Additionally, in Ridley v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 217 Fed.Appx. 130, 132 (3d Cir.2007), the plaintiff, an employee of approximately fourteen years, complained that he had been demoted and discriminated against because of his race, but his complaints were deemed unfounded. Id. Later, following an incident that raised safety concerns, the plaintiff was demoted and transferred from one store to another much farther from his home, while also receiving a $ 17,-000.00 pay cut. Id. at 133. The plaintiff complained that he was being retaliated against and later resigned. Id. During trial on his Title VII and state law claims, the plaintiff and his wife testified that he was not the same; that he lost sleep and weight, became socially withdrawn, and had a diminished self-worth. Id. at 137. The jury awarded $ 200,000.00 in emotional distress damages and the Third Circuit affirmed. Id. The plaintiffs in Johnston v. School Dist. of Phila., 2006 WL 999966, *8 (E.D.Pa.2006), alleged that they were discriminated against and, following a jury trial, each plaintiff was awarded $ 500,-000.00 in non-economic damages for past, present and future mental anguish, pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and humiliation because of what the jury determined to be unlawful discrimination or retaliation. The court upheld the verdicts for all four plaintiffs finding that each presented evidence of lasting distress. Id. at *9-14.

In Bogle v. McClure, 332 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir.2003), a remitted compensatory damage award of $ 500,000.00 per plaintiff was upheld where the plaintiffs testified to feelings of upset, embarrassment, humiliation and shame, while some became depressed and one was even suicidal, after they were transferred due to their race. Id. at 1359; see also Bach v. First Union National Bank, 149 Fed.Appx. 354, 363 (6th Cir.2005) (An award in a Fair Credit Reporting Act case of $ 400,000.00 in compensatory damages was affirmed based on evidence that the plaintiff, who suffered a stroke and needed her granddaughter’s help, attempted to get a second mortgage to purchase a nearby home for her granddaughter and was left feeling “ ‘desperate’, ‘ashamed’, ‘embarrassed,’ and ‘damn mad’ ” when her second mortgage application was denied.)

Clearly, damages for emotional distress are difficult to quantify as evidenced by the varying awards in the above-cited cases, however, in determining an appropriate compensatory damages award, I must keep in mind that the “purpose of procedural due process is to convey to the individual a feeling that the government has dealt with him fairly, as well as to minimize the risk of mistaken deprivations of protected interests.” Carey, 435 U.S. at 262, 98 S.Ct. at 1051. The defendants argue that an award of $ 50,-000 is the outermost limits of a compensatory damages award. (Doc 258, 33.)The Geisinger Defendants additionally argue that the case law is structured in a way that makes compensatory damages for denials of due process difficult to establish, “to avoid punishing defendants for their justified actions.” (Doc. 293, 8.) However, the Geisinger Defendants misinterpret the jury’s determination and how it impacts this case. The jury determined that Ms. Borrell would have been dismissed regardless, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that, the jury credited Ms. Borrell’s testimony that her distress was caused by the lack of opportunity to tell her side of the story, and the actions by the defendants in denying due process, were not justified. There was no evidence presented that the termination had to be immediate, in fact, there was evidence that Ms. Borrell was in the operating room on the day she met with Mr. Richer and Mr. Lieberman. (See Trial Tr., June 23, 208:16-209:4.) There was no evidence that she posed a risk to anyone nor that a hearing would not have been feasible.

Emotional distress damages in excess of $ 50,000 have been upheld in several cases where there was testimony of lasting impacts on the plaintiff, therefore, for the following reasons, a compensatory damages award of $ 250,000.00 is an amount that does not shock the judicial conscience. Ms. Borrell presented evidence that she suffered lasting changes to her personality and her ability to trust others. She testified that she continues to have sadness and feels hurt by the demonstrated lack of consideration for her. This testimony was credited by the jury and it is also reasonable to conclude that the jury considered this to be an ongoing injury following her dismissal in 2012. However, Ms. Borrell did not present evidence that she suffered any physical or emotional conditions requiring medical intervention or that she was held in less esteem by her peers. Therefore, mindful that there is never precision in determining an amount of emotional damages, an award of $ 250,-000.00 is appropriate in this case based on the evidence. But, when reducing a jury’s award, the court must also provide the plaintiff the option of a new trial. See Hetzel v. Prince William Cty., Va., 523 U.S. 208, 211, 118 S.Ct. 1210, 1211-12, 140 L.Ed.2d 336 (1998). Therefore, Ms. Borrell has the option of remitting $ 165,000.00 in compensatory damages or declining and elected a new trial. Notwithstanding Ms. Borrell’s ability to elect a new trial on the issue of compensatory damages, I will grant the defendants’ motion for remitti-tur, but deny Dr. Ficca’s motion to remit compensatory damages to $ 1.00.

C. Geisinger Defendant’s Motion

The Geisinger Defendants filed additional post-trial motions requesting: judgment as a matter of law on the punitive damages award and on Mr. Richer’s request for qualified immunity; and for a new trial based on: a jury award that shocks the conscience and is against the weight of the evidence, several evidentiary rulings that were erroneous and inconsistent with substantial justice, and Ms. Borrell’s counsel’s statements during closing arguments that created a reasonable probability of prejudice. In the alternative, GMC seeks a re-mittitur of the punitive damages award pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). (Doc. 257, ¶¶ 5-7.) I will first address GMC’s motions on punitive damages.

1. Punitive Damages

The jury awarded Ms. Borrell $ 1,100,-000.00 in punitive damages against GMC, but declined to impose punitive damages liability on Dr. Ficca or Mr. Richer. (Doc. 286, 3.) GMC now seeks various forms of relief from that award. (Doc. 257) For the following reasons, I will deny G